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PARTICIPANTS:

Welcome and Moderator:

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Introductory Remarks:

RACHEL BRONSON
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Featured Speakers:

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BENJAMIN PAGE
Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making Northwestern University

Panelists:

THOMAS E. MANN
Senior Fellow, Governance Studies
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CHARLES A. KUPCHAN
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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: (in progress) -- two, every two years and is, I think, generally regarded as the most reputable and certainly the longest running sources of public opinion data on foreign policy topics.

We are very glad to have the opportunity to present the poll findings in detail this morning, and to do so we have the two people responsible for the polling and analyzing of the polls. First of all, Professor Ben Page, who is the Gordon Scott Fulcher professor of decision-making and professor of political science at Northwestern University. His most recent books are *Living With The Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China*, and *Class War: What Americans Really Think About Economic Inequality*.

He has a host of other books and publications to his name. He is a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science and at the Hoover Institution, and he's a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His partner in this effort is Steve Kull, no stranger to this podium where Steve has been presenting the polls he has taken in various formats here, including the one -- the major study that he did of Muslim public opinion towards the United States.

Steve is the director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, or PIPA, at the University of Maryland and worldpublicopinion.org, which is an international project which includes research centers in 25 nations around the world. He is an expert on public opinion, conducting polls and focus groups throughout the world, in particular for the BB World's -- BBC World Service Poll of Public Opinion.

Once Ben and Steve have presented the findings, we will then have a panel discussion, and joining me on the podium for that will be our very own expert on all things political, Tom Mann. He is the W. Averell Harriman chair, and the senior fellow in

government studies here at the Brookings Institution. He has been the director of the governmental studies program from 1987 to 1999. Before that, Tom Mann was executive director of the American Political Science Association. He, too, has many published works, books and other papers, the most recent being *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections*.

He is currently working on projects dealing with redistricting, election administration, campaign finance, and congressional performance. What's that? He and Norm Ornstein recently published an updated edition of their famous book *The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get it Back on Track*.

With Tom Mann on the panel tonight -- in fact, today, excuse me -- his -- a good friend, colleague, and foreign policy expert, Charles A. Kupchan. Charlie is professor of International Affairs at the School of Foreign Service in the Government Department at Georgetown University. He's also the Whitney H. Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He, too, has many important books in his name. His latest is *How Enemies Becomes Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*. And before that *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century*.

So we have a terrific panel awaiting you to discuss what I found to be some very interesting and counterintuitive polls. But before we get to that I wanted to introduce my colleague and friend, Rachel Bronson, to talk to you about the poll and the roll of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in it.

Rachel is the vice president of Programs and Studies at the Chicago Council. Prior to that she served as senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and has held positions as senior fellow for International Security Affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as well

as a position at the Harvard University's Belfer Center. Her book *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia*, that was published by Oxford University Press in 2006.

And as I said in my opening, I'm very pleased that we've been able to partner with the Chicago Council in this launch and welcome Rachel to tell you a little bit about it.

MS. BRONSON: Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Indyk, and thank you up to the Brookings Institution. Nobody pulls together people better than Brookings, and we really appreciate all your support as well as the support of the Institution.

Today the Chicago Council is delighted to be releasing the 12th in a series of major surveys that examines how Americans view the world. Chicago Council, as Ambassador Indyk has said, has been conducting these surveys for more than 35 years and, as a result, we've developed a unique and robust perspective on trends of how Americans are thinking about foreign policy.

This year is Global View 2010, which you have before you; shows an American public adapting to new realities brought about by the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and ongoing involvement in two major crises, one of them which now is slowly ending.

From the data it is clear that Americans are feeling constrained when it comes to engaging internationally. They're not shying away from taking an active part in global affairs but are seeking a greater selectivity and more careful prioritization around how and where American blood and treasure is committed. You'll hear more about that from the panelists today.

A little bit about the survey. The 2010 survey from the Chicago Council is an encyclopedic survey. It includes more than 100 questions. It asks many questions

that have been asked before so that we can get a sense of what is constant and what is changing in American views on foreign policy. But it also asks a host of new questions so we can better understand the views about how immediate policy issues confronting our nation are being interpreted by the American people. Subjects that we have asked on and you'll hear of today range from the rise of Asia, immigration, feelings towards particular countries, terrorism proliferation, and the connection between the economy and national security.

The survey was conducted in June of 2010 by Knowledge Networks, a polling outfit in California. It draws from a sample of 2,596 individuals, so a little more than 2,500 from across the United States. Because this question will no doubt come up, you should know that the distribution of that sample closely tracks U.S. Census for a population of Americans over 18 by race, ethnicity, geographic region, employment status, income, education level, host of other things, including whether or not they have a landline or not since that comes up with cell phones. So that's all taken into account by the polling firm to make sure that we have a national representation.

We have a terrific team. Ambassador Indyk introduced most of them. I just want to highlight that we have Greg Holicruz, a assistant professor at Washington Lee University here. He's a great person to ask if you have methodological questions as well as substantive.

Tom Wright, our executive director from the Chicago Council is our point person, internally. And I want to thank Sylvia Velchifer for making this all happen.

We're delighted Marshall Bouton, the president of the organization, has maintained commitment to this poll over the last decade or so, and we think it's really important and appreciate that.

So none of this would have been possible without the support of the

MacArthur and the McCormick Foundations, who have been real supporters of ours, and the Korea Foundation supported a special section, a special report, on U.S.-Korean relations that we are also releasing today along with the report that you have in front of you.

So with that, let me welcome Ben Page to the stage to begin a conversation on the report itself.

Thank you, and thank you again to Ambassador Indyk.

MR. PAGE: Thanks, Rachel. Now I assume if I hit some button, I'll get an image here. Let's try this one. I'll let somebody else be doing this.

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MR. PAGE: Yeah, except I don't know how to do it, so I'll just start talking. I don't really need slides for the beginning anyway, but let's get somebody up here who can get this show going. Do we have a person?

SPEAKER: It's up now.

MR. PAGE: Right. Okay. Now, when we designed this study, we were really expecting quite a disengagement from internationalism, maybe even trends toward isolationism. And the reasons we were expecting that are fairly obvious. Lots of constraints on U.S. foreign policy, a very difficult historical moment that includes the economic downturn, lower revenues, less resources to spend on foreign policy, competing domestic priorities, intractable problems with terrorism, two wars going on, and a changing international scene in which the relative power of China seems to be rising. Maybe we're moving toward a multipolar world. For all these reasons you might expect Americans to be withdrawing from foreign policy and focusing entirely on problems at home.

