THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

WAGING PEACE IN SUDAN:

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SUDAN'S FUTURE

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O’HANLON: Well, I’m honored to be moderating this panel, three days before a referendum begins in Sudan that, as we all know, is so important for that country’s future. We are delighted today to have several speakers who are extremely involved, both in the past and in the present, and, therefore, also in the future, in this important ongoing challenge. And I will briefly introduce each of them and then we’ll get straight to business.

Congressman Don Payne will join us in the process of this and we look forward to hearing very much from him. As you know, he’s represented the 10th Congressional District in New Jersey since 1988 and has been heavily involved in Sudan issues for several years.

But we will begin with Hilde Johnson, to my left, a Norwegian who is currently Deputy Executive Director at the United Nations for UNICEF and who has been the Minister of International Development for Norway for a number of years in the past, leading up to the important 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which, of course, is the basis for everything that’s now happening. And she’s written a book, Waging Peace in Sudan, that will be the basis for at least some of her remarks. But, of course, there will be a great deal of forward looking and contemporary analysis in her remarks that goes even beyond where the book leads off. But it’s a fantastic read and I certainly recommend the
book to you, as well.

If Congressman Payne is here at that point, we will then hear from him. Afterwards we will go to Gayle Smith, who’s to my right. We’re delighted to have Gayle, as well. She’s interrupting a busy schedule at the National Security Council and National Economic Council, where she’s dual-hatted for democracy and development. She has worked on Africa issues in a previous role at the National Security Council, and, of course, has been very involved, as well, in this ongoing process.

Congressman Payne, great to have you. I’m just introducing you and the other panelists. And then finally Rich Williamson, who is a colleague here at Brookings, and also has been an Ambassador to the United Nations for the United States, has been a special envoy in the George W. Bush administration on Sudan policy himself, so also has a very personal background on these issues and has a considerable set of experiences in the broad range of issues concerning democracy, development, elections. I’ve been privileged to work with him in Afghanistan a bit and his experiences certainly range far and wide.

So without further adieu, and knowing that we’re going to want to hear from you soon, as well, we will now turn to Hilde Johnson, who will talk a bit about her book, but also with a specific focus, of course, on how this tees up the issues that we’re going to see addressed in the Referendum, and then, as you know, in the counting period of the votes, and then in the next crucial six months, which is when we perhaps will
really see if this whole process is coming together, when the north and south, if they are headed towards separation, and it’s not a foregone conclusion, but it’s predicted by most, but they’ll have to work out in those six months the modalities of how they’re going to get along, share resources and everything else.

So a lot of big issues going forward and Hilde is going to talk about, again, her book, and also where we are today. And without further ado, thanks for being here.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you very much and thank you for that introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, I think friends of Sudan, Sudan is at the brink. The Southern Referendum starts on Sunday, three days from now, and we know will go on for another six days, up to January 15, and will take a few more days before we know the result. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the CPA, between the government of Sudan and the SPLMA, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Army, in 2005, guaranteed Southern Sudanese to opt for unity or secession, or as southerners say, for independence.

We all know, I think we can say that, that a partition of the country is a likely outcome. We could soon witness one of the first divisions of an African state since the colonial era. While expectations are high in the south, there is wariness and worry in other parts of the country.

The CPA ended, as we know, a 20 year old civil war, pitting the Southern Sudanese population against successive Arab Muslim
regimes in Khartoum. The war which ultimately claimed over two million deaths and twice as many displaced was finally brought to an end.

There is now a lot of drum beat that the war may start again. We’ve had some new signals the last couple of weeks. Before talking about those scenarios, let me spend a minute or two on the CPA itself. The agreement was not a north/south agreement, as it has often been labeled. It was an agreement intended to transform Sudan. The idea was not only to silence the guns it was also to create a just Sudan, where all marginalized people had a fair say in the running of the country and in the allocation of its resources. The agreement catered for that.

This was also the vision of Dr. John Garang, the late Chairman and Leader of the SPLMA. The new Sudan, a just Sudan, on this basis, unity would be given a chance, also for the southerners in the interim period until the referendum would be held.

So why were the guns actually silenced? Firstly, the timing was right. Khartoum wanted to be among the good guys after September 11, and both sides had gone through a period of consolidation. The SPLM was also ready to negotiate.

Secondly, the leadership was right. While the Protocol was negotiated between delegations from both sides under the very competent leadership of General Sumbeiywo, the Kenyan mediator, the rest of the agreement was a result of the partnership between two people, between Dr. John and Ali Osman Taha, the first Vice President of Sudan. It was
Taha who made the move in August, 2003. The talks had stalled. He called me and Oslo one evening, on the 31\textsuperscript{st} of August, and wanted me to convince Dr. John to negotiate with him personally. As I reveal in my book, \textit{Waging Peace in Sudan}, Taha had tried to get Garang to the negotiation table repeatedly, ever since 1990. He traveled to the UK five to six times to meet with Doctor John’s trusted people to appeal for such a meeting.

Now, 13 years later, with the added push from the international actors, Dr. John finally agreed. But Taha had to wait for almost three days before he appeared in Kenya.

Very little is known publicly about this negotiation process. In fact, the two leaders negotiated for 16 months almost continuously and behind closed doors, alone in one room, without a mediator. As Taha later told me, they saw the talks much as family business. They felt that the presence of a third party was rather awkward and preferred to sort out their problems alone within the family. I don’t think any other peace agreement has been negotiated in this way and with this level of detail.

It is this unique process and these personal dynamics that is described for the first time in my book. Both the former foes were changed by the process. They became partners in peace and friends. It was quite amazing to witness. But the process was also tough and painstakingly slow. As Taha described it, in the Security Council in November, 2004, peace had not been achieved through maneuvers and
fostering, but was a result of digging with bare hands, and I think I can testify to that, and the book also shows it.

The two leaders got stuck quite often and were dependent both on pressure and international help to move the process forward. Thirdly, therefore, the international community was instrumental in silencing the guns. The Troika, the U.S., the UK and Norway were coordinated, coherent and decisive in support of the talks.

The negotiations would never have been completed without these intense and unflagging efforts, including at the political level. We were literally waging peace in Sudan.

While I became a kind of personal go between and troubleshooter between Ali Osman and Doctor John, the role of the U.S. was absolutely fundamental. Without their engagement at all levels, including the President, waving carrots and sticks, we would not have got the agreement.

And I want to particularly highlight today the role of two people, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Charlie Snyder in his various capacities. Another challenge was dealing with potential spoilers. There were tensions on both sides, within Khartoum, as well as amongst other leaders and in the SPLMA. Both leaders met challenges at home and both overcame them.

