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REDISCOVERING PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD'S HOTSPOTS: A VIEW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SOLOMON: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to Brookings. I see that we are almost at a full house this afternoon, so I'd like to thank all of you for your interest and for joining us this afternoon.

I'm Andrew Solomon, a fellow here in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings as well as deputy director of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, which, as some of you may know, formally supports the mandate of the UN Secretary-General's representative on internal displacement and IDP issues.

Our event this afternoon, which we're very pleased to be co-hosting with our Brookings colleagues from the Managing Global Insecurity Project, will focus on efforts by the United Nations and other actors in the area of conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of violence around the world, in many ways violence which gives rise to internal displacement. And we'll look at it, the efforts of the UN, to address conflict through preventative diplomacy, mediation, and other tools that are associated with conflict prevention and mitigation.

We're gathering here today about 10 days after a special debate at the United Nations Security Council at which time many members affirmed or at least stressed the need to transform the organization -- that organization's culture of responding after conflict into a culture of conflict prevention, one that includes tools and cost-effective measures such as preventative diplomacy, and integrating these into comprehensive strategies and approaches for peace and security.

Now, this is a topic which involves many complex issues, not only those that relate to the politics and the architecture of international peace and security, peace-building, and also peace-keeping operations, but it's one that has other dimensions that include the humanitarian, including issues of responsibility of national governments as well as international actors for the protection of civilians; issues of justice and accountability, and the extent to which and how to deal with those who are accused of mass atrocities and human rights violations; and also issues of economic development

and poverty reduction, both of which are linked to conflict and conflict prevention.

Now, fortunately, today we have with us three leading experts and practitioners in this field, including the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, to help us unpack the many issues related to conflict and conflict prevention and to better understand their many complexities. So I'm very pleased to get us underway this afternoon by introducing our principal speaker, United Nations Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe.

As head of the UN Department of Political Affairs, which is a post that he's held since March of 2007, Under-Secretary-General Pascoe advises the Secretary-General of the United Nations on political matters and on peace-keeping -- peace-making around the world. He also oversees more than a dozen UN political peace-building and good office missions around the world in places such Iraq, Somalia, Cyprus, Western Sahara, and elsewhere in the Middle East, West Africa, and South and Central Asia.

Prior to serving in his current role, Mr. Pascoe had a long and successful career as a U.S. diplomat and Foreign Service officer, having served as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and to Malaysia. At the Department of State he served as the deputy assistant secretary in the Europe and Eurasia Bureau, and as U.S. special negotiator for regional conflicts for the former Soviet Union.

Among his many other achievements and accomplishments, which are listed in the full bios that you should have in front of you, I would just note that Mr. Pascoe previously served as a special advisor to the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

The Under-Secretary-General will get us underway by providing remarks this afternoon on the progress to date and the ongoing challenges -- the political, the financial, and the institutional challenges -- that face the UN in its efforts to strengthen their capacity and the capacity of UN partners to prevent and to respond to conflicts through mediation and diplomacy. Afterwards, we'll hear from our two discussants today: David Smock of the U.S. Institute of Peace and Paul Stares of the Council on Foreign

Relations, both of whom I'll introduce more fully once we move into phase 2 of our event today. And then we'll finish up -- we should have plenty of time for a good interactive session of questions and answers.

So with that, Mr. Under-Secretary-General.

MR. PASCOE: Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to be here. It's always fun to be in Washington and I enjoy it a lot. It's fun to be at The Brookings Institution.

Let me just begin by thanking Brookings for this opportunity to speak about some of the work of the UN in conflicts around the world. While academic studies seem to conclude that conflicts have actually been declining in recent years, it doesn't feel that way from our vantage point in New York. From Sudan to the DRC, Afghanistan to Iraq, Somalia to Madagascar, South Lebanon to South Kyrgyzstan, Nepal to Sri Lanka, the Maldives to Pakistan, there seems to be no shortage of flashpoints to consume our energies.

Crises and conflicts are not disappearing as much as they're evolving in nature. They're still overtaxing the abilities of governments' regional and global institutions to respond. With more blue helmets in the field than at any time in our history, UN peacekeeping has been straining under the burden of trying to contain conflicts. The global financial crisis, meanwhile, only adds to the sense of fatigue internationally with the massive costs of far-away conflicts and their aftermath.

At the United Nations these factors are contributing to a rediscovery -- or a rebirth, if you will -- of preventive diplomacy and mediation as a cost-effective option for dealing with crises. Member states are seeking better-tailored approaches all along the conflict cycle and, in doing so, they're having a fresh look at the old art -- diplomacy and mediation -- that somehow had become less fashionable in recent years than other UN instruments.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has led this effort in New York. From the outset of his administration he has been pushing for a reinvigorated use of preventive

diplomacy. He's made it a priority to rebalance our capability so that diplomats and mediators can be mobilized as first responders to trouble. And, of course, he is active in this area every day himself, talking with global leaders in person or over the telephone, cajoling participants in conflicts to resolve differences, and urging others to use their influence to help.

The Security Council is also focusing on these themes and the members states in the developing world, particularly African countries, are among the most enthusiastic. As was mentioned at a special session two weeks ago on preventive diplomacy in Africa, the council members were strongly united in calling for earlier and more frequent use of preventive diplomacy as a way to save lives and scale back costly military commitments on the Continent.

Preventing conflict is easier said than done, of course. The challenge is to translate this political and rhetorical commitment into effective preventive action in the field. My department, the Department of Political Affairs, is at the center of this effort. And I want to talk a little bit about the progress we are making and the challenges we face.

Our end goal is really quite clear: It's to become better in not only stabilizing conflicts and easing the sufferings they cause, but also at preventing and resolving them through political means. Progress towards this end is in the interest of all members states, not the least, I might add, of the United States, which has renewed its own commitment to diplomacy as an instrument for solving the problems in the world.

The case for more robust political action for peace in the world's hotspots begins with three simple propositions. First, at the root of most conflicts that may or perhaps already have turned violent are political problems requiring political solutions. Security interventions can provide breathing space from the bloodshed, but they rarely settle the underlying differences that drive the conflict, such as the ethnic and religious question or disparities in wealth and power. Is there any doubt, for example, that security gains alone will not put Iraq and Afghanistan on stable footing for the future? Or that the

challenges to peace in Sudan are largely political in nature?

Second, we know that distrust among national actors in conflict often run so high that they are unable to arrive at the necessary compromises without help in the form of international mediation, facilitation, or diplomatic encouragement. To those problems the UN brings a special legitimacy, impartiality, and, we hope, real competence to the table as a universal organization that really has no dog in the various fights. It can also pull in the UN's development, human rights, and humanitarian machinery behind a peace agreement and lead in the follow-on peace-building effort.

Third, we know there is a place for political action before, during, and after a conflict. Ideally, we want to prevent violence from erupting in the first place. But even if that fails, robust diplomacy and mediation is still required to end the fighting through negotiations and then to help countries navigate the difficult politics of reconciliation and rebuilding. Too many nations fail at this last stage and slide right back into conflict.

