

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ESCOBAR: (in progress) 12 years ago in which displacement or IDP's assistance was pretty much a matter of 3 phases: The prevention, the humanitarian assistance, and the socioeconomic and stabilization phases.

With that in mind, we had to bring onboard more issues that had come to the attention either of the government or of the judiciary in Colombia. So, we developed a policy with much more elements. These elements are three main components for crosscutting issues and two scenarios of implementation, and, pretty much, are going to talk about the three main components, and briefly only mention the crosscutting elements and the scenarios of implementation of the policy.

The three main components, which are -- they're in Spanish, but I'm translating as I go along -- are, again, prevention, second, what we call comprehensive assistance, which is the new one which has created the most discussion in the last, let's say, 24 months, which is truth, justice, and reparation.

We changed the concept of the phases of humanitarian assistance and socioeconomic stabilization because we have understood, and actually, the constitutional court also had demanded that in a country like Colombia, after the emergency phase, there was not much waiting for IDPs or the things that were waited for then could last long enough to produce differences in their lives that you needed something else, and that, actually, assistance in terms of their basic needs has to go parallel to the effort of creating the capacities within the families to create their own income and their own means to move along with their lives.

So, that's why we changed from a phases kind of approach to like a comprehensive assistance in which you provide some pretty much assistance type of

elements at the same time that you tried to develop capacities in the families with giving them assets or giving them training or giving them something else that in some cases even it may take a whole life to actually produce a difference in the families.

In terms of prevention and protection, we have made some changes, some tactical changes in the policy. We have addressed some issues that have to do with the military operations that eventually could produce displacements; we have introduced in the regulations of the military some issues that can help those operations to prevent or to avoid producing displacement. We also have addressed a problem with the protection of the leaders of the IDP organizations so, the screening process of the level of those leaders can be more accurate and we're testing this. Most of the things that we have changed or addressed are too soon to be evaluated at this point. So, we hope with some of these changes, we will be able to produce better results.

And I'm going to tell you my third point; we have a very good tool today to actually monitor the impact and the effectiveness of our policies and strategies. Comprehensive attention which is the second one includes five main elements. One is the humanitarian assistance element. The other one, which is the parallel or counter phase or whatever element which is the basic comprehensive assistance. Basic comprehensive assistance means health, education, food, and what we call family reunification.

Then we go to three main topics of assistance. The ones that produce the more complicated issues which needed more budget and would need a longer-term to actually produce a difference in the families, which are housing, land access, and income generation.

Again, while a family is able to have their own houses or have access to their own land or to land and produce their own income, we will need to provide either humanitarian assistance or basic comprehensive assistance. The difference between one and another is we really want to limit humanitarian assistance to the very initial phase of displacement, but we wouldn't take a family out of humanitarian assistance until we're not secure that they have been included in more long-term assistance programs in what we call now our National Protection System or our National Social Protection System. So, that's pretty much the idea behind that component.

The third component is truth, justice, and reparation. It is still under a lot of discussion. I just want to share with you some of the strategies that are behind this huge and complicated component.

In terms of truth, we're moving on especially with the National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission in trying to do what is called strike truth and try to do more cases of strike truth mostly with the hint of some events that not only produce displacement, but also produce some other kind of crimes, and we hope to move as quickly as possible with this because it really creates a sense of peace within families when you provide more truth of what happened to them, and they get more ready to move on with their lives when these kind of things happen.

In terms of justice, most of our bets are on the creation of a special unit inside the *fiscalía*. This is our district attorney, our attorney general office, and the unit that specializes in displacement. This unit was officialized two months ago, but its creation has been discussed and implemented for the last 18 months or so. It is supposed to start with something close to 20 attorneys and more than 100 what we call judicial police to help start solving some of the crimes that are behind the problem of displacements. We

want to start or have suggested the *fiscalía*, which is actually on their own turf to decide that, or we have suggested them to start with the print of collective displacements. We have something close to 1,200 collective displacements registered in our registration system. That counts for probably something close to 80,000 families, and it would be a good start with those let's say 1,200 collective displacements that we need to go after the criminals that produce those displacements. So, that's our recommendation to the attorney's office, to the *fiscalía*, and we hope we can make rapid progress on the judicialization on the prosecution of these criminals.

On reparation, we have ideas for issue of the internationally-recognized elements of reparation to create a more comprehensive policy, but underneath all those strategies, there is a single idea of what our reparation for IDPs should be, and that single idea is our reparations should not be a monetary process, a monetary transfer process.

Cash reparations, it is a good business for lawyers. It's not a good business for vulnerable people. We have a money transfer-based reparation system for the other victims, and what we have discovered in this 18 months of implementation of that other reparation system is what I just said. Lawyers are charging 30 percent to the victims to do a process that in itself is for free. They tend to frame innocent people, alleging that they can produce better results if they're mandated by them to do the process in their names, which is not true. It doesn't provide any better results for them, but people end up giving them their 30 percent of whatever the compensation is. Which today, since it is a symbolic compensation that comes from a transitional justice kind of system. It's only something close to \$10,000. So, out of the 30 percent is, again, it's not a lot of money for IDP. So, a lot of them would be good money for the lawyer, but that's

not the idea of this system. So, that's one of the reasons why we don't want with IDPs to do a reparations system that depends on money transfer and to give opportunity to lawyers to actually frame the IDPs.

International constitutional, international crime court, La Corte Penal Internacional is following these kind of ideas also for developing countries because it's kind of the same way everywhere else. So, that's one of the things that we're -- I think, we believe, we have spoke with this in private with the constitutional court. We have spoken to the constitutional court about this. I think they agreed with us. Not all the judicial system or the judicial branch has agreed with this idea, but we believe we're going to make a good move with the constitutional court, but it's on their own turf, again, to decide why it is good or not in terms of reparation to do one that doesn't imply the transfer of cash to the victims, or at least it is not based basically on the transfer of cash. That the transfer of cash would be a minimal part of the reparation.

We're trying to move very hard with a piece of legislation that will enable the judges to provide quick answers on the claims on land disputes. I think that's the most important thing that we can achieve in terms of reparation. When we take the registration system, there are something close to 300,000 disputes over land that people say they have. We have cleaned that number up a little bit to believe that probably we need to solve something in the neighborhood of 200,000 claims on land because of displacement. That we'll need more than a very expedite or along with a more expedite system of claims, we will need let's say a system of companionship, of comprehensive interdisciplinary assistance to the claimants so we can solve the problem that is each piece of land has so we can move quickly with this issue.

