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IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Well, I think we'll go ahead and begin and I wanted to welcome everyone here. My name is Michael O'Hanlon. I'm a senior fellow at Brookings. And we're delighted to have you here to discuss the New START Treaty and the future of nuclear deterrence, nuclear safety, nuclear arms control. And we have a very good panel that's discussed these issues before publicly and in a working group last year that the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings ran to discuss these issues with you this morning.

So I'm delighted to see everybody here struggling back after a Thanksgiving weekend. I think we can formally mark today, also, as the end of the Washington Redskins' season, so that allows us to fully embark on a discussion of topics like this as we await the return of our senators and members of Congress for the rest of the lame duck session during which the New START Treaty is on the agenda.

I'm just going to say a couple words of introduction about our panelist, a couple words of introduction about the treaty itself, and then we'll just run down the line with presentations of about 8 to 10 minutes each. And again, we're talking about the New START Treaty, recently signed this year and awaiting Senate consideration. But we'll also be talking more generally about the future of nuclear weapons. And we have different relative emphases on those two questions. And, of course, you're invited to raise whichever parts of the broader subject you'd like in discussion.

Sitting to my left is Steve Pifer, who is my colleague here at Brookings and one of the nation's expert negotiators and practitioners as well as academics on nuclear arms control. A former member of the State Department, worked a great deal on

the inside process of treaty negotiations during his time in government. Also was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, and has written prolifically since coming to Brookings a couple years ago on the future of arms control. And I will briefly take the liberty of advertising his recent paper, "The New Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START." But, of course, we're not quite there yet. So again, much of today's discussion will also be on New START, and I think Steve will make a case largely in support of the treaty.

Going down the line, Keith Payne is the president and CEO and founder of the National Institute for Public Policy. And you'll find many of its publications and information at nipp.org. He is the author of *The Great American Gamble*. He is a foremost expert on nuclear deterrence, former Pentagon official, and also a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. And again, I was honored to be part of this working group last year with Keith, who is extraordinarily thought-provoking and perhaps will raise some different points of view on the future of New START and arms control from what you will have heard up until that point.

Tom Donnelly is at the American Enterprise Institute and also a distinguished author who has written a number of books, largely on ground forces and conventional combat. But all the more reason why I think it's very important to have Tom on the panel because he brings, of course, a perspective on the interrelationship between different military forces, different military capabilities, and the relative role of nuclear weapons in broader national security policy. And Tom's forthcoming paper is "Toward a New, New Look: Strategy and Forces for the Third Nuclear Age." His most recent book is a 2010 publication with Fred Kagan, *Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields*.

And before turning it over to Steve Pifer, I'll briefly mention that my most recent book on this general subject is called *A Skeptics Case for Nuclear Disarmament*, trying to address this issue of the long-term future of nuclear weapons and the vision that President Obama, along with people like George Schultze and Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and Bill Perry and Ronald Reagan, have articulated or a world someday free of nuclear weapons, whether that would be a good thing, a feasible thing, or in any way relevant to the near-term issues on the agenda today for the United States in any case.

So let me briefly remind you just in two sentences that this New START Treaty that is now being considered by the Senate would lower our overall deployed strategic forces by somewhere between 10 and 30 percent, depending on how you do the counting and how the two countries -- Russia and the United States -- would choose to posture their forces. It would not affect tactical nuclear weapons, meaning, of course, short-range weapons; surplus nuclear weapons; weapons that are in a stockpile but not directly associated with any particular war plan or delivery vehicle; or missile defense, even though there's been, as you know, a great deal of controversy about even the mention in the treaty's preamble to the possible association in Russian eyes between missile defenses and offensive arms. And that's become a subject of controversy, but there are no binding restrictions whatsoever on missile defense in the treaty.

There is no differential distinguishing between a nuclear-armed long-range ICBM or SLBM, a long-range missile, and a conventionally armed one. And for those people who are interested in the question whether we can put conventional warheads on previously nuclear-specific systems, there is no particular allowance for that, so if you do that, it counts against your treaty limits. These are just a few of the little nitty-gritty points that will probably come up in discussion.

But again, to emphasize the big picture, we're looking at 10 to 30 percent reductions in deployed strategic forces and a resumption of the verification measures that are now lapsing from previous arms control accords. That's the basic immediate issue, but we'll be talking more generally about everything under the sun that's nuclear.

And with that, I will turn things over to Steve Pifer.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Mike. I'm happy to be here to talk a little bit about both the New START Treaty, but then what comes after it, what's the next step. And let me just begin by reminding you what the three basic limits in the New START Treaty are.

First, the United States and Russia would be limited to no more than 1,550 strategic warheads. That would be warheads on ICBMs -- intercontinental ballistic missiles -- on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and then each heavy bomber would count as 1 under the 1,550 count. There's a second limit, which is each side can deploy no more than 700 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. And then a third limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. A non-deployed launcher would, for example, be a ballistic missile submarine tube with no missile in it. And that actually is relevant to the U.S. Navy because typically two of our ballistic missile submarines are in long-term overhaul with no missiles on board. Those would not count into the 700 limit, but they would count as non-deployed launchers under the 800 limit.

Let me talk just for a moment about why I believe that the New START Treaty is in the U.S. interest and why I hope it will be ratified and entered into force fairly quickly. First of all, it will reduce and cap the level of Russian strategic nuclear forces. Now, I don't lie awake late at night worrying about a Russian nuclear attack, but I think that Americans are safer and more secure if the Russian force is reduced and limited.

Second, the New START Treaty contains a wide range of verification measures -- detailed data exchange, notifications, onsite inspections -- that are going to give the U.S. military a lot more information about Russian strategic forces than the U.S. military would otherwise have. And that means the U.S. military will be in a position where it can avoid worst-case assumptions. It can make smarter decisions about how it equips and operates American strategic nuclear forces.

Third, although the treaty will require some reductions on the U.S. side, in fact, the Department of Defense has looked very carefully at how it could make use of the full numbers allowed to it under New START, and the result will be a U.S. strategic deterrent that is very agile, survivable, and robust, capable of deterring attack both against the United States and also against American allies.

And fourth, bringing the New START Treaty into force is going to strengthen the U.S. hand in terms of raising the bar against proliferation. And it's also going to contribute to a stronger U.S.-Russia relationship. And we've already seen over the last 15 months how as the New START Treaty's been developed you've seen a better relationship with Moscow that has yielded some specific benefits in terms of Russia helping to provide more access to provide supplies to American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. And I think most importantly, over the last year and a half, you've seen Russia take a much tougher attitude towards Iran on the nuclear question than was the case in the previous 7 years. And I think that flows from the reset which has been driven to a fair degree by the New START Treaty.

I do believe that the New START Treaty's going to be ratified in the end. I think the arguments in its favor are compelling. And I guess, at the end of the day, it's difficult for me to see how serious Republican senators in the end can justify opposing a

treaty that has been supported unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commander of Strategic Command who operates all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, by seven of his predecessors, and by every senior serious Republican statesman, every Republican former Secretary of State, former Secretary of Defense, and former National Security Advisor who has spoken out on the New START Treaty has endorsed it.

So I'm optimistic regarding the ratification and entry into force. I'm not smart enough to say whether it'll happen in the lame duck session or sometime in 2011. I hope it will happen sooner because I think gaining access to the verification measures in New START and the transparency measures in that treaty will begin to give us information about Russian strategic forces that we have not been receiving now for the last year, since START I lapsed in December of 2009.

But I think whether the treaty comes into force or when it comes into force there is the question what comes next? And President Obama has already said that he envisages a step-by-step process of reducing nuclear forces. I'm not sure the Russians are all that enthusiastic about further cuts, but they have nominally committed in joint statements to such a step-by-step process.

