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PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction and Moderator:

FIONA HILL
Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

Featured Speaker:

IVO DAALDER
U.S. Ambassador to NATO

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ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. HILL: Ladies and gentlemen -- I was just checking to make sure that the microphone was actually on there. We're going to dispense with all formality today -- I think our speaker's probably had enough of formal sessions for a little while -- and do the whole event from here, from the podium.

I'm Fiona Hill, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe, and it's a great pleasure for me today to reintroduce, of course, to this audience -- in fact, doesn't really need any introduction to this audience -- Ivo Daalder, our former senior fellow and European security and U.S. foreign policy expert who spent a number of years here at Brookings -- probably more than you want to count, Ivo -- but in any case who is now the distinguished ambassador of the United States to NATO and has come literally hot from the plane, from the NATO Lisbon summit.

I don't know whether you managed to drop off at home and change your socks before you here, Ivo, but we're really extraordinarily pleased that you were able to come so quickly after the NATO Lisbon Summit -- to come here and share some of his observations on that summit, some of the very important outcomes.

Obviously for those of us who are NATO buffs, we've been following very much all of the deliberations on issues like missile defense, Afghanistan, the new strategic concept, the continued attempts to reset the relationship with Russia, the important participation of President Medvedev in this event and all of the other developments over the last couple of days. And so we're very pleased to have Ivo here to tell us what it was like actually at the event, some of these observations on what happened, and once Ivo has given us some of his knocks, we'll hopefully have quite a bit

of time -- certainly at least an hour -- for Q&A and discussion with all of you.

So, Ivo, thank you so much for coming. Really pleased to see you here again. And also on behalf of myself and Martin Indyk here, our doctor of Foreign Policy Program and vice president of Brookings who's sitting here in the audience and other colleagues here, we're just really pleased to see you back here again. Thank you.

MR. DAALDER: Great, Fiona. Thanks very much. It is an honor and a pleasure to be back at Brookings. I've sat at this podium many, many times, though never after having conducted a huge summit in the way that we did in Lisbon that ended with the important news that the next summit will be in the United States in 2012. We are already gearing up for that one, and let me tell you, it is a lot of work to put one of these things together, but it is -- it's also a lot of fun and pretty exhilarating, too, particularly when you get the outcome that you would like to get. I'm not sure how the ones are that you don't get the outcome that you were seeking. Let me put it this way. Most of the folks in the White House were happy to finally go to a summit where they got what they wanted. So, the President certainly was pleased. So were we.

Let me put the summit, first, into some kind of larger perspective of American policy and what we tried to achieve and have been trying to achieve and then talk a little bit about what we got in the two days that we were in Lisbon and then really open it up and have a conversation with all of you, which is why I thought it would be much easier for me to sit down here and do this very informally.

Just to put it in context, as I said. I mean, from the very first day that this administration came to office, the goal, when it came to foreign and national security policy was to rebuild our partnerships and alliances around the world. That was a theme throughout the campaign, and it was a theme in the President's Inaugural Address; it is

the central theme in the national security strategy of this President; and it is a reality of everything that we try to do.

NATO, as the President reaffirmed in Lisbon, is the cornerstone of our engagement in the world. So, if we're going to rebuild alliances and partnerships, rebuilding NATO has to be a fundamental objective and was a fundamental objective and is a fundamental objective of this administration. And when it comes to NATO, we for the last 22 months tried to pursue the goal of rebuilding NATO and rebuilding our partnerships through three big efforts.

First is to revitalize the alliance and make it ready and responsive to the 21st century, that it would be essential in dealing with the threats of today and tomorrow as this alliance was for dealing with the threats of yesterday and the day before yesterday. We wanted an alliance that was committed to the collective defense of all members against all threats and at the same time an alliance that would work through cooperatively with other countries and regions and organizations to build security around not only the Euro-Atlantic area but indeed around the world, particularly in a world that is increasingly globalized.

The second main effort was to recommit this alliance to a strategy in a path of success in Afghanistan.

And the third was a belief that for this alliance to succeed, for our partnerships to be rebuilt, this alliance needed to reset its relationship with Russia in the same way that the United States had reset its relationship in Russia.

And it was these three areas that, from the beginning when I got to Brussels in May of 2009, had been sort of the light motif of our effort of engagement with the Europeans.

We got all that. We revitalized this alliance, not only on paper but in reality. We recommitted the 40, now 49 countries, 28 allies, 21 other countries to a strategy of success in Afghanistan; and we reset the relationship with Russia in the first major summit meeting that NATO had with Russia since the Georgian conflict.

Now, none of it seems, if you looked at it backwards as I did looking back over the last 22 months -- was easy to achieve, nor in fact was it self-evident that we were going to get any of those areas. In fact, if you go back and look at where we were in 2009, you can see that the effort was not at all self-evident. There were doubts about the alliance, about where it was standing, and what it was about; large degrees of division among the allies on really big and key issues, about Russia. The alliance was divided between those who wanted to engage Russia and those who needed to be reassured against Russia, particularly post-2008 when many of the allied countries, new allies of this alliance, feared that they might be next, that the events in Georgia only presaged the possibility of some further level of unsettlement that might affect their security even more directly, and a whole set of allies that believed -- and strongly believed -- that their security and prosperity required a level of engagement with Russia that was new, novel, and big. This was a big debate within NATO in 2009.

Another big debate, second big debate, was what is the focus of this alliance? Is it on the Euro-Atlantic area? Is it about Europe? Or is it about beyond Europe? Are we going to constant act within the European theater, or we going to act globally? Are we going to be part of the larger world in which we are living? Are we going to concentrate on territorial defense? Are we going to have expeditionary capabilities to be able to operate at great distances from the European theater? This, too, was a big debate within the alliance in 2009. Figure out what it is that the focus of

this alliance should be.

We had a debate about -- certainly about missile defense, which was dividing the alliance between those who are worried about how the deployment of missile defenses in Europe might upset the relationship with Russia and those who sought to deal with the growing missile threat that was emanating from the Middle East. Some wanted to have missile defenses now; others wanted to have it only if the Russians were okay; some wanted to make the reset with Russia more important than the deployment of missile defenses. So, this, too, was a major source of division within the alliance and indeed within countries in the alliance, including in this one.

And, finally, post-Prague after the President had made his speech laying out his vision for a world without nuclear weapons, we had a debate within NATO about the role of nuclear weapons, a debate that had been dormant, frankly, for a good 10+ years but had been part of the NATO fabric almost from its founding. Indeed, I wrote my dissertation on NATO's nuclear debate from 1967 to 1983, know a little bit about it. But it had disappeared. NATO was not debating nuclear weapons and hadn't debated nuclear weapons for quite some time. But when President Obama came out and said that the peace and security of the world depends on us moving towards a world without nuclear weapons, that debate reappeared with countries, on the one hand, saying NATO needs to contribute to this effort and the way it can contribute to this effort is to reduce its own reliance and indeed in some cases get rid of the nuclear weapons that are in its territory, and others who said no. In fact, nuclear weapons remain fundamental and only to our own security but we need those nuclear weapons as reassurance against whatever is happening further east. We have an alliance that has 12 new members, who had come to this alliance in the last 11 years, and those 12 new members had not been part of the

NATO debate about nuclear weapons, but they had bought into an alliance that had nuclear weapons, and they wanted to stay within an alliance that had nuclear weapons. So, we had a pretty big debate in 2009 about those issues. That was in terms of where does NATO go, what was NATO's role, and how to think about NATO in 2009.

