

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION  
ARE GLOBAL LEADERS LEADING?  
OUTCOMES FROM THE SEPTEMBER SUMMITS  
AT THE U.N.

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

**PARTICIPANTS:**

**Introduction and Moderator:**

TED PICCONE  
Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy  
The Brookings Institution

**Featured Speakers:**

ROBERT C. ORR  
Assistant Secretary-General for Policy, Coordination and Strategic Planning  
Executive Office of the Secretary General, United Nations

NICHOLAS HAYSOM  
Director of Political Affairs, Executive Office of the Secretary General  
United Nations

BRUCE JONES  
Director, Management Global Insecurity  
Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University

\* \* \* \* \*

## PROCEEDINGS

MR. PICCONE: My name is Ted Piccone. I'm a senior fellow and deputy director for foreign policy here at The Brookings Institution, and I'm happy to welcome you to today's event sponsored by the Managing Global Insecurity Project here at Brookings. And the topic today, as you know, is on the U.N. Summit and meetings that were just held in the last week or two up in New York. Are global leaders leading? There are lots of questions that we want to cover today. It's a big topic with many areas to address, and we're very fortunate to have with us three of the top experts, analysts, operators on the scene to inform us about what did happen up in New York and what will happen going forward.

You'll hear basically top discussion on a couple of core themes. One will be on issues more thematic: Millennium Development Goals, of course, is a big issue up in New York -- climate change, nonproliferation issues -- and then we will also hear about some of the core peace and security agenda items, including Sudan. And the we'll get some commentary and maybe some critical commentary about where all this is going.

I want to introduce in the following order who we'll be

hearing from: Dr. Robert Orr, director on my right, is the assistant secretary-general for planning and policy coordination in the Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations. He's been there since August 2004. He has a wide range of responsibilities. He's the principal policy advisor to the secretary-general on climate change, food security, global health, counterterrorism, and the U.N. Reform agenda.

We know Bob well from his time both in and outside of government. He spent time at Harvard University where he directed the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served in the State Department as deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and as director of the National Security Council staff. We're very happy to have him here.

We're then going to hear from Nicholas Haysom. Nicholas is the director for political affairs in the Office of the Secretary-General. He's been there since May 2007. Nick has served in Baghdad as the head of the U.N. office there, the Office for Constitutional Support, has a long and very illustrious career as a human rights lawyer and advisor on constitutional issues in South Africa, in Burundi advisor on the Sudanese Peace Process, and I could go on and on. It's a very impressive set of experiences he brings to his current post.

And then we'll hear from Dr. Bruce Jones, who's a senior fellow and director of the Managing Global Insecurity Project here. He's

also director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Bruce is involved in many other projects. He's a senior advisor to the World Bank's World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development, as well as a senior advisor on the U.N. Secretary-General's review of International Civilian Capacities. And he also has a long career at the U.N. as a senior advisor on the U.N. reform effort, on the high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change on the Middle East peace process, Kosovo, et cetera.

So what we'll do is we'll hear from our seats from Bob and Nick, and then Bruce, and then we'll open it up to questions. Thank you.

MR. ORR: Great to be here, and glad that so many of you made it out on such a beautiful Washington day here. We did get to circle Washington for two-and-a-half hours, so we know it's beautiful. It's very green out there.

Thank you for the invitation and the chance to talk about two very central questions: Are global leaders leading right now? It's a very simple answer: Yes, no, and sometimes. I think what I'd like to try to do in my remarks is talk about some of the global issues and the extent to which we are getting the leadership we need or not on some of the macro global issues, and then leave it to my colleague, Nick Haysom to talk about some of the peace, security and geopolitical issues.

I would start by just observing that the platform that was intensively used last week in New York is one that is generally underestimated by the good educated crowd in Washington like you all. I see some faces in the room that know exactly how the U.N. platform is used and can be used, but the fact that you have all the leaders of the world basically descend on New York over the course of one week means that you get not only a snapshot of what's happening at leadership levels in the world, but you actually do get engagement on a broad range of issues in different configurations that can tell you a lot about what's happening in the world. It can't tell you everything, but it can tell you a lot.

So one of the things we'd like to do today is give you a taste of what happened, but also maybe a little bit of interpretation of what it means. The Bottom line on the U.N. as the place where all these pieces come together is that the U.N. continues to lead a double life. On one hand, if you listen to the pundits, the U.N. is on the verge of dying as it's been on the verge of dying for 40, 50 years. It's the most often-declared institution as irrelevant and going out of business.

The second life we lead is that somehow the governments of the world don't think so. They are using the U.N. more, on more issues, more deeply, more intensively than at any time in the institution's history. So at a public perception level, there's a total disconnect with the way that

governments are actually using the institution. So, as a framing device, I think it's worth to think about that.

I wanted to start with where the center of gravity was last week on development. The Millennium Development Goals was a rather unique experiment that was launched 10 years ago by global leaders to try to come up with a set of basic minimum standards that the world would seek to achieve over a 15-year period. This was the 10-year-review with 5 years left for a sprint to the finish, at which we had to very clearly design the roadmap for what the next 5 years look like, raise the attention in the global public to these issues, and harvest specific commitments from governments, businesses, philanthropists, to be able to address those aims. And on all three fronts, it's quite interesting that we pretty much met the goals of what we wanted out of the summit.

First of all, I think if you had told me 6 months ago that 140 leaders of the world would come to New York to talk about development, I think I would have laughed. The idea that so many leaders came to talk about development at a time when, if you read the newspapers, all that you hear is: we're strapped for cash; we can't do anything; this is not a time to be making those kind of investments; defer, defer, defer...is huge.

They came to New York and they had a very different message which is, yes, times are tough, but this is exactly the time to be

investing in development and investing in the places and in the people that most need it. It's a time for targeted strategic investments, and I think that's a very important message to carry out of last week.

The reception of this -- call it the global development jamboree that happened -- was quite striking. Just like I would have been surprised if you had told me the number of heads of state that would come and really engage on these issues, I would have also been not surprised, but rather shocked, that our news monitoring unit essentially was overwhelmed by the number of stories on development in the MDGs last week. By latest count, they had tallied up over 28,000 new articles and news, pieces on the MDGs. In a given week around the world, you wouldn't see, more than 10 or 20 stories on the MDGs, so the fact that the summit was able to raise this to a political level and get follow-up by the, you know, 2,000 journalists that came to New York during this period is quite striking.

In terms of outcomes, beyond the consciousness- raising, beyond approving unanimously a roadmap for the MDGs, the specific commitments that a number of governments made and a number of philanthropists and private sector individuals is really quite striking, and here are just a few that you may have missed. European Union committed a billion euros to help the poorest countries achieve the MDGs.

China committed to zero tariff treatment for more products from the least developed countries and additional debt cancellation. Japan committed \$3.5 billion over 5 years for education. And if you start tallying up this list of all the major players and what they're committing, and not just pledging, but actually we can see where the money's coming from, in this kind of an environment to see a number of governments stepping forward simultaneously to invest in the world's poorest and most vulnerable people is quite significant.