And when you get into that, you have to look at a number of questions that may arise. You know, some of them are predictable. One, you know, what would be the level of deployed strategic warheads under a new treaty? Would the sides want to go below 1,550 and, if so, how far?

Second, if you're going to reduce strategic warheads, would you also want to reduce strategic delivery vehicles and strategic launchers below the 700 and 800 limits in New START?

But also going beyond that, I think the sides are going to get into some

new territory. President Obama when he signed the New START Treaty in April of this year said that the next round should address non-strategic and non-deployed strategic weapons. And that's going to get the sides into some new territory. Negotiating limits on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is not going to be easy for a couple of reasons. First of all, the Russians have a large numerical advantage. And whenever you have this kind of disparity it's always difficult to negotiate an equal outcome. Moreover, though, the Russians, because they perceive that their conventional forces have disadvantages vis-à-vis NATO and China, in effect the Russians have adopted NATO nuclear strategy from the 1960s and 1970s and now see tactical nuclear weapons as an offset to conventional disadvantages. So that's going to complicate a negotiation on non-strategic forces.

Moreover, you're going to have, I think, new verification challenges. When you look at the New START Treaty a lot of the verification measures there are really centered on strategic warheads associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. When you begin to talk about tactical weapons you're likely to talk about weapons that have been denated. They're not with delivery systems. They're sitting somewhere in bunkers. And that's going to pose a set of verification challenges that neither the United States or Russia have had to grapple with before.

Likewise, when you talk about non-deployed strategic warheads you're talking about warheads separated from their missiles. It's going to have new verification challenges, although there may be kind of an interesting dynamic on the non-deployed strategic warhead side, and that is because that would be likely an area of U.S. numerical advantage. The United States plans to achieve most of its limits under the New START by downloading missiles that is keeping the missiles, but taking the warheads off. So, for

example, the Minuteman III ICBM, which can carry three warheads, will be deployed under New START with just a single warhead. Now, they'll take those extra warheads and they'll be stored somewhere. They won't be eliminated in the immediate future and that would give the United States the potential, should the Russians, for example, violate the treaty, to put those warheads back on, to upload warheads.

The Russians appear to be reducing their forces by eliminating missiles and keeping their residual missiles with full warhead sets, so they're not going to have that sort of capability. And that U.S. advantage in terms of non-deployed strategic warheads may offer a bit of bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Russian advantage on the tactical side.

Other questions that may come up, the Russians, I suspect, will raise missile defense again in the next round of negotiations. And I think there is potentially a dilemma for the administration because the Russians will seek or I believe will seek some kind of constraints on missile defense. I don't detect any interest on the part of the administration in negotiating on limits on missile defense. And I think the administration also understands that any treaty on strategic offensive arms that were to contain meaningful constraints on missile defense would be dead on arrival when it went to the Senate for ratification. So there is this potential box here.

The one way out may have been articulated about eight days ago at Lisbon when Russian President Medvedev met with NATO leaders and expressed interest in working towards NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense. And if you could have, in fact, genuine cooperation between the United States, NATO, and Russia on missile defense to provide missile defense protection for Europe, including European Russian that might change the whole dynamic surrounding the missile defense question.

One other issue that might come up in the next round would be the question of third country nuclear forces, particularly those of Britain, France, and China. And the lower that you push U.S. and Russian numbers, the greater the pressures will be to bring other countries in, although my sense is that U.S. Administration folks would like to have one more negotiation that would focus just on U.S.-Russian forces before you got into the much more complex dynamic of bringing in other countries and making those negotiations multilateral.

Finally, these issues I address in the paper that Mike mentioned at the beginning, which is either now or will shortly be up on the Brookings website, and talking about the next round. And in exploring the issues the paper also talks about what might be a U.S. position for the next round. And what I would suggest is looking for a limit of 2,500 total nuclear weapons counting everything except those weapons that are in the queue for dismantlement. So that would include strategic, it would include tactical, and it would include both deployed and non-deployed. And then within that 2,500 limit there would be a sublimit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads that would correspond to the 1,550 limit in the New START Treaty. And what that structure would do is basically allow a tradeoff where the United States might have an advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads or the Russians might have an advantage in tactical weapons in the context of an overall limit providing for equality.

Now, I think I should add that in that kind of a limitation regime, you would likely have a two-tiered verification system in which you would have high confidence in your ability to monitor the limits on deployed strategic warheads, but you would have much less confidence in your ability to monitor limits on tactical warheads or on non-deployed strategic warheads. And I think, in the end, although that's an imperfect

verification scheme, it may be worth taking it because it gives you at least some limits and some reductions on Russian tactical weapons and some monitoring in contrast to the current system where, in fact, there are no constraints on Russian tactical weapons and absolutely no monitoring. And then hopefully, as you go through that verification scheme, you gather experience and expertise that would allow you to form a smarter verification system for later on.

This kind of agreement, I think, would allow -- would require further reductions on the Russian side, but would still allow the United States to maintain a robust deterrent and would still allow us to keep the strategic triad, although I think at that point when you're talking about a thousand warheads you begin to come up under a little bit of stress on the triad and the Pentagon probably has to make some decisions that will be a bit painful. But in any case, just to swing back to the starting point, all of this is the next step. The first step really is moving forward in the immediate future to ratification of the New START Treaty.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Steve. Keith, over to you.

MR. PAYNE: Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here this morning. I'd like to thank Michael and Steven and Brookings for the invitation to speak. As a good academic I usually look out 10 to 15 to 50 years in my discussions and writings, but today because New START is an immediate concern and a subject of immediate attention I'd like to comment on the process that has gone along with New START in Washington because I think in this case the process has been important to the substance of the debate.

Obama Administration efforts to garner Senate support for ratification of this New START Treaty have met greater than expected resistance. And this resistance

follows primarily from concerns about the various loopholes in the treaty's limits on forces, its narrow but explicit limits on missile defense and non-nuclear strategic missiles, and also the treaty's significant weakening of START's past verification provisions. But it may well be that the opposition to New START and this resistance that we see has as much to do with the administration's mode of promoting the treaty as it does with the substance.

Senior members of the administration have contributed to skepticism about New START by engaging in a pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection about the treaty while simultaneously being dismissive of reasonable treaty concerns identified by knowledgeable commentators. For example, even before Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the treaty in April of 2010, some U.S. commentators expressed concern that the administration would agree in New START to limits on missile defense. Russian commentators fanned this flame by frequently claiming that the treaty would indeed limit U.S. defenses.

In response the administration assured all that there would be no such limits whatsoever. New START was to be a treaty on strategic offensive forces, not on defensive forces. During an April 29 press conference to explain New START, Ellen Tauscher, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, stated, and I quote, "The treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. This treaty is about offensive strategic weapons." And, "There is no limit or constraint on what the United States can do with its missile defense system." Further, "There are no constraints to missile defense."

Yet the actual text of the treaty shows Russian commentators and U.S. skeptics to be correct. New START's Article 5, paragraph 3 explicitly limits some U.S.

missile defense options. And the treaty establishes a bilateral commission wherein missile defense can be subject of further ongoing secret discussions and possible limitation. The administration has repeated the false claim of no limits on missile defense so often and so definitively that the claim continues to be erroneously presented as fact by journalists and commentators sympathetic to New START.

Several U.S. commentators similarly express concerns that the administration would allow Russia to gain limits on perspective U.S. non-nuclear strategic forces under New START. Senior military commanders for years have pressed for non-nuclear strategic forces for prompt global strike, and the U.S. Senate specifically warned against any such limits in New START. Undersecretary Tauscher again assured that, "There is no effect for prompt global strike in the treaty. Very much like missile defense it doesn't have any constraints to it."