On Afghanistan, there was plenty of questioning about the strategy, about why we were there, what it was we were trying to do, whether the resources we had were sufficient, and what is it that the United States really wanted from us. A long review in United States fed a sense of uncertainty among some European countries and a debate within European countries about whether the effort was worth it, whether for many countries who had been there for not just one or two years but four or five, six and more years. In the Netherlands, in Germany, in Canada, the answer was we're really getting to the end of the rope; we're really getting to the end of the strategy; we don't see why we need to stay; we need to find some guidance here; we need to really understand when this is going to all end. That was a major sense of uncertainty in 2009 for many allies who looked at the United States and saw that the possibility of it moving in more forces might provide an opportunity for them in fact to leave. So, that's what we confronted.

And then finally in Russia there was a concern among many that the American reset that was started in April of 2009 was coming at the expense of the American commitment to the defense of its allies in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. There were those who said is this really the right way in which we need to deal with our security, by having a reset over our heads. An old fear of condominium between the United States and Russia being played out over the heads of the Europeans was reemerging. In September of 2009, the Obama Administration decided to abandon the

third sight of the Bush Administration's Missile Defense Program, the missile defense site which had 10 interceptors in Poland, and a huge radar in the Czech Republic. Many saw this as proof positive that in order to ingratiate oneself with Moscow, the United States was willing to sacrifice the interests of its allies in Eastern Europe and further dividing the alliance between those who wanted to improve relationships with Moscow and those who were fearful.

Skeptics claimed that there was really no way in which this alliance could overcome these differences. Critics, frankly, claimed here in Washington and around the alliance they claimed that administration was pursuing contradictory goals and really couldn't resolve the problems that we were confronting ourselves. There was no way, for example, that we could get NATO to agree on building a real ballistic missile system capable of defending all of Europe while at the same time strengthening our relationship with Russia.

That was the climate I think in 2009 that the administration found itself as it was trying to find a way to define where do we want to go with NATO, where do we want to go with Russia, where do we want to go with our European allies.

Well, now we know, because hard work, real American leadership that took a lot of effort from the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense and others on down have proven the critics wrong and have confounded the skeptics. The 28 NATO allies who left Lisbon on Saturday night left an alliance that is stronger and more united, frankly, than the alliance has been in many, many, many years. And this was not just a very successful summit but, as the President said, it was an extremely productive summit. It achieved all of the goals we had set for ourselves, which is the revitalization of NATO as a 21st century security alliance to deal with the

challenges that we confront both today and tomorrow; to ensure that the allies and the 21 ISEP partners are united and not only in terms of the strategy but also in terms of providing the capability for that strategy to succeed in Afghanistan; and we did reset in a very fundamental way the relationship between NATO and Russia. So, let me take those three areas and sort of go through how that wasn't done just in words but how the 24 hours that we met in Lisbon did it in deeds to give you a sense of how far removed and how much the differences that had defined the alliance in 2009 have now become sources of unity and strength.

First, on revitalizing the alliance. If you have not yet read this new strategic concept, you should do so. There is no excuse for your not having read it. It is only 11 pages long. In and of itself, that already tells you virtually anything you want to know.

Unless you are a true NATO-nik, like Hunsben and Dyke and me, you probably have never read the 1999 strategic concept and certainly not more than once. This is a strategic concept you can read in three minutes, and it will give you a very concise and very concrete way about how this alliance is dealing with the world it is of today. It reaffirms in strong and bold terms the essence of this alliance, that of collective defense -- the notion that an attack against one is an attack against all -- thereby meeting the key requirement of what it means to be an alliance, the fact that we are committed to defending each other both against threats that have long existed and against threats that are new and are emerging. And at the same time, it commits this alliance to a concept of cooperative security, the fundamental notion that in order to be secure today it is important -- in fact, it is necessary -- for the alliance to work with others -- neighbors, key countries, other organizations, and indeed what in the alliance parlance are called

partners across the globe -- countries like Australia and Japan, future partners like Brazil or India -- that we need to work in a globalized world with countries around the world to address the security challenges before they become real threats or to mitigate the consequences of them once they become real threats.

That's the strategic concept laid out in brief, overcoming all of the divisions that we had before, a statement about what the nature of Russia and NATO should be; a statement very clearly about what the role of nuclear weapons should be, balancing both the importance of maintaining the terms while also underscoring the very great importance of NATO contributing to a role in which there are no more nuclear weapons; an agreement on the question of whether we need to focus on territorial defense or expeditionary defense by an answer that we need to do both, that in fact the only way you can defend a territory these days is to have expeditionary capabilities both because you need to move over great distances to defend territory and because the security of the people and the populations and territory in NATO depend on the ability to move far forward as we are doing today in Afghanistan.

So, the strategic concept now lays out a sense of what the role for NATO is how it needs to deal with the challenges of the 21st century in clear, concise terms with the concrete suggestions of how we need to move forward. That's one key piece on the revitalization of NATO.

The second is the agreement on missile defense. Remember that in 2009, this administration was accused of abandoning missile defense in order to have a stronger and more fruitful relationship with Russia. In fact, the fine print then, as is now most evident, was not about the abandonment of missile defense but actually building a missile defense that would be stronger, swifter, and smarter than the one it was trying to

replace. And importantly, the administration in September of 2009 made the decision that if we're going to build missile defense and we're going to deploy it in Europe, it better protect all of Europe and do so within a NATO context. And that is exactly the decision that the heads of state in government made on Friday night. They decided to embrace the goal of building a missile defense system in Europe to protect all of Europe -- all of NATO Europe -- against the threat of ballistic missiles, to do so in a phased and adapted way, phased over time, that as the threat increases the capability to defend against it would increase and adapt it to the nature of the threat as it emerged.

That decision was not only made in theory. It was made in practice, because the leaders committed themselves to funding the command and control and battle management backbone -- a NATO-funded, NATO-controlled command and control system within which individual nations would plug in their sensors and shooters in order to provide for a more capable NATO missile defense of NATO territory; a major decision that was done that would provide NATO with the first stages of a defense in 2011 and by the time we get to 2018 will provide a defense of all of NATO territory against long-range -- intermediate-range missiles and medium-range missiles, as well as short-range missiles from the Middle East, including from Iran. And that decision was made in September that the United States was going to move ahead September 2009, and this is the system that is a NATO system protecting NATO territory that is going to be -- that was replacing the system that the Bush Administration had proposed for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic in 2018. And it was embraced not just by the Czech Republic and Poland but indeed by all other 25 and counting (inaudible) 25 allies, including the United States.

So, that was a key part of the revitalization of NATO, of dealing with new

threats as they emerge and providing the capabilities.

The third element of the revitalization was an agreement that despite tight defense budgets and indeed cuts in defense budgets, NATO will prioritize the funding of 10 critical capabilities, 10 key capabilities that will allow it to expand its involvement in Afghanistan to meet new threats from missiles -- from cyber to deal with fragile and failing states and to enhance the ability for joint operations throughout not only the NATO territory but throughout the theater. So, rather than saying let's live with reduced defense budgets, NATO said let's focus on those capabilities, that we should fund is a matter of priority, so even as we cut our defense budgets we make sure that we fund what is the most important and most immediate, and the decision was made in Lisbon.