But instead, we didn't find that at all. We found something I think rather

interesting which is a strong continued commitment to international engagement. In many different realms, Americans are willing to make major efforts, stay engaged, and we'll give you some examples of that. At the same time, they're quite aware of these constraints, and I'll go through perceptions of the constraints and continued engagement in general. Then Steve will discuss what we call "selective engagement;" that is, the public's reaction is not to get out of international affairs, but to be particularly discriminating about exactly what sorts of activities the U.S. should engage in, and Steve will indicate some fairly clear principles that people seem to have in mind about what's worth doing and what's not.

We have a slide about the methodology that Rachel touched upon. I don't -- the main point here is just that the percentages we give are pretty close to what you would get if you asked every American the same questions, roughly a 2 percentage point range within which the results hold.

Now, the first perception of constraints that I'll comment on is the perception among Americans that the U.S. relative power and influence in the world has declined, particularly with comparison to China. One of our most striking findings was this one, that if you ask people about perceived influence in the world -- and we have data from 2008 and 2010 about present perceived influence -- the United States is seen as having quite a bit more influence than China in both those years.

But then when we ask about what people expect to see in 10 years, the gap almost completely disappears. I think that's not a statistically significant difference. And what they see is a relative decline of the U.S., not much change for China, maybe a little bit of a rise. When you ask the same kinds of questions about other countries -- oh, dear, what do I do?

When you ask about other countries, it turns out that the same sort of

thing is true. You can see at the top that the U.S.-China finding is the dramatic one, but there's a closing of the gap in perceived influence between the United States and essentially every other country with Brazil and Turkey, particularly, seen as rising from a very low level.

Similarly, there's been a fairly dramatic change since 2002 -- and, unfortunately, we can't track exactly when it happened, but I think it's been gradual over the period -- a big drop in the proportion of Americans who think that U.S. power and influence in the world has been rising compared to the previous 10 years. Now, that's hit an all-time low of only 24 percent thinking the U.S. influence has been going up.

When they look to the future, most Americans -- 66 percent -- two-thirds of them think that either another nation will become as powerful as the United States or that the United States will be surpassed by another nation. And most people assume they have in mind China. There's other evidence that they do, in fact, have in mind China.

Similarly, there's a sense among a majority of Americans that the United States is just not as able to achieve its foreign policy goals as it used to be. They say that that ability has decreased over the last few years. Furthermore, these intractable problems, there's a perception that terrorism is still a major threat to the United States and that the ability of terrorists to attack us has not, in fact, decreased. Most Americans say that ability has stayed about the same since September 11th despite all our efforts since then, and just about as many people say the threat's actually greater as say it's less. So the center of gravity of opinion is there just has not been much progress.

A specific example of constraints with regard to a major foreign policy problem is the idea it's going to be really tough to get Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons, and most Americans consider that a very important problem. They're worried

about it, but they say that even if the U.S. attacked Iran, they're skeptical that Iran would give up the program.

Another set of constraints that are perceived clearly are these economic constraints looking at home and the competing domestic priorities. There's a fair amount of pessimism about the economic future. This is a particularly striking one that the American Dream to a lot of Americans is looking elusive; that a substantial majority is saying the next generation of Americans will be worse off economically than those who are working today.

In thinking about constraints on foreign policy, domestic priorities play a very big part because now an absolutely overwhelming majority of Americans say that problems at home are more important than addressing challenges abroad. And this one poll question is backed up by lots more having to do with spending priorities; domestic programs get a lot more support for spending than most international programs. The goals of foreign policy, often the highest-ranking goals, tend to reflect domestic concerns about energy supply, certainly about terrorism and nuclear weapons, but after that energy supplies, immigration, jobs of Americans, and other kinds of domestically oriented concerns. So there's competition from domestic programs.

There is also increasing skepticism about globalization. A majority of Americans still say that economic globalization's mostly good for the United States, but you can see from that bottom line that the mostly bad response has been gradually rising over the years, and it's now up around 40 percent. And when you ask more specifically about particular aspects of globalization, it's clear people are mostly worried about jobs. There's concern that international trade and outsourcing in investment abroad have a negative impact on job creation and job security in the United States.

At the same time, there's really not a whole lot of sentiment for trying to

stop globalization. People recognize it's happening. There's been a moderate rise in people who say they'd like to slow it down. Here we added up slow-down or try-to-defers, and there it's sort of a 50/50 balance, but really a lot more people say allow it to continue than say they would like to reverse it.

Now, given all this, it sounds like a very negative picture. There are all sorts of reasons to expect that Americans would be somewhat isolationists or at least disengaging, focusing on problems at home, forgetting about international affairs. It turns out that's really not the case. There are a number of -- in fact, in the whole survey there are very few instances where we found a serious pull-back. There are some, some selective ones, but not many.

A simple way to get an overview of this is to think about this very traditional survey question -- it's been asked since the end of World War II, this graph just goes back to 1974. Will it be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs? This is the active part question. Or would it be better if we stay out of world affairs? And since World War II, there's been most of the time about a two-thirds majority of Americans saying take an active part.

A downturn for the Vietnam War that's not really shown here, some downturn in the early '80s and so forth, but right now, the main point is that right now we're just at the usual point. Sixty-seven percent say active part and it's very seldom any higher than that. So no signs of isolationism there. That 31 percent stay-out is not appreciably higher than it's been in the past.

There is also by this question not much sentiment to withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems. That's at the bottom there just at 19 percent. Americans are skeptical about this sole superpower, preeminent world leader idea at the top. Not so many want to be the preeminent world leader, but opinion is very heavily

clustered in the middle there. Do our share to solve international problems with other countries.

Commitment to NATO is a specific example of this continued commitment to engagement. You can see that two-thirds of Americans want to keep the commitment the same. There's almost an exact balance between the number who want an increase and the number who want a decrease. So the center of gravity of opinion is very much keep things the same.