The White House factsheet on New START posted on March 26th also assured us that, "The treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities." This carefully nuanced statement is precisely correct, but wholly misleading. It would have been impossible to constrain U.S. current or planned capabilities for a prompt global strike because no current or planned public program for deployment existed. In fact, the treaty explicitly constrains select options for these prospective weapons by counting them as if they were strategic nuclear warheads and launchers and limiting them under the treaty's ceiling on deployed nuclear warheads and launchers.

The pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection is not limited to the two critical issues of missile defense and non-nuclear strategic forces. Soon after the

treaty text became available several commentators observed that rail-mobile ICBMs -- an old Russian favorite -- were not specifically defined in the treaty (inaudible) as they had been in the previous START agreement. This raised the concern that rail-mobile ICBMs had been carefully excluded from the treaty's limits. Administration officials and treaty supporters in general dismissed this concern as absurd. Yet when the Senate demanded that the U.S. specifically state that the treaty does indeed limit rail-mobile ICBMs, Constantine Kosachev, the chairman of the Russian Duma committee responsible for treaties, stated in response that such a U.S. claim compelled the Duma to stop action on the treaty. He noted critically, and I quote, "The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built." Apparently this problem identified early on by some commentators is not so outlandish.

The pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection also extends to the repeated administration claims that New START will reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads by the usual quote, and I quote, "and the usual number is about 30 percent below the 2,200 maximum that was in the 2002 Moscow Treaty." However, the specific terms of the treaty actually permit the number of nuclear weapons to move higher than the 2,200 maximum under the previous Moscow treaty. Despite the administration's repeated claims of 30 percent reductions, New START would permit an increase in the number of strategic nuclear weapons because under New START all the weapons on a bomber would count as only one warhead, even though some bombers are capable of carrying many more. Long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles, possibly on submarines and ships, wouldn't be captured at all.

A Russian strategic expert, Mikhail Obonov, described this sleight of hand regarding New START's supposed reductions as, and I quote, "nothing short of

fraudulent and clearly designed to mislead the public." Nevertheless, the near universal talking point about New START is this erroneous claim that it will reduce the number of nuclear warheads. Usually the claim is by 30 percent.

Similarly, the Obama Administration has made much of the fact that New START requires reductions not only in nuclear warheads, but in the number of strategic launchers: ICBMs, bombers, and submarine tubes carrying those warheads. A fact that the administration typically has left unsaid in this regard, however, is that according to Russia's own count of its strategic launchers as presented in the open Russian press, Russia is already well below New START launcher limits and is headed lower with or without the treaty. In short, New START's strategic launcher limits impose reductions only on the United States.

Senator Kit Bond made this point during a Senate floor speech on November 18th. The State Department immediately responded with a continuation of mischaracterization and misdirection. I quote the response: "The treaty does not force the United States to reduce unilaterally. Rather, the treaty imposes equal limits on both parties." Here the administration rightly claims that New START mandates common limits on launchers, but erroneously denies the fact that the U.S. alone must reduce its number of launchers to meet those limits. Russia would have to build up its forces to do so.

Finally, the administration now claims that the lame duck Senate must ratify New START immediately lest U.S. national security be seriously endangered. Yet Secretary of Defense Gates has stated repeatedly that Russia poses no military threat to us or our allies. So why the urgency? This bit of illogic remains unexplained and even *The Washington Post* labels such administration claims of urgency as, and I quote,

"overstatement and hyperbole."

Perhaps the administration's apparent treaty mischaracterization and misdirection would be less noxious if it was not also frequently so dismissive of the concerns raised by U.S. commentators. Unfortunately, there are numerous illustrations of this behavior. For example, an assistant secretary of state reportedly observed that no one with any, and I quote, "pedigree" has raised concerns about New START. This dismissive characterization manages to be simultaneously insulting and arrogant and nonsensical when notables, such as James Woolsey, the director of Central Intelligence under President Clinton, former Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph, and former Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman have all raised serious concerns about the treaty.

In addition, Undersecretary Tauscher often refers to concerns about the treaty as red herrings. And in testimony before the Senate on June 17th, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that those expressing concerns, and I quote, "just don't believe in arms control treaties at all and, from my perspective, are very unfortunately slanting a lot of what they say." So dismissing skeptics' concerns has been the administration's consistent mode of operation with regard to New START. Ironic given its own pattern of mischaracterization and misdirection and its calls for bipartisanship.

Now, politics is a game of hardball. And as President Harry Truman famously observed, if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen. Treaty skeptics do not need nor expect cheers from the administration. But the administration might ultimately fare better with New START and even advance arms control a step if it shifted its current mode of operation and instead engaged concerns about the treaty seriously and thoughtfully. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: And thank you, Keith, for a very thoughtful presentation. Tom, over to you.

MR. DONNELLY: Thanks, Mike. Keith very kindly set aside the art of the long term in his presentation, so I'm going to take that as my theme. But before I do that, I have got two words to say on START. In addition, as Michael said in his introduction, to being more a student of conventional military power and thus a student of warfare as opposed to all things nuclear, for my sins, a former congressional staffer and thus a political hack who can count votes and who's read the Constitution recently, and as an employee of the House of Representatives I'm also painfully aware of the rules of the Senate. So I want to talk about the near-term politics of the START deal as a way of suggesting why there's unlikely to be a vote during a lame duck and to look ahead a bit.

I think the administration could have had and, as Steve suggested, ultimately will get Senate ratification of the treaty, but they've not seriously engaged in making any concessions or any deal-making, particularly with Senator Jon Kyl, who is a man of pedigree when it comes to nuclear issues and the leading figure in opposition to the treaty as it currently stands. He's signaled the issues very clearly that he wants to be satisfied about and I think certainly the senator himself, but also his representatives have suggested that what his price is, in particular on upgrading missile defense investments and making a serious investment in the modernization of the nuclear infrastructure, not just for the purposes of enabling a test ban for the Test Ban Treaty, but actually modernizing the infrastructure in the event that the United States sees fit to produce nuclear warheads in the future. I think that's a reasonable price. It is certainly Senator Kyl's price.

But the Obama Administration, having governed keeping 60 Senate

votes in mind up until this point, has reached a juncture where it needs 67 votes and can't get them. And Senator Kyl is likely to be able to get -- have more influence and to be able to get more of what he wants in the coming session of Congress. So I would say there's very little incentive for Senator Kyl to reach an agreement at this juncture unless the Obama Administration is willing to move the needle pretty substantially and make more commitments than it's been willing to make thus far and the President himself is willing to engage in these negotiations or deal with it at a much higher level than the administration has done heretofore. You know, the President's priorities have been elsewhere and I just -- this is sort of like an expanded version of the Korea free trade deal in the sense that you can't get there from here in the time remaining. So that would be, I think, the one note that I could contribute about the current START debate.

But to lift our eyes up a little bit and look a little bit more to the larger picture and in the longer term, the connection between nuclear issues and the larger questions of international politics and military correlations of forces, as the Soviets used to say, are becoming much more interrelated than they have been certainly during the late years of Cold War when it was the presumption that nuclear weapons were qualitatively different, particularly the arsenals at the levels that the Soviet Union and the United States enjoyed during the salad years of tens of thousands of warheads quite capable of eradicating all human life on the planet, et cetera, et cetera. Well, those days are gone, but it's also the case that the sort of bipolar international system of which the nuclear balance was a reflection is also a thing of the past.

Why are we negotiating so assiduously with the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union is entirely unlike the United States except in the number of nuclear weapons that it has. And the Soviet Union is an ex-superpower, a demographically collapsing

state, a political imploded empire, domestically it's politics are highly unrepresentative to put it euphemistically, and its economy is a resource-extraction economy on a larger scale, but not qualitatively different than other second or third rate countries on the planet.

