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HOW WARS END: THE POLITICS OF WAR

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Introduction:

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MR. INDIK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Martin Indyk, the director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. I'm delighted to have a chance to introduce Gideon Rose to you. Before I do so, I have to begin with an apology: I have to go and moderate another event after Gideon's presentation. The director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, Peter Singer, under whose auspices this book event is taking place, will moderate the discussion after Gideon's presentation.

Gideon Rose is a very old friend of mine. I can literally say I knew him when he was "so-high," and we have kind of grown up together in America. I think one of Gideon's first jobs after he graduated from Yale was to come and work for me when I was the senior director for the Middle East in South Asia in the National Security Council, where he took on the position of associate director for Near Eastern/South Asian Affairs.

Subsequent to that, he was the Olin Fellow and Deputy Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2000, he became the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, the most important and influential foreign policymakers in the world, and in that decade working with Jim Hoge, he took Foreign Affairs to a newly influential role in the foreign policy debate, not just here but around the world.
For the incredible job that he did as editor, managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, he was named editor by the Council on Foreign Relations earlier this year, and it was a very well-deserved promotion to take total control of the magazine.

While he was doing all of that, Gideon took the Ph.D. dissertation which he wrote at Harvard University and converted it into this book that he's going to talk about today, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle*. And unlike normal dissertations that are converted into books, he turned it with his inimitable style into an imminently readable book which has gained high praise indeed from all of the grandees of the foreign policy establishment. It is indeed a thought-provoking and argument-provoking book -- Gideon and I just had one before we came down here about how the war is likely to end in Afghanistan. That's something we're going to get into, I'm sure, after Gideon has had a chance to speak to you about the major arguments in his book.

It gives me real pleasure and pride to welcome Gideon Rose. (Applause)

MR. ROSE: Thank you very much. It's a great honor and pleasure to be here. I have indeed learned at Martin's knee over the years from I think my first exposure to serious international diplomacy was in
playing *Diplomacy* with Martin when I was a teenager, and I believe, as I recall, he was France and I was England, and I helped him take over the world. And my older brother got very, very upset because he felt that Martin was taking advantage of me in letting me be the Robin to his Batman, which didn't really happen in world history like that. But it was fun to win, even if I was only the junior condominium partner taking over the globe.

Then, later on, I got coffee for him at the NSC and learned the trade that way. And in many respects the book that he is describing, *How Wars End* is my act of filial piety, or my homage to my teachers, both in academia and in the real world. I've had the great good fortune over the years to be taught by very serious, very responsible people not just at the various schools I've attended but at places like the NSC.

And, in retrospect, my year at the NSC, people talk about ambassadors going native; well, I went native during my year at the NSC to be professional staff world of foreign policy and came away convinced that the people behind the scenes, places like the NSC, who got up every morning and tried to make the world a little better place, and knew a lot more than a lot of other people and, essentially, tried to keep the ideologues and hacks, and timeservers and divas around them and above them, from mucking the world up too much were my heroes. And once I
left the NSC, I've devoted my career since to trying to bring that world view to a broader public.

And that's what I tried to do in the book. The book essentially has three components to it: a conceptual and theoretical side, a historical side, and a policymaking side. The conceptual side is simple: Everybody knows that Clausewitz defined war as an active force to compel the enemy to do what it will, and everyone also knows that he defined war as the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.

The conceptual frame for the book is the realization that these two statements, these two diktats by Clausewitz are indeed the heart of the subject matter and that the key challenge in strategy in war is linking them together, that the Clausewitzian challenge, as I call in the book, is how to make force serve politics, how link the negative or coercive side of war to the positive or constructive side of war and allow your military operations to achieve and construct some kind of sustainable political settlement, that this is the fundamental challenge in strategy, and that if you don't get this challenge and plan for it adequately and implement your plan successfully, you will end up like Robert Redford in The Candidate sort of getting, if you're lucky, to your end zone and then turning around and going, well, so what do we do now? And if you haven't
thought very clearly about what you are going to do at that point, then if you haven't designed your strategy to achieve some kind of sustainable political settlement on the ground afterwards, then you are going to be left essentially a mess, either chaos or your provision of order, or a variety of unpleasant options that take you by surprise and force you to improvise in very bad circumstances.

In many respects this sounds a lot like, of course, 2003 in Baghdad, and it is. But what people don't realize is that the Bush administration's failure to plan for the postwar order practically and successfully in Iraq in 2003 was less the exception than the rule in American foreign policy and in American military history. And that in fact if you go back and look at practically every single conflict over the last century, there was not the kind of sustained, sophisticated postwar planning, the kind of clear strategic thinking that led you to a successful segue from military operations to a sustainable postwar settlement that one would expect to find and that, in effect, almost basic strategic best practices would lead you to put together.

And, in fact, the reason I can say this with confidence is that I wrote the entire dissertation long before the second Iraq War, and even mostly before the first Gulf War. And so when these new wars came long, they literally just did the same kinds of things even more so. It was very
nice to have the paradigmatic case of my study appear after the study, the first draft, had been largely written. It sort of confirmed that I was onto something.

So, essentially, this has to do with the three frames as the conceptual frame about linking the negative and positive wars together. There’s historical cases which trace how American policymakers have done this, and there’s a forward-looking policymaking set of advice at the end. Ironically, for an audience like this, the last part, B, the policymaking advice is the least interesting.

And why do I say that? Because it’s pretty obvious, it’s not rocket science. It turns out that strategic best practices are not that hard to figure out: know what you want from a war, figure out a strategy to achieve that; monitor the strategy and its implementation in practice so that it does achieve what you want it to achieve, figure out at least rudimentary backup plans for scenarios in which your assumptions go better or worse than you expected. This kind of stuff, it’s not rocket science; in fact, it’s the kind of thing that the professionals tell their bosses to do all the time, but it doesn’t get done. And so in some sense the advice going forward is listen to the deputies, listen to the staff, do things the right way, the way you actually should, and you’ll have fewer problems
or only the necessary problems rather than a whole bunch of self-created problems.

Now, if that's so simple, why should you bother reading the book? Well, because the case studies are really, really interesting, and they take you through exactly how policymakers in practice screw things up time and again and again. You might call the case studies sort of history from the perspective of the deputies.

I was trained, as I said, I went native by the Center professional staff members, and, you know, the people who sort of tell their boss, you know, Cassandra-like, all the things that will go wrong if they do something stupid like X, Y, and Z and then sit there and watch as, in fact, the boss does something stupid, and it goes to hell in a hand basket. And the extent to which that actually is the way the world works, was amazing to me to discover in retrospect, even when going through the cases. And I'll just take you through two of them to show what I'm talking about.

Again, we all know the Iraq War case, but I'll take you through exactly why that was as bad as we think and in some ways even worse. But what people often don't realize is that the Gulf War, the other Bush war ending scenario, was almost as bad. And since everybody thinks the Bush II, Iraq case was problematic for reasons very specific to
the Bush administration, the fact that the hawk men, Bush 41, the A-team of Scowcroft and Baker and Powell and "Poppy" Bush all got things almost as badly wrong as the later ones is a good example of what it is not just unlimited to a certain set of people with a certain set of circumstances.

So basically, the key challenge in war termination, as I said, is to link your forceful means to some kind of political and that is a sustainable, durable, stable political settlement on the other side. If you don’t, it all comes down to political order, public order, because although we define wars as being usually against something, against a threat, the threat usually emerges from some domestic situation or lack of domestic order on the other side, and the only way to not just deal with the threat that has popped up but prevent a future threat -- the same threat or a future one like it -- reemerging is to generate some kind of stable political settlement on the other side.

This is, however, a very serious challenge; it involves applied political development compared to politics, what have you, nation-building, the provision of public order on the other side at the end of the day. And it’s something that we never like to think about much, and we tend to avoid grappling with until dragged into it because the consequences are even worse. How does that play out?
Well, essentially, in the Gulf War, the -- Saddam invades
Kuwait, August 2nd, 1990, takes the entire government by surprise, the
entire region by surprise, and the first 12 hours after the invasion are, in
fact, one of the most impressive periods of American foreign policymaking
and national security decision-making that I've ever encountered. Looking
at it, really people like Brent Scowcroft really deserved the reputation they
have in a lot of respects.