We're thinking of funding that particular issue, the companionship with this interdisciplinary groups, which is composed basically by lawyers and other, let's say land-technical people, that can help solve the problem. We have had pileup projects on that that gave us the idea that we would be pretty much successful. We're thinking of putting something close to 120 interdisciplinary groups that we will have a rate of solving land tenure issues, something close to 4,000 a month, and that we'll allow those in a year to solve something close to 40,000 to 50,000 claims, and if this is successful would mean that all these claims will be over around 5 to 6 years will be good news. And, right now, the money is there, but I will go back to that in the last part.

We're also trying to do some compensation in terms of cash, but it will be given along with some other project, some other program basically, with programs on the housing and land access, meaning that you don't get the money just in cash in front of you, but it's part of higher offer, a wider effort for you to get housing and land. Specifically, we are talking that if the normal program of housing subsidies is, let's say, 20 for any regular Colombian, it will be 30 for an IDP, so, the 10 difference is the compensation that the IDP gets for being a victim of war, so, that's the kind of system we're moving on with right now. I'm going to stop there with the reparations because I know I have very limited time.

We're paying attention to the four crosscutting issues, which are shaded areas in the diagram up there. One is what we call differential focus which is pretty much affirmative action for some specially-protected groups, basically women, children, the elderly, minorities. So, every component of the policy has to create differential issues, differential instruments or tools to address the problems of those specific groups. We have not done a very good job on doing that because there's not very much experience

all over the world in doing this. So, any experience that you know you have, it would be helpful to Colombian Government for this.

Where have we done very recently good steps for this? In humanitarian assistance, for instance, we are really moving along a very different system that pretty much promotes different tools and instruments for these kind of specially-protected groups.

We also have to look at institutional capacities and information systems. Every attention, every assistance that you provide to an IDP has to be implemented with better institutional capacity, which is more important with better systems of information or information systems. This is becoming a huge complex issue, but very interesting one. Every decision that you make in terms of policy for IDPs has to be let's say consulted with the organizations of the IDPs. We've done that over the last 18 months. It is a process that creates a lot of stress because consulting can have very many different meanings.

IDPs would love, of course, to say that they have the last word on the policy, but that will be after the conflict of interest that the IDPs decide over their own policy or the policy that benefits them, but we do have a protocol of participation, and we have to follow that protocol of participation every time we take a decision, and that protocol of participation actually very detailed and complex when it comes with minorities, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous population.

Finally, and I think it's one of the most important crosscutting issues is territorial articulation or what is called the concurrence between local governments and the national governments in terms of who has which responsibility in terms of assistance.

Two last ideas because I believe my time is running up. Every single piece of these very huge policies has been valued, has been costed. I don't know if that's the right expression. We know how much that it costs. The overall strategy, and that is the sign, will cost over the next 10 years. There are some costs that is for once, but there are costs that have to be every year. So, for the next 10 years, it will cost \$22 billion, and we're ready to make that investment. And, right now, today, we are investing something close to \$22 billion to \$14 billion. We need something close to \$8 billion additional dollars, and we're ready to make that move. We have consulted with a new government, and they're also ready to make that move, and they say they are. So, I think we're in good shape to change mostly things that have been unattended up to today, which is land access, restitution of land process, and income generation. Those are three areas in which we haven't had enough money there, and they will have money beginning 2011.

Finally, and this is the thing that I worked the most on, all this system is today, and they're a very sophisticated and developed monitoring system. Internally, we call that Juntos and some other things besides Juntos. We are able today to track each single family that is displaced. We created baseline of their human achievement, I'm sorry (inaudible) of the right enjoyment. We will accompany that family until it successfully enjoys every single of the 45 rights that the constitutional court has pinpointed that is the most important for IDPs.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much.

MR. BISSIG: Well, the International Committee of the Red Cross is present in Colombia since 1969. Our main mandate is to protect and assist the victims of armed conflict, and internal displacement is the major part of that. In Colombia, about 80 percent of the assistance we are giving out is going to IDPs.

Compared to *Acción Social*, our mandate's a bit different. The ICC concentrates on emergency phase or we have a partial overview. We have a concentration on the first three months of displacement, which gives us a little bit of a different perspective than from what Armando was telling us now. We try to substitute the state only when absolutely needed. We prefer to support and complement the state. And, in Colombia, given that we are there and we have to assist about 40,000 people a year, and individual assistance means that there is a need for a certain substitution still underway.

In our offices, in our operations, the main causes of displacement in 2009 were combat, death threats, psychological achievement, and forced recruitment. And I would also like to mention that the eradication of illicit crops. I'm talking about the Coca Eradication Programs have led to a big number of people have to leave their fields and lands, and that especially because eradication of illicit crops is a company by armed groups or combating armed groups, and the police are accompanying the eradication process, which causes combat during the process of eradication, which causes a lot of displacement, which is actually not always recognized by the state.

The ICC assists about 40,000 people in individual assistance. These are individual persons who come to our offices who seek assistance. They had to leave their homes, they traveled for certain weeks until they are there. We have a very close collaboration with the Colombian Red Cross and 5 out of 14 times they implement together with us those programs.

The other part is happening in the rural areas, in the fields. We talk about massive displacement. Massive displacement is a group of more than 10 families. And we talk about villages that have to leave their land because of the events I said

before, mostly combat and the ICC had to intervene in 25 cases, assisting 11,000 people in 2009.

This particular part of the operation, we have an agreement with *Acción Social* and the government, we specify each other's roles. The ICC would like in all cases that a neutrality of operation is respected. So, we will only assist cases the others cannot assist. We would have a deal with *Acción Social* on agreeing who is taking on which case.

Very often, those cases are in very remote areas. That's where the combats happen, that's where access is very difficult, and very logistically speaking, you have a big trouble getting there and assisting those people. For us, as ICC, we think we have most added value exactly in this field of work where others can't work, and it's quite difficult to get there.

Now, just to figure out the last 13 or 14 years, since 1997, the ICC has assisted more than 1.2 million IDPs in Colombia. You see the green bars, the individual assistance. That's what I talked about before, the people who are coming to our offices. The blue bars, these are the massive displacements, which happen in the field in the rural areas.