There is also continued internationalism on participation in international treaties and agreements. This one often surprises people although it's not a surprise to us because it's been true for quite awhile that the American public, in general, supports a number of international treaties and agreements that have been rejected by the Senate and/or by various presidential administrations. And that includes banning the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, participation in the international criminal court, and a climate change treaty as well as enhanced inspection under the Biological Weapons Treaty. In all those cases, pretty substantial majorities of Americans say the United States should participate, quite different from the Beltway consensus.

But at the same time awareness of these constraints has led Americans to be more selective in exactly what kinds of international engagement they want to participate in.

And, Steve, why don't you come up and discuss that?

MR. KULL: Okay. I'm going to be talking some about the principles in American attitudes about this selective engagement, but first I wanted to bring up a finding that you may have heard about. There's a question that has been asked for decades now, agree or disagree that the U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. And that

question has often been seen as a measure of isolationism, and you may have heard that there has been an increase in the numbers who agree with the statement. And Pew's had -- a while ago, got 49 percent agreeing with it. And we reran the question and found exactly the same number on the agree side.

We have tried to find if this is now a really good measure of isolationism, and it turns out that it's not. When we core take those people who agree that the U.S. should mind its own business, we find that they actually do support many form of international engagement. What seems to be the driver here is this phrase that the U.S. should mind its own business, and there's so -- it seems that there's a feeling that people have, many people have, that the U.S. isn't minding its own business enough, and that seems to be really what is coming through here, not isolationism.

At the same time there is some feeling, well, other countries, maybe they can take care of themselves better, may be they shouldn't rely on us so much. And you can see that in decisions or attitudes about U.S. foreign policy this greater selectivity looking for opportunities to some ways ramp down the U.S. role.

Now, all of this is kind if imbedded in a broader sense that Americans feel that the U.S. isn't as dominant, isn't as much the hegemony in the world, and what's interesting is that they basically have a kind of accepting attitude of that. They're pretty comfortable with that. They don't want to simply exit by any means, but they're somewhat comfortable with that role of being coming down a notch. In fact, for some time now, they have been somewhat uncomfortable in this role, in this dominant role as to whether they agree or disagree that the U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be. As you can see, 8 in 10 agree with this statement, and that's unchanged in the current poll.

This is one that I thought was really quite interesting along these lines.

We ask as rising countries, like Turkey and Brazil, become more independent from the U.S. in the conduct of their foreign policy, do you think this is mostly bad because then they are more likely to do things the U.S. does not support or mostly good because then they do not rely on the U.S. so much? And almost 7 in 10 took the position that this is mostly good that they are acting in a more independent way, which is somewhat counterintuitive to what some international relations theorists would expect.

Now, there are also there have been some really interesting shifts in perceptions about China. For a few years now we've been asking whether the U.S. loans more money to China or China loans more money to the U.S. And back in 2006, a plurality thought that the U.S. loans more money to China. In 2008, they kind of got closer together, and now two-thirds know that China loans more money to the U.S. is a rather significant change in such a short period of time.

So how are people feeling about this in the context of this growing awareness of China's rise? So we asked: will China shop with the U.S. economically? And three-quarters think that China's economy will grow to be as large as the U.S. economy, that they're on that trajectory. So how do they feel about that?

Well, they offered mostly positive, equally positive, and negative and mostly negative. And only 38 percent said that it is mostly negative. Now, a very few, only 8 percent, said mostly positive. Fifty percent said equally positive and negative. So there's a mix there. They don't see it as entirely negative. There are some positive aspects to this picture.

And how should we deal with the rise of China? Should we, starting with the low one, actively work to limit the growth of China's power or undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China? And a clear majority, two-thirds or so, said that the U.S. should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. That's

up slightly.

So we tried to look at, well, what are the underlying themes, what are the principles and priorities in what Americans want in terms of U.S. engagement? And we notice -- we've pulled out basically five key principles. One is that there is support for actions against the top threats such as which we'll look at in just a moment. But at the same time, it's not that they're simply taking some kind of limited realist perspective that says we only need to focus on issues that are directly related to our highest national interests because there is support for continued humanitarian action.

There's also support for multilateral action through the UN. At the same time, there's preference for staying on the sideline of conflicts, the ones that one might not expect or at least a pull in that direction. And there's also some movement towards looking to lighten the U.S. military footprint in the world, not like -- not just let's pull out, but looking for opportunities and some trend in that direction.

So in terms of the top priorities, these seem to be related to nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These come up at the top as one of the top goals for the U.S., to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to combat international terrorism. And what they perceive as critical threats very high up on the list is Iran's nuclear program and violent Islamist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We'll come back to that some later.

But, as I said, there does continue to be support for humanitarian forms of involvement. Large majorities, three-quarters, approve of food and medical assistance to people in needy countries; nearly as many to create an international marshal service through the UN that would give -- that could arrest leaders responsible for genocide. Seventy-two percent support using U.S. troops in other parts of the world to stop a government from committing genocide in killing large numbers of its own people, 7 in 10 for using U.S. troops to deal with humanitarian crises, and 62 percent for aid that helps

needy countries develop their economies.

Now, on some of these there's been a slight downward movement, not surprisingly in the -- given the current economic conditions, but the basic support, rather robust levels of support, are still there. The U.S. continues to believe that U.S. foreign policy should reflect American values.

There is also continued support for various forms of multilateral action through the UN. This is an interesting example taking defending South Korea. Asked -- if you ask just straight out should the U.S. use U.S. troops, if North Korea invaded South Korea, to defend South Korea, you get 56 percent opposed. But if you ask about the U.S. contributing military forces together with other countries to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression if North Korea attacked South Korean, then you get 61 percent in favor. So U.S. commitments to defend other countries are closely connected to the sense of it being a kind of multilateral effort.

There's also support for the U.S. to participate and support for various forms of multilateral peacekeeping. Sixty-four percent approve of the idea of having a standing UN peacekeeping force selected, trained, and commanded by the UN; its own peacekeeping force 64 percent approved. Fifty-six percent approved of using troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur. That's for the U.S. to do that. And -- but half approve using troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. That's actually come down a bit. Again, some of these numbers have moved down slightly, but you still again see this dominant trend.

There is also some tendency to say, can we stay on the sidelines of some of these conflicts? Can we just not get involved in everything? And here's an interesting example. We asked if Israel were to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities and Iran

were to retaliate against Israel and the two were to go to war, should the United States bring its military forces into the war on the side of Israel? And 56 percent said no, it shouldn't; only 38 percent said yes, it should.