And then, finally, as part of the revitalization, there was an agreement to reform the alliance to ensure that it has far greater effectiveness, it operates more efficiently and more flexibly than it has before. The key decision was to reform the command structure of NATO by cutting the overall size by about 35 percent and at the same time put in place a command structure that is more deployable and scalable to deal with the threats of tomorrow rather than the static nature that the current command structure has.

And we also are reforming in the way NATO does business, which is any international organization is not one of the most efficient organizations or bureaucracies for enhancing the capability of this organization to meet the business environment of the 21st century of less people, more shared services, greater integration, and doing together what we can do easier than having to do it separately. So, for example, NATO has 14 different agencies to deal with procurement, deal with support for NATO operations, and

a whole host of other issues. We have decided to move those 14 agencies into 3, one dealing with communication information, one with support, and one with procurement -- a major rationalization of the way that NATO does business.

That's NATO. That's the organization I live in day and day out, and this is an organization that after these kinds of steps will allow this alliance to deal with the realities of the world of today and tomorrow rather than focused on the day before. That was the first decision.

The second major area, briefly, is Afghanistan. You have all seen the papers. You know what the decisions were. But let me just put them slightly in perspective. What the leaders of the 49 allies and partners decided to do, joined as they were by President Karzai, was to recommit themselves to the strategy that President Obama had announced in December of 2009 and that NATO had embraced at the same time, a strategy that said that we needed to target the insurgents, train the Afghans, and transition responsibility -- the three-T strategy. We had been engaged in the past year providing -- as General Petraeus likes to put it, getting the inputs right -- providing the troops, providing the civilians, providing the financial means necessary for the strategy to begin to be implemented. We have been targeting the insurgents, in fact quite hard; and we have reached a point at which it is possible to say that some of the momentum that the insurgents had is now being arrested. And as a result, the leaders of NATO and the ISEP countries were able to conclude that in early 2011 it should be possible for the process of transition to begin. And by that is meant that from a province-by-province process, Afghans will start taking then lead for security on a province-by-province basis starting in early 2011, a process that is likely to take until the end of 2014 at which time President Karzai and the international community have set the goal of Afghanistan taking

the lead for security throughout the entire country. We are able to do that both because the strategy of targeting the insurgents is working and also because the allies have once again been able to step up to the plate and provide the trainers that are necessary to build the Afghan forces to the point that they can start taking over responsibility for security in key areas.

Remember that last year even though there was a huge debate in every country about Afghanistan. Last year the allies were able to up the total amount committed of troops committed to the effort by 10,000 so that right now over 45,000 of the troops are from allies and partner countries, not from the United States, and they have once again provided the trainers that were necessary to fill the priority training requirement that was identified by the forces in the field.

So, we have a training requirement that is filled. We have the resources. We have a transition strategy that has now been agreed. And at the same time we have made it very clear that NATO as an alliance will be committed to stand with Afghanistan not only during the time of transition but after the transition, that while Afghanistan needs to stand up, it won't stand alone, as the President put it on Saturday. There is a -- as part of the summit, the Secretary General of NATO signed with President Karzai a NATO-Afghan partnership agreement that will make -- that sets out an enduring commitment of NATO for Afghanistan in security and capabilities for the long haul.

Finally let me say just a word about Russia and the NATO-Russia Council. Many of those who spoke during the council, including President Medvedev, called the meeting historic. I like history. I usually like to think about history when it's past, when we look back. I don't know historic it was; it was an important meeting -- not only the fact that it took place, which in and of itself was not at all certain, it was only

about a month ago that the Russians decided to accept the Secretary General's invitation to attend this meeting, and once they decided to attend they also decided they wanted to make it a real meeting and they spent the last month figuring out how working with NATO to make this a productive meeting. And it was productive in three fundamental ways.

First, we concluded -- in fact, we worked till the end, but we did conclude what is called a joint review of 21st century security challenges in which all 29 countries, the 28 NATO countries and Russia, looked at the key challenges of piracy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, manmade and natural disasters, and Afghanistan -- what is the nature of these challenges in the 21st century -- and then laid out an action plan to respond to those challenges. We have concluded that review, and we concluded in most, not in all cases -- time ran out -- but in most cases concluded a work program about how we would deal with those challenges.

We also, in two of those areas, expanded cooperation further. In Afghanistan, we concluded a new agreement for transit of non-lethal goods on Russian railroads into Afghanistan, including for unarmed but armored vehicles to be transported over those railway lines, as well as to enable the reverse transit of equipment out of Afghanistan back to Europe, which is a major necessity, a major need, given our dependence on certain lines of communication through Pakistan. The Northern Distribution Network, as it's called, is a key way in which we're going to have to resupply our forces, and Russia's cooperation with that is absolutely central. So, that was a major agreement.

We are expanding our contra-narcotics cooperation and training of Afghan forces, and we are setting up a trust fund for maintenance of helicopters' personnel and helicopters themselves, all of which of course in Afghanistan are Russian

built in Russia now.

And then finally and perhaps most significantly was the agreement to cooperate on missile defense, putting an end to the argument that you can't deploy missile defense in Europe without upsetting the Russians. We, in Lisbon, decided to deploy missile defense in Europe and do so in cooperation with the -- and yet cooperate with the Russians. The cooperation we decided on is threefold. First, we completed a joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat. Second, we agreed to resume our exercises of theater missile defense cooperation exercises that were extremely useful to demonstrate how different countries could cooperate on missile defense but were ended when the Georgia war took place in August 2008. We're going to resume these. And finally and perhaps most importantly we agreed to do a joint analysis of the modalities of cooperation for territorial missile defense and report to defense ministers in June of 2011 about how NATO and Russia who together cooperate on defending against the threat of short, medium, and intermediate and ultimately intercontinental ballistic missiles. A very serious commitment that President Medvedev underscored as something he wanted to do. He has many questions about what we are trying to do in NATO, but he wants to solve those questions through a cooperative framework rather than through a competitive one.

So, let me conclude with that. As you can see, we were busy in those 24 hours going through all these agreements. All the documents are available on the website, so you can peruse them in greater detail. But anyone who in 2009, looking at the state of the alliance and the relationship we had among ourselves with regard to NATO, with regard to Afghanistan, with regard to Russia, would have said that in November of 2010, we would have been able to move to the situation where we are

today would have been met with some incredulity; in fact, that probably was true even six months or two months ago.

Now, the final point I want to make is these are great agreements. Now we need to implement them. And I had a journalist who called me this morning. He said you know, how can you call this a success when so much still needs to be done? I said, well, if it wasn't a success nothing needed to be done. The good news is that we now have an agenda, that we need to work with the Russians, we need to work with the Afghans, and we will work with our allies. That is going to keep us busy for quite a long time. And the ultimate success of Lisbon will only be clear if what the promise -- what has been promised today and yesterday and the day before in Lisbon will in fact be fulfilled. But I think you have an alliance that for the first time has decided that as 28 countries it is better to do this together than trying to argue about it and disagree about it.

And with that, I'll be happy to take any questions.

MS. HILL: Well, thank you very much, Ivo.

