

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

DO RELIGIOUS ISSUES STILL MATTER?  
WHAT ROLE DID THEY PLAY IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS?

Washington, D.C.  
Wednesday, November 17, 2010

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome. I am E.J. Dionne. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings. We are very grateful that you have all come to join us today for a discussion of the role of religion in the 2010 elections, including a report Bill Galston and I have done on the old and new religious politics, and Robby Jones' excellent report and summary of the survey by the Public Religion Research Institute on which our report, as you will see, draws extensively.

Right at the start, I want to thank Robby and his colleague, Dan Cox. This is our second project together and they have been an absolute joy to work with. And I could go on and on and on about that, but all I will say is, Bill and I hope this is the beginning of a beautiful polling friendship, so thank you very much, Robby.

I also at the outset want to thank Korin Davis, John Seo, Amanda Nover, I think of her as a supernova, Amanda Nover, and Emily Luken of Brookings, without whom none of this could have been produced, bless you all. And also, to stay on the religious theme, I devoutly thank Sheila Davaney, Program Officer at the Ford Foundation, not only for financial support, but also, and in many ways more importantly, for her passion for this subject, her superb advice, and the freedom to do this work.

Here is the order of battle today, if you will forgive me, that combative phrase. I will offer my take on certain parts of our report, then Bill, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, will present other aspects of our findings.

Then Robby will offer an overview of the survey in more detail. He is the PowerPoint guy, and he does it very well. And then we will be joined up here by two excellent respondents who will approach our report from different viewpoints.

You have the bios, but I will just say that Anna Greenberg, a Democratic

pollster, a University of Chicago PhD, a former Professor at Harvard's Kennedy School, has done some of the very best and most innovative work on religion and politics, and is a spectacular analyst, as well as a spectacular person.

And Mike Cromartie is also an old friend whose very early work on religion and politics in the 1980's was equally path breaking, and it actually led to our friendship. After I read a superb collection that Mike had edited, I said to myself, I have to get to know this guy, I called him up, and we have been friends and also sometimes collaborators for more than, God help us, Mike, 20 years.

So what did Bill and I find? Economic convulsions have a way of changing the priorities of voters. Although concerns for their own and their families' well-being are never far from citizens' minds, these matters are less pressing in prosperous times. At such moments, voters feel freer to use elections as a way of registering their views on matters related to religion and culture and foreign policy. But when times turn harsh, the politics of jobs and wealth and income can overwhelm everything else.

Thus, did the focus of our country's politics change between the 1928 election, a classic culture war contest dominated by arguments over prohibition and Al Smith's religious faith, to 1932, when the Great Depression ushered in a new political alignment and created what became Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition.

The Great Recession has had a similar effect in concentrating the electorate's mind on economics. But the evidence is that the 2010 election has not, did not at least for now, fundamentally alter the cultural and religious contours of American political life. Religion and issues related to recent cultural conflicts, notably abortion and gay marriage, played a very limited role in the Republican's electoral victory.

Overwhelmingly, voters cast their ballots on the basis of economic issues

and also on their view of the world of government, while the religious alignments that took root well before the economic downturn remain largely intact.

Democrats lost votes among religiously conservative white voters, but they also lost votes among religious liberals and secular voters. They lost votes, in part, because many of their core supporters stayed home this time. They did not lose ground between 2006 and 2010 among African Americans of various religious creeds, and they held their own among Latino voters, losing some strength in some parts of the country, but counting on Latinos to win key contests in the west.

To see issues related to religious or cultural questions central to 2010 is, in the end, we believe, a mistake. But there is a new constellation of issues related to religion that looms as a potentially divisive and even troubling element in American political life. The attack of September 11, 2001, has left the country divided in its view of Islam and of Muslims. Indeed, in many ways, we are more divided now than we were, especially along political lines, than we were in the period immediately after 9/11. These divisions reinforce cleavages between Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, and Americans are also sharply divided in their perceptions of President Obama's own religious faith, a subject that Bill will talk about in more detail.

I just want to focus here on our findings about Islam and also offer a theory of how the Tea Party may be altering the political configuration around religious questions, and particularly around what came to be known as compassionate conservatism.

Here's one major finding: The PRRI survey found that Americans split almost evenly when asked whether the values of Islam, the Muslim religion, are at odds with American values and way of life. The survey found that 45 percent of Americans

agreed with that statement, including 20 percent who said they agreed completely, and 49 percent disagreed, including 22 percent who disagreed completely.

There was a wide variance of views across demographic and political lines. Among Americans 65 and over, 51 percent said that Muslim and American values are at odds, but only 36 percent of those under 30 said this. Among whites, 46 percent agreed, 44 percent of Latinos, but only 31 percent of African Americans saw Muslim and American values being incompatible.

Attitudes on this issue are closely correlated with partisan allegiance, 67 percent of Republicans, but only 43 percent of independents, and just 30 percent of Democrats saw Muslim and American values as being at odds. There was a comparable ideological difference -- 62 percent of conservatives saw them at odds, only 26 percent of liberals, with moderates in between.

Now, it's worth putting some qualification around these observations. For example, as I noted, you had the 20 percent who completely agreed and the 22 percent who completely disagreed. That creates a very large middle ground on this question, 25 percent who mostly agreed with the statement that these values were at odds and 27 percent who mostly disagreed.

I think this indicates an opinion on this question could be subject to change, that many Americans hold nuanced views, and that a majority may not hold their views on this question very strongly. Nonetheless, we believe that a serious threat of further national division lies in the potential politicization of this question, and that's a genuine possibility in light of those strong partisan and ideological differences we described. Where 33 percent of Republicans said they completely agreed that Muslim and American values were incompatible, only 11 percent of Democrats said this. While

31 percent of conservatives and 43 percent of Tea Party members completely agreed, only 8 percent of liberals and 16 percent of moderates said this.

And this is related to our findings about the Tea Party. In our report, we cite the historian, Gary Gerstle's fascinating recent essay describing what he called the religiously inflected multiculturalism pursued by President George W. Bush. It's an approach that Gerstle also described as the multiculturalism of the godly.

He notes that on questions of immigration and diversity, Bush was worlds apart from Patrick Buchanan and the socially conservative wing of the Republican Party. Bush, he writes, was comfortable with diversity, bilingualism and cultural pluralism, as long as members of America's ethnic and racial subcultures shared his patriotism, religious faith and political conservatism. It is particularly notable, especially in light of these findings on Islam, that Gerstle wrote, during a time in which the United States was at war and Europe was exploding with tension and violence over Islam, Bush played a positive role in keeping inter-ethnic and inter-racial relations in the United States relatively calm.

Now, we also cite the conservative columnist, Christopher Caldwell's, recent Financial Times column in which he argued that many of the Tea Party's gripes about President Obama can be laid at the door of President Bush. And you can read a longer excerpt from that column. But he concludes provocatively that if Obama has come to grief through his failure to realize that the electorate is poor soil for cultivating social democracy, then Bush failed to realize that Christian democracy was just as alien a plant to our country.

Now, we have disagreements with Chris Caldwell's views, but we believe that Gerstle is on to something important about the Bush presidency and that Caldwell

has identified a central cause of the Tea Party revolt and has shrewdly sketched the substantial difference between Tea Party politics and the politics of compassionate conservatism. Now, I should note here that in an earlier study that we did in – that Robby did in cooperation with us, there is a large overlap between the Tea Party and members of the Religious Right. Fifty-seven percent in our survey of Tea Party members said they were Christian conservatives or part of the Religious Right. And Christian conservatives and Tea Party supporters are in broad agreement on many issues, but there is a harder edge, we believe, to Tea Party views on immigration, multiculturalism and Islam.

Again, we don't want to exaggerate the importance here, and yet we do think that these findings suggest that behind the Take Our Country Back slogans of the Tea Party lies an assertive nationalism that is fed in part by a reaction to the sharp increase in immigration in recent decades and a mistrust of Islam created after 9/11. And in at least one contest we call attention to, one of the loudest spokesmen for that assertive nationalism gained a large vote as a third party candidate, and it was clear evidence here of a difference between the Tea Party movement and religious conservatism.

Colorado, as many of you know, had an unusual governor's race this year. The Republican candidate, Dan Maes, was discredited in the eyes of many in his party by a series of press reports. And former Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo, who was on the ballot as a candidate of the right wing Constitution Party, stepped into the breach and emerged as the main challenger to Democrat John Hickenlooper, the mayor of Denver.

Tancredo is best known for his vociferous opposition to illegal immigration and for his extreme hostility to President Obama. We have some quotes

from him in the report just to illustrate that point.

Hickenlooper won the election with 51 percent of the vote, to 37 percent to Tancredo, 11 percent for Maes. But there were striking differences in the voting patterns of conservatives and white evangelicals on the one hand and those who told exit pollsters they strongly supported the Tea Party.

White evangelicals gave Tancredo 54 percent of their ballots, but strong Tea Party supporters gave him 80 percent of theirs. We believe that what might be called the Tancredo difference has important implications for conservative and religious politics.

While many accounts have emphasized the possibility of splits in the Republican Party between its establishment and the Tea Party, there is a potential of other divisions between religious conservatives with more moderate views on immigration, more compassionate views on poverty, and members of a Tea Party movement still rebelling against certain distinctive aspects of the Bush presidency. And at this point, Bill will pick up the story.

Let me close by saying that our findings point to a challenge, but perhaps also to an opportunity for President Obama. The President has proven himself adept in the past at addressing both religious issues and national divisions. He spoke about these questions a great deal before he became president. But he has largely shied away from expressing himself on religious matters as president.

Our findings would suggest that it would be in his interest and the country's interest for him to find his voice again on issues that are of particular importance in the United States, which has been described, for good reason, as a nation with the soul of a church. And now I turn it over to Bill.



MR. GALSTON: Well, I am not really a data nerd, although I occasionally play one on TV, but I couldn't resist, because PRRI has outdone itself with this survey by formulating questions that have just provided an extraordinary new angle of vision into the complex interplay of the old politics of religion and the new politics of religion in contemporary America. What I want to do for the next ten minutes or so is pull out five of the questions that were posed and look at them in some greater detail to see what they reveal about the electorate.

And I will be talking off this two pager that has five tables on it. And I hope everyone picked one up at the door or is sitting near someone who was foresighted enough to pick one up at the door.

Table number one -- and this is where my opening comments link to E.J.'s closing comments -- table number one asks the following question, "Does Barack Obama have religious beliefs that are very similar, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or very different than your own religious beliefs?"

In our judgment, this is a much better way of probing the sense of distance or proximity that Americans feel to Barack Obama on religious grounds than is a question based on what we regard as a total falsehood, namely, identifying his religion as Islam rather than Christianity. And here's what we found; overall, only 40 percent of the respondents thought that Obama's religious beliefs were very similar or somewhat similar to their own; fully 51 percent saw some or a great deal of difference between their own religious beliefs and their assessment of Obama's.