Darfur was another challenge. The book shows how Darfur was held hostage by the peace negotiations in Russia. Our attempts at
creating fast track negotiations on Darfur and back door talks to resolve the crisis in 2004 and 2005 never got off the ground due to resistance from several quotas.

Later, Darfur took almost all the attention, in many ways holding implementation of the CPA hostage. If this was a deliberate strategy from some quotas, it certainly was successful.

Now, why are we now, six years after, in troubled waters, at least the challenging environment? While the interim period was intended to lead to a transformation of Sudan, making unity attractive for the southerners and other marginalized people, the death of late Doctor John Garang was a significant blow to those efforts. The leadership team that delivered the CPA was cut in half. The partnership was gone. Others were taking more of the reigns in Khartoum, and those who found it more opportune to slow down implementation did so. Implementation was questionable and bumpy. One could, of course, tick off the number of actions embedded in the agreement as done on paper. Laws had been passed and commissions had been established, but the transformation that was to follow never came.

And it did not help that the intention of the international community turned elsewhere during most of the interim period. Darfur was one. It clearly proved difficult for the international players to deal with Sudan comprehensively and to see the problems in Darfur and the rest of the country as interlinked, in fact, quite inseparable.
Clearly, the two major factors that delivered the CPA were not forcefully present to push implementation: the partnership at the top level, and coherent and high level international pressure. The result was that unity was not made more attractive. Southern Sudanese sentiments for independence only grew stronger.

And if I can in a formal forum like this still quote a joke from Southern Sudan, in 2007, it went like this: Two men are talking to each other, looking at the girls passing by. One says to the other, have you seen the girl named Unity, I've not seen her in a long time, she was supposed to be so attractive, and the other responds, her, oh, no, she departed a long time ago. This was also confirmed in a number of opinion studies that the National Democratic Institute conducted covering thousands of people. (Inaudible) put it this way, we will be divided, even children know that, we'll wait and see. But as Sudan faces its most critical moment in history, we need to learn the lessons from the CPA negotiations.

The international community has a significant role to play, and I would say, even more now. Several scenarios can unfold. The most positive one would be that the results of the referendum are respected, with agreement being reached on critical post referendum issues, including RBA, border demarcation, the serving of oil resources, et cetera, et cetera, establishing good neighbor relations.

And I have to say, the recent signals we've heard this week
are positive and disregard. If the referendum is not respected, it could trigger a return to war between the north and the south. Khartoum is well aware of this. It is not likely that any of the two parties deliberately want to reignite Africa's longest civil war, but it can still happen inadvertently. If the outcome of the referendum is questioned or seen as illegitimate, there will be outbreaks of violence, and they can spin out of control, and this can lead to unilateral declarations of independence for Southern Sudan, and again, lead to violence and could take a life of its own.

And such scenario can also be deliberately triggered by political forces that find this opportune. We also know that southerners may be victimized in such a scenario and there might be expulsions from the north. But the critical factor will be leadership on both sides and in the international community.

Allowing the situation to get out of hand can lead to more violence, using proxy militia and clashes in the border areas. There are enough hot spots in the country, the oil producing Abyei being the worst, to make this a high risk scenario. A domino effect can set a vicious circle in motion, a vicious circle of violence.

The fact that the referendum in Abyei is not taking place on time and the solution for the area is still pending is of significant concern. The Abyei incident in May, 2008, when the whole city was burned down and tanks fired at each other before ours shows what can happen. Accidentally, I was there at the time. I was on my way to Ali Osman’s
house when I got critical information from Juba, and with the SRSG’s permission, got Vice President (inaudible) to call his own colleague, Salva Kiir, to stop the fighting.

The damage was done, but at least the fighting didn’t escalate. They controlled the situation, because the parties had an interest in retaining peace. It is this factor that will be decisive now, as well, because the situation in the north is very fragile and needs to be managed carefully.

Apart from the pressing crisis in Darfur, episodes of violence can slide out of control in Abyei, in Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile in the eastern region, and in parts of the south. This is very risky. Chances of violence can spread across all of them. The key is the parties own interest in retaining peace and the role of the international community in waging peace.

Dr. John outlined this scenario in June, 2005, in his speech to the Security Council, warning that the areas, these areas that I just mentioned, “could drift back to war, and lining up with Darfur and Eastern Sudan, and he said that would lead to a scenario of a failed state in Sudan, the very scenario we wanted to avoid in the first place by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” And I will go even further. If the situation isn’t managed well, if we don’t wage peace from the international community, the risk is not only a failed state, but also a fragmentation of Sudan as a whole.
It is my hope, however, that maturity on both sides and among the leaders in all marginalized areas will prevail, and that strong and competent engagement by the international community will contribute to prevent such a worst case from ever becoming a reality, and that we can see the signals from this week be what is happening as we go forward into the weeks and months that are coming. Because if there is one important lesson to learn from the negotiations that ended Africa’s longest civil war, it is the need for engagement, continuous, coordinated and forceful, at the highest level, from the international community, the same leadership is needed now.

And as former Secretary General Kofi Annan, in the forward of the book says, and I quote, “it is a sad truth that waging peace is so much harder than waging war”, yet this is our responsibility. Waging peace in Sudan is more important than ever. In fact, in my view, it is now that the job really begins. Thank you.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you, Hilde. Before moving on, a couple of quick notes. First of all, let the record show that Congressman Payne was here. In fact, he made Herculean efforts to be here. He was caught between the efforts to contribute to reading the Constitution on the floor of the U.S. House this morning into lunch time and now being called back for a vote, but I think we can all understand his commitment to this issue, that he would show up even without the opportunity to speak, and so we’re especially grateful, even though, of course, we’d all love to hear
what he has to say.

Just one or two other quick things as I turn to Gayle and Rich, and I think most people in this room are well aware of the challenge before us, but just to give one example, for all of Sudan, oil represents, and my colleagues who know Sudan better will correct me if I get the numbers wrong, more than half of the country’s overall revenue base for its national government, and yet three-fourths or more of the oil is in the south, which has about one-fourth of the population of the country. So you can do the math to understand the significance of the issue here, because we have not yet seen the parties work out an arrangement whereby they would apportion or have any kind of transit fees for the oil, which presumably would have to be shipped out of Southern Sudan through northern ports, as is the case today, in any kind of, you know, new kind of two state situation.

So that's the kind of challenge that remains and I think helps explain Hilde’s call for continued engagement. So without further adieu, I’d like now to turn over the floor to Gayle and then Rich as they explain where they see things today, what’s on their mind, and, of course, how they anticipate handling the big challenges still before us.

MS. SMITH: Thanks, Mike. And as you were talking about numbers, I couldn’t help but follow the faces of our Sudanese guests here. In terms of the numbers and the outcome, you keep me very entertained. I'm delighted to be here, and I wanted to be here for a number of reasons,
obviously, Sudan, also Hilde.