I guess one of the first questions might be were you surprised by anything? It doesn't sound as if you were. You said there was an awful lot of hard work was put into things. But usually at these summit meetings there's always something that was unforeseen. It sounds perhaps as if the level of cooperation might have been unforeseen at least by, you know, some of us sort of sitting on the sideline. So, was there anything, before we move to the audience, that was a surprise in all of this?

MR. DAALDER: Well, I mean, frankly, we weren't there until the very end. There were still big issues that were being debated throughout last week into the time we got to Lisbon. We had to find ways to overcome different perspectives within the

alliance, between the alliance and others. So, it wasn't foreordained that we were going to get to Lisbon knowing that we would resolve all the outstanding issues.

There are differences within the alliance. They are not to be papered over. They exist today, and they will exist tomorrow, and they will influence how we will deal with those issues as we go down the line. It was not clear how President Medvedev in fact would deal with the issue of cooperation until we got there. We didn't know whether he would embrace the commitment to missile defense cooperation. There was an indication. We had already agreed on the joint statement, which laid out that this is what we should do. But ultimately you don't know until you get there. Ultimately it's the atmosphere that is there.

There was one big outstanding issue in the strategic concept that needed to be addressed which had to do with how to characterize the relationship between NATO and the European Union, a very sensitive and important issue for key allies, including EU allies as well non-EU allies. And in the end it was only when the issue was discussed that the nations who had the most difficulty with this issue decided that they were prepared -- in the interest of alliance unity, in the interest of maintaining a strong united alliance they were prepared to accept something that perhaps if it was a choice of yes or no they would have not accepted. And that's how this alliance has always worked.

Ultimately, it is the need for the alliance to remain united that has -- that must be and is the driving force of this alliance. If national interest cannot be accommodated within an alliance framework, the alliance is in trouble, and I think the most important thing that we reaffirm for the first time in a long while is that there are times when the need to maintain unity within the alliance is more important than winning

the argument about a specific issue. You will win -- by being willing to compromise, you can win on other issues down the road. And that's what has made this group of now 28 countries a unique and successful alliance for 61 years, and I think in Lisbon we demonstrated that reality and importance once again.

MS. HILL: Well, thanks.

We have a lot of people in the audience, and you actually already invoked the name of -- you're the -- they're the person who may have read the strategic concept. As a matter of fact, you've had a role in it, Hans Benedict.

So as his name was invoked, you want to make sure that wasn't sure that wasn't in vain. We'll hand it over to Hans Benedict, then I will get to everyone else involved.

MR. BENEDICT: Ivo, first, congratulations bringing home that great summit result.

My question really goes to the next couple of weeks when ratification of New START is going to be a critical priority for the administration. And it seems to me you can look back at this summit and argue that it really created new momentum for New START in a couple of ways. First, are European allies restating the importance to them of NATO-izing in a sense the New START with Russia and a number of comments from allies about the importance of this?

Secondly, the critics of New START have printed the focus on this preambular language indicating a relationship between offensive and defensive systems. And here at Lisbon you -- we really have demonstrated the importance of missile defense not only to the United States but to the alliance, and hopefully you can put that issue to bed.

And then thirdly the strategic concept in other documents note that we remain a nuclear alliance.

So, all these three things together, it seems to me, provide some additional momentum for New START application. I'd just ask for your comments on that.

MR. DAALDER: Well, I certainly hope so. I think it was remarkable how many of the leaders spoke privately and also publicly, but privately about the importance of getting START ratified. The ratification of this treaty is important to the security not just of the United States but indeed of the allies. And it was allies who went out to make that point publicly to underscore how important it was. And it wasn't just the allies in Western Europe, although that in and of itself is not unimportant, and it's not unimportant for the Chancellor of Germany to say that START ratification is something that is necessary. It is certainly not important for the Secretary General of NATO to go out and say that the failure to ratify START will be damaging to alliance security, which is what he said. But it was the countries that neighbor Russia that argued that it was important: Lithuania, Latvia. It was important for START to be ratified and to have the early ratification for START. It's what the Lithuanian foreign minister said. He said we need START ratification, one, because we want to be sure that a system is in place that can monitor what is happening inside Russia -- not because we don't trust Russia but because we've had that system for a very long time and it's not there now. And secondly, and as important, we're concerned about the imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons, and we want that addressed, and we understand we need a START agreement to get it addressed and to have the next round of negotiations to begin. But we need START ratified in order to address our strategic concerns. So, I think what the allied leader said

on their own sense of how START affects their security is an important message for those who are considering the ratification on Capital Hill.

And, second, I think you are exactly right on the issue of missile defense. To the extent there is a worry that somehow the moving ahead with START is undermining the ability to go ahead with missile defense, Lisbon spoke loud and clear and said no. In fact, this administration decided to move on with missile defense despite the fear that it might upset relations with Russia and to do so in a phased manner and without any restriction or limitation on anything it is going to do and do it with our allies. Missile defense has now become a way to solidify our alliance rather than divide it, which is what it was until recently; and that, too, should be reason why folks on Capital Hill ought to take very seriously what happened in Lisbon. And I won't -- you know, I don't know what the politics is and how that will evolve. There are other experts in this room far brighter than I am about those issues. But I would argue that the argument that this alliance thinks it is important to have START ratified is an argument that ought will speak loud and clear on Capital Hill.

MS. HILL: Did you get a sense, though, Ivo, from any of the NATO allies at Lisbon about what their reaction would be if it was not ratified?

MR. DAALDER: You know, they're all practical politicians, and their focus was on getting this thing ratified rather than figuring out what would happen if it didn't get ratified, but let me quote again, and it is a quote from the Secretary General of NATO who said that the "failure to ratify START would be damaging to alliance security." That is, I think, something we all ought to take very, very seriously.

MS. HILL: (inaudible) question, sir.

MR. HERRIOT: Judd Herriot, documentary filmmaker. To those

members of the alliance who were suffering fatigue in Afghanistan, to those who were questioning what we were doing there, to use your words, what our collective national interest is there, what arguments did you present which solidified the analysis -- the alliance on the issue?

MR. DAALDER: Well, the most important argument, which is the argument that the Obama administration took into the alliance almost from the start and then solidified and reified last December is that we're there for our national security, that we are there because al Qaeda is in the region of Afghanistan-Pakistan, that al Qaeda is still a threat to the security not only of the Americans here in the United States but they're a threat to the security of Germans in Germany.

I mean, just notice what's happening in Germany as we speak today where a major alert is on the rise because of a fear of terrorism striking home there. It is a threat to British citizens in the UK, to French citizens in France, and to the alliance as such. Australians are in Afghanistan, because they know what this means. They know what Bali did, and they know that this is about their security. So, that's the argument. And it's an argument that is convincing, that has unified the alliance to commit itself once again to do what it thinks needs to be done.

In that regard, take a country like Canada, which made a decision three years ago, two years ago, that it would pull out its troops in 2011, a decision that on the eve of this summit was amended, not reversed, because the combat troops are going to come home. But Canada will, from 2011 through 2014, send trainers -- 750 trainers, 200 support troops -- into Afghanistan to train Afghan forces so that they can ultimately take over the responsibility. This is a minority cabinet that made that decision. It is by the same cabinet and the same prime minister that originally had made the decision to pull

out.

And why are they doing it? They're doing it because they think that the security of Canada requires a continuation and continued support by Canada as part of this largest coalition assembled since World War II. That's what's there.