There is often a clear need for regional and international mediation to manage tense electoral disputes or to reverse coups or other unconstitutional changes in governments. Sometimes I need to say that a well-managed election is the best form of prevention available. Sometimes it causes more problems.

In rising to meet these challenges, the United Nations neither starts from scratch nor does it usually work alone. We have a substantial track record in peace-making dating to Ralph Munch, a relatively united Security Council in support of our actions, and ever-stronger partnerships with key governments and regional organizations, such as the African Union or the OSCE.

It is work that often lacks the high-profile of blue-helmeted peacekeepers on patrol or humanitarian convoys rushing aid to starving people. But I must say that our goal in this effort is results and not visibility.

Let me turn to some of the keys to successful preventive diplomacy. One is getting to the action quickly when trouble appears. Kenya, in 2008, is one

encouraging example. Of course, it was the African Union led by Kofi Annan that was at the forefront and the publicity on the mediation effort. But we in the UN were there early and actively working behind the scenes. We quickly deployed political officers, electoral, constitutional, and security experts that became the main support staff for the mediator as he helped the parties forge the agreements to end the crisis. I think few would contest that prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent an even larger catastrophe.

Another key to success is being out there, close to the action and the players, with a finger on the pulse. Anyone who's worked in conflict resolution knows that close proximity to the countries and deep knowledge of the actors is one of the most important assets. Unlike a country such as the United States, the UN does not have a global network of embassies. The UN Development Offices located in most countries is not really designed to do political work. A political presence or active involvement in troubled countries is, therefore, critical for us to be able to make a difference.

Our main platforms today for preventive diplomacy in the field are the dozen political missions present in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These include the UN missions in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as mission in Nepal, Lebanon, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somalia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic. We have regional missions in Central Asia and West Africa. We also, of course, work with our peacekeeping colleagues as needed in the countries where they have missions.

Each of the political missions I mentioned is headed by a senior representative of the Secretary-General and most have either an explicit mandate or tacit acceptance by the local parties to use the UN's good offices to help keep tensions in check and encourage dialogue and agreements to move peace and political processes forward. They're usually working alongside regional and subregional organizations in the area as well as with influential governments who have a key interest in resolving the conflicts.

These missions are relatively lean, inexpensive civilian operations that

can achieve impressive results. I'll mention a few examples.

In Iraq, UNAMI has helped broker compromises and offered expertise to keep elections on track as well as to encourage dialogue on such explosive issues as the future of Kirkuk. In Lebanon, the diplomatic activity of our Beirut-based political envoy adds to the role of U.S. peacekeepers in the South and smoothing the tensions there and easing problems with regional neighbors. In Sierra Leone last year, the head of our political mission literally had to scamper up to the roof of a building in Freetown to diffuse a situation that could have triggered a relapse in the conflict. He brokered a political agreement that has helped to keep the country's hard-fought peace process on track.

The Sierra Leone mission is actually called a peace-building mission as are those in Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. They're deployed to help guide the peace after violent internal conflicts.

Our West Africa-focused envoy based in Dakar has played a very helpful role -- along with ECOWAS and the African Union mediators; and governments, including the United States and France -- in responding to coups and electoral crises through the region. At latest count, he has traveled to Guinea 38 times in the past 2 years, working to keep the political transition there on-track. We're not out of the woods yet in Guinea, but it could become a prime example of preventive diplomacy saving us all from another terrible and costly conflict.

I should also mention Kyrgyzstan and the efforts of our Regional Office for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia to help ease the crisis there. Since the ouster of President Bakiyev in April, our senior envoy based in Turkmenistan has been shuttling back and forth to Bishkek. He works closely with the OSCE, other organizations, and bilateral representatives to help keep the political transition on track, promote reconciliation, and prevent a recurrence of conflict.

Most of these efforts are mentioned only infrequently, if at all, in the press. But it's this kind of quiet political intervention by the UN that can pay great dividends at very little cost. We have found the two regional offices particularly valuable

and we're now well advanced in setting up a third one in Central Africa to deal with the multiple tensions still simmering in that region.

I should note that we also face a number of obstacles in increasing the scope and effectiveness of UN action in preventive diplomacy. First, government leaders sometimes do not want our help. Early involvement is often essential to success, but parties sometimes are not willing to admit that they have a problem until it has escalated beyond their control. They may think they can avoid legitimizing an adversary or "internationalizing" their problem by keeping the UN away or they may wrongly believe that UN involvement will lead quickly to a large peacekeeping force or Security Council sanctions.

A second set of challenges to boost our capacity are financial. As a former U.S. diplomat I must say I watch very sympathetically the efforts of Secretaries Clinton and Gates to defend the State Department budget and make the case for reinvesting in diplomacy. A similar battle has been fought over the years at the United Nations to reverse the chronic underfunding and understaffing at the Department of Political Affairs. This trend has begun to be reversed, but we still have a long way to go.

As we know with peacekeeping, as it expanded in the '90s to meet spiraling demands of the time, the peacekeeping efforts were taken off the regular biannual budget and put on a special budgetary track for the very clear reason that in these matters of life and death, speed and flexibility count. Political missions have remained on the UN's regular budget process, which is far less capable of responding to fast-breaking crises. We have so far been able to bridge the gap only through extra-budgetary funding, but this is becoming harder to get under the current financial restrictions in many countries.

The third set of challenges relates to our own professionalism. Effective diplomacy and mediation is not only about being there or about being fast, it is also about being good at what we do. Success requires more than simply naming a top-flight envoy and starting up an airplane. Mediation is a complex and increasingly professionalized

field. Envoys need more than their own guile to guide them. They need strong, well-trained staff support and adequate funding and logistics. I mentioned the 38 visits from our West Africa envoy. He has a plane that he can do that. Otherwise, he'd be going through Paris every day for all of the other travels.

And they also need strategic advice. They must have at their fingertips the lessons learned from past and comparative experience as they take on new mediation challenges. This is the unglorious reality behind the scenes of a mediation effort, but it can make or break an operation.

The Department of Political Affairs is making a concerted effort to fill this mediation support gap. We have set up a Mediation Support Unit to backup our regional desk and we have a small team of world-class experts on issues such as power-sharing, constitutions, and cease-fires that can be deployed on-call -- i.e., within 48 hours -- to help envoys in the field.

We're also developing standard guidance and training for mediators and their staff, distilling the best lessons from others' experience and debriefing all of our envoys at the completion of their assignments to better find out what works and what doesn't. We're also helping regional organizations, like the African Union, to develop their own mediation capacities and nourishing the close ties necessary to enable us to address crises together.

In conclusion, let me just say that my years as a diplomat have convinced me that modesty and patience are required in any discussions of preventive diplomacy. I know that some progress aside, the United Nations and the international community as a whole still have a long way to go before we can reliably predict, prevent, and respond through diplomacy to reduce the extent of conflict around the world. Some drivers of conflict, including economic and social disparities, and the unpredictable whims of kleptocrats or third-rate leaders, are beyond the immediate reach of preventive diplomacy.