And I would also mention here the tendency. When you see as of 2008, the figures start to decrease. And 2010, we observe exactly the same tendencies. From our point of view, we had to assist less people with assistance under the frame of IDPs in the last three years. There are certain reasons which I think not all are conflict-related. The first reason is the ICC has closed down four offices in the north, so, less geographical coverage in areas where we think combat and conflict is no longer so

intense, so, obviously, our figures go down not because there are less displaced people, because we have closed offices.

But there is also a change to be observed in the patterns and the behaviors of IDPs. In many areas, people don't leave their area, fields, and houses so quickly anymore. It was previously the case that displacement was taking place in a rather preventive way. Today, we can say people try to stick it out, try to stay as long as they can, and they only leave if it's no longer otherwise possible. That has led also to a decrease in the IDP figures, I think, in the country.

And, obviously, the conflict dynamics, I think we can say that the conflict today in Colombia has concentrated on certain areas. It no longer covers the same areas geographically as it did 3 or 4 years before, but that has clearly led to the fact that less people are today displaced than I would say 10 years ago.

Where I was talking before about 40,000, 50,000, 60,000, these are only the 3 months recently displaced people the ICC is taking into account. That has nothing to do with the global figure. The NGO's quote estimates that there are 4.9 million people displaced in the country, and *Acción Social* recognizes \$3.3 million. That means we're talking here about huge amounts of people who are officially displaced, who are situations legally in the right of having state support as being displaced, and I've said before that if that figure is the second highest in the world after Sudan probably.

State response to the IDPs, taking on, Armando said before, we need to kind of observe quite positive internal reorganization in *Acción Social*. They manage to be much more efficient in validating the stages of IDPs and the delivery of aide was clearly improved thanks to cash disbursements in the emergency phase only, I am talking here.

On the other hand, unfortunately, those improvements could not yield better results during 2010 because simply *Acción Social* was running out of budget in June. They just received yesterday a little add for budget for the second semester of 2010. There's definitely not much money available to serve the IDPs, and as a consequence newly-displaced people, have to wait for several months, I guess until the next budget is going to drop in.

Everybody talks about the very good legislation; 387 was mentioned before the law, 387 from 2008. It's a fact, yes, Colombia has very good laws on IDPs, and there constitutional court has clearly stepped forward and has defended the IDPs in a very constructive way.

I would mention two things which the constitutional court has done in 2008. First, the time limit was taken away. That means today you can declare your displacement also if it happened 10, 20 years ago. That means there's no time limit anymore on the event when it actually happened, and the second, the state, according to the constitutional court, state has to give emergency help to the victims until they're sustainable, and that can take an infinite number of years.

So, for us, although it's very much praised, the law 387 and the constitutional court, what they did has a consequence for the IDPs, which is that the system is overloaded, the demands which those two new rules created to *Acción Social* are so much that simply the system does not have the capacity to absorb all that. If you imagine, the demand has increased tremendously with all those people who newly go into the system, but were already displaced 10 or 20 years ago, and, additionally, all those people will receive maybe 12 months of assistance. They can now prolong their assistance for many years.

So, those two effects are having an impact on the recently-displaced nowadays, which means that the recent displaced cannot get help because the budget to 80 percent is going to channels which is prolongation of emergency aide to people who were displaced many years before.

We, as ICC, see a challenge in there that the funds will be probably re-channeled, they'll be more to the recent displaced people, and for those people who are displaced, will make available long-term programs, as Armando has specified.

So, in times of limited resources, we would propose that we'd rather give priority to the emergency assistance, the recently-displaced people, and we hope that the government will make available for 2011 the budget which is adequate to the needs.

Armando mentioned the new government is willing to go for that, but the amounts are huge. When we hear about those billions, I have my doubts if the country can bear such a load of continuous payments for many years. In times of bad economy or in difficult economy, that's not going to be easy.

And what I said before towards the law, the legislation, there's a need to regulate better those laws. It cannot be that somebody has the right to receive assistance *infinito*. Now we have to get limits, they're set. So, the regulation of those laws need to be fine-tuned, and I think better done.

Acción Social is in the process of doing that. We may present with the new proposal. For example, the emergency aide assistance is limited to 12 months at first, which I think that makes sense. So, I think in order to help the state to discharge the system a little bit to make it more bearable, more reasonable, the regulation has to be made in a more perfect way.

Challenges I see in the IDP public policy, it's a long-term challenge. Three point three million are officially accepted as IDPs to have rights and to have, after all, a big need of sustainable solutions. We talk about return, relocations, or problems for IDPs who are in urban settings. What happens is that there's a debate ongoing how many want to go back actually. That might be very possible, and not all want to go back. But I don't think that that is the end of the discussion. If they don't want to go back, maybe they have to be relocated. If those who don't want to be relocated want to stay where they are, we have to find solutions for them in the actual situation where they are, and, very often, they live in the worst areas of the big towns where we have all the typical problems of urban, characteristic urban violence, no income generation, and a limit of state services.

For 2010, that is the model which the ICC has put up, which we would like to work for a bit more. We would like to make the conflict a bit more visible.

We have the impression that there's a tendency that one doesn't talk anymore about the conflict in Colombia. When you look at the presidential elections recently, when you look at the debates, that was no longer a subject. When you look at the dialogue in the diplomatic community, then you talk about the TLC, which means the Free Trade Agreement, you talk about investments, you talk about other things. So, slowly, slowly, the subject of IDPs and the conflict is dissipating, which is a little bit preoccupying us.

We agree, I agree that the trend is very positive in Colombia. So, the number of people probably which are displaced every year is decreasing. But even one more displaced, if you add that to the accumulating number which already exists makes the accumulated number bigger. So, even if the trend from two years going down, the

number of total displaced is increasing. And I think the ICC would like to contribute this year that the conflict is remaining a priority in the new government and in the new legislations, and that international committee, as well, is continuing to contribute endowed funding it in the way that the IDPs can be served also at long-term in the country.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Martin. We'll hear now from Patricia (off mike).

MS. FAGEN: Good afternoon. First, I want to thanks Brookings for inviting me to speak at this event, and thank you all for coming on such a hot day, when the temptation is clearly other than doing something other than going out into the streets and coming to an event, even in an air-conditioned room.

I don't have a PowerPoint, and I've learned a long time ago that if you're the third speaker and you're supposed to comment, it's best not to have one so that you're not locked into what you intended to say, only to hear other people repeat the same points or repeat or to say things that you were going to say in a different way. But I think this will be pretty clear and pretty short.