This is not an American war only. This is a war in which over 33 percent of the body bags that go home do not go to Dover Air Force in the United States. They go to other countries. This is a war, in which everybody is sacrificing, and they're doing it not because they like the United States; they're doing it because they think their security is at risk.

MS. HILL: There was a question, a gentleman at the very far back, and then we'll take the lady in the pink shirt here. I'll a couple of questions together just to sort of maximize the number of people who want to ask.

MR. TREMBLE: Ambassador Daalder -- Ivo, also congratulations on boring a circle on a lot of difficult issues. Harold Tremble from (inaudible) Association.

As you said, one of the debates that was opened up after a long time was on nuclear policy. I'm wondering if you could just comment on the further review of deterrence of policy, nuclear and conventional, that was discussed I think coming out of the Saturday communiqué. And before you do, I mean, I would note that having read the '99 strategic concept (inaudible) for myself, I know that there are some things that -- relating to nuclear policy that aren't in the current version and that I would note that it says that the ultimate security guarantee of the alliance are the strategic forces of alliance members and that there should be an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. That would seem to me -- tell me if I'm wrong -- to imply that NATO is at last recognizing the fact that the tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe don't

have a serious military role in defense of the alliance. But my main question is about the review -- the further review. How long will it take? What are the -- what's the scope? Can you tell us more about it?

MS. HILL: Okay, and this lady here, pink shirt?

SPEAKER: My name is Mikayla Venkovar. I'm with the Heritage Foundation.

You mentioned a couple of times that some of the things were suspended following Georgian war, but Russia is technically still in violation of the peace agreement. So, what is different, and are we not sending the signal that we are content with the status quo situation in Georgia? Thank you very much.

MS. HILL: Thank you.

MR. DAALDER: I will take just the last one first. No, we're not sending the signal that we're content with the status quo in Georgia. In fact, the Communiqué is quite direct about this. It calls on Russia to abide by the agreements it signed in 2008, and we expect them to be fulfilled. No one in this alliance is about to recognize the status quo. Quite the contrary. The agreements that Russia signed need to be implemented. The recognition of Apazia and South Ossetia as anything other than being the territory of Georgia is unacceptable. The territorial integrity of Georgia must remain. And, indeed, in the communiqué a very strong reaffirmation of the commitment that this alliance has made to Georgian membership in NATO remains, and it is strong, direct, unequivocal, and repeats the language from 2008. So, there is nothing that this alliance has changed with respect to the issues of Georgia.

What is different is that this administration and our allies agreed that it makes no sense not to talk to Russia just because we have a major disagreement over

this issue. The way we deal with our disagreements is in fact to confront them directly through conversation and that it makes very little sense to say until something happens we are not going to talk to each other. That is not the philosophy of the Obama Administration, and frankly it's not the philosophy of this alliance. And I think that's the recognition why it is important to have these conversations, not in order to forget but in order to resolve those issues in and of itself.

I'm not surprised, Darrell, that you read very closely what was in the strategic concept, both from 1999 and 2010. What I would say on the nuclear language in and of itself, it is very important to read what is in 2010 and to read what was in 1999 and to see what's different. And it is -- it's not just it's shorter; it's different. I think you've pointed out a number of ways in which it is different. But this is an alliance that retains different views over nuclear weapons. The divisions that were there after the Prague speech haven't disappeared, but we have found a way to talk about this that allows us to move forward.

I think the most important sentence that you picked out of the communiqué is this notion of an appropriate mix not just of conventional and nuclear but conventional nuclear missile defense forces, and it adds missile defense into that mixture for the first time. The appropriate mix language comes out of the language that was adopted in 2009. But it now adds missile defense as a central component of how to think about deterrence and collective defense, and that allows you to think anew about what is that appropriate mix. And that's why we decided not to do a nuclear posture review but to do a deterrence posture review. How in the 21st century should the alliance work together and posture itself to deal with threats? What kind of conventional capability does it need? What kind of missile defense capability does it need? What kind of

nuclear capability does it need? There are certain varieties. The most important one is the one that Hans mentioned. As long as the nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. That is fully consistent with what President Obama said in Prague when he said that as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO -- the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. This is a slightly different way of saying the same thing but it is an important reaffirmation of that variety.

But then, given that variety, given the centrality of deterrence, given how nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces make up that deterrent strategy, what is the appropriate mix? How do we move forward? That's a debate we're going to have next year. And, importantly, it's a debate we're going to have among all allies -- 28 allies. Not 27 for those who were in the nuclear NATO -- nuclear business. The Nuclear Planning Group, which is just 27 countries because France is not a member, tends to have -- address issues of nuclear weapons. That will still be the case. But the larger review is going to be done by our allies, and France will be an active participant in that review. It will be an interesting exercise no doubt, I can guarantee you, and it will be something new and different and a very important part of it. And there are -- within that exercise, the balance that was struck in the strategic concept between the importance of deterrence on the one hand and the importance of contributing to disarmament on the other will have to be maintained throughout the review, and finding that right balance is going to be interesting, to say the least, and for junkies like me, fun.

MS. HILL: I have a couple of questions down here at the front. There's this gentlemen here, head Ambassador Kutelia and also from Georgia, so.

MR. CHEN: Yeah. Chow Chen, freelance correspondent, (inaudible).

Ambassador, thank you for comment. How important is the long-range

convention strike force, given discussion; and then what's the results? Well, it's discussion. Thank you.

MS. HILL: Up here as well, please, Ambassador Kutelia.

AMB. KUTELIA: Batu Kutelia, ambassador of Georgia. Ambassador, congratulations with the successful summit. I personally think that this summit was largely successful because of very strong U.S. leadership as well, and, I mean, the agenda the way it was directed, too.

After the Russian invasion and occupation of Georgian territory by Russian Federation, there was large discussions in NATO about making some changes or amendments in the NATO contingency planning. So, now NATO has a new strategic concept. Will be there some changes in the contingency planning? Thank you.

MR. DAALDER: On the issue of long-range conventional strike forces, there was no discussion of that. And these American capabilities that really didn't enter into any discussion we had in NATO -- in part because much of NATO's thinking was about the strategy as opposed to the capabilities, and the capabilities are something that, as part of this posture review that I mentioned earlier, may come in at that point but not before.

With respect to contingency planning, let me say this. NATO as an alliance, as a military alliance, of course engages in contingency planning. It has to. And to the extent one changes the way one looks at it, one has to look at one's contingency plans. All I can say is that NATO has a whole range of contingency plans to deal with, a whole range of particular issues and possibilities.

Talking about military plans is not something one does in public, for obvious reasons, so let me leave it at that. New ways of thinking will lead to new ways in

which one needs to deal with the different contingency phases, and as a military alliance prepared for today and tomorrow, NATO will do what it needs to do in order to be ready.

MS. HILL: Thanks. I have a question here. The gentleman with a blue tie. And the lady here in the aisle. Just over here in the fourth row back. Thank you.

MR. STACEY: Jeff Stacey from the State Department, the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Ambassador Daalder, you mentioned that many efforts have been made in recent weeks and months to reassure our European friends that a stronger NATO doesn't necessarily mean a weaker EU. Quite to the contrary. And I wonder if you could comment in the civilian realm related to the strategic concept how you were successful in essentially winning the days, as you seem to allude, with the notion that not only are our interests here reconcilable but indeed a mutually beneficial group.

MS. HILL: Thank you. And this -- there's -- right behind you here.