That said, we at the United Nations are in a much better position today

than we were even three years ago to make a positive contribution. This trend should continue as the number of -- as member governments of the organization dedicate more of their attention and support to preventive action. And the more we use our skills, the better we will become.

We also know that for every case in which preventive diplomacy succeeds, there will be others in which it falls short, or perhaps the successes will prove to be short-lived. Political will, the number one ingredient for peace, cannot easily be generated where it's lacking. However, there's one thing we can control and that is whenever the services are required, the UN must make a world-class effort, and we will certainly be doing it with our partners, such as the United States.

Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Mr. Under-Secretary-General. We'll now move into what I call phase 2 of our event, the discussion phase. And I'm very pleased to be able to more fully introduce our two discussants, both of whom I suspect many of you already know.

Beginning with David Smock, who is vice president of the Center of Mediation and Conflict Resolution at the United States Institute of Peace, where he also serves as vice president of the Institute's Religion and Peace-Making Program. Dr. Smock has worked on African issues for about 30 years and has lived in Africa for over a decade, including as a staff member of the Ford Foundation between 1964 and 1980, during which time he also -- he served in Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, as well as New York.

In addition, he served as director of the South African Education Program and vice president for program development and research for the Institute of International Education. Then after serving as executive associate to the president of the United Church of Christ, Dr. Smock became executive director of international voluntary services where he supervised development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

I'm also very pleased to be able to introduce Paul Stares, someone who

is certainly no stranger to many of us here at Brookings. Dr. Stares is currently a senior fellow for conflict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he oversees a series of council special reports on potential sources of instability and strife, and where he's also working on a study assessing the long-term conflict trends. Dr. Stares recently led an expert working group on preventative diplomacy for the Genocide Prevention Task Force and is also a member of the East-West Institute's International Task Force on Preventative Diplomacy.

Prior to joining CFR, Paul was the vice president and director of the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at USIP, so he's a former colleague of David's. And also held senior research positions around the world, including here at Brookings.

So, David, why don't you get us underway?

MR. SMOCK: Okay. Thank you, Andrew.

Before I start, let me plug a series of publications that USIP has produced at the encouragement of the Mediation Support Unit of the UN, and we have done this in close collaboration with the UN. The first one is called "Managing a Mediation Process," and this is a peacemaker's toolkit. We have five other volumes that have been published and six more in process. They're free of charge. They can be downloaded from our website and I encourage you to have a look at them. I want to take my time to look at several African cases, not just the preventive diplomacy, but also mediation and peacemaking where the UN has played a particularly important role with some successes and some not-so-successful situations.

Western Sahara. Nineteen years of efforts to make peace in Western Sahara with a succession of different UN mediators. One of the problems that's been confronted is that UN member states are divided in terms of which of the parties they're supportive of, with the U.S., Spain, and France being strongly supportive of the Moroccan position; with Algeria and its allies supporting Polisario. So the UN has largely been hamstrung in terms of being assertive in its mediation efforts because of the divisions

among member states and which side should be given priority and preference.

Somalia. Another 19 years of, in this case, chaos in Somalia. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the SRSG for Somalia, has -- until recently has done yeoman service in trying to bring peace there. The Djibouti Agreement that he helped mediate at the time looked like a very positive development, looked like it was going to get us over the hump on the road to success. It has proved otherwise; gone back to chaos. One of the problems here is neighboring states -- Eritrea and Ethiopia -- fighting, supporting different elements in the Somalia situation with Ethiopia supporting the transitional federal government and Eritrea most likely providing support to al-Shabaab. So it's been very difficult for the UN in addition to facing an impossible situation in Somalia to deal with member states who are supporting the competing factions there.

Eritrea and Ethiopia. It's just amazing that they haven't gone back to war after the arbitration decisions setting out the boundary between the -- that brought the war to an end between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the Ethiopians refusing to accept the arbitrator's decision. And in part this is due to an unwillingness, particularly on the part of the United States, to be more assertive with Ethiopia and insisting that they accept the arbitrator's decision with the U.S. deciding that there are other issues that are -- our relations with Ethiopia that are more important, particularly on cooperation in Somalia and in counterterrorism.

Kenya. Very interesting case that Mr. Pascoe mentioned. Kofi Annan retired from his position at the UN, at least nominally representing the AU, but primarily in his personal capacity, but supported not only by the UN, but by some important NGOs, like the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. An interesting example the Aceh -- the settlement of the Aceh conflict, again done by an individual representing an NGO rather than the UN or another nation.

Zimbabwe, another frustrating case. Here the UN largely nudged aside by SADC, the regional organization in Southern Africa, asserting its prerogatives to handle a regional conflict situation, but being unwilling to be as assertive as the situation

required in Zimbabwe to bring about a resolution of that ongoing conflict.

Sudan has been a complex case, another case of some tension between a regional organization and the UN, although not as serious as some others. After the Abuja negotiations, dual mediators were appointed: one by the AU, Salim Salim, and Jan Eliason for the UN. While they did work together, there was some tension and conflict over who was to play the principal role. They were followed by the appointment of a joint mediator by the UN and the AU, Bassole, who, unfortunately, has not been very effective, but in the face of a very difficult mediation situation.

Libya and Egypt also at various points tried to assert their roles as mediators. Qatar, the current mediation is taking place in Doha, and Qatar as the host wants to play the role of mediator as well.

But the problems go beyond the mediators. The fragmentation of rebel groups, I met with some of the JEM leadership on Friday and I asked them what would it take to get you to go back to the negotiating table? And they outlined 10 different difficult conditions that they would -- said had to be met before they would go back to the negotiating table. Again, the involvement of regional powers with Chad having been providing, until recently, military support to JEM and the rivalry between Sudan and Chad with each side supporting rebels against other countries and with the government of Sudan creating a whole host of difficulties and with the unwillingness of the most popular rebel leader, Abdel Wahid, to negotiate at all.

A somewhat more positive scenario is playing out this last week in Juba, the negotiation between the North and South in anticipation of the referendum for secession of the South, which will -- the referendum will take place in January. And two very effective mediators working quite successfully together: the SRSG from the UN, Haile Menkerios; and the AU envoy, Thabo Mbeki. And USIP was involved providing technical assistance last week in Juba, but they have a long way to go before they sort out all the issues in the North/South difficulties. But it was a successful weekend. I think that both the AU and the UN envoys are playing effective roles with Mbeki taking the

principal lead.

Let me summarize some of the difficulties that I've identified. One is competition between the UN and regional organizations. Second is the lack of evenhandedness by some of the member organizations at the UN in confronting some of these conflict situations. Third is multiple mediators or powers putting themselves forward as mediators. Fourth is the fragmentation of factions. And fifth is neighboring countries supporting, often with military support, one faction or another in a conflict zone.

Finally, I want to suggest two approaches to preventive action that have been underutilized. One I will call problem-solving. This is not just offering to mediate, but it's an effort to identify what some of the problems are that are creating the conflict and then offering your services in an effort to help sort out that problem and reach a resolution. To some extent that's what we've been doing last week in Juba in the North/South negotiations, offering expert advice on debts and assets and the oil situation, in addition to the popular consultation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile with an expert providing advice to the governor on how the popular consultation might go forward.