By contrast, the world that we see coming in the 21st century, the multi-polar world that everybody talks about, features more prominently the rise of the People's Republic of China as an international global great power. A step behind that, the rise of India, but with many other factors that complicate international politics and are being propelled by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Now, the administration, quite rightly, spends a lot of time talking about proliferation, nuclear anti-proliferation efforts as a way to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors, again to use the term of social science euphemism. And that's a seriously terrifying prospect, so that's quite reasonable and no sensible American would stand against that. Of course, this treaty has almost nothing to do with that.

The second feature of our nuclear future that we can clearly see is the rise of otherwise weak, second-rate powers, with Iran and North Korea being the leading edge examples of aspiring and small nuclear states who are constantly building larger arsenals. The efforts to contain North Korea's program, as we just heard again in recent weeks, has not been successful. Likewise, it's highly unlikely that any effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and then of obtaining a militarily significant arsenal -- again, not measured in the thousands or tens of thousands of warheads, but certainly measured in the dozens, if not low hundreds -- over the course of time seems highly unlikely.

And those data points, those facts, are creating uncertainty and instability and new questions about the need for nuclear weapons among not only other opponents and enemies and adversaries of the United States, such as Venezuela and Hugo Chavez' regime, but among America's friends. The conversation that we've heard, and as the WikiLeak stories over the weekend suggest, the prospect of an Iranian bomb is deeply terrifying to the Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf region and other possibly unsavory, but long-term strategic partners, if you will, of the United States. Secretary Clinton, I think quite rightly, but without much discussion, extended an offer of deterrence to the Gulf states about 15 months ago, and that pressure is likely to expand. The demand for American security guarantees in the face of nuclear proliferation is already increasing and is likely to increase evermore as time goes forward.

And finally, as I suggested, the larger great power competition will inevitably lead to modernization and expansion of now small arsenals, as we see in China, in India, in Pakistan, for example, although where exactly in what category, if not all three categories that I've laid out. One should put Pakistan -- would be a subject for yet another panel.

But at any rate, this is by any measure and by many measures an entirely different future than our Cold War past. All the things that we told ourselves were stable and predictable and negotiable about the Cold War past do not obtain in the future. I noted in Steve's presentation that one of the great debates in the negotiating community is when do you expand the realm of negotiations to include third parties? An interesting question, but, as Steve suggested, a much more nettlesome and complex set of negotiations that, again, I think will make our Cold War ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union and after the Cold War with Russia look like child's play. The fact is there is

no international consensus for nuclear disarmament and that's the only way one could explain the behavior of those who feel threatened by American convention power and who have their own regional ambitions or own domestic regime stability ambitions as the North Koreans do.

So if we're so uncertain about what the future is going to be like, except to say that it's going to be deeply unlike our past experience, why should we be continued to be locked like two scorpions in a bottle, to use the Cold War metaphor, with the Russians? We don't know what's coming and that's exactly the point. We don't know what kind of arsenal we will need, although we do know that the need to respond to very different nuclear crises and potentially nuclear use and in the face of very different nuclear threats is a certainty.

So why should we continue to go down this road with the Russians? Even if the START Treaty itself is ultimately ratified, it doesn't really address the most pressing nuclear questions that face us now and will face us in the future. And we don't know what kind and what array of nuclear capabilities we will need. But again, it's almost certain that we will need some form, probably more varied forms, of nuclear weapons ourselves.

So now's a good time to open the aperture, to take the longer view, and ask ourselves not what deal can we reach with the Russians, but what set of deals, what kind of arms control agreements will actually secure Americans in the future, and what kind of deterrent arsenal do we need to respond to a future that's almost impossibly different from the past? Here endeth the lesson.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Tom. We're anxious to get you involved in the discussion. I'm going to use my mini-presentation now to make a couple of

comments in support of New START and then we'll go straight to a discussion. And I think other panelists may want to comment in the course of that on each other's remarks as well and we'll engage you in that conversation.

I think as I expected there have been some very thoughtful comments from various perspectives on this issues. And I for one would also like to say as a supporter of the treaty that I think Senator Kyl is being entirely sincere and serious in the issues that he raises. I think that there is not politics in what he's doing. And Republicans in the last two years have proven that they're willing to be supportive of President Obama on foreign policy issues in general, where they agree with him. The politics have been largely relegated to domestic and economic matters. This is not a defense of either party's overall approach, but it is a little bit of an affirmation of the old adage that politics should stop at the water's edge. Actually historically, politics usually does not stop at the water's edge. But I've been struck by how much in the last two years we've had some bipartisan accord on issues like Iraq and Afghanistan and sanctions on Iran, and I'm going to come back to that in just a second. And so I think in general I take at face value Senator Kyl's arguments, that he has the kinds of questions on his mind that Keith Payne and Tom Donnelly have raised today as opposed to wondering whether this is the moment to give the Obama Administration a political boost or not.

Having said that, let me now make a few arguments of New START. And I think easily the most important is that, in fact, the Obama Administration is correct when it says that New START has helped improve U.S.-Russia strategic cooperation in general on other issues. The treaty, in my mind, while it can be critiqued here and there -- and Keith's done a very good job on some specific points -- nonetheless is generally

solid enough that I don't worry about whether in theory the bomber loophole could allow one side or the other to theoretically increase its forces. And I'm not too worried about how one particular way we could deploy missile defense may be constrained because the overall possibilities for missile defense are generally wide open for American and Russian consideration. But what I'm interested in is seeing that the U.S.-Russia relationship is actually, I think, much improved.

And this is not, by the way, a critique of how the U.S.-Russia relationship or arms control were handled under George W. Bush. I actually agreed with President George W. Bush, with his approach to arms control, which was essentially to say the U.S.-Russia strategic detail shouldn't matter anymore the way they used to. Let's just do a three-page treaty. Let's agree among gentlemen, Mr. Putin and Mr. Bush, to reduce forces a little bit. We don't need all that verification. We don't need all these lengthy consultations. Let's just do something fast. And that happened in May 2002 in Russia in the SORT Treaty, as you may recall. But, unfortunately, over time it didn't really seem to work in the sense that it did not improve the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship adequately. And I think this was primarily because Russia wasn't fully ready to move beyond classic arms control and also felt it was losing a little bit of clout internationally.

And, of course, the Bush Administration was controversial in other ways on other issues, and that led to a situation where, in fact, Russia wanted to resume a classic form of arms control. I basically see no harm in it. I think the New START Treaty is generally sound. And moreover, let me just quickly itemize where I think it's actually improved our security in other ways.

It has certainly, I believe, fostered a better spirit of U.S.-Russia cooperation on the northern distribution network shipping supplies into Afghanistan,

where we don't want complete dependence on Pakistan as our only way in for NATO supplies for that important war effort that now involves 145,000 foreign troops who require an enormous number of supplies. And as you know, in much of the early years of the war, Russia either opposed or tried to interfere with shipping of supplies through its own territory or through former Soviet republics, like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. And now we've seen a mellowing of that to the point where, depending on which supplies you're looking at, 30 to 40 percent of NATO supplies are coming in through the North. That's a huge improvement and it's not just important numerically. It's important because it also may strengthen our hand a little bit dealing with Pakistan to remind Pakistan that, in fact, we don't depend on them exclusively and entirely the way they once might have thought. And this is important as we seek to pressure Pakistan, frankly, to work harder against the Afghan insurgent sanctuaries on its territory.

I know I've come a long way from ICBMs to the Haqqani network, but, in fact, the issues are interrelated and linkage is real. And I do believe that we're seeing benefits in Russian cooperation in Afghanistan because of this generally improved relationship, which is partially due to giving Russia what it asked for, which is a formalized arms control process yet again.