Within hours, literally, you have an all-night deputies meeting
-- it's actually not technically a deputies meeting because it's chaired by
Brent -- but you have a sort of the professionals working around the clock.
Saddam invades, or the news of the invasion comes the evening,
Wednesday evening, Washington time, by 4:00 a.m. there, Bush is woken
up to sign an Executive Order freezing Kuwaiti assets which turned out to
be very important because Saddam with his incredibly crude
understanding of the world, actually seems to have thought that Kuwait's
vast financial resources were literally stuck like a giant treasure chest of
pirate booty in the basement of the Kuwaiti National Bank, and so when
the troops roll up and go to the basement to be Iraqi of the Kuwaiti
National Bank and look in the basement for all the giant gold and treasure,
they find only a small little bit there because most of it, of course, is in
bank accounts overseas, and this is very shocking. And they try to get
into the bank accounts, but because they've been frozen they can't. And so the Iraqis are raging at not being allowed to get their things. This all happened because we have the foresight to actually, literally in the middle of the night, freeze the assets.

By 6:00 a.m. of the morning after an evening invasion, there's a unanimous U.N. resolution putting everybody on record reversing the invasion and creating the predicate for the use of force. Superb policymaking, and within basically the next 72-96 hours, the American response of essentially settling on a graduated series of policy responses designed to reverse the invasion and make sure Saddam doesn't get any benefits from it is set in place. And I would argue that everything, essentially, from the first few days after the invasion through March of 1991 is simply the playing out of a script that's written in those first several hours.

So, if this is the case, why am I -- and it goes generally pretty well, as we all know. If I'm -- to what do I criticize the first Bush team for their planning? Well, because essentially they, the goals of American policy in the Gulf War, as articulated by George W. Bush right from the beginning, leaving out the minor ones of protecting American nationals in the area and restoring the government of Kuwait, there were two key goals: one is reversing the invasion and the other is providing for the
security and stability of the Gulf. And that latter phrase basically is a
almost a sort of been a diplomatic boilerplate, a national security
boilerplate, that has entered the American lexicon a decade earlier. It
turns out to be the kind of thing that actually will be the key to much future
policymaking because it's essentially the Carter doctrine in action, a direct
American responsibility for the security and stability of the region.

But no one really knows what it means, no one pays any
attention to it, and they focus their attention on the first goal: reversing the
invasion, and they do a very good job of dealing with that. But they never
actually answer for themselves the question of, what will happen once the
invasion of Kuwait is indeed reversed?

And, you know, it's interesting. We all know that the sort of
the -- one of the things that it turns out, that policymakers don't like to
confront unpleasant choices. Well, this is very human, but it's kind of
interesting to see this happen because what happens in practice is
oftentimes, like a good professional we know, that there is only a choice
among lesser evils. And what happens in the Gulf is a classic example of
that.

It turns out that essentially once you've pushed Saddam's
troops out of Kuwait, you have two options: Either you go all the way to
the source and knock off Saddam and deal with Iraq in some long-term
sustainable way to make sure it doesn't happen again, or you accept that Iraq is going to be problematic, that Saddam is going to be there, that Kuwait will need to be protected, and you establish some kind of Korean-like solution in which you essentially guard in perpetuity on an ongoing basis the southern part of the territory in question while leaving the north Scot-free, essentially, or under some kind of containment.

And those two choices, permanent American military presence in the Gulf ala Korea, or the colonization and transformation of Iraq, both are anathema to American policymakers because, quite naturally, they're both very costly, difficult, unpleasant, and nobody's signing up for them. So when faced with these two options are what do policymakers do?

Even the wise men of the Bush administration, they opt to create a third, okay? This is exactly what policymakers always do, they generate a deus ex machina. They generate a magical Iraqi, a magical Iraqi who will solve all their problems. And you can actually see this process psychologically occurring. Bush's diaries are now public, and there's an entry, one point just before the ground war starts in the Gulf, there's a false report that Saddam is pulling out, has conceded.
And you can see Bush sort of reacting to it in his diary, and he says, "Oh" -- first part of the entry -- "this is great. We've achieved our goals, he's withdrawing. Everything is working wonderfully."

Second part. "Hah, but if he pulls out, I just don't see how this is going to work. If he's still in power in Baghdad, I just don't see where this is going to go. I won't feel like victory, there'll still be a problem there. I'm not sure what we'll do about it."

Third stage of the process, psychologically, "Ah, that's okay, surely he can't stay in office. Surely somebody will rise up and topple him. The Iraqi people won't let this continue and will deal with the problem."

So, in other words, essentially confronted with the actual -- smart enough and able to recognize the actual problems and the real choices there, he punts by essentially deciding that, or putting his faith in an uprising.

Well, of course, what happens right after we surrender -- or, sorry, right after -- right after Iraq pulls out -- not we surrender, Iraq pulls out. And what happens is the wrong people rise up. Right? Instead of the Iraqi army rising up and another Sunni strong man coming into power, a somewhat less aggressive one -- there's a CIA joke from the era that the head of the Saban Center now told me at the time -- "Well, we can't tell," -- we know -- I can tell you the last -- I can't tell you the first name of
Saddam’s successor, but I can -- sorry, I can’t tell you the last name of Saddam’s successor but I can tell you his first name.

What's his first name? General. So that was what the CIA was thinking, and so the idea was another moustache would come along essentially and keep Iraq secure.

Well, what happens? Instead the Shia and the Kurds rise up, and the Army and the Baath establishment rallies round Saddam, and you’re faced with this very unpleasant question of, what do you do now? The Bush administration, with no desire to occupy Iraq, no desire to fundamentally topple Saddam directly and take responsibility, stands back, and as we put out the fires in Kuwait we watch and let Iraq burn. And eventually, after about a month or two of terrible carnage and destruction and humiliating disaster, we get dragged back into the kind of Korean-style containment that was always on offer from the beginning in one sense, but that we had not wanted to accept. And we end up stumbling into an unpleasant and less-than-wildly-sustainable containment regime that ultimately continues for a decade.

And I would argue, so broken out, what should they have done? Well, the answer is there are always two choices that were available: They were you should have decided whether or not you could live with Saddam, and if the answer was you could live with Saddam and
that essentially what you wanted to do was reverse the invasion of Kuwait but leave Iraq stable under Saddam, then you should have had a plan to segue from the fighting to some kind of postwar containment regime. And the result would have been a lot like Korea; in other words, where you went from a war, you had a stalemate, a sort of status quo anti-plus solution, and you have the regime in the North still sitting there causing problems, but the South is essentially protected.

But that was too much for the American military and the national security establishment to accept, and they wanted more than that. But they also weren't prepared to have Iraq. If, however, you wanted to basically -- if that was not acceptable, then you should have devised a war plan that essentially led you to knock off Saddam instead of just simply hoping that he would be knocked off.

And I say the world is viewed by the deputies, the actual decision to end the war in the Gulf is phenomenally interesting. It literally shows what happens when you let the principals go into a room by themselves and make decisions. There's a classic -- we all remember Schwarzkopf's great press conference in which he sort of essentially -- the mother of all press conferences in which he takes everyone through the strategy of how Iraq has just been beaten. Well, some hours after that there's a meeting in the Oval Office, and the senior figures of the Bush
administration -- Powell -- meet together to decide what to do. And Powell basically gives his version, classified version of the same briefing that Schwarzkopf just gave and wraps it up by saying, "Well, Mr. President, I expect to be able to come to you tomorrow and say we've largely achieved our goals, and we should think about what to do at that point."

And Bush says, "Well, are you saying that, you know, we've basically gotten where we want to get?"

And Powell says, "Yes, essentially that's what I'm saying."

And Bush says, "Well, if you can do that tomorrow, how about tonight? How about ending it tonight?"

And Sununu, Chief of Staff, pops up and says, "Well, you know, if we did it tonight at midnight, that would be -- that would be 100 hours of the ground war. That's a nice-sounding sort of thing. A hundred hours, gee, that sounds cool. Well, gee, anybody have a problem with ending it tonight at midnight?"