I want to start off by noting that I was reading recently about a system created in Colombia in 2007 to track demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. And that system, it is run by the Colombia high commissioner for reintegration, and the hope is to reintegrate to ensure the reintegration into civilian life of the approximately 53,000 former combatants. And it includes programs of health, education, psychosocial support, job training, income generation opportunities, and so on. But these are for the registered former combatants.

Now, registered IDPs, number quite a few more, as we've heard so far, and the numbers range from -- well, the registered IDPs are in the neighborhood of 3 million. So, that's a bit more of a challenge, especially in these difficult budget times, as we have just heard. And, as we've just heard, the mandate for attention to IDPs was first the law 387 mandates attention to IDPs, and the constitutional court, over the years, has held the state to account on the measures in that law.

Acción Social is by far the main entity that attends to the needs of IDPs. *Acción Social*, to this date, in a case, has been overwhelming oriented toward what Armando Escobar called "humanitarian assistance," and there are integration elements in this "humanitarian assistance," but I think it's fair to say that to date in any case, the overwhelming attention, the overwhelming emphasis has been on relief.

Now, the integrated attention, I think, is very good news. This is a declared intention of *Acción Social* to look beyond the relief and to try to work towards something more approaching integration, but, still, I think one of the problems is that *Acción Social* is in there to a large extent alone, and the other institutions of the Colombian Government have much less responsibility and are leaving a great deal of the work to be done only to *Acción Social*.

I want to affirm that my job, of course, is to say that oh, everything that the Colombian Government says is not quite the way they say it, and I don't want it to be that kind of critical, just plain criticism. I don't want to take that role. So, I want to affirm in the beginning that, despite fragilities, uneven practice, the humanitarian attention to IDPs has been steadily improving over the years, and it's also true that the government has many people who are committed, competent, and determined to make the attention better. I hope the resources for this are forthcoming because if resources are

forthcoming and if the tendencies, the lines just elaborated for us continue, then the attention will continue to be improved. At least that's the hope.

But so let me go now to the qualifiers. That's why I was invited here.

Overwhelmingly, as I said, the emphasis is on relief, and when you think about it, this is a serious problem. If displacement is lasting 5 years, 10 years, and people are still getting relief, then it's unlikely they're going to be able to find a stable economic place in Colombian society. Government programs on the long-term are dismal, and as Armando Escobar has just said, the income generation, which is absolutely key to integration, has not done very well, I'm not faulting *Acción Social* for doing it badly, but I'm saying it's not doing very well, and it is key to integration of IDPs.

The Ministry of Planning has created an entity called Red Juntos. I don't know how to say that actually in English. Together a network. Anyway, it's a network that supposedly attempts to want to address both displaced persons and impoverished persons. Poverty and displacement under the same umbrella, and to try to do both at the same time, try to improve a lot of the extremely poor and of the displaced persons at the same time.

To date, they have established, as Armando Escobar just said, a database, but what it means is that, to date, the only thing that we see are people based in Bogotá going to the field and interviewing people in the field. So, it's going to be a while before Red Juntos does anything, I think. Anything of a significant, lasting nature.

The second qualifier is related to who is eligible and who is not eligible. This is the big debate about numbers. Now, the number of ineligible IDPs is really much too high. Nearly all of the donors and all of the NGOs have programs that encompass a much broader range of people who are displaced than the government program does.

The government criteria is displaced by violence. Privately, when one talks to government officials, they will acknowledge that forced displacement due to fumigation of land, due to land grabs, due to recruitment of youngsters, due to threats of different kinds are all very valid reasons to consider persons having been forcibly displaced, but those persons would not qualify under the government criteria and do not qualify under the government criteria.

And, therefore, that leaves open the question, and I mean it's open, there is a decline, as Martin Bissig has said, in the number of displacements, but there is also a decline in numbers due to the narrow criteria for judging displacement. So, and I don't pretend to have the answer to how those numbers line up.

Third qualifier, and this is something that I was very, very pleased to hear Armando address, the *Acción Social* and the government apparatus in general for the attention of IDPs is overly centralized. It's centralized in Bogotá. Ultimately, as everybody acknowledges, local officials have to be enlisted and engaged, and they have to be resourced for programs for attention to IDPs. And, yes, of course, I acknowledge that there are places, there are local officials through whom one would not want to channel any resources at all, but, still, there are many through whom it is necessary, with whom it's necessary to work and even to take some risks.

All of the mechanisms are top-down, and when I first went to Colombia, I was totally misled because I kept seeing and hearing about entities at the local level, and the departmental level, at the national level. There were commissions and Consejos and committees and Mesas and all of these consultative of mechanisms through which, supposedly, everybody involved in IDP attention would be involved and could be involved in making policies or at least advising policies, but upon looking more closely, it was a

little deceiving because the existence of these entities give space for people to voice their concerns, but I think fall far, far short of serious consultations.

You find that the various entities don't talk to each other, and the communication is overwhelming top to bottom, and hardly ever bottom to top, and, so, the best you can say is all of these entities of consultation I think could be cut not only in half, but by a quarter, perhaps, and made more effective. They don't really have much of a voice in the policy-making arena, except as advisors.

Well, exceedingly distressing, I mean, perhaps, I won't say the most distressing, but exceeding distressing is a lack of protection to IDPs and especially to indigenous and Afro-Colombian IDPs. There are measures in place of origin to protect, to try to advert displacement, and maybe they've worked. What comes to mind, the measures for early warning, for socioeconomic improvements, for land titling. All of these are very important measures. The extent to which these measures have actually convinced people or allowed people not to be displaced remains to be monitored. I mean, I don't know of anyone who's actually going and seeing the extent to which all of these measures are effective. One hopes that they are, but they haven't to date prevented displacement. People continue to move. They continue to move because of all the reasons that we already know.

Moreover, and I think this is also important in not taking into account enough, people are displaced multiple times. The first displacement leads to a subsequent displacement for the same reasons, because of violence, because of threats, because of forced recruitment, because of loss of land in a property or never having acquired land and property, and, so, you've got an IDP population that is extremely mobile and extremely unstable, and the point at which IDPs consider and are encouraged

by the government to go back to their places of origin on the argument that these places of origin are now safe, it turns out, very often, the government will help people go back. Then the government helps disappear, and people are left stranded, and they're not protected, and, so, they end up for various reasons having to leave again. So, the policy is a waste of resources if that's the end product of it.

Now, let me just say in the last minutes I have just a few words on national security and IDP security, and I'm not saying national security versus IDP security because I think IDP security is part of national security. That is really my basic argument.