I'll just mention one more issue. And again, in the spirit of bipartisanship or non-partisanship that I think -- I hope is present across our entire panel -- and I've certainly heard that today with just very serious substantive arguments -- but a point I would make in fairness to the Bush Administration, I think that in their earlier years or their years in office not only did they have a very reasonable approach towards trying to limit offensive arms in a way that was consistent with our interests of the day and consistent with the nature of American interests in general, but, in fact, Russia was willing

to start putting greater pressure on Iran in that period of time as well under George W. Bush, but -- and it was gradually increasing. And some of the sanctions that Undersecretary Levey began to impose, some of the not just U.N. sanctions, but informal cooperation across major powers was starting to improve in the '07/'08 time period. And I give the Bush Administration credit, I think, for trying to identify that issue, some of these mechanisms of working more effectively, putting pressure on Iran's high-technology sectors, on its banking industry. Some of this was done officially, again at the U.N.; some of this more unofficially, but it had begun in that period of time. But it has accelerated under President Obama. And we have seen more U.N. resolutions, more U.N. sanctions, and more international cooperation, including now Russia being willing to stop the shipment of advanced SA-10 surface-to-air missile batteries to Iran, partly as a result of this improved U.S.-Russia relationship, which is, again, helped along by the New START Treaty.

So I don't want to get into the details any more than I already have on the specifics of the treaty. It's not to say that we should sign a bad treaty to do good things elsewhere, but the treaty, whatever minor or even mid-sized flaws it may have or points of stipulation that may not be quite as ideal as some would prefer, is generally solid. It allows us to do everything we need to with our nuclear and conventional and missile defense forces in the foreseeable future as far as I'm concerned. And it helps U.S.-Russia strategic relations on other issues that are arguably even more pressing and get to some of the matters Tom Donnelly was talking about with other countries' nuclear ambitions and how we can work together to deal with those.

So for these reasons, I strongly support it and look forward very much now to the conversation with you all on New START or any other issue in the future of

nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control that you'd like to raise.

So again, please, for the benefits of the TV cameras and your fellow members of the audience and us, identify yourself, wait for a microphone first, and then please pose a concise question. And we'll begin here in the front row, please, and then move back to the third row.

MR. SLAIMAN: Thank you very much. My name is Mozer Slaiman, Center for American and Arab Studies, a think tank monitor.

It seems to me the nuclear club, also called nuclear club, has been expanding lately and the prospect of expansion is on the horizon. And I think even the issue of Iran probably going to end up guiding the Arab Gulf states and other states like Egypt and others to renew their effort to have -- to establish their nuclear programs. So the question is what is the mechanism with this treaty and any future treaties to get rid of nuclear weapons, of weapons of mass destruction? It seems to me Mr. Donnelly in particular, I sense that he's looking into new forms of nuclear weapons for the United States to introduce more weapons instead of reduction of weapons. The question remained for the rest of the world and for the United States how we can get rid of weapons of mass destruction and why we don't go through the issue of a nuclear-free zone or weapon of mass destruction-free zone or each continent like some continents already started. And we put this goal and then everything will be measured toward that goal.

MR. O'HANLON: Let me say one brief word and then ask others because that's the topic of my book. And I would just quickly say that I don't think this panel would all agree on the desirability of that goal of a nuclear-free world. And certainly there's no particular linkage between the New START Treaty and prejudging the long-

term ability of the world to reach that conclusion.

Now, I'm a skeptic who supports the vision of a nuclear-free world, but I think it's several decades into the future. And I'm wary about, especially in the Middle East, rushing too much towards that destination at a time when, as you say, we see trends in the other direction and a lot of Americans worried -- a lot of American allies worried about whether the U.S. nuclear commitment is strong enough. So I volunteer myself to start the answer just because even though I'm a supporter of this vision, I'm pretty skeptical of how much we can fast-forward the process in the next few years in the Middle East.

Let me go down the aisle, down the panel here. Steve?

MR. PIFER: Yeah, let me say I agree with the idea that we ought to have the objective of a nuclear-free world out there, although at this point I'm not sure whether we can reach it. I mean, I can see steps getting in that direction, but a lot of things have to happen. In fact, Keith and I were talking earlier, I mean, I think in some ways we actually might agree here that if we could get to a non-nuclear world with all the conditions that might not be a bad thing. The debate is probably -- would be more about, you know, how likely it is to get to those conditions, which require not only, you know, new verification mechanisms, but require fundamental changes in political relationships.

The United States might say a non-nuclear world from our perspective is not bad. We have powerful conventional forces. We have the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean and friendly neighbors. You know, if you're another country, though, you may look around and you may not have that, you know, positive geopolitical setting and you may have a different view. And until you can get that country to feel likewise comfortable, that country's going to have, I think, hesitations about giving up its nuclear

weapons.

I think Tom made a valid point, although I think I'd come to a different conclusion. As we think about, you know, U.S. nuclear weapons in a broader context, you know, we do have to worry about not just Russia and China, but all the other countries out there with nuclear weapons. Although I guess where I might probably come to a different conclusion with Tom is when I look at a U.S. strategic force under the New START Treaty of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads or even 1,000 deployed strategic warheads if you wanted to go what I would see is perhaps the next step. It seems to me that that level of forces is going to be sufficient to deter Russia, China, and anybody else. Now, if Country X out there is not going to be deterred by a thousand deployed strategic warheads, Country X probably isn't going to be deployed by 5,000 or 50,000 U.S. nuclear weapons. So you're going to have to come up with some other way to affect their calculations.

MR. O'HANLON: Keith?

MR. PAYNE: Yeah, I'm a bit agnostic on the goal, I must say, of nuclear disarmament because we've seen what a non-nuclear world looks like. It looked like the first half of the last century. It looked like World War I and World War II with somewhere around 120 million casualties. I don't think that was a very attractive world and I think pining to go back to that world, as I said; I'm agnostic about that possibility or the possibility of that as a goal to aspire to. As long as nuclear weapons provide a profound deterrent effect, it seems to me that they're enormously important for us, they're enormously important for many other countries.

Let me add to that briefly because the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission I believe got it right with regard to the goal of nuclear zero. The bipartisan

commission said nuclear zero will be feasible with the transformation of the world order. I would agree with that. I believe nuclear zero will be feasible, even admirable, as a goal with the transformation of the world order.

The question in the back of my mind is whether that transformation is feasible. If the last 2,000 years of history give us indication of what may be possible in the future, the answer is that level of transformation of the world order is not possible. The League of Nations was an effort to create collective security to end international war. It failed. The United Nations was an effort to create a collective security system to end international war. So far it's failed to do that. So in my mind, absent a collective, a reliable, trustworthy, collective security system that can provide security for all members, nuclear zero will be very difficult to get to, probably impossible, because members will want to retain the great deterrent power of nuclear weapons.

And let me say lastly that I think nuclear zero is the wrong goal in general. I would much prefer to see zero weapons of mass destruction. If we're going to have a goal that's a visionary goal, that's a goal to aspire to, it should be zero weapons of mass destruction. Because we don't want biological weapons which can be every bit as devastating as nuclear weapons. Very difficult to get rid of all nuclear weapons if biological weapons are going to remain out there because some countries are going to want to retain a nuclear deterrent to prevent a bioattack if biological weapons remain. So I'd much rather see the goal zero weapons of mass destruction if we're going to essentially posit a visionary goal to aspire to. And remember in the back of our minds that it will take a transformation of the world order for the conditions to make that feasible.

MR. O'HANLON: Tom?

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah. I'm not going to speculate in a scholastic way

as to what the world should be like, you know, once there's an eternal peace. I'd prefer to try to think more practically about the world in which we actually live. And in particular to address your question about Iran, there's been a lot of fashionable talk in Washington over the last 18 months or so about containing Iran. Oh, we'll just -- you know, if prevention fails, containment's the miracle cure.