"Well, you know, maybe we should probably get Norm in on this. Norm," so they pull out the phone and they call Schwarzkopf and say, "Norm, what do you think about ending it tonight -- 8:00 a.m., you know, 8:00 a.m. your time in the region but midnight here?"

"Let me check. Okay, it sounds good to me." He hangs up.
Okay, great. Everyone on board, great, let's go out and sell this, and we'll tell people -- and this is basically it. And this is literally how it happens, and they file out of the meeting having decided to end the war at midnight with this nice thing, assuming that Saddam will fall, everything will topple, and that's all great.

The deputies -- and I interviewed several of the deputies -- and the deputies all were completely shocked. They had absolutely no idea that their bosses were going to go into this room and come out ending the war. They all knew the situation was not nearly as favorable, or probably not as favorable as people had believed, and they essentially all have misgivings. They would have wanted the war to continue another day, they would have wanted to do the staff work to make sure that whatever our end game was that we had segued naturally into it. But, you know, the deputies are not the principals, they're not going to tell the bosses no. And they're worried, but not too worried because everybody kind of assumes we've gotten what we needed. But, no, so they suck it up and move on.

And what happens? Basically within a -- like that, the United States acts like a James Bond villain with Saddam as James Bond. Anybody who's watched any James Bond film knows this is time at which the villain captures Bond, straps him to the elevator, pushes the button
that gradually lowers the elevator into the shark tank and goes, "Haw, haw, haw, goodbye, Mr. Bond," and then walks out of the room, you know, before Bond gets eaten. And, of course, on the way down Bond manages to do something and hop out of the -- off the elevator and escape from the shark tank, and then go kill the bad guys.

Well, essentially, Saddam is Bond, and we are the schmucky James Bond villain. By the way, of course, the key to that whole thing is that the villain should never have seen any previous James Bond film, which is kind of unbelievable but it's -- but anyway, U.S. policymakers act exactly that way, and Saddam literally -- there's a wonderful quote from Wafiq Samarra. He's director of Military Intelligence that we captured later on, told me and the Frontline interview with him where he says, "Saddam really was -- he was completely -- he was almost crying, and then there was ceasefires announced, and he goes, 'Yes, I won. This is wonderful.'" And he basically sort of reestablishes control.

But because nobody's ever bothered to think about this, I mean U.S. military want so sort of essentially defeat Saddam and then go to Disneyland. They're not in the mood for sticking around, and they're very, very surprised that they have to stick around later on because they haven't bothered to think through in effect the long-term stability of the Gulf region and what they will mean in practice.
So you segue into containment. By the way, you can make a case for either one of the options. I know very serious people, very good Iraq experts who feel that what you got in the 1990s was as good as you were going to get, realistically, and that the containment was the best thing possible, and that it got a bad rap, and that, in fact, what you should have achieved in the end of the war was a nice segue to that rather than anything more.

I know other people who think that's ridiculous. You should have taken your opportunity to get rid of Saddam, deal with it and so forth. But you, either way, you should have developed a plan that actually figured out what you wanted to see on the ground in Iraq afterwards and segued to that.

Okay, so cut forward 10 years, okay. Basically the Clinton administration was a permanent stasis on Iraq. Martin was there, I was there, I know this, we all know this: Essentially, it wasn't the policy set in stone. Everybody hated the policy, but it turned out the more you looked, every other policy we hated even more. And so you ended up with this sort of status quo for 10 years in the Gulf. You sign the Iraq Liberation Act because there are political reasons to do so, but nobody ever expected it would change anything. And the situation, essentially, is frozen in amber for 10 years.
So a new Bush team comes in and looks at Iraq, and then 9/11 comes along. And 9/11 essentially does many things that also essentially lowers the risk tolerance of the key decision-makers in the administration, and it frees up the coffers of national -- of the national purse for use by the government. And the combination of these two factors means that the Bush administration in 43's term decides, you know what? We're going to deal with the solution. We're going to deal with Iraq once and for all. So what is their response to these two difficult choices, permanent containment or colonization, de facto colonization?

They say, you know what? They do the same thing that the previous Bush administration did, which is they punt. They look at the first Bush's experience, and they say, we don't want to leave Saddam in place. They look at the Clinton administration's experience and they say, well, well don't want to do nation-building like the Balkans or Somalia, and so forth. It's really bad company.

So they essentially invent another magical Iraqi, Ahmed Chalabi and his crowd, who will solve the problem for them. And, you know, there's a lot of -- there was a lot of discussion at the time that Ahmed Chalabi is the Svengali who essentially tricked, or lured, or duped American officials and the American public and Congress into suckering themselves into, you know, going into Iraq. In fact, if Ahmed Chalabi, the
INC didn't exist, the Bush administration would have had to invent them. Because what they really represented was a solution to the Bush administration's problem.

The Bush 43 administration decided that it wanted to get rid of Saddam but not take responsibility for Iraq afterward. And Chalabi serves the role of: Okay, here, we'll hand it off to you. That's the grand historical role of the INC and Chalabi. It's a way out of the dilemma of actually taking responsibility for Iraq or living with Saddam in power.

The problem is, of course, it doesn't work. It was never a real option, and so it only makes its way into policy in 2002 or 2003 in a unique set of circumstances, essentially circumstances that are totally unconstrained. The origins, in other words, of the Bush 43 Iraq are one thing, but to understand the Iraq 2003 case, you also have to explain why such a policy that on its face was so unlikely to succeed made it all the way into actual practice. And the answer there is because you had a unique set of unconstrained circumstances that allowed a few decision-makers in the White House and the Pentagon to get whatever they wanted.

International hegemony meant that there was no external check on American actions, the legacy of 9/11 politically at home, and that there was no domestic check and a dysfunctional national security
decision-making structure, and a sort of breakdown of the NSC process meant that there was no internal bureaucratic decision-making structure that was able to give the whole set of options really serious consideration.

And so essentially you slide into war without really checking the price of various different things, plans that looked good on paper get approved, and you end up with a policy that essentially puts you, as I said, like Robert Redford in Baghdad, at the end of the day saying, "Okay, what do we do now?"

The most interesting case perhaps in the entire -- interesting few weeks in the entire book in my opinion are late April 2003 in Washington and Baghdad. Because as the situation in Baghdad starts to go collapse into chaos, the Bush administration wakes up to the fact that its planning is inadequate. And at that point they have absolutely no idea what to do next. I really couldn't believe -- I, to my everlasting embarrassment and shame was a supporter of the Iraq War because, frankly, I assumed that if they were going to go do this, they would have thought through all these questions and come up with good answers and so forth, you know.

Schmuck that I am, I actually was trained by serious policymakers and I thought that you wouldn't do something as serious as launch a war if you didn't know what you were going to do afterwards.
Little did I know that that was, in fact, just what they had done, that the public rhetoric wasn't in fact the same as the private rhetoric, and there weren't serious plans on the ground for what to do.

So they find themselves actually in effect calling, in audible football terms, coming up with an improvisation on the fly. And the best way to understand CPA is as a solution. Ali Allawi says this, and it's a great line -- it's actually true -- in his book that the CPA is best understood a replacement for an on-the-fly improvisation that is a substitute for the postwar planning that the administration never actually did. And so you end up generating the thing, but because the military and the Defense Department in general doesn't want to stay in Iraq and has convinced themselves that it'll have to, you're always trying to leave. And you never provide the kind of public order and security on the ground that would be necessary to stabilize the situation, and things go from bad to worse and ultimately the situation descends into almost outright civil war. And then, of course, you get the surge and things stabilize just enough, as we were talking about earlier, to allow you to walk out eventually, and do later.

There is a lot of drama over the course of the surge. I would argue that the drama in 2006, late 2006, really 2007, over the surge was more about the process of adopting it and politically coming to recognize that it was necessary rather than generating the ideas. Ken isn't here, but
if you look at Pollack's arguments from, you know, back prior to 2003, if you look at Threatening Storm and you look at what Ken Pollack's plan for Iraq was prior to the war, it looks a lot like the surge.

