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PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction and Moderator:

VANDA FELBAB-BROWN
Fellow, Foreign Policy, 21st Century Defense Initiative
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

STEVEN PIFER
Senior Fellow and Director
Arms Control Initiative
The Brookings Institution

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE
President, Ploughshares Fund

STROBE TALBOTT
President, The Brookings Institution

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Good morning. My name is Vanda Felbab-Brown and I'm a Fellow in Foreign Policy here at Brookings. It is my pleasure to welcome you today to a very distinguished panel to discuss how to sustain U.S.-Russia leadership on nuclear security.

Last year Brookings supported the establishment of a dialogue between former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Brookings President Strobe Talbott on the American side, and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and the Director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Alexander Dynkin on the Russian side.

The focus of this dialogue is how the United States and Russian can cooperate to reduce nuclear weapons and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The group supported by Brookings -- first met last December here in Washington and it produced joint recommendations which were transmitted to senior U.S. and international officials. The American input into those recommendations was later published in January as the first paper in the Brookings Arms Control Series titled “Resetting the U.S. Leadership on Nuclear Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation.”

The group met again in June with participation of experts including several retired Russian generals in Moscow, and in subsequent

exchanges, a paper was produced with a set of recommendations. In early September, these recommendations and the paper were given to U.S. and Russian government officials. On October 13, former Secretary Albright and former Foreign Minister Ivanov published an opinion piece in the *Financial Times* outlining some of these ideas. A similar op-ed with Strobe Talbott and Alexander Dynkin joining as co-authors was published in the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* on October 11. We are here today to launch the full paper with its full text and recommendations.

To discuss the paper, we have Strobe Talbott. He is joined by Plowshares Fund President, Joe Cirincione, and the Brookings Arms Control Initiative Director, Steve Pifer who took part in the Moscow discussions and were closely involved in the preparing of the paper. You have their bios. Strobe will lead off by providing the context for the dialogue and describing the paper's principal topics. He will be followed by Steve and Joe who will each outline the paper's main recommendations. Following their remarks, we will open the discussion for questions from the floor.

Before we begin with the panel, Brookings would like to thank the Foreign Ministry of Norway which sponsors the Albright, Talbot, Ivanov, Dynkyn dialogue. Brookings is also grateful to the Ploughshares Fund and McArthur Foundation for their continuing support for the Brookings Arms Control Initiative. Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you very much, Vanda, and thanks to all of you for joining us for this discussion this morning. What Vanda has described is a classic example of track two diplomacy which is to say it takes advantage of a group of people, a number of whom have the benefit of past experience in government having a pretty good sense of how government works and having worked in government on the issues at hand, combined with the independence that comes with no longer being in government. Vanda gave you a number of names of those involved and there were a couple of others as well. Steve Pifer of course was intimately involved and continues to be in this whole venture, Rick Burke known to many of you and former chief negotiator of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks in the Reagan Administration was very much a part of this effort. Joe was intimately involved in a number of the discussions that we had both here in Washington and in Moscow as recently as this past summer. And Vanda mentioned the director of IMMO, the Institute for World Economics and International Relations if I'm remembering my acronym correctly, was also joined by several of his colleagues and in particular, Alexei Arbatov who is connected with IMMO and also has been connected with the Carnegie Endowment and the Carnegie Center on Moscow next door. So all of us have had intersecting careers and the atmosphere I think contributed to a fairly productive exercise.

The premise behind this whole effort was fairly simple, and that is that the United States and Russia have a shared interest, both in the resumption, and I use that term advisedly, of serious arms control and also much deeper and broader and more consequential collaboration on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. I think it's only a slight exaggeration to say that the issue of arms control during much of the Cold War was pretty much all by itself. It had the lonely distinction of being the one issue on which the United States and the Soviet Union could systematically and institutionally collaborate for the very simple reason that the United States and the Soviet Union had a joint interest in not blowing each other up along with much of the rest of the world.

That obviously has changed with the end of the Cold War. There are now multiple common interests between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the security interest, particularly having to do with nuclear weapons both in terms of arms control and nonproliferation, remains very important. In fact, cooperation between the two countries can solidify the U.S.-Russian relationship which is now far more multidimensional than it used to be.

I might also say something about the timing of our exercise and how that timing is in synchrony with the current leadership in the two countries. In my years as a journalist and certainly in my experience in government I was constantly impressed at how important the personal

chemistry between the top man in the White House and the top man in the Kremlin is to whether the kind of venture we're talking about here thrives or lags or goes into suspension, which has of course has been the case from time to time. As it happens, the presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation have developed quite a good personal chemistry and I think it's fair to say there is considerable overlap in some crucial regards between their agendas.

In the case of President Medvedev, those of you who were here for his speech at Brookings in April at the time of the nuclear security summit, will remember he stressed the theme not just of the modernization of the Russian economy, but also the desire of Russia to integrate more with the international community which obviously means participating more in international institutions and arrangements, notably those concerned with security. In any event, as a result of a number of factors including the good working relationship between President Obama and President Medvedev, we have seen real progress in U.S.-Russian relationship which is a good thing since I think it's fair to say that as recently as August 2008, which was only just a little under 2 years ago, the U.S.-Russian relations had sunk to pretty much the lowest it had been in a very long time. So there's been a lot of bounce-back since then and arms control has had something to do with that.

And because there has been progress on the arms control front, I think that it has kind of lubricated improvements on other issues of common interest to the United States and the Russian Federation. Just to give you a couple of examples of that, Russia is now cooperating with the United States and its allies and partners on Afghanistan. About 30 percent of the supplies reaching coalition forces in Afghanistan are coming through Russia. Russia has also, particularly about a year ago, which is to say around the time of the October 1 breakthrough with Iran which unfortunately didn't hold, Russia was quite helpful diplomatically in putting pressure on the Tehran regime on the issue of its nuclear program. Russia has also halted the supply of S-300 missiles to Iran. And generally, I think it's fair to say that arms control has been both a driver and a beneficiary of the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations.

The issue of course before the United States Senate, one of many, one of many contentious issues, is the question of whether to ratify the new START Treaty that was signed by the two presidents last April. That treaty has considerable support and has been endorsed, for example, not only by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also by the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Command and seven of his predecessors, as well as by numerous Republican luminaries in the foreign policy, defense and national security field, and here I'm referring to former Secretary

Schlesinger, Kissinger, Shultz, Baker, Carlucci, Powell, Steve Hadley and Brent Scowcroft, two former national security advisors.