And I want to tell you, you need to read her book, and here’s why. Hilde’s contribution to this, and I say this as a friend, but it’s also objective fact, was incredibly unique and I think is a really interesting model itself in terms of negotiations. And there are two things I observed about Hilde throughout this whole process, dogged, I mean she would not let these people sleep or eat, she was on them every day and there for them every day, utterly dogged and relentless, and I can’t tell you how important that was, because as important the kind of bilateral direct conversations were, to have a sounding board that was there and could be trusted was critical I think to both parties.

The second, she’s an extremely skilled and totally unconventional diplomat. And I think diplomacy is important and there are ways to do it. I will also say, having seen her on more than one occasion look at one of the other parties and say, what are you talking about, you can’t do that, or, no, no, you have to go back in the room and talk about it, or don’t be ridiculous.

At its court, it was really human. It wasn’t formal, it was Norway, and an extraordinary representation of Norway, I might add, but it was a human being saying to other human beings, do the hard work for what is right, and so -- and to also be here with my friend, Rich. This kind of feels like old home week on Sudan, and it’s really great timing on it.

And I just want to throw out a few things I think we all need to think about,
and I say this both as somebody who’s currently in the administration and working on this, but somebody who has worked on Sudan for 30 years and remains an optimist.

One of the things that is masked by the dominant story of war and violence and human rights violations in Sudan is that, in my experience of -- I kind of grew up the first time in Columbus, Ohio, but the second time I grew up in the Horn of Africa, the generosity, the kindness, the warmth of that country from the north to the south, and the opportunity that exists today is to get that back and have that be the dominant story of Sudan as opposed to the story that most Americans hear, which is that Sudan is a country of blood and hate and disenfranchisement, it’s not.

And I think that the historic moment that the Sudanese people face today is one of turning that on its head. So that’s a lot of what this is about. And so it’s profound in ways that are far deeper than what the outcome is and what the political configuration looks like. It’s that essence of Sudan that means that every Sudanese I know, regardless of where they come out on the referendum, on the government, whether they’re from Darfur or the Nuba Mountains, or Juba, or Atbarah, or Kasla fiercely love their country, and so that’s the moment that exists. And there are a lot of people rooting for Sudan right now, but the entire future of that country is in the hands of the people who will, over the coming weeks, months and years, as Hilde rightly says, decides whether the children of Sudan are going to have that Sudan that is the generous, warm, some of
the best music on the continent place that I think many of us know it to be, or that country that’s described in the headlines, so that’s where we are.

I think going forward, the challenges are obviously enormous. And I think Hilde is absolutely right, it’s extraordinary that we’re where we are today. And I think the people and leaders of Sudan are to be congratulated for the fact that all the signs indicate that on Sunday, or on Monday, soon, Sunday, the referendum, I don’t know what the date is today, the referendum will start.

There are a lot of people who thought a few months ago that that was unlikely. And the fact that it’s where it is today, yes, the international community deserves some credit, but at the end of the day, the credit for that is with Sudan and its people. After the referendum come, and again, as Hilde suggests, I think some of the biggest challenges, and I just want to point to what some of those are, because the other thing that’s important for all of us, and one of the great things is that there are constituencies out there who care about Sudan, democrat and republican, executive branch, legislative branch, in Washington, in Omaha, Nebraska, to stay engaged.

What are some of those challenges? You know, in a perverse way, war is a very convenient distraction for political leaders, because if you’re at war, there are a whole lot of things political and economic that you don’t have to pay that much attention to, you can put those on the back burner, because security, the war, fighting is
As that recedes, what’s paramount, regardless of the way the referendum comes out? It’s the economic future, its political stability, it’s making sure that Africa’s largest country in whatever form it takes is large enough for the political opinions of all of its people, those are the big challenges going forward.

And I think the challenge to the political leadership is to make that shift from people who have been in a military adversarial posture to leaders who are about development and reshaping political space in the north and the south to make it big enough for everybody who lives in Sudan. Hilde made a really important point at the top about the CPA itself. The CPA is about the war between the north and the south, but it’s about the future of Sudan. There’s much more of the CPA to unfold going forward, and a lot of that is that political space question.

Again, another story about Sudan that’s masked by the headlines of blood and conflict is, Sudan has one of the richest histories on the multipartism, extraordinary, diverse political views, a history despite more than your share of conflict of different political views, figuring out sometimes how to work together and sometimes how to effectively work against each other, but as often without arms as with arms, and so I think there’s an extraordinary moment there.

I think the other challenges are, where is Sudan going to place itself in a region which, not unlike Sudan, has been beset by more
war than peace in the last 50 years? You know, Sudan, one-third of the size of the United States, more borders I think than any other country in Africa, neighbors with potential, lives in the same neighborhood as Somalia, Sudan has a chance to lead in the region. Sudan has a chance to be a key player in transforming the entire Horn of Africa. That’s going to be another challenge. One of the reasons the Horn is where it is today is because Sudan hasn’t been home. Sudan has been too distracted by its own internal challenges to play a constructive role in turning around a region that cyclically sets the record for the most wars per square mile on the African continent. So that’s I think the second challenge, thinking about Sudan in the larger context, where does Sudan fit, what role does Sudan play.

The third challenge is the staying power of the international community. I think it was easy for the international community to think, and Hilde may have some views on this, but once the CPA was signed, there we go, got that done, check that box, let’s move on to the next one.

Well, I think what we’ve learned, not only during the intervening period, but during the period of all the work required to get to where we are today with respect to the referendum, is that, as Hilde says, the hard part starts right now.

There are still political issues to resolve, there’s still other political issues to resolve across the country, Darfur is still there, hasn’t gone away, and won’t go away until there’s a just resolution that
everybody can abide by, so all of us are going to have to remain as engaged with a less clear roadmap. The CPA and its implementation has been a roadmap for all of us. We’ve now collectively got to chart a new roadmap and say, all right, which things are we going to knock down one by one. I think that’s the biggest challenge going forward.

And if the world kind of says, wow, this was good, let’s hope the referendum goes beautifully, there are all those great stories on the news and pictures and happy celebrating people on CNN, but that’s the closed chapter, then I think we’re in trouble. So it’s the staying power I think of all of us inside and outside of government, as well, that’s political leadership.

So I think those are the key challenges going forward. I think we may want to get into some of the specifics of the negotiations and so forth. I would just like to close with one comment, and it’s a bit sentimental, which is that you all have, and I’m looking at the Sudanese friends here today, you have in your hands more power than you have had at any time since independence, so seize it and seize it for the good.

MR. O’HANLON: Rich, over to you. Thank you, Gayle, that was very good, I appreciate it.