A Nigerian example is Oronto Douglas, the advisor to the president of Nigeria on the Niger Delta. We met with him a few months back and he identified one of the approaches that they want to take in relation to the Niger Delta to bring more of the oil revenues to communities in the Niger Delta, to bring 10 percent of the oil revenues to the communities there as a way of satisfying their demands for greater participation in the spoils of the oil production. But he said there are many problems involved in trying to implement this 10 percent formula, and so offered to provide technical advice and we're now preparing a paper for Oronto Douglas and the government of Nigeria on how this 10 percent formula might be implemented.

There are many, many examples of how this problem-solving approach might be adopted rather than waiting for just bringing the parties together to mediate, to identify what the problems are, and providing technical advice on how they might resolve -- be resolved.

Secondly, another approach is to convene a group of eminent persons to assess the issues and work with the parties, not as formal mediators, but as advisors on how to resolve the conflict. And USIP is currently involved in two such efforts behind the scenes, not public, under the radar, but, hopefully, being helpful.

I'll stop there.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, David. Before I turn it over to Paul, I just want to do something of a plug for a Brookings tool, which David referred to: the peacemaker toolkit series from USIP. There are copies of one of these that The Brookings Institution participated in developing on integrating internal displacement into peace processes. I think these tools are very practical. If you take a look at them, they can be very useful. We developed them in consultation with mediators and we're very pleased that they fed into the Mediation Support Unit, which the Under-Secretary-General mentioned as part of their efforts to really provide mediators on the ground with that professional support that's required to be effective.

So, Paul, with that.

MR. STARES: Okay, thanks. Thanks, Andrew. It's great to be back at Brookings where I spent many years as a scholar in the '80s and '90s. And it's also gratifying seeing you all out there, that a topic that's very dear to me should garner over 100 people on a hot day in July. So it's quite gratifying to see everybody here.

When I saw David on the panel I was a little concerned that we would be sort of repeating ourselves since we used to be colleagues together at USIP. But whereas David, I think, focused more on individual cases, I'm going to try and take a broader overview, a kind of 30,000-foot view of the challenges ahead.

In listening to Under-Secretary-General Pascoe's comments, I couldn't help feeling a strong sense of déjà vu. As he would readily admit, successive Secretary-Generals since the end of the Cold War have all extolled the virtues of conflict prevention, have made the shift to a culture of prevention a priority for the UN. And unfortunately, these things have gone in cycles. The performance hasn't always matched aspirations.

And I think, you know, to be fair, there are obvious reasons for this and why it's been difficult for the UN to live up to its aspirations to do more in the area of conflict prevention.

I think the most obvious reason is that most conflict today is civil conflict internal to a state. The UN was set up 75 years ago to deal essentially with interstate conflict and provided the normative -- a very valuable normative framework for dealing with interstate conflict. But this has made it hard for the UN to deal with internal conflict, civil strife, and to be proactive in that area. It cannot develop really in any real form a dedicated early warning system, conflict early warning system, because states are suspicious that this will be used to spy on them. It cannot carry out really detailed contingency planning for early preventive action, again because states are resistant to that kind of intervention or suggestive intervention in their internal affairs. So the states are just basically unwilling to countenance that and, moreover, pay for any capability that suggests that there's going to be intervention re-capabilities, with some exceptions and I'll get into that in a minute.

So it's not surprising that the main contribution to conflict management by the UN has essentially been on the backend: the peacekeeping, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction. And, of course, that's played a very important preventive role in preventing the re-ignition of conflict. And I think one of the underappreciated roles of the UN since certainly the mid-'90s in bringing down the level of conflict that Lynn Pascoe mentioned has been the role of the UN in various peacekeeping operations around the world. But these operations are immensely expensive and draining on the resources of the UN, both the political and financial resources, which is then leading us back to revisiting -- a rebirth I think is the term that Lynn mentioned -- of the virtues or imperatives of conflict prevention.

Now, I think there are some encouraging signs that things are moving in the right direction. The DPA that Mr. Pascoe heads has received further support and funding to fill out new staff positions, both in New York and in the field, and provided more funding for reaction to crises that break out at short notice, contingency funding.

There are support for these niche capabilities in terms of mediation support, more emphasis on anticipating violence around various elections that may come up, and arbitration support services, which the UN has excelled in. It's also evident in, I think, the partnerships that the UN or New York offices, the secretariat, is forging with various regional organizations, particularly the African Union. And these are all, I think, to be encouraged and supported and given the credit where it's due.

I think, however, there are still significant shortfalls, shortcomings. Much of this effort is understaffed and underfunded. The Mediation Support Unit is really very modest capacity. That's not to say it doesn't do good work and is irrelevant. Quite the contrary. And in fact, it's something that I've been urging the State Department to do and build up their own capacities in this area and essentially replicate what the UN has been doing. But I don't think we should kid ourselves that this is a major capability of the UN that it can draw on.

More troubling to me is the profusion of prevention-like initiatives at the UN that extol or have conflict prevention as part of their mandate. And it's everything not only just what the DPA does, but UNDP. There's the whole peace-building commission, which uses up a lot of resources at the UN, that has a preventive component, although it's primarily focused on post-conflict reconstruction. There's the whole "RtoP," Responsibility to Protect effort, which overlaps considerably with the Prevention of Genocide Initiative. It's, I think, a good sign that those two efforts are moving closer together and possibly will be combined and may, in fact, have been.

A third area I think has been -- and I think David intimated this, is that it's still difficult for the UN to cede lead responsibility to regional organizations, to play a secondary role, to leverage the resources of these various organizations. And I'm not here -- I'm not just talking about the obvious regional organizations, but other multilateral organizations. And I'm a big supporter of how to leverage the international financial institutions -- the IMF and World Bank -- for conflict prevention. They, I think, can play an extraordinary -- a very important role.

Now, what I worry about looking ahead is that despite these good intentions and these new capacities, that the UN is going to face some enormous challenges in the next 12 to 18 months. In the short term, we've got the situation (inaudible) in Lebanon, North Korea, Somalia is looking very shaky at the moment. The UN-supported transitional government there is under a lot of pressure at the moment. There's Burma, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, all issues that are on the sort of immediate inbox.

In 2011, some major challenges are coming up, some of which have been mentioned. The likelihood of Southern Sudan secession; the major elections coming up in Nigeria and we've already seen how parts of Nigeria are a tinderbox to interreligious conflict. David's done a lot of work in this area and can speak more authoritatively than I can about the real risks there. There's the likelihood of the UN mandate expiring in the DRC, Eastern Congo, and an upsurge in major violence there. We've got the situation in Iraq still unsettled. But with U.S. forces drawing down there's a real problem, a real threat of -- that centrifugal forces in Iraq will play a part.