I think partly for this reason and also because what a number of us feel are the compelling, inherent merits of the treaty in question, it is quite likely to be ratified. I suspect there will be some discussion about the chances of that happening during the lame duck session or early next year. But in any event, it is in the expectation that the new START Treaty will in fact be ratified, that our joint brainstorming exercise with our Russian counterparts took place. it is the overall view of the Russian and the American participants that it would be good to use the time before the entry into force of the new START Treaty to identify and develop ideas for a follow-on stage in arms control and nonproliferation between the United States and Russia. I might add that as we have produced written products, and Vanda referred to a number of those in her opening, we have found appropriate and effective ways of sharing our papers with responsible and authoritative figures both in Washington and in Moscow. In other words, we're keeping the two governments apprised of our own thinking and to the extent possible looking for ways where we can be an outside source of information and in due course support.

The report breaks down into four sets of recommendations. Steve will speak to the first two sets of recommendations, and Joe will speak to the second two. The first set of recommendations is basically

pushing the idea that the United States and Russia should engage in intensive consultations to lay the ground for formal negotiations during the period while we're waiting for the entry into force of the new treaty so that when the new treaty is in force we're ready to go with follow-on negotiations.

The second set of principals has to do with an extremely important and highly contentious issue which is missile defense and cooperation. As I look around the room I see quite a number of people who like those of us up here have spent much of our careers working on these issues, and what I'm about say will not come as a surprise to you. There is an exquisite irony it seems to me in the fact that cooperative missile defense should be as controversial as it is particularly in this town. There is a strange turning of the tables that has occurred. As I think all of you know, back in the very earliest days, I'll call it the cold dawn of the strategic arms era, the United States, particularly during the Johnson administration had to work very hard to persuade the Soviet side, and this was when Kosygin was prime minister and met with Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro, had to persuade the Soviets that there was an inherent and crucial linkage between the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the regulation of strategic defensive systems.

That line of argument proved persuasive with the Russians and now they take it as a sacrosanct principle which they want to see

reestablished if there is going to be a follow-on to the new START Treaty, but the issue is not quite subject to so much unanimity and consensus here in Washington. I might add that Secretary Albright, Joe, Steve Pifer and I spent a good deal of time on this subject in June and listened to Russian lectures on the importance of this issue. We didn't need a lot of persuading but some others are going to need some persuading. Joe and Steve will perhaps touch on this but I came away with the sense that if there were to be genuine, clearly worked out cooperation between the United States and Russia, and even between NATO and Russia on missile defense, it might be a real game changer of the most positive kind for the next stage of strategic arms control.

Turning now to what Joe will have more to say about in a moment, the third category of recommendations that we have put forward have to do with the control of nuclear materials and this is simply a matter of taking advantage of the fact that the United States and Russia have through programs such as cooperative threat reduction and the Nunn-Lugar program really achieved a kind of gold standard for how to control nuclear materials and we should find ways on how to share our own experience and the mechanisms that we have developed bilaterally with the 40 other countries that were party to the April nuclear security summit here in Washington. Then the fourth set of recommendations which Joe will also speak to have to do with strengthening the NPT regime in the

wake of the NPT Review Conference that took place in May, and here too there is a good deal of U.S. bi-lateral cooperation to build on. But anticipating what I'm sure Joe will have to say, a critical issue that unfortunately a little bit like cooperative missile defense is exceedingly controversial and politically fraught here in Washington, that is, what's going to happen to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and whether in 2011 the United States Senate, if I can put this in the form of an editorial comment, will have the good sense to undo the horrendous mistake that it made in 1999 by refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at that time, but I'm sure that Joe will have his own prognostications and exhortations on that subject. So with that, I take you over to Steve.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Strobe. I'll talk about the first two sets of recommendations in the paper and as Strobe said, one of the premises of this discussion in June over the summer was the idea that the sides are not going to be able to engage in formal negotiations until after the new START Treaty has been ratified not only here in Washington but also on the Russian side -- but the idea was that there could be some consultations and discussions that Washington and Moscow could conduct even now that would help prepare the way to have a better negotiation.

One suggestion is having a discussion about deterrence and strategic stability and what those concepts mean now to the United State

and to Russia because if you look at where the sides are now compared to where they were 20 to 25 years ago, if you look at the new START Treaty both sides are comfortable with a level of 1,550 strategic warheads. Twenty-five years ago that number was over 10,000 on each side, and that suggests to me that the sides have different ideas about what it takes to make deterrence and strategic stability work now than was the case previously.

Having a conversation about those concepts, how they're affected by things like the inner-relationship between offense and defense, the role of missile defense, the impact perhaps of long-range conventionally armed precision guided weapons, having that kind of discussion might allow the sides to come to sort of agreement on concepts that could facilitate the negotiations once they get underway presumably at some point in 2011.

There are also some specific suggestions as to things the sides could discuss now that might prepare that negotiation.
The new START Treaty right now limits only deployed strategic warheads. It doesn't talk about other types of nuclear weapons. President Obama has said in the next round he wants to talk about reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, and he would also be prepared to talk about nondeployed strategic warheads. If the Russians accept that, the next negotiation for the first time in 45 years between the United States and

Russia is going to involve a discussion of all types of nuclear weapons and there are things that the sides ought to be talking now to prepare that discussion. First of all is simply coming up with a common set of definitions, are they tactical weapons, sub-strategic/nonstrategic? Even in the United States I'm not sure we have a clear set of definitions. But having a clear set of ways to categorize and to classify weapons, having that kind of discussion would allow for an easier negotiation once you sit down at the negotiation table. A second area would be transparency on numbers. In May the Pentagon announced that the U.S. nuclear arsenal as of September 2009 had 5,113 nuclear weapons, and that was everything except those nuclear weapons that are retired and are now awaiting dismantlement.

First of all, it would be useful for the Russian government to show a similar degree of transparency, for the Russian defense ministry to say what is the total Russian nuclear arsenal. But the paper recommends that the sides then go a step further perhaps not publicly but to declare to each other nuclear weapons broken down into four categories. First, deployed strategic warheads, nondeployed strategic warheads and sub-strategic warheads and then the number of warheads that are retired and awaiting dismantlement and give those numbers to each other. If the United States had that information from Russia, what it could then do is go back and check classified intelligence holdings and ask itself, do these

numbers make sense? The Russians could the same thing. What that might do is build confidence so that in a later negotiation if you actually had to have a data exchange, the sides could take a look at those numbers and say, yes, those make sense and that sort of checks out with where felt the Russians were going and vise-versa.

