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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott and it's my pleasure to welcome you all here to Brookings this afternoon. I hope you've all had a good summer and a reasonably restful Labor Day weekend. It's now back to school.

It's always a pleasure for me to have a chance to participate in the launch of a new Brookings book, and the one that we're going to be talking about today, *Arming Without Aiming*, is, I think, a particularly important book, first because of the topic, which is peace not just in South Asia, but in Asia as a whole, and also it's important because of the extraordinary experience and expertise of the two authors.

Steve Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta are our gurus on South Asia here at the Brookings Institution, well known to all of you. And I'm particularly grateful to Ashley and Mike for being willing to join in the conversation on this book.

It is officially being published by the Brookings Institution Press this week and there will be a paperback edition published by Penguin in November. This book is in some ways a follow on to Steve's earlier book, *India: Emerging Power*, which was published back in 2001. In the intervening nine years, India, of course, has grown in prosperity, it's grown in its economic, and I would say, geopolitical clout, its role in an evolving international architecture of multilateral institutions. But of

course, during that same period, since 2001, the neighborhood in which India plays such an important role, a neighborhood that is home to more than a third of humanity, has gotten, in some ways, even more complicated. That's in no small measure as a result of the 2008 Mumbai massacre and the ensuing tensions between India and Pakistan, and, of course, we've also had, during this period, rising concerns about the long-term stability of Pakistan given the encroachments of the Taliban and al Qaeda into that country.

Also, to complicate the matter further, there is what I would call ongoing uncertainty about the future dynamics of India-China relations. And I would, just speaking for myself, not necessarily for the authors who will in a moment speak for themselves, I would put the overall context as follows: One of the more interesting -- in the sense of the old Chinese curse -- relationships in the world is the triangular relationship among China, India, and Pakistan. One leg of that triangle, namely the relationship between Pakistan and China, is, both historically and prospectively, highly cooperative whereas two legs of the triangle, the one between India and Pakistan and the one between India and China, are fraught with some danger.

Now, there is an idea out there that I suspect will come up in the course of the conversation and I know comes up in the book, that that danger can be managed in a way that somehow replicates the way in

which the United States and the Soviet Union were able to keep the Cold War cold, that is to make sure that it didn't turn hot in the form of a thermonuclear war. And, of course, the principle mechanism for that was mutual deterrence.

I can remember hearing this idea myself back in the late 1990s and in 2000 when I was working in the State Department in the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. There were suggestions in Delhi and there were also suggestions in Islamabad and Rawalpindi that were echoed in Beijing that the way in which the superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- managed their rivalry during the Cold War through, among other things, reliance on mutual assured destruction, might serve as a model for different regions, namely South Asia and Asia itself into the future. I, and a number of my colleagues in the U.S. Government -- with some support, I might say, from, we'll call them strategists, particularly outside of government in the countries involved -- cast some doubt on whether that was, in fact, a good model and particularly whether you could apply the principle of mutual assured destruction to a three-way relationship when the three countries in question have contiguous borders and those borders are in dispute and, in fact, have been a casus belli in the past, that is both between India and Pakistan and also between India and China.

Far better would be for the three nations to develop, deploy,

and explain via their strategic doctrine, their deterrent strategies without identifying targets. And as Steve and Sunil note in their book, India's military modernization program has evolved in a way that avoids getting too specific about the strategic purpose of the arsenal, hence, the title of the book, *Arming Without Aiming*, which strikes the authors and indeed quite a number of us as a good slogan for moving forward.

One last point and then I'll turn the proceedings over to Steve. As Steve and Sunil note and welcome, there has been an emergence in India of think tanks not unlike those that populate Massachusetts Avenue here in Washington, D.C., and that those think tanks are beginning to produce analysis and policy prescription that is more sophisticated and forward-looking, particularly with a view on how to stabilize the strategic balance in the region. And we at Brookings, particularly Steve, have been working with several of those Indian think tanks on this and other issues.

So, with that, I'll now turn the proceedings over to Steve, who will say a bit more about the panelists and how we're going to proceed over the next hour-plus. Thank you.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Strobe. Let me, on behalf of Sunil also, thank you and Brookings for being extraordinarily patient in the production of this book. It took much longer than we thought it would partly because we were learning or relearning about the subject. It's not

an easy subject to understand, especially from a distance, and also because the Indian Defense Modernization Process has been undergoing changes. We count at least four major studies that were completed while we were writing the book. So, in a sense, we owe a debt of gratitude to Brookings for their patience, and also to Mike O'Hanlon and others for encouraging us to make it a short book. It began a much bigger book.

Let me introduce some of the panelists and then say a few words about the book myself. And first of all, let me note that Ed Luce, who was originally supposed to speak here, was called -- got an e-mail last night, was called to Milwaukee by his boss, the *Financial Times,* and I guess the Wisconsin primary race was more important than this, certainly from the *Financial Times*' point of view it certainly was. And Ed has promised us that he would make this up in some way in the future. So if you're watching Ed, we do miss you.

But I was able to get Mike O'Hanlon to substitute for Ed. And Mike is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, homeland security, and American foreign policy. Mike came to Brookings from the Congressional Budget Office, and he's the author of literally hundreds of op-ed pieces on American defense and security policy and was the founder of the Brookings indices on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which are very useful documents to have and I've used the

Pakistan one in a book I'm doing on Pakistan itself.

Mike's latest book, *A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament*, is only one in a long chain of books that he has written. It's available in the Brookings bookstore. He has a Ph.D. from Princeton, and I notice that he served in the Peace Corps in Africa teaching physics in French to Africans in the former Zaire.

Ashley Tellis came to the United States from India. He migrated in the 1980s where he joined the Ph.D. program at the University of Chicago, and I think I had a little bit to do with sending Ashley to Chicago. Ashley is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He had a long trip to make it here, just literally out that door to this door, and he specializes in international security policy defense and Asian strategic issues.

Ashley was senior advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and was intimately involved in negotiating the Civil Nuclear Agreement with India. He has also served as senior advisor to the ambassador in the United States to India, which was Bob Blackwell at the time, and then was on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning in Southwest Asia.

Prior to his government service, Ashley has also been a policy analyst with the Rand Corporation. And Ashley, of course, is the

author of several books, including *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture* and other books on Asian security policy.

Sunil Dasgupta, my co-author, was a native of Lucknow, worked with the *Indian Express* and *India Today* as defense correspondent. And I came to know Sunil when he came to the United States on a fellowship from the Ford Foundation. And he then stayed on to do a Ph.D. program at the University of Illinois and eventually joined me at Brookings as a colleague, and then went on to teach at Georgetown and George Washington University. And now he's on the faculty of the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, where he heads the Political Science Program at the University Center in Shady Grove.

Since we began this book there were many changes in Indian procurement policy, but nothing significant has changed. They're sitting on like $100 billion worth of defense purchases; we're waiting to see what's going to happen. But the book tries not to be too technical and too specific about this, tries to take a long view of India military rearmament policy.