It's been interesting to go back and re-read what exactly containment meant in regard to the Cold War and the Soviet Union, even though Iran is going to be qualitatively and sort of quantitatively a very different strategic problem. But you asked will we need different kinds of nuclear weapons to deter Iran? I don't actually know the answer to that question, but I think it's an open question. In the Cold War we had many times intermediate-range nuclear forces. As others have suggested, there was a whole tactical -- you know, which on the American side led to sets of absurdities as the Davy Crockett nuclear bazooka. So -- not that that was, you know, a very useful solution, but we do ourselves an injustice if we think that was just -- that the people who were trying to solve those puzzles were completely misguided and didn't know what they were thinking.

In other theaters of the world, notably East Asia, there's a huge ballistic missile competition going on. There's nothing so destabilizing to East Asia than the expansion of the Chinese ballistic and cruise missile arsenal. That's a game that we are constrained from entering because of past deals with the ex-Soviet Union. So again, I just think we have to confront the world as we find it, you know. Treaties limiting armaments are a traditional tool of state craft and strategy to achieve your goals in that world, but you can't simply export mechanisms in a wholesale fashion from one strategic era to another and expect them to be, you know, perfectly effective and efficient in the way that you expect them to be, particularly when the strategic landscape is much more

complex and the number of actors is much more diverse and inspired by a wide array of ideologies and geopolitical goals. So these are questions that we just need to ask and not foreclose answers now because we're continuing a set of negotiations with Russia.

MR. O'HANLON: I think I'll take two questions -- no, sorry, we don't have time for follow-up. I'll take two questions at a time, both here in the third row, if I could. And then we'll take responses.

MR. SMITH: Bruce Smith, Brookings, retired. Thank you for a very excellent panel.

I had two questions, one was partially I think met in the first response, but let me repeat it just to make sure we're totally clear on the point. Is it the policy of the Obama Administration to declare as a declaratory policy or rhetorical policy or anything else that they embrace and endorse the nuclear-free concept? I think that does have some bearing on whether we go beyond the current START even if the rationale for the current START makes sense, the New START (inaudible) been helping us in the issues that Keith and Tom have raised.

But secondly, it is contended and the administration has given that impression that they have met all of Senator Kyl's objections. They've given him more than he asked for and somehow he's welched on his commitment to live up to the bargain whereas hearing him yesterday on the news shows, he made, I thought, a fairly persuasive case that the administration has not met his requests for modernization, upgrades, except again in a kind of loose, oh, yes, we agree with you as a goal, but they didn't practically commit. Now, query: Is it the administration's policy to strive to -- for the nuclear -- not merely to strive for, but to embrace it as a goal? And secondly, what is their policy on strategic modernization and, in particular, Senator Kyl's request to

modernize our facilities in Los Alamos, Sandia, and Oak Ridge?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Bruce. If you could pass the microphone two to the right, we'll take that question, also.

MR. JUNG: Thank you for your presentation. My name is Anthony Jung from China's (inaudible) media. My question is what about North Korea? How should the United States Government do after its recent release of its so-called facilities in terms of anti-proliferation issues? And should the United States review its current policy towards this region? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Why don't we go in the reverse order this time, starting with Tom, if that's okay?

MR. DONNELLY: Well, I'm hesitant --

MR. O'HANLON: Any question you want, any or all.

MR. DONNELLY: I will defer to others on the administration's policies. The President's commitment to a nuclear-free world, I thought, was pretty clearly stated and is of long standing. There's still a question of sort of so even if that's their policy, that doesn't obligate them to take any particular set of next steps. The path to get there, you know, there are many paths to get there.

I think -- I mean, my understanding is that Senator Kyl has been pretty consistent about what he's wanted from the start, so to speak, and that the particular investments in budgets proposed by the administration have not met his threshold test. The administration's response has been we can't make commitments for future administrations. That said there are clearly things that they could do to prepare for a long-term modernization of the facilities that he described, and I would tend to take

Senator Kyl at his word, but obviously I haven't been privy to the actual descriptions or discussions. So, it's hard to judge from the outside.

Apropos of North Korea, again, I just think that's another case that's illustrative of the world that I've been trying to describe in a very broad and general way. These are the kinds of nuclear issues that we're likely to see more of and for which we do not yet have a very good response and which are only tangentially related to either our overall relations with Russia, and not at all related to our arms control negotiations with Russia.

So, again, I would not -- my point is not that START, per se, is bad, although I think Keith does raise some important issues that need to be addressed and I would agree with Senator Kyl about the need for investments elsewhere. It's just that we're not devoting most of our efforts to the most critical nuclear problems that we face now and which will only get greater in the future.

MR. O'HANLON: Keith?

MR. PAYNE: Sure, thanks. Let me address the first question and I believe it had to do with the Obama Administration's policy position concerning Nuclear Zero. It's a very good question. I would only point you to for example, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that the administration produced which, by and large, I think is a very good document. I congratulate the administration on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. But if you look at that document, I believe it's page VI, what it says is that, "Movement towards Nuclear Zero and nonproliferation is the administration's highest nuclear policy priority." Highest nuclear policy priority.

The reason I mention that is because administrations in the past have given rhetorical support to nuclear disarmament, but they've tended to balance that goal

with the goal of maintaining nuclear deterrent, assuring allies with the extended nuclear deterrent. In other words, administrations in the past have balanced the goals of requirements for nuclear deterrents and assurants, and the goal of moving towards nuclear disarmament.

The really dramatic change that I see in the kind of document that I referred to is the comment that this is now the highest nuclear policy priority, which leads to concerns, at least among some, that what we'll see is when tradeoffs come. The tradeoffs will be to the disadvantage of U.S. requirements for deterrents and assurants.

Now, the way that that point is connected, I believe, with the other question concerning, for example, North Korea's nuclear program, is that as we see the potential for nuclear proliferation continue apace -- North Korea, possibly in Iran -- we see other countries now apparently interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. The concern is how do we assure our allies -- how do we continue to assure our allies who live in these growing, increasingly dangerous neighborhoods?

So, for example, if North Korea is going to stay with a nuclear capability as a strategic decision and modernize that nuclear capability and expand that nuclear capability, we need to expect that the requirements to assure Japan and South Korea, for example, are likely to change. They're likely to become deeper and wider in scope. And so we, as a country that provides these types of guarantees that are very important to our alliance structure, need to understand that to assure allies in the future, if nuclear proliferation does continue apace, will require us to be very agile and listen closely to what our allies say about what they see the requirements are for their assurance against these emerging threats.

I haven't noticed in the conversation we've had today, but this has been

very typical of the types of debate in the United States, we tend to identify some number of weapons we associate as adequate for deterrents, and, therefore, say that's a good number and arms control can then attain that number and we're satisfied. But deterrence isn't the only role for our strategic nuclear forces. Yes, deterrence of enemies is a role for strategic nuclear forces, but assuring allies is also a very important role and these are two different goals.

I believe it was Harold McMillan who said deterring enemies probably takes 10 percent of what it actually takes to assure allies. And so what you see are different requirements for what the U.S. force structure needs to be to provide these important roles of deterring opponents and assuring allies, and in particular that latter goal, I believe, is going to become more challenging and require more of the United States if nuclear proliferation continues apace.

MR. O'HANLON: Steve?

MR. PIFER: Yeah, let me make three points. First, in response to your question about where the Obama Administration is on a world free of nuclear weapons. I think when the President made his first articulation of that goal he was also, I think, very careful to say a lot of things have to happen in order to achieve that goal and, you know, it probably wouldn't happen in his lifetime. And I took it as a shorthand reflection of some of the concerns, I think, that we would have, things that have to be achieved in order to get to a Nuclear Zero.