The second way that that kind of transparency could be helpful would be in allowing the sides to have information on which they could make smarter proposals for tackling things like tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed strategic warheads. A third area that the paper recommends the sides should begin a conversation now about is verification measures, because if you move beyond limits on deployed strategic systems, on ICBMs and SOBMs and on deployed strategic warheads and you get into questions like sub-strategic warheads, nondeployed strategic warheads, you're going to be breaking new territory in terms of the verification requirement because you're not going to be looking at warheads that sitting on large ballistic missiles, you are going to be looking at warheads that are separated sitting in bunkers and that's going to entail a much more intrusive verification regime than either the American military or the Russian military has had to cope with to date.

What the paper suggests is the sides begin to discuss without prejudice to what the actual limitations might be, but what are the sorts of verification and monitoring measures they might develop that

would allow them to have some degree of confidence that limitations that ultimately might be agreed on tactical weapons or nondeployed strategic warheads could hence be monitored with some degree of confidence and I'd go back to the START-I negotiations as an example of how difficult some of these verification negotiations can be. START-I really began in earnest in 1985 and by the end of 1987 the basic limitations, the numerical limitations, had been agreed. But the treaty wasn't signed until 3-1/2 later and a lot of that time was working out very intrusive, very difficult verification measures. So to the extent that the sides have a conversation now, they may facilitate and make easier that negotiation once it gets under way.

Another area that the paper suggests that the sides talk about now is third-country nuclear forces. There is a number in Moscow below which the Russians will not go until you bring in the British, French and the Chinese. In Washington, there's probably also a number below which the United States is not prepared to go without bringing in third countries. Those numbers may not be the same, but it would be useful for the sides to talk about what are those numbers because that would shape the idea if you're going to have one more round of bilateral negotiations that limit only U.S. and Russian forces, on the American side you need to have a proposal that doesn't push down below whatever that threshold is for bringing in third-country forces on the Russian side.

The second set of recommendations in the paper addresses questions regarding cooperation on missile defense, and as Strobe said, there really was I think a sense on both sides of the table in Moscow in June that if we could find a way for the United States and Russia or NATO and Russia to engage in genuine cooperation on missile defense, that could have a huge impact on how the sides look at one another. The gist of the recommendations in the area of missile defense was what principles might guide American-Russian or NATO-Russian cooperation in the missile defense area, and there were five or six specific principles laid out. One was that they concentrate on missile defense against intermediate range or shorter range missiles, not try to address strategic range because that gets into the difficult question are we helping each other defend against our own strategic deterrent. It's also easier for the United States and Russia to have a discussion about defending against intermediate range nuclear missiles because as a result of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, neither side had missiles in that category. So that was the first principle, what they ought to be looking at in terms of the threat.

The second principle was talking about transparency and it's regarding transparency about systems and capabilities on both sides. The United States ought to be prepared to talk about what the standard SM3 missile can do in terms of its ability to deal with ballistic missiles. But as

sometimes gets lost in the conversation, there are also Russian missile systems like the S300, the S400 which have capabilities and what capabilities do they have. And then to tie this in with some transparency with regards to possible deployment options. I don't think the U.S. military has decided exactly what that specific architecture for missile defense in 2020 looks like but it certainly ought to have some idea what the options are, and having a degree of transparency on that might facilitate cooperation between Washington and Moscow or between NATO and Moscow. Another principle was that the initial focus for missile defense cooperation should be on Europe including European Russia. You might extend out from there, but Europe seemed like the logical place to start.

Then as we talked about how you would manage this missile defense we thought having a truly joint system might be difficult in the sense that the Russians would probably not be ready at least at the start to report to an American commander, and the United States/NATO probably would not be ready to start to report to a Russian commander. And because of the short flight times involved, you're talking about 7 to 12 minutes and there won't be time for two decisions to be taken so the idea was having perhaps not a completely joint system, but a complimentary system, two pieces that fit up against each other.

Then the last principle dealt with the question of how do you decide who shoots, and fortunately within a few minutes of a missile

launch you can get a pretty good idea where the missile is headed, and so the basic idea here was that if the missile track is heading towards Europe, it's an American or a NATO decision issue, if it's heading towards Russia, it's a Russian decision. So you could put in place a system which would allow the sides to cooperate short of a truly joint system that doesn't prohibit from later evolving into a complete joint system by principles that ought to be workable for the militaries on both sides, and the suggestion here was that this might be the basis for a discussion between the American side and the Russian side, the NATO side and the Russian side, as to how they could really begin to talk in a real way about truly cooperative efforts on missile defense. That covers the first two set of recommendations and I guess we go to Joe now.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much, and thank you Strobe and Steve for including me in this whole process. I found this exercise a real model for how to develop useful, practical recommendations for governments. This was instead of a conference where we were listening to or exchanging lengthy papers, this was a working group, a small group of senior Russian and senior Americans working these problems out together and then in the weeks before and the week after hammering out practical suggestions. The principals on both sides were themselves former, a secretary of state and former foreign minister, were very cognizant of the political realities in their respective

countries and so what they produced is a very short, almost rhetoric-free paper. These are practical suggestions for each of their respective countries with very little rhetoric in here and they get right to the point.

Each of these recommendations they felt, and I agree, would make their country safer. These are not primarily about facilitating the relationship between the United States and Russia or checking off the boxes. These are real, practical steps for security for the increased safety of both of their countries. And this is very true in the first area, I'll summarize, which is how to build on the nuclear security summit that was held here in Washington in April. The goal is to secure and eliminate where possible all the weapons-usable material in the world, all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The methods for doing this are well known, the procedures are fairly well established, the main obstacles you have to doing this are complacency, the lack of high-level attention and bureaucratic obstacles. All of this can be overcome if the U.S. and Russia in particular take the lead in driving the process and setting the example. That's why here the paper recommends some very simple steps that the United States and Russia could do starting with inviting the IAEA to come in and review the safety and security of the U.S. and Russian arsenals, the stockpiles rather, the two largest stockpiles of fissile material in the world and in the process establish a gold standard. What should other countries aspire to in the security of their materials? Some highly rich

uranium around the world is guarded little better than library books. How should it be guarded? There's no agreed standard. The U.S. and Russia could set this gold standard, and by that we mean that in two senses of the word, the optimal security situation and as tight a security as we have a Ft. Knox. We haven't lost an ounce of gold from Ft. Knox and we should not lose an ounce of highly enriched uranium. The other practical step here is simply increasing the budget of the IAEA so they could do what we've asked them to do. They are so woefully unfunded in this area and the U.S. and Russia could take the lead.