I won't try to summarize the book, but we came to at least three discoveries. First, India's new affluence has intensified the importance of the question of India's rise as a military power. Rising powers are expected to have some advanced military capabilities. India has, for the first time, the money to build and buy, but will it? And I think

that's the central question of our book. Will India buy the weapons that would make it an advanced military power? We are skeptical because of two reasons: one is that India's preferred stance has been military restraint. Its rise has been welcomed in Asia by everyone except Pakistan because India's not seen as an assertive power.

Also the defense acquisition process in India is amazingly convoluted. I think that's the proper word to describe it. India's preference is to acquire the technology and build the weapons itself. This has deep problems, but it is a preference that is engrained in the Indian national identity, goes back to Nehru and even before Nehru in terms of autarchy and self-reliance.

Thirdly, India finds it difficult to engage in structural and organizational reforms. It is easier to add and to expand then to reform what is obsolete or counterproductive.

Our second major point was that India Defense Modernization will not transform India's strategic environment. That environment features two major military powers, one rising -- China -- and one in deep disarray -- Pakistan -- both are also nuclear weapon states. They present quite different problems and challenges to the Indian strategic community.

Further all three countries -- well, India in particular -- has also severe domestic problems. We have a full chapter in the internal

security problems in India. I think we identified this before it became popular to talk about it in India. And later on, as we wrote the book, Manmohan Singh came out and said India's major strategic problem -- the Prime Minister of India said India's major strategic problem are the domestic insurgencies.

We have a full chapter on this, we have a full chapter on defense modernization and the internal threat. We also have a chapter on the one weapon, the nuclear bomb, that India has built without outside support and how these weapons will shape relations between India and its nuclear neighbors. This, like the Cold War, as Strobe noted, is a test of how nuclear weapons affect relations between major powers. If you believe in deterrents, you'll see that the region will be stable and peaceful. If you have doubts about deterrents or note that deterrents may fail, there's questions ahead.

We do not think that this new hardware and weapons will make that much of a difference, but that diplomacy and new strategic thinking are more important, although we would not underestimate the symbolic and practical importance of India having well-equipped modern forces.

Our third major point -- conclusion, was that looking at the American military cooperation with India we see the most fruitful arena to be at sea. We were told this before we began the project. I'm a skeptic,

so I was looking for reasons why not to -- why we would not conclude this, but we did conclude it. I think all the evidence points to U.S.-India naval cooperation as the most fruitful area of cooperation.

The Indian Navy knows what it wants to do; it can perform many important tasks at sea. It follows the British naval theorist, Corbett, was more relevant than the American naval theorist, Mahan. I think it would be disastrous, however, if India squanders its money on that white elephant of a weapons system, the Arihant, which is a seagoing, nuclear-powered, nuclear weapons delivery vessel. The book and my own view is I'm really quite skeptical about the Arihant as a practical weapon. They may make one demonstration model of it, but I doubt if they'll go beyond that.

Finally, Sunil and I believe that there's an opportunity to use arm sales and technology transfer as an inducement to move India towards a strategic agreement with Pakistan on Afghanistan. Sunil will talk further about this, but we see this as the most fruitful strategic area of cooperation between the United States and India. It's not part of American policy yet, but we think that's the way in which the direction should go.

Both countries have a strong -- both India and Pakistan have a strong interest, as does the United States, in a neutral or non-aligned Afghanistan free of extremist ideology. American diplomacy should not

give up on the regional approach though it may require changes in the way in which the U.S. Government approaches India and Pakistan.

I would begin by getting rid of AFPAC, a bad name for a worse idea.

Let me now turn to Mike O'Hanlon for his comments and then hear from Ashley and then Sunil will finish. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Steve. It's an honor to be part of this launch with Strobe and Steve and Sunil and Ashley. There are a number of you who know this region better than I, so let me just make a couple of observations from my vantage point as a general defense specialist and also the director of research for Martin Indyk in the Foreign Policy Program, which is the best management job I know of at Brookings because you just get to think through book ideas with your colleagues in real time as they go. And the reason I mention that is because it was fascinating to watch Sunil and Steve develop the argument behind this book, which is summarized extremely well by the title, one of the best titles I know of in modern public policy publishing.

Also congratulations to Bob Faherty and those folks at the Press who came up with the cover and everything -- I guess Steve had a hand in that as well. And it's a very elegant and highly recommended and readable book. But the idea behind *Arming Without Aiming* is that, of course, India has, on the one hand, had to do too many things in its

defense policy. It had internal insurgencies and various rivalries and different neighbors that were of concern or that it had agendas vis-à-vis, but also that it didn't have this burning desire to dominate; that it could, therefore, make due without a strong, central organizing principle or theme or purpose to its defense policy.

And this really emerged from their research because I think in some ways it's fair to say -- and they can comment here in a second if they don't agree -- but in some ways they came to that conclusion reluctantly. They did the individual research on individual aspects of Indian defense policy, historically and then today, and it was only putting the ideas together and ruminating over them where the fundamental thesis emerged. So, it's really an excellent example of very good scholarship as well in the sense of doing the research and then letting the conclusion almost develop itself through just a lot of hard work and a lot of thought and deliberation and debate. But nonetheless, it came out of the individual elements of the research and I greatly enjoy watching that.

I want to commend Indian friends in many ways for the positive side of this title, or this them. *Arming Without Aiming* does not sound like a compliment and at the end of the day I'm not sure it is. But there is an aspect to this basic historical concept behind Indian defense modernization and Indian defense operations which is complimentary, which is that India hasn't had that burning desire to dominate regionally or

globally and maybe it hasn't had the means either, and so this is making a virtue partly out of necessity. But it also is to the credit of Indian friends that even as they have had a lot of ambitions and some of them in the military area, like nuclear weapons capabilities, they've nonetheless always exercised a certain version of restraint. And I think that is something that great powers don't do frequently or automatically or reflexively and it deserves notice and mention. And, again, I'll look forward to subsequent discussion on that point.

Of course, there's also an aspect to which this title is perhaps a critique of the Indian defense and national security system, and I'm sure Sunil and Steve will say more about that in the next hour, but obviously *Arming Without Aiming* can't really be a good thing at the end of the day. And as a public policy practitioner you can't be too thrilled to hear that there's no real organizing principle guiding your choices. It's a pretty inefficient policy at best and potentially will send you off in wrong directions.

So, I think at the end of the day the title is a challenge to the Indian defense establishment to do better even as there's an aspect of it which is a reassurance, that historically and even today, India has not had that, again, burning desire to dominate or otherwise move forward in a particularly assertive way in its security policy.

So, those are my main points I wanted to highlight in terms

of talking about the title, the thesis, the genesis of the book and the genesis of the argument within the book, which, again, I had the privilege of watching unfold over the last couple of years.