But he was also, I think, pretty clear and I think every time he's come back to the subject he's also made the point that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States needs to have a safe, reliable, secure, robust strategic nuclear deterrent. So, I think he's squared that circle.

The second point would be, if you go back to the spring, about the time that the New START Treaty was signed, the administration also put out a couple of spending plans looking at over 10 years, both with regards to the strategic triad -- the ICBMs, the SLBMs and the heavy bombers -- but also with regards to modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, the national abs, and that infrastructure that maintains the actual weapons themselves. And what they announced in the spring was that over the next 10 years, the spending plan was $100 billion for the strategic triad and $80 billion for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, which was, I think, about a 10 to 15 percent increase over previous plans.

In response, Senator Kyl -- and I think that was in part to address Senator Kyl's concern and the concern of others that, you know, if you're going to be reducing nuclear weapons, you have to have confidence that your nuclear weapons complex can support and give you confidence that, in fact, the weapons are reliable. There's been a lot of exchanges, I think, going out over the last four months between administration officials, including the Vice President and Senator Kyl on this question. And two weeks ago the administration said it was prepared then to commit an additional 4- to $5 billion to upgrading the nuclear weapons complex. So, we're not privy to those negotiations and the specifics of it, but it does sound like that there's an effort on the part of the administration to address Senator Kyl's concern and, in the end, assure him that there will be sufficient funds so that the weapons complex can support the nuclear arsenal in the future. And my sense is that the administration has gone quite far in this and I think there's a little bit of question now, you know, how much more does it need to go to secure Senator Kyl's support.

The last point -- here, I guess, I would agree with Keith -- is that the point

of nuclear weapons is not only to deter a range of potential adversaries, but also to assure allies, NATO allies, also countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the East Asian Pacific region. But, correct me if I'm wrong, at least as far as I've seen, every allied government, so far, that's spoken out on the New START Treaty has endorsed that treaty. So, I draw from that the conclusion that the allies, when they look at this treaty they say even within the reductions envisioned under New START, at the end of the day the U.S. has a strategic force that still leaves them assured that that force can not only deter attack on the United States, but could also extend deterrents to include them as well.

MR. O'HANLON: So, let's go to the next round. We'll start up here with Gary and take one more as well and then we'll go to the responses from the panel. So, I guess here, and then in the middle, and then we'll have a set of responses, please.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I want to just say at the outset that I feel like I've paid some attention to this issue. This is far and away the best conversation I've heard about it because I think it has laid out the complexity which is really -- which is very, very helpful.

It seems to me we've heard at least four points of view. One is the treaty is good on its own merits, vote for it. The other is the treaty is good enough and is also important because it helps us in other issues related to Russia.

The treaty has been badly misrepresented and has been badly handled politically and, therefore, it's in trouble. And the sort of, if I can characterize Tom's widen the aperture, this is not necessarily a time to be concerned about whether we close this deal in the next couple of weeks, but whether we take this opportunity to sort of widen the aperture, take a longer look at the way we think the world is going to look further out.

I'd throw in another one which is not mine, but you're probably familiar with the case that was made last week in an op-ed by Jamie Ruben about the fact that we don't need to do these big treaties anymore because so much can get done under executive deals. And given the difficulty that the non-parliamentary governments like ours have, we ought to be thinking about that.

And then Mike also alluded earlier in his presentation to the notion that this sort of helps us with our discussions on de-nuclearizing the world. If we do this deal it will sort of help smooth the path and I wonder whether that's aspirational or an actionable sort of point of view.

Having said all of that, what I'm interested in -- I mean, what I'd really love to do is to say, okay, so how are you going to vote on this thing? Because I have a pretty clear sense in a couple places and less clear in another sense. What I would be interested in knowing is, given everything that we have heard, each of your contributions and the contributions of your partners, when push comes to shove is there more upside in approving this treaty and approving it during the lame duck session or is there more downside in doing that? And if there is more downside in doing that, what's your recommendation about how we ought to move forward -- how the Senate ought to move forward on this?

MR. O'HANLON: So, before we hear the votes of Senators Donnelly, Payne, Pifer, and O'Hanlon, we'll go to the next question and then respond.

MR. FOXFOGEN: I'm Doug Foxfogen. I'm not speaking for any organization. Is there any strategic utility for the U.S. to modernize nuclear weapons? Under this I'm treating assuring the allies as really just an extension of deterrence because we are assuring the allies that we will defend them against an attack and to help

deter anyone who could attack them.

And related to this, is there any strategic advantage for high reliability for nuclear weapons? This just seems to be taken as a given, but since the basic point of possessing the weapons is deterrence, not war-fighting, any opponent cannot assume that a weapon won't work, so that it's not useful for there. And that, in fact, with not very high deterrence -- not very high reliability, a lower reliability that any particular warhead would work, that would actually make it so a first strike might be less likely for whoever needs to ensure that a certain bomb goes off could not be assured that it does.

MR. O'HANLON: Why don't I start here and we'll work down the other way? First of all, my response would be I hear where you're coming from on this last question, but I would not support the New START Treaty, which I do emphatically, if I did not believe we could retain very high stockpile assurance and confidence with that treaty and also, frankly, with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. So, I support both those accords and believe we would have very high confidence in our arsenal, part of the reason being that we're seeing the plutonium pits within them actually hold up quite well, and we do a lot of monitoring to the tune already of 6- to $7 billion a year of stockpile stewardship in various ways, and so I understand the debate Senator Kyl is having now with the administration. I think we're already doing a great deal to assure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The question is what added steps may be needed in the future, down the road? But I think Americans can have confidence in the very high reliability of their nuclear arsenal today.

A couple of more specific things and I'll be done and pass the baton to Steve. First, just in clarification of Jamie Ruben's thinking, I believe he did want to see congressional action, not just executive dictate, so he wanted to have law as opposed to

treaty be what would guide some of our thinking and that would allow a majority vote instead of a two-thirds vote. But, of course, then other countries will say that means the United States is not quite as committed as we'd like them to be, so there's a pro and a con.

Very last point, while I do support way down the road a nuclear-free world, I do not support New START for that reason. And if New START prejudged the pace at which we could pursue a nuclear-free world, I might not support it because I think we're a long ways away from being on that path. There are certain specific things I'd like to see the next round of arms control do, for example, more focus on cooperative missile defense. And I applaud the Lisbon Summit's spirit for what it accomplished, but it hasn't yet translated into programs. And I'd like to see some of the warhead monitoring that Steve Pifer talked about.

These are the kinds of things we have to learn a lot more about and do a lot more of to even see if a nuclear-free world may some day be attainable. But ratifying New START does not prejudge that debate and I don't think one should imply otherwise because that will throw too much into this particular conversation.

MR. PIFER: Let me respond to your questions. I mean, first of all, I emphatically support New START. I think it's good arms control, but I think it also has other positive effects such as on the U.S.-Russia relationship.

Now, if the treaty doesn't get ratified in the lame duck session, but falls somewhere into 2011, that may not be the end of the world, but I don't know what a 2011 timeframe looks like. I don't think it's January or February with the new Congress; they'll have other issues. How far back does that get pushed? And that's where I worry that as of December 5 -- so, in what, six days from now? -- we will have been one year without

verification, the data exchange, the inspections allowed under START I. How far do we stretch that period out? And I think the longer that period goes, the more our confidence in our assessments about Russian strategic forces declines, it weakens.

Now, is it going to weaken fatally? Probably not, but I think there is a certain logic there to say getting New START into force sooner rather than later will limit that period of time when we don't have the inspectors on the ground and we don't have the data exchanges.