We did not even hear that debate a year ago. I've sat every meeting of the G-20 since it's been created at the leaders' level, and the discussion about the poorest and most vulnerable could probably be summarized on the back of a napkin. So the fact that finally we got an appropriate focus on the poorest and most vulnerable for an extended period of time at a leadership level and that it produced a number of commitments is significant.

One particular area which we had, what I would describe as a breakout success, also one on part of the MDGs where we've had the least progress, namely on maternal health. This has been the perennial basement dweller of the MDGs that has moved the least, the Secretary-General put in place a process two years ago to try to target the hardest things. We're not just going to harvest the success of India and China's



growth and say we achieved the Millennium Development Goals; we have to go after development in the hardest places and the needs of the hardest to reach people.

And on maternal health and children's health, which are so intricately interwoven, we have had the most stubborn, slowest progress. This is quite outrageous, if you think about it, the fact that mothers and children are the ones that are getting insufficient attention and resources. In the 20th century, it's a pretty shocking reality. Another reason that if we want development to succeed on all of our other goals, perhaps the area where you get the greatest echo effect from your investment is on mothers and children. If a mother dies in the process of giving life, her children are 10 times more likely to die a premature death. If a child is sick in a family, all the investment, other children are pulled out of school in order to get the medicine for that one child. So if we address these hard-to-move ones, the echo effect on others is major.

And last week we had not just governments from donor countries come up with money and commitments that we have not see ever before on these issues, but we had even more significantly major announcements from developing countries on what they are doing for the health of their mothers and children taking ownership of their own plans and investing in their own plans.

We saw corporate leaders come and pledge large amounts of concrete things like new deworming medicine, Johnson & Johnson and GlaxoSmithKline, big pharmaceutical companies putting their money and their product where their mouth is extraordinarily important. But it's even more important when you realize what the challenge of women's and children's health is.

Governments alone, north or south, corporations alone cannot solve this problem. And what was interesting was we had commitments from not just governments, but from philanthropists who will do bridge funding and targeted funding to make sure that deworming medicine that was pledged will get to the places it needs to go and from NGOs to make sure they delivered those medicines. So we saw the coalition come together that can actually help us move in concrete ways come together, can move the most stubborn of the MDG goals.

I wanted to just move to a couple of other areas in which I thought there were interesting developments. Food security is an area that got a lot of attention after the price spike in 2008. And recently in the news you saw discussions of Russia's policy, vis-à-vis wheat exports, and you saw reports of rioting in Mozambique. And so people started to say, oh, are we having another food crisis?

The answer is that this is not 2008, it's not looking like 2008, and global food supplies are different than where we were in 2008. We don't expect a price spike anytime soon. But the vulnerabilities that we saw due to market conditions and the way that the food and global markets work and how they intersect with local markets, are still very much there. And I think we've learned a lot of lessons, and there's a lot of work going into this area. So we're in a very different place where we were two years ago on this issue.

There was one interesting development last week, in that nutrition is starting to be included into the food security equation much more centrally. This is important, obviously, when nutrition doesn't get to the youngest minds entire decades, and lives' worth of capacity is lost. So bringing nutrition into our food security equation is an important development. And I think the event that Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Martin of Ireland chaired on this at which seven donors came together to have a coordinated effort on the nutrition piece is a significant development.

A word on climate change. If this year was all about MDGs, a year ago any meeting like this we would have all been talking about climate change. So where is climate change today, and are leaders still thinking about it? Very much so, but it's a very mixed picture as to what

they're thinking about it and what lessons they've drawn from where we were a year ago in Copenhagen.

The interesting take-away on the climate change debate is that leader after leader said in one form or another, well, Copenhagen wasn't perfect, but at least it moved us forward and gave us a basis to move forward further. And if you had asked that question six or nine months ago, that's not the answer you would have gotten. There's a soberness in the debate now that we're not going to get there all the way in one gulp, and Cancun is not going to be Copenhagen II; that there's a very different, more targeted agenda for Cancun, but the fact that people feel there has been a basic agreement among major players is something to be built on and that there is now an agreed strategy.

Last week, about 55 to 60 ministers got together on the issue of climate change and what to expect from Cancun in December and the UNFCCC negotiation. What was very interesting about that meeting was I could have closed my eyes and not known who was speaking; that almost every speaker -- north, south, big, small, emitter, most vulnerable -- were all saying we need five things from Cancun, and they ticked off the list.

We need to get the fast-start financing flowing, and we need to see it, and we need to have mechanisms to be able to count it.

We need to have progress on deforestation, the so-called REDD +.

We need to finalize all of the arrangements on technology that were centrally up to the gate in Copenhagen, but never got agreed because of the political process.

Capacity-building and -- let's see, my fifth? I heard it -- adaptation framework. So the five areas where there's concrete progress to be made, where the negotiations have matured to a point where virtually every minister felt comfortable saying, this is my agenda for Cancun, that is a significant development. This is different from the old days of trying to get a comprehensive binding climate change agreement in one fell swoop. Now there is much more of recognition that we have to make incremental progress, but incremental doesn't mean small increments. We can actually take big bites, but we have to keep moving forward.

There is one last area that I'd like to mention because it was very striking in not just the meetings themselves namely the focus on women and women's empowerment. If there is one single most underutilized resource in the world, it is women. If we look at all of the issues we are looking at, at the U.N. -- whether it is the climate change agenda, the development agenda, the peace and security agenda -- to the

extent that we weave women more centrally into the narrative and into the programs and into the leadership opportunities, we are seeing different results.

And we've just gone through a long process, painfully long process, of four years to try to get the U.N. architecture that deals with gender and women's empowerment created and solidified and take four different parts of the U.N. and put them under one roof with a coherent mandate. And the Secretary-General just earlier this month named former President Bachelet of Chile as the head of U.N. Women.

This may sound like an arcane bureaucratic thing at the U.N. It's not. The fact that programming of major governments is changing dramatically on writing women into the equation, the fact that the U.N. now has a coherent architecture and that there's funding out there is a very interesting, very important development to keep your eyes on.

So with that I want to turn it over to my colleague, Nick Haysom, to talk about some of the developments on the peace and security side last week.

MR. PICCONE: Great, thank you, Bob.

MR. HAYSOM: Thanks very much.

So what is GA Week, and why do we want to have a look at what it delivered after the event? Basically, GA Week is the week in which

the heads of state and government come to town to open the first meeting of this session of the General Assembly. It brings significant leaders together. Some will come with only a passing interest in some of the topics or side events. The challenge which we face in the secretariat is to ensure as high a level of representation as possible, and that once the leaders are in New York to engage them on whatever pressing issues there might be, those which we see as current international challenges.

I think this year the UN managed this task about as effectively as we could. This emerged from the numerous bilaterals which the Secretary-General had with heads of state. The panoply of issues – which ranged from development issues, such as child and infant mortality, and to the specific peace and security issues – were timely and related directly to very immediate and volatile situations.