One last specific point and I'll stop, which is on the issue of Cold Start. And this is a doctrine that, as I'm sure those of you who follow this well know, this is a relatively new idea in Indian defense policy and it's partly the notion that India should have the ability to respond to another Mumbai-like terror strike or something of that nature with a limited and fairly near-term, fairly rapid kind of conventional military response largely as a deterrent to any state, specifically Pakistan, tolerating or in any way aiding and abetting such an attack. Now, I'm not trying to get into the issue -- others probably will -- of whether Pakistan can do more or whether Pakistan deserves criticism as a state for Mumbai. I think it could have done more myself, but I'm not going to get into that in detail. The point is, even if it's largely retired ISI, retired Pakistani intelligence operatives who might have had a hand in that kind of an operation, the general sense is that India needs the capability to be able to say to Pakistan, we've got a way to respond short of all-out war because we all know all-out war is not appealing, it's not really feasible, it's not viable. And India has spent a lot of time trying to think that problem through and they've come up with the notion of Cold Start.

It's understandable at one level; it's also, however,

dangerous at another level. And I hope we have a rich discussion on that because, again, I'll just make two quick points and be done. One is I commend India for the restraint it showed after Mumbai in 2008. Most great powers would not have had that kind of restraint. And to essentially absorb such a heinous act of murder against so many of ones' own citizens and against a major city was an extraordinarily tragic and difficult thing for India to wrestle with and obviously it has pushed back in numerous ways as it had every right and obligation to, but it has refrained from any kind of a military response. That is every bit and every imaginable amount I can think of to its credit.

On the other hand, we also know that by changing philosophy and now going with Cold Start, India runs the risk next time around of reacting too soon or reacting the wrong way. And hypothetically, what if Pakistan really is now doing more? And I think they are trying to do more at some level to restrain this kind of activity by terrorist groups on their soil. What if despite Pakistan's best efforts something happens and then Cold Start leads to a tragically too rapid Indian response on Pakistani soil? And then you have the potential for an escalatory conflict, not to mention that Pakistan's counterterror and counterinsurgency operations in the Northwest are disrupted as forces swing from the West to the East. This is the dilemma that India has to wrestle with. I don't claim to have an answer for you about just how India

gets that balance right, but it is a balancing act to have a deterrent against another Mumbai, but, at the same time, to avoid the potential for an escalatory response.

You'll also read about that in this book and, to me, that's one of the most fascinating and important issues that we have to think about in security policy in South Asia.

So, with that, I'll turn things over.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Mike. Ashley, do you want to say a few words?

MR. TELLIS: Sure. Thank you, Steve. Let me start by thanking Steve for inviting me here this afternoon to say a few words about the book, And let me also take the opportunity to thank Steve for the mentor that he has been to me personally over the years, ever since I came to the U.S. and going through graduate school and actually getting into the trade was owed, in large part, to Steve's corrupting influence in my youthful days.

Let me say a few words about the book itself before I want to try and parse some of the analytical dimensions that are embedded in it.

This is a great book and it comes at a great time. It comes at a great time because I think it is fair to say that at the moment, Indian defense policy is in crisis. It's in crisis for at least two reasons. One, the external environment that India had planned its military forces for since

independence is steadily changing before the eyes of Indian policymakers. The kind of threats India is going to face from Pakistan, which are threats that emerge increasingly from weakness, are not the kind of threats that the Indian military is the best instrument to cope with. And the kinds of capabilities that India is going to face on the Chinese front, which traditionally were premised on the assumption of persistent Chinese weakness, are actually being transformed as we speak into fundamental Chinese strengths, emerging Chinese strengths. And it is still not clear at this point whether India's military capacities will enable it to hold its own vis-à-vis a modern Chinese military, particularly if China's political and strategic intentions towards India were to change.

So, there are clearly changes in the external environment that are taking place as we speak and, if for no other reason, ought to confront Indian policymakers with the need to revisit the premises on which their military modernization has been undertaken over the last two decades.

There's a second dimension of change which is just as significant, and that is, it is becoming quite clear now that there is significant internal sclerosis in India's defense decision-making in a wide range of issue areas and this has the consequence of preventing India from being able to utilize the military capabilities that it actually has into political outcomes that it would seek to procure. And this goes

fundamentally to issues of state capacity which I'm going to talk about in a few minutes. So, when one looks at the nature of the beast, the only element of continuity that I see still persisting in Indian defense policy is the point that Michael made with great emphasis, that is India's strong cultural impulses to restraint still remain more or less intact.

We are not assured that these cultural impulses and the propensity to restraint will survive in perpetuity, but for the foreseeable future the fact that India chose not to respond to the tragedy of Bombay through the use of force leaves one to be at least cautiously optimistic that when it comes to broad cultural propensities about the use of force, change in this area is going to be slower than otherwise.

But in the other two areas, the changes in the external environment and changes in terms of India's own internal capacities to deal with external threats, I think the story is more pessimistic. And so this book comes at a time when the Indian state is, in a sense, grappling with how best to deal with these challenges. And I must say it comes from on top of a great deal of Indian writing and Indian soul-searching in the last five years, particularly actually starting since after the war over Kargil, but increasing in the last five years. But the Indian state now has the resources to go out and buy the toys that its military may want to buy and this has led to a great deal of intellectual ferment with different constituencies within India asking whether the toys that are sought to be

bought are, in fact, the right and appropriate toys for the task.

So, the task before me this afternoon is to just share with you some reflections on how, in the scheme of things, one is to assess India's defense capacity given that it is slowly rising as an emerging power. And I would argue that there are two ways to do it: One is to do it with a lot of arm waving and essentially convey to you my prejudices; the other is to kind of structure it in the form of questions that I think anyone needs to ask, and the book does the latter. And so I want to walk you through the questions that I think are pertinent to answering the question.

There are four tests that I think Indian defense policy has to meet if it is to be judged as appropriate to India's strategic environment. The first is, does India have an appropriate grand strategy for dealing with the world? Does it have the capacity to develop this grand strategy? This would be question number one.

Question number two would be, does the Indian state have the capacity to mobilize the resources required to procure the range of military instruments necessary to achieve its political aims? This is the resource mobilization question.

Question number three is a particularly difficult one and it deals with institutional capacity and it comes in three forms. Does the Indian state have the institutional capacity to efficiently allocate the resources it mobilizes towards creating the right kind of military

instruments? Does the Indian state have the institutional capacity to assess what is appropriate defense strategy, force requirements, and military technology? And does the Indian state have the institutional capacity to direct its military instruments in times of war and peace to secure certain political aims? These are very difficult and very complex questions, but critical.

And the fourth question is, can the Indian state maintain armed forces that are capable of deploying the right kind of military capabilities and capable of implementing the right kind of military strategies?

So, if one is to do a net assessment of whether Indian military modernization is appropriate to the objectives that the nation seeks to achieve on the international stage, I think one systematically has to go through the hard work of, in a sense, answering these questions. I won't try to answer these questions in any detail here because I'll keep you for much longer than you've signed up for, but I want to give you what I think are my summary conclusions and tie these to some of the themes that occur in the book.