And there's some tendency toward lightening the U.S. military footprint. We asked about support for military bases in different parts of the world, and as you can see in the column on the right, there were significant downward movements with the exception of South Korea where you still have 62 percent supporting them, and that's been stable. But in Germany, it's gone down 7 points to 52; in Afghanistan, down 5 points to 52; in Iraq, down 7 points to 50; Japan, down 8 points to 50; Pakistan, down 4 points now, a slight majority against it; and Turkey, down 7 points now, a slight majority against it. So this again, there's this pull in a direction toward lessening of the U.S. military presence.

Just a few last words about Afghanistan and Iran, because you can see some of these themes working through these particular situations. We asked, do you think eliminating the threat from terrorists operating from Afghanistan is a worthwhile goal for American troops to fight and possibly die for or not? And putting the line in there "possibly die for" is supposed to, you know -- that really puts it in people's face, is this really key? And 59 percent say that's a worthwhile goal.

So you can see that this theme of terrorism, concern about terrorism is still a key driver, and people will continue to support efforts that they think are effective in that regard.

When we asked, what should we do in regard to the troops in Afghanistan, starting from the bottom, only 23 percent say that they want to simply withdraw combat troops right now. The largest number would like to withdraw combat troops within the next 2 years, 44 percent, and then another 31 percent say leave them

there as long as it takes to establish a more stable and secure Afghanistan.

So you have three-quarters or so supporting the continued presence for now at the same time the dominant feeling is looking for an exit, looking for a way out. Not a lot of optimism about how things are going there, so there's frustration about that. But they also, in a sense, they feel they linked to it and compelled in some sense to be there because of what they perceive as the relation to the terrorist threat.

Iran's nuclear program. When we asked what should the U.S. -- what should the UN Security Council do right now? When we asked what should the U.S. do, the answers are very similar. You get a rather small number, only 21 percent, calling for the authorization of military strike against Iran's nuclear energy facilities; 45 percent favor imposing economic sanctions on Iran; 26 percent just continuing diplomatic efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium; and just 24 percent saying don't do anything to pressure them.

So there is -- but there's a kind of pessimism about if the U.S. were to strike militarily, there is not much optimism that this is going to do much good, that it might slower run down. The majority say it might slower rundown but it will not really stop movement toward it. And the only outcome that they see is really possibly positive would be that it might deter other countries from developing nuclear weapons.

And that's -- you say, well, if it all fails, if it all -- if we're for sure it's not working -- and it's always hard to convince people of that -- that, you know, nothing -- everything's been tried, then you end up, well, a divided response about using military force if people are really convinced that it's inevitable that Iran is headed for nuclear weapons. But given their real skepticism and pessimism about the effectiveness of a military strike, it does not seem that the support for that is very strong. But even in that context, they are so concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons that they, you know,

half will seriously consider it. And that's not an insignificant number.

Now, in the context of this pessimism, it's not surprising that Americans are looking to make some kind of deal with Iran, and so we put forward one. If Iran were to allow UN inspectors permanent and full access throughout Iran to make sure that it is not developing nuclear weapons, do you think Iran should or should not be allowed to produce nuclear fuel for producing electricity? And in this context, 52 percent said that the U.S. should allow this, or they should be allowed to produce, to enrich uranium in the context of this regime of intrusive inspections.

This is again linked to looking to the UN to play an important role in the world. A lot of effort, orientation to using multilateral systems to constrain or contain the threats related to nuclear proliferation.

So I'm -- we're going to leave it there, and open it up for discussion.

MR. INDYK: Thanks very much, Ben and Steve. We now have an opportunity to have some reaction from Tom Mann and Charles Kupchan, and then we're going to have a conversation up here about some of these very interesting findings. And then we'll come to you, the audience, for your reactions and questions.

Tom, were you surprised by these findings?

MR. MANN: Actually, I find them more consistent with my view of what's been happening in American politics, and American public opinion than not. And maybe because I've become such a regular consumer of Chicago Council surveys, I've become familiar with them and I know they always sort of capture the changes that seems to be occurring, but also underscore the continuities that are oftentimes present.

So first, congratulations to the Chicago Council team for another tremendously useful report.

Here's what I take away, Martin. One is the powerful impact of the global

financial crisis and Great Recession. It's underscored and exacerbated the diminished confidence Americans have, trust in government and large organizations. It's also sadly, if you will, reinforced and exacerbated a partisan polarization that has been brewing for decades in American politics, but has taken new shape over the last two years. It's obvious on domestic policy, but it's also really quite evident in foreign policy.

And I commended the audience, the Appendix 2, with a very nice breakdown of foreign policy attitudes by party. It's really quite striking. I mean, we now have discovered, of course, that one's partisan lenses affect what your interpretation of facts are; that is to say, facts have no independent standing anymore from one's particular political view.

So what I see is a public that is deeply worried, scared, pessimistic about the future, want to focus on economy and the jobs. I see no market for the America greatness theme that was enunciated not too many years ago as a basis for engaging and shaping our foreign policy. I recommend a table, the table on page 26 of the report, "Foreign Policy Goals." This is a fascinating table. You'll see more continuity than change except in one item which is improving America's standing in the world. Between 2008 and 2010, there was a 30 point drop in that.

Now what that tells you is, during the campaign, there was a lot of unhappiness about the decline of America's standing and with publics around the globe in the aftermath of Iraq. And Barack Obama was going to restore that. Well, he's restored it, but people don't think that's anywhere near as important anymore. I think that's a testament to the extent to which we've pulled inward.

Interesting, from my point of view, is there's been relatively little discussion of foreign policy in the midterm elections. Issues like Iraq, even Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East are talked about at the edges, but are in no way central to the

campaign itself.

Now, does that mean that they're not -- those foreign policy issues are not important? As the report stresses, foreign policy is important insofar as that it has a direct domestic impact, so immigration becomes an important issue. Trade becomes an important issue. Climate change ends up being important as well. But -- so we have deep partisan divisions on these issues reinforcing the dynamics of this election.

I would argue -- and this is my final point, Martin -- that the consensus within the public, the continuity on, say, maintaining an active role in world affairs and not falling back into a sort of form of isolationism reflects an elite consensus as much as anything else.