A wag once asked me whether this period, this GA Week was not the diplomatic equivalent of speed-dating; a dating ritual in which the diplomatic encounters were too brief for anyone to lose their virtue. In fact, we approach this period and each bilateral meeting as a special opportunity for which preparatory work has to be done and specific goals achieved. Yet even for the big events they're not going to yield "touch downs". To use a football analogy, it's always a question of how much 'yardage' we can get.

And the journalists quite rightly question the purpose of say a “mini-summit” in which the post summit communiqué is pre-agreed and there is only a limited exchange of views? It’s a challenging question and one that requires an answer. The way we see it is that we have to use this opportunity to focus international attention on an issue which requires multilateral collaboration on an international solution.

Firstly, such mini-summits require an engagement with the parties involved, as in the case of Sudan. Secondly, they require us to set and agree on an agenda, to make sure that the right stakeholders and regional leaders are present. Thirdly, the pre-agreed communiqué forces us to draft and to negotiate sometimes over several months -- a communiqué which reflects consensus, appropriate commitments, and new promises. And then it requires us to have regard before and after the event, to the crucial barometer of the success of these diplomatic encounters: the translation of the verbal commitments into follow-up action.

I’m going to give you a broad sketch of the most important topics that we covered in the peace and security field.

One of the most important of the many side events on the margins of the GA, one which attracted nearly 100 foreign ministers was a high-level meeting on disarmament. This event allowed the expression of



the growing frustration of the international community on the lack of any constructive movement in the Conference Disarmament over the past 13 years. States expressed the very real threat of developing an alternative forum unless the few spoilers holding up progress in the Conference cease blocking constructive engagement on the issues. This event was a follow-up to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in July which proposed that the Secretary-General convene this meeting. In his "Chair's Summary", of the event he proposed that his advisory board consider the appointment of a high-level panel investigate a better modality of negotiating disarmament issues.

A second thematic issue which was the subject of the Security Council Summit (the summit of the heads of state of all the members of the Security Council), was on improving UN "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peace-building". This is one of the perennial challenges facing the U.N. and the international community. It was an opportunity, 10 years after the Brahimi report (the last time the international community had looked at its "peace making" toolbox) to collect together the wisdom and what we've learned since Brahimi. The current post-summit communiqué (a Presidential Statement) captured this learning.

Quite frankly, you won't find much new in this statement which hasn't been said over the last few years but for many Security Council

members, it was the first time they'd been able to look comprehensively at post conflict peace operations and reflect on how well they were doing, how engaged they were with conflict prevention, how comprehensive were their interventions in their post-conflict reconstruction, in what ways they could refine the critical tasks of long-term peace-building at the very same time as they were attending to security issues, to look at the glaring challenges which face the UN in discharging its responsibility to protect civilians, and how we need to adapt to meet that responsibility more effectively.

In the SG's bilaterals, he used the opportunity to request peacekeeping resources, support in the form of training, troops or helicopters that can transform our static missions into proper mobile forces better capable of doing their mandate job.

In regard to specific country situations, the side events which drew attention from the international community during this week, I want to single out the following: Sudan, Middle East, Somalia, Pakistan, and Myanmar. If I can start on Sudan. The Sudan high-level meeting presented the international community with the last opportunity to address the challenge that Sudan faces in the organization of its two referenda on the 9th of January, the referenda which will see the people of South Sudan decide whether to secede from Sudan - or not. And it poses really

significant challenges. Firstly, it's clear that the parties have not put in place all the arrangements which are required to be put in place for those referendums to run smoothly and on time.

Secondly, both parties needed to be told by the international community that that referendum has to be conducted free of intimidation and free of violence.

Thirdly, both parties needed to be informed that the international community expects that they will abide by the results of the referendum and plan for the consequences of the decision.

And finally, that both parties need to be warned against unilateral action outside the comprehensive Peace Agreement. In this case, both parties were present. The government of Sudan was represented by Vice President Taha, and Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir represented the SPLA. They responded positively to the calls by a wide range of international leaders present (including President Obama).

In regard to the Middle East, also one of the topical issues during the GA week, it was critical for the international community to engage a range of relevant parties, not only the parties directly involved (Israel and the Palestinian Authority). The consequences of the breakdown of these talks will be very serious. The GA week afforded the SG an opportunity to impress upon the parties the need for flexibility, to

persuade the regional players of the need to give the parties the space to make these negotiations work, and to address on the donor community on the need to properly support the Palestinian Authority in its state-building project. This was done at a Quartet meeting, a subsequent meeting with the Arab League Ministers and at bilaterals with donors.

The mini-summit on Somalia gave the UN an opportunity to conduct a similar exercise in the face of the very difficult circumstances that the country is experiencing. These include political infighting in the Transitional Government, an unstable security situation, the persistence of piracy, and an international community, whose interest is flagging. The SG used the mini-summit to encourage support to the African Union Peacekeepers in AMISOM, to provide the necessary training of the government security forces, and to impress upon the government the need to sustain an inclusive political process.

The mini-summit on Pakistan, attended by a range of leaders and jointly convened by the UN and Pakistan, was a very timely opportunity to rally the international community to “up” the level of short-term support, as well as providing aid for long-term recovery. It also allowed the international community and the Pakistan Government to address the necessary governance requirements without which reconstruction and recovery targets were not going to be possible.

And finally, on the Friends of Myanmar High-level meeting, I would comment that like Sudan, it was a last opportunity for relevant members of the international community to discuss, share their concerns and expectations in respect of the scheduled November election. The Secretary-General also took the opportunity during this period to also share those views separately with ASEAN Foreign Ministers and the Myanmar Government.

During this period the Secretary-General held over 100 bilaterals with the various heads of state, heads of Government, or Foreign Ministers. It really is a period of intense diplomatic activity, and it is important that the SG has particular objectives each meeting. And, indeed, each one yields its particular opportunity: whether it's urging states like Niger to complete a transition; whether it's Guinea or Côte d'Ivoire being called upon to complete its elections commitments on time; whether it's to boost troubled peace processes as in Nepal or Madagascar or an opportunity not only to talk to the relevant regional organization and neighbouring states.

It's also an opportunity for the SG to explain his various initiatives, such as what he hopes to achieve from the inquiry into the Flotilla incident, or the Sri Lanka Panel of Inquiry. And so a wide range of peace and security issues are dealt with in this week.

It is quite striking that, when one looks at the issues which were foremost on the agenda of the week, how close they are to the very issues of concern to Washington and yet how little attention the treatment of these issues received in the Washington media. From the US Government itself there was a recognition, perhaps belatedly, of the utility and importance of this week and consequently a noticeable attempt to engage in these various forums and side events of the last week.

Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you very much, Nick.

Bruce?

MR. JONES: Thank you. I'm going to start with Bob's comment about a double life, although when you said it, Bob, I was reminded of a comment a British diplomat made to me once. He said, "British diplomats who have served both in the U.N. and in the EU are known as cross-dressers." And so when you said that thing about the double life, I thought you were going to reveal something more about the nature -- about the U.N.'s dynamics this week.