Now, concealed in that top line finding are some very, very interesting differences within the population. Here are some things that jumped out at me. I would have expected the youngest voters to have some sense of identity with Obama on

religious grounds, as they do in so many other areas, but they were no more likely to sense a religious affinity with President Obama than was the population as a whole.

What's surprising, the older Americans were the least likely they were to find an affinity. Only 32 percent found anything in their assessment of Obama's religious beliefs that they could identify with. White voters, only 35 percent, African American voters, 74 percent, and Hispanics, in the middle, but at only 44 percent, so there was actually a plurality of Hispanics who saw more difference than similarity between their own views and Obama's.

If you look at some of the political breakdowns, 76 percent of Tea Party members saw a difference, 78 percent of Republican identifiers saw a difference, 69 percent of Democrats saw a similarity. Perhaps more revealingly, only 35 percent of independents saw a similarity, and that may point to one of the many reasons why the independent vote dropped off significantly for Obama compared – rather for the Democrats compared to 2008.

You see the same sorts of splits when you look at ideology, only 23 percent of conservatives saw a similarity, but fully 49 percent of moderates and 56 percent of liberals.

Now, if you take a look at the religious breakdown, some expected findings, but also some surprises: white evangelicals, only 27 percent saw a similarity. By contrast, black Protestants, 75 percent; white Catholics were, as is typical for this swingiest of swing groups in the population, about 45 percent.

I would have expected white mainline Protestants to be more sympathetic to Obama's religion, but only 40 percent saw a similarity; fully 52 percent expressed a sense of distance from Obama on those grounds. And a lot has been

written about the President's cool manner, you know, his very studied, deliberative governing style, et cetera, as contributing perhaps to a sense of distance with major segments of the American population, but it's possible that these findings cast an additional light on that sense of difference.

Turning to table two, this might appear to be the dog that didn't bark. "Government should do more to protect morality in society," or, "I worry the government is getting too involved in the issue." We asked people to choose between those two statements.

Overall, only 33 percent thought that government should do more to protect morality in society versus 63 percent who expressed anxiety about government getting too involved.

We did not see, with one salient exception, the kinds of differences within the different demographics that we would have expected. Age doesn't make much of a difference, nor does party membership, Tea Party movement, sympathies, conservative, moderate or liberal. African Americans, by 51 to 46, thought that government should do more to protect morality in society. And not surprisingly, black Protestants were split evenly, 48 to 48, while the other religious groups had majorities against. Even white evangelicals, only 44 percent, thought that the government should do more, 54 percent thought that excessive involvement of government was a big worry.

Now, having said that, the PRRI report goes on to point out something very important, namely, that when President Obama took office, many conservatives changed their mind about the advisability of government involvement in the enforcement of social morality, and this is a finding that I think deserves some real analytical attention, and, fortunately, the PRRI report gives it that attention, and you'll find out more about that

in a few minutes, I suspect.

Now, let's put tables three and four together. And this struck us as a very interesting diagnostic. We asked people to choose between two statements, "Democratic candidates don't pay enough attention to religion," or "Democratic candidates are too close to religious leaders." And by a margin of 47 to 28, the respondents said that Democratic candidates don't pay enough attention to religion.

And it's not entirely surprising that older voters would say this, or that Tea Party members would say this, or that Republicans would say this, or that white evangelicals would say this, but guess what, so did the youngest voters, so especially did African Americans, so did Democrats themselves. Democrats themselves said that their party wasn't paying enough attention to religion. So did liberals, and so did – and even 34 percent of unaffiliated voters, people who don't attend church, don't identify with a denomination, many of whom are probably non-believers, even so, 34 percent of them said that the Democrats weren't paying enough attention to religion, that's a fascinating finding.

But now go to table four, okay. We asked them to choose, "Republican candidates don't pay enough attention to religion," or "Republican candidates are too close to religious leaders." By a margin of 54 to 27, the respondents in this survey said that Republican candidates are too close to religious leaders.

So what we have is the finding that Democrats don't pay enough attention, Republicans are too close. And the middle of the electorate is forced to oscillate back and forth between two parties, neither of whom gets the relationship right, in their opinion. This is a very, very intriguing finding. And interestingly, when you look at table four on the Republican side, Tea Party members are split down the middle on that

question, conservatives are split down the middle, white evangelicals actually have a plurality saying that Republicans are too close to religious leaders. This is an astonishing finding, or so we think, but perhaps those with greater experience in the evangelical movement, of whom there are many in this audience, can give us a good explanation.

But we were really struck by the fact that in the same way that the core of the Democratic coalition is not satisfied with Democrats, the way Democrats address this relationship, the core of the Republican coalition is deeply ambivalent about the way Republicans are addressing this relationship. So there's clearly political work here to be done on all sides.

Finally, table five, this is one of my favorite topics ever in the study of American culture and religion, and this survey I think has cast shining new light on a hearty perennial of American self-consciousness. We asked people to respond in one of four ways to a very, very strong assertion, which you see verbatim at the top of table five, "God has granted America a special role in human history." You cannot affirm American exceptionalism more clearly than that proposition does. I mean maybe someone can come up with a better formulation, but that is pretty stark and hard edged. By a margin of 58 to 38, the respondents in this survey affirmed that proposition. And interestingly, when you look at the ethnic breakdown, racial and ethnic, 54 percent of Hispanics, 56 percent of whites, and 60 percent of African Americans affirmed American exceptionalism.

Not surprisingly, Tea Party members and Republicans affirmed it, Democrats were split down the middle, 49/48, independents were roughly in the same place as the population as a whole.

One thing that jumped out at us was what a sorting mechanism this

question was ideologically. Take a look at the ideological breakdown for just a minute. Seventy-five percent of conservatives affirm American exceptionalism, 39 percent completely and without reservation.

If you look at liberals, only 38 percent affirm the exceptionalism, and 46 percent completely reject it. This is a stark polarizing element in American politics today. Do you believe in American exceptionalism in your gut or don't you? And I would suggest, and I'm doing this in my own name, that political leaders who challenge American exceptionalism are taking on a heavy burden of proof, and it will not be easy for leaders who want to substitute some other understanding of America's place in the world for the exceptionalist narrative and frame to make their case. It will be an uphill battle. That is not to say that it might not be worth waging, but it is to say that political leaders who want to do that should go into the endeavor with their eyes wide open. Thank you very much.

MR. JONES: Well, thank you very much, E.J. and Bill, and first I have to say my own words of gratitude both to E.J. and Bill, with whom working on this project has been, I'll just reciprocate, an absolute joy. It's hard to not come up with a good product when you've got such bright lights sitting at the table with you, so thank you, thank you, thank you. And my thanks, as well, to Shelia Davaney, who made not only this – and the Ford Foundation, who made not only this post-election survey possible, but the pre-election survey, as well, of which this is a part.

So a couple things about the survey that you should know: this is a nearly 1,500 person survey; it's a call-back survey from the pre-election survey. So the pre-election survey was in the field in early September, with around 3,000 respondents, we called back all 3,000 of those people after the election to kind of find out how they

voted, and we were able to compare some of their answers from before the election to after, and also able to sketch out a much broader profile than we might be able to in a single survey, so that's the basis of the survey.

I'm going to move fairly quickly through some of the things that have already been covered by E.J. and Bill, and will spend a little bit more time where I can flesh out some things, so don't be too alarmed if things fly by fairly quickly. But I'll just cover a couple of things where I can add around the edges and maybe emphasize some points that haven't been emphasized already.

So a couple things to say is, I'm in full agreement that what we find in this election are really stable religious alignments. The tide that receded on the Democratic side pulled back pretty much all religious groups. There were some small differences, but no real large differences.

Just to put this up real quickly, the main takeaway here is the red, the darker lines on the left are the Republican vote, and basically the line here is that Republicans did well, as they have in the past, with white Christian voters, and Democrats did well with minority Christian voters and the religiously unaffiliated. Those were the big, broad brush strokes, lots we could say underneath, but the big, broad strokes were those, and that's largely unchanged from the past. The levels have changed, but the basic alignments haven't really shifted that much.

We did have a question about the role of faith and religious values this time as compared to previous elections, and basically what we found is that nearly three quarters of the country reported that faith or religion played about the same role in their vote as it did in times past, nearly the same number said it played a larger role as played a smaller role, and 13 percent of the country said that it played no role in their vote at all.

So the great majority of religious voters said it did play a role, but it played about the same role as it did in the past, again, the economy really dominating this election.

So we have a question about what was the most important to your vote, this is no surprise here whatsoever, the economy overwhelmingly, the single most important issue to your vote. The second two are health care and the size and role of government, which registered double digits saying they were the most important issue to respondents' votes.

We also asked those people who initially said the economy was their most important issue, what was the second most important issue to their vote, so we could get a sense of that, and again, health care, the size and role of government, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed up in double digits. The other issues, immigration, same sex marriage, abortion, all really down almost unregistrable on the meter here.

Interestingly enough, we also asked about what people were hearing in their churches leading up to the election. So despite the fact that we see the economy, health care reform, the role and size of the government as things driving the electorate, very few people were hearing about those issues in church. In fact, what they were hearing mostly about was the issue of abortion. So you can see there, a third of the country saying that they heard about the issue of abortion in the months leading up to the election. The big number here that jumps out as very different is among Catholics. A majority of Catholics, 56 percent of Catholics reporting hearing about the issue of abortion in the months leading up to the election. That number jumps to 65 percent, by the way, if you limit it to white Catholics, so white Catholics nearly two-thirds report hearing about the issue of the abortion running up to the election, but other than that, only about a third. And these other issues, only about one in ten Americans reporting



hearing about these other two issues heading into the election.

We had a question about the feelings of the outcome of the election. Overall, 41 percent of Americans reported being satisfied about the outcome of the election. And what was interesting, though, is we had very few people who reported being excited about the outcome of the election. This fits with some of the things in the exit polls that we've seen. For example, that both parties had relatively similar favorability ratings after the election despite kind of heavy Republican victories. So we had 41 percent overall being satisfied, only 9 percent, about one in ten, seeming excited, and about four in ten, almost as many as saying satisfied, saying that they were disappointed or worried about the outcome of the election. Those are the overall numbers. Here you can see how these break down by party. We've included Republican and Democrat, and also the Tea Party here.

You can see the members of the Tea Party. Most of them, the majority, are in the satisfied column. They are more likely than Republicans to say excited, but the majority are in the satisfied column, not in the more excited column here. Democrats, as you can see, plurality of Democrats are in the disappointed column, not surprisingly given the outcome of the election.

So a couple of words about top priorities. We have a question among Democratic voters and among Republican voters, what their top priorities for Congress were after the election. On the Democratic side, two things really jumped out: the top priorities, to ensure the health care reform that was passed is fully funded, and to cut taxes for Americans making less than \$250,000 a year. Those were the two things that were very clear.