MS. ZAMADJ: Thank you. Zori Zamadj, defense counsel at the Embassy of Montenegro. Your Excellency, thank you very much for your contribution, and in the region during the Balkan crisis. We are very much encouraged by the context of communiqué that referred to Montenegro's success and the military and army reforms in the membership action plan and our contribution to the regional stability and within the (inaudible). Can you, though, talk a little bit about the open door policy and how do you see that an ethical future enlargement, particular with regard to the fact that solidifying stability on the Balkans is really one of the focus of NATO as well. Thank you.

MR. DAALDER: Thank you.

On NATO EU, this administration, back like the previous administration, has made it very clear that a strong EU is something we value and that therefore the

relationship between NATO-EU is not a zero sum but a positive sum. Our EU allies within NATO of course have a similar point of view. What we don't always find is that the EU allies in the EU have a similar point of view. There tends to be some down -- as we call it, downtown in Brussels. Some sense within the EU that a stronger EU needs to go at the expense of NATO, and that is -- that's the bridge we're trying to cross where in fact we're trying to make this a positive sum gain. And we have worked very closely with the Secretary General, and we will continue to work close with whomever on the EU side, on the NATO side to bolster the relationship between NATO and European Union while understanding that there are limits of how far you can go. There are limits by definition because of the different memberships, including the fact that not each member of each organization recognizes the other member of other organizations, which makes it a little complicated at times, but also because they have different avocations. The EU is a broader -- has a broader mandate, has a broader reach, and NATO is focused on security.

That said, this clearly is an area where we can do more and do better and that why was it was important for this why it was important for this strategic concept today out a vision about cooperation between NATO and the EU that was forward looking towards a fully strengthened partnership between the two organizations that so far has been more aspirational than real. And now we need to move from that aspiration into reality, and that is one of the big tasks left to be done for those of us who will go back to Brussels, whether they live downtown or in Aveda, which is where NATO is. We both need to work on that.

On the open door policy, I think both the strategic concept and the communiqué but the strategic concept is the more important document. The open door

policy is clear. NATO's door is open. It is open to any European democracy that wants to join and meets the standards of membership and whose membership will contribute to security at the North Atlantic area.

With respect to the Western Balkans, the door remains open to Macedonia, and an invitation will be extended as soon as the name issue will be resolved.

With respect to Montenegro, Montenegro has entered MEP. It now needs to benefit and perform as a result of that MEP, and the quicker and the better and cooperates with NATO; the sooner an invitation to membership can be extended.

With respect to Bosnia, Bosnia was granted MEP in April of 2010, but will not be able to start its annual national program until it has reformed the defense sector and has demonstrated that the defense properties are in fact national as opposed to entity based.

And just in general, I think NATO has once again reaffirmed an important point. If you want to be a member of NATO and you are European, which is a pretty big requirement, and you meet the standards of membership, you will get a membership invitation. However, you don't have to necessarily. Just because you're European and you're European and you meet the standards doesn't mean you have to be a member of NATO. We have very good partners in Finland and Sweden. They could join if they wanted to, and they don't want to. Ukraine has decided that for the moment it does not want to become a member of a bloc, and NATO, in the communiqué, made very clear two things: One, it respects that decision; and two, NATO's door remains open so that if Ukraine decides it wants to apply for membership. Once it meets the standards for membership, it can join. And that is the way one needs to deal with it.

Georgia has made very clear it wants to be a member of NATO. We have the NATO-Georgia Commission and the various activities to help make that possible and that therefore it was very clear and NATO reaffirmed the fundamental decisions it made in Bucharest with respect to Georgia and now did so for Georgia. I didn't do it for Georgia-Ukraine; I did it for Georgia. And Georgia is now on its own, in its own place where it needs to place. If and when the requirements are met, an invitation to Georgia would follow.

MS. HILL: You said something that I suppose some might find a little provocative there, because you said "if you're European," and I'm sure there are a number of people and I saw a couple of raised eyebrows on some of my Europeanist colleagues here, and of course the definition of Europe sometimes seems like it's up for grabs. Could you say a little bit more about how you see that criteria being applied to one of values. You said its being a democracy. Is it a geographic --

MR. DAALDER: It's actually in the treaty, which is why I'm saying it. Article 10 in the treaty says that nation -- European countries can be invited to join.

MS. HILL: That's true, but how are we seeing "European" here --

MR. DAALDER: Verb is a geographic expression in this particular instance, and that's all I meant. Usually I get asked about this, because once when I was a young boy as a scholar at Brookings I wrote an article about the importance of a global NATO and inviting non-European members to be part of NATO. I now have to remind people I'm not advocating change in the treaty. I'm not, so. Whatever I may have said when I was young and irresponsible.

MS. HILL: But in that regard, given the fact that actually just over I think it was on Friday, an International Herald Tribune, a couple of colleagues had taken part in

some of the deliberations, the Russian colleagues -- (inaudible) -- had their piece about Russia and NATO right after President Obama's rather nicely prominent op-eds there (inaudible).

MR. DAALDER: And I would argue that Russia is a European country, that if it would like to join NATO it should express that interest. It will then have to meet the standards of NATO membership, and a determination will have to be made that it's membership would benefit the security of the North Atlantic area, which is also in the treaty, and at that point an invitation would be forthcoming. Russia is not excluded just because part of its territory is not in Europe. After all, Turkey has territory that is not geographically located in Europe and yet is a NATO member and has been since 1952.

MS. HILL: Very good.

There's a question -- this gentleman here and then a gentleman, the back of this aisle here.

MR. PIERRE: Andrew Pierre from United States Institute of Peace. If I could take you back, Ivo, to your dissertation days, perhaps -- nuclear weapons in Europe.

MR. DAALDER: When I was really young and irresponsible.

MR. PIERRE: Tell us a bit more about how you see the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons on allied aircraft, the five countries evolving over the next months and years. Yes, NATO's going to remain a nuclear alliance, but to simply say that we're going to put this into the mix of negotiations with Russia, that might be a long time coming, some agreement, because of the overhang of numbers of the Soviet tactical nuclear weapon arsenal. Meanwhile, do you think that within Europe some agreement can be reached that we are happy with? And basically how did he come to avoid the

problem head on in the recent summit?

MS. HILL: All right thanks, and this gentleman here, and then I can see a couple more (inaudible).

SPEAKER: (inaudible) Daily News from Turkey. Turkey has been one of the most visible countries in the NATO Summit, and, in fact, Turkish president on the way back from the summit said if Turkey was not in the summit, summit would have been (inaudible) within 10 minutes. I would like to address that. This was a prelude to my question actually.

There is much discussions in the Middle East, especially that over the command and control issue of the missile defense system. Turkish prime minister toward summit said it's not command and control even to us. It's not going to happen. And accordingly, today, Israeli may be a (inaudible) in the deal additional provide for the missile base to come under the command of a Turkish general. Could you please elaborate on that better? Comment on control issue has been resolved.

And relate that very simple question, why Turkey was not included the first version of the missile defense system if Russia is not. And now Turkey's included in the system as, you know, Poland and Czech Republic was in first version. If it was -- obvious Turkey is the most ideal geography.