MR. WILLIAMSON: First I just want to acknowledge that Chairman Payne, who had to leave us, has had an incredible interest in the future of Sudan and Eastern Africa and commitment to the Sudanese people, and has played a key role for all of us who have cared about this
issue and been involved, so I want to acknowledge that even though Don
is not here.

And I thank Hilde for her contribution, and I look forward to reading
her book, and Wegger Strommen, the Norwegian Ambassador with whom
I served up in New York at the UN has also had a deep interest in Eastern
Africa.

One thing that Hilde said that I want to emphasize, but not
cause any damage to him, was your praise of Charlie Snyder, who --

MS. SMITH: I almost went there.

MR. WILLIAMSON: -- yeah, who is an extraordinary
important service officer I've known for many years, but was kind enough
to be a frequent counselor to me when I was special envoy, and I think
represents the best of foreign service. Charlie, we should all applaud
Charlie for his contribution. (Applause)

MS. SMITH: Turned your hair white, didn't it, Charlie?

MR. WILLIAMSON: And thank my colleague, Michael
O'Hanlon, who's helped tutor me on both Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally let
me just say, I've had strong differences with the Obama administration
over the last two years in some of their approaches to deal with Sudan,
but one thing that's always given me comfort is that Gayle Smith is in a
key position, because I know she cares deeply about the area. And I --

MS. SMITH: Makes my life easy when I go back to the office
there, Rich.
MR. WILLIAMSON: My job doesn’t make your life easy, Gayle. Anyway, let me just try to go through a few points briefly that are consistent, but maybe with a different perspective. I think it’s important that we remember as we approach the post referendum period this long, long war, and the way in which it was prosecuted.

The things that so many people have become more aware of because of Darfur are the same techniques that were initially employed in the south, armed militias, joint attacks between the Army of Sudan and those militias, the atrocities committed. I remember I used to tell President Bush there were no white hats in Sudan. No one has totally clean hands from St. John going on down. But the suffering of those people is literally incomprehensible, and most of us, including Washington, ignored it for decades, and I think we should remember that.

Second, we should remember, since we’re here in Washington, the role the United States played, and I think it was, in part, responding to citizen interest in Southern Sudan. So it’s a testament to when citizen involvement really has an impact on politics and policy, which, in turn, has an impact on the future for a large country of 38 million people and its neighbors.

And I think while the process was important, the role of the UK, Norway and the United States was important, I think it is worth recalling as we enter the final days before the referendum the particular role the United States has played, and I would suggest the particular
responsibility the U.S. has going forward.

And at least in having served in three administrations, it’s extraordinary in my experience to see a president who has engaged at such a sustained level for so long at the early part of this century met with Salva Kiir four times -- it was his last meeting with any foreign official, President Bush -- talk to him more frequently, and that enabled U.S. diplomats to do things. After the Abyei flare-up, more than one time a day for seven days I talked with both Nafi Ali Nafi in Khartoum and Salva Kiir in Abyei trying to make sure it wasn’t this unintended tit-for-tat escalation that resulted in 15,000 people losing their homes by the Masseria armed while the Sudan armed forces sat in the barracks to let it happen.

At great political cost, Salva Kiir did not respond in kind and he just had a very unsuccessful political convention. And I don’t know many politicians anywhere in the world, including this town, who are willing to risk their own political health the way he did in that situation.

But now we have the reality on the ground where there are key issues that weren’t resolved. One reason unity hasn’t been made attractive is the history of marginalization that predates independence, that goes back to the Ottoman Empire in Egyptian management in the 19th century, that continued under the British and the 20th century, where certain Northern Navarian tribes were favored, and others that didn’t qualify, that weren’t Jalis or other of those favored tribes were discriminated against politically, economically, health, education. And I
think the vision that John Garang outlined and the visions some had when
the CPA was signed was that we could move past the marginalization.
And in my experience, talking with leaders in Khartoum, they recognize
they lost that opportunity.

Now, you can interpret whether they ever really planned to
do it or not, but the marginalization continues. And I want to bracket that,
because what’s important is, the next six months and beyond, and that
issue still hasn’t been dealt with, and that still is going to stress Sudan,
and it is something that if the south chooses separation, they’re going to
have to deal with in ways that have not been fully dealt with during this
CPA implementation period.

I want to praise the last few months for President Obama
and his administration for the level of engagement they’ve had, for the
President’s own interventions. I think that’s been important to put -- to
herd the cats, and I think it’s going to have to continue to be needed.
That’s why I wanted to talk about our history. I want to acknowledge and
praise what’s happened the last couple months, but say it’s not going to
get easier, it’s going to get, in my opinion, far more difficult. And there will
be a tendency for the press, whose attention is about a half a minute, and
politicians in Washington that’s even less, to say, okay, the referendum
check box, move on, unfortunately, that’s not the story.

I think the referendum registration went better than almost
anyone had expected, including at least one, maybe two bombings that
occurred during the registration period, where, again, Salva Kiir showed restraint and didn’t respond.

I had many discussions with Salva where his bottom line was, I do not want to be the one responsible for derailing the CPA. And I also want to say the north took advantage of that. They knew they had leverage and they used it aggressively, and they are going to continue to do that.

But we’re going into this referendum, this plebiscite much better than anyone had reason to believe. I suspect the plebiscite will go relatively well. We did have a bombing not too long ago that the UN verified, where 18 bombs were dropped by the Sudan Armed Forces. My own view is that the north will have more leverage is they can say that there was an incredible election, and I expect some disruptions enough that they can claim that.

But I think there’s going to be enough international presence, there’s enough commitment among the Southern Sudanese, and the Referendum Commission has done a credible enough job that it should take place, be credible. When the vote count 30 day period is over and it’s announced, I certainly hope that the United States and others are able to be emphatic in saying it was credible. And why does that matter?

Winston Churchill once said, and I think applies here near the end of World War II, “we’re not at the end, we may not even be at the beginning of the end”, because the tough issues have not been resolved,
the marginalization exists. The oil revenue -- now, when the regime came to power in a coup d’etat in ’89, the total exports of Sudan were about a half-billion, now it’s 8-1/2-, 9 billion. Almost all the growth was oil. Seventy percent of that oil is in the contested border in Southern Sudanese areas. The government has grown dependent on it. The south has also grown dependent because there was a revenue sharing where there’s $2 billion a year which goes to the south, and there’s where cooler heads can find mutual interest, because there’s no way to get this oil to market except through the pipelines largely built by the Chinese to the north, to the storage tanks outside Port Sudan built and operated by the Chinese, for exports to foreign markets from Port Sudan in the north.

And while there’s been a lot of growth over the last couple of years, most of Southern Sudan still has dirt roads in an area that gets almost 50 inches of rain a year, you can’t travel, so there’s no way to get this oil for the next three years, and that’s an optimistic assessment of when an alternate oil pipeline might be able to be built from the south, through Ethiopia, up to the sea, and, of course, it’ll be usually expensive.