On nonproliferation efforts it's recognized in the paper and by all the participants in this dialogue that the most important action for achieving nonproliferation goals is for the U.S. and Russia to continue rapid progress on disarmament. There is some debate in this city about the connection between disarmament and nonproliferation, but this paper recognizes what most of the world recognizes, the iron law of proliferation: As long as some nations have nuclear weapons, others will want them. If you want to slow the pace of proliferation you have to increase the pace of disarmament. Much of that discussion is focused on the strategic reduction talks that Steve has already covered, but there's other specific nonproliferation steps you can take and some of these are related to improving and continuing the U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran. I think the U.S. and Russia are more in agreement on Iran than I've seen in the

last 10 to 15 years, continuing that country-specific task, but also taking the regime on as a whole and improving the overall nonproliferation regime. A specific, practical step is that both the United States and Russia should agree to condition any future nuclear technology agreement on the recipient country implementing the enhanced inspections adopted in 1997 known as the additional protocol. If we're going to trade nuclear technology to other countries for civilian purposes, then we've got to be sure that those other countries are opening up their facilities or allowing inspectors to go to every nuclear facility in that country and to ensure that there's no diversion of that technology or material for nonpeaceful purposes.

Another practical recommendation is of course to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into effect. Of the five permanent members of the nonproliferation treaty, three, Russia, the United Kingdom and France, have already ratified the comprehensive test ban, the United States has not and China has not. We know this is going to be a difficult process in the United States, but it is vitally important that the United States be seen as trying to do this. It would be a disaster if the United States were to give up on this process. It would send exactly the wrong signal to the rest of the world so that if there are difficulties in bringing this before the Senate, the administration has to at least make the effort and make the case. If it proves impossible to ratify this agreement next year,

the United States has to be able to tell the rest of the world we want to do this, we're trying to do this, we think it should be done, here are the reasons why we can't do it, here are the people who are stopping it from being ratified and maybe that can actually at least reassure other countries of U.S. intentions and maybe even build an effect of getting the treaty ratified by overcoming the obstacles presented by some in the U.S. Senate.

The other area of practical steps is starting the negotiations for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. This is the part of the discussion where people usually start checking their emails. The FMCT as it's known is one of these really boring agreements that has been sought for almost the beginning of the nuclear age. Kennedy mentions this in his speech to the United Nations. The idea is that all those countries who are making fissile material for weapon purposes should stop making it; stop the production of this material. Most of the nuclear weapons states have already stopped the production and we haven't made any of this in years for weapons purposes. The idea is to get those negotiations going. Pakistan is currently blocking the negotiation of such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. But there are steps the United States and Russia can take that could accelerate this, For example, it could take the lead in increasing the transparency on its fissile material arsenals, open up the stockpiles, declare fully and completely how much material the

United States and Russia have and encourage their allies to do the same, the other participating nuclear weapon states in the nonproliferation treaty, to work to verifiably and irreversibly reduce these stockpiles.

The final recommendation in the paper is that the United States and Russia encourage all the nuclear weapon states in the NPT on a voluntary basis to open up their enrichment and reprocessing facilities to IAEA safeguards. As I said, these are simple and practical steps that could be taken, each one of these makes sense in and of itself, together, they provide a path for increased nuclear security and an increasingly safer world.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Thank you, Joe. Strobe, you spoke about the track to negotiations and the discussions and how productive they were. One of the areas the paper highlights is the issue of joint understanding of concepts such as deterrence, such as stability, and raises the issue of a third-party component of it and especially as we go down in reductions of the stockpiles and arsenals, the third-party issue becomes quite important. At what point do you think countries such as China should be included into broader discussions?

MR. TALBOTT: The short answer, Vanda, is as soon as possible and timed in a way that the raising of the issue is likely to get treated seriously and positively on the Chinese side. Steve touched on this issue in his own comments. There are several factors that constrain

or limit the degree to which Russia is going to be prepared to further reduce its nuclear arsenal in general and its strategic arsenal in particular in a follow-on to the new START Treaty . One of those by the way is yet another irony of the post-Cold War era.

We, United of States of America, developed our nuclear arsenal, our capacity for massive retaliation, our reliance on mutually assured destruction, as a way of countering what was and certainly perceived to be perhaps with some degree of exaggeration the overwhelming Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional superiority over NATO and the West. But there too the tables have turned and now the Russians rely on their strength as a nuclear weapons power as an offset to what they see as their vulnerabilities at several points of the compass both West and East which goes of course to the question of China. It's come up more than glancingly in our conversations with former Minister Ivanov, Dr. Dynkyn, Arbatov and others about the extent to which the Russian willingness to contemplate further reductions will depend on their perception of what the ceiling or upper limit is going to be on the Chinese arsenal. And by the way, the Chinese aren't indicating that there's any ceiling necessarily yet. They are in a more expansive mode.

You speak about a third party and I might just pick up on something that Joe said, and that is that there are fourth, fifth, sixth, and perhaps seventh parties as well. The one that I would single out there is

India. This gets into multiple variable geometries of a very complicating sort that makes this an era that's going to be much more difficult to navigate in some ways than the bipolar era of the Cold War. China has among its strategic calculations what is going to happen with the India nuclear arsenal and the Indians are not prepared to discuss even in Track II settings, never mind a more formal setting, putting limits on the number of nuclear weapons they have. Back in the 1990s when I was deeply involved in the strategic dialogue with India, we were having some success in getting them to consider such things as what we were prepared to call, they were less prepared to call, strategic restraint, limiting the number of types of missiles they had, the modes of deployment they had and also getting them to contemplate the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty which Joe had talked about and indeed signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Whatever hope there was for success in those negotiations went out the window in October 1999 when the United States Senate refused to ratify the CTBT, so those issues have been in suspension for a long time but will have to be reengaged.