And then even further ahead we've obviously got Afghanistan after the U.S. begins to draw down in the end of next year. So these are a lot of challenges. I worry that the UN could be called on to do a lot more and really not be up to the task and its credibility as a center for preventive action could be seriously compromised.

So kind of what should we do? And this obviously is easier for me to say than to enact, but I think the UN has to, given this huge set of challenges, figure out where it wants to focus its effort and pick the areas where it really can make a difference. I think nothing succeeds like success. And if it can put some up in the win column, I think it will make a big impression, a big -- make a big difference as to how the UN is perceived.

I think to the extent you can do some discrete preventive planning, as I call it, to look at how these particularly the areas they want to focus on will unfold, what different parts of the UN system can do to improve the chances of preventive action, what I would call political prepositioning, if you will, of the key actors. And obviously these

preventive plans have to be tailored for specific circumstances.

I think more effort should be done, if they can, in trying to consolidate the various activities at the UN Secretariat to streamline the various initiatives that have prevention as part of it so there's less duplication. To the extent that the UN can focus on its real comparative advantages when it looks at what it can do in any given situation, I think is also something to be considered. And by "comparative advantages" I think its roles is legitimizer of collective action, both in terms of various norms that are promoted, but also in terms of operational missions, as a convener, facilitator for parties to a conflict or parties interested in a conflict to come together to settle differences, to discuss strategies. The UN doesn't have a monopoly on that, but it is, I would say, one of the most important conveners and facilitators in the world today given its relative impartiality as an arbitrator to areas -- clear areas of flashpoint, like Kirkuk, for instance, where there was a UN mediation effort.

The technical skills that go with these efforts, both in electoral assistance, territorial arbitration, voting, and so on, I think are held by virtually no other organization in the world today. And those skills, I think, the UN can nurture in other organizations, so it's not the organization of both first and last resort.

So I think there are lots of things that can be done as the UN looks ahead at these various challenges. And it's just not -- we're going to be, I think, moving into a very, very difficult period.

And I'll leave it there. Thank you.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Paul. Well, I think we've heard a very good overview of the challenges for conflict prevention as well as how the United Nations is equipped and engages in prevention -- preventative diplomacy and other tools. We've also heard prescriptions for moving forward and how to improve on the UN's performance and its cooperation with partners around the world, and also some of the specific challenges that we're seeing in conflicts and peace processes around the world.

We'll move now to our Q&A session. But before we do that, I'd like to

give the Under-Secretary-General several moments just to respond to some of the analysis and critique of the United Nations' efforts.

MR. PASCOE: Well, thank you very much. It's, you know, a relatively cool day today. I was enjoying being back in Washington and everything else till Paul started going through his list. (Laughter) And then I felt that I should catch the shuttle earlier and get back up to New York to get at these.

No, really, both -- what both named are clearly the nightmares that we have day-in and day-out as we're trying to deal with these issues. I think one thing that is important to understand is often what comes to the UN are problems where either other people have -- or countries have tried to fix it and haven't succeeded and then after they don't succeed it comes to the UN, and then, of course, we're expected to do it in five minutes. And that's fine, I understand that. But, I mean, the list of countries that David read through, for example, I mean, are the ones that we all live with day-in and day-out, and they don't get resolved, and I think that we need to keep working on it.

On the question of help, let me say that we have gotten an enormous amount of help from both of these organizations and lots of others. I mean, all of us working at it together need to constantly be trying to improve and make the process so it will work. The fact of the matter is, though, as I keep going back to the -- and mentioning my first thing, is the list of problems out there just keep sort of extending out over the horizon. And a few we may come close to fixing; many haven't been fixed for 30 or 40 years and we all understand that. And we started out with Western Sahara, you know. I was ready to say "yep," I know all about this; because these issues are not easily fixed, so they don't seem to come to – or we don't have with enough – to figure them out, somewhere in that line. But it is a constant problem I think we have to do.

I don't make any excuses on the question of do we have resources, do we not have resources? Of course, we could always use more resources. But in some respects I think first is we've got to look at how difficult the issue is that they are often not easily resolved. If they were easily resolved, they would be resolved by now. That we

are sometimes -- when you -- when Paul was going through his list I was thinking again to myself about a country the size of the DRC, the Congo, where the UN has now been involved for 50 years. And what you had to start with was a very difficult, ungovernable place that had been left without almost no governance resources. And all of the entire international community's been struggling with it for the last 50 years without coming up with a way to do it. Whereas, if you deal with a place like Guinea, for example, now, I mean, all of us knew that when Conte died there was going to be a problem, that the military was going to take over. And then there was going to be a problem of how you make the transition. And that, with some luck along the way and a lot of work -- people working together, I think gets to be the size problem where you think we can make -- where we can do a bit better.

And finally, let me just say this question of unity of operations is absolutely critical by all of the people involved, whether it's, you know, NGOs that might be there working on the issue, whether it's governments, whether it is the big regional organizations. Because let me mention another failure that no one's mentioned yet in the place was Madagascar. We had things moving along very well in Madagascar, had agreements, the Maputo Agreement and everything else. And then the consensus inside Africa and with some of the major powers that were involved fell apart, and we very quickly found ourselves right in the middle of it. I mean, we had been making a helpful contribution. We thought that several of the ideas that we had been putting forward had been good ones. And we found out in the end that we were in an untenable position because we couldn't be there if people were not working more or less together. The UN's got to have more coherence. And we ended up having to pull our negotiator out of that, which, to me, was a sign of what can happen if we don't have the coherence that we really need to work on.

And again, I agree completely on this question about how you get regional organizations to do it, and I should have mentioned HD as part of the Kenya thing because they did -- there was an interesting sequence to that. We went there very

quickly. The Secretary-General asked Kofi Annan as well as the AU if they would be involved. He was involved. It took about a month or two before the HD operation could start gaining traction, and in that period was when we had our maximum impact and then we happily turned it over. I think it's -- I think this kind of working together on these totally intractable problems is absolutely critical if we're going to succeed.

Thank you.

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, your turn. I'd like to turn it over now to the audience. We have about a half-hour for Q&A, so if we can begin with just several questions. I see this gentleman here with his hand up. Let's start here.

SPEAKER: Hello. I'm Leon Weintraub, formerly State Department Foreign Service, now with University of Wisconsin's Washington Semester in International Affairs.

I know the discussion was essentially on international types of conflict, but a few people -- the Under-Secretary and Dr. Smock -- mentioned particularly the issue of events in Kenya. And Dr. Stares also mentioned RtoP. And I know occasionally the work of Mr. Annan was cited occasionally as an example of an effective use of RtoP.

Now, after a little bit of hurrah, if you will, about five years ago with resolutions in the General Assembly asserting RtoP and then seconded by a vote of the Security Council, I'm wondering is there anything of RtoP -- Responsibility to Protect -- as a more robust form of international intervention when we see national governments, for whatever reason, whether threatening their own citizens or incapable of or unwilling to protect their citizens, is anything likely to happen now to make RtoP more of a normative type of an idea rather than just a philosophical idea?