But if you interrupt that income flow in the south, huge problems. They’ve used a lot of that income to buy security, which many people have said it’s not right because they’re paying off militias, well, but it’s bought also security, that might be a good expenditure of money. But the bottom line, the money has been used, and so they can’t have an interruption. And the north, I would suggest to you, has a very hard time
seeing themselves clear the next few years if they only have 30 percent of the oil revenue they have today. So some type of fee through the oil pipeline should be able to work -- we're talking money here. But both sides will tend to be more greedy, and I think that's why outsiders, Norwegian oil experts, but also the United States are going to have to be very aggressive in trying to have realistic discussions.

And my own experience was, at different times, depending on where the moon was, sometimes it was the north who walked away and sometimes the south. On this one, I think the south could have been more effective during the last few years in trying to move for a resolution. But that there needs to be a resolution, in my mind, is unquestionable.

Also, the border area, and I think it's important to remember while having our -- about how wonderful things are, that in the CPA, there is an agreement of a mechanism where both parties committed to accept the result through the Abyei Board. The south accepted it, the north did not.

After the Abyei flare up, I negotiated the roadmap, which deferred Abyei and the contested border areas to the Hague permanent tribunal and arbitration. Both sides agreed to accept the result. The result was slightly more favorable to the north in the Abyei Board of Commission. Nonetheless, the south accepted it, the north did not. We have a pattern.

Their leverage is going to increase if they can say the
election wasn’t credible as they approach the separation, if that’s where the vote is, six months after the vote coming, and the United States will be sorely tempted because we have more influence on Juba and Khartoum to leverage and beat up on Juba to give up more and more.

Now, I don’t know what the right answer is, but the U.S., Norway and others are going to have to be very involved to help arbitrate that. In my own experience, I know there’s been some progress for acceptance in principal on oil, or on borders, or on citizenship, on Abyei, and my experience is, that’s worth about as much as a promise from an American politician during a campaign.

You can’t go to the bank with it. And they’re not, you know, it just buys time. And I used to call it the D strategy, within say elaborate deliberations, we’re going to discuss, we’re going to delay, we’re going go discuss, we’re going to delay, we’re going to delay, we’re going to deny, because by the time we get to deny, the international community has moved on, they care about other things, they have other crisis, so the responsibility for the U.S. government, Norway and others who are vested in this, as well as the nine neighbors, is to stay deeply engaged, to say, no, we’ve got to get resolution.

Second, the nine neighbors are doing what nine neighbors should. They want stability, so for years they figured get rid of this damn CPA. So did China, so did others that were doing well with their concessions from the government. But they reached the tipping point, and
now most of them accept that this referendum is going to be overwhelmingly in one direction.

And they have an interest for a peaceful resolution that has stability, so we have energized partners who either were on the other side or, at best, neutral hedging their bets so now can be more engaged, more active and more helpful.

Let me just emphasize, and Abyei is a good example of the danger. There’s not tight command and control. I am absolutely of the belief that that incident that happened one night where a Southern Sudanese official, army officer, was killed, and within three days, the city was burned down, was not a decision made in Khartoum or Juba. In fact, Nafi Ali Nafi was enormously distressed as he saw this break out because he couldn’t figure out how to stop it, and you have that situation today. So the risk of flashpoints of violence is enormous. Salva Kiir has shown a capacity for restraint, we have to hope that the north does as well, but in both cases, other parties will have or must play a role if that’s going to happen.

And finally, the legitimacy and stress in Khartoum is going to be enormous. You have the problem in the East Nile, you’ve got the problem in Nuba Mountains, you’ve got the problem in Darfur, all rooted back to that marginalization to continue, and the regime will have some who are going to say your legitimacy is questioned because you allowed the south to break away, and by doing that, you’ve made it inevitable that
Darfur and other regions will break away.

So sorry for going on so long, but I think the dangers are enormous and they’re wide. To the degree there’s been success, it has been, because the Sudanese people, and the Sudanese leaders, many of whom aren’t the nicest people, but for their own reasons have helped push this process forward. I think the example the last couple months of President Obama and the administration have to be redoubled after the vote starts to be taken, and the worse thing that would happen is for our attention to be diverted or will return to an Eastern Congo where the level of violence should repel any decent person. Thank you.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you, Rich. I’m just going to ask one question and then we’ll include you in the discussion, so be preparing your queries, as well. My question is for Hilde, and it really builds on some of what I’ve been hearing so far today, but it’s sort of a blunter question from an American generalist point of view, and I’ll just put it on the table because I don’t work for any official body so I can be blunt.

Mr. Bashir’s government, and Mr. Bashir himself, is under indictment by the ICC. Mr. Bashir’s government has been accused for most of this decade of genocide by much of the international community, including colleagues of mine at Brookings who are now in the Obama administration.

Mr. Bashir’s government is now being investigated for potential huge diversion of funds, adding the corruption of perhaps
Mobutu-esque proportion to a human rights record that is among the worst in the world of any regime. And I’m sorry to be blunt, but how can we hope that any kind of deal with this man and his government will be successful? And the reason I ask is not to challenge you, because, of course, I’m very much hoping that you can explain to other skeptics like myself what the basis is, not for -- I’m not asking you to predict a happy path ahead because that would be unfair and not consistent with anything you’ve said necessarily, but what’s the theory of the case for why this might work? Why can we even hope that the government in Khartoum is a trustworthy partner in peace?

MS. JOHNSON: Maybe this is the right moment to say that when I’m here, I’m not speaking on behalf of UNICEF, I’m still a UN official, so I have to caveat what I’m saying. But I really want to answer your question. I think it’s, in a sense, it’s quite simple, too. There are two points to make to this; one, we need to deal with whomever is in the government in Sudan.

And if we are going to influence the process between the parties and not least prevent any worse case scenarios from unraveling, there’s no other possibility then to deal with the government that is there and the person that is heading the government. It’s kind of simple international diplomacy, it’s a fact, that’s what you have. But the second point I want to make, which is maybe more important is, I think in every negotiation and in every process, we need to look for what is an enlightened self-interest
for any party, and I think looking at what is a strategic interest for any party. That was what we did in the CPA negotiations, and the international community needs to look for that now.

I think that it is not in the interest of any leader in the government of Sudan to see the government -- to see the country become fragmented. For me, there is a major risk that that can happen. We know that the popular consultations of southern Blue Nile and of Nuba Mountains are still pending, or southern Kordofan still pending, not resolved, significant tensions are there.