You know, the surge was basically the road not taken, a sustainable ongoing, long-term American commitment to the provision of public order in Iraq that will allow you eventually to stand up some kind of serious government was always on the table. It just was never chosen because that course was too difficult, too costly, too intrusive, and no one wanted to actually pony-up until they realized the alternative was absolute chaos and civil war.

So then you end up backing into that, eventually, again. American policy often does that, and you ultimately sort of get out.

Afghanistan. Let me say two words, briefly, on Afghanistan, and throw it open to questions. I'm being deliberately blunt and provocative here because it's sort of a interesting subject, and I get very annoyed when people do stupid things. And I think we've often behaved very badly and stupidly in these areas, and it really pisses me off, frankly.

You say to yourself, could it really be true that we've done things so stupidly? And I think the answer is yes. Not always. There are very serious policymakers who do very serious things, but I mean, in effect, policymakers at the highest levels have behaved all too humanly.
We all know how to lose weight. You eat relatively small amounts of relatively healthy food, and you get regular exercise, right? It's not rocket science. But everybody buys, you know, millions and millions of diet books every year to sort of figure out how to eat only grapefruit or cleanse yourself with, you know, water and Tabasco juice and lemon or whatever the cockamamie diet of the day is. Because they don't want to do the kind of serious responsible things.

Study after study has shown that relatively modest but real investing success is open to everybody if you follow a few basic rules about cost-saving, cost-control, diversification, long-term investing time horizons. And yet study after study has also shown that individual investors underperform the very indices that they invest in because they act out of fear and greed and various kinds of stupidity rather than following best practices.

And I would argue that in effect policymakers at the highest levels have often done exactly what dieters or, you know, ordinary plungers, or your brother-in-law do in the market, but they really are not like that. We call -- we call them agent -- we call them principals, right? We call the White House Poncho's Principals, the heads of the departments.
In fact, they're not principals, they're agents, and in that regard they're more like, you know, money managers with severe fiduciary responsibilities to their clients, or they're like the surgeon general rather than a, you know, a fad dieter. And so it annoys me, and that's why I'm -- get emotional when I talk about this stuff because there are best practices that could manage the policies somewhat better to make only the most necessary costs and expenditures possible.

In Afghanistan, just to wrap it up, basically once again we find ourselves, in my opinion, not confronting the real costs or choices of the difficult option in front of us. Basically -- and I lay out this argument in the book in the conclusion -- if you look at America and American grand strategy and American wars, what we've done is basically used clear hold and build, not just as a strategy in one counterinsurgency operation in one conflict, but rather as a grand strategy for a broad multigenerational campaign of global pacification.

We all know Fallujah in which, you know, sort of you go in and you take out the bad guys, you come out, and what happens? The bad guys come back. And so you go in and do it again, but this time you say this time we're going to stay there and make sure they don't come back, and you're going to build some kind of government around them.
Germany, I would argue, is nothing but Fallujah writ large. World War I you go in and you clear it and you come home. And what happens? A generation later Germany finds itself in bad straits again and it's something you need to clear again. So you go in and you clear Germany a second time, and you say to yourself I'm not going to do this a third time. So you hold Germany.

But, you know, holding these areas is difficult and so to make it less costly and to make it more sustainable, you build a nice new happy Germany and a nice new happy Western Europe around it. And so you're still holding Europe today, but you're doing it with the help of the nice happy Europe that you have built over the years to sustain that process.

You do the same thing in Japan. You clear Japan, you hold it, you're holding it now, and you build a new Japan. We tried to clear North Korea, we decided that's too costly and difficult; we settled for half in Korea, we clear it, we're holding it, we're still holding it today, and we build South Korea to make that holding it somewhat less problematic and difficult.

In the Middle East, we've had to clear Kuwait, we've had to clear some other areas. We finally decided to clear Iraq whether it's necessary or not, and we're stuck with the same kind of fundamental
challenge of where public order is okay but we have to provide it. And if we don't provide it, the choices aren't very good.

And the question becomes Afghanistan. I would say that Afghanistan is really the real question is, do you want to bear the costs of staying or the risks of leaving? And those are real questions. We ultimately decided in '73 that we could let North Vietnam go in '75; that we could let South Vietnam go and all of Indochina go. We decided, you know what? I'm sorry Indochinese bad for you, we're no longer interested in providing public order and security for your area. You can -- we're going home.

That may well have been the right thing to do for us; it was lousy for the Indochinese of various kinds. And but it essentially, that's what allowed us to shed the burden. We could always do that in Afghanistan. But it would come at a risk, not just a cost to the local Afghan population, but at a risk to us of potential chaos and terrorism and so forth.

Or we could stay and fight a thankless counterinsurgency in a long-term attempt to create some things sustainable and durable on the ground. That's going to be a very difficult proposition. Now, the question we have to face is essentially, which of those two unpleasant choices do we want? We don't like to confront the unpleasant choices, so we tried to
invent a third one. So the Obama administration basically says, in a version of St. Augustine's famous prayer, "Lord make me chaste," but not yet. Says, you know, "Lord, let us withdraw, but not yet," so that the decision you make at the end of 2009 is we're going to sort of surge up and then fade back.

Okay. Well, there was no real plan for how that was going to work out in that time frame despite the famous term sheet, and so essentially you're facing a very similar question in 2011 that you were facing in 2009, which is do you want to be on the hook for the provision of public order in Afghanistan, or not? Can you live with local order or the lack thereof if you basically aren't maintaining it yourself? Or do you want to stay around?

Now, how we actually manage that going forward is a really interesting question. This is what we were fighting about before. The question was, is there some kind of way forward that is a choice between withdrawal, immediate simple withdrawal, or permanent ongoing counterinsurgency warfare over many, many, many years with an affiliated difficult and unpleasant and thankless nation-building campaign?

It's an interesting question. That's the real question facing us. I'm not sure there is -- I think there might be -- again I'll write a piece if I get a chance applying the Vietnam lessons arguing sort of, you know,
how Nixon would get out of Afghanistan. But it's a very difficult and
dubious thing. It may be what the Obama administration is shooting for in
a second term, but it's not going to happen anytime soon.

And with that, let me throw it open to questions. I've
probably gone on too long anyway, but it's a lot of fodder for discussion
and so forth. Happy to talk about any of this if people want.

I don't know, Peter, do you want to monitor or do you want --
MR. SINGER: Why don't we go ahead and we'll sit over
here.

MR. ROSE: Okay.

MR. SINGER: Why don't we just first give a round of
applause. (Applause)

SPEAKER: I'm going to resist making the Nixon comparison
about doing something in terms of cross-border bombings.

MR. ROSE: All right.

SPEAKER: Why? All of the drone attacks in the (inaudible)
are --

MR. ROSE: I was resisting it, but you don't have to resist it.

SPEAKER: Not at all. The drone attacks are the modern
technologically sophisticated version of the bombing of Cambodia. I mean
the Fatah is structurally similar to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in many respects
with the sanctuaries across the border. And we're doing -- we can get away with it now since technology has allowed us to target more narrowly and risk fewer people in the process. So, absolutely, it's exactly parallel.

MR. ROSE: Except one fundamental difference.

SPEAKER: Which is what?

MR. ROSE: Cambodia doesn't have a nuclear bomb. But the question that I want to ask is actually -- I want to flip the lens.

SPEAKER: Okay.

MR. ROSE: And you actually have a mic here that should --

SPEAKER: You're the one accused of being too soft.

SPEAKER: You've been looking at sort of the U.S. part of how wars end, but one of the things that I think is the most interesting parts of your book is looking at the other side in terms often the mindset that they were bringing into it. So as an example in the book there's a great story of the end of World War I where you've got the negotiations going back and forth not merely between the allies and the Germans but, more importantly, the negotiations between the Germans internal, inside Berlin, and the poor guy that's stuck in Paris negotiating for them.

And what I want to go at is this question, which is, in answering the question of how wars end, what if the nature of the
adversary or the nature of war itself is evolving? That is, you looked at the case study of Afghanistan versus all of these other cases, but it seems moving forward one of the fundamental changes is its not one single adversary, not Hitler in charge of Germany, not Kaiser in Germany, not even Ho Chi Minh or what comes next with the Viet Cong in North Vietnam but rather a challenge in Afghanistan. And arguably, most conflicts moving forward in that type of nature is that you have a multiplicity of actors. There's no one Taliban.