In a general sense, conservatives, liberals, Republicans, Democrats, all believe we have to engage the world, and that's the signal going out, and in some degree of consensus on now, Iraq and even Afghanistan, after a period of enormous conflict, so that is there. It's there on terrorism, to some extent on even on Iran and China. But that doesn't mean, as the report points out, that we don't see a lessening of influence and acceptance of that, and a real desire to be careful and prudent in our use of American resources in world affairs.

MR. INDYK: Do you see any political implications for either of the parties in this poll?

MR. MANN: I -- the reality is I don't. I mean, what I see as the dominant force in the elections right now is the objective reality and the subjective perception that our economy is not moving in the right direction. And the country's scared and voting against the party in power even though the party out of power, which will be rewarded is not thought well of. In fact, it's -- people think worse of the Republican Party and believe they have less ability and programs to get us out of this mess. It's a sort of automatic

reaction against because of the conditions. And I don't see the sort of foreign policy positions on this as having really a direct -- a direct impact on the parties.

MR. INDYK: Charlie, if you were President Obama, and you've just been briefed by Steve and Ben on these polling results, what would you conclude about your foreign policy?

MR. KUPCHAN: I would say the main takeaway would be watch out for overreaching because I read the data somewhat differently than Ben and Steve. I think that the data indicate that the President of the United States can't count on the same robust permissive internationalism that has been there since Roosevelt -- Franklin. And I don't see an isolationism for sure, but I do see, as the report's title suggests, a constrained internationalism.

And when I see the numbers on the U.S. should mind its own business, which is not absolutely high, but it's relatively very high -- in fact, it's the highest it's ever been since that question has been asked -- I say something is happening here in the United States.

When I see diminishing enthusiasm for international institutions, when I see concern about the size of the U.S. footprint, that suggests to me the following: not that the U.S. is packing it in, not that the United States is in any way walking away from global engagement, but that the U.S. as the provider of last resort, that era may be coming to an end. And that if others look to the United States to programmatically invest in the UN, in the IMF, in the World Bank, in international institutions, in more engagement militarily abroad, they may be mistaken, and that we may be hitting somewhat of a plateau.

We're not going to walk away from the UN, we're not going to pull out of NATO, but we may no longer be the driver of a sort of robust, liberal, multilateralized

order in the way that we used to.

Just another quick takeaway. I thought very interesting the answers to the question about does the United States need to be Number 1. Does it need to be at the top of the heap? And there seems to be a surprising readiness of the American public to say no. In fact, to say been there, done that, tired of this. And I think it would be interesting and necessary for Obama and other American leaders to see that because I think they misread the public. They feel that every time you get up on the podium you need to say we're the indispensable nation. American primacy till the end of time. And I think the American public is saying, you know, you don't have to say that anymore. We are not just ready to accept, but maybe even welcome a world in which we are not always the ones having to cough up the money and the lives.

The other finding I thought was very interesting was half the respondents said let's either slow or reverse globalization. That says to me watch out for free trade, especially in the Midwest and the large swing states that are suffering job losses. Not much appetite for a new round of global multilateralism.

Last point, and I'll phrase this as a question, give my own quick answer, but I'd like to hear the panel talk about it. Is this sort of downward tick that we're seeing a temporary response to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the financial crisis, or is it something deeper? My answer would be that it's something deeper for three reasons: One, I think the downtick started well before Iraq, Afghanistan, and the financial crisis. It goes back to the '90s.

The second this is that I think the near-term politics will reinforce this trend of a sort of retrenchment. What's likely to happen in November? Well, the Democrats are probably going to lose their centrist members of Congress, so they're going to move to the left wing of the party, which is less internationalist in the traditional

sense than the centrist wing.

The centrist wing in the Republican Party is not likely to gain because a lot of the winners of the Republicans are going to be more Tea Party members who are also not centrist liberal internationalists. They tend, I think, to hail to what you might call the neoisolationist wing of the Republican Party.

So my guess is that Congress, after this next midterm, is actually going to be less internationalist than this Congress because both parties are going to move to the political extremes.

And the final point would be -- and Tom mentioned this -- polarization. And our two presenters didn't talk much about it, but at the end of your report I think you've got some very interesting data that Democrats and Republicans are agreeing on less and less in Congress and in the public when it come to foreign policy. That says to me that if there is to be the restoration of a bipartisan consensus, if Republicans and Democrats are to find common ground, my guess is it's going to be on doing less rather on doing more. And that, I think, reinforces this sense that the direction of American foreign policy over the next decade is going to be one of retrenchment and not one of growing engagement.

MR. INDYK: I'll come to Steve and Ben to respond to those points in a moment, but I just want to get Tom to respond to Charlie's analysis of the impact, likely impact of the midterm elections on this kind of polarization and lessening support for internationalism, because it would go to the heart of your thesis that there's a bipartisan consensus from the political elites that's supporting this international -- giving a lead to this continued selective internationalism.

MR. MANN: Yeah. On it's face it seems plausible, but remember, the level of consensus that exists now is at a fairly general level of America has some role to

play, but there's already underneath a good deal of conflict. And it isn't true that the moderates, moderate Democrats are universally more willing to pay substantial cost for U.S. engagement abroad.

So I, you know, I think it's something to worry about. My own take is I see less symmetry in the polarization than Charlie may see. I see a Democratic party that has, after Clinton, Obama, and experiences of being on the losing side and for other periods of time have sort of camped themselves out in a sort of center left position. And it's the Republican Party that's now undergoing an experience Democrats went through some years ago of really being pulled very hard to their right. And so I think that sort of the conflict and uncertainty is likely to be felt more on the Republican side of the aisle.

MR. INDYK: Do either of you want to respond to Charlie's points about the trend here?

SPEAKER: I'll say something. I think that with the increasing polarization in Congress it will be harder to make decisions to take international action. When the public sees the leadership polarized and arguing, you already have a disinclination. You have a higher threshold to get over to get public support for international action, and when the leadership is arguing, that really dispirits the public, and there, this kind of underlying tendency to look at every opportunity at great international engagement with something of a jaundiced eye gets enhanced by then.

SPEAKER: I think that's right. Thinking about the Republican Party over the next two years, I don't think we're going -- it's going to have an enhanced position, clearly. And the Lugars of the party, it seems to me, are going to be in a weaker position, and more stay-at-home type Republicans will have more. So I agree with that analysis.