We know the east is unhappy with the situation. A lot can happen there. There is no -- I can’t see any reason for any government or leader in Sudan to have an interest in seeing a scenario when these sentiments blow up in new conflict, whether it is a contamination, if I can use that, or a kind of link then, a less value based term, a link between the Darfur rebels, the Southern Kordofan over to the Southern (inaudible) and up to the east, and see the country either be failed or fragment. I can’t see that this is in anyone’s interest. And so I think also to look for solutions that can imply that stability can prevail and that change of policy to kind of ensure that the very intentions and the very core values that were embedded in the CPA still is the basis on which the government should move.

And I think that is maybe the more important answer to your question, is that I really believe that that is the argument that can win over
and can make sure that we move in the right direction.

And I would sign up to what Gayle said at the very end, that the government and Sudan, both -- all Sudanese, and not least the ones that are leaders, have a choice now. This is the most important moment in their history. How they deal with the next six months, the next eight to ten to 12 months is going to decide the future of this country. And there is a choice to be made, and the choice can be right, and it can go right, and that’s I think the point we have to make.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you. I think now we’ll turn to you, and I think we’ll go with two questions at a time in the interest of being economical and efficient with our time, because we have about a half hour left. So if I could begin here in the fourth row, please, and then we’ll take a second question right behind her before turning back to the panelists.

MS. OMEDA: My name is Omeda (inaudible) from Stats Consulting. My question is about -- let’s say Sudan would become independent, and does the country -- will the country have capacity to build a civil society, is my first question? My second question is, we predict that there will be a lot of, again, in the case Sudan will become independent, there will be influx of silence back to Sudan, both from IDP’s and both from -- and also from foreign countries, and is the country ready to accept them and mitigate, and if not, what are the -- for the country? Thank you.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you. If you could pass the
microphone to the gentleman behind you. Thank you.

MR. ATKINS: My name is Travis Atkins, I’m with the Counsel on Foreign Relations. And my question, Hilde spoke to some of my concerns, but with Abyei denied to date, I was wondering what -- if some of the other panelists could speak to the prospects for the proper consultations and the threat, I would say, I guess, of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile state and so forth becoming essentially a new south after partition has taken place. Thanks.

MR. O’HANLON: Hilde, do you want to start and we’ll just go down the row?

MS. JOHNSON: On the first issue, there is civil society in South Sudan now, and maybe the most influential one is the churches that normally is defined within the civil society have been vocal in many ways in relation to the government, as well, but, of course, there is a need to strengthen the civil society further, and that is as much I think a responsibility for all of us in support of the people as it is a governmental responsibility.

I think on the influx of returnees there is already 100 -- the last record -- this is the UNICEF number that I just received this week, there’s 115,000 returnees that have been recorded this week, that have been returned, have returned already, and there’s a significant amount of Unitarian assistance now mobilized to help them and to ensure that they get assistance to return to their homes, et cetera.
There is I think no doubt that returnees will be received in every way by the government of Southern Sudan and by the people of Southern Sudan. I don't think that's an issue, I think it's more the capacity to assist them and help them restart and rebuild their life in their new home, so I think that's the challenge more than anything. And Abyei, I think the question, unpopular consultations, I think the question was more directed to the others, but just to -- a very brief comment, I think the challenge clearly is going to be I think the areas that are remaining still in the north, but that had special conditions negotiated within the CPA, and where there is a sense of feeling of betrayal, that goes for Abyei, as well as for Southern Blue Nile, as well as for Southern Kordofan and Nuba Mountains, and I think that is going to be where the international community's engagement and everyone's engagement is going to be absolutely critical, otherwise, I think you're right in predicting that it can move in a different direction that can be highly risky.

MR. O'HANLON:  Gayle.

MS. SMITH: I just had a couple things on this last point that Hilde was making. I think there are going to be three ingredients that are necessary to prevent the kind of scenario you're talking about. One Rich talked about at length is that the international community is going to have to remain as engaged as we have been throughout the course of the referendum and as we were -- at many other times when we were in Abyei and during the negotiations itself, because one of the other things here
that I do think makes a difference is this message to everybody that the world is both engaged, but also watching. I think that’s actually been very important in this case.

Second is that the processes and the negotiations that haven’t been completed yet need to continue. And I think the best insurance is that those processes are open, transparent and ongoing, that there isn’t a message sent that, well, we never got to that, so, you know, too bad, never mind, because the spigot has been opened here by the referendum, by the implementation of the CPA, by the CPA itself, and any sign that it’s now being closed would be counterproductive.

So it’s keeping it open, transparency, so that people are confident that even if issue X or Y is not resolved yet, there’s a transparent process by which it can be.

I think the last is this point about political space, and it’s a tough issue, it’s a tough issue for any country, it’s not unique to Sudan, but I think that the disenfranchisement that Rich talked about that has been too big a piece of Sudan’s history is what there’s the opportunity to address now. And so I think if there is a bold and courageous step, and this is a step that’s going to have to happen also in the south, I think, which has had its own conflicts internally and tensions that I think there have still been efforts to manage and work on throughout this process, but I think it’s going to be those messages that are confidence builders to all of Sudan’s people that, again, there is enough space for your voice to be
heard and your interest to be represented.

Because the minute people feel that their interests aren’t represented or there isn’t that platform where they can get a fair shot, that’s when you get into trouble. So, again, as we’ve all said I think many times, this is a much more challenging period and potentially a much more transformative period than even the CPA itself.

On the civil society point, I would just add one thing. There is a civil society, I think a big challenge in Southern Sudan, and there is incredible vibrancy in the churches and a great I think independent mindedness in the churches in Southern Sudan. But is A recognizing that a civil society isn’t just like some unarmed opposition, it’s a component of building and development that’s going to be critically important, because the Sudanese people are going to have to be mobilized. New ministries are not going to be able to solely take on the challenges that Southern Sudan faces. And second is to have the institutions that people need to make a society work, and that’s a challenge that can’t be overstated.

And if you look at post conflict rebuilding around the world over the last 20 years, probably the biggest challenge has been moving quickly, but methodically, to build the kind of institutional capacities you need for dispute, resolution, for financial management, for the other things that just allow the day to day workings of the society to unfold.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Let me try to make a few quick points in response. First, if I can, I want to go back to the issue Michael raised
regarding Bashir, the ICC, et cetera. First of all, you deal with bad characters all the time. And the first time I met Omar Bashir, his first words to me, you know, he kept me waiting, which is what they do, and then you go up, and you met in the middle of the room, with like four people there, it’s about the size of this, and he first say, you know, my people told me I should never meet with you, they’ve read what you’ve written, and I thought for a second, and I said what the hell, so I said I never wanted to meet with you. It’s not a surprise to people who do bad things, you know, they do bad things. And I think maybe sometimes we’re too gingerly in saying that. And the surprise is really that you’re too much of a weenie to say the truth.