Among GOP voters for Congress, you see something very – on the flip

side: repeal the health care reform law that was passed last year, and secondly, balance the budget. Now, keep your eye on this, I'm going to come back to this and highlight some differences in just a minute between the Tea Party and white evangelical voters that picks up the thread that E.J. and Bill have already talked about, about potential tensions here in the GOP coalition on some of these priorities. So keep this in mind overall, this is among Republican votes, repeal health care reform, balance the federal budget, cut taxes for all Americans coming in third here.

So I want to cover a couple of emerging fault lines. I'm going to move quickly through a couple of these because these have already been covered very thoroughly and capably. The one thing I do want to point to here, just to reemphasize it, this is the kind of dueling pie charts that we're calling Obama's religion dilemma, that a majority of Americans see his religious beliefs to be different from their own.

One thing to hammer home here is that this number jumps among white Americans, right, so that among white Americans, nearly four in ten, 38 percent, say his religious beliefs are very different from their own, so that number is a really important number to watch. As it turns out, the number for people who are saying it's very different is the – that wedge of the pie is the wedge where it really effects favorability –place where the correlation between favorability and seeing his religious beliefs is very different are high.

So you can see, here's the total across the top that reflects the pie on the previous page. The real thing to pay attention to here is the swath of blue among very similar, somewhat similar, or somewhat different.

Obama's favorability ratings are in strong majority territory for those who say his religious beliefs are very similar or somewhat similar to their own. They're still in

majority territory even for those who say his religious beliefs are somewhat different from their own. But you see what happens when, for those Americans, 35 percent of the country, 38 percent of white Americans who say his views are very different from their own, this number goes to nearly eight in ten unfavorable for President Obama. So this is a real issue for a sizeable swatch of the country for the President here and one I think really to watch.

So potential tensions, E.J. and Bill have mentioned a couple here, and I want to mention a couple of others in terms of priorities that we've been sorting out. You can see here the red is the Republican party, the sort of – it was supposed to be tea colored, but it's not quite tea colored, is the Tea Party, and the pink color is white evangelical. So these are two coalitions in the GOP coalition.

You can see some real differences in terms of what they said their vote was mostly to communicate. And so among the Tea Party, plurality say their vote was really mostly about opposing President Obama, right, this is really what was driving the Tea Party vote.

You look at Republicans, the plurality say really it's about helping the GOP win control of Congress, not surprisingly. And you can see white evangelicals are actually fairly spread over these various options. But one thing to point out here is that they're more likely to say it was about local issues than the Tea Party. So for the Tea Party, a very national election focused really on opposing President Obama. You can put the pieces together. We have also focused on opposing health care reform, that's the other piece that was really important. On the other – oh, priorities for GOP in Congress, these are the numbers I showed you before, but I want to kind of break them out by Republican, Tea Party and white evangelicals. So you can again see some possible

tensions here with, on the one hand, the top priority for white evangelicals, four in ten saying balance the federal budget.

By contrast, the top priority for those who are members of the Tea Party is, repeal the health care reform law, right, so there it is again, some real tensions here and some real differences.

Interestingly enough, balance the federal budget, only 23 percent of the Tea Party movement claimed that as the top priority, right, it was very much loaded into repealing the health care reform law.

One other place where there's some tensions that E.J. mentioned here that I want to highlight is on issues of discrimination and equal opportunity. And here the Tea Party are, and I'll use E.J.'s word, harder edged. The first one is about discrimination against women. The question basically was an agree/disagree question that said discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the country. We have six in ten members of the Tea Party agreeing with that statement, that discrimination against women is no longer a problem. Only 46 percent of white evangelicals agree with that, and you can see in the country, only four in ten Americans agree with that, so there's some significant differences there.

The second question was blacks and minorities have received too much government attention over the last few decades in the country. Nearly six in ten members of the Tea Party agree with that statement, but only four in ten of both white evangelicals and the general population agree with that statement.

And then finally this question about equal opportunity, this was a question where you could – a double barrel question – that asked people to choose between two statements, one, it's not really that big a problem if some have more

chances in life than others, or, one of the biggest problems in this country is that some people have more chances in life than others.

Nearly two-thirds of members of the Tea Party agree with the first statement, that it's not really that big a problem that some have more equal chances in life than others. Evangelicals are basically split on this question, with half affirming it. And again, the general population number is down around four in ten. So around questions of discrimination, the sort of government programs that are targeted to the poor and to minorities, things that have to do with equal opportunity, you may see some real tensions here as these two groups in the GOP coalition kind of wrestle it out in terms of policy and priorities.

This one I'll move quickly through, Bill talked about a question being a great sorter of the American electorate, this is another one, this is about Islam, the values of Islam, the Muslim religion are at odds with American values.

You can see in terms of age, it's really a linear relationship. The younger one is, the less likely one is to affirm that statement, and the older one is, the more likely one is to affirm that statement.

African Americans really stand out as the group that is least likely to affirm that statement. There are educational breaks, there are huge party breaks. There were 30 points between – really almost 40 points between Democrats and Republicans and members of the Tea Party, and pretty big divides in religious groups, although the biggest divide is between religious Americans or Christian Americans and the unaffiliated. Minority Christians as a whole are relatively split, as are the white mainline Protestants. A majority of Catholics and white evangelicals affirm this statement.

And then finally, I'll close with the statement about American

exceptionalism that Bill mentioned. He's already given you all the breakdowns on this. It really is an extraordinary question again that sorts the American electorate, religious, political, ideological, across all those lines.

Here's the overall numbers by religion. And the one I just wanted to make sure I put up here that we didn't – that I don't think Bill talked about so much, but those who affirmed American exceptionalism are more likely to favor military strength over diplomacy and are more likely than those who don't to say that torture can be justified in at least some circumstances.

So there's an interesting relationship between the sense that God has granted the U.S. a special role in human history and being more likely to support military action over diplomacy and more likely to say that torture can be justified in at least some cases. So I'm going to leave it there and we will and we will pick up with Anna.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Robby. And for those of you who have the two reports, there are still – there are many other findings here that we haven't mentioned, one is – and Robby raising the issue of military strength versus diplomacy. Another fascinating split is that white evangelicals are much more likely than Catholics, than mainline Protestants, to assert the priority of military strength over diplomacy. These other groups assert the priority of diplomacy over military strength. So we encourage people who are data junkies to look through both Robby's report and ours for other interesting nuggets that may grab your attention.

As I said, we've got two really great people to respond to the survey from different points of view. I welcome Anna Greenberg and Mike Cromartie. Anna, please, kick it off.

MS. GREENBERG: I can't believe we're having a panel on religion and

the election and there's been no mention of witchcraft, I just want to say for the record. Sorry.

MR. DIONNE: Those signings mysteriously disappeared from the survey, we don't know why.

MS. GREENBERG: Wasn't that the biggest religious issue in this election, whether or not Christine O'Donnell was a witch? First of all, I just want to thank Brookings and thank E.J. and Bill and Robby for inviting me to come and comment. As someone who has to do eight presentations this week, it's very nice to do one where I get to comment and not actually have to do the data collection or come up with any of the ideas.

Initially when they asked me to comment, I was a little concerned because, as they found and acknowledged, the role of religion in this election really wasn't all that different than it has been in previous elections, and arguable the way it's been really since 1980, and certainly throughout the '90's.

And we probably have to stop having panels on the role of religion in elections if we sort of focus on the traditional thought lines. And so I was very interested and encouraged to – and somewhat disturbed at times, frankly -- to see the analysis on Islam and American exceptionalism and the Tea Party.

Let me just make a few comments, though, about the role of religion in this election that I thought, and this is independent from the public opinion data, that I thought stood out, and then make a couple comments specifically about the study.

The thing that struck me about the role of religion in this election really was at the level of groups and networking and mobilization, and that is actually – and it was true in 2000, as well, but it was particularly striking in this election the degree which

that has changed.

And if you look at particularly 2004, to a lesser degree, 2000, but certainly 2002, 2004, the Republican party really had integrated very well with Christian political networks, to the point where Karl Rove, for example, was getting lists from churches and integrating it into the voter vault to help with the modeling for targeting voters, where leaders in local churches were precinct captains in getting out the vote in 2002 and 2004, and again, pretty clear integration of the sort of Christian right with the political operation of the Republican party particularly directed by Karl Rove.

And it is striking, the degree which that seems to be broken. It probably started breaking in 2006, but that was a wave election, so it's hard to imagine how any sort of mobilization on the part of the Christian right could have sort of stopped that wave.

But it was very clear in 2008 and very clear in this election that those are broken. And, in fact, I had a discussion with a Republican consultant, I don't even know who he was, I was just sitting with him in the green room at Fox, and he talked about the failure of the grassroots, the ground game on the Republican side as it has historically been organized.

And certainly you can see it I think in this sense, but you can also see it in the sense of looking at sort of the Tea Party candidates that emerged and the way the Republican party had very little control over who ultimately won, either got nominated or won those primaries in lots of places, whether they were conventions or primaries, and this person, I don't know who he was, but was sort of – he looked depressed and tired. This was the day after the election and I thought he should be elated, he says I'm just so distressed at, you know, who we have let in. And, you know, if you look at a state like Nevada, there isn't a doubt that Democrats, that Harry Reid would have lost that seat if



Sharron Angle hadn't been nominated. There isn't a doubt that Christine O'Donnell had she not, you know, they would have won Delaware. I think that Colorado probably would have stayed more competitive. But there are – and there are other examples at the level of the House.

And so I do think that one thing that stands out, to me, is the dog that didn't bark, which is the degree to which I think these connections between kind of the political apparatus of the Republican party and the Christian rights seem to be broken, they seem not to be integrated, and that there is energy outside which really is around the Tea Party, which I'll talk about in a minute, so that was interesting to me.

And I don't know what happens in 2012 honestly. I don't know if those can be reestablished or if they even need to be. It may be that the Tea Party as a "social movement" is sufficient to mobilize voters for whoever the presidential nominee is on the Republican side.

The other thing I wanted to talk about is, while there isn't a doubt that this election was driven by the economy, and I would say jobs in particular, both certainly concerns about spending and deficit and big government were a big part of what fueled rage on the right, there were actually important places where social issues actually played a role.

So if you ask a question about what's the most important issue, either first or second choice, abortion, gay rights, et cetera, all are going to be very low on the list. But there are some very big races where the choice issue was very important.

But what's interesting about it is that it was primarily used as an indicator of the values of the Republican candidate being extreme or out of touch or outside of the mainstream.