And the last point -- has been talk a lot in the Middle East but not in Washington, D.C., or the U.S., Israel's role in the wholeness of the (inaudible) system. The Iranian foreign minister's spokesman just said on Tuesday that possible deployment of NATO missile system in Turkey is solely aimed at defending Israel interest. Just, you know, clarify what's going on, because I know it's a marginal topic here in U.S., but there are lots of commentaries in the Middle East. Thanks so much.

MS. HILL: Okay.

SPEAKER: Two big questions. Let me do the nuclear weapons one first.

First, the U.S. has made clear that in the next round of arms control negotiations with the Russians we will want to include non-strategic nuclear forces in that negotiation, and that's the right place to put them. We made clear we want to have the next round to be about deployed and non-deployed strategic and non-strategic systems. To the extent we're interested in negotiation that affects not only our non-strategic weapons but Russians, we ought to want to have START ratifying. And I know that one of the criticisms of START is that it doesn't address tactical nuclear weapons. Well, let's get it ratified so we can get a negotiation that does.

With respect to the future of the dual-capable aircraft and their loads, that is the issue that the posture review will address. And we will have to make many decisions in the course of that review that will address both the capabilities, the delivery systems, et cetera, which we will start as soon as we get back to Brussels. But I'm not going to start here, for obvious reasons, because these are decisions that, most importantly, will have to be made at 28. Twenty-eight countries will have to make the decisions about NATO and nuclear weapons, not the United States or indeed any other country.

How we -- how do we avoid that issue? Well, we avoided that issue, because we wanted to have a rational process where we first decided what is the role of nuclear weapons, which we have now done, before we decide what capabilities we're going to maintain, which we're now going to address. And there was an agreement quite early on that we would do it in that step-by-step fashion. But we would not address the

posture until we had addressed the role. We've now addressed the role. We had a very interesting, good discussion about it. I think, as Darrel said, if you look at the language, there's a lot there. There's a lot that tells you where we need to go without necessarily closing any particular route off, and that's going to be the debate we will have next year -- throughout next year.

On Turkey, I won't comment on President's Gill's view that this could have been done in 10 minutes, but let me tell you the interventions of others than the Turks were longer than 10 minutes. Much longer. So, I'm not sure. And then in fact by the time we got to the summit the issues in which Turkey had strong views had all been addressed, and I don't think that Turkey was a big object of the summit. No one was a particular object of the summit. We came together. And we came together as 28 allies. And it was gratifying to come together as 28 allies, not 27 + 1 or 26 + 2, but 28. And it is good for an alliance to act in those -- and Turkey was a central part of that discussion at 28. Vigorous. Turkey has views. Many countries in the alliance have views and projecting those views and making those views known is what allies do, but we do it within the confines of the Council, and then at the end of the day we try to reach a compromise that satisfies as many of us, and I think President Gill would admit that we did for this particular summit.

With respect to the command and control of missile defense, this is an issue that we are now going to address. We first have to address the fundamental big question: Will NATO agree to acquire the capability to defend its territory against ballistic missiles. The answer to that was yes. That was a major, major decision. NATO has never done that. It had never said that it is the goal of NATO to defend all of NATO territory against ballistic missile attack and that we are now going to require the capability

to do that. That's why it was a major, major decision. Much debated, including in Turkey. But a decision that we made at 28. Irrespective of what the Russians or anybody else thought about it.

The command and control of that system is now the issue that we are going to address. But this is not that complicated. NATO has for many, many years operated systems under single command and control, under NATO command and control. We have an air defense system, an integrated air defense system that has operated for decades under a single command and control system with the supreme allied commander in Europe in charge and operating procedures and ways and concepts of operation that allow this to work. And we're going to have a very similar setup for missile defense in which we will agree under what circumstances commanders who operate the system will be able to defend against it.

The good news here is that we're defending against incoming threats. We're not actually launching military operations. You're defending against something, and therefore it ought to be a little easier to find what the circumstances are in which you would defend. Rule No. 1, the missile needs to in fact attack you before you do anything, which makes it a little easier to device your command and control system. But the specifics of this will be done afterwards. It will be a NATO system, because that's how NATO operates. It's why NATO is not a coalition of the willing; it's an alliance. And the specific ways in which it will operate will leave.

Let me -- on the issue of Israel, I'll just say this. NATO is acquiring the capability to defend NATO territory period.

MS. HILL: Two questions right together here at the back.

MR. LOWRY: Andrea Lowry, (inaudible) Institute. In response to one of

the earlier questions, you have mentioned that you and NATO expect Russia to be (inaudible) to service the agreement after the Russian-Georgian war. Could you tell us openly whether you, NATO, President Obama did receive clear confirmation from the Russian site that the Russian site is going to withdraw troops from Apazia and South Ossetia and to cancel recognition of independence of the territories.

And the second related question is two years ago at Bucharest Summit, NATO had a statement that Georgia one day will be a NATO member. And it did not prevent Russian invasion into Georgia. What make you and NATO think that repetition of the same statement in the Lisbon communiqué would not -- would be able to prevent something similar in the future?

MS. HILL: Okay, the gentleman sitting next, thank you.

MR. COOKS: Dennis Cooks from the Woodrow Wilson Center. I wonder if would elaborate a little bit on the agreement that was reached to transport non-lethal goods from Russia into Afghanistan and specifically a couple of questions. One, what is new from the status quo; B, did we ask for , and that's for the petroleum if that's not in the status quo; and C, why is lethal equipment ammunition et cetera and not being shipped that way.

MS. HILL: Okay.

MR. DAALDER: Just on the last question, what's new is the categories of equipment that is now being able to be shipped. In particular we can now ship armored vehicles that are unarmed, and we can ship them back. That's new.

I don't know the answer on petroleum. I don't know whether it is included in the original deal or not. I just don't know, so I hesitate to comment on that.

On the issue of Georgia -- did Russia announce that it was going to

withdraw from Apazia and South Ossetia? I'll make some news, the answer is no. I didn't expect them to, but they didn't.

What NATO did was the important -- was the obverse that says that the answer should be yes and reiterated the importance of that answer being yes. It was important, and it is important to make very clear that the decision we made in Bucharest in 2008 with respect to Georgia is not going to be changed, certainly not because Russia and Georgia had a war after that.

To the contrary. It is extremely important to reaffirm the importance of that decision and not to change it. Just precisely for that reason. And that's why it was reaffirmed, and I believe that the government and the people of Georgia are pleased that it was reaffirmed, because the alternative was to say oh, there's a war, let's not them in. No, the contrary. We're not going to be -- allow a country, any country in Europe or anywhere else for that matter, to determine the choices, the free choice of any European country, to decide it's alliance.

It's fundamental to the Helsinki final pact and the principles, and we are reaffirming it by saying -- we're reaffirming it with the Ukraine, too. We are saying that Ukraine has the right to decide whether or not it wants to join NATO. But it's Ukraine's decision, not NATO's nor anybody else's and that Ukraine should know that, one, we respect the decisions it makes, but we will keep the door open if it changes its mind. I think that's the only open door policy that NATO can have and that NATO has reaffirmed. No country can tell another country which alliances it can join, and that's certainly the case with Georgia. If Georgia wants to join NATO, the door to NATO is open. We will work with them and -- with Georgia -- to get it ready for NATO for the day and hasten the day that it could become a member.

MS. HILL: Thank you. There's another couple of questions. There's one at the front here and also this gentleman here on the side. I think I missed you before. Actually, we've got about 10 minutes, so maybe we'll just take both question by question, so right here, the gentleman here and then there was somebody else at the back -- we've got five minutes? Yeah, okay. We have five now, so let's be quick.