The last point is Pakistan. There are some very important meetings coming up with regard to U.S. relations in South Asia that have a direct or at least indirect bearing on what we're talking about here. We were talking when we huddled before coming to this meeting about press reports, that the Pakistani's are going to come to Washington seeking to

have a civil nuclear deal along the lines of the one that exists between the United States and India. The Pakistani arsenal is quite formidable, rivaling even that of the United Kingdom if I'm not mistaken, numerically or getting close and of course that will then complicate the Indian calculation and that will complete the Chinese calculation. But hard as that is, we absolutely have to have the intellectual groundwork done so that we and our governments are prepared to deal with those issues when the time is right politically and diplomatically.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Steve, let me ask you on missile defenses, something that bewildered much of U.S.-Russian cooperation in the late 1990s and 2000s and continues to be a very difficult topic. You outline an impressive list of suggestions. But the first one was side-stepping the issue of strategic missile defenses. One of the principal Russian concerns is a more limited missile defense focused on intermediate ranges for example will provide the U.S. with the breakout capacity for a strategic missile defense which could threaten their strategic capacity. What can be done or how can the Russian side be persuaded that such a capacity will not be developed, what kind of mechanisms can we build in to prevent the development of such a capacity?

MR. PIFER: I think missile is going to be in the future still a very difficult issue for both Washington and Moscow to manage. Right now it's American policy not to try to defend against a Russian ballistic

missile attack. We don't have the technology and we don't have the resources. But the policy is to defend or be able to defend the United States against a limited ballistic missile attack such as could be mounted by a country like North Korea or Iran. The problem is that the Russians don't wholly believe that and the Russians worry that at some point the American capability could expand and pose a threat to their strategic deterrent, and this is as was my understanding one of the last issues that had to be resolved in the negotiations this spring on the new START Treaty, was the Russians wanted to put actually into the text of the Treaty language that said if one side's missile defense expands to the point where it can threaten the other side's strategic deterrent, that would be grounds for the side to withdraw from the treaty. The United States resisted that and in the end the Russians made that a unilateral statement that they issued at the time of they signed the treaty.

I suspect that in the next negotiating round the Russians going to push perhaps harder for some kind of constraints on missile defense and that's going to be an issue because I think the Obama Administration does not want to limit missile defense. One of the reasons also being that as we've seen an ratification debates over the last 4 months, there is a strong degree of support in the Senate for going forward with missile defense and an agreement that came back with real limits on missile defense might well have trouble being ratified by the

Senate. So I think there's an issue down the road that's going to be quite difficult in terms of how you deal with missile defense and that's where I'd go back to this idea of could you promote a system of real cooperation between the United States and Russia on missile defense? That might be the way if you had Russian officers working in a system on a daily basis exchanging threat information, warning information where they're working back-and-forth with America and NATO on that, that begins to I think change the perception about in fact what the American missile defense is aimed to do and that might be a way of building confidence in Russia that the missile defense system that is planned under the phased, adaptive approach for Europe is indeed not aimed at the Russian strategic deterrent, it's aimed at third-country threats, and that might begin to build some confidence that would move the Russians away from trying to seek constraints on the missile defense system that would be extremely difficult for the U.S. government to agree to.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Joe, Strobe brought in Pakistan and we've talked about China and India, all three very critical countries for nonproliferation. South Asia is already a very complex nuclear triangle, certainly the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan is a fragile one and perhaps one where nuclear war could most easily break out. Both countries although continue to pose great problems from the perspective of nonproliferation. In these latest negotiations between India and Japan,

India is resisting some of the additional protocol-type inspections and requirements that you were calling for in your recommendations. In your discussions with the Russians and more broadly, what kind of framework, what kind of steps can be taken to facilitate India's and Pakistan's greater acceptance of the nonproliferation regime?

MR. CIRINCIONE: The first step is not to agree to Pakistani' demand that we give them a sweetheart deal like we gave India. There's a disturbing report in the "Wall Street Journal" today that Pakistani officials are going to come to Washington on October 22 and raise with Secretary Clinton the Pakistani demand that they get a nuclear technology cooperation agreement similar to what the United States gave India. This is a deeply flawed agreement that has caused major problems for U.S. nonproliferation efforts around the world, has weakened the non-proliferation regime and it would disaster of the first magnitude to duplicate that mistake with Pakistan. So the very first rule is don't do any more harm; hold the line here.

The second is to push on the recommendations that are in this paper. The paper does not talk specifically about India or Pakistan, but you can see where it's going. We're trying to establish this global standard, not sweetheart deals for individual countries, not it's okay for you to have one standard and you another, we're worried about you in the Middle East but we're not worried about you in Asia. It's got to be one

standard and that's the only way you can enforce that and that standard has got to be rigorous inspections, increase the inspection process so that the IAEA can go everywhere they suspect there might be some illicit nuclear work going and be able to inspect those facilities. Advance notice for example, this is one of what's called the additional protocol, any country that is considering building a new nuclear facility has to declare their intention to build that facility and outline to the IAEA inspectors their design. This is one of the issues for example in Iran where Iran built a secret centrifuge facility near the city of Qom and did not declare it and said they didn't have to because the original inspection agreements don't require it to. The additional protocol would change that. Not only do you have to declare that when you're building it, you have to declare that when you're designing it. So the idea is to give more advanced notice and that's the kind of standard we want everybody to do. We want Pakistan to that, we want India to have that, and by the U.S. and Russia insisting on this, that this be a condition of all future supply and getting the other states in the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to insist on this, you can start implementing this and you can start making more rigorous inspections the rule rather than the exception.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: And bringing in some of the other parties such as China will be critical as China has already moved to offer

Pakistan nuclear reactors using the U.S.-India deal as a precedent to justify it.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Exactly, so you can see the damage it's done, that if the U.S. can offer a deal like this to its ally India, why exactly can't China offer a deal like that to its ally Pakistan? That's the problem with trying to have this U.S.-specific good guy/bad guy proliferation role, it's got to be one standard.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Thank you. We are now going to open it for questions. Please wait for the microphone which I believe we have in the room, identify yourselves and if you want to direct your question to specific panelist, please do that.

MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you very much. I'm Marybeth Sheridan from the "Washington Post."

My question is given that it's been a much harder lift for the Obama Administration to get the START Treaty ratified than they initially expected, and given that the Republicans are expected to pick up several seats in the Senate in the elections, do you think that there's going to be momentum to go on to a more ambitious type of arms control treaty? Is the administration really considering this a priority? I guess Strobe would be the one for that. Thanks.