Some very prominent examples would be the Bennett race in Colorado, where there were multiple ads by multiple parties, either the DSCC or Women's Voice, Women's Vote, or the Bennett campaign itself run against Ken Buck talking about his position on choice. There were ads run against Toomey, ads run against Fiorina against LePage in Maine. Now, not all – it wasn't the case that Democrats were successful in all of those places, but the choice issue became sort of a – it wasn't that people were voting on whether or not the Supreme Court might overturn the right to choose, but that here is an indication that this person is completely outside of the mainstream.

And I'll give you a concrete example in the race that I did in Arizona 8 for Gabby Giffords. We had, you know, the very sort of typical scenario, a primary with an establishment candidate who raised a lot of money, who everybody thought until a month out, was going to win that Republican primary, and then Jesse Kelly, a 28 year old Iraqi vet, sort of Tea Party candidate ended up winning that primary.

And he had a whole range of views that were extreme and bizarre. But the last ad that we ran against him – well, first of all, we sent direct mail to independent women and Republican women on his position on choice -- he was against a woman's right to choose in the case of rape and incest and the health of the mother, his only exception was life -- and Arizona 8, even though it is along the border with Mexico, is actually a sort of moderate district on social issues, it's much more conservative, obviously, on immigration and role of government and sort of libertarian issues. And Emily's list also sent direct mail on that issue to those voters. I don't know, we weren't coordinated, so I don't know exactly who they sent it to, but I assume they were similar targets that we had.

But our final ad that we ran against Jesse Kelly, which was primarily

focused on women voters, started – it had three issues in it, one is that he wanted to eliminate the minimum wage, two, that he wanted to eliminate a woman's right to choose even in cases of rape, incest, health of the mother, and that he also wanted to eliminate the FDA and thought that people should regulate the foods they eat themselves.

But packaged together, targeted at women, moms, younger women, college age women, that, you know, sort of says this guy is a nut, right. Now, you know, I'm not saying that's the reason we won the 4,000 votes, but I do think it was part of why we won. And in other districts in Arizona, this is the only sort of toss up in – one of the only toss ups in the west that stayed in Democratic hands, and I think part of it was our effectiveness as defining him as far, far, far outside the mainstream.

So, again, while choice itself, if you look at that issue relative to the economy, it looks like it didn't play any kind of role, but I would argue there's some pretty big races where some pretty substantial dollars are spent around Democrats and progressives using that issue as an indicator of someone being sort of extreme and out of touch.

And one thing that's interesting to me, as we have a lot of Tea Party and very extreme candidates in Congress, especially in the House, where they obviously have more of a (inaudible) than they do in the Senate, but also some very loud voices outside, like Sarah Palin, to what degree do some of these social issues continue to play that kind of role in 2012, because I don't think those voices will be silenced, even though the Republican leadership I think understands that they are potentially alienating issues.

There's a reason why George Bush hardly ever talked about abortion when he was the president, and it wasn't because he was pro-choice, it was because he knew that it was actually a polarizing issue and he did not want to be polarizing, and we

have a lot of people in Congress right now who want to be polarizing.

So those are just some general issues about – general comments about the role of religion and social issues in the election. A couple specifically about the data. First, on the question of Obama and his faith and sharing his views, a question I have, putting on my former academic hat, is, to what degree are those attitudes different from peoples' racial attitudes, and their partisanship, and their ideology.

In other words, if you were to do a multi-variate model and control for partisanship and ideology, would those beliefs about Obama's faith, would that be predictive of how you felt about him. I imagine they're pretty highly correlated. There may be an independent effect, don't get me wrong, but I would really like to know that, because I'm guessing they're pretty highly correlated.

Another sort of – and I think this is actually probably not really the case, but I just want to throw out there that we don't know why some people say they don't share his views, and it may be, especially if people are younger, who are the least affiliated religiously, and where you're seeing the growth of people who are not religious, the nones, for example, it may be that they –

MR. DIONNE: That's n-o-n-e.

MS. GREENBERG: Yes, n-o-n-e-s, exactly, as opposed to, yeah, the revival of the sisterhood. It may be that – despite the fact that Obama does not – I think he's gone to church once, something like that, maybe twice since he's been President, during the campaign, no doubt, he was very clear, particularly because of the issue of his own church, very clear about the fact that he was born again and religious, and so it may be that some of the people who say they're in church, because they're not religious, and they know he's born again.

That's probably actually overestimating how much younger people actually know about Obama's religion, but I'm just throwing out there that that might be a possibility.

Or, again, it may not be that they think he's a Muslim, it may be that they think he is not religious and so they don't share his views because they are religious and he's not. And that is an assumption that people make about Democrats, is that they are not religious. And, of course, there's an irony to that because, arguably, someone like Bill Clinton, you know, certainly is more religious than Ronald Reagan, but I don't think your average person would say that.

The final point I want to make, it's sort of about the data, but it's sort of broader, is to talk about the Tea Party. I think the Tea Party is one of the most sort of interesting things, phenomena I guess in this election, but it's really complicated, and it's not – the emergence of the Tea Party is not just a function of this election cycle.

So two things I want to say about it, one, in its origins, the Tea Party was not an organic grassroots movement. It was funded by Corporate America, primarily to fight the cap and trade bill, and then to fight health care reform, and it primarily organized around calls and emails and other forms of protests to members of Congress.

You all remember the Town Hall meetings. I know that seems like a really long time ago, but you remember the people being hung in effigy and people's windows being shot out of their campaign headquarters and other things, to the point where, you know, people stopped holding Town Hall meetings.

That was not spontaneous, it was not organic, it was funded by the Koch Brothers, among other people, and you can read about that in the New York article and others that trace back the funding for it. And it was very much around protecting corporate interest around, you know, led to pieces of legislation that impact bottom line in

Corporate America, as well as financial services reform down the line.

Now, that being said, it might not have been organic in its origins, but there isn't a doubt that it took off, and that more people either participated in it or viewed it sympathetically. In fact, the majority of people in this country, not a huge majority, but give the Tea Party positive ratings and believe it's a legitimate, you know, sort of form of protest, of disgruntlement, and so despite the fact that it has sort of kind of Corporate America – and, by the way, continuing to fund it, and you think about all the money that was spent on behalf of Christine O'Donnell to win that primary, that came straight from, you know, the Tea Party.

Despite that at its origins, there's no doubt that there's some organicness to the Tea Party that is tapping into something real. And what I want to sort of point out is that what is tapping into started before Obama was President. And it actually goes back – I've never seen those quotes about Bush, but I actually think that that's very interesting. I went back, because I'm doing eight presentations on the election this week, and looked at – I was looking primarily at independent voters and looking at the ideology of independent voters, because what we've seen over time is an increasing number of independent voters calling themselves conservative over the last four years.

Overall, the electorate is more conservative. If you look at 2006, about 32 percent of people called themselves conservative. If you look now, it's about 44 percent, and that's a pretty massive increase, you know,

Core values don't change so quickly, right, and so that kind of movement is pretty profound. And we don't know – I don't have panel studies, so I have lots of cross sectional data, it could be that it's different people taking surveys, or it could be that people are changing their views, and I think it's probably a combination of both.

But what's distinctive about Tea Party folks is that they hate Obama. They are very anti government, they are very anti institution, they are very libertarian, and they are less socially conservative. They, by the way, are very male and very white, as well. And if you look at the rise of this kind of conservative sentiment, it actually starts in the fall of 2008, right around the nomination of Sarah Palin and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and then coming out of that, you know, sort of accelerating with TARP.

Now, Bush was President, right, when this happened, and TARP is passed by Republican, you know, is introduced by and passed by a Republican president. But I believe that some of this increase in conservative sentiment that ultimately is fueling the Tea Party comes from a combination of sort of anger about government and the failure of government institutions, again, that you could probably place at the doorstep of Bush, but certainly becomes translated into Obama, particularly after the past health care reform, they both are now carrying the mantel, if you will.

But also I believe it's root and race and the real possibility of an African American president that becomes much more real, you know, after – you know, McCain and Obama were tied coming out of the Republican Convention, but by September, is it the 28<sup>th</sup>, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when Obama clearly emerges as kind of the leader, with (inaudible) standing, who has the kind of temperament to handle what's going on with the economy and is offering a very populous world view and becomes sort of – pretty much, you know, it was going to be difficult for him to lose the presidential election, the reality of that. And then, you know, a set of responses by the government to the economic crisis that – both are perceived to be failures, even if they're not, I mean arguable wasn't a failure, but perceived to be failures because people's lives didn't actually get better, we don't see a lot of jobs being created, but also seem to benefit the

wrong people.

So with something like TARP, you know, you don't have any kind of strings attached really to the people who are – the banks that are being bailed out, and you see CEO's giving big bonuses, and even when you get to financial services reform earlier this year, watering down, really taking on Wall Street.

So going back to this whole question of the Tea Party, I think the – I'm not surprised by the differences between Tea Party and say white evangelicals or Tea Party and Republicans, because I think they are very distinct libertarian anti government, but also I think – and you're calling it nationalism, I think there's issues of race involved with it, kind of a reaction that's rooted in the kind of failure of government, you know, prior to Obama becoming President, but then finding its full expression as the administration passes a bunch of policies that people see as government takeover, overreach, and certainly sort of helping the wrong people.

MR. DIONNE: Anna, thank you very much. And now to Mike.

MR. CROMARTIE: Thank you, E.J., and thank you, Bill, and Robby for inviting me. I'm going to disarm, totally disarm everyone here on the panel and my friends in the audience by saying I have crafted a memo to the President, to a senior policy advisor to the President, and I'm a friend of the senior advisor, and he's asked me for this memo, to think out loud for him about what happened in the election. So if you think you know who I am, just hold that thought for a moment while I respond to a request from the White House. It's called Memo to the White House from a Loyal Friend.

There's a multitude of intriguing things to say and to talk about with regards to this recent election, and the impulse to speculate wildly is nearly irresistible, but one needs to show some restraint, even some modesty, especially when an election



like this leaves so many unknowns. For instance, what is the Tea Party and how effective is it really? While it is true that it can be argued that they help galvanize the conservative base, clearly Sharron Angle of Nevada and Ken Buck of Colorado and Christine O'Donnell were candidates that clearly cost the Republicans three potential Senate seats. This is very good news for us, indeed.

But I also would remind you that we have it on the testimony of Henry Kissinger that Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was an avid student of French history. In fact, Kissinger once said that Zhou Enlai was one of the two or three most impressive men he had ever met.

And so before President Nixon's historic trip to China, Kissinger informed the President that Zhou Enlai was an avid student of French history. So during the trip to China, Nixon met with Zhou Enlai in the Walled Garden of the Forbidden City.

As they walked around the historic Forbidden City, Nixon remembered Kissinger's comments, and so to break the ice, Nixon asked Zhou Enlai what he thought had been the impact of the French Revolution and western civilization. Zhou Enlai considered the question for a few moments, and he turned to Nixon and said, it's too early to tell. And so with this election, enough already with wild speculations, I will resist irresponsible speculations for fear of embarrassment later. After 2008, James Carville wrote a book called 40 More Years: How The Democrats Will Rule the Next Generation, where he argued that Democrats remain the party of dominance for the next 40 years.