On the first question of whether India has the capacity to develop a grand strategy and whether it has done so, I think the correct answer, from my point of view, is that India has done tolerably well on this question. It does not have deeply articulated grand strategies, but it's got

principles that guide its foreign policy. And its objectives and in the main, broadly speaking, the entire Indian establishment shares a rough coherence with the objectives that India seeks to achieve, so it's done tolerably well on this score.

On the second question of does the Indian state have the capacity to mobilize resources to achieve the military aims it seeks, the Indian state has actually done reasonably well, particularly relative to its peers. And if you look at both Pakistan and China as just being two exemplars, you find, by some simple metrics like India's ratios of tax to GDP, India actually does better than both China and Pakistan. And, in fact, it's perversely demonstrated by the fact that today the Indian armed forces have a glut of resources that they often find themselves unable to spend.

So, in a way, that is quite radically different from the '70s. The Indian state today has money. Whether it has the capacity to spend it efficiently is, of course, a question that I will come to next.

The third question, which is the hard question because it deals with the squishy issues of state capacity, the question of whether the institutional capacity exists to do each of the three things that I flagged, first, does it have the capacity to efficiently allocate and mobilize resources? My view is that the Indian state does quite poorly on this score. Does the Indian state have the capacity to assess defense

strategy, force requirements, and military technology? I think the Indian state does quite poorly on this score. And on the third issue of whether the Indian state has the capacity to direct its military instruments appropriately in war and peace, I think what can be said is that the Indian state does tolerably, but not particularly well.

I would have to take a lot of time to amplify these conclusions, but if there is a single theme that comes through in the book that explains why India's performance in these areas has been less than optimal, I think one can flag the issue of civil-military relations. And Steve's book does a remarkable job of showing how the Indian state and its peculiar pattern of civil-military relations has prevented the state from achieving the kind of strategic outputs that it should, by nature, enjoy because of the resources it brings into play.

Now, there's an important asterisk when one advances this conclusion and the asterisk is this: It is not that the Indian state is unaware of the constraints imposed by its peculiar pattern of civil-military relations. In fact, the Indian state is very well aware of the constraints. But it is a deliberate choice on the part of state managers to accept some degree of liability where it comes to military effectiveness in order to preserve inviolate the principle of strong civilian control. And so the point to keep in mind is that this is not entirely accidental, it's deliberate. Which, of course, now raises a second question, which is, whatever the

exigencies that drove these choices at the time of India's founding, are these exigencies still in place that justify a continuation of these patterns of civil-military relations? And to my mind, this is where the future of India's external environment is going to play a great role, that to the degree that Indian feels pressed because its external environment turns out to be far more hostile than it was in the founding years of the country's post-independence era, then to that degree one would hope that the current pattern of civil-military relations will also change.

Let me say a few words about the last area which is, is the Indian state capable of maintaining armed forces with the appropriate military capabilities and capable of implementing effective military strategies? My judgment here is that the Indian military actually does very well and actually quite better than many of its peers. The book spends quite a bit of time focusing on this dimension of Indian military effectiveness, and I think sometimes Sunil and Steve may have been a tad too harsh with respect to the judgments they have drawn. My own view is that the Indian military, divorced of grand strategy, divorced of issues of political control, when addressed and assessed purely as a war fighting machine, is actually far more effective than people give them credit for. And one of the things that we have learned in the United States in the last eight years because of our increased interaction with the Indian military is that although India is a third world state by all the nominal

indicators of what it takes to be third world, its armed forces are not your generic, run of the mill, third world armed forces. They are far more sophisticated than that. They are certainly not at the level of where the armed forces of the great powers are, but they're not exactly also-rans either.

Where does all this leave us? It leaves me, personally, with a certain qualified optimism. And the reasons for my qualified optimism is that, first, the book does India and students of India a yeoman service because it casts, sometimes, a harsh spotlight on things that need to be fixed. And Indians being voracious readers and even deeper parsers of everything that's published in the West, I'm sure will look at this book very closely and it will become one more element in the mix of the debate.

Second, I think we have to be careful about being too harsh because India is just taking baby steps on the road to great power status. India's rise in material capabilities is, honestly speaking, barely a decade old and so it will take some time before its ideational and institutional capacities keep pace with its material transformations. The material transformations will come first. And if the environment plays the role that I expect it will, it will force a transformation in the ideational and the institutional capabilities.

Lastly, if India fails to get its act together, it will be confronted by crises and it will be confronted by geopolitical failure and ironically in

the context of Indian history, crises, in the case of India, have had catalyzing effects, that is, they've been far more effective harbingers of change than normalcy. And so a little crisis along the way may not be an altogether bad thing.

Thank you, Steve.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Ashley. Sunil, my co-author -- Sunil Dasgupta, my co-author, will conclude these presentations and then we'll go to you for questions. Let me say that Sunil began as my grantee, then he became my student, then we were colleagues at Brookings, and now he's my co-author. And I'd say the book is at least more than half his, although I do claim credit for the cover. I will claim that, but Sunil worked out the title, in fact.

Sunil?

MR. DASGUPTA: I want to thank Brookings, Steve, for years and years of patience as a teacher and mentor, Mike and Ashley. You do not know how much they helped us fix the book. As Steve likes to say, they helped us turn a book about everything into a book about something, so thank you both. We do appreciate that help and without you we would not be here today.

I want to do two things. One, I want to talk a little bit to Ashley's point about change in the structure of -- especially of India civil-military relations, and -- but more importantly, I think, I want to spend more

time talking about the implications for U.S. policy right now. And especially with the presidential visit coming up, you know, we hear a lot of talk about military trade with India, and so I want to address that issue a little bit.

So, the first thing is, one of the expectations clearly is that as India's affluence grows and as its external environment changes, that India will, in fact, alter its defense policies, right, going from grand strategy to the allocation of resources, the maintenance of armed forces.

The thing that we do notice, however, is that we have found reason to think there is going to be more continuity. And why I say this is there are definite advantages for India to -- if I may use the term -- arm without aiming, and that is because its own rise and the accommodation of its own rise in the neighborhood, in Asia and even globally, has something to do, I think, with this deep-held restraint in a strategic posture, and that India rearming itself doesn't make people as uncomfortable as say China rearming itself.

Now, India is rearming itself at quite a breakneck speed. The numbers, I think, being thrown around are $100 billion over the next 10 years. Now, if you look at the SIPRI data, India is one of the top -- India has already been one of the top importers of arms for the last 30 years. The data, we can debate the values, et cetera, but generally India's been up there. And one of the things that we do notice is that this

new -- sort of this enlarged market has made a lot of foreign companies, people who want to supply to India, line up in New Delhi to want to be able to sell it. If you have been listening to South Asia circles in Washington lately, you will have heard a steady drum roll of this, you know, we'll sell this, we'll sell that, and so I want to address that issue a little bit.