I think that the main qualification I would suggest is that the U.S. economy and the state of the economy is just a crucial factor in all this, and if we get it

together and the economy starts improving, things could change quite a lot. There will be a lot more willingness to spend money, for example, abroad. So that even though I agree with the basic analysis that it'll be harder to do things internationally, I think a lot will depend on the economy.

MR. INDYK: Okay, let's turn to a couple of issues that I think are very interesting in this poll. First of all, Afghanistan. There seems to be strong support for engagement in Afghanistan, but if I'm reading it correctly, it's quite qualified its support as long as we start withdrawing the bulk of our troops within two years. So it's a limited commitment.

MR. KUPCHAN: I wouldn't read that as we need to be out in two years; it's that's the timeframe we would like to think in terms. It's not a kind of hard and fast rule.

We're looking for the way out. We don't want this to go on indefinitely, and it does suggest that at a certain point there is the potential for that crystallizing that, okay, now is the time. You know, these two years can keep receding into the future. It is really an expression of we're looking for the exit.

MR. INDYK: Are you surprised by that?

MR. KUPCHAN: I wasn't surprised, but to put it in terms of your initial question, if I were Obama, again I'd say watch out that -- especially after the midterms when his party base may have moved a little bit to the left. I think he's going to be hard-pressed not to stand by his commitment to see next summer as a turning point.

And I sense beneath the surface that there is a rethink of Afghan policy right now, and I think it's a needed rethink. And that is to change our objectives in a way that decrease the military side of the equation and increase the political side of the equation simply because, you know, when you look at these numbers and you see focus

on the home front, that is the message. We rebuild the American economy, and we all know that that's going to take, at least to some extent, a cut in the budget, including the defense budget. Now, I would be very cautious about looking at Afghanistan as an open-ended military commitment.

SPEAKER: Martin, if I could just elaborate, there is an argument in the foreign policy community that "setting a deadline" of any kind, even the initial withdrawal of troops, is a terrible mistake. Well, two-thirds of Americans disagree. The reality is to manage both Iraq, initially, and Afghanistan, any leader has to demonstrate to Americans in order to maintain support that this is not an open-ended commitment, that we're going to do our best and there are good reasons for doing so. But it is going to come to an end. Without that promise, I think support would just collapse.

SPEAKER: But Obama needs a narrative to say that this will not lead to the recreation of a haven for terrorists. He is vulnerable to that charge, and it's something that people are sensitive to and that he needs to tell the story of how it's going to work out.

SPEAKER: And, on the other hand, he can, presumably, sustain support by playing up the focus on terrorism.

SPEAKER: That's right, because Americans do see that as a direct threat to their security.

SPEAKER: But that doesn't mean that they'll feel good about it. They would like to see it somehow --

SPEAKER: I mean, there are --

SPEAKER: But then it hurts him that he is somehow exceeded --

SPEAKER: The facts are there. The facts are there for him in the sense that even the CIA will tell you that there are about 100 hardened al Qaeda fighters left in

Afghanistan. The problem for Obama is if he wants to start making that argument, which he probably will want to if he wants to downsize, then he's going -- people are going to say, well, then, what the hell are we having 100,000 troops there to begin with? But I think he does have to start turning that corner.

MR. INDYK: Interesting. If I were on -- analyzing this poll from the -- my seat in Seoul, South Korea, or Jerusalem, Israel, I would see it as a warring result of law in the sense that your numbers suggest that the strong alliance commitment on paper, in the case of Korea and troops there, of course, and a strong bipartisan support for Israel, doesn't translate into public support for military intervention if they get into trouble, unless it's under a kind of UN multilateral auspices, which I would think that would be concerned about.

Is that -- do they have reason to worry, Charlie.

MR. KUPCHAN: Yes. I would probably be sweating more profusely if I were in Jerusalem than if I were in Seoul, in part because in Seoul we have a formal alliance there of U.S. troops in Korea. It's hard for me to imagine an invasion from the North and the United States basically saying see you later.

In the case of Israel, there does seem to be a change afoot in thinking about Israel in the American electorate. Some of that is picked up in your numbers. You know, I don't think it's anything that I would call a sort of falling through the floor, but some softening of the question of should we come to the defense of Israel.

And some of you may have read Peter Beinart's interesting article in *The New York Review* recently about changes in the Jewish community. So again, I don't see the numbers as suggesting a watershed, but the trend lines do indicate that something interesting is afoot, that change is taking place.

SPEAKER: I think Charlie has that right, and I would add that the key

element in Americans' minds I think is somewhat related to Israeli policies and therefore is somewhat under the Israeli's control. That is, there's still very warm feelings towards Israel, a definite feeling that Israel's an important U.S. ally and desire to back Israel, but there's simply disagreement between Americans and the Israeli government about settlements and about making an agreement with the Palestinians so that it may not be easy for the Israelis internally, but in a sense it's conceptually easy for them to do things which would make Americans much stronger supporters of Israel and get rid of some of this doubt.

SPEAKER: There's an increase in criticism for the settlements. You now have a clear majority disagreeing with Israeli policy. And the nature of Americans' commitments, bilateral commitments I think is something that needs to be looked at more. Do Americans feel, when we have these alliances, that we are obliged to step in militarily if they get themselves in trouble? It may to some extent be affected by their perception of how culpable the country is that got in the conflict.

SPEAKER: But it also seems to be affected by a kind of sense of, the broader sense that we weren't going -- we don't want to be doing these things alone.

SPEAKER: Right.

SPEAKER: That we don't want to share the burden alone, and it seems to me --

SPEAKER: But it comes through real clearly if the UN Security Council gets involved, there's this international consensus something needs to be done here. International law has been violated by cross-border aggression. Americans come to, quite strongly, we'll be there, we'll be part of that. That's an important byline.

SPEAKER: But the reality is there are important bilateral relations, and

they become increasingly difficult to manage. I'm thinking of South Korea which, where President Obama and President Lee get along famously. The South Koreans have really cooperated in a difficult way on the sanctions on Iran. I mean, it's really cost them some domestic political support because of the business connections and involvements there. The Free Trade Agreement is so important to South Korea, and yet you read in the study that a majority of American's oppose it.