They entered the New York Times book review. Sam Tanenhaus wrote a book right after the election of President Obama called The Death of Conservatism. If this election tells us anything, these books were very far wide of the mark since it appears Democratic dominance lasted about two years.

But you would agree that everyone should be careful. Lest someone on the right get overly excited and write with much hyperventilation a book called The Coming Dominance of the Tea Party Movement. As I suggest, it's too early to tell.

But as you can imagine, the temptation for someone to write such a book is profoundly real. The sobering facts are these, Republicans picked up more House seats in this election since 1938. Republicans now control more seats, more House seats, and Democrats now have the smallest number of House seats since 1946. Moreover, 50 incumbent Democratic congressmen were defeated, while only two Republican House members lost.

But there's a new study and a survey just out today by our friend, E.J. Dionne, and by our sometime friend, Bill Galston, on the religion and election that contain some helpful signs that some of our mistakes are correctable.

Here's some interesting facts that I detect from their data. And, by the way, I'm quoting from a – I received the study two days ago, and the page numbers are wrong, but here's some interesting facts that I detect from their data.

On page 20, they note, "a potential major dispute between compassionate conservatives and Tea Party conservatives." They note, and I quote, "While white Christian conservatives and Tea Party supporters are in broad agreement on many issues, there's a harder edge to the Tea Party views on immigration, multi culturalism and Islam", end of quote.

And on page 23, they note intense differences between the Tea Party movement and religious conservatives that they see as especially dramatic. What they call the Tancredo difference on page 24 has huge implications for the future of religiously conservative political activists. There appears to be, and this is good news for us, there

appears to be potential for a very large split between these two groups on immigration and poverty issues. And from there, this can be – and from this, we can see much hopeful signs for Democrats.

Their survey highlights also what they call President Obama's religion dilemma. For instance, they note that only 40 percent of Americans believe the President has similar religious beliefs as they do. They also found that there's a strong relationship between how Americans perceive President Obama's faith and their views toward him.

They note that Americans say Obama's beliefs are very different. Americans who say Obama's beliefs are very different have decidedly negative views toward the President. In fact, nearly eight out of ten say they have very and mostly unfavorable views of the President because of this.

They also note that attitudes towards Obama's religious faith might be altered in the President's favor by a simple increase in his overall popularity. They point out this interesting observation that the recent elections showed this, by a margin of 47 percent to 28 percent, respondents said Democratic candidates did not pay enough attention to religion. Now, here's why I'm encouraged by these facts, because I believe there are tangible ways that these numbers can be turned around.

The President has been articulate about his faith in the past, and he can be articulate about it in the future. There is a place where he can use the bully pulpit quite simply as a pulpit. We need more from the President on these topics both personally and politically and practically.

Moreover, it is urgent that the President and First Lady renew their search for a good church to attend in Washington. I know there are security hassles and hazards, but Americans of all faiths respect their President when they see him or her in

their favorite house of worship on a regular basis.

Over 70 percent of Americans want their President to be a person of personal faith. President Obama is such a person, and the American people need to see him practicing it more. In conclusion, I hope to see you and the First Family in church soon. Thank you very much.

MR. DIONNE: I want to thank Mike for that. You may think that Mike was actually being sympathetic, but even though he didn't tell me this, knowing Mike, that was an imitation of the Screwtape letters in which the devil Screwtape gives his devil nephew advice on how to corrupt humanity. Now, was I right or not about that, Mike?

MR. CROMARTIE: Fully right.

MR. DIONNE: We've got such a great audience here of people who know so much on this topic that I want to turn to. I just want to note a couple of things quickly, one, everybody pointed to what you might call the Tea Party paradox, they help Republicans by mobilizing voters and they hurt Republicans by sticking them with candidates who couldn't win no matter how many people the Tea Party mobilized.

I think Anna asked a good question in terms of correlations on the issue of Obama's religious beliefs. My reading is that you could hit 30 percent negative if you ask people, do you completely disagree with Barack Obama's taste in ice cream. I mean there's clearly a hard anti Obama core here. And I bet you could get 20 percent who'd say they'd give up ice cream if they knew Barack Obama would like it. I mean there really is throughout this survey, and I don't think, Robby, correct me if I'm wrong, but there is this element. But there is – believing your religious views are not the same as Obama's is not entirely a negative, it's not a negative for everyone.

And just in the report, and Robby and Dan did a very good analysis of

this, if you actually attend religious services at least weekly, it makes a huge difference. If you agree with – think Obama's views are like yours, 92 percent favorable, if you think they're different, only 18 percent favorable.

However, in the group that doesn't attend religious services regularly, Obama does better among those who share his religious views, but even those who don't, 52 percent have a favorable view of Obama. So this question works differently for different groups, and not surprisingly, it works most strongly among religious people.

And I will leave it at that. And we have some mics going around the room. And who wants to join this conversation? The gentleman in the front was the first with his hand up. I can't resist asking Rich Cizik if he'll join at some point. It's great to have you here, Rich.

MR. GLOCK: Thank you. My name is Peter Glock. I'd like to ask mostly a methodological question about the way you chose to formulate the similarity between the respondent's religious beliefs and Obama's, because it seems to me that if you perceived Obama to be a Muslim, and you're a Muslim, then you have similar religious beliefs, but even if you allowed that Obama is a Christian, if you're not a Christian, if you're Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, you could, or Muslim, thank you, you could answer that question that they're not similar. So how did you take this into consideration?

MR. DIONNE: That's a great question. Robby, do you want to take it first?

MR. JONES: Yeah, it's a great question, and one of the reasons why, you know, we can look at this and we can break it down by religion. I mean you're right, this is a real conundrum with this question, because there are problems, of course, that Bill raised with, you know, asking straight up, do you think President Obama is a Muslim,

there's problems with sort of, you know, reading a list of things and sort of cueing off, so we had to make some decisions about how to do it. And you're right that what you end up with is differential reference points from the respondent point of view, right.

Depending on what religion the respondent has, you end up with different reference points, and that's just in the data. But what we can do is, we can look among – you look among like white Christians, for example, these numbers are more accentuated.

The number of Jews and Muslims than Hindus in the survey is actually quite, quite small, even given a fairly large sample. In fact, they're so small; we can't measure them with any statistical significance. But even when we weed them out and just look at Christians, the patterns are basically still there. But it's a great question and one that, with this formulation, you're absolutely right, you have to kind of make sure that, you know, those people who have different reference points are accounted for.

MR. DIONNE: And just on that point, I think that you see in the – those numbers I just gave you, there are clearly a significant number of people who say, for the reasons you said, just the fact that I'm this and he's that, that that doesn't effect their view of him at all. But there's clearly a subjective element that's more like does he share my religious sensibility, so that you have 45 percent of Catholics, most of whom I think know perfectly well that Barack Obama is not a Catholic, nonetheless, say his views are similar to theirs. So I think we're getting at a sensibility question as much as an affiliation question, but that ambiguity is there.

MR. JONES: We did at least – we said his religious beliefs, not his religion, which is at least one way of kind of, you know, being a little bit more accurate about kind of affinities.

MR. CROMARTIE: Can I –

MR. DIONNE: Please.

MR. CROMARTIE: Bill, did you all measure – could I ask this question? Did you all measure the beliefs of the Tea Party in their racial attitudes? The reason I ask, I think we really need to have some data on that before we fling out the possibility that people are racist, after having voted – 54 percent of Americans voted for a black African American president. To me, they now say that there's a movement in the country that it's at its core racist, we ought to have some data.

MR. GALSTON: I don't think anybody has said that, Mike.

MR. CROMARTIE: I did ten minutes ago.

MR. GALSTON: From whom? I mean I think –

MS. GREENBERG: No, I said it could be correlated with racial attitudes, I didn't say that there –

MR. GALSTON: What you find is that on, Mike, I don't think anybody here is asserting that all Tea Party members are racists, most Tea Party members are racist, I think what you see is on, and I've seen this across a lot of surveys, on racially loaded questions, the Tea Party tends to score higher.

And you can debate what the questions actually mean, but we had in our earlier survey, you know, a question about the government – has the government done too much for black people, that kind of question, and the Tea Party tends to score higher than white evangelicals, higher than – I think higher than Christian conservatives, if I'm not mistaken.

Now, that doesn't prove anybody – we're not in the business of proving somebody is a racist here, but I think there is a racial dimension to it that you just can't deny. Does anybody – Rob, do you want to –

MR. JONES: The other question that we didn't get into here, but I think you're right, you know, Mike, to say like let's just look at the data, what do the numbers say, and then let people draw their conclusions. But just to kind of reiterate the numbers, so it's six and ten, 58 percent of those in the Tea Party say that blacks and other minorities have been getting too much government attention over the last few decades, that number of the general population is 37 percent.

And the other question that we had was actually a question about reverse discrimination that I didn't cover, but it's in the report. But on this question, we asked whether people agreed or disagree with the proposition that discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities in the country. And on that question, we had 61 percent of the Tea Party agreeing, along with 57 percent of white evangelicals. The national number for that is 44 percent.

MR. DIONNE: So it doesn't prove somebody is racist, and that's a loaded word, but it does show that there is some connection to racial attitudes. Anna.

MS. GREENBERG: First of all, and it also could be tied into anti government attitudes, right, so we'd have to sort of disentangle that. But I actually thought you would think it would be more controversial that – the Tea Party is a corporate movement in trying to protect Corporate America's bottom line.

MR. CROMARTIE: No, I was also bothered by –

MR. DIONNE: I was hoping you'd say, no, I totally agree with that.

MR. CROMARTIE: I think we ought to discuss it, sure.

SPEAKER: Let me just get back to the questions originally posed. As you recall, I noted with surprise that in that religious grouping, of which Barack Obama is



a member, namely mainline Protestants, only 40 percent of white mainline Protestants, you know, saw a similarity or identity of religious views as opposed to 52 percent who saw either some or a considerable difference. I found that quite surprising. And that's as close to a controlled experiment as I think this survey got to a direct address to your question.

So something is going on there. These are not Jews, or Muslims, or Catholics, or even white evangelicals, right, you know, these are people, many of whom I'm sure are in the United Church of Christ, which was the church that Barack Obama attended for two decades while he was in Chicago. So what is, you know, I think there's a big question, and you're right to raise the question, but I think there's something going on here.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks, Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I'm having – just heard all of this today, not having read the report, et cetera, I sort of – my initial take is, there are two things here, if you forgot everything else, there are two things that this report sort of screams out to me.

One is about American attitudes about Islam. And the second is the thing that Bill talked about, which is American exceptionalism. And I'm struck by – I'm about to do one of these I'm not sure how to make a question of this, but I'll try –

MR. DIONNE: You always do well.