MR. TALBOTT: I think my colleagues will have views on this as well. The short answer, Marybeth, is I think that assuming that the

predictions that are virtually universal with regard to what's going to happen in the midterm elections and assuming, alas, that the extreme partisanship which we have seen for the last couple of years is not going to get better to put it mildly, I think there will be the opposite of momentum and it will be a heavier lift. There is still reason, and I think I touched on this in my remarks, to think that the new START Treaty will be ratified. It has simply got too much by way of its own arguments for itself and too much support among distinguished and influential Republicans to be stopped in its tracks. But I suspect that the remaining debate with regard to the START Treaty will be used by some to lay down red lines and build obstacles to further movement particularly on other comprehensive test ban treaties. I would love to be wrong.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Steve, you have been spending a lot of time in the Senate discussing these issues.

MR. PIFER: My perception is that the debate about the new START Treaty changed a bit in July or early August where the debate shifted away from the specific terms of the treaty because I think that the administration did a pretty good job of answering the specific questions about did it limit missile defense, what about the absence of a specific definition for a rail mobile light ICBM launcher, and it began to shift more toward the question of is the administration committed to providing money to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex and also to ensure that the

deterrent is modernized. So I think that they're in that bargaining mode now. I think the treaty will be ratified. I can't say whether it will be in the lame duck session in early 2011, but I think that it's moving in that direction.

Looking to the next stage of negotiations, my sense is that the administration is committed to doing that, and remember that next negotiation will get into some of the issues like tactical nuclear weapons that were raised by people who said they weren't fully satisfied with the new START Treaty. So it will be addressing some of the questions that I think people like Senator Kyle and Senator McCain raised and therefore may be able to get some support in that sense. Although I think the negotiations you're talking about next is not going to be 10 or 11 months like the new START Treaty was, this is going to be a 2, 3, 4 year effort because the sides will be getting into these new questions that they haven't had to deal with before.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me just add what I've picked up both in these discussions and in similar discussions among U.S. and Russian experts and former officials is a great willingness to go further to continue this process. The exercise here has been mirrored in other forums such as the Luxembourg Forum which just concluded a series of meetings, again a similar model, a small number of U.S. and Russian experts and former officials talking, and you'll see similar recommendations coming out

when they issue their statement in the next week or so and there were other such exercises. What you hear from the Russians is a willingness to discuss things like increased transparency over tactical nuclear weapons, the kind of recommendations you see here. Let's have this talk. So, almost independent, and Ivanov and Albright talk about this, of the next negotiations, let's talk about increased transparency on tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles, a recommendation that Russia for example follow the U.S. lead and declare its inventory as to how many weapons are in its active stockpiles. These are simple steps that you have to overcome some bureaucratic resistance to, but these kind of simple steps, step-by-step you open up transparency, you pave the way for new negotiations and in this exercise and others you start teeing up issues that negotiators can then take off with. I think I'll just stop there.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: The gentleman in the back?

MR. EVANS: I'm John Evans, formerly with the State Department. There are some wonderful ideas in this report and I was particularly struck by the idea of the complementary missile defense rather than join and the fissile material idea. My question though is isn't there a danger of offending the Senate if you launch into talks in the fall of this year? This is really a timing question. Just as newly named ambassadors hesitate to do anything in their presumptive area of assignment before they're confirmed, isn't there a danger in getting a little bit ahead of the

game? Wouldn't it be better to take one's time with this and let the political atmosphere ripen? Thank you. Anyone can take that I think.

MR. CIRINCIONE: John, I agree that I think there is that risk. If the administration were to proceed down this route I think, one, they ought to consult with the Senate to make sure that the Senate understands that this is not a new negotiation. But it does seem to me that when you're looking at the topics that we've suggested here in the paper, they're fairly innocuous. We're talking about transparency. That ought to be a good thing even whether or not there's going to be a next round of negotiations, talking about coming up with a common definition scheme, talking about verification concepts.

If you go back in the early 1990s, Ambassador Jim Goodby, a former colleague of several of us, had a channel with the Russians looking at how you would verify the irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions. You can have these channels and the discussions, and I guess the reason the report would suggest that we have the discussion now is that you're going to have to tackle this questions at some point, if you can clear away some of the brush in the fall of 2010 and the early part of 2011 before you get to formal negotiations, you may be able to enable those formal negotiations to come to a conclusion more quickly than would otherwise be the case. But I do think your caution is very well taken and I think you would want to be very transparent with the Senate that these are

the sorts of conversations are going on, we're not starting the next negotiation but we're talking about issues that might facilitate that.

MR. PIFER: Let me just add quickly that I think in some ways this is responsive to the concerns you heard from the senators during the 21 hearing and briefings on the new START Treaty. Clearly the senators are concerns about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles. Let's address that. Let's start working on that now. There are practical recommendations on how to do this.

On the larger issue of opposition to an arms control agreement, this is a constant in the U.S. political system. I was just watching a wonderful movie from the early 1960s called "Seven Days In May" where Burt Lancaster is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and he was leading a coup against the president because the president is negotiating an arms control treaty with the Russians. There's always some sliver of senatorial opposition to arms control treaties. The elections aren't going to change that dramatically. There will be a good 10 to 15 senators that will vote against arms control treaties and that's just the way it is.

MR. TALBOTT: Could I just add one quick word here? It's a bit of a parochial plug but I think it's also relevant to your question, John. That is, this is a set of issues where there really is a pretty high degree of cautious receptivity on the part of governments including in the case of the U.S. government the Legislative Branch to the sort of work that's going on

in the community that we represent which is to say operating foundations like Ploughshares, think tanks like Brookings and other colleagues on Massachusetts Avenue and on the Russian side, IMMO, because there is a community that has developed over the decades where there is a lot of expertise, a lot of experience and a lot of networking that cuts across the boundary line between government and NGOs and there's an awareness in government, and this goes for the Russian government as well as the United States government, that they are both so preoccupied with issues of the day and politically constrained for the reason you raised from getting too far ahead of themselves vis-à-vis the Senate in particular, that they actually welcome having brainstorming of the kind that we've been doing and that's been apparent in the reception that we've gotten when we have passed papers and given briefings to people in the U.S. government we've done everything we can to reach out, particularly to congressional staff.

MS. MACK: Jennifer Mack, CSIS. I was wondering since a couple of the panelists have stressed CTBT if in your discussions you had any talk about transparency of test sites. I know that the U.S. government I believe and some Russians have suggested this. And I wondered also if you had any thoughts about some other ideas of circulating a letter of understanding or agreement regarding the agreement on Zero that was

taken in the negotiations. This might go a ways to assuaging the opposition. Thank you.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Yes, we discussed this in some detail and the summary of those discussions is in the paper and the operative sentence is on page 8, "To facilitate Senate consent to ratification, the United States and Russia should reaffirm their understanding that the CTBT bans all tests and explosions of nuclear weapons." This is an issue that concerns some senators, understandably so, it should be a relatively easy matter to clean up or at the very least narrow the range of uncertainty about what is covered and what is not covered.