I was quoted in *The Washington Post* this week saying something to the effect of: Some of the juice is not in the U.N. anymore in international politics. I also then did 45 minutes on C-SPAN making the case for why the U.N. is more relevant than ever before. Of course,

everyone who reads *The Washington Post* and nobody watches C-SPAN, so I was just cast in the role of critic, but I was speaking to these two dimensions. And I think Bob started by saying that there are these two depictions of the U.N. as constantly about to die and actually more relevant than other.

It seems to me that, in fact, those aren't just images, they're realities; that there are two different realities of the U.N. at this moment in time. One is that some and really important dynamics are happening outside of the U.N., and I want to talk a little bit about that context. But that it is also true that the U.N. is now and will be more relevant than other, and there's a reason that those two dynamics relate to one another.

In my mind, it is important to put this discussion in a slightly broader context, and the context is changing relations of the major powers. And if you think about international organizations, international institutions, the U.N., they are, by necessity and by design, shaped, not definitively but deeply shaped, in terms of what's possible and what's not possible by the relationships between the major power in the international system. And so if you think about the history of the U.N., you think about the Cold War. The kind of headline version is: Oh, the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry really blocked the U.N. from doing anything.

Well, that's half of the story. The Cold War stopped the U.N.

from doing a number of things for the U.S., and the Soviets couldn't agree. It also occasioned the U.N. to do an awful lot of important things. The U.N.'s humanitarian role, and its peacekeeping role, and its medication role were all born in the Middle East as tools for avoiding U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. Peacekeeper were deployed to the Suez and to Israel's borders with Jordan and Egypt and Lebanon, et cetera, because U.S. allies, Israel, and Soviet allies, the Arabs, were fighting it out on the ground, and the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid direct confrontation, and the U.N. was a tool to stop that escalating into confrontation.

So it was great power relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union shaped what was and what wasn't possible during the Cold War.

At the end of the Cold War, you had this long period of dominant U.S. power but one that was viewed -- lots of little exceptions, but broadly viewed as a benign period of U.S. power, largely aligned to international order, largely aligned to the purposes of the United Nations. And what you saw in that period in the 1990s was this enormous expansion of the kinds of activities that the U.N. was involved in: humanitarian assistance inside the borders of countries; enormous expansion in the kind of mediation roles that Finke was talking about;



huge new engagement in peacekeeping; and the Christian International Criminal Court -- this huge new panoply of tools that U.N. could use to manage crises and conflicts that came out of that period where the power relations allowed that expansive role.

I would say then after 9-11 we went into a slightly different phase where there was still largely a period of dominant U.S. power, but one that was more tense in terms of its relationship to international order. You still saw an enormous expansion of U.S. roles, but you also saw a substantial increase in tensions around those issues. So we've seen a six-fold increase in peacekeeping over the past 10 years. Most of that happened during the Bush Administration, not the Clinton Administration, but we've also seen substantial new tensions around what it is that peacekeeping should do, how deeply it should to into issues of responsibility to protect or, you know, to engagement in sovereignty questions, the RtoP debate, et cetera.

So we've seen a continuing expansion of the role, but also a rise in tensions. And at the same time we've witnessed what I think is the most important feature of international politics today: the rise of the emerging powers -- China, India, Brazil, and to a lesser degree South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, the other Middle powers.

And my proposition would be that we are only at the

beginning phases of watching a process of the major and the rising powers forging new kinds of relationships, and we're only at the beginning phase of seeing how that plays out in the U.N. context. This kind of forging of new patterns of cooperation between the major and the rising powers is happening at different speeds in different arenas. It's happened very, very quickly in the global financial arena because of global financial crisis. We saw, virtually overnight, in the global financial area the creation of a deep pattern of cooperation between the United States, Europeans, the Chinese, the Brazilians, the Indians, et cetera.

Now, ironically enough, at the U.N. if you put it in the following way, the expansion of the G-8 to include major new actors from the global south has been treated by the rest of the global south as a phenomenal threat. The G-8 was pretty easy to dismiss because it was a narrow little club of kind of old boys from the West; the G-20 is much harder to dismiss. So it's occasioned some concerns among the broader membership of the U.N., but whether or not the G-20 will be taking decisions that should broadly be the purview of a more inclusive forum like the U.N.

I take the opposite view on this. I think that the fact of the major powers finding ways to cooperate on global financial issues, and I think that will sort of lead into broader cooperation on a range of other

issues, is the best news the U.N. could possibly have because the alternative is that we would be watching a period of the major and the rising powers starting to see an increase in the degree of conflict between them, competing in nasty ways of a range of issues, and that, I believe, would very rapidly undermine a lot of what the U.N. tries to do.

So people tend to cast major power cooperation and the U.N. as opposing concepts; in my mind, the one is fundamentally dependent of the other. The U.N. will be able to tackle the kinds of issues that Bob was talking about and be serious in the kinds of issues that Finke will talk about -- was talking about -- if we start to see deeper and an in deepening pattern of cooperation between the major and the rising powers.

I think we are starting to see that at the U.N. There was places where it's slower and faster at the U.N., and I think in this phase of major power relations unlike the previous ones that I mentioned, the U.N. does have a problem in that the decision-making structure -- it is not in the General Assembly, but in the rest of the body -- are misaligned with the balance of power in the international system.

That wasn't true during the Cold War; it wasn't true during a period of American hegemony. It is true of the roles of the emerging powers. India has a huge role in peacekeeping and a big role on a lot of

these other issues, but doesn't have a seat in the Security Council. We all know these kinds of issues. There's a misalignment of who has power in the world and who has power and voice inside the U.N. And I think we're still going to have to see the process of adaptation at the U.N. of sort of voting relationships and power relationships for the U.N. to be able to capture this new era.

But we are starting to see some of this. We've watched, I think, the deepening of the relationship to the United States and India at the U.N., or last several years, on important issues. China, of course, already has a seat in the Security Council, a sort of historical accident that's going to make this whole process a lot easier. And the General Assembly is an important -- because -- precisely because it allows countries that don't have seats in the Security Council and other things to express themselves and play roles that they couldn't play in the more narrow bodies. But I do think that the question of adapting the U.N.'s decision-making structures and power structures to the broader change in the balance of power in the world is only the beginning of that process.

The last thing I wanted to say, though, is -- flipping back into the other half of the double life -- I wanted to reinforce something that Bob said earlier, and then is illustrated by what Finke said. Those of you who follow these issues and closely will know that last year there was a report

by an organization called the Security Council Report that talked about the fact that there were fewer resolutions in the Security Council last year than in previous years. And this was picked up again this week and then kind of is the U.N. doomed to irrelevant story line?

It's garbage. It's the most ridiculous way of looking at the Security Council. And just do a line-by-line comparison of what the Security Council was doing this year and what it was doing 10 years ago. Ten years ago the Security Council was involved in peacekeeping and mediation in small Central African states and had a minor but essentially a relevant role in the Middle East.