MR. MITCHELL: It feels to me like there's some connective tissue between those two highly salient findings that, among other things, suggest to me that we're – that the old America love it or leave it syndrome is back. I mean I sense in the American exceptionalism thing, and I think about some of the things that happened during the campaign that, of course, includes Michelle Obama's comments about this

was the first time that she had been proud of her country, if American exceptionalism is that salient, as Bill suggests, and it sure feels that way to me, those folks have a lot of raw material to work with with President Obama both during the campaign, bowing to an Emperor in Japan, which made lots of those folks go crazy, so I'm wondering if – and the frequent – when he was asked, for example, about American exceptionalism, and I think he said, you know, I suppose the French feel the same way.

So having said all of that, my question is, are those – for those of you who've spent a lot more time with this, are those the two most salient sort of pieces that come out of this American exceptionalism and attitudes about Islam, is there some sort of connective tissue that runs between those two, and if you were in the White House, and you weren't looking at Michael's letter –

MR. DIONNE: He makes a good point.

MR. MITCHELL: Yeah, what would you want to know more about? In other words, if you called your advisors and you said, now, here's some interesting survey data, but I want to do some focus groups, I want to drill down a little bit, so would you drill down on capitalism, would you drill down on Islam, and would – enough said.

SPEAKER: I think you probably have a better sense of the (off mic) driven connector. So how about I stay close to the ground here and we'll let Bill fly at 30,000 feet after I do this? The first thing to say is that Americans are more divided over the question of Islam than they are over the question of American exceptionalism, all right. So six in ten Americans agree with this concept of American exceptionalism, and as we have it in the survey, it's divine American exceptionalism, right, it is about God has granted America a special role in human history.

We actually did some looking back at John Green, a kind of well known

political scientist, has asked this question in 2004 and 2008, without the God piece in it, but a very similar formulation about whether America is a special country and should behave differently than other nations was his formulation.

But the question, interestingly enough, in '04 and '08, he got very similar numbers to what we have here, kind of mid 55 – 56 percent agreeing with that statement. So with the divine in or with the divine out, there is kind of high agreement on this statement. And you can see it across religious groups. I mean there's no major religious group that falls below majority agreeing with this statement. Even a third of the unaffiliated agree with that statement even with the God formulation in there. On the question of Islam and American values, this is something where Americans are really divided down the middle on. And so 45 percent agree with it. I don't have the number right in front of me, but I can find it in just a second, but it's about the same number on the other side, right, no real statistical differences, and it divides people on age, it divides people on party, it's a real sorter of people on one side or the other, whereas the weight on the American exceptionalism side is really on one side here, and I think that's at least one difference that you see.

And so it may be like they fall on one side of the divide or the other on the question of Islam, the compatibility of Islam and American values, and it really is a matter of degree on the question of exceptionalism. Go ahead, Bill.

MR. GALSTON: Well, this question of American exceptionalism I'm just sort of going to repeat with emphasis what I said previously, registers one of the starkest divisions among the different ideological groupings in the American population. There is about a 25 percent difference between Democrats and Republicans on this question. There's almost a 40 percent difference between conservatives and liberals. If you are a

liberal, you are a member of one of the very few groups of which an outright majority denies the premise of American exceptionalism. The liberal sensibility in this respect is an outlier sensibility. And you sort of smoked me out. I made some veiled references towards, you know, towards the end of my comments about political difficulties.

In fact, and I'll say this on the record, I think the President blundered into a mind field, and I'm not sure, given where he was coming from, that he understood just how many minds there were in that mind field and how powerful they were.

And this is – I note with interest that some of his more recent statements have been somewhat more exceptionalist in tone. Comrade, I think that's no accident, because somebody somewhere is looking at numbers quite similar to these, and I think they figured it out. This is, you know, well, I'm just repeating myself.

So people say sometimes that ideological self-attribution or self-description doesn't mean anything, I think that is flatly false, you know, as a methodological and empirical proposition, and this is one of the most convincing markers of the difference between thinking of oneself as a conservative and thinking of oneself as a liberal in the contemporary American context, and moderates are closer to conservatives on this issue, which is revealing, because I'm doing a big study of the moderate difference, and on many questions, moderates are closer to liberals, which is why moderates are more like – much more likely to vote Democratic than independents are. But on this one, it is the liberals who are the outliers.

MR. DIONNE: I don't want to add much except to say that I think it's worth thinking about the extent to which Barack Obama spoke about values and religion and patriotism. Remember, he decided to put the flag on his lapel after being ambivalent about it. He did this I think with great care and a lot of consistency until he became

President. And I think it's fair to say, I'm sure somebody at the White House can send me some speech that proves me wrong, but I still think – I think it wouldn't prove me wrong about the whole thrust, that these are issues he hasn't touched on as much.

And just to go to Screw tapes point down at the end of the panel here, I was talking a few days before the election to a Democratic congressman who very strongly supports President Obama, and he said, why doesn't the guy go to church, and this was not somebody who disliked him or was, you know, against him in any way, and he was talking about very much the same thing that Mike did in terms of sending a message.

Now, this is a double standard, we didn't really ask this of Ronald Reagan, he didn't go to church a lot, but the double – whether the double standard exists or not, it may be some of these numbers suggest a more important base for Obama to touch than it was for Ronald Reagan.

MR. GALSTON: Let me just add one more thing for analytical completeness in response to your question. I think in the minds of many people who voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and maybe in the mind of the candidate himself, it was something like the follow apparent syllogism.

George W. Bush was a fervent American exceptionalist, and he got us into war in Iraq. If I think it was a mistake that – if I think the conclusion of the syllogism was a mistake, then I must think that the major premise of the syllogism was a mistake, as well. So I will not only oppose the war in Iraq, but I will oppose the assertive exceptionalism that apparently was the cause that got us there. And I think that was a logical mistake, it was also an analytical mistake. You can be a perfectly good American exceptionalist and have a range of views on specific foreign policy issues. And I think

that there has been something of a learning curve in that respect.

MR. DIONNE: Please.

MS. ZAPOR: Hi, Pat Zapor from Catholic News Service. There's been a Democratic Party experiment in the last few election cycles of supporting pro-life Democrats. A lot of them went down in flames this time, and I don't know offhand if they went down in flames in a greater proportion than the rest of the Democratic members of Congress went down in flames, but I wonder what your take is, panelists, and especially maybe Anna, whether that signals the end of the Democratic party support of pro-life Democrats.

And I recognize that this is, you know, there were soft districts and there are a lot of other considerations as to why they might have lost, but what does that say for what the Democrats are doing with pro-life?

SPEAKER: I just want to say the Democrats will do everything in their power to reelect Bob Casey, but I'll leave the rest to Anna.

MS. GREENBERG: Well, I'm not sure I totally agree with the premise, which is to say that there was active recruitment of pro-life Democrats. I think there was active recruitment of moderate and conservative Democrats in moderate and conservative districts without regard to their position on – so that it was not a litmus test.

But it's an important distinction, because, you know, even though there are lots of pro-life Democrats, both as voters and also as actual, you know, people in power, the actual platform of the Democratic party, you know, has – supports the woman's right to choose.

One of the things that was interesting to me about this election was that, and this is really the hallmark of a waive election, is that if you look at – one of the ways I

was sort of tracking what was happening in the congressional battleground was looking at the key votes that different Democrats had taken on TARP, on stimulus, on health care reform, and our financial services reform, and it turns out that just as many Democrats who voted against all of them lost, and just as many who voted for all of them, you know, won, and what it really came down to was the, you know, the kind of campaign that was run, you know, how conservative the actual district, you know, was. So a lot of Democrats who lost who just were in Republican districts that won in 2008 in a waive and probably would have lost no matter what, you know, happened in the mid terms. So that's not really an answer to your question.

But on the question of the choice issue, it's very interesting because the Stupack Amendment fight is seared, and all of us who work for pro-choice organizations, it's seared in our brains, and it's likely to come up again. Maybe it won't be called the Stupack-Pitts because Stupack is not that anymore, but it's going to come up again, and now we're going to have a Republican House.

And so I think that there's going to be a heated battle over this, and I think there's going to be a lot of angst on the part of the White House and in the Senate, as well, about what to do about it. The compromise that was struck around health care reform, which was issuing that executive order, was not well received. And when you go into a presidential election where your base matters and college educated and younger women are the only groups who voted Democratic in 2010, and those are among the most pro-choice groups in the electorate, I think that's going to matter a great deal. So I don't know what's going to happen, but I do think there's going to be a very intense – in the course of trying to repeal or defund or do different things to health care reform, I believe these issues are going to arise again, and I believe the kind of placating with an

executive order is not going to be the way that this administration can handle this down the line.

MR. DIONNE: And if I could just say something from a little bit the other side of that, I mean one of the questions I have had, and we've got to go look at this, is, to what extent did pro-life organizations target pro-life Democrats, and if so, why, and what does that say about the relative importance of the abortion issue to party affiliation of some of these organizations, and I think that's a fair question.

And what Anna says about the pro-choice groups being very upset about this, what's remarkable is that the Democrats are a majority pro-choice party, but with a very substantial pro-life minority. They made a substantial concession in the view of the pro-choice people to the pro-life side and seem to get nothing for it from the pro-life side, or very little for it. And I think it's fair to ask, does that really serve the interest of the pro-life community. If you win a victory and then say it's not a victory, or try to define it as something other than a victory, where does that leave the pro-life community in the long run, and that's a question I'm going to be pondering myself, because I think it really – and I'm going to turn to Tom Reese next, Father Tom Reese, if he wants to talk about this, although he may not want to – he may want to evade this question.

MR. REESE: Actually what I would like to do is suggest areas for further research. I mean –

MR. DIONNE: He is a Jesuit, you know, they're very smart about these things.

MR. REESE: Well, I mean what I was hoping to hear today was an explanation of, for example, why white Catholics move so dramatically from voting for Democrat two years ago to much more Republican this year. And I guess maybe



another way of asking that same question is, who are these strange white Catholics who keep changing their minds and being the swing voters, probably the largest and most important swing – group of swing voters in the election?

And then the third part of this question for further research, based on the Pew Forums data that went out of three people who were raised Catholics, have left the church, and are, therefore, the third largest denomination in the United States, if they were a denomination, where are they – what are they doing in terms of voting? I think all of these questions would be interesting to look at.

MR. DIONNE: Just very quick, we don't have any data on ex-Catholics, but, boy, that would be fun. There is no Catholic vote, and it's important, which is to say Catholics, as you know, are the ultimate swing group. They are, in a sense, a 40/40/20 group. It's hard to go below 40 if you're a Democrat, hard to go above 40 if you're a Republican, but the middle swings a lot.