MR. TALBOTT: I might just add that on the question of Zero, we take note and build upon the fact that President Obama and President Medvedev both endorsed the concept of Global Zero, I believe it was at their London meeting which was in April 2009, and one of us, maybe me, mentioned at the opening that Ambassador Rick Byrd was part of our whole exercise and Rick is working very hard on Global Zero so that you can be sure he made sure it came up with some regularity.

MR. FERGUSON**:** I'm Charles Ferguson of the Federation of American Scientists. Joe, I appreciate your mention of the gold standard for securing nuclear materials, but I didn't hear anything about reducing nuclear materials and I didn't see it written in the text here. So I'm curious as to whether there was any discussion among the group

about building on the very successful megatons-to-megawatts initiative in which 500 metric tons of weapons-grade -- have been down-blended into nuclear fuel and that it's now fueling about half of the U.S. nuclear reactors right now. Also similarly, a discussion about the plutonium disposition agreement and how to accelerate that. Finally, how to get the Russians to begin to convert more of their research and test reactors from using highly enriched uranium which could be used in improvised nuclear devices into low and enriched uranium. Thank you.

MR. CIRINCIONE: We did not get into detail on any of those three areas. Would you join the discussions so next time we could? We could have, we just didn't get down to that grain level in discussions. But on the first part there was agreement and it is in the paper in the very last page that both the United States and Russia should take the lead by increasing transparency regarding their stockpiles and working to verifiably and irreversibly reduce these stocks. So there is a sense that we can and should do this.

MR. LOVELL: I'm Malcolm Lovell of the Brookings Advisory Council. Strobe, you've written that there's a possibility in 40 years due to nuclear proliferation and global warming that we'll have a single global government. Do you see any interest in that concept today?

MR. TALBOTT: Not to quibble, but what I have said both in columns I wrote for "Time" magazine back in the days I was in that

profession and also in a book on global governance that I published since I came here to Brookings, is that I can imagine that over a period of many decades the existing system of global governance which is quite different from a world government might thicken and become more effective in a way that will enable us to deal with existential threats to the planet, the two principal ones being nuclear proliferation and climate change, more effectively than we are able to deal with them today. As we say in Washington, it's another lunch or another Brookings panel discussion to talk about global governance and how that differs from world government.

I think to cast a slightly pessimistic note over the conversation that in times of great economic distress around the world of the sort that we're going through now that there is a rise of nationalism and an erosion of support for internationalism. That is perverse in some ways because not that we need another example of why there should be effective global governance, but the global financial crisis give us one, and yet the political winds are blowing in a different direction in many countries around the world, notably this one.

MR. JONES: Bill Jones, ERI News. I don't know if either of you or any of you saw the article today in *Izvestia* where Igor Ivanov, academician Velikhov, General Moiseyev and others had talked about the issue of disarmament where they said disarmament is not enough but what we need is some kind of structure in which we can together deal with

common threats. I don't know if you've seen the article or if Strobe saw it, it was reported yesterday and is in *Izvestia* today. Is this in line with what you're talking about or are they going further in this? They're talking about a structure of global cooperation. Does this reflect something on the Russian side that is in line with what you're saying? And secondly, what is the estimate of getting this through the Duma? Is there going to be opposition to this treaty or will it sail through without a problem?

MR. TALBOTT: I'll take a first stab at that but Joe, Steve and Vanda might have their own thoughts. I'll take your second question first because it's so easy to answer. I don't see big problems for ratification of the new START Treaty once the Prime Minister in particular and the President says it's time to do it. Washington is a more complicated town in all kinds of ways than Moscow. Moscow is complicated in its own different ways. I didn't get my "Izvestia" delivered this morning but I'll go online which one can do now and take a look at the piece. Knowing the individuals, particularly academician Velikhov, whom I've known for a very long time and have huge respect for, is a man of great physical and political courage as you know. And having worked with Igor Ivanov in several of his capacities, my guess is that what the two of them and their colleagues are talking about is quite consistent with what we're discussing here. I suspect it also relates to such issues as President Medvedev's proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security

architecture and I wish them luck in making the case on their side. And while there are lot of devils in a lot of details, I think there's compatibility between what they're talking about and what we're talking about.

MR. CIRINCIONE: I would add if you look at the recommendations in the paper for missile defense cooperation, I think any list that the United States would come up with for four or five national security threats would have the proliferation of ballistic missiles where you've got 25 to 30 countries with significant ballistic missile technology. What the paper suggests is moving towards a cooperative U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia that would put in place a structure moving beyond arms control where in fact Russia is working with the West to deal with a contemporary threat. I think that would be one of the models or an example of the sorts of things it sounds like they're discussing in this "Izvestia" piece.

MR. PIFER: Very quickly I want to take your questions as an opportunity to point out that this treaty talks about multiple levels of cooperation, many ways that the U.S. and Russia and other countries can cooperate and there's no treaty fetish in this paper. There is no fixation on another START Treaty as the only way to achieve these security goals. In fact, the authors go out of their way to point out that the presidential nuclear security initiatives of 1991 have not been exhausted. You may remember this is when President Bush unilaterally took 3,000 nuclear

weapons out of the U.S. stockpile and denuclearized the U.S. Army, the U.S. surface fleet. There are steps that this president can do that don't require negotiations with the Russians or approval by the U.S. Senate and some of them are outlined in this paper, to increase transparency, agreements that don't require treaties on storage of tactical nuclear weapons, accelerated dismantlement rates of U.S. nuclear weapons that could be matched on the Russian side. There's a whole host of ways to cooperate and make progress on this issue without negotiating new treaties.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Let me ask a question of the panel. The Nuclear Posture Review as well as your paper very much focuses on nonproliferation and of course part of the way to sell nonproliferation is to give certain guarantees to countries that feel vulnerable and that live in complex neighborhoods. There have been talks with our counterparts in the Middle East for example about what kind of security guarantees could be given should Iran not be dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons. How much should the U.S. commit itself to providing security guarantees to countries like Saudi Arabia or countries in Asia such as South Korea to dissuade them from contemplating the nuclear option and how much could such guarantees be made credible? In fact, much of the proliferation during the Cold War was precisely because security guarantees were often not seen as credible. I would also like to point to Steve being the

main author of a paper on extended deterrence and its complexities that Brookings produced a few months back. Steve, do you want to start?