There are obviously many advantages to doing military trade with India. It's a friendly country whose long-term interests are converging with the United States. It's a democracy, has a long tradition of strategic restraint, has professional -- and I think -- I want to emphasize, we actually think that the Indian armed forces are very professional and very competent in what they're told to do. The fact is that the civil-military relations is a little bit shot and so you get these other kinds of results.

And military sales to India will not need subsidies and they may even generate some employment in the United States. But perhaps the most important outcome we can hope to have from encouraging weapon sales to India is to repair -- and I'm using that word cautiously -- which is repair the U.S.-India relations and bring us greater freedom of action with respect to Pakistan with our Pakistan-Afghanistan policy.

Now, when I say repairing U.S.-India relations, means that it needs repair. Since the U.S.-India nuclear deal that Ashley had so much to do with, U.S.-India relations have been on somewhat of a decline, especially since the Obama Administration's AFPAC approach that largely

excluded India from U.S. policy in the region. Now, that's not entirely true, but in large measure that would be true.

The Obama Administration largely rejected the exceptional treatment of India that was accorded to that country by the Bush Administration, and, in particular, the return of the nonproliferation agenda made Indian officials a little bit wary. And, of course, in Afghanistan, India found itself increasingly left out of the formal process, and legitimately so because the fear in the United States has been that if India should become more involved in Afghanistan, that Pakistan would be antagonized and that's not something that the U.S. wants to see. But from the Indian perspective, an Afghanistan dominated by Pakistani proxies signals a return to the late '90s of the Taliban regime where an Indian airline flight was hijacked to Kandahar, if you remember.

Now, I don't want to have to tell this audience that if Pakistan is the key to Afghanistan, India holds the key to Pakistan. The Bush Administration, I think, already was predisposed to building up India as a kind of way to China and quickly realized also that India was going to be a very important player in the war on terror. And so we do get -- and so the Bush Administration launched this massive diplomatic exercise initiative that culminated in the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

If you look at this period in parallel, the India-Pakistan relationship, especially from about 2005, improves dramatically and, in

fact, the rhetoric about cross-border infiltration reduces a lot of things. A lot of positive things happen until, of course, the 2008 Mumbai attacks and that impetus is lost.

Now, whether the U.S.-India nuclear deal brought India acquiescence to U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan, remains unsaid. We certainly -- but, you know, it remains somewhat speculative, but it is something that has been on the minds of a lot of people thinking about weapon sales. Can weapon sales today provide the United States with some latitude when it comes to U.S. policy towards Afghanistan-Pakistan? And this is particularly important because the President has laid out a strategy -- a plan of withdrawal in the future. So, as the United States readies itself to withdraw, what's going to be the -- will it encourage Pakistan, and it has, encourage Pakistan to become more involved in Afghanistan, and how does that play into the sub-continental relationship?

To cut to sort of -- to answer the question before I go any further, we think to do this right is not going to be easy. To be able to make this connection and make it well is going to be difficult. First of all, the Indian procurement system -- and you should all buy the book and you'll read it there -- the procurement system is pretty shot and its very difficult to think about how India can move fast enough to be able to procure the weapons that are being sold.

Secondly, Indians themselves have articulated that the weapons purchases are going to be used as levers for technology transfers, and that raises a whole other host of issues. If the primary goal of the Indian government is to have greater access to technology, then they're going to have -- then it's going to raise some issues with the technology control regimes in the United States, and that's where the problem is.

If the administration wants to change that or thinks that this is the way to go, then that's where it has to work. It has to work on the technology front. I have heard Indian government officials, military officers talk about aircraft engines, rocket propulsion, things that probably have a 10- to 20-year timeframe in their development. But sort of joint development of those kinds of things is something that perhaps has the capacity to -- and I use, again, use the word advisedly -- to rescue U.S.-Indian relations. And, you know, this is something that is quite important to do now, especially given the withdrawal plan.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Sunil. We can now turn to questions, but let me remind you to turn your cell phones on when you leave the building. Okay? So, let's have some questions, and please state your name, affiliation, if you would like to. And why don't you stand up, first gentleman right here? And if you could address your question to one or more --

MR. HENDRICK: Hi, I'm Brian Hendrick. I'm a retired U.S. Army foreign area officer and I've been involved with India extensively, especially the procurement portion of it. I want to just kind of address a couple of things that Sunil said there at the end, and that was that the procurement system is shot, which I don't know if the system is shot, because I think what they've done with the DPP is really tried to fix a system that really and truly was broken. Now, it could stand a lot of improvement. I think the problem is, is that the bureaucracy is not yet ready to implement all of the capabilities that are within that procurement system. So, I mean, I'd just be interested to see if there's any commentary on that.

And then the other piece that you mentioned was the access to technology, you know, and I wonder how in the research for this book you found that the Indians' procurement process is more about getting the technology versus getting a capability that meets a specific purpose. Because in my experience there's been a little bit of a disconnect in terms of what they want and really what they need, and I think a lot of that goes back to the desire for technology. And so any commentary on that as well.

Thanks.

MR. TALBOTT: Sunil?

MR. DASGUPTA: Yeah. The DPP does a lot of things,

actually does smooth out a lot of things, but mostly what the DPP does is to make things easier for people wanting to sell. So, it's an instrument external to the government, in a way. So, what the DPP says is, you should do A, B, and C, in order to get to be considered, right? What -- the reforms that are actually required are quite within the government, and let me, you know, point out a couple. First is the DRDO, which is the Indian Military Research Agency. It practically has a right of veto on acquisitions, so they want first shot at trying to develop things and, you know, have not done a great job, as everybody knows, of their projects.

Secondly, if you see the DRDO chief is also the scientific advisor to the Defense Minister, which is the role of a producer and a developer and the role of an evaluator all rolled into one, and there is no question about conflict of interest. That's not an issue yet. So, when that becomes an issue, it's going to be resolved. Right now it's hard to see how this resolves itself.

By and large, I think the Indian focus has been on technology because when you have a policy of restraint and there is lack of political guidance, I think, if we can describe the Indian civil-military relationship as such, then what you do find is the organizing principle becomes technology and that you improve your capacity based on whatever technology is available out there.

So, those are my two immediate responses.

MR. COHEN: I would only add that one of the qualities of the Indian defense acquisition process, in fact, the whole Indian system, is really the lack of expertise. And when we went around interviewing people, I'd say, well -- I'd hold up my hand and say, how many Indian politicians really understand Indian military defense policy, and I'd take one hand down. And I'd hold one up and I'd sort of go like that. And they'd say, Jaswant Singh, Aroon Singh, maybe another one, but it's extraordinary how such a major country with such a large military has so few politicians. I'm not talking about the military. Politicians have defense expertise, and I think they're afraid to make some of these decisions because they lack the expertise. Eventually the bureaucrats acquire it, but that takes a long time.

Ambassador Schaffer over there.