Now the Security Council is involved in peacekeeping in the largest and most critical cases in the world, including Somalia, Congo, Sudan, et cetera. It's dealing with Iran. It's dealing with North Korea. It's dealing with Iraq. It's dealing with Afghanistan. It's dealing with -- I mean, just the most salient issues in international politics are inside the Security Council right now. I don't think there has ever been a point in its history when more issues of strategic significance have been at the U.N. But that doesn't mean that they're being grappled with as well as they should, and I think this issue -- we watched, for example, Brazil and Turkey struggling to find a way to play a role in Security Council negotiations in Iran, and that was mishandled, in my view, by the United States.

We're still grappling with these two realities. On the one hand, more and more issues coming to the U.N. On the other hand, U.N. structure still is a little misaligned with the rising emerging powers. And we'll have to watch how those things play out over the coming years. But bottom line in my view is when you watch this play out over time one of the points that we will discover is that there is no place where the United States, the Europeans, the Japanese, the Brazilians, the Indians, the Chinese, the Singaporeans, the South Africans, Indonesians can cooperate on security issues, on development issues, on any of these other things other than the U.N.

So the very structure of international politics is my mind forces issues back to the U.N. I think we'll see it be more relevant, not less, though we may have these slight detours in some of the issues as the major and the rising powers figure out how to relate to one another in the first instance. So the double life will continue for a while, but hopefully not cross-dressing.

SPEAKER: Don't do blouses.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you, Bruce. Your last point is exactly what I want to jump on for maybe a follow-up question for the panel before we open it up to everyone else, which is the question of U.N. reform. And there were some big speeches made by the French and the British and

others about, you know, we need to get back to this problem of misalignment, as Bruce put it, and deal with Security Council membership, et cetera.

You didn't mention that in your points. I'm wondering if you want to reflect on that and see where we are, if there's any momentum brewing to tackle this issue again.

And maybe for Nick and Bruce, I'd like to hear your thoughts on, you know, Bob's point about why doesn't the U.N. get more attention in official Washington and the national media? And another way of asking the question, how did Obama do in New York? What do you make of his interventions, the leadership role trying to carve out and particularly the announcement on the U.S. global development strategy?

MR. ORR: All right, I'll start on the U.N. reform issue. If there are two different realities for the same vocabulary, U.N. reform, you say that word in Washington it means one thing, and you say U.N. reform in New York it is a totally different thing. And it's kind of mind-boggling given the media is largely shared. You can read the same newspapers, follow the same outlets, and a lot of people that have been in one or the other city, but the fact that to this day you can't have a serious and healthy discussion of U.N. reform that starts with basic principles is a shame.

Washington would often -- you use U.N. reform I think

referring to misalignment and --

MR. PICCONE: Yes.

MR. ORR: -- U.N. Security Council reform, but most of the time you hear the term "U.N. reform" in Washington, it means tighter budgets, the kind of things that Birenbaum, when he was ambassador up at the U.N., had to fight through. And I think this is something that I want to just broaden your question a second to say the U.N. is in a constant process of reform. Don't wait for a big package of things to say this is the newest, latest U.N. reform. There is a constant drumbeat of changes on the reform front to make sure that the machinery of the U.N. is adapted to the new reality. And I would just cite two of these that are important that may have just totally passed you by here in Washington.

The creation of a Department of Field Support. The U.N. has operations in all the hardest places in the world to maintain operations. The fact that we do so on a shoestring and deliver results should not be lost on anyone. It ain't perfect, but I would say pound for pound you get more out of the U.N. in the field than probably any other organization that I'm familiar with, and that's a pretty bold statement. But it is because we have to do with so little, and the Department of Field Support is our attempt to try to make sure that we are getting the proper resources to the proper places in the time we need.



We still have a ways to go, but the fact is that's a reform that's been playing out over the last three years which is quite important.

A second one is this issue of U.N. Women. A friend of mine in Washington who is kind of a U.N. doubter, said, you know, only at the U.N. would you call it a reform if you create a new organization, a new, big, upgraded organization.

I said, yeah, but that came out of four different atomized parts and there's a strategic coherent view to it.

This hasn't even started yet. Michelle Bachalet won't start for a bit yet, but the fact is that having coherence on a strategic asset around the world, women and their involvement in peace processes, their involvement in development, their involvement in human rights protection, their involvement in our whole agenda. This is a big deal, and the fact is the Secretary-General, since coming to office almost four years ago, has revolutionized the work force of the U.N. in terms of the gender balance.

This is a big deal, actually. The U.N. is now sending women special representatives into the field to negotiate. When he took over, there was not one woman special representative of the Secretary-General. Now there are five. The whole senior levels of the U.N., when we have a senior staff meeting, -- looks like a nice balanced audience a bit like it does here today.

So that piece is moving, but it's moving in the nice non-news-gathering way.

On Security Council reform, Ted, to your question, this is certainly a live issue because the power of realities that Bruce described are not lost on anyone. Security Council reform as a subject for debate that has a life that looks a bit like a sign wave, it goes up and down. But the angle of the sign wave sometimes changes. I think right now the debate is there. It has matured a bit in the General Assembly, but don't expect any vote soon.

But I think there is one reason to think that this issue is not only alive but it has another life coming up, and that is because of the reality of the G-20s of the world. Once the major powers start cooperating on economic issues in ways they haven't in the past, they get used to meeting with each other. They get used to talking about all issues, not just the issues that are narrowly on the agenda.

We've seen the same group of major leaders meeting on climate change which has implications that are not just climate change but energy and structure of economy, and peace and security. We've seen those same leaders engage on what I just described on the women's and children's health strategy. How did we get for the first time ever global agreement on a women's and children's health strategy? Actually, by

going to governments and a lot of these same players.

So just thickening of cooperation between major powers around the world is a reality. It isn't mature yet, but I think it will have an impact on ultimately the security architecture, and you may see some of that also in some of the nonproliferation disarmament discussions that Fink described.

One last observation on this is that the major power cooperation is one reality but how to incorporate everyone else in all those debates, what happens to those that aren't in the green room in Copenhagen? What happens to all those who are from a smaller mid-sized country who see the U.N. as their venue to make sure that their interests are taken into account? And this is where the U.N. does have a very important role to play. Even if things shake out among the big powers on peace and security, on women's and children's health, on climate change, you name the issue there has to be a way to systematically hear the voices of all the small and medium-sized countries and to bring them in.

And that is one of our challenges, and it happens at every one of these major meetings is, how do you make sure you have a level of representativeness and openness and transparency for all to participate even while recognizing the reality that there are big countries and small

countries in the world. And just like there was an initial deal done on the Security Council, oh, so many years ago where some big players were accorded certain privileges, that kind of a deal needs to be relooked ala what Bruce described, but it also needs to be relooked on all these other fronts as well. And that is what is happening de facto. It's not in a formal negotiations, not a formal process, but it's happening in the kinds of interactions we're seeing in all these negotiating rooms.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks.

MR. HAYSOM: Let me just make a remark on the G-20. I was at a senior -- so was Bob -- leaders' meeting of U.N. senior managers in which one of the senior managers, a former premier, actually, of a European country, said the one thing worse than the G-20 doing well is the G-20 failing. And I think that's overall our approach, the G-20 is an important institution of multilateralism. Multilateralism doesn't have one institution, it has many.