And secondly, I think that suggests you need both carrots and sticks. There’s been a lot made about incentives. The first presidential envoy to Sudan, Jack Danforth used incentives; Zoellick used incentives; Natsios used incentives; I used incentives. Now I guess it’s cookies and gold stars, whatever.

But you also have to have sticks, because, frankly, tough characters tend to react more to that. And any regime that survived in that neighborhood since 1989, it’s a pretty tough group of characters, so that’s the first point.

Second, I am disappointed that we have been so soft on the ICC arrest warrants because I think we’ve hurt the whole cause of accountability, but that’s a different discussion that can’t go totally ignored.
By ability of the south, we haven’t done enough since the CPA in capacity building, we being the international community, we’ve been too tolerant, we’ve given too much to humanitarian aid, more of that should have shifted to capacity, we haven’t been demanding enough on good governance, et cetera, and that’s something hopefully we can be better at. But I think we wear that shirt some, as do the leaders down there who haven’t done enough. I think they will accept refugee return.

The further dismemberment question has overlaid all of this. I had many discussions with senior officials, including at the highest level about this, and they’re well aware of the concern, their fear that this is a precedent.

And as one of the -- the most senior people said to me, and then they’ll want to cut off another arm, and then another leg, and where would it end? So the whole issue of having this go smoothly and then talking to rebel movements in Darfur and others and say, no, you’re not going to have a dismemberment, we’re going to have to figure out how to move beyond the marginalization, it’s going to be very important.

Abyei Consultation, blah, blah, blah, look, I think -- it’s like one of those negotiations and everybody knows the end point, but you have to go through the process so everybody feels good, it’s the theater. My own view is, Khartoum doesn’t stay up nights worrying about Arabs that are nomadic and move toward water, that’s merely a pawn. It’s a pawn because they can say, oh, the poor Masseria, and it’s a pawn
because we are -- them and they can go do bad things and so it’s on us.

And let’s not forget, in the last two years, there’s been a lot of army, of Arab militias by the north, and a lot of army of militias in the Nuba Mountains and other places, and it was anticipation of what’s happening now.

So I think the bottom line, in Abyei, either they’re cut a deal or not, they know what’s going on, and in my view, it’s an extremely emotional issue in the south, principally because so many of the leaders in the regime are from the Abyei area, mothers were burned out during that fire, et cetera, and having visited there, and they all moved under these tarps in the rainy season, it was hell, so I appreciate that.

I think for the north, it’s not an emotional issue, it’s a money issue, it’s part of this whole oil revenue sharing that has to be addressed. And so, look, I couldn’t -- I’m sure I made a trillion mistakes when I was special envoy, none of which were Charlie Snyder’s fault. But one of the mistakes is not forcing this issue more effectively with both sides, and I think we’ve lost two more years, and the time is less, the combustibility is more, and you can’t ignore how important time is going to be over the next four months, and Abyei creates enormous stress on the government, and Juba, the north, appreciates it, it helps them.

Just like any good negotiator, they want to weaken the other side, they want to have them stressed, they want them desperate, and the United States has to be sure not to squander time like we have, but
realizing that’s what happens in May, now force the issue and not just agreements in principal, but specifics.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you. Let’s take two more. In the middle, yes, on that row, and then one more there after -- well, I’ll keep looking while you ask. Go ahead.

MR. FEDDI: Hi, I’m Scott Feddi and I’m with Oxfam. CPA is about ending the war, it was about disenfranchisement, but when we talked to a community in South Sudan, it also -- to them, it was really about development, as well. There’s these really high expectations of future development after the referendum. And at the same time we have the global community cutting back on development because of austerity measures in Europe and possibly the United States, we have the republicans saying we’re going to cut back on foreign aid spending. So my question is, you know, these people in Southern Sudan are going to have unmet expectations; is that a threat to the CPA, equally to all these other things you have mentioned, and what can we do to guard against that?

MR. O’HANLON: Let’s take one more. There was a hand over here I think, in the back row.

MS. BACHMAN: Thank you. Christina Bachman, German International Radio. I have a question for Ms. Smith. What are the plans for the administration in the near future? How are you planning to stay engaged, what’s the policy? Thank you.
MR. O’HANLON: Would you like to start?

MS. SMITH: The plan is absolutely to stay engaged. We have a new member of the team working with us on Darfur, we’ve got Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who many know, including from this stage, who’s been working with General Gratian. So we’ve got a bigger team, and as Rich points out, and I can attest to, by the time that I get home every night, the level of engagement involvement across the government has expanded exponentially. I think we have no intention of dialing that back. In fact, I think it’s our expectation that we’re going to have to be even more aggressive and more active in multiple ways and places, so that’s number one. Number two, I think we will continue, and the President will continue in particular to call on others in the international community to step up, as well.

The Troika survives, and it’s obviously very important, but going forward, given the range of those challenges and opportunities, this isn’t going to be resolved or managed effectively if it’s just three countries out there.

I think one of the very good signs was the meetings around the U.N. General Assembly, where we had a number of countries, heads of state and foreign ministers with President Obama and a unique assortment of countries. I think we had a number of countries from the Middle East and the region, as well as Europe, Canada, the United States and others, but we’re going to have to keep that moving and I think build
and maintain momentum in the international community, because it’s
going to take engagement well beyond our own. But we have every
intention, we’re not dialing back, nor are we going to slow down. And I
think, if I can just go to Scott’s question from there, I think you’re right,
Scott, that a threat to the CPA, but I think also a threat to the long term
peace and stability is whether development delivers. And I say to the long
term because that’s going to be the ingredient that’s going to be critical in
5, 10, 15, 20 years from now defining and shaping what Southern Sudan
looks like.

But I think there are multiple ingredients, and only one of
them is how much aid the international community comes forward with.
One is assistance, we’ve had that, and we and others need to be able to
step up on that. Two are the things that can be done that are not driven
by assistance, it’s going to need investment, there’s going to need to be
an effort to mobilize domestic resources, but a really critical thing is
whether the political leadership decides to invest political capital in
development.

And the most common practice, again, in post conflict
situations, is that political capital is invested in politics. And traditional
politics, making sure these guys are happy and these guys are happy and
I’m protecting my flank, and sometimes very good politics. We’ve got to
have an election, get ready for that. But it’s less common that the political
leadership makes a deliberate decision that one of our top priorities, if not
our top priority, which, quite frankly, I would argue it should be, is going to be to put our political capital in making sure that peace delivers to the people of Southern Sudan. To do that I think is going to require a couple other things, one is transparency. There could be no better insurance north or south for the future of Sudan than transparency across the board.

All development, politics, sunlight is the best disinfectant, transparency is going to critical, because that’s how people are going to decide whether or not they have confidence in their leadership.