There are five regions called Areas of Coordination and Integration Action, five corridors in Colombia which are the war zones, the former conflict zones. And the strategy of the Colombian Government is counterinsurgency, elimination of eradication of illegal substances run by the military under military control to be followed by civilian-led recuperation of those areas for the state, and that means bringing governance, civilian governance and services to the people who were there. Theoretically, this is a very good process for ending displacement because, logically, if the major threats to security are removed and if the people who would be displaced don't have to be displaced, they can stay where they are, and people who are displaced theoretically can go home because the major threats are no longer there. Why doesn't it work? Because it really doesn't work.

In the short run, the CCAI process augments displacement, increases displacement. First, fumigation. Fumigation to remove illicit crops. The fumigation by air, not physical means is different, but by air, eliminates all the crops in the area, and, so, even USAID has complained on multiple occasions that they bring in alternative crops

for peasants in these areas and then the fumigating planes come and destroy everything, including their projects.

This is not a good message. This is not really a very helpful policy. The policy of the government is zero tolerance for illicit drugs. I mean, the U.S. could listen. The U.S. officials have a similar one. Well, the zero tolerance for coca means the following: Farmers who are committed to eradicating coca, not to cultivate coca, who want to be part of the programs for alternative crops and are willing to adopt them nevertheless, are facing a transition period during which they have no income whatsoever, and, so, what do they do? They have a little bit of coca. They have a little bit of coca for income until they can make the transition. This means they are totally ineligible for all the benefits, and they're pursued by government policies, and they very often can't stay where they are because their crops are eradicated and they're pursued.

Let me say a few things about return to areas, these semi-conflict zones. The government would like and is encouraging, promoting, strongly encouraging and promoting people who are IDPs to go home and lending support to this process, as I just said. But they haven't solved the problems that prevent return, which are land and security, number one, two, and three, I would say, and then the other problem, which is the protection problem. Peasants who are in these areas or return to these areas are caught in something of a vise.

First of all, the government accuses the peasants of giving material aide to insurgents, which they probably are doing because the insurgents threaten them and say that you have to do this, you give me what I want or I'll kill your sister. So, they do. The insurgents, by the same token, accuse the peasants of revealing to the government authorities where they are, which they undoubtedly are doing, and, therefore, they suffer

the consequence of having done that. The major point is there's no one to protect them from this kind of situation.

As Beth mentioned, I was part of an evaluation team looking at USAID's programs in Colombia, and, well, I want to end on a somewhat more positive note. The evaluation team emphasized one simple point: If you want a policy to help the internally displaced person, the attention needs to go to where the IDPs are. And that sounds simple to the receptor communities, and these are receptor communities where, by and large, IDPs who are there want to stay if they can, and most of them would rather stay than to return, especially if the alternative is to return to a place where there's still conflict and no possibility of livelihoods.

Many of these communities that I'm speaking of are in the CCAI zones, but they're in the cities, they're not in the more conflictive rural zones, and the cities tend to have less violence, they're not in such contested areas. They have better organized security forces, they have more economic opportunities, local officials in several of the places we visited are really committed to trying to do their best for the IDPs and for the rest of their citizens. They're cleaning up their act to put it in the vernacular. But they have no resources, and they don't have the ability to make their own decisions. They can't plan, and if they could plan, they'd probably do a much better job than anyone in Bogotá could possibly do because they know the terrain.

So, in conclusion, one sentence conclusion, and that is what I started off with. There is no separation between national security and IDP security because if there's no attention to IDP security and wellbeing and IDP integration, the national security is sacrificed. Therefore, my humble advice to the Colombian Government is follow along the positive lines that have already been outlined, but, also, keep in mind

that attention to IDPs needs to be focused on IDP needs, on IDPs themselves, and not on the big picture of doing away with insurgency and doing away with coca instead of the IDPs, or rather, don't sacrifice the IDP policy to those policies. You can do both, but you have to do both.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, Patricia. And thanks to all three of our panelists for presenting the different perspectives on the complex situation of displacement in Colombia.

We have now about half an hour for questions, and if it's okay with the panelists, I think we'll take two or three at a time and then give you a chance to respond. And we have microphones. If you could also identify yourself. Let's go one, two, three.

MR. JONES: My name is Jim Jones, and I've worked sporadically in Colombia over a period of about 40 years. While I found the presentations very interesting, and I certainly would agree with our last, (inaudible) that the democratic security policy has compromised, I think, in a very serious way efforts to address the needs of the IDPs. The ways are numerous, and I won't go into those.

One issue that I have picked up on after talking with a lot of IDPs and also refugees across the border in Ecuador, in Venezuela, and in Panama, when I've been to Panama, if there's one thing that characterizes the attitude of these IDPs, it's fear. It's fear, fear, big time fear at large, and, so, with regard to the second of the three categories that Mr. Escobar put on the screen, I guess my question is: What is the government program in place to address this fear? I mean fear of government that has historically has allied with these paramilitaries. Fear of insurgents. Fear, I mean, it gets in the way of everything you try to do.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

Okay, we'll take Melanie and then the woman in black over here.

MS. TEFF: Thank you. I'm Melanie Teff from Refugees International.

Mr. Escobar talked about the fact that there's a differential approach to different groups, for example, woman in the type of assistance that *Acción Social* gives and the need for more guidance and more assistance with how that differential approach should be put into effect. But in 2008, the constitutional court, in its Order 92, gave some very specific orders about the way in which that differential approach should be put into effect for displaced women, and it listed 13 socioeconomic programs that should be set up.

Last year, I was in Colombia talking with woman's groups about the way in which that Order 92 had been put into effect, and really almost nothing had been put into effect a year later. We're now nearly two years from the court order, and, so, I wanted to ask what has been done to put into effect Order 92, the 13 socioeconomic programs, the consultation with women's groups in setting up those programs, and the criminal policy on sexual violence?

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll take the third question here, and then give you a chance to respond.

MS. SPELLMAN: Hi, my name is Leah Spellman, and I'm with International Relief and Development. We're a large NGO funded by aide, and we currently have three programs in Tumaco on the southwest coast.

I had a question combined for Mr. Escobar and Ms. Fagen. Ms. Fagen, you spoke of the Ministry of Planning and the fact that they had already done some preliminary field research and spoken with IDPs. It seems that there's a theme of a lot of different groups in government doing research that maybe could be shared, and I was wondering how willing the Ministry of Planning -- and maybe, Mr. Escobar, you can speak to this -- had been to share that information with NGOs or different government organizations and if there were mechanisms in place to facilitate that communication?