But the question which would fall to be asked by the U.N. is, what is our role in relation to the G-20? And I think we would want to have some influence at least in a gender setting and in what is discussed. And so I think it's not so much G-20 or U.N., but how do we interact.

On the question of Obama's impact on the U.N., I don't think citizens of the U.S. are aware of what a significant presence the U.S. has

as a delegation in all U.N. forums and in all its agencies. And nowhere is there a clearer reflection of that than when Obama speaks at any one of the U.N. meetings. I personally thought he spoke clearly. He raised tough issues, and he raised them -- he dodged none of the difficulties that need to be confronted in dealing with them.

MR. PICCONE: Bruce, do you want to come in on this?

MR. JONES: Very quickly on the Council thing, I would only think to add is watch this space. Obama's going to both Delhi and Tokyo this fall. It seems to me to beggar belief that they won't raise this within in a very substantial way, and I think the United States may be forced to get serious on this issue. I'm saying that there would be a vote anytime soon, but I think you might see more seriousness on this issue in the administration than you've seen to date.

On how Obama did and why the U.N. doesn't get attention, I think the U.N. doesn't a lot of attention in Washington because for 20 years or so the United States, as a kind of absolutely overwhelming hegemonic actor, could afford to ignore multilaterals when it chose to and frequently did. Clinton did on occasion; Bush did frequently. And if you look at the kind of structure of incentives inside State Department and everything else, I mean multilaterals is a side thought. That will or must change. Or put it this way: If it doesn't change, the United States will find

itself losing out in a big way in terms of how it can play its role in the world.

And I think this administration understands that conceptually, hasn't yet quite pushed through the machinery, the mechanics of actually paying more attention to all the various multilateral processes it needs to at a bureaucratic level and other ways. So I suspect we'll see that change over the coming period of time, at least I hope we will.

On Obama at the U.N., I'd say I'm going to be a little bit more critical, then, I think. I thought that last year Obama had the effect that you just described. I thought this year was a little flat. I thought the global development speech was good in terms of its importance on the kinds of issues that you said before, Bob, sort of stopping what otherwise might be a kind of erosion of support for the development agenda, a seriousness in this capital about the development process which has been absent for a very long time.

I thought his presence in the MDG Summit was very good. I thought his speech at UNGO was a bit -- it was a bit warmed up, and I was particularly disappointed, if I'm frank on that particular hobby horse of mine, which is peacekeeping. Obama went to the U.N. last year, convened a summit of -- I can't remember if it was 10 or 15 of the top troop contributors and said this is an incredibly important thing. He's talked about it before, it matters a lot to U.S. security, we all have to invest

more, et cetera. They spent a year in interagency discussions about what to do, and he came back to New York this year and said now is the time to reinvigorate peacekeeping. Well, I thought that was a bit flat.

So I was a little disappointed in Obama's presence in New York this year, though, generally, what things said about the United States remains true: The United States remains absolutely the essential entity at the U.N., and most of what the U.N. does or succeeded in doing, it succeeds, if it's aligned with the United States, and not, if it's not.

But this year, I thought, wasn't the best ever.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Well, why don't we open it up to some questions from the audience? There are some seats, by the way, up front if anyone wants to move forward for a seat down here. There are some people with microphones, and this gentleman in the middle here. Please identify yourself.

MR. WANCH: Yes, I'm Leon Wanch of the University of Wisconsin in Washington, Semester of International Affairs.

On peace and security, I wonder if some of you might be able to address an issue that was pretty vague a few years ago, and that's the concept of responsibility to protect RtoP. And I don't mean this, as it's often been criticized as a kind of a fancy intellectual way of looking at what is otherwise known as humanitarian intervention in third world affairs, but

the whole idea of looking at conflicts in the making and looking at the issue of prevent as well as possible intervention or post-conflict things about how to look at the whole thing, issue, rather than handling it, okay, well, it's a job for peacekeeping. Well, maybe it doesn't have to reach peacekeeping. Maybe we could do much more work at prevention.

There were, of course, the under-resolutions and Security Council resolutions on this issue, but it seems in the last couple of years it's on the shelf, and we don't hear about RtoP anymore.

SPEAKER: Do you want to take a couple more?

MR. PICCONE: Sure, we can take a couple more. Please, David?

MR. BIRENBAUM: Thank you. David Birenbaum, The Wilson Center. Thank you for your presentations, although I have to confess that I find this discussion about relevance versus lack of relevance a bit tedious. I don't remember any time when that issue hasn't been discussed, and it's never going to be resolved, and it's, I think, unresolvable. It is what it is, and I think at some point its contributions will be recognized.

But I have a different question. Bruce touched on it at the end of his remarks, I think are just in response to one of your questions which has to do with peacekeeping. Is it -- I share your frustration, it is



about time we took steps to get that right. We've been working on that assiduously at least since the '90s. I worked on it, and I know lots of people in this room I'm sure have had that experience as well. What are the ideas that are now on the table so that we're not dealing with it in the ad hoc manner that we've been addressing this issue for the longest time? Getting peacekeeping right, it seems to me, is an achievable objective. It ought to be accomplished in the next year or two, and postponing, it seems to me, or dithering with it is just inexcusable.

MR. PICCONE: Let me take one more here in the front.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) India Global and Asia Today. The question is that according to certain news reports most of the people around the globe, they do not have faith in the United Nations because what they feel is that it has become a annual drama for a few leaders who come there, and they can say anything they want rather than the real issues, like Iranian president said that U.S. was behind 9-11 and so on, and all that.

My question is that as far as reform the United States Security Council is concerned, how can you bring reform without China agrees on this issue? Because, let's say, India is on the National Security Council seat to be, but China is not for that because China doesn't want India to be.

Now, in one hand, China, the largest communist country; on the other hand, next-door neighbor India the world's largest democracy and still not there, and contributing on every major global issues, including the peacekeeping and so on. So my question is, how can you bring -- is there a backdoor reform on the United States Security Council's seat to bring India and others without Chinese?

MR. PICCONE: Thanks. Thank you, those are all good questions. Why don't we take these three, then we'll come back? We have RtoP; peacekeeping operations, how do we, you know, get it right; and China's view on Security Council reform.

MR. HAYSOM: Let me just -- I mean, Bob ought to say something about RtoP. It's an issue he's been working on for a long time. But just one issue which I think needs to be addressed, the Security Council has a rather strict view about what it can consider, that is known as its agenda. And if you're not on the agenda, there is a reluctance, also supported by many member states, that it should not have a free hand to look at countries which are not a threat to peace and security.

The problem is that for conflict prevention you have to look at countries which are not yet a threat to peace and security. And unless you're prepared to put things on your agenda which shouldn't be on your agenda, it seems to me very difficult to play a preventive diplomacy role.

And I think that's one of the issues that we have been engaging with the Security Council on is how to find a format and a modality of allowing our early warning systems to trigger appropriate Security Council consideration of conflict situations like Kenya or the other situations. Bruce is an eloquent commentator on peacekeeping issues.