Now, Ben has said on other occasions that that's partly because no one has made the case for it publicly, and it's quite possible that will change once President Obama makes a full-fledged commitment. And, ironically, if this comes up for approval early next year, he'll be looking on the Republican side of the aisle for most of the support for that.

MR. INDYK: I want to go to the public -- the audience, I should say. But if you'll just quickly about South Korea, I think Charlie's point was right that the South Koreans shouldn't be too worried.

MR. KUPCHAN: Right.

SPEAKER: The Free Trade Agreement's tricky, but for reasons that Tom gives, if that might actually be doable on other fronts, on defense and so forth, the alliance seems to be very strong in the minds of Americans, partly because of the North Korean threat they perceive.

MR. KUPCHAN: Yes.

SPEAKER: And you have these support for bases and so forth.

MR. INDYK: Okay, let's go to questions. Please wait for the microphone, and identify yourself.

Jennifer? No, sorry, next to you. The lady. Ladies, first.

MS. MIZRAHI: Thanks for this outstanding study, so thank you for it. I

have a question about demographics.

MR. INDYK: Identify yourself.

MS. MIZRAHI: Jennifer Mizrahi from the Israel Project. We do a lot of polling on some of these same topics, but I was very interested in your data on Korea to know what the demographics look like because I am very familiar with what they look like on Iran with Republicans and Democrats being very different, African Americans and white men, liberals versus conservatives being very different. Is that the same on Korea? In other words, are the demographics and the ideology driving all of this? Or when you look at policy like Israel which you talk about having a lot of partisan split, is that unique to a case of Israel and Iran?

SPEAKER: I'll try to make a little shot at that. I think Israel is definitely different from South Korea in that regard. As you can see in this table at the end of the report, page 80 or so, there are some significant differences between parties on Israel, but the differences are just not as large on Korea.

MR. INDYK: Okay, Julie had a question. Would you wait for the microphone and that solution?

MS. FINLEY: Julie Finley, a Tea Party sympathizer. And, gentlemen, I think you need to become very much familiar with the makeup of the Tea Party, because I consider myself a Tea Party sympathizer, and it has nothing to do with foreign policy or social issues, my interest anyway, and there are many of us in that group.

Is it -- and being a Chicagoan by roots, I found this to be extremely reassuring, extremely thoughtful on the part of Americans, balanced and timely. It's about time we pulled back a little more and rethought things.

But on the question of the U.S. being a super -- or being the number one strong power, is it fair to conclude that the United States could still be the number one

power economically, educationally, you know, all ways militarily, but just not be number one to apply it? In other words, could it still be number one, but not use it?

SPEAKER: Well, the question is what people expect. That's what we're trying to find out. We're not prescribing what the U.S. foreign policy should be or its stance. They would like the U.S. to continue to be militarily number one. They probably would like the U.S. to be number one economically, although they're probably more concerned about the absolute level of their economic position than the relative one.

The question is where do they see it going? And they see that changing, and they are already beginning to adjust. They're adapting to that situation. They're not saying let's fight this, let's push hard, let's reverse this trend. They're coming to terms with it. In some ways they think it's even good because there's no such a burden, but they surely see some downside to it, too. But mostly they're just being realistic about it.

SPEAKER: What about this question of Tea Party attitudes? I have the sense that they don't really take positions on foreign policy issues. Is that right?

MR. MANN: There is no "they," or "their," and that's the most important thing to understand about the Tea Party, as my colleague, Jonathan Roush, has written, this is a radically decentralized network of literally hundreds if not thousands of separate organizations with no leaders that communicate by network. Some of them sort of parachute in from California to try to influence the Delaware Senate nomination while other Tea Partiers were appalled by that intervention and feel differently about it.

So, no, I think the only thing that ties sort of activists and sympathizers together is a belief in more limited government and a sort of a notion about constitutionalism and what it is and what it stands for, and how we've gotten away from it. It's very interesting, a legitimate argument, but it's not a given; it's a point.

But some Tea Partiers are nativists, and some are isolationists. They

differ all over the board in their views toward foreign policy, toward the importance of social issues. Take O'Donnell and Sharon Angle, social issues, they are Tea Party champions and social issues are very important to them, and yet probably not so for the majority of those who are active.

SPEAKER: In studies we've done show that they're not even that concerned about big government. That is not the big driver; the big driver is the perception that the government is not responsive to the people. That is the big focus, the big thing that draws them all together. However, if their candidates do get elected, that will have a partisan impact, and they'll have an impact on the Republican Party, and that could ultimately affect foreign policy.

SPEAKER: One quick -- what you described, Julie, is my guess as to where we'd be heading. That is, if I were to triangulate these different political pressures and pick the temperature of the Tea Party, which I don't know well, I would say that the United States will continue to spend as much on defense as the rest of the world combined, even if it cuts \$100 billion from the defense budget, but that it will be much more difficult, politically, to use it.

MR. INDYK: I want to go back to the man who had the microphone in the first place, please. Identify yourself.

MR. NADEL: I'm Mark Nadel from the Government Affairs Institute at Georgetown University. I have a question about how the results are pegged to respond in knowledge and also a question of wording.

For example, on the question on Afghanistan, it's not -- I don't think it's a surprise that most people will support the goal of fighting terrorism. But if one were to do the question strategy of some people say that it's a worthwhile goal to fight terrorism; other people say that al Qaeda is so decentralized that we can't chase them all over the

globe, and they're in Somalia. I wonder, first of all did, in your pretesting, did you experiment with questions like that, and did you get -- you know, what kind of results did you get? Or how do you think that that would work?

Also, I was actually, frankly, surprised not to support for maintaining troops in South Korea and Germany. And again, if one were to say the U.S. spends whatever hundred millions it is to garrison troops in Germany, do you support that? First of all, to your knowledge, have -- are there polls that have posed the question with a knowledge base, and do they differ from yours?

SPEAKER: Steve is actually (inaudible).

MR. KULL: There's always more you can do, more poll questions. Those sound like good ones, but we'd look at a lot of relations between questions. We look at other people's data, and it does seem that a key driver in Afghanistan is this concern about terrorism. And we again put up this, you know, Americans dying which is really in a sense the highest test you can put into a question. And it still came out in a rather robust way.