The second is setting priorities, and I think the hardest thing and one of the things that we on the outside can help with, and you and your colleagues can help with, the temptation because the need is so great is to say let’s do everything, and the first priority is health, education, infrastructure, agricultural, institution building, financial management, regional integration, foreign direct domestic, resource, mobilization and trade.

So what you end up with, at best, is a mile wide and inch deep, and nothing substantive on any of those because you can’t do all of those at once. So the challenge is to pick, in my view, two or three things, do them well, do them seriously, pick things where you’ll have impact, where you can deliver tangibly to your population. Let your population know, we’re not going to fix everything at once, and do those things well, and that’s where I think we need to help, because our own tendency is to say, well, for development, you have to have all these things at once, and
it just doesn't happen that way. So I think if we can ourselves help establish priorities, that would be useful.

MR. O’HANLON: Rich and then Hilde.

MR. WILLIAMSON: A couple things, my first point would be something Holbrooke once said about the date and accords. He said ugly, brutal, bloody wars are ended by bad peace deals, because the goal is to end the killing.

MS. SMITH: Right.

MR. WILLIAMSON: And so you’re either ambiguous or do other things about the future because you want the deal, and I think that’s probably -- it’s unfortunate, but right, and the CPA did that. It kicked it down six years for the resolution, and for six years, both sides have renegotiated by trying to change back some of the ground often in unpleasant ways. And we haven’t been very smart, we being the international community, being Washington, D.C. USAID is really good at humanitarian assistance, and most of them really like doing humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian assistance is important. There are fewer USAID who are into really development. And one thing this administration deserves credit for is trying to relook at what the role of USAID is and what they can do, but we haven’t done as good a job, and I would suggest to you others haven’t either, and so there has to be a pivot there. So it’s not only the -- what they need to do within the government in Sudan, both governments, but what we have to do outside.
Second, I’ve never seen a peace deal in Africa where there wasn’t an excessive expectation of a peace dividend. It’s the nature of things. Just like there’s always an excessive expectation after every American election by one side or the other, whoever won, you know, and it’s never quite as dramatic.

But I think there does have to be a dialogue to try to recalibrate those expectations while making progress on a peace dividend along the lines that Gayle said. And most importantly, it’s got to be a long term deal. And again, I’ll go back to one point I made earlier, the stress is not alone in the south, it will be enormous in the north, and the neighborhood will not benefit from further fragmentation and war, and habits, history and heritage are hard to change. And in this country, the size of the United States from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, the history, habits and heritage are to use violence.

And one old Sudan hand once said to me, how can they do this to their people, and the answer is, they don’t think these are their people, and that’s been the failure.

To go back to Hilde’s point on marginalization, during colonialism and since, there’s not that sense of united Sudan, and to the extent it exists in the south, it’s only against those bastards in Khartoum, so you’ve got to develop that identity in the south and the north, because then you can start to have real power sharing politically, economically and otherwise, but it’s still a gain of ethnic and tribal heritage.
I come from Chicago, our politics is all ethnic, but they figured out that they got a share. So you can do that, but that’s not a lesson well learned in Khartoum or Juba, and hopefully we can help make that happen.

MR. O’HANLON: Well, appropriately, we’re going to finish up with Hilde. We’re just about out of time, but she has enough time to answer these questions and add any further comments she’d like to wrap up, so please.

MS. JOHNSON: I’ll start with the question and then a couple of points on the future. First on -- I mean one part of -- the latter part of the book is actually devoted to peace building and broken promises and is directly linked to the feeling of the people, that peace dividends that should have come never came. And I’m sharing the burden between the international community and other actors. But it’s absolutely critical to focus on that and the reference to Scott’s question and not least going forward.

I agree with Gayle. I think one has to sequence and prioritize. You can’t do everything at once. And there is absolutely no doubt that if people don’t feel that there are schools or health clinics that can help their children and have a future for their families, they will not feel that the peace dividends are there.

But I have to add, knowing Southern Sudan very well, I think there is another very critical area that will be fundamentally prioritized, and
that is roads. So I think, if I can just -- this is out of the top of my head, the three kind of big ticket things that will be recognized by ordinary people, and we’re talking about ordinary people now, and it also implies that not only we as donors, the international community need to focus that the government of Southern Sudan also needs to look at how they budget. And, of course, lately there are two major challenges, and one is that a significant part, actually more than 40 percent, has gone to defense, and very, very marginal priorities for education and health, very, very, very marginal. That has to change going forward if you’re going to have peace dividends for the people, because the donors can’t fund everything, and there need to be prioritization also from the government.

The second point is the point that Gayle made, which is transparency, absolutely fundamental, all over the country, in all budgets, and that is a major governance challenge that everyone has in Sudan, and it really has to be I think emphasized. Without that, there is a very, very significant worry that we’re undermining the complete kind of institution building that has to be an essential core of a new state, if that is what it’s becoming, and so I think that is an absolute priority.

And we as the international community have to help also there. And we need to avoid a situation where one is basically a blessing, which is oil, becomes a curse, as we’ve seen in so many cases, and we’ve seen the seeds of this happening both in the north and the south, and we need to really address that. Then to the more future points, I just want to
make two quick ones because I know we’re running out of time.

And just to make the first one, which is, now is the time for the international community to be coherent and cohesive and strategic and forceful. I think a lot has happened the last six months in that direction, and I would say that I think the Obama administration, the recent months have really, really picked up a leadership role here, which is high appreciated and which is important.

However, there are now too many actors saying too many different things and too many forum. And if there is one thing that doesn’t work when we’re going to try to help, and I’m talking we with a global we, trying to help resolve some of the critical challenges going forward at this crucial moment in history for the country, it is that there are too many voices speaking two different things in too many places.

That has to be dealt with. I’m not in a position to do that now, but I’m handing it over to Gayle and others, that really is critical. And secondly, I think we have seen, at least partially, some of the things that have to happen, and I think the meeting in September that you referred to, Gayle, I think was one example of absolutely where we need to see this goal, which is mobilizing the President of the United States, other heads of states, prime ministers, foreign ministers from both the Security Council members, but not least from the region, the African region, as well as the Middle East, and really focus on how can we support these parties to move forward and to resolve these remaining issues.
It cannot be left with one or two actors, but at the same time, you need a core that deals with the critical negotiations. You can’t negotiate in a huge parliamentary forum where everybody talks their own opinions, and that is the challenge that is remaining, is who does that job and how, and I will leave that again with the key countries that will have to take action here.

But with that, a coordinated and very forceful engagement at the highest level, I don’t think we’ll see the positive scenario be realized in Sudan. But the crucial decision remains, and that is with the Sudanese themselves. They have to take the decision of where this needs to go. But they also need push from the international community. That is the lessons we’ve learned, that is what is going to deliver in the future. Thank you.

MR. O’HANLON: Well, please join me in thanking the panel.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

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