I think if I can just put one issue on the table because about a year ago we tried to raise many of the issues on peacekeeping, more fundamental issues, with the Security Council. I'm not saying it's a Security Council issue only, but it's a member state issue. There are some issues which really require the member states to rethink that they're prepared to allow in the form of peacekeeping.

The most important for many member states is the requirement that the parliament has to endorse any deployment of their troops in a peacekeeping operation. That immediately means that they will not endorse future use, which immediately means that you can't have standby troops or you can't have troops in place to deploy. And through the fifth committee they refuse to sanction the possible deployment of troops committed to one area for another, which means that you can't have over the horizon rapidly deployable units which is what we really need to do effective civilian protection.

Nor can we start to budget next year because everything has

to be done within the budget cycle. So these rather technical issues are really not anything to do with DPKO or the U.N.'s administrative capacity; they go right to the heart of the peacekeeping business. And we think that there would be a much greater attention to it if there was a broader spectrum of troop-contributing countries; that if the Western countries, in particular the European-U.S., were prepared to put people in peacekeeping, it would elevate it. We need to have a much broader sense that when you're engaged in U.N. peacekeeping activities, you're doing something of benefit to your country.

At the moment it's a kind of some foreign issue, but I'll serve my country's armed forces over there because it's getting some return or maybe some assistance, financial assistance. We need to have a real competition amongst peacekeepers to serve in peacekeeping operations.

At the moment, quite frankly, the bargaining position of the secretariat in regard to troop contributors is the other way around. We're solicitous, and they're able -- the troop contributors are able to establish the caveats to the use of their forces, which makes the management of these operations difficult.

MR. JONES: I would just add quickly on the peacekeeping, it's one of the arguments I think that the administration has taken on board abstractly but not acted on is this. One of the reasons why advanced

countries or, say, countries of advanced militaries don't go into peacekeeping right now is that it's not attractive for their armed forces. It's attractive for their armed forces to go into NATO or for the EU operations for a variety of other reasons political, but also we could put NATO in particular because the Americans are there. And if you're a Danish military or a Norwegian military, you want to be where the Americans are because that's how you get access to technology and training, and a whole host of things and relationships. And you can go to, you know, you get all sorts of things if you have access to the U.S. military.

Even reasonably small U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping, but in my view have a huge impact on the willingness of the European armies and others to come back into U.N. peacekeeping, and that's the only possible pathway forward because for a number of the reasons we've been discussing peacekeeping is getting a lot harder. And it's not as if the challenge is on a static course and the support's going down; support's going down and the challenge is going up: more sophisticated spoilers, transnational conflict of a variety of types, more and more contacts where it's not a question of just keeping a settled peace, it's really about suppressing one party to the conflict. This is a very tough challenge.

In this context, I think that Somalia is going to prove to be

important as it was in the past in a different way, because here you have the United States deploying special forces and intelligence assets to counterterrorism operations in Somalia that matter a great deal, but on the other end of the kind of the response is an African Union, a U.N. force trying to keep some kind of control in Mogadishu.

And I think certainly inside the Defense Department in other places the fact that they can deploy some kind of terrorism assets and see another piece of the puzzle being dealt with by U.N. or EU peacekeeping forces is forcing a recognition that peacekeeping is not just some sort of third-rate thing you send out to countries you don't care about. It is actually a tool that can be used in countries of strategic significance.

The great opportunity, it seems to me, for the U.N. in the coming period, not on the peacekeeping in the narrow sense of the word, but in the peacemaking thing, is in Afghanistan and Iraq in the coming era. As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, what the nature of the U.N. role is, we have a new opportunity in Afghanistan with the new SRS to kind of rebuild the U.N.'s political role in Afghanistan, and those are the kind of cutting-edge cases which will demonstrate to the United States and others what the relevance can be.

I think too often this discussion happens purely in policy terms and doesn't happen in concrete cases that matter to the real

countries. And if we can get it right in those few place -- Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan -- I think it'll make a big difference in the politics of what happens in this, in this context.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks. Maybe Bobby can do the question on RtoP.

MR. ORR: On RtoP, I think the issue of responsibility to protect has evolved quite some ways, and it was maybe surprising to many people that in 2005, all the governments of the U.N. kind of signed up for RtoP. But the debate since then has been quite interesting in that there is a real discussion and struggle with what are the implications of this emerging doctrine.

For us, it's a very practical question: How does one operationalize RtoP? The fact is there's not going to be any big Office of Responsibility to Protect or anything with that name. We have to use all the different capacities of the U.N. If we don't look at the three pillars of responsibility to protect, if we only focus on the use of force pillar at the back end, we will have totally underutilized where the real value of the concept lies, which is at the front end.

And this is an interesting development that we are making strides in deepening and improving the capacity of the U.N. in the preventive diplomacy area. We have been tested in the last year or two

and have actually had some successes. This is important because this is operationalizing RtoP, to be quite honest. You don't call it that, you don't put it out there first, but if you succeed at diffusing these conflicts, you're doing RtoP.

That said, if you don't succeed at that, the question of when, how, and under what conditions to use force, and under what authority, that debate is still definitely ricocheting around the membership. But there have been serious discussions on this, and I think that's an improvement over people just using the bumper sticker to beat each other up or to say they're for or against it.

On the question there is no back door for Security Council reform. There is not that much I can guarantee. But I do want to take up this question. You used the discussion on India and China. It's actually interesting the extent to which India and China cooperate at the U.N., not compete. Now, I know they compete in some spheres, but it is interesting that on a number of the key issues India and China are sitting not only next to each other, but working together.

Last week the women's and children's health strategy, India and China were two of the main players helping to develop that, and guess what? These were there two countries that have a huge part of their population who could most benefit from the knowledge and the



approach and the support that is outlined in that strategy. So it's both. They have something to contribute, but they also have something to gain from this kind of international multilateral cooperation.

In the peace and securities sphere, I think there is no question about the value of the kinds of contributions that India has made for many years on peacekeepers. This has to be written into the equation when we talk about seats at the table. But, interestingly, and something most people don't know, China has also become a significant contributor to U.N. peacekeeping, and I think we can expect that to grow.

So as those equities in the field grow, and as the role of those countries grows economically, geopolitically, I think it will force a reconciliation of the realities on the ground with the realities in the architectural arrangements.

MR. PICCONE: Okay, a couple more questions right here in the front, and then we'll go in the back.

CONGRESSMAN GILMAN: Thank you very much. I want to congratulate Brookings for bringing together these three experts on the U.N. I'm Ben Gilman. I was a former chairman of the House International Relations Committee and a public delegate to the U.N. I saw the need for reform for many years, and I haven't seen any reform being accomplished. And I'd like to address this panel and ask you what do you see as the

greatest need for reform and the possibility of it being adopted in this session? What is the greatest need for reform right now in the U.N.?

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. In the back.

MR. ROSEN: I'm Dick Rosen with the Council for a Community of Democracies. I would like to ask a question that links women's empowerment to democracy, as happened at the session that everyone is speaking about on this panel.