MR. SOLOMON: Why don't we just take several more questions and then we can ask the panelists to respond? So I see this gentleman here and then this gentleman here and then we can ask the panelists.

SPEAKER: I'm (inaudible), professor emeritus for international law from Wayne State University.

It was alluded to by all of you, especially Mr. Stares, that the UN was set up as an organization to deal with conflict between nations. It's quite obvious that we've moved, to some extent, away from that particular set of problems in the world with regard to the use of terrorism as a means of dealing with international conflicts. Terrorists don't seem to follow the kinds of rules that state leaders or those who prefer to be thought of as state leaders follow. And I'm wondering why the UN cannot perform or why it has not been able to perform more of a role there.

And the other issue, of course, is the more traditional one of the Israel-Palestine situation. This fits into a closer formula that states have represented in the past, but the UN has not played a successful role there and has not played a major role. I'm just wondering what your explanations on that.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you. Last question for this session.

MR. JEANSILTON: Thank you very much for your speech. My name is Arafel Jeansilton. I am from the (inaudible) Institute.

I am wondering does preventive diplomacy undermine in any way the prerogative right of state over the internal issues? And my second question is this: The conflict -- the preventive -- the preventive (inaudible) diplomacy of the United Nations and the trip that you have described mostly dealt with small countries. But how can the United Nations execute preventive diplomacies in China or in Russia or in some other, you know, influential countries that have some leverage in the United Nations?

Thank you very much.

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, so we have a question on RtoP, Responsibility to Protect, and its -- the future of that or its -- the usefulness of that concept. And then also the UN's role in addressing issues of terrorism in conflict prevention, Israel-Palestine. And then issues of sovereignty and how preventative diplomacy can apply in situations where larger powers are involved.

MR. PASCOE: Let me start out and be very brief and then pass it on to the others. We actually are working quite a lot on RtoP and the direction of that and the

implementation of it. Ed Luck has been working very hard to bring this together and moving it through the General Assembly as well as others. There's supposed to be a session, I think within the next couple of weeks, in the GA -- we got postponed again -- which will be, again, explicitly on RtoP to discuss this and move this through. So I think that that process is working well, although clearly it still remains controversial and there are people that argue against it. But I think nobody disagrees with everything except whether or not the international community can intervene militarily. But the whole areas that a country is responsible for protecting its people, that it may need help in working on that issue, I think there's a lot of range there that there's not much dispute on. There's only one area that I think remains disputed.

On terrorism, I think the main issue for a long time was on -- got hung up on definition of terrorism, et cetera, that the General Assembly opposed or had groups on various sides. In 2005, they came up with a definition which was not a definition, but a general statement and a way to approach terrorism. We since have been developing a much more coherent approach since that time.

Now under the Political Department I have the Counterterrorism Committee that's working to make sure all of the UN resources are headed it the same direction on counterterrorism. And I think we've had -- you know, I think we're moving into programs that can be useful. But I would say that we're about, you know, 10 years behind where we probably should in that process. We're slower than we should be, but we're beginning to get there.

On the question of Israel and Palestine, obviously it's been an issue in front of the UN since 1948, hotly contested battles, all the battle royals. More is said about Middle East policy than anything else. I give a briefing or one of my people give a briefing once a month on this issue.

Clearly both sides have wanted the U.S. to be the main mediator, not the UN, and they stick to that approach and that's fine with us. We have been very involved with Gaza because we put about -- it's something like 70 to 80 percent of the population

there is dependent on assistance from the United Nations, so that's why we have been very outspoken and emphatic on that issue.

I think on the question of preventive diplomacy and sovereignty, I think that we have had very little difficulties on that question because there's a tremendous amount of agreement that we need to work on these issues, and the lead has really been taken by the African countries as well as others that have been pushing this process. And that's not to say we don't get into arguments. I mean, you know, I've been in arguments with the Sri Lankans and others on how much we can do and how much we can't do, and that does arise and it's out there.

But I think it's clear to say that overall there's a tremendous amount of agreement that we need to avoid these disasters from happening. The UN does not go into a country or other sorts of things unless it's a Chapter 7 Security Council operation, unless we have the consent of the government. So I think in any of the areas that we work in has not been a question.

Thank you.

MR. SMOCK: I'll only make one comment on the Israel-Palestine situation. Of course, the UN is one member of the quartet. The quartet hasn't been as active or prominent as it was earlier on. But the quartet experience, Alvaro DeSoto, who was a very energetic UN representative on the quartet complained bitterly that the member states constrained him from dealing with Hamas and he felt that was a particular role that the UN might play in bringing Fatah and Hamas closer together. But -- and this is something we have to keep remembering that the UN is a membership organization and that it isn't a free actor to assert its diplomacy with a free hand. It has to be responsive to -- particularly to the stronger Perm 5 and other members of the Security Council. And he felt seriously constrained in his role there by that constraint.

MR. STARES: Let me just try to touch on each of the questions. I think on RtoP there was a lot of hope and expectation that after the passage of the key language at the Millennium Summit that this would kind of be the beginning of a new era

of activism, and I think that was unrealistic and there's been a clear reaction by many states to RtoP. And some would say that we kind of reached a high-water mark there in terms of normative development. I think that may be the case, and to continue the metaphor of sort of the tide kind of went out a little bit. But I don't think it's gone back to where it was before RtoP. And so my -- I tend to be rather more optimistic in believing that when the cases arise, the RtoP precepts will provide the kind of, let's say, the normative framework for collective action in those kinds of situations. The international community's always looking for legal precedents, if you will, or normative precedents for collective action, and I think RtoP provides a very valuable benchmark, if you will, for that in future cases.

On terrorism, I agree that we tend to focus on how the UN's got itself sort of twisted in the definitional debate, but we -- in the process we ignore, I think, some of the very useful things it's done, particularly post 9-11, the various sanctions committees and dealing with international financing and so on. And actions against al Qaeda and the Taliban I think have been quite useful, if unheralded.

On the preventive diplomacy, you know, it's just a fact of life that the UN Security Council and the UN in general could only go where the Perm 5, if you will, allows it to go. And so certain countries and certain conflicts are always going to be difficult for the UN to take on because of veto-wielding P5 members, and that's just a fact of life. And hopefully, with the reform of the Security Council, whether its membership or the roles, that will happen less. And there will be sort of gentlepersons agreements about what you can and cannot do.

I think in the meantime, this shouldn't preclude effective preventive action. And something I wanted to emphasize in my remarks is that there is obvious sensitivity to carrying out certain initiatives for preventive action that on the surface breach sovereign prerogatives or are seen as interventionary. But there are, I think, ways to get around that to make those initiatives less politically sensitive. And I call it "surrogate prevention" or prevention by other names, that states will often sign-up to

certain things if they're not called "conflict prevention," but something else which they all generally agree on, whether it's electoral assistance or democratic -- sorry, economic assistance of various kinds or anti-corruption. There are a whole slew of initiatives that if they're not called "conflict prevention," they're not seen as so challenging to state sovereignty, but, nevertheless, can be extremely useful in terms of reducing the likelihood of conflict. So I'm a big supporter of, as I say, what I call surrogate prevention.