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. I turn to the panelists now for the three questions, addressing the fear that IDPs have, the court order 92 and its implementation, and the question of sharing of research particularly in the Ministry of Planning.

Would you like to start, Armando?

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay. I couldn't agree more with Jim that probably fear in general psychological attitude of IDPs is the one thing they should work the most before you try to do anything else. Whatever you do after that, it will build on a better basis if you have addressed that issue.

In *Acción Social*, we created something that's called the PAI which is the initial Program for Income Generation Assistance, and what we do in that program is out of the nine months of treatment that we provide to the IDPs, the first four months are basically to build their confidence that they're able to go back and to be mostly productive again, but, in general, citizens again. We have been able to assist close to 200,000 IDPs with this program, which is one of the first bad news because you really need something bigger than that.

The resource in terms of building confidence on or in the IDPs are great. The results in turning this into income generation capacity is not that great. But we need to do more of that particular program, but we also need let's say to institutionalize that program because we did it as an extra program in *Acción Social* when we don't really have the main responsibility in terms of psychological assistance to the IDPs, but I think we are the coordinators of the systems, and as coordinators of that system, we do agree with you 100 percent that we have to do more, at least let's say health system should have a special program of rehabilitation and psychological assistance to IDPs so they can reintegrate in whatever other programs there are in a better way. We started to do that mission, it goes well, but their numbers are still very low.

In the budget, we have put together \$22 billion. We expect to have universal coverage of that program. So, if things go right, we will have more and more IDPs with access to that program or something like that program. So, in general, at least on paper on numbers of money that is going to be put into that. The news is encouraging.

Let's hope that it works because it definitely -- I have to admit that it's hard for the health authorities to convince them of the importance of something like this, importance in terms of a very massive and huge effort in order to address the confidence and the fear of the IDPs. But I think they're getting there. They're getting there at least with our hand behind saying here's what we do; this is what we have to do. Most of actually USAID money has gone to programs like this. Similar, like this.

I want to close with let's say comment which is complicated. We know it is very important to address fear and confidence before you do anything else. But our first let's say enemies of that are the IDPs themselves. Some of the IDPs themselves

and some of the leaders themselves. Bringing about confidence and the fight against fear will take several months, if not years. When they getting into the programs, they want to see the money first. Where's the money? When do I get my money? I need my money to go and do whatever. Many of them either drop out of the programs or advise their IDPs to drop out of the programs. That happens mostly in big cities. That doesn't happen much in these medium-sized cities, and that happens mostly in Bogotá, a little bit in Medellin where it's very hard to keep people because the effort actually to go into the program is bigger. You have to pay for transportation in order to go to the places where the conferences and the support takes on, and they believe it is too much of a hassle to do all that, that what they actually need is to pay their bills today, so, where is the money for that? I don't really want to go -- so, but we work with that. But I just wanted to make that comment because it is hard when you're trying to do that.

Second, I'm going to be completely open. I firmly believe that the constitutional court made a huge mistake in saying that the different approach to women is setting those 13 programs. We have addressed this issue permanently with the constitutional court at least in order to make them understand that we probably need the 13 components of those programs, but we don't really need 13 different programs. It may come to 12, to 2, just to 1 program in order to address that.

We have created in a very firm way at least two programs that encompasses probably between 6 to 9 components of those 13 so-called programs that were stated in Order 92.

One of the programs let's say the most advanced, Families in Action in itself helps families and women in order to take care of their children, which is 1 or at least 2 of the preoccupations of those 13 programs. We have started a program called

Mujeres Productivas, Productive Women. We set the rest as a list between 2 or 3 of the other 13, among the 13 concepts or the 13 programs that we have, and it's running for some 6,000 women now, but it has to be run for something close to 100,000 women in the future in order to make a difference for women.

So, one of the difficulties, and I think the general idea of having a very huge affirmative action for women was very good. The way it was ordered to the government, it was a very lousy way. It was not a good idea. So, the government in this side is saying what do I do? Should I just create your 10 programs to follow-up the mandate when I firmly don't believe that's the way or should I try to convince, see, and work with the court to make them understand that a different approach would be?

We have spoken almost every part of the (inaudible) that is interested in the programs or in this issue, and we all agree that the approach on having 13 different programs is just addressing the 13 different issues that are beneath or behind those programs, and that's what we're trying to do. But, again, I don't believe that the orders are clear-cut suggestions on how did you address the issues of women? It just addresses the problem, but not the solution. What I'm asking here actually and advise is who has a solution?

For instance, one of the programs, it says when the woman has to move from point A to point B, and that is one of the things, one of the examples that is in the sentence, we need better-lighted areas because women gets the risk of sexual assault. But it's easier to say that to help we have at least 1 million women in the registration. We would like 1 million women when they mobilize through the country to have lighted areas. How do you go about doing that?

That's a very complicated, hard issue to solve within the 13 programs. So, things like that need like a different or better approach if you really want to change things because we all do agree about the sexual issues and the sexual threats that women face.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Anybody want to comment on the question about access to research of the Ministry of Finance?

MR. ESCOBAR: I want to say something after --

MS. FAGEN: Oh, do you want to go through -- how do you want to do this? Have each one of us --

MS. FERRIS: Sure, I mean, if you'd like to --

MS. FAGEN: Answer any of the questions or --

MS. FERRIS: Sure, if you'd like to comment on any of the questions.

MS. FAGEN: Because you might as well continue with all the questions then.

MR. ESCOBAR: Let me say something, first, the people who visit the family are not in Bogotá. There are 7,000 social workers. One of the requisites of being a social worker for IDPs and for (inaudible) people in general is that they are from the region or from the city that you're helping. That actually creates a lot of problems because many regions don't have enough trained people, but we're working on that. And they produce a baseline that is going to be hopefully before the year ends to disposal or for everybody in our web page.

MS. FERRIS: Any other comments? Okay.

MS. FAGEN: You're done?

MR. ESCOBAR: I'm done.

MS. FAGEN: Okay. Because I wasn't clear whether you're going question-by-question or all three of us.

MS. FERRIS: Right.

MS. FAGEN: Okay, I can just pick up where Armando left off. Why don't I pick up with the last of the questions about the communications and the information and research because that is really a thorny and difficult area.