MR. PIFER: I think that's always been one of the challenges and when we've talked historically about extended deterrence, part of that was aimed obviously during the Cold War at deterring the Soviet Union from military action against NATO, but also a secondary goal was assuring allies, assuring countries in Europe, that the American nuclear deterrent would cover them as a way to dissuade them from acquiring a nuclear weapons program of their own and I think in the case of NAT Europe it was a success story. It not only successfully deterred the Soviet Union, but it also reassured allies so that you would not have other countries moving down that path.

Fortunately I think we still have some in the Iran case before we have to decide whether or not we have to accept a nuclear Iran and that there is still some hope that the combination of sanctions plus the West's readiness to engage with Iran should Iran move away from a nuclear weapons course, I think we've got some time there. But if you had to go to a point where Iran acquired nuclear weapons, I think the United States would need to think very carefully about extending assurances because if Iran goes down that path, I don't see regional security or American security being advanced if you then have other countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey then acquiring nuclear weapons. You can picture

a Middle East in 10 or 15 years that can be very ugly from the perspective of nuclear proliferation. So as difficult as it may be to extend assurances, we may see that as a very desirable alternative to seeing other countries following the Iranian path. One of the challenges that we're going to have which you mentioned is how do we make those assurances credible, and that will be something that the people will have to think carefully about if we have to go down that route.

MR. TALBOTT: Maybe I could offer two thoughts and then since our time is coming to an end, I'll level the last words to you, Vanda, and to Joe by way of summing up.

Picking up on the last point that Steve made, I've been in conversations in recent weeks with regard to scenarios relating to Iran's nuclear weapons program including conversations that have included authoritative people from other countries in that very difficult neighborhood, and I'm quite pessimistic that key countries would be satisfied as it were with the prospect or for that matter even with the reality of American security guarantees if Iran were to in fact become a nuclear weapons state. I think there would be a strong impulse on part of a number of them to have their own nuclear deterrent.

I'll single out one country in particular, and that is Turkey. I've been going to Turkey since the 1970s and for most of that time I have been struck by the fact that whenever nuclear security comes up, the

Turkish position has been we have a nuclear deterrent and it's called the United States of America because they're in NATO and of course American weapons have been based on Turkish territory. They don't say that anymore, and in their lacunea there is I think a hint they are beginning to consider other options and so are other countries in the region. This just makes all the more important, successful diplomacy and let's hope it can be done through a combination of diplomacy and sanctions preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

The last thing I wanted to say picks up on something that Joe said a moment ago, his warning against, I hadn't heard the phrase before, treaty fetishism. I think that's worth bearing in mind and thinking about. Treaties are still a very good thing. They have the force of both national and international law. But we should not over rely on them. We should not make them the be all and end all because if you don't get treaties then you're left with a law-of-the-jungle situation in very high-stakes areas, and there is a parallelism I think between the two existential threats we face, climate change and nuclear proliferation. We cannot wait until what I will call the G-192, that is to say, all the member states of the United Nations sign up to a universal, binding treaty. There has to be a lot that is unilateral on the parts of countries that are in the European Union which is way out in front, not to mention a lot of countries particularly the United States in controlling carbon emissions, bilateral arrangements,

some of them rather informal, and there's a certain amount of promising conversation going on between the United States and China, between the United States and India and I'm sure that U.S.-Indian synchronization of emissions reductions will be on the agenda when President Obama makes his state visit to India on a couple of weeks.

Similarly, in the arms control and nonproliferation area, I think, but Joe is now going to have the sense to correct me if I'm wrong, part of what you're saying is that in addition to things like the new START Treaty, we need to look at more informal, smaller and more ad hoc arrangements to deal pragmatically and in a timely fashion with these threats as they arise.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Yes, that is true. Let me take the closing remarks to talk just a bit about Iran. Correct me if I'm wrong, is Iran mentioned in the paper? It doesn't come up in any major way, maybe it's mentioned in passing. But as was clear in the discussions that we had that Iran is one of the subjects that the U.S. and Russians are talking a lot on multiple levels, I think the next 2 years are going to be critical in determining whether we can contain and ultimately reverse Iran's nuclear program, and to do that it's absolutely essential that the U.S. and Russia be in close synchronization on this diplomatic effort.

Part of that is making sure that the United States and Russia are also talking in a cooperative mode on the set of issues that are directly

addressed in this paper. The two are closely related. What I see is a growing U.S.-Russian spirit of cooperation and even partnership on this. I think it's unquestioned that the U.S.-Russian relationship is much better now than it was just 2 years ago and that the cooperation on Iran is perhaps the strongest it's ever been. This is an extremely difficult problem. It's not like the previous administration didn't try to develop a strategy to stop Iran, it just failed to do so. The Iranian program has been accelerating over the last 10 years. Now this administration is trying to develop a strategy to stop it and I would say it's making great progress. We have the strongest U.N. sanctions resolution ever passed on any state passed on Iran. We have more cooperation now than we've ever seen on Iran. We have sanctions that are really biting, that are really hurting that you can see impacting in the decision-making process in Iran, but it is not over. The program has not stopped. Iranians seem to show signs of coming back to the negotiating table. I think we might have talks again as early as next month. In those talks it's going to be absolutely essential that the U.S. and Russia are in close coordination on their policy and on their efforts. Cooperation on arms control is part of building the kind of cooperation you need to stop Iran.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: And the question of Iran and U.S.-Russia cooperation once again brings in China and the importance of including China and other rising powers, rising powers and existing

powers into such discussions and into the global architecture of dealing with transnational threats such as nuclear nonproliferation. The issue of nuclear stability and n nuclear nonproliferation is indeed existential for the planet, for the world and for the United States. It can often be a very depressing topic especially when one thinks about issues such as nuclear terrorism that we didn't talk very much about today and the challenges of deterring it and dealing with the consequences.

One of the very many virtues of this panel and the report that the participants produced is that it provides some light, some positive recommendations, in fact very many positive recommendations, and steps that can be taken forward in dealing with very complex, often a very difficult issue that both have global ramifications and often very great complexities domestically. Please join me in thanking our panelists, and please pick up a paper on your way out.

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