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, let's take another round of questions again. I'll move from the back to the front. I see one hand in the center here.

SPEAKER: Sir, Everett (inaudible), U.S. European Command.

Some of the comments it sounds almost that you speak of the potential capacities of the UN as almost assuming a monolithic, coordinated whole, and yet, at the same time, it's characterized by the fact that if there is a stereotype it's a monolithic, uncoordinated, disparate whole with, you know, obviously varying stakes in interests that often incapacitate its ability to act. How do you go about finding incentives to get the stakeholders to cooperate in a way that's good, you know, for the primaries involved, you know, belligerents as well as themselves, to change the course and bring into play all these different things that you've talked about as the tools?

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, this gentleman right here.

MR. ROCKSIN: My name is Gregory Rocksin from the Center for American Progress.

After Black Hawk Down, President Clinton in a statement said that the UN should learn to say no to certain missions. Now, in the wake of these growing strains on the UN do you share the same concern that the UN has to learn to say no to certain missions? And if not, do you think as we move forward there's a need for a stronger (inaudible) between the UN peacekeeping department and NATO to be able to respond to most of these conflict areas?

MR. SOLOMON: And a third one right here.

MS. CHEN: Hi. My name is Jennifer Chen from the Southeast Asia

Program at CSIS. I have two questions, the first one relates to Burma.

How does the idea of preventive diplomacy apply to a country like Burma that does not allow political interference from the outside?

And my second question relates to reaching out to regional organizations. How much has the UN reached out to ASEAN, the Southeast Asian association, in terms of trying to promote mediation efforts in the region?

MR. SOLOMON: Okay.

MR. PASCOE: All right. Let me make just a little bit quick try at this.

On the UN being uncoordinated, I thought when I left the U.S. Government I understood what the lack of coordination was, but the UN really makes a real effort to top it, I think, in the way it goes. Let me just say, though, the UN is really very many different things thrown together that we call the UN.

The debates in the General Assembly have their life. The Security Council has its life. The Secretariat has its approach. The funds and programs that have long traditions on the way they operate on development have their own. And one of the things that Ban Ki-moon has tried very hard is to make sure at least the Secretariat and the funds and programs and the agencies are all working in a quite coordinated manner. We've been particularly on the ground working on this process. One of the things that we've been trying to do is more integrated missions, et cetera, and I think I'd give us at least a good B+ on that. I mean, I think we're doing a much better job of making sure the UN programs are all coordinated.

As always is the case, it used to be my case when I was an ambassador, is that you can get better coordination on the ground than you can in Washington or better coordination on the ground in the UN than you can in New York sometimes. So I think that that process does work together. And so we do have most of our tools there that are available. Where this comes most clearly is in the peace-building area, where we're trying to bring them together, although we are having some growing pains on that subject. But I think on the ground, I think they're working very well. One of the things

that my department's been doing has been working -- reaching out very hard to UNDP and the resident coordinators around the world to make sure that we are there to help them and to give them assistance on political issues, which they are not very well geared to take care of.

On the question of the saying no missions, well, the Security Council certainly can say no to major missions out there and something like peacekeeping and such, as they have essentially on Somalia. They've given encouragement to the African Union for the Amazon forces, they've helped supply the logistics for that, and we work very hard on these issues. But I must say that on most things, when it comes to the UN, we end up having to do it and trying to work at it and doing it. If I could pick and choose among the varying ones, I would have dropped Western Sahara a long time ago because we don't seem to be getting very far and haven't been for a long time. But I don't have a choice to say which ones I want to work on and which ones I don't. We try to help them all and try to move them forward.

On the question of cooperation with NATO, I would say that, you know, we cooperate with really all the regional organizations. NATO has been -- provided some support down through the past to DPKO efforts. Occasionally we need them for logistical efforts and such. We're working with them and talking with them, like we do all regional organizations on the political side, which maybe why don't I go around and grab the ASEAN one there, too?

We -- frankly, we worked -- tried to work very close with ASEAN. As an old ambassador to Jakarta, naturally I'm interested in working with ASEAN and dealing with them. But ASEAN itself is not able to deal with these conflict prevention things as aggressively as, say, as the African Union, who has very clear ideas of what they can do and where they can operate. And so I would say the level of cooperation there is not dependent on our bilateral level between the two regional organizations, but it's really on what they can and what they feel they can do with their membership.

And when you deal with Myanmar, we have been working on that quite

hard, but we don't have an awfully lot to show for it in the sense of major changes in their policy or major democratization approaches. They set their course and they intend to go at it and they intend to continue it, so we will keep working. It is one of those issues that we can't say that we'll just walk away from, but that doesn't mean that we can tell you we have a long list of successes. I wouldn't pretend to that.

MR. SOLOMON: Paul, do you want to touch on any that?

MR. STARES: Yeah, just a few things on this, you know, how do we incentivize the stakeholders. This gets to the political will issue.

And I agree with Mr. Pascoe that, you know, even when you can improve the coordination of the various UN bodies -- and there is actually a framework team that meets regularly to do that and I think you don't hear too much about it, but it's actually quite effective in trying to herd the cats, if you will, and the Secretariat to do certain things -- but even when you've got the UN kind of aligned, there's still the issue of the key states and their support for the UN, and getting them aligned is harder.

And I think, you know, it comes down to a couple of things. It's, one, being able to demonstrate in a compelling fashion the costs of inaction, of, you know, if we don't do something, what is the likelihood that it's going to get worse? And moreover, what are the possibilities of action? You know, what could we do that might lessen the likelihood of the worst happening? What can we do to possibly mitigate it should the worse happen?

And so often, I think, we've had a poverty of imagination, if you will, in terms of what can be done in certain situations and it's either -- it comes down to kind of the choice between doing nothing or sending in military forces to deal with the aftermath. And there are various other options typically in any given situation that one can employ and in demonstrating that they may have some chance of success I think is the real art that's required.

My concern is that even with the powers of persuasion, if you will, of key players in the Security Council, that we're entering a period in which many of the key

players are facing long-term indebtedness, financial fiscal problems, operational overstretch in their military capacities which is leading to a sort of era of strategic retrenchment. And I'm worried that just at the time when some of the key players are really needed, they're probably going to be drawing back, and that makes me extremely worried about the future.

Just quickly on Burma, it's almost identical to the -- well, on certain respects it's similar to the situation in North Korea in which you're trying to balance the desire for reform with the imperatives of regime survival by the people you are trying to persuade. And trying to reconcile those two -- because reform can often undermine regimes' survival, which makes it difficult to -- for them to accept any kind of outside mediation -- is the real problem. I think, you know, that the two things you have to do is obviously work on those states, particularly neighboring states and ones that have a real stake in that country -- China particularly in both cases -- to try to use them to work on reform in a way that reassures those in power that, you know, they can take useful steps to open up the country and bring about peaceful change. But also, send a very strong message that there cannot be any sense of impunity from those in power that they can basically get away with anything. Again, easier said than done, but I think there are certain things that the international community can do in both cases which can, say, undermine any sense of impunity for those in power in both countries.