But, you know, when you look at, for example, at the chart just from the exit polls, Republicans gain six points among white Protestants, seven points among white Catholics, eight points among whites with no religion, although as a percentage, that was less of a shift because there are so many of the non-religious or Democrats.

So I'm not sure the Catholics were distinct except in two ways that I draw from the exit polls. One is, the Democrats lost blue collar whites in 2006 and 2008 by ten points, they lost them by 29 this time, and I think something happened in the Midwestern belt from, you know, counting Pennsylvania for these purposes of the Midwest, through Ohio, west to Wisconsin, something connected to the economy happened there, and I think it effected Catholics.

There is also, and I think any analysis this election has to deal with the

fact that this was a much older electorate than the electorate in 2008, and clearly that had something to do with these shifts, as well, and Bill wants to jump in.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah, only to underscore the regional and geographical dimension of this. As you know, white Catholics in particular tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the older industrial states of the northeast and especially the Midwest, and that area is an economic basket case. And not only that, it is an area that, more than any other part of the country, has lost faith in the economic future.

They know what success in the past looked like, they really haven't heard anything persuasive about what success for them, in their industries, with their skills, in their regions or states would look like. They didn't hear it for eight years under George W. Bush, and to be blunt, they haven't heard it under this president either. I think that, you know, setting aside the important differences in the age composition and the size of the electorate in a midterm as opposed to a presidential year, I think that there has been a major letdown among people whose incomes stagnated, at best, for eight years under Bush, and who really had a surge of hope that there would be a difference for the better in this administration, and they haven't felt it.

Indeed, they've been the major victims of an unprecedented surge of unemployment, something that we haven't seen in close to 60 or 70 years, and I've got to believe that, you know, that that economic factor was a major driver, and why shouldn't it have been?

SPEAKER: The Midwest voted 53/45 Democratic in Houses races in '08, and 53/44 Republican in House races this time, according to the added numbers at the exit poll, but that sounds about right from what you – when you saw the carnage to

the Democrats.

SPEAKER: So just real quick, it's a great question. One interesting little tidbit, in 2009, we did a religious activist survey where we actually sampled from groups who had done – who were on mailing lists from religious – kind of self-identified religious activist organizations. One of the very interesting things on that survey that kind of goes to some of this is that we had a bigger than expected swath of people who identified as unaffiliated, even though they were active through a religious organization and politics. And when we looked underneath, it was the male survey, and they had actually – many of them, a large swath, I don't have the number off the top of my head, had actually written in former Catholic, grew up Catholic, you know, went to Catholic school, things like this in the survey.

But it was enough still in their identity, though, right, I mean this means something, they took the time to write this on a survey, it mattered to them to not just say nothing, they wanted to sort of still have the kind of Catholic identity registered on the survey, so maybe something about the complex nature of formally affiliated Catholics.

MR. DIONNE: Rich Cizik.

MR. CIZIK: My friend, Mike Cromartie, has tweaked the Democrats, rightly so, for – and the President for his non-religious church attendance, non-church attendance, in spite of being religious. What you didn't do, Mike, was tweak the Republicans. So I would like to ask clarification from you all about the data that indicates a trend, I would suggest, tell me I'm wrong. You have 63 percent of 18 to 29 year olds in table two who say government is too involved in morality. Interestingly enough, 54 percent of white evangelicals say that. This was pointed out by the panel.

You turn the page and you look on table four, even 42 percent of white

evangelicals say Republican candidates are too close to their – too close to religious leaders, we'll see how that trend continues with the death of the religious right leaders, top profile leaders at least, a trend that I predict will continue. That's one thing I think we'll all know to be true, age marches on.

But look at the figure for youth, 18 to 29 in table four, 71 percent of the young. So I'd like to know what percent of the white evangelical young are upset with the GOP for its, you know, too close association, and if there isn't, tell me so, tell me there aren't young people who believe this.

But see, there isn't – I'm asking, isn't there a trend here that is what some of us have been saying, namely that the Republican Party is missing something here?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Rich. What I'd like to do is ask Robby to talk a bit about that. Anna did a really good survey in 2008 of evangelicals, looking at this young/old difference, so I'd like to bring her in. And I don't want to identify them as Screwtape anymore, so I'll bring in C.S. Lewis last.

MR. JONES: Right, so let me just, first of all, say, from this data on Republican candidates in table three and table four, we don't know, and that's because the sample size just won't allow us the parts of that filing. So we'll have to, you know, look at other places in the data for those things.

We certainly know some things about younger evangelicals. I'm just going to let – hand the ball to Anna to sort of speak about that, and I can fill in a couple things, too, but let me just hand it to Anna for that.

MR. DIONNE: The Ford Foundation will finance new research in this area, we're absolutely certain.

MS. GREENBERG: Well, there's a couple things going on. I mean there are generational effects and there's cohort effects, and the generational effects, it's just true that people who are younger are less religious, and the – of religiosity is 18 to 25 or 26, whenever people start getting married and having kids, and once people have kids, they often return to whatever religious fold they have come from. So part of the answer here of the sort of age differences in the survey is just a reflection of that. But there also are cohort effects, and there's no question that the rise of unaffiliated people, unaffiliated voters is real, and that younger (inaudible) of that, and some of that is driven by immigration and what happens when people come here and then their kids are born here and they sort of become – and the country sort of becomes a little more homogenous, and some of the distinctive religious practices and beliefs sort of change when, you know, you have more and more generations here.

So the short answer is, yes, I do think there is a long term problem for Republicans, if you look at this at generation Y, but some of the data reflects just generally the difference in older and younger people.

We did do a study working with Religious and Ethnic Newsweekly and UN Foundation on America and the world, and we have an over sample of white young evangelicals, and it was striking that on a whole range of social issues, that younger white evangelicals were more progressive. In fact, a majority, for example, favored some kind of relationship recognition for LGBT people. They didn't necessarily favor marriage, but they favored some kind of recognition, whether it's domestic partnership or civil unions, and that issue in particular, LGBT issues, distinct from abortion, I do think will become less salient in the Christian right over time as I think that there is kind of a growing, you know, sentiment within the sort of religious communities around that issue

that is different than older people.

MR. DIONNE: Mike.

MR. CROMARTIE: Yes, has anybody pointed out, that younger evangelicals are more pro-life than their parents, which is a finding that is always surprising, but has been suggested they're more tolerant of gay marriage than their elders.

I think one of the things that we have to avoid in this is, again, everybody begins by saying economics was what the election was about, but here's what the religious people really thought. I mean I think, for instance, on the Tea Party – by the way, can you hear me, because I can't hear me.

MR. DIONNE: Just talk a little closer to the mic.

MR. CROMARTIE: One of the things we should remember, and at least from some of the surveys that I've read by not only this one, but John Green and Jay Cost and some others, is that, especially in the Tea Party, these are people that are mad at Republicans and Democrats, and they're mad at what they call Rhinos, Republicans in name only, and that's why they want to throw these people out, I think in an imprudent way, but they did it anyway.

In other words, many of them are new to politics, and therefore, they have not learned the art of principal and prudent compromise, and the William F. Buckley rule, which is vote for the candidate most likely to win, not the most extreme candidate to make your point.

And so I think one of the things we can do two years from now, E.J., is talk about either the matcharation (inaudible) possibly, maybe of the Tea Party in the next two years, but I rather doubt it, but I also – I came away from looking at your data thinking

that actually the Tea Party, while it did galvanize some people, actually didn't help that much.

And, in fact, as I suggested in a memo to the President's Aid, is that, in fact, that it actually hurt in states where they actually could have won if they put a more mainstream, more rationale, more sensible candidate up against the Democrat in the state. So for all the lamenting, I would to say to my friends who are nervous about the Tea Party, you need to know that Republicans are nervous about them also, very.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Mike. Bill wanted to come in and then over here we've got a bunch. I may try to bring in a bunch of folks. We've got until 4:00, is that our plan?

MR. GALSTON: Right, that is our plan. Let me just give a one sentence gloss on what Mike just said. I think as a general proposition, the Tea Party was a net plus for Republicans in the House races, and a net minus for Republicans in the Senate races, and I have some reason for those two generalizations.

With regard to this very important generational issue that Rich has put on the table, let me just drop a footnote to the recently published book by Bob Putnam and David Campbell, American Grace, which has an extended analysis of that. And they actually make the argument that the evangelical surge into politics peaked in the mid 1990's, and it's tailed off a little bit, and what Anna referred to as the rise of the unaffiliated has become an increasingly important phenomenon relative to the more conservative evangelical mobilization, and I commend that analysis to your attention, because, as you know, they commissioned a couple of – they did a couple of surveys that they themselves designed with a very, very large number of respondents, 3,000 or something of that sort, and so you can really slice and dice those data and make it sing.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Please, and then a mic to this gentleman over there who's been very patient, thank you, please. Let's bring in a couple at a time just so I can try to get a lot of voices in before we have to close.

MS. KELLEHER: Fran Kelleher, and I would like to tie perhaps some of these questions together with an additional question to add to your research agenda. I look at what you said about table two and the American public not thinking that government has it right yet, or that either party has this relationship to morality right, and the very low importance given to abortion and gay marriage and some of the issues that the traditional churches put forth as major moral issues. Does your data show anything about what these various groups and the voting public think the moral issues are that are important to them beyond these that have been put together by official religion, for example, justice of how their employer treated them by giving bonuses to themselves and then laying them off, or, you know, other issues like that that might be more tied to the economy, access to health care, might be a very interesting divided one of whether or not that's considered a moral issue. Do you have anything on that or is there a way that in the future it might be incorporated? If we're missing the boat, what are the moral issues?

MR. DIONNE: I have deep personal sympathy for that question. Hold on because Robby has got a lot of data on this, data both present and past. I'd love to have anyone else who wants to take it. Sir.

MR. MARUS: I think this is mainly aimed at Robby. I'm Rob Marus from the Associated Baptist Press. But I'm still sort of fascinated by this apparent cleavage between the Tea Party and white evangelicals on priorities, at least legislative priorities. My question is, how much of that cleavage is effected by – and I didn't look closely enough at the data to see if you included in that white evangelical category 20 percent or



so of white evangelicals who, you know, tend to vote for Democrats anyway or would consider themselves progressive or moderate evangelicals, or these people actually said they voted for Republicans this time around. And secondary to that question is, how would you see – if that cleavage is real among the conservative coalition, how would you see that effecting an actual legislative process in this session of Congress?

MR. DIONNE: And then let's just – this gentleman back here has also been patient, then we'll go one more round.

SPEAKER: Thank you. As far as the election and politics is concerned today, going to have the State Department release a report on global religious freedom. And what she said is how politics play and diplomacy and U.S. policy plays a role as far as religion is concerned around the globe, including in the United States. My question is, how did President Obama's election play the role as religion is concerned and how it will play in the future, in 2012, if he decides to run?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Robby, why don't you kick it off?