Totally agree with the speaker who said where is the information and why can't we access it? Why can't NGOs have it? And we found that it was very, very hard to get information on almost anything because the information channels are not very well developed, and if I were a donor, I would say one of the major priorities would be to vastly improve the whole IT system, the whole information system so that it's possible to get a database that not only one entity has, but that other entities can access.

This is a technical problem, but it has serious ramifications, and it has serious ramifications in the area of services, as well. For example, one of the initiatives that we are always looking at has the wonderful name in English called the UAO, which is not spelled W-O-W, it's spelled U-A-O, and it is the entity in each municipality in every district or is it or --

SPEAKER: No, one municipality.

MS. FAGEN: One municipality.

SPEAKER: In 37 places.

MS. FAGEN: Yes, in the municipality which tells to which presumably an IDP family can go and be told where the health services can be delivered or can receive the health services on or near the premises and which coordinates all the services to which IDPs are eligible in an intelligent and in a usable way. And the unevenness of this

system is legendary. Some places, it works reasonably well; some places, it just doesn't work at all, and, so, this is part of the fear question, too.

So, people coming to the UAOs don't always find what they need, and people coming to the UAOs end up reinforcing their already pre-established prejudices against governments because the government entity at that level, at the level where the rubber hits the road, at the level of where they need it isn't there, and the health system is in place, but the health system is somehow -- the numbers don't come together. The health facility's in this corner, the people in need are in that corner, and there really needs to be much more communication between and among them.

Besides, and I do agree with the sharing, as well, and even the sharing with donors. It's hard for even donors to get adequate numbers of who's doing what. So, I mean, that's definitely a need.

Let me say something about the fear that Jim Jones raised, the question. Well, I'm not a Colombian, and, perhaps, it's not my place to give a history of Colombia, but I think I can say a few things, that most of the IDPs come from rural areas. They come from rural areas where the Colombian Government has not been particularly prevalent or even present in past years, and that's part of the challenge of today, recovering these areas within the Colombian state so they are actually part of the Colombian state, the Colombian homeland.

The real powers in these areas in the past were large land owners, and, on occasion, the military. And, so, people who are being displaced have a notion of government which consists of when the military comes, that's who the government is, and they haven't had the positive experiences with civilian government that urban dwellers and the people who are part of the core of Colombia may well have. And, so,

overcoming this fear is, indeed, a challenge, and I quite agree, this is the major challenge because they've been exposed to people who want them to do something and are willing to punish them or threaten them in order to get what they want.

Now, this is where the challenge of local authority, I think, comes in. I think the local authorities, those who have tried, have made more progress in approaching IDP organizations and establishing decent relationships with them. But the problem is they can't come through with what they've promised, they can't come through with what the IDPs want because they simply don't have the resources, and, in many cases, they don't have the decision-making power to comply. So, it does come together. I totally agree that it's necessary to overcome people's distrust of government. That distrust of government has historical roots, but it's going to take a long time and a lot of positive action to reverse it.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Martin?

MR. BISSIG: I think the assistance should, from the beginning, be as integral as possible. The fear factor has to be integrated and the psychosocial aspect has to be taken onboard from the beginning. Any food, cash, or whatever from the start. I think there are efforts to be made to try to do that. We, as ICC, we try to associate to each individual assistance project and psychosocial project so that if our interviewees can detect such type of programs, the victim can be referred to a psychosocial entity, which is usually done by the national Red Cross.

The UAO is a very good strategy. It's the first entry point where the IDPs can come to meet the government and should basically have all the entities at once. So, one office which has all the services, the strategies are very good, and I think it starts to work in several towns. We have --

MS. FERRIS: In several towns.

MR. BISSIG: ICC has supported several ones in the country, have selected a number who support financially and with other efforts that the service can be provided. But it's a long way to go. I think right municipality, the Alcaldia the mayors are behind the project. It's going to take off. Where the mayors don't have the funds, are not motivated or other priorities, there we have a problem. Or that it's going to take simply a much longer time.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Let's take another round then of questions. Let's get this gentleman in the back here, and then one here and maybe one here.

SPEAKER: I have two comments. Basically --

MS. FERRIS: Could you identify yourself, please?

SPEAKER: Vicente Echandia from the Colombian Embassy.

One very brief comment on some information that was mentioned here by, I believe, Mr. Jones about the linkage between the democratic security policy, the national security policy, and displacement, and that being the cause for displacement.

Just to give you some information that I believe is useful, the years in which displacement was bigger in Colombia were the years from 2000 to 2002. The democratic security policy started in June 2003. So, there was no security policy before. So, you cannot establish a link of causality between displacement and the national security policy.

And another comment on the presentation by Ms. Fagen and the comment she made about the national consolidation strategy, you mentioned that CCAI wasn't really working in the new strategy, that there was no transition initiatives, no subsystems assistance for the peasants who had to eradicate their coca, and I believe

then that you misportrayed a bit the program because the national consolidation strategy precisely has had very important results in La Macarena, as I'm sure you're aware, and Montes de Maria, where not only is there no aerial spraying, there's only eradication, manual eradication, where the transition initiative, precisely the one you mentioned and precisely the aide that comes to La Macarena in a large amount comes from OTI Office in the State Department.

So, we're actually covering what you said. And the CCAI gave way about two or three years ago to more local what we call now Fusion Centers, but I'm sure Armando Escobar can give a more clear picture about the consolidation strategy because I believe it is really being successful.

And, yes, the food security that comes with the transition initiatives so that the peasants, while they eradicate for six months or a year, get sustained income from the government actually because the cooperation from USAID is funneled directly through the government. So, I believe there are some changes from what you said in the consolidation strategy that really make it different from what was portrayed.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll take the woman over here.

MS. SANCHEZ: Hello. Gimena Sanchez from the Washington Office on Latin America.

Well, first of all, I would like to say that we will greatly welcome the establishment of the unit to look into the crimes that generate displacement, given that for the past 12 years, the impunity rate has been more than 95 percent in those cases.

And my first question is for Patricia Fagen. The whole point of law 387 is the framework was the beginnings of what then became the guiding principles on total

displacement, the notion that you had to have an integrated response of protection and assistance throughout the three phases. However, what we've seen in Colombia, which is always lauded as the model, is that only one aspect or certain aspects sort of picking and choosing of those guiding principles has been implemented. So, my general question is: At what point will the international community start to think of the fact that there maybe needs to be a new model on how you address internal displacement rather than thinking about a model that's not implemented fully?