And I guess the other question I would ask about the lame duck is, you know, why not do it in the lame duck session? You've had now 18 Senate hearings, 4 briefings, I think the count I heard from the administration was they've answered 955 questions for the record. So, there's been a lot of study about this treaty over the last six or seven months and it seems to me that, you know, the senators probably have the information they need. I mean, certainly it's out there and they ought to be able to sort of take that and be able to make a decision.

So, I guess I don't see a persuasive argument for not going ahead in the lame duck session.

I guess to come back to a point that Keith made, I think the administration is partially in this bind because I think, as Keith said, you know, they did oversell New START and some of their language was imprecise in ways that have raised suspicions that don't need to be there. So, for example, the administration did say, at some point, or some administration official said there are no limits in this treaty on missile defense. I think the more correct term: there are no meaningful constraints in this treaty on missile defense.

The limit in Article V, paragraph 3, for example, says, "The United States

and Russia could not put a missile defense interceptor into an old converted ICBM silo." Now, that's a constraint. But I don't think it's a meaningful constraint because we've actually done both. We've converted five ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base to hold missile defense interceptors, and we built 25 or 30 new silos in Alaska -- brand new silos -- to hold missile interceptors. And the New START Treaty allows -- it grandfathers -- it says those five interceptors, or the conversions of ICBM silos, those are okay. Don't do it again.

But what we learned was it costs about $20 million more per silo to convert an old ICBM silo than it costs to build one of these things brand new. So, I don't see -- it seems to me that a constraint that prevents us from doing anything, something that we would never do under any circumstances, is probably a constraint that we could live with.

You know, likewise, I think the administration, you know, it was imprecise when it said, you know, there are no constraints on conventional ballistic missile warheads because, in fact, the limit of 1,550 would capture conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs. Now, at this point, neither the United States nor Russia deploy those. There has been talk on the American side about a prompt global strike system where you would put -- in the Bush Administration the proposal was about 30 conventional warheads on strategic ballistic missiles.

What the administration now says is if they were to go ahead and exercise that option it would be, you know, a few tens of warheads. And Keith and I might disagree here; I know some people are uncomfortable with the idea that a strategic offensive arms treaty would limit any conventional capability. You know, I am not uncomfortable with the idea that if you wanted to deploy say 30 or 40 conventional

warheads, I don't see that as cutting that deeply into a total warhead allotment of 1,550 on the nuclear side. But again I think the administration probably could have been more artful in how it originally described some of these provisions because it raised some suspicions that, I think, when you look at the treaty, really don't have a strong base.

MR. O'HANLON: Keith?

MR. PAYNE: Let me respond to both questions but start with yours, sir, and follow on from Steven's point because in some ways it reflects back onto what we talked about earlier.

I'm not making the argument, and didn't try to make the argument, didn't intend to make the argument, that the restrictions on missile defense or prompt global strike are extremely significant restrictions. That wasn't my point. My point was that when the administration took the opportunity to explain the treaty, in a number of different ways it was incorrect in its explanation. It misrepresented the treaty in some very important areas. These were the folks who created the treaty and they misrepresented it in open testimony.

Now, the reason why that is important, never mind for now whether the missile defense option is an important one or not an important one, the point was that by misrepresenting the treaty and overselling it so thoroughly and so consistently, and even to the current period, what it creates is skepticism among those who are asking for answers. So, I point you to, for example, Kit Bond, Senator Kit Bond's speech on November 18th, where Kit Bond said some absolutely factual, correct things about the treaty. The State Department replied last week specifically to Kit Bond's, Senator Bond's, speech and some of the responses to Senator Bond's points are literally factually incorrect.

Now, when you have a process like that that went on in the past, it continues now, what it suggests is, there will be many who would like to have more time to actually sort this out. That's why I think that not having this decided in a lame duck would be a good idea because there's still a great deal of questioning about this treaty given they types of responses that have been provided by the administration on numerous occasions.

I see no value whatsoever -- no advantage whatsoever -- in pushing this treaty through during the lame duck. There are some great disadvantages, I think, in trying to do so. And the advantage of moving it into 2011 with the new Senate is that the Senate will have time to methodically, systematically, seriously go through these issues that have been created by the administration's handling of it. It would seem to me that the administration would want that.

Let me go to the second question with regard to deterrence. It was a fabulous question and thank you for posing it because what the question said essentially was nuclear weapons provide deterrent effect even with great uncertainty about them. Therefore, why do you worry about modernization or, in a sense, the details of the fore structure? Because if deterrent effect is available because of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear weapons -- deterrent effect is available with uncertainty -- then stop worrying about all the rest of this. Certainly don't need to spend all the money to get these things down to great precision. Yeah, okay, the gentleman is shaking his head yes, that's the point.

Let me suggest that that is a -- there's a strong tenet of U.S. thought on strategic policy going back to the mid-'60s that is exactly that. I mean, that is one of the profound schools of thought in the United States on nuclear deterrents, nuclear strategy,

and force requirements.

The other school of thought says, no, in some cases opponents won't be deterred by uncertainty. In other words, you have to posit an opponent that is deterred by uncertainty for that to apply. You have to posit an opponent who is deterred even if the reliability of our weapons may not meet our satisfaction. You have to posit an opponent who is deterred even if the weapons may not be structured such that they meet our satisfaction.

In other words, you have to pose -- posit, I should say, a very specific type of opponent who is deterred within the great context of uncertainty for those points to apply. Now, that, as I said, has been a theme in U.S. strategic policy for decades, that is exactly so. The other theme is, you know, on occasion there will be opponents who will need to be deterred lest we suffer or our allies suffer a devastating attack. And they will not be deterred by uncertainty. In fact, they may be spurred on by uncertainty. They may see uncertainty as something to take advantage of as opposed to something to be deterred by.

Now, because we don't know what the future looks like and we don't know what all the opponents are going -- how they're going to calculate in the future, my view has always been we want to be able to deter those opponents who will be deterred in the context of uncertainty, but we also want to be able to deter those opponents who might otherwise be spurred on by the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. force structure, which is why, as Michael, I believe, said, I'm one of those who say, no, we want to have reliability, we want to have precision, we want to have a very effective strategic force structure because deterrence may require it. And the failure of deterrents, one time, in this era, could lead to several millions, to scores of millions of fatalities in the United

States or in our allied countries. We can't afford to take a lot of chances with deterrents, in my view, and relying on opponents who are deterred by uncertainty and thinking we have an adequate deterrent in that case, I believe, is a mistake.

MR. O'HANLON: And before passing to Tom, for what will have to be the last word, I wanted to make sure you didn't want to directly respond to Gary's invitation to vote or do you prefer to wait and say this is not something for this week or this month or next month, let's wait for 2011?

MR. PAYNE: I probably should wait.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay, fair enough. Tom, over to you.

MR. DONNELLY: All right, very quickly. My desired outcome for the treaty would actually be for the administration to essentially satisfy its critics, to essentially frame a deal, just using Senator Kyl as a placeholder, that would be acceptable to Senator Kyl. And ideally it would be passed in the lame duck session because that would represent a commitment on the part of the administration and the Democrats as a party to nuclear modernization and missile defense that has been so far lacking.

Now, you couldn't really take that to the bank for very long, I don't think, but in American politics, that's as good as it gets. So, if you could assure me of that, then -- and actually I'd like to put this whole discussion in the rearview mirror and talk about the things that I was describing earlier and also part of my deal for voting for the treaty would be like a five-year moratorium on arms control negotiations with the Russians, just simply cut it out and let's actually start talking about the things that are really sort of more critically important.

So, if you can meet those two threshold tests, I would be willing to vote

for the treaty, and the sooner, the better.

SPEAKER: I think you just ratified it, three votes out of four.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you all for being here. Thanks for the panel.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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