MR. JONES: So one question – and Fran, hello, a former colleague of mine from Emory, so nice to see you. So the government should do more to protect morality question is very interesting, because we actually have some trend data on this question. And one of the more interesting things about this trend, so if we go back to 2007, before President Obama was elected, we have 40 percent of the country saying that the government should do more to protect morality. So still more on the other side, but 40 percent. It drops to 33 percent this year, right, so it drops – a seven point drop down.

Interestingly enough, that drop is almost entirely accounted for by conservatives, right. So in 2007, 50 percent of conservatives, self-identified

conservatives said that governments should do more to protect morality. Now that President Obama is the head of the government, 37 percent say that the government should do more to protect morality.

So there is certainly a factor of like who's at the lever, whose hand is on the lever of government, and what kind of morality you think that hand is going to institute when the lever is pulled kind of going on in this – certainly going on in this question, so that's sort of one thing there.

The bigger question about – we're back to the '04, whose moral values question, right, and, you know, my own take – I don't have data on this, but my own take is simply that – I mean what else are people doing if they're not voting their values when they go into the voting booth, right. I mean everybody has a set of values that makes sense to them, some that are more or less connected to religion, and I'll recommend Pews. Pete has some really good data on this about -- kind of on specific issues, which ones religion is kind of more tightly connected to and not that's a fairly interesting thing to look at.

On the second thing, Rob, thank you for the question between white evangelicals and the Tea Party on priorities. And you're right to point out that the contrast that I put up, I have all white evangelicals, right, so that's a general population number of all white evangelicals, you're right to say a portion of those are self-identified Democrats and voted for Democratic candidates in the election.

I don't off the top of my head have the number, but it's important to note, right, that white evangelicals voted – they vote overwhelmingly for Republican candidates and much more strongly identify with Republicans. But –

MS. KELLEHER: Can I ask you a follow-up question?

MR. JONES: Yes.

MS. KELLEHER: To what degree are white evangelicals also more female than Tea Party?

MR. JONES: Right, they are definitely more female. The Tea Party tends to be more male, white evangelicals tend to be more female, so that's clearly – they share a lot actually in terms of demographics, but this is one point on which evangelicals – the other point where they differ is that white evangelicals tend to have little bit lower income levels and Tea Party members tend to have little bit higher income levels, so there's –

SPEAKER: I have a quick question here, too, to all three of you. The phrase – when I read your paper, “protect morality”, I didn't know what that meant. Was there a definition in there when you ask it?

MR. JONES: No, the question read, you know, governments should do more to protect morality, yeah, right.

SPEAKER: That's a big phrase.

MR. JONES: Yeah, right.

MR. GALSTON: But we had a time series on it that we could not possibly lose. Let me just offer one specific response from the survey. You might well think that concern about the gap between the rich and the poor is an example of a morally inflected economic issue, and what this survey revealed was some stark differences among different parts of the population. So, for example, 36 percent of African Americans regarded that as the most important economic issues, for whites, it was 13 percent, and interestingly, for Hispanics, only 11 percent.

If you look at it more politically, one percent of Tea Party supporters and

three percent of Republicans singled out that issue, seven percent of conservatives, 14 percent of moderates, and 28 percent of liberals, 25 percent of Democrats.

And then hear, for me, is the mind blower, and this is probably the statistic in the entire survey that will make my esteemed colleague to my immediate left the most unhappy. Black Protestants, 42 percent, white evangelicals, only seven percent, white Catholics, guess what, only seven percent.

There is this enormous Catholic social justice tradition, but at least in these data this year, it was not very much in evidence. Now, whether this represents a long term secular, so to speak, shift in the American Catholic community is something that E.J. is more competent to pronounce on than I am.

MR. DIONNE: Let me just cite one other piece of data which helps explain some of that, that if you really want to hear preaching about social justice, you should go to an African American church. What we found is, Black Protestants were far more likely than other groups to have heard clergy speak out on health care reform, 30 percent for Black Protestants, 14 percent among all – 14 percent among all respondents.

And also on the proper size and role of government, 21 percent of Black Protestants, 11 percent of the whole sample. On the other hand, white Catholics, 65 percent heard about abortion, 41 percent on conservatives. And the amount of preaching, as we write in the paper, and it is notable in light of the Catholic social tradition that only seven percent of white Catholics said their clergy spoke about the role and size of government and only 13 percent said they heard preaching about health care.

And it's an interesting question whether the datum that my colleague to my right just cited and this datum are linked somehow. One last – we've got to call it – we'll give this gentleman the last question, then we'll let everybody close. If you could –

MR. CROMARTIE: I wanted to respond to this cleavage question.

MR. DIONNE: Oh, I'm sorry, Mike. Could I let this gentleman in, and you'll be the first, and you can respond to both?

MR. CROMARTIE: That's fine.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

SPEAKER: In your executive summary and on page six there's the following sentence, "Americans who believe God has granted America a special role in history are significantly more likely to say military strength rather than diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace and to say torture can be justified." My question is, is there a factual basis for this comment or is this conjecture, because I've got to believe that torture, no matter how you get to the answer on exceptionalism, certainly is not one of the hallmarks of American exceptionalism.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. Mike, you pick up where you wanted to go, and also any closing comments you want to make. And then why don't we just go right down the panel?

MR. CROMARTIE: Well, I'll let Bill Galston handle that last question. And my simple comment about the cleavage question is that – maybe this is wishful thinking on my part, but I think the resolution of the Christian conservative Tea Party, and especially if the Tea Party is represented by Tancredo, that Tancredo will get as much interest ultimately in 2012 as Pat Buchanan did, and that he will be delegitimated, like Buchanan was.

But the good news for my Democratic colleague on this panel, and the bad news for some of us others is – the sad news is, and I'm a person who had some hope, for about two days, for Sarah Palin, but it only lasted 48 hours, and that is this, that

I'm afraid that if she ran for the caucuses next week in South Carolina, she would win, so that's good news I think for the Democratic party.

I think there's time now to keep that from occurring in 2012. But I think, for instance, I think her influence on the party, just witnessing the recent Alaska endorsement of Miller, and her lack of ability to push him over the line even with the right candidate, it's like telling her power or lack thereof.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Anna, closing comments?

MS. GREENBERG: Well, wait until she's been on reality TV for a while, you never know. I don't really have any closing comments. I mean I think that this is sort of the beginning of a really important discussion about the Tea Party, about, you know, kind of the intense anger around government that I think is the hallmark of the Tea Party.

I think it's really interesting to look at these folks in power and see how people who hate government govern, and, you know, I'm just going to see how it all sort of plays out.

MR. JONES: I'll take the specific question about the executive summary. So it's based on the last slide I had up in the PowerPoint slide. And so if you look at – if you take – among those people who say – who agree, and again, it's 58 percent of the country, so if you take – among those people who agree that God has granted the U.S. a special role in human history, and then you take the rest of the country who do not affirm those two things, and then you crossed out those and kind of correlate them to the questions of whether we should – the best way to ensure peace is through military strength, or the best way to ensure peace is through diplomacy, on the one hand, and a agree/disagree question about whether torture – there was an agree/disagree question that said torture can never be justified, and so if you take those two questions and

correlate them, what you do end up with is, among those who said that God has granted the U.S. a special role in history, 52 percent say that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength.

Now, that's in contrast to only 26 percent of those who say God has not granted the U.S. a role in special history. So that's basically twice – twice as likely to say military strength versus diplomacy.

On the other question about torture, 55 percent of those who say God has granted the U.S. a special role in history disagree, that torture can never be justified, compared to 42 percent of those who say that God has not granted the U.S. a special role. So these are statistically significant differences correlated to those views on American exceptionalism.

And I guess the last thing to say, in terms of just big picture play out, you know, I agree with Anna, I mean this is going to be fascinating to watch how these groups – and just two points to emphasize, the considerable overlap. I mean we put up two bars, as if these are, you know, that made it look a little bit like these may be like mutually exclusive groups, but the thing to remember, if we really – those bars overlap a little bit, right, and, in fact, they have overlap by half, so half those in the Tea Party movement also count themselves part of the Christian conservative movement, that makes for a really interesting interplay between – it's not two warring factions, right, who are standing on either side, it's some on this side, some on that side, and some kind of standing on the line together in the middle.

And the other sort of interesting thing about this is the relative size of these groups. So on the one hand, we had the Christian right that, you know, as Anna and others have pointed out, has been flagging, some since the 1990's, in terms of

funding, in terms of leadership and aging, but they still count among their membership 22 percent of the population.

Among the Tea Party, the way we have the question, do you identify with the Tea Party, it's only one in ten Americans. So we still have twice as many people who identify with the Christian conservative movement as we do with the Tea Party movement. That makes for a kind of unequal struggle if there's a tug-of-war.

And then finally, on the same question, it'll be really interesting to see whether – what we hear from Tea Party elites often is that we don't talk about the social issues because that's going to divide us. What the data suggest here, in fact, is that they may actually have more in common on the issue of something like abortion than they do on some of these other economic issues, where they seem to think that there's no daylight between them, and that struggle that I think in many ways says maybe not been anticipated, will be really fascinating to watch how it plays out.

MR. GALSTON: A final word at least from me on American exceptionalism, as I tried to indicate before, I think the American exceptionalism issue got bound up with the debate over the war in Iraq, and that we are still looking at American exceptionalism through the prism of that debate.

And if you ask what were two of the biggest controversies that erupted, one had to do with the use of force as opposed to the continued pursuit of diplomacy, and the other was a rancorous debate over the use of what is internationally defined as torture under certain circumstances. And so for better or for worse, and I think for worse, those two questions got smooshed together with the broader thesis about American exceptionalism, which is an idea that has gone through many, many iterations and transformations in the course of American history. And I don't think we've seen the last



turn of that particular screw by, you know, by any means. But right now, I think there is good reason to believe that the data that Robby and Dan have come up with are revealing of something very, very significant and real in the American consciousness right now. I'm not saying that with any pleasure, oh, contraire, but I think it's a fact.

MR. DIONNE: And I want to close by saying just four quick things. One is, as we approach the anniversary of 911, we're going to be talking about a lot of serious things as a country, and we should, and I think one of the issues we're going to have to confront are the divided American attitudes toward Islam itself and what that means for us.

Second, I think it really will be fascinating to watch the relationship between compassionate conservatism, if that survives at all, and Tea Party conservatism, because I think this is a very important sub struggle. We talked a lot about the Tea Party and the Republican establishment. I think there are other interesting fault lines and intellectual lines. A third point is, if I ever run a campaign, I want Anna to run it for me. And the last point is, I can't wait to see the meeting between Mike Cromartie and President Obama when the President gets hold of that memo of yours.

Thank you, Bill, thank you, Robby, thank you, Anna, thank you, Mike, and thank you, Sheila, and thanks to you all for coming.

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## CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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Expires: November 30, 2012

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