MR. MITCHELL: Ivo, Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I'd like to move off the policy-related questions and maybe get some thoughts from you on process and perspective, and let me just put it this way. Few people have come to a post with as much direct experience and deep knowledge as you have to be the ambassador of NATO, and I don't need to repeat all of that, but everything European born to having done your dissertation American citizen, et cetera, et cetera. You've spent a lot of years on the outside looking in at NATO, and now you've been there, and I'm interested to know what have been the sort of most salient learning experiences that you've had. The view from the inside looking out, particularly as it relates to how -- what NATO's role is in America and grand strategy; how NATO is viewed in other areas of the world; and, to the extent that it's relevant and can be discussed, where do you think there's some learning that emerges from the apparent success that NATO is having that other global governance organizations might learn from?

MS. HILL: Okay, this gentleman here.

MR. YOUNG: Steven Young with the (inaudible) Scientist.

Ivo, a question about the nuclear cost review -- I know you were involved in it as well and do like with the Russia question -- one of the things that jumped out at me on the (inaudible) was a statement in there that the U.S. needs to maintain equivalent forces to Russian forces, along those lines, which is actually different than the Bush

policy. The Bush policy is very clear. U.S. deems these weapons in Russia as almost relevant to how many weapons we need. (inaudible) thought that was a step back on that. Is that a NATO-driven assumption in there or what? What was that change dealing with -- that policy change and NPR at all?

MS. HILL: Thank you. And there was a couple of -- one gentleman here and only probably able to take two here. So, this gentleman here, and then gentleman here in a -- I think it's a red tie, so my eyes are failing a little a bit the day wears on, so.

MR. MORROW: Daniel Morrow, TransAtlantic Center, here at (inaudible). The question is about Russia, which is really important. I think what you said that they give the West permission to cross to Afghanistan, which I think costs us 10 percent if you compare with what it will cost to go to Pakistan and also use a strong signal, and that's why I am asking you to the Pakistan -- because will be safer and will be extremely cheaper. Is possible to say that you in exchange move from Poland the missiles to Turkey?

MR. DAALDER: Thank you.

MS. HILL: There's a cost question? The gentleman here in the red tie. Actually, the gentleman behind him as well. If you can do your questions very quickly, and then we'll give it over to Ivo to wrap up, because he'll have to flee for his next meeting.

MR. COLLINA: Thank you. Tom Collina, Arms Control Association, very quickly.

Can you tell us about the NATO-Russia Council decision on missile defense and specifically the follow-on analysis you said will be done by June. What do you expect it to cover, and what can we expect from it? Thanks.

MS. HILL: Okay, and the gentleman just behind here. Thank you, sir.

SPEAKER: Sure, just real quick. Was there any discussion on policy analysis and resolution and resolution between ISEP forces and the Afghan government? You know, we have a strategy. They have a strategy. And occasionally in the newspaper we see a difference between what the Afghans would like and what ISEP forces are doing. Was there any discussion on how to create consensus in the strategy and policy arena there?

MS. HILL: Okay, Ivo.

MR. DAALDER: You want me to answer all of this in three second, three minutes?

MS. HILL: Yes. We know you can do it.

MR. DAALDER: Thanks.

Some of it is actually -- the answer to the last question is yes. And I think if you read President Obama's press conference, it'll give you a good sense on how and where we will try to agree as much as we can on these issues.

On the joint analysis on what it is going to cover, it's going to cover the detail questions of how would you cooperate? What is each going to bring to the table? And how would you deal with that? Is there an architecture that would work from where you put them together? A whole series of questions that we need to ask and need to answer. I don't think we're going to be done by June of 2011, but we will have set the parameters from how to think about architecture, how to think about cost sharing, how to build in the knowledge that we gain from joint exercises of theater missile defenses, et cetera, in order to make -- to see how you would in fact cooperate when it comes to territorial missile defense.

Discussions that have been ongoing between the U.S. and Russia for many years but are now taking place in a NATO-Russia context, which is different.

The chance of agreement is not new; it's been there. We're just expanded what is, and it's important. But if you look at geography, Russia isn't the only country you need to get through in order to get to Afghanistan. Wish it were so. Would be a lot easier. But the northern distribution network writ large is extremely important, in part because of reliance on -- the only other reliance is Pakistan, which is expensive and has problems. So, we are trying to find ways to get as much through Russian and other territories to Afghanistan in order to enhance the ability to provide their forces with what they need. And the more the better, certainly cheaper.

And on the U.S.-Russian site, we're doing lethal -- in answer to an earlier question -- as well, and I think don't exclude that that's something we would be doing in the NATO-Russia context down the road.

I don't remember a sentence on the equivalency in the MPR, so we ought to take that off line, but it certainly wasn't because of NATO. I think that's a misreading. I just don't remember, but then it's been a while since I reads the MPR. But NATO wasn't the issue. If that was -- that wasn't. But I just don't remember that.

On Gary's question, let me end on this sort of a what-have-I-learned mode. You know, the most interesting thing about NATO is it's a coalition, and diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, is a craft that is completely different than you do certainly as an academic but even as a faculty member. As Kissinger used to say, the politics and faculty -- sorry -- faculty politics are the most corrosive politics of all times, because the stakes are so loaded. And the stakes are very high often; although a lot of issues they're very low. But building coalitions and figuring out how to trade off issue A

versus issue B is a craft, and it's something that isn't easy to do, but it is something you can learn, and the better you get at it, the more likely it is that you can get to the result where 28 countries in fact agree. But you need that unifying glue, and you can't create organizations without that unifying glue.

The biggest challenge that NATO has had, and I'll end on that, is to find what's that unifying glue? Because we had a threat? That's NATO 1.0. NATO 1.0 has existed from 1949 to 1989, which was the NATO that was united because of the threat. And then the question arose afterwards what are we going to do? What is unifying us now? And NATO 2.0 was about enlarging the sphere of European security, and that included the enlargement process. It included a new relationship with Russia. And that became the glue that kept it together.

And the question we had to ask is what's the glue for 3.0? And the answer is that in a world of globalized threats, you'd better be with the guys who you can count on at all times to work those globalized threats together, and that's what we have reaffirmed here, that NATO as an organization is fundamental to the security of each of its 28 members in order to deal with those globalized threats. Whether it's cyber, whether it's missiles, whether it's nuclear, whether it's failing states in terrorism -- you name it -- you need that organization to put it together, and once you have that glue you can then build the coalitions to move forward. And what the challenge is for global governance in institutions like the G20 and others is what's the glue? What keeps them together? What's the institutional framework that allows you to do the coalition bargaining that you need for multilateral diplomacy to work. That's the real challenge. It's the challenge for all multilateral organizations, and NATO (inaudible) I think has found a new vocation. It will be able to move forward on the basis of that vocation.

MS. HILL: Well, thank you very much, Ivo. I think we should definitely wrap up there, because that was such a positive note. And also now your colleagues in the State Department are ready to whisk you off to the next meeting.

But, again, we can only thank you for coming to Brookings so soon after what was obviously a pretty exhausting but very gratifying and satisfying experience in Lisbon. We're delighted to see you and hope we'll see you back again, and thank you to everyone else for spending their last part of the day with us. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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