And then the second part of that is that one of the challenges of having these multiplicity of actors is a number of them actually may be what you could call "conflict entrepreneurs." That is, actors whose goal is not much like your goal, seizure of the tools of government and public order -- I'm trying to take the enemy's capital city -- but rather the rise of warlords for whom just the mere existence of war itself is the good. They want to keep the war going because that's how they're linked up to global networks. That's how they're in charge.

You can see another case would be a Liberia like this. So in looking at how wars end, how might this new type of war end, and how do we deal with that in our strategic planning?

MR. ROSE: I am unconvinced that we are fundamentally entering some new age of war. I think there are indeed different kinds of
wars, there are classic interstate wars, there are insurgencies, there are civil wars, and certainly, as Clausewitz also said, you know, understanding the nature of the conflict you’re in is absolutely crucial to developing a strategy for it, but it’s not clear to me that necessarily there is a new situation. We may be confronting different kinds of wars than the ones we have liked to confront in the past or have traditionally confronted, which are sort of classic state-state conflicts in, you know, almost great power ways. We're now engaged more in sort of imperial policing and nation-building missions.

But that's not because war necessarily has changed, I would argue, but because in effect we've stabilized so much of the world that there aren't that many regions that are left. I mean essentially we've, you know, pacified the Western hemisphere. We've taken Europe off the table, East Asia off the table, the Korean Peninsula is stable. You know, and essentially, you know, Russia and China have their areas. So what we're doing is borderlands and imperial policing. I'm not sure that we're engaged in any dramatically different kind of warfare in Afghanistan than previous people coming into Afghanistan and trying to do things where the question then becomes, if, however, whatever you want to call it you're in a war that's not as simple and it doesn't have a simple enemy, how do you deal with that?
That’s an interesting challenge. I would argue, though, that it’s fundamentally, it comes back to political order. If you look at Europe, if you look at, you know, warlords, one warlord -- there was an article in *Foreign Affairs* that talked about 17th century French state-building, and it said if you look at what Louie, you know, Louie 14th did, it was actually somewhat similar to the challenges facing Karzai and that, in effect, what you really need in a process of state-building -- not so much nation-building in Afghanistan -- but even simple state-building, and, you know, we used to -- we called -- what we called "warlords" now used to be called simply "lords."

And you had a center periphery dynamic in medieval Europe and a lot of other places, and so the challenge of providing a simple single, unified, centralized government for a territory, achieving the kind of very -- classically Bavarian monopoly, legitimate monopoly on violence is not a new challenge. That’s how modern states emerged. The problem is you’re now dealing in areas of developing world in which that hasn’t happened yet, and you’re on the hook if you don’t want to leave disorder proliferating.

It’s not that this was a different challenge in Afghanistan; it’s that we used not to give a damn about Afghanistan. Now we actually care about Afghanistan because people originating there helped fly planes into
our buildings and knocked them down. And so we decided we can't leave Afghanistan to its own devices. The challenge we have to face is if you really are serious about establishing political order there, what do you have to do? It's a very difficult political challenge. It involves not just confrontation with military units nor just counterinsurgency, but, as you say, this kind of weird mixture of the whole variety of actors, and nobody really knows what to do with it.

One answer might be to cut the Gordian knot and say, you know what? It really is too difficult to deal with, and we should accept the risks of leaving rather than the costs of staying. But we don't really want to do that either. And so there is no good answer, and I guess what I would say is just look very squarely at the challenge rather than assuming it's going to be -- that necessarily it's going to be some simple easy -- easy solution.

It's a bad answer to a good question, but it gives you a sense of where I was going on that. All right, let's get some other questions out there, right here in the front.

MR. SINGER: And if you could stand up and identify yourself as well for those that --

SPEAKER: Yeah. (Inaudible) -- global nature to my question is that the last wish from Ambassador Holbrooke was stop the war, and
end the war in Afghanistan, and also how can you end the war, he said, without dragging out terrorism, or terrorists from the area, especially from Pakistan, because they are based not in Afghanistan but they are based and claimed and financed out of Pakistan and going elsewhere around the globe?

MR. ROSE: Nobody knows how to stop the war in Afghanistan. What we know how to do is to keep our side from losing, and what we know how to do is walk away. We’re not sure how to stay and win it. And however little answer we have to Afghanistan, we have even less about what to do about Pakistan.

I sometimes joke that there are two kinds of issues in our field: There are the issues that everybody knows what to do about, but the answers are politically difficult and off the table because they are too costly for some constituents here or another, and they are the problems that nobody knows what to do anything about.

Pakistan, I think, is in the latter category, and, unfortunately, Afghanistan might be in the latter category, too. So anybody who has good answers to what to do about Pakistan, please send them to me care of Foreign Affairs and we will run them in future issues.

As for Afghanistan, I wake up every morning with a different view on what our strategy there should be, and we have a very interesting
series of articles appearing not just in the January-February issue but going forward on that. So, unfortunately, there are no good answers, and Holbrook's question is going to be with us for a long time.

MR. SINGER:

SPEAKER: Thank you.

MR. AMATRUDA: Will Amatruda. All right, getting back to the Robert Redford moment in Baghdad, in April of 2003, the okay-what-do-we-do-now, there were accounts in the press that the State Department had a quite detailed plan as to what to do in Iraq, and the people with the power said no, no, we're going to do it our way.

Was that a myth? Was there really a State Department plan, and, if so, do we know what it is?

MR. ROSE: It's a partial myth, or I would say it's more a legend than a myth. The *Future of Iraq Project*, which is usually what is referred to in that scenario, they long-rambling, not particularly focused set of discussions about all sorts of issues that was never anything like an actionable plan, that said there were various people in and out of government who had rather more realistic suggestions for what to do about postwar Iraq and maintaining stability there that were indeed not listened to. It wasn't really the State Department.
And again, if you go back -- not sucking up to Ken, but this is the Saban Center that's up to a degree on any of the foreign policy. We're not -- this is not a Saban program.

MR. SINGER: You're at the Defense Center, aren't you?

You can say nice or bad things about Saban Center all you want.

MR. ROSE: But, you know, the -- you know, Ken wrote this book *The Threatening Storm* that basically said here's why we should go to war against Iraq and here's how two do it. And the Defense says, you know -- the Bush administration took the first part and sort of like they ripped the book in half, took the first part and then threw out the second part.

What it was that you should have done, again the best case scenario in Iraq? Something like the surge. It was never going to be easy. It would however probably would have been possible to go right from 2003 to something like what you've got in 2007. There's no reason you couldn't have had Crocker and Petraeus, and their strategy and their troops in place ready to go in 2003. There's no reason you couldn't have achieved the kind of half-assed stability you've gotten since then.

The great debate in Iraq, it's a great counterfactual, it was the chaos that occurred or played out from 2003 and 2007, was that best understood as a preexisting medical condition in Iraq? It was revealed by
the surgery of the war. Or was it best understood as a postoperative infection that was caused by the malpractice of the surgeon? We can't answer that, but the case is a lot harder to settle than you would think. And the argument that, in fact, the retreat and flight into communal identity, the slide into anarchy and chaos was, iatrogenically, it was all in fault for not providing public order is I think pretty good. And if we had done a lot more, then it probably could have been avoided.

On the other hand, if you had been honest about what would have to be done in order to achieve that outcome and you had talked about it up front, the public might not have supported the Iraq War, and they might have said, you know what? If those are the real costs, then accepting the risks of continued containment might be a better bet. And so in some ways you only got the war because the Bush administration had a very exaggerated view of their costs and risks of containment and a very under appreciation of the costs and risks of dealing with the post-Saddam Iraq.

PROFESSOR ALI: Oh, yes. I'm Salim Ali. I'm a professor at the University of Vermont, and I was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Center in Qatar last year. So a quick comment and a question, a comment regarding the Pakistan conundrum for full disclosure. I am from Pakistan originally. The solution has been presented many times. It's a
regional issue. Until you couple India-Pakistan-Afghanistan, you will never have a solution, but it's resisted for political reasons.