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, we have time for two very quick questions, so I ask you to be brief. But I also want to pick up on this theme of impunity that Paul raised. Let me just ask this question first and then I'll pick you.

This issue of justice and accountability, and to what extent and when should these issues be brought and put onto the table in the context of a negotiation? And what guidance, if any, are mediators given on dealing with so-called bad actors?

This gentleman in the blue shirt and this woman right in front of him.

MR. HASSAN: My name is Hashem Hassan, visiting scholar from the Colin Powell Center.

My question in regard to Sudan. And what would happen to the three disparate areas: Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile? And how do you build the trust and prevent conflicts when there's so much hate and distrust and bias from the government sides, meaning that there's no transparency?

Thank you.

MS. ROWE: Hi. My name's Eugenia Rowe. I'm from the UN Refugee Agency American Association. You just briefly touched upon North Korea. I have a question in reference to the joint military exercise carried out by the South Korean government and the American government on the Korean Peninsula coastline right now.

How do you think -- or what do you think is UN's role or how do you think the UN can effectively carry out peaceful diplomacy and international justice given the fact that China -- without being undermined by China as a key power holder of the Security Council?

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, justice, accountability, Sudan and the processes for conflict resolution there, and then UN role in Security Council politics.

MR. PASCOE: Okay. Let me just start out very quickly on peace and justice. This one is a perennial, but we, frankly, don't see that there has to be conflict between the two, as far as we are concerned; that both are essential. They both reinforce the other side and you have to work the process through.

And I think that, you know, the situation in Sudan now is very much a part of this as we're working on the whole question of the referendum that's coming up. You've just had the election. You have a leader that the ICC has indictments against. And it looked like to me, if you looked at this in some respects, rather than say that they're necessarily running against each other, they're actually running together in parallel in a much closer way than they often do in this process. So from our point of view, we think they're both important; that you have to have some justice out there or some reconciliation, something to move together to have the long-term peace or to have the peace agreements hold. And so we don't see that either should be cut out.

This, by the way, is one of the discussions I've had many times in Sri Lanka about reconciliation and the process forward and accountability. Because I think we see it as a very clear and necessary part of the long-term stability and its society and where they're going.

On Sudan, clearly healing the issues there are long-term issues. No one suspects that they're going to be short. What we're trying to do is build the blocks in a positive direction. I mean, they have agreed under the CPA to have the referendum and we are working to be helpful on that score and to make it decent. We are also, as was mentioned earlier, Mr. Bassole and others are working on Darfur and seeing what we can do there. So we will keep working these issues forward. But there's no magic wand, and I want to be very clear to say that because I think these are very long-term projects.

Now, on North Korea, when I went to North Korea in February, we were doing a lot of talking and supporting on the question of the six-party talks and trying to get people together, trying to make sure the process was moving forward. It was also clear to us and so we were talking about these issues. We were also talking about North Korea's relationship with the UN. And the third thing was very clear that there was a growing danger of a very serious food shortage and that we were having trouble getting enough money there to sort of continue it and keep it going. Again, I think we will keep working on these issues, but I don't have any way to suggest that there will be a very quick and easy resolution of these issues.

On the question of the P5 and their role in the Security Council, I think it's quite fair to say that, as Paul was mentioning a while ago, this is the way the UN was set up and it's there. And until reform comes along that's going to change it, they got that through. And, you know, you can believe it's true, the U.S. Senate would agree to this if it comes up that there's any movement forward on changes would have to be sure that U.S. interest is protected the same way the Chinese are going to be sure that Chinese interests are going to be protected and the other members of the P5, because this will have to go through a ratification process in each place.

I think that for the most part I would say that there's only been two or three areas where this has been a very serious problem and the kinds of preventive diplomacy that we've been trying to do is we've been trying to move things forward in the three years that I've been there. So I would say that it is an issue, but it tends to be a -- I would think the overwhelming amount is the consensus in the Security Council on the steps that the UN needs to be taking to improve peace and security around the world.

Thank you.

MR. SOLOMON: We have several moments for just concluding remarks.

MR. SMOCK: On the accountability question, I certainly agree with Mr. Pascoe that both the justice and peace are critical, but it does get complicated. I've been following the LRA case in Northern Uganda very closely. It probably wouldn't have gotten Joseph Kony close to the -- it never got the bargaining table, but to send representatives to the bargaining table without the ICC indictment, and yet, at the same time, the fact that that indictment was not lifted was the reason that he wouldn't sign any peace agreement.

Similarly, the debate about -- in Sudan about the special envoy from the U.S. It's said it's made life more difficult for him and his work to have the recent indictment on genocide and that there are others who will argue that because of the ICC indictments against Bashir that that puts pressure on him to make peace. One of our future handbooks is going to be on this subject and dilemmas of how to resolve these issues and so that they're not in conflict.

On Abyei, Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountains, I think all we can say is that the CPA laid it out as best as anybody could imagine: a referendum for Abyei to decide whether to go with the South; a lot of difficulties in getting that referendum underway, the Referendum Commission to get set up and have a fair vote in January. But they do have the opportunity to vote and to go with the South. If the South votes for secession, they would go with the South and secession.

On Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, the provision for popular consultation,

there's no provision for secession, but there is popular consultation. Presumably, if Khartoum agrees, if people of those two states want a more autonomous situation, they should have the right to do so. But I think to adhere to the principles of the CPA is the best way forward.

MR. STARES: Just very quickly, like David, I agree that we cannot look at the accountability issue and the peace side, the preventive diplomacy, as inflexible instruments. I personally believe that we should have -- our primary responsibility should be to the living rather than necessarily justice for the dead. That's hard to swallow always. But if it can -- peace can be brought about with some cost adjusters, at least in the short term, to me that's a price worth paying. I'm on the record about that with regard to Darfur. We would all like to see a sort of perfect world in this respect, but I think there are compromises that one should take in the effort to maintain or keep as many people living as possible.

I won't mention Sudan. I don't know enough about it really to comment on that.

On North Korea, Mr. Pascoe mentioned a couple of places where the UN is already playing an important role, both in humanitarian relief through the World Food Program. Obviously the Security Council is playing a role in terms of sanctioning North Korean behavior at the moment.

I think down the road there could be two areas where the UN could play a significant role: One is in terms of bringing about a peace treaty for the Peninsula. The UN was a signatory of the armistice and, therefore, I think has a right to play a role in helping to facilitate the peace process on the Peninsula, assuming that the conditions are right for that.

And secondly, down the road, you know, if things really unravel in North Korea and there's -- the regime starts to crumble, there's going to be a real need for collective international effort. And I think the UN can play an important role in legitimizing that effort because it will require intervention in North Korea as well as obviously the

resources of many different countries, and the UN I think can play an important role in that respect.

Thanks.

MR. SOLOMON: Okay, right on time. Well, thank you for your attention and for your engagement as an audience. Please join me in thanking our panelists.

(Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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