I think it would be an interesting question to find out more about perceptions of al Qaeda, but I do think probably at this point Americans equate the Taliban with al Qaeda, that there was this link. It was a link that was made in their mind right after 9-11. Support for going into Afghanistan was overwhelming, so people have clearly linked these things, and so the whether or not there are a lot of al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan right now isn't so much the key question as what would happen if we left and the Taliban regained power. And it's hard to not -- the scenario of al Qaeda re-encamping there is hard to resist.

MR. INDYK: Let's go over here to Gary Mitchell.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. I

want to come back, I think, to the question that Julie from Chicago, who is a Tea Partier, raised and come at it from a different point of view. I'm not a Tea Partier, but I think there's a message in them stones.

The question I want to ask you is whether -- Charlie Kupchan really framed the business about Americans just sort of taking a frame of mind that says been here, done that, don't necessarily have to be number one or the first out. As I look at this poll, the thing that I was most stuck by was a -- or is a sort of sense of one might call it pessimism, but one might call it something else. And, interestingly enough, the opening sentence in Andy Basevich's newest book, *Washington Rules*, he starts by saying: Worldly ambition inhibits true learning. And he ends the paragraph by saying: Only as ambition wanes does education become a possibility.

So my question is, however one characterizes this pessimism or something else, but the sense that we don't necessarily have to be number one or been there, done that, is this situational? Is this mostly a reaction to the financial difficulties that we are experiencing and that the world is experiencing? Or is something larger and more systemic going on here about Americans genuinely adopting a different point of view about their place in the world?

SPEAKER: This view has been, in a sense, incipient for decades. Certainly since the end of the Cold War, Americans have been looking for the opportunity to reduce Americans' dominance in the world and to put more of an emphasis on a multilateral system.

What we have is an economic crisis where people feel less, like they have fewer resources, and that puts increased pressure in that direction. It's not only that it's not only consistent with our values and self image, now it's also consistent with our pocketbook. So these things are converging.

When we have all the resources, it's easier to persuade people. Well, in this particular case we need to yet do -- put ourselves out there. Yes, we need to take on that. Oh, okay, the public goes. Oh, okay, the public goes. But when it's -- now there's a question of can we really afford this? And that changes the dynamic.

MR. INDYK: I want to go to the last question, but you haven't said anything about the polling results in terms of attitudes towards the Muslim world, Muslim communities. And, of course, this is a hot topic today for obvious reasons.

SPEAKER: Yeah, there's been a substantial increase in the number of Americans -- it's still a minority, but it's a substantial increase in the number who believe that there is a kind of almost inherent clash of civilizations. And that expresses -- I think it's not really surprising. We've been in these two wars now for years. Afghanistan's one of the longest wars that we've ever been in. Every day we get news about conflict with the Muslim world. American troops are dying. It doesn't seem to be improving. As they learn more about the Muslim world, they hear more stories about ideological factors in Islam that can be interpreted as being intrinsically hostile to Western values and so on.

So there's a kind of accumulation that has undermined Americans' initial tendency to give Muslims the benefit of the doubts and to endorse the view that Bush put forward at that time that what we're seeing here in 9-11 in terrorism is some kind of bastardization of Islam. Islam itself is peaceful. But as it's gone on for so many years, more people, not a majority, but a growing minority are saying, well, maybe there really is some kind of fundamental issue here about these two civilizations.

I don't think it has any major implications in terms of that what kind of foreign policy that they would support. It's not like there is some support for going to war with Islam. If anything, they're probably looking -- this probably points them in the direction of let's have not such maximal goals. It probably makes them more ready to say

in Afghanistan, okay, maybe we don't have to have a Jeffersonian democracy here before we leave. Then that's not realistic.

MR. INDYK: Yes, please? This will have to be the last question.

MR. SCHADLER: Bob Schadler, a senior fellow in public diplomacy at the American Foreign Policy Council. And I would like to ask a question on public diplomacy that overall it, I think the report as impressive as it is, tends to slight. And most people think it's both very important - increasingly important - and overall the United States is not doing a very good job about it.

Brookings just came forward a few months ago with a report on public diplomacy, suggested we need a lot of reforms as have a lot of other groups from the Council on Foreign Relations, et cetera.

The one place where there is a question that seems focused on public diplomacy on page 26 that was mentioned, is it important that -- is it very important as a foreign policy goal that the United States improve America's standing in the world? And that seems a dramatic finding, a drop of 30 percent over a third, drop. So it dropped in 2 years from 83 percent, believing it's a very important goal, to 53 percent.

Two things that would suggest it needs more focus in reports such as this, one, General Petraeus was begging a pastor in Florida not to burn a book because it would kill, he felt -- result in the deaths of American civilians and soldiers. He had no tools to counteract that, and overall our traditional diplomacy had no tools to counteract it because there's not a foreign diplomat anywhere who thinks a burning of a book represents the United States. It was a public diplomacy problem.

MR. INDYK: Can we get on to a question?

MR. SCHADLER: More quickly, if -- just one extra point and --

MR. INDYK: Unfortunately, we're out of time, so if you want to get an

answer, if you don't pose the question --

MR. SCHADLER: Is this report, do you think, sufficiently focused on public diplomacy? Will future reports maybe emphasize it more given, I think, the general consensus that it's both very important and we're not doing very well with respect to it?

SPEAKER: This big drop in concern about America's standing in the world is very easy to explain. In 2008, the people were hearing lots of numbers from -- coming in from all over the world of people being very hostile toward the U.S. Two years later they're hearing all those reports that people love Obama, right? And that problem's fixed.

MR. SCHADLER: Yeah.

SPEAKER: I mean, it gets into people's brain. I don't think they think that the whole problem is solved. I think if you probably said America's standing in the Muslim world, you would probably get a very different number. But people, what was really striking was, a few years ago people said this is a big problem. They put it way up there in terms of a priority to address that. So, clearly, there's something that people are really very sensitive to, and questions that try to say, oh, it's not what -- it doesn't really matter are strongly rejected.

So it's something that people are attuned to, and I'm sure will look for some opportunities to see how they perceive it in the future.

MR. INDYK: Thank you very much to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, to Ben Page and Steve Kull, and, of course, to our panelists Tom Mann and Charlie Kupchan for a fascinating poll, a surprising poll and a fascinating discussion.

And thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for joining us.

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