Now, with -- and that ties in with the question. The question is the relationship between the military establishment and the civilian decision-makers. In your book, you brought it up a few times that while the military didn't want to stay in Iraq and so on, and democracies always pride themselves in saying, well, the military is subservient to the civilian leadership. And Indians always say that to the Pakistanis that, oh, you know, the defense minister would never travel with the prime minister this way, and so on.

How would you respond to that, because it seems that there's more than meets the eye there?

MR. ROSE: What I would say is that, on the civil-military relations question, uh, I said before that you need to think of the chief challenge in strategy is marrying force and politics. This means that everything has to be joint.

Now, everybody is averse to this because it's extraordinarily messy and no one likes a mess. And no one likes to have dual change of command, no one likes to have chaos in the government. And so there's a great tendency to simplify matters by creating a clear division of responsibility, both functionally and temporally.
And the classic response is to say, okay, yes, we understand that war involves both military and political aspects, but we're going to link these temporally or sequentially, and we'll have a decision to go to war made by the civilian leadership, and then you will pass things from the politicians and diplomats over to the military at the beginning of the war, and then when the war is completed, you'll pass things back from the military to the civilians at the end to deal with the postwar political issues. And that way everybody will do the thing that they are best at, and that'll work fine.

The problem is that you can't do that because you can't separate out those things. Everything is literally both, and so what you need -- and, by the way -- Tommy Franks is an absolutely classic example of this because he literally sends a note to the Defense Department to Wolfowitz, wait a minute, edge of the verge of the Iraq War very snippily, sort of brushing off micromanagement, saying, "Look, I'll deal with the day of, you deal with the day after, all right?" All right, as if, "Look, I'd let each get our own area of responsibility."

The problem is that's fine if you're a sort of an operational commander, if you're a brigade commander, or if you're handling a division. It's not okay if you're CENTCOM commander. It's not okay if you're the commanding general.
There's a wonderful -- you know, the process is very, very clear on this. It says, you know, to bring a war or one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. That is where the commander in chief has to become, simultaneously, a statesman. But there is no alternative but to marry the two, because you're segueing directly from one to the other. And so what you need is exactly like Petraeus and Crocker. What you need is some kind of combination in which they are both working together joined at the hip.

The problem is no one likes to do that, and so you separate it out, and it almost never works well. The simplest -- and, by the way, the way we think about war and plan for it, the military in particular affects this -- so it's no surprise that the war in which you designated the creation of a sustainable, durable political settlement as phase 4 was the war with the worst postwar planning on record. Okay, nobody in the world had ever gotten to the fourth item on a to-do list. If that's how you think of it, of course, you're going to screw it up.

You'll -- there's a wonderful quote from -- I think it was Conway -- when it asked about this postwar planning always gets short shrift compared to planning for combat -- he says, "Look, you shoot the wolf closer to the sled, right?" And if you're a guy, if your military ops are on the ground, that's obviously going to be what your attitude is. But that
it's the job of the civilian authority to say, no, no, no, that's not what you have to do; you have to my simple suggestion is instead of just of adding more phases or mandating what the military does now, mandating consideration of later phases from the beginning, is simply reverse the numbering so that you think of postwar planning, you think of war planning like a countdown, like a moon launch, right?

So phase 1 is the ultimate political settlement, the end faith that you actually want. And everything else is basically a countdown to that. Because if you look at it that way, then the prewar and the early stages of the war, and the later stages of the war, they had a 4, 3, 2, 1, they leave you there because that, if otherwise, you know, -- John Bolton -- sorry, this is a good question, it always seems to come up -- John Bolton has a little part in the end of his book where her says, "Silly people have said that the Iraq War and the chaos afterward discredit interventionism, and this is ridiculous because, in fact, the war went very well, and it was the postwar plans and chaos that was not done well. And so we could separate out one from the other, and, yes, we could and should have done something better. I still have my own views on what that should be, but that shouldn't discredit the war-fighting itself."

Well, that's silly. That's like the guy jumping off the Empire State Building and checking in with him 80 floors down and saying, how's
it going, and he say, oh, it’s really fine. Because, of course, if you don’t have a plan for the end until you get there, it's going to look great. The problem only comes up later on, and that’s only deferred costs. And so the problem is you need to have a military and civilian leadership that works together on common goals.

Too often, I would argue, the civilian leadership has deferred to the military leadership, and the military leadership has not wanted to accept the responsibilities of dealing with postwar challenges. What you need are military leaders who are fundamentally political, and political leaders who are deeply, strategically aware. And your Elliot Cohen has a really good book on this, although I would disagree with him that Iraq was a good example. But a lot of the things in Elliot Cohen's book Supreme Command I think are worthwhile, but it's a really difficult challenge in which the military and civilian leadership has to work together.

MR. SINGER: I want to go over here to someone who knows a little bit about both conflict and the conflict prevention sector.

GENERAL NASH: Will Nash. I would just point out, Gideon, that we teach our second lieutenants reverse sequence planning, and they begin with actions on the objective and then back up to the line of departure. So General Franks notwithstanding, there are a few people how know how to do it.
I was really impressed with the quote that you use, and I'm bringing this up about generals having a political understanding. The letter from Eisenhower to Marshall that you quoted in the book about not wanting to take Berlin, but, "If it's necessary, I'm prepared to adjust." And I think that's a -- a lesson that's been lost. And you might want to compare that circumstance with your earlier example of Tommy Franks.

MR. ROSE: Thank you very much, Bill. About the sergeants and the second lieutenants, you know, if we made civilian -- if we made the national command authority actually fill out something like the Five Paragraph Order before they launched a war, you would avoid a whole lot of problems. And, you know, this assumption that the highest levels are sophisticated enough not to follow the sort of basic practices of planning and structure, but they should be forced to.

And so a lot of things that, you know, with that book *Everything I Need To Know in Life I Learned in Kindergarten*, right -- you know, literally I was shocked to find how much of best practices actually would -- what was that book *Checklist Manifesto* recently, right? Or you could avoid all sorts of mistakes by simply going through the basic checklist: Have I done this? Have I done this? If you would do the same kind of thing, literally, before starting a war -- have I thought about this?
How about the cost? This sort of thing, you would avoid a whole lot of problems.

But the highest level decision-makers don’t subject themselves to the kind of intellectual and operational discipline that they demand of their subordinates. And it’s really appalling that that in fact is allowed to go on.

We all cut corners when we’re in charge, but it’s astonishing -- the problem is we’re in Washington, and the real world, this is like a court, right? And nobody tells the king that -- or the emperor that he has no clothes, and nobody tells the principals that they should do a better job. And the deputies, even when they know better and sort of say, oh, well, okay, you made that one.

With regard to Eisenhower in World War II, actually, you know, if you had to look for a great case of when we did this thing kind of right, it would be World War II, as long as you build the Truman -- as long as you incorporate the Truman administration’s calling an audible in the late ’40s, i.e., the early-called war policy fact, if you read that as part of the World War II case, because the really -- the way to think about the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO is as the second delayed appropriate and realistic phase of postwar planning for World War II, sort of like the surge in Iraq.
So NATO, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan are the functional equivalent. The later development of plans that actually secure the victory that was won by force of arms earlier, because nobody thought about a world in which the Soviet Union would be an opponent. Again, if you ask yourself, how difficult -- everyone knows the Berlin Airlift, right?

The Berlin Airlift there's great heroic moment, well, think, ask yourself why a Berlin airlift was necessary in the first place. The answer was because nobody bothered to think through how to coordinate the logistical arrangements for resupply of our outposts several hundred miles behind enemy territory. Should there ever be some kind of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union after the war? Literally, no one bothered to think about this and plan for it. And so you had to come up with this heroic after-the-fact innovation later on.

But the World War II planners, a lot of things they did were actually really, really good, and I was, you know, I was very proud. There's a re- -- some of the things that -- some of the policymakers deserved praise who have great historical reputations come out that way. And I think Truman and the Truman administration in particular.