MS. SCHAFFER: Thank you. Teresita Schaffer from CSIS. A lot of what one reads of Indian leaders' comments on the Indians' strategic environment focuses, in the first instance, on insurgencies inside India, the Naxalites, some people would include Kashmir in that bunch, the Northeast. I noticed in your table of contents there is a chapter on police modernization, so I will have to read the chapter to find out what you say about that. But I wonder if any of you would like to comment on how that influences the external environment that is faced more properly by the military and how that affects the usability of India's strictly military

capacities?

MR. COHEN: Ashley and Mike, feel free to join in. Sunil?

MR. TELLIS: It is a connection, but the connection is extended. If India's insurgencies were purely internal insurgencies, the problems that you flag would not arise. Because India's internal insurgencies, at least in some cases, have some external connection, you end up making military force relevant in two ways. One, substantial fractions of your military capacity have to be diverted from their proper external defense function to coping with what are internal threats. So, that's one effect. The second, because the internal insurgencies have some external links, you end up having to start thinking of at least how some of your military capabilities will be used not merely to defeat the insurgency, but also their foreign sponsors, and so both those elements become interactive in this process.

Now, it varies from service to service. The army faces the biggest burden on the first issue because internal insurgencies are manpower-intensive and they soak up a substantial amount of manpower. It actually prevents the capitalization or the recapitalization of the Indian Army because they simply cannot trade labor for machines because they need boots on the ground to support these insurgencies. But the second aspect interestingly makes the more capital-intensive components, like the air forces, particularly relevant. Because if you have to start thinking of

dealing with the foreign sponsors or the foreign supporters of your insurgency, most of the contingencies that Indians think about today involve the use of military forces that are rapid, flexible, and don't involve unnecessary escalation, which most people believe ground forces do. So the air power component, so the naval components become relevant.

So, you do have a loop that ties these together.

MR. DASGUPTA: I think Ashley is absolutely right with respect to the diversion of resources that happens as a result of the army having to fight insurgency. But in the case of the Naxalites, the army is not deployed there. It's primarily a police operation. It's a state government operation with some support from central paramilitary forces, so that raises sort of different questions.

The larger question of police modernization is very interesting in India. One would think that given the changing nature of the threat, right, which is -- even the manifestation of external threat primarily in an internal form, then what you should have is a diversion of resources from your regular armed forces to these other functions and other agencies that do this. But that shift has not happened, that reprioritization has not happened in earnest. The Ministry of Home has a larger budget. The Home Minister wants to do a lot of things, but his hands are tied too because constitutionally law and order belongs in the states and not at the center.

So, there's a much bigger battle with police modernization than there is with army modernization, which the central government can do by itself. I think that reprioritization at least -- some of that reprioritization should have been visible to us by now, especially after Mumbai, but it is not and that's sort of troubling as well.

MR. COHEN: Dr. Rajesh Kadian.

DR. KADIAN: Thank you, Steve. Thank you all. Actually you have been very kind to India by calling Indian military policy as strategic restraint. In fact, the Indians have not shown strategic restraint against smaller powers, whether it was the Portuguese in Goa or whether it was the IPKF in Sri Lanka.

Where they have shown strategic restraint is against bigger powers, and that's the fear of escalation more than restraint, and it's a reactive mode rather than a policy. And, therefore, I'm not so sure whether deterrents will work, and I think the title is very apt because of that.

Thank you.

MR. DASGUPTA: Actually can I add to it? First of all, Dr. Kadian has been one of our great supporters over the years, so, thank you, Rajesh for reading and rereading and critiquing all our work.

In the book we do mention this. We talk about India acting in a strategically assertive manner in a number of cases, and the forward

policy against China, by the way, in 1959 would be one of them. So India did act strategically against a bigger power as well. The IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka would be another one.

But, you know, most of these strategic -- cases of strategic assertions have actually not turned out quite well, and so the Indian politicians have taken that to heart. They have learned from it. And in fact, I would say that it has strengthened restraint. And by the way, I do think restraint is not accidental, it's quite deliberate. It's very -- it's sort of thought out as a policy.

MR. COHEN: Let me add to that the one country that does not take Indian strategic restraint seriously and will not like the argument of this book is Pakistan. And I think the major failure of Indian diplomacy is to persuade Pakistan that India is not a malevolent power that wants to see Pakistan destroyed. I don't think Indians do want to see Pakistan destroyed, especially now, because I think they realize the negative consequences of a failed Pakistan. But Pakistanis don't believe that and, in a sense, that's the supreme diplomatic challenge to India to persuade Pakistan of India's strategic restraint.

Let's see, Rodney, over here?

MR. JONES: Thanks. Rodney Jones, Policy Architects International. Kudos to the authors for getting this book done. Congratulations.

I have a couple questions that have to do with now that you've done the book and all the interviewing and things that have gone along with that that have to do with India's long-term strategic outlook on things that may happen that we're all aware of -- and I also want to say that, just as a preface to that, that I think India's lack of a monolithic or well-defined grand strategy is actually productive in an opportunistic way. It leaves it adaptive to changing circumstances and it's about changing circumstances that I'd like to ask a couple of questions.

The question really is, how do the Indian strategic planners and whoever they have to interact with on the political level, think about the outcome of Iran going nuclear on one side, and on the other, let's say, you know, to put it crudely, what might be regarded -- I hope it doesn't come to that -- but what might be regarded as a U.S. and coalition failure in Afghanistan and the consequences for Pakistan? How do these bear on Indian planning about the future?

MR. COHEN: Mike, do you want to -- actually, that's our next book, Roger. But I think you can respond.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, I probably can't answer your question very well directly because you're asking me to put myself in the mindset of an Indian planner who has certain assumptions about what might happen in Afghanistan. So I guess the best I can do is comment on the assumption you put on the table, very briefly realizing that it may or

may not be persuasive in New Delhi or anywhere else in the region. And to me the clear point is that I think the United States is much more committed than people realize. I think President Obama is much more committed than he, himself, is able to communicate so far. I think his policy is more robust than his rhetoric. And I think when you triple combat forces in a war in your first 18 months in office, you're more committed than people may assume. And that central fact needs to be thought about more and his difficulty in finding the right words to send that mixed message that he's committed, but people better not take us for granted. He's having trouble with that message. But his actions speak louder than his words, or at least people should digest the meaning of his actions at least as much.

So, I don't think the United States is likely to leave Afghanistan and, therefore, South Asia, militarily any time soon unless things really go disastrously, much worse than they're going now. Right now they're not going well, but there are glimmers of hope.

And my prediction and my interpretation of Mr. Obama's thinking is that it will take substantially more negative trends for him to sort of pull the plug on this operation or fall back on a minimalist Plan B, like the one that Bob Blackwell has usefully laid out. But I don't think that's where Obama's headed. I think he's going to see this through, at least that's his preference and his inclination, and more planning in the region

should be based on that likelihood rather than assuming we're somehow headed for the exits, which I do not think is true.

MR. DASGUPTA: If I may speak for the Indian thinkers, planners, and this respect is I think that's exactly what they are hoping for. They're hoping for the fact that President Obama is going to see this through and that the United States is not going to leave Afghanistan in a hurry and create a power vacuum that is taken over by Pakistani proxies.