Four years ago -- five years ago, a U.N. Democracy Caucus was established at the U.N. For the first time this year, this caucus met in the big, cavernous, new ECOSOC Chamber, the big white building on the lawn outside the U.N. because ECOSOC was being reconstructed inside. And five women presidents sat on a panel discussing the issue of how women leaders can -- what role do women leaders have in democracy development?

The interesting thing about this meeting and about that panel was that there was joined women's empowerment with a democratic action by the United Nations, the infusion, if you will, of democracy as an issue at the U.N. And a caucus at the United Nations on democracy had not had much relevance before this panel took place because these women were saying women's rights, women's human rights, women's right to equality has something to do with democracy and the operational

power that democracy has if exercised within the United Nations.

I would like to hear the comments of the panel on that particular point.

MR. PICCONE: Okay, why don't we come back to the panel on that last point? And maybe you could even comment a bit more about the politics of the different blocks and where you think there might be space for a democracy caucus.

But also, a question about the real U.N. reform again, and what can be accomplished this year.

MR. ORR: I think Congressman Gilman's question first, the issues that he spent so much time on and, quite frankly, we spent so much time on working in different venues. Today, Ben, the biggest need for reform is in the budgetary process of the U.N. As a member of Congress, you know that the power of the purse is rather important and how budgets are constructed, how they're deconstructed, how they're implemented makes a big difference. And I think the budgetary process at the U.N. with 192 members of the board all thinking that they should be able to get everything they want all the time has created a real gridlock in the budgeting process which really has to be rethought.

On the very interesting observation and question about the relationship between women's empowerment and democracy, you can

see the arrows going in both directions. In fact, where there are women leaders, you actually do see in many cases different types of policies, different attention to those constituents of other women, but also children. So, interestingly, where we get a lot of pickup on issues like global health, guess what? Countries that have women in positions of leadership actually pay more attention to these issues, so development actually picks up and gets stronger as a result of that.

The Democracy Caucus piece of the equation is interesting. This is something I know Ted worked on many years and others in the room. The U.N. cannot be static in terms of how it caucuses; no country is just one thing. You're not just African, you're not just in Southern Africa, you are a -- and fill in the blank. You can be a member of the NAM, you can be a member of the Democracy Caucus, you can be a member of 10 different caucuses. For a institution as sophisticated as the U.N. and as complicated as the U.N., the caucusing arrangements and the grouping arrangements are rather static.

And that is to the detriment of the issues, that you get very static group positions when what you need are the nuances that come out when your group has very different interests within it. And how do you come to the table when a group does not share all the same interests?

Just to give you the most obvious example on climate change, there's not a single geographic grouping that shares the same interest on climate change. I'm sorry to say, you either have coastline or you don't. You are a northern latitude government or you're not. You have great vulnerabilities to heavy rains or you don't. And those cut across regions, they cut across everything. So to try to put any single group together, even if it's called Europe, it's hard to get a common position. And if it's Africa, or if it is the G-77, it's even more complicated.

And so I think caucusing as a concept, not just the Democracy Caucus, but caucusing on issues and across groupings, is a very interesting powerful concept that I hope will develop further in the U.N. in future years so that countries can actually realize their own interests instead of being trapped in negotiating groups that don't often take into account their interests.

MR. PICCONE: Nick and Bruce, any -- because we're probably going to do a wrap-up now, so if you have any final comments?

MR. HAYSOM: Okay, let me just -- I'd worked in the field briefly. I haven't been that long in the U.N., but to the extent that I worked in the field, I had at least some experience of where I would like to see reform. I think I'm slightly different from those who always worked in New York.

I personally had never come across, personally myself, corruption in the U.N. I think the notion of it as a corrupt, you know, people lining their pockets, what is maddening are the inefficiencies and the delays in taking decisions and, in general, the entire human management, human resources management system. And there's not a person in the field who won't complain of how long it takes to recruit, quality of the recruitment, and maybe even difficulties in disciplining.

And it seems to me that the U.N. is marked by its history, which is an extremely distrustful environment because half the members were watching the other half of the members, including who was recruited and who was dismissed. And so it really builds up layer upon layer of regulation which goes back to the '40s, '50s, '60s. And the U.N., as with its mandates, struggles I think with removing other mandates or regulations once enacted.

And so I would certainly like to see a just a more professional treatment of its staff, career passing, proper discipline and etiquette, and speedy recruitment so that we can deliver more effectively. And maybe some of the issues are run more effective in speedy decision-making.

MR. JONES: I 100 percent echo things common on human resources.

On caucuses two thoughts. I've always been, to be perfectly frank, a skeptic of the Democracy Caucus point, not in the way Bob described it, but in the broader context. And Ted and I have debated this over time. I worry about its -- from the perspective of China, you watch China, and China's going through a two-part evolution: It's evolving in its global role, and it's evolving internally. And I think that there are serious and significant pressures internally in China pushing it towards a process of democratization.

It's very easy for those to go wrong. I think some of those same pressures are pushing China towards a reasonably responsible role in global systems, it's very easy for that to go wrong, too. And if those two things go wrong, we will live in a very, very difficult world for the next 20 or 30 years. If those things go right, a whole host of other kinds of possibilities open up.

My fear is that caucusing as democracy pushes all the wrong processes and all the wrong buttons in China. It pushes all of the forces that argue against internal democratization and argue against responsible action at the global level. It should be the opposite, but watching the dynamics, it's not as if they think, oh, gosh, we have to get into the Democracy Caucus or -- it's not what you see. You see it kind of pushes all the nationalists and negative triggers. So I worry about it from

that perspective.

A more positive note on caucuses, I would say that one of the things that we have watched, not definitively, we have watched the beginning of the erosion of the non-align movement as an effective block on some key security issues, not in every one, but -- while I'm thinking, I wanted to connect this to one of the last questions -- if you look this year at the negotiations at the U.N.'s Committee on Peacekeeping, C34, classic U.N. committee called C34 has 102 members.

C34 you saw the most progressive language ever about how it is that peacekeeping operations can undertake protection of civilians in RtoP kinds of operations. And that language was negotiated by United States and India. And it was not the old dynamic of the United States and the Europeans pushing for a progressive position in the non-align movement, throwing up obstacles, and then they sort of, you know, bland text, negotiate at night. That wasn't what it was. It was a serious negotiation between the United States and India, India breaking from the non-align position on these issues, and you got pretty good movement on that question. And I think those dynamics pulling the Indians, Brazilians, and others out of a kind of traditional block dynamic at the U.N. into a more responsible role is the most important thing that's happening at the U.N. right now.



MR. PICCONE: Well, since I'm the moderator, I get to have the last word. And on this point --

MR. JONES: You disagree with everything I just said.

MR. PICCONE: -- so you're in favor of like-minded coalition-building, but not third democracies. And I don't think you want for China to democratize --

MR. JONES: Not if they do it at China.

MR. PICCONE: -- to have a Democracy Caucus. So I'll leave it at that.

Thank you all very much for coming and thank the panel.

(Applause)

\* \* \* \* \*

## CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012