MR. SINGER: Let's -- I want to follow up on that and this goes back to maybe, you know, the kind of question you would have been asked at your time at Harvard. How do we explain, then, not the rule of
not following that guidance but the exceptions where people do the strategy right? Is it, you know, one hypothesis is just extraordinary leaders? You get an Eisenhower and, unfortunately, not everybody's like an Eisenhower, they're the exception to the rule.

Is it something about the planning process that we set up, then, for example, that you actually have a strategic dialogue between the U.S. and the U.K., USMAY and Marshall and the like, and it's that structure that's forcing these kind of conversations. Is it because of the scale of the war, that it's a battle for national survival as opposed to kind of the choices that we have in an Iraq case where we can -- we have choices so we bungle it.

What is the explanation for the exceptions rather than for the rule?

MR. ROSE: Uh, well, the exceptions are so few and far between that it's really hard to draw great lessons from them. But I would say that the -- you have to create kind of factual sort of strong good lessons as well, and, in fact, it's actually relatively easy to create the kind of factuals, and you can ask yourself, gee, this case screwed up because there was a really dumb mistake. What would have prevented that mistake and therefore allowed this case to go -- well, Korea is a perfect example of that.
The Korean War continues for a year and a half longer than it needed to because of some very bad decisions about prisoner repatriation and a failure to understand the specifics on the ground of how prisoner of war camps worked. So an implementation failure or bureaucratic profits failure, and you could say to yourself, gee, never elevate a goal to declare national policy until you've priced it out, right? that would seem like something, a no-brainer, right? Don't declare a goal until you know even roughly what it will actually cost to achieve that. And turns out that Acheson sets a goal, and Truman sets a goal without bothering to see whether it'll screw up a negotiation. They just assume that it won't. It turns out to, and you end up unable to back away from it. So that's interesting.

Uh, I would -- one of the things that make for good success, a president and a national security advisor who know what they're doing and realistically confront the problems around them, that is the indispensable criteria for success. And the -- you know, one of the things that was frankly -- I don't want to be nasty about this -- but one of the things that was shocking to me about the Woodward book was about -- the Woodward book on Obama is worse -- was the way the National Security Council structure didn't really work well, and the relatively detached and nonelite role of the national security advisor and the
nonclose -- I mean if it's one thing we know from the entire literature on national security decision-making, the national security advisor is the second most important person in the government when it comes to national security policy. And the idea that you will pick somebody you know and not have them be directly involved in a major way and just sort of it's not surprising that that sort of didn't go all that well, frankly. And discussions haven't gotten anywhere.

You know, leadership, it sounds bad, but and it's hard to replicate, but, yeah, people who know what they're doing and are prepared to confront realistically and honestly the choices are even, that decision-making process -- decision-making processes aren't a guarantee of success, and you can do everything right on the decision-making process and still have stupid results. But they would seem to be able to help you avoid at least some dumb mistakes.

So I came out a greater fan of process than I was going in, if only because there were so many stupid mistakes that were made that even a rudimentarily serious process would have accomplished. When you think of Iraq 2003, the fact that there was never a single meeting at the highest level of the government at which various courses of action towards Iraq were ever subjected to any kind of rigorous comparative analysis, with cost-benefit discussions or implementation discussions,
that's just insane. I, literally, again one of the reasons I supported the war was because I could never imagine that that kind of lackadaisical, irresponsible approach to national security would be followed. And it's astonishing that it was.

So now, if you would have done everything right, would -- I say in the book -- Cathabins used to say this to me, and he wrote an article about foreign affairs saying this: If you had done Iraq decision-making better, if you had a proper process, you wouldn't have had this bad plans. And I was, like, oh, I don't buy that. But looking it, the onus would have been on the senior policymakers to either pony up for solutions that were appropriate to the scale of the goals they wanted; to decrease the scale of the goals they wanted commensurate with the resources they were prepared to pony-up; or to abandon the operation in the first place.

And at least then you could say, you know what? We told you here's what you have to do, and this is the mismatch between your goals and your resources. And then we all would know, okay, gee, this was the person who responsible for that decision. The fact that you never even had a decision like that was bad.

So let's give someone in the back a chance who had their hands up. Maybe not, then, okay.

Right here in the green.
MR. MARQUEZ: Sir -- my name is Richard Marquez -- I couldn't help but noticing how leaning heavily you are on the robustness of planning going forward, but with any exercise of war, there's just so many variables. Iraq 2003, it goes well the plan in place, as your current factual says, but Abu Ghraib still happens. Prison management happens to be the lowest thing on the priority list. So how do you account for those things? Do you say there's kind of factuals -- perhaps in you book? I haven't had a chance to read it. Diplomacy. Turn the scorpions on each other. If we don't want to go to war, make sure at least their bloodshed occurred. Those kinds of things.

What intel can accomplish in a sense?

MR. ROSE: It's very good answer. Planning is not a panacea, obviously, and things change, and there are all sorts of things that come up. But that's not an excuse for a lack of planning. What, in effect, if you think about -- sometimes policymakers in my cases say to me, "You're way too hard on us. You're way too difficult."

And I say, no. In fact, I cut a lot of slack. Whenever there's new information, whenever there's situations or things that couldn't have been predicted, if there is something that's a functional equivalent to an act of God, then, yes, you can -- you get a buy on that. But you don't get a buy if it's not an act of God. If you walk into traffic and get hit by a car, you
don't get a buy because -- you know, if the car jumps off the road and it goes onto the sidewalk and plows into you, that's not your fault. If you walk into traffic, that's your fault. And planning to know where the streets are and where you walk, you know -- (interruption).

I'm sorry, I don't know --

MR. SINGER: That's one of the policymakers calling you.

MR. ROSE: Nah, it's my wife, the senior policymaker. And a very angry one at that.

MR. ROSE: So I would say is that the planning is -- oh, here's a good example. You mentioned Abu Ghraib. Korea's a perfect example of this. Yes, you're absolutely right. Prison camps are always the lowest - uh, uh bureaucratic politics tells us prison camps are the least important function of the army because everyone wants to be a warrior, you couldn't be further away from being a warrior than, than guarding prisoners.

So what does that mean? Well, if you understand that, you don't make your entire national policy dependent on properly-run prisoner of war camps, as we did in Korea. You look at Korea, basically the Korean prisoner of war camps were Abu Ghraib with kimchi. And this -- no one would know about this if we hadn't made prisoner repatriation the single policy that held up the war for a year and a half. People who don't
know the Korean repatriation story really should go read the chapter. It's not mine, I drew on all the work that's been done since the archives have been open, Rosemary Foote and Calvin McDonald, and a lot of good historians have worked this stuff. But nobody except the historians who deeply work in Korea.

Everything you know about Korea is about the first year, and then nobody, no studies the second, the last two years, and this stuff is really interesting, and it's all about sort of planning to know what you're going to do.

In Iraq, it was not rocket science to know that once you took out the government of Iraq there was going to be chaos on the ground. In fact, the Army War College -- the study after study after study. I'm at the Council on Foreign Relations, okay, this is Brookings. Uh, you think of Carnegie. We all know these blue ribbon reports, right? Everyone here has taken part heavily, so that I'm sure Bill Nash has done several of these kind of major task forces and reports. Okay, these things are lowest common denominator of products that represent the establishment's conventional wisdom. You can't get more pretty basic and obvious than that, right?

There were several -- you can't -- you couldn't throw a dart in early 2003 without hitting some blue ribbon panel report telling you to pay
attention to political order in postwar Iraq. And they all said exactly the same thing: Figure out what you need. Figure out who's going to supply it. Plan now for how to deal with it. And everyone just tossed this stuff.

The Army War College did a fantastic study. In fact, this is largely what Shinseki was drawing on, we think, when he made his comment. It wasn't pulled out of his buddy, he was -- he read the report. Gee, we'll need several hundred thousand troops. These are (inaudible) to guard. And you could see the executive summary. This is two months before the war, the executive summary of the War College report on postwar Iraq. It spells out everything you're actually going to see and says if you want to go in and take Saddam out, you should have a plan for dealing with all this. And they just didn't -- they just ignored all that.