SPEAKER: Our hopes, their belief, that that will be the way it plays out. Anyway, you know, (inaudible).

MR. COHEN: I have a third view, I guess, and might disagree with both Mike and Sunil. I think that the Indians want to fight the Taliban to the last U.S. Marine, and I don't see that as a sustainable policy from an American point of view, especially in terms of U.S.-Indian relations. I think we should be talking and working towards a larger regional framework where eventually you've got the Indians -- it would be the hardest thing in the world to do, but it would be easier to do than Kashmir -- get the Indians and Pakistanis to talk about cooperating on a neutral or non-aligned Afghanistan. They both would have that in their interest. Instead, I'm not sure what we're up to in terms of higher diplomacy.

I would also require -- to extend the question a little bit -- the United States and Iran to cooperate on Afghanistan. That may be even

more difficult, so those two pairs -- India-Pakistan, U.S. and Iran -- I think they hold the key to a successful outcome in Afghanistan. But, again, I'm not an Afghan expert.

Ashley, do you want to have a fourth view?

MR. TELLIS: No.

MR. COHEN: Okay. Let's see, over here. Great.

MR. DUNKERLEY: Hi. Craig Dunkerley at the NESA Center. Compliments to the authors and the other panelists.

Could I encourage the panel to expand a little about where you think the future direction of the Indian strategic nuclear arsenal might be headed? Because this afternoon we've heard a couple of different things, one has been a heavy emphasis on the theme of restraint. Another theme, though, is this recurring suggestion that there are potential disconnects between basic strategic principles and the sort of decisions or non-decisions that occur vis-à-vis individual development programs. And as new technological opportunities arise in this particular field, whether cruise missiles, ballistic missile defense, MIRVing, some of these may have stabilizing or destabilizing effects on this goal of deterrence. The panel's thoughts?

MR. COHEN: I'll say a word or two, then Ashley might want to follow up on this.

I think that the Indians -- for India to have a major nuclear

weapons program, MIRVs and, you know, sophisticated program, they're going to have to do more testing. Laboratory work only gets you so far. And if they do more testing, then I think the roof falls in in terms of the relationship with the United States and other countries. So, I think the challenge for India is to have -- grow their nuclear program, but without testing.

The danger is, in fact, that the Pakistanis may -- are racing them and the Chinese are, also. So India's faced with the de facto nuclear arms race with both Pakistan and China, two countries with -- especially in the case of the Chinese, have no problem testing. So, I think the testing is a big barrier for the Indians.

Ashley, would you like to --

MR. TELLIS: Well, I would just say that if -- this is a very peculiar race in South Asia because the evidence shows that the Indians are not racing, which can mean one of two things: either they are, in fact, racing and nobody else knows about it because they're doing it so efficiently in terms of their ability to do denial and deception, or they actually believe in a minimal deterrent even if others don't believe it.

And so if you look at some of the indicators, like, for example, fissile material for military purposes, the ballistic missile production, it's biased heavily towards the low end of the spectrum. And there doesn't seem to be any discernable signs that they want more if they

can get away with less.

Now, how do you explain this? There are two explanations. One is they are truly strategically messed up, that is they don't understand the relationship between requirements and what they actually have to do.

The other is a bureaucratic explanation, that the drivers of their program are essentially part of the civilian nuclear establishment who consider nuclear weapons to be second rate things compared to other civilian applications of nuclear energy and so, when faced with a tradeoff, will continue to put most of their resources in civilian applications, (inaudible) cycle, what have you, rather than go out and build bigger and better bombs. There are more details to this story, but that's a second hypothesis.

And the third is simply that India's civilian leadership just believes that nuclear weapons are such powerful deterrents that you really don't need too many of them as long as you are convinced that your adversaries don't know what you have and where you have them. The assumption being that these devices are such nasty things that even having a handful of them buys you all the deterrents you need in most of the conceivable scenarios that Indian policymakers think is relevant.

Now, whether this changes in the out years will be interesting to watch. But today what I find most surprising is the Indian's reluctance to race, even though there is enough evidence in the West that,

as Steve points out, the Chinese and the Pakistanis are moving at a fairly rapid clip.

MR. COHEN: Right here.

DR. CHAUDHRY: Dr. Nisar Chaudhry with Pakistan American League. I must say that Steve has written a book and there's nothing --

MR. COHEN: And Sunil.

DR. CHAUDHRY: -- no surprising thing when he writes a book. What's surprising is that intriguing title he has given to the book. That's very intriguing, I must say. And I think -- I wonder why he thinks Indians are so dumb they are building military, but they don't know what they will use -- what they will do with this military. It is understandable when you make weapons, you use them, also. It has happened in history always.

The other thing, Mike had mentioned that the biggest threat to Indian domestic insurgency, because threat and even Prime Minister has mentioned it, that (inaudible) because security threat to India domestically when it comes to insurgency, you don't need nuclear submarines to fight insurgency. And he very simply fired this thing that in Bombay attack, if something happened again, then India might choose to go on a different route. But I am surprised that -- is it that simple? If al Qaeda wants India and Pakistan to go in a war, they just have to have

another attack inside India? Will it be enough to bring India to attack Pakistan?

And the other thing is that in India, we should understand that India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, their territorial integrity is interdependent because if any one of them starts cracking or breaking it will have a domino effect. And for that matter we should really be working to reinforce those things.

The other -- my question is coming. I am getting close to my question, also. The population of India below poverty level, I think somebody can come up with what is the exact figure, and all the resources -- state -- resources of the state which are being utilized to build elements of human destruction, why they cannot be used to improve the quality of life, living conditions, and infrastructure and giving a future to the people of India, to the people of the region, to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and all these.

And my question is if Mahatma Gandhi, who was a known champion for peace, if he was alive today, what kind of advice do you think he will give to the Indian leadership?

MR. COHEN: We'll take that as a comment, not a question, but it's a good comment.

Gentleman all the way in the back in the purple shirt.

MR. KASSIN: Muhammad Kassin, a retired World Banker

and once upon a time foreign service officer to the United States.

We are prisoners of the past. And when you talk about military, it's at least two wars in the past. But, of course, we have to project that in a linear fashion, which makes forecasts very difficult, especially about the future.

I would like you to comment on the macro side, in the sense that the borders were imposed by the British on the locals. And I think (inaudible) has described very well the Chinese border which was imposed by the viceroy of India -- British viceroy of India in Delhi acting for his empress back in London. And then Mountbatten acted on his emperor, Winston Churchill, slicing up India and Pakistan in six weeks.

So, you know, you are not the British empire anymore. I address the Indians, why is this border so solid?

And secondly, on Pakistan, you had an enormous tragedy. What are the opportunities that you see for this bigger dealmaker?

MR. COHEN: Let me comment on that, not the last part of it because I think we're still discovering what's happening in Pakistan. It's mostly bad, but there could be a good side to it. But let me comment on your first -- the implications of the first part of the question and that is India and Pakistan writ large. That's my next book. So, hopefully, three years from now we'll be sitting here and I'll tell you all about -- the title tentatively is *The Second Hundred Years War*. They've got 62 years of war right now

-- conflict right now. It's only another 38 or something -- I forgot my arithmetic is bad -- but so I think that this is one of the intractable conflicts of the world. Now it's been nuclearized and it extends to culture, it extends to diplomacy. Kashmir is just part of it.

So, I think I want to look at that and think about it deeply as best I can and see whether the second hundred years war is going to go on indefinitely or whether there's some way of getting out of this. So, let me defer the answer to your question for another three years or so.

Gentleman in the back over there.

MR. WALTON: Timothy Walton, Delex Consulting Studies and Analysis.

Over the last couple years we've read about Indian and Chinese infrastructure modernizations along the borders and troop movements and the like. India's been modernizing its military and it seems, as you suggested, its strategic culture is changing to an extent. Will India arm and aim towards China?

MR. COHEN: Sunil? Read the book?

MR. DASGUPTA: I think the thesis of the book is that the Indian government does not have an interest right now, and obviously as you go into the future things get iffier, but it doesn't seem like the Indian government wants a direct confrontation with the Chinese government. And I think mostly -- it's partly because India is way behind China in

military and economic terms, but also because I think they do see that kind of arms racing as counterproductive to nation building at home. And so what you do see, in fact, in the last 10, 12 years, especially -- and starting with about Kargil, that India and China have actually tried to develop something of a cooperative relationship, though clearly there is this infrastructure -- military infrastructure development work that's going on. But largely in Kargil and during the Kargil War, for instance, China did distance itself a little bit from Pakistan and that was -- that sort of stabilized the situation a little bit.

So -- and I think Indian leaders have gone out of their way repeatedly to say that the relationship with the United States, for instance, is not aimed against China, which is the primary, I think, Chinese concern with -- security concern with respect to India.

MR. COHEN: Moeed, right there.

MR. YOUSEF: Thank you. Moeed Yousef (phonetic) from USIB. Congratulations, Steve and Sunil. Both of you have been mentors in different ways. And if you remember, actually, you guys brought me in when you were doing your idea of Pakistan book to Brookings, so we've worked together.

A question on this issue of disconnect between what India requires and where it's looking for technology acquisition for the sake of it. And I'm thinking specifically of things at the higher end of the technological

sort of spectrum, like BMD, for instance. Now, India may be acquiring those things for technological reasons. I remember being on a panel with Ashley where we had this discussion of the BMD, but what does it do to strategic stability in the region in the meanwhile?

Because a country like Pakistan is going to respond with its own measures as India makes these acquisitions, whether or not they are targeted at Pakistan at all. And if the title of the book says something, it says that Pakistan cannot be sure because India is not sure where the aim is. So, if we sort of project this forward, am I correct in saying that Pakistan is probably going to become more and more paranoid about these acquisitions and thus either this rivalry really goes 200 years and becomes much more dangerous with nuclear weapons there or there is a very, very urgent need for countries like the U.S. and perhaps bilaterally Pakistan and India, to find a public diplomacy channel, to find ways to actually bring their conflicts to a resolution before we get to that stage?

MR. COHEN: Ashley, you want to talk about BMD? Because you're --

MR. TELLIS: Well, I -- you know, the simple and somewhat facetious answer is welcome to the security dilemma. I think this is inevitable that you will have acquisitions on either side which are going to be seen as threatening by the other, and each side will have very good reasons for what they set out to do in terms of their own frames of

reference and they will run all the risks that come from a competitive response by the other.

There are very few instances where states have actually been able to manage their competition. The U.S. and the Soviet Union provide two good counter examples, one in the nuclear arena and the other in the conventional arms limitations or the CFE process. But remember, both those dynamics came into play in the context of strategic excess on both sides. I mean, there was such a surfeit of capabilities that getting rid of marginal capabilities actually had some benefits.

I don't see the subcontinent as being in that position today. Each side believes that certain marginal additions has greater than proportionate benefits. And so they will go out and acquire those capabilities and then you will have a process that requires counter response.

I just don't see this disappearing.

MR. DISGUPTA: Well, the security dilemma is a very important thing to keep in mind. I think India and Pakistan are going to have to sort this out a little bit over time. Remember -- keep in mind as well that in terms of nuclear weapons and in terms of the building of the nuclear arsenal, India has not wanted to race. And lots of reports -- there are lots of reports out now saying that the Pakistani missile program, the Pakistani fissile material production, have increased much faster than the

Indians expect, want, but it still hasn't moved the Indians to sort of get into a race.

Now, given that constraint at the highest level -- highest technological level, in a way, the weapons that are being bought, the conventional weapons that are bought, may or may not have a muted effect. But I don't think -- I agree with Ashley, which is there's going to be -- they're going to have to play out the security dilemma again over some period of time.

MR. COHEN: I'm slightly more optimistic that they can both acquire the weapons for symbolic purposes, like you have airlines and football stadiums and soccer teams, cricket teams now, in South Asia, but maybe they can agree that some of these weapons can be bought only in token numbers. Maybe I'm enough of an idealist to believe that.

We have time for one more question. This gentleman over here.

MR. WEINTRAUB: I'm Leon Weintraub, University of Wisconsin, Washington Semester of International Affairs.

Steve Cohen mentioned the need for the Indians to convince the Pakistanis of their real intentions. Also considering the serious military risks inherent in the situation, also taking into account the relatively open polities we have both in India and Pakistan, and the broad level of intellectual depth available in both societies, I wonder is this not a

situation ripe for the extensive use of a Track II diplomacy or back-channel diplomacies that perhaps might be able to get some serious discussions going that might not be capable at the official government to government level?

MR. DASGUPTA: Steve, you are the Track II guru.

MR. COHEN: Well, I sort of gave up on Track II a long time ago because I thought it was an opportunity for a lot of formers to meet and burn up a lot of airline miles and really say nothing. And about 15 years ago, I started working with younger Indians and Pakistanis and Chinese when I was with the Ford Foundation, and I thought that was far more useful. Unfortunately, it's not as fundable as getting the formers together.

I'm very skeptical of Track II diplomacy. I think back-channel diplomacy is important, but most of Track II diplomacy is a waste of time.

There's a new book out by -- what's his name -- Kupchan, Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends.* And Kupchan, who's a political scientist at Georgetown, argues that these things don't happen from the bottom up, they happen from the top down. So there has to be a strategic decision by senior policymakers in one or both countries to normalize, then all the Kumbaya moments follow after that: trade, people-to-people movement. So I tend to be skeptical about Track II. And I do think you need to work at the very top to explain to policymakers that

they're driving their country over a cliff and there may be somebody else in the vicinity that can help them.

So I'm weary about Track II as such. I think of it as a part of a larger comprehensive peace plan, but by itself it won't get very far.

Let me thank my co-panelists, especially my co-author Sunil, Ashley, and Mike for their thoughts. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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