So it's not that plans give everything. It still would have been difficult, right, it still -- by the way, I'm not saying there was an easy answer. The answer was something like colonizing Iraq for a substantial period of time in the hope that that would allow you the space to create a domestic government to which you could then gradually pass thing onto. The very difficulty of that prospect, the very lengthy and expensive and politically crazy cost of that was what made everyone run and scream in the opposite direction. But again, if you're not prepared to pony-up for even that, you shouldn't have done the war in the first place.
So planning is not a panacea, but it's a possibility. And where you can't plan, you should have a sort of relatively robust capacity. The great investor, Benjamin Graham, Warren Buffet's mentor, had a capacity called "the margin of safety." And his point was, investing was, you know what? If you buy a stock thinking it's going to go up, you may be right. And, in fact, if you're wise when you do that, you'll make money when you sell it when it goes up.

But just in case you're wrong, use the parts of the company should be able to be sold for less -- for more than you're buying it at because if you could do that, then even if it doesn't go up, you'll still actually have something worthwhile. And that creates a margin of safety that will be a cushion. So you're not on the line. So your planning can give you a nice generous margin of safety so that even if you have some surprises, you know, you actually can weather them a little bit better. You don't want to have --

You know, Clausewitzian friction. We all know Clausewitzian friction, I'm a perfect example of it, I'm late every goddamned day of my life, but you know, what? A proper understood concept of friction means you build your plans in with a relatively generous cushion of various things to accommodate for that, and you scale their goals down to what's available. You keep it simple, stupid, and you do
things like that. If we were to approach again, it's not rocket science, and
if you do just what professional best practices say, you'll be so far ahead
of the game of what historically we've actually done that everybody in
forum like this will bow down and say, yes, you were wonderful.

MR. SINGER: All right, the last question over here on the
left.

SPEAKER: I work in a small think tank directly for the head
of the United States Air Force. But I should probably tell, I'm a bit of an
infiltrator from --

SPEAKER: Could you speak up, please?

SPEAKER: Yeah, certainly.

MR. ANDREW: I'm Dean Andrew. I work in the head of the
Air Force's Strategic Studies group. I'm from the U.K. My job and my role
is to look beyond five years out to 20 or 30 years and beyond that.
Although I do smile very wryly, as I've spent the last 20 years or so
involved in either Iraq or Afghanistan, either or on the ground or flying over
the Taliban, And I smile because what you're saying is very true.

However, Peter sort of stole my question, unfortunately. I
would like to ask one thing, though, about Germany. I don't sign up to the
fact that you kick Germany back in the first World War, because you know,
since the war was not fought on Germany in the first World War, but for
the second World War in particular, I would like to ask you whether you think the fact that after the concentration camps were found two years before the end of the war, three years before the end of the war and the coalition, the alliance decided that firmly unconditional surrender would be sufficient to end the war, therefore there was a defined end state to which everybody could push for, something that I would argue is perhaps lacking, was lacking in Iraq, potentially lacking in Afghanistan whether that defined instinct makes it easier to conclude a war and be able to plan for what you say shouldn't be called baseball but what happens afterwards.

I'm tied to that little bit, if, and as you know you can tell I'm not an American, is there historical examples where a war or a conflict that started under one administration struggled, if there is a change in that administration during the course of its execution, struggles to find an end state that is suitable for the American people?

MR. ROSE: Well, the first part I would say that unconditional surrender was not an end state, it was a weigh station. Unconditional surrender was simply an end to the fighting; it didn't actually say anything at all about -- it was a null set. It was a placeholder. We bracketed the postwar settlement. Unconditional surrender was a way to keep your alliance together with the lowest common denominator plan until the
actual fighting was done. But it didn't specify what you would do with Germany once the unconditional surrender was achieved.

So unconditional surrender was an end to the guns, but it wasn't an end to the creation of a postwar order, which is why in World War II, the creation of the postwar order takes another five years or so because you're then stuck in Germany saying, well, people what do we want to do now? And so unconditional surrender, you know, it was a useful way of keeping your alliance together, and there were, I don't think, significant downsides because you really couldn't imagine and shouldn't have imagined dealing with the old regime in Germany.

So you might as well say, you know what? We're going to get rid of you and think about what to do later. As long as you're powerful enough to actually achieve that, it was actually, I think, a good thing to do. Most of the criticisms of American policy in World War II, the revisionist criticisms of Warneker and other have not held up well at all. There are problems hat they have in World War II, Roosevelt should have brought Truman into the planning more. They should have figured out how to deal with the Soviet Union after the fact. There are some moral issues you can deal with here and there.

But, by and large, unconditional surrender was a logical way -- it's hard to -- imagine unconditional surrender is best understood as an
alliance management provision. How do you keep two alliance partners with fundamentally or very different goals together until their primary goal of defeating the common enemy is complete? And that was a way of bracketing that. It was again a logical, almost a game theoretic device, and I think that's how it was understood and should be understood.

As for the, you know, the question of change of administrations, that can be useful, it can be not useful. It can be an -- you know, we tend to overemphasize the extent to which things are in control of the decision-makers at the top once the war has gotten underway.

There's an old joke about a guy who goes hiking in the forest and gets lost. And he finds himself in a clearing, and he stumbles into a house in the clearing, and he knocks on the door, a guy comes out, and he says, "Excuse me, I'm completely lost. Can you tell me how to get back to town?"

And the guy looks at him, pauses, and says, "Well, first thing is I wouldn't start from here."

You know, when you have a change of administration during war, that's almost a pretty guaranteed sign that the war has not been going badly. That's one of the reasons why you have a change of administration, and the new people coming in are not miracle workers. If
there was -- you know, in relatively well-functioning democracies, if there is a hundred-dollar bill lying on the ground, it's usually picked up, so if it looks like it's there, it's not there. So the idea that there was some great answer to Iraq that the Obama administration could pick up because it didn't have one, because the Bush administration had been ignoring it by for eight years, or six years, not true.

The same thing with the Nixon and Kissinger approach in Vietnam. I mean you stop doing something dumb under Johnson, but you didn't have a great answer to, now what do we do?

So the idea that, oh, Obama made it his war, or Nixon made it his war. You're the president of a country. If you take over a wartime thing, and you're stuck with no plan to get out, that's your predecessor's fault.

By the way, you were talking about, you know, cutting people slack. I give policymakers who inherit a crappy situation a hell of a lot of slack. People are surprised when they read the book because I'm actually pretty kind to Nixon and Kissinger, because if you look at the situation they inherited, it was an awful situation. The Johnson administration does not get nearly enough blame, and the Nixon and Kissinger administration gets a lot more blame than they deserve for Vietnam. And what they did was they chose a sort of moderate glide path
out, and it almost worked. It's a pretty -- you know, you could better in Vietnam than Nixon and Kissinger did, spell it out, because I've read every single damned thing on the subject, and I haven't seen a treatment that actually spelled out a better scenario for what the Nixon administration could and should have done.

In fact, the one serious historian I talked to about this who claimed they could find that, and he said, you know what? I agree with you that it hasn't been done, but I want to do it. I said, "Great. Write it up for me in Foreign Affairs." So we may see that in Foreign Affairs in the next year or so.

But basically, it's very tough once you're in, and I would say that it's not the change of administrations that allows you to get out; it's the change of administrations that gives a new team a chance to look at the same old dilemmas. And by that point, if you've screwed it up late in the game, you know, the time to fix things is in the beginning before you start rather than -- so you know. And so people, you know -- in fact, my publishers are very upset with me about this because, you know, everyone's always looking for great answers on Afghanistan because we're in this war and we ought to end it.

The real fact is that a careful look at this subject shows that if you've gotten yourself into this situation, you're kind of screwed because
the choices all suck, and there is no silver bullet. There are only bad options. You can make your the least bad option and take your way out as best you can. You can confront the choices seriously, but you want to get yourself in a good way to end a war, plan from the beginning before you get in. And if you haven't done that, you're going to find yourself in a difficult situation.

So, frankly, the lessons in the book really are more appropriate to the next war than they are to the current wars, except to remind us how we got into a mess the way we do.

MR. SINGER: It's as perfect ending point, and so please join me in --

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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