And then my question for Armando Escobar is, given that the government's policy of the narcotic security was basically to prevent further displacement, how do you respond to (inaudible) claims that under the Uribe administration more than 2 million people have been newly displaced? We would like to know how you viewed that. And, also, given the increase in resources that the government has given to internal displacement projects in recent years due to the constitutional court order in 2004, why hasn't the constitutional court lifted the state of unconstitutional affairs? I would like to understand that.

And then, lastly, we understand that Orders 004 and 05 of Afro-Columbians Indigenous People are orders that ask a lot of the government, and that within those orders, there are 64 requirements for prevention of displacement of Afro-Columbian communities and 34 or so for indigenous communities, and while that might be excessive or a very broad ask, would like to know how many plans, whether or not they're the plans that were recommended by the orders themselves have actually been put in place to prevent any of those communities from becoming newly-displaced since this has been put into practice.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And then I have the woman here.

MS. SNYDER: Hi, my name is Jessie Snyder. I work at the World Bank.

My question was just in regards to, Ms. Fagen, what you had mentioned about the integration process. Given that displacement is not exactly a new issue in Colombia, I was just wondering if you could comment on maybe why in maybe *Acción Social* this issue of integration and income generations has become like a focus so recently, and if the government is doing anything to work with integration more heavily, as well as especially given they have such a large program to provide aide, continuous emergency aide to refugees, and maybe just comment on what kind of successes you have had moving people beyond the displaced status.

MS. FAGEN: That's for --

MS. SNYDER: That's to both. Yes.

MS. FAGEN: Yes. I don't have much --

MS. SNYDER: To both of you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, and why don't we have just this one more question here?

MR. ELABA: Hello. My name is Maurice Elaba. I also work at the World Bank.

And I was just kind of curious like what is the process of receiving help from the government or from NGOs? Let's say I get a phone call and I'm told that to get out of the house or my family dies by the end of the week. So, I decide to leave, and how do I prove that I received a phone call that I received a threat? And how do I prove that like I own a home and I own the land?

MS. FERRIS: Okay.

MR. ELABA: Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Okay, we'll give you all a chance to respond, and I'll ask you to please be brief. To all these questions.

MS. FAGEN: Yes, right.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

MS. FERRIS: You want to start, Armando?

MR. ESCOBAR: Good. A couple of things, just to comment on what the sentence said at the beginning, and which actually was a response to what Liz said in her presentation. Two things.

One is it is not true we do not register people for recruitment or for aerial spray or for fumigation or whatever the eradication process. We have several people who have been registering for that recently, but mostly, eradication has many phases, and some of those phases we don't consider them displacement. But many of them are considered under many people probably by the thousands who have been included as displaced in the registry because of those reasons.

Actually, in 2001 and 2002, the main reasons for inclusion in our registration was recruitment or the choice of recruitment. It was the big reason back then. Today, the big reason is threat, general threat of death, but back then was recruitment the number one.

CCAI was designed for 68 different particular points in Colombia. It wasn't even municipality, was less municipality was Veredas who were badly threatened by violence or badly affected by violence. I believe in most of those 68 places, CCAI made a huge difference for those regions. It made a difference, of course, the biggest one for the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta for amount of difference for La Macarena. It

made a fair amount of difference for Montes de Maria. It didn't make a huge difference for Putomayo. It didn't make a huge difference for Catatumbo. It didn't make a huge difference for Arauca. It made a huge difference for the old extension or classifications zone in Caqueta and it was a good strategy. And I think something like that, like today, national consolidation plan, it is a great idea if it steps on the good practices of the CCAI, if it learns from the mistakes of the CCAI.

So, I definitely think that's the way to go on, I'm going to take for your question on that a little later on to actually complete some of the questions.

I don't believe (inaudible) is serious with their numbers. They used to be they're just trying to convince everybody that we still have a lot of IDPs out there moving in the numbers that are not really seriously figured out. That doesn't mean that the crisis that we have is not very big still. We doubt the very inflated numbers (inaudible). That's one of the reasons we never really tried to let's say argument we'd call this about the numbers because, still, with our own numbers, the crisis, it's extremely high.

I think three things have evolved in the last eight years in terms of displacement. Two of them were already there years ago, but one of them not as strong as probably today. And one of them is fairly new. When somebody takes the decision to move today, there are probably three things in mind very strong. Number one, safety situation here is not the best or it's probably very bad. Otherwise, they probably wouldn't move. That's the reason and that's actually the basic reason why we're all here because migration is forced and it's not a voluntary decision.

Number two, economic situation is not the best either. Things are not going well. For instance, 2008, food prices made a huge impact on rural areas. That probably was in the mind of many of the people who decided to displace.

And, number three, today, there's something out there helping that wasn't years ago. So, taking the decision makes more sense because I've heard my close or far relative actually displace and I'm registered. He's getting help.

In the last three years, we have provided housing to something close to 45,000 households. Those 45,000 households has relatives in the place where they left, have friends in the place where they left who were probably facing the same kind of stress that they faced when they decided to leave or to flee four, five, or six years ago. So, that's news are brought back to their homes and say why don't we leave, too? I mean, if they're getting some help, they already got their house, let's do that. An example would be, La Palma, Cundinamarca; 8 years ago, 400 to 500 families flee. In the last 2 years, another 500 have registered because, I mean, those other 500 were helped; why don't we do the same thing?

Due to the constitutional decisions, many of the money or much of the money is going only for IDPs. So, that creates attention and eventually more hazard for the people to say let's become IDP, too. I also face the same trends that somebody else faced eight years ago. And this is one of the decision which were not by the constitutional court but by Consejo de Estado made it possible to register back all the time you want so people today are saying I have been displaced 7, 8, or 10 years ago. Today, more than 50 percent of the people who claims are displaced are claiming they were displaced at least two years before this previous time, and most of the people are from years of 2004 and before.

So, that's what is going on and explains why still we have such big numbers. Still, if you remove all that, we still have a lot of displacement. That's the reason. That's probably very important.

The way *autos* 4 and 5 for indigenous and Afro-Colombia made the implementation of this policy complicated, but I think it's the right way to go. The Ministry of the Interior is held and the consultations are mandated by those *autos*. In the terms of the Afro-Colombians, we're using the National Consultancy Group that is there and it's always been there, in order to provide a little bit more efficiency to this process.

In terms of the indigenous people, I think we have moved with 15 different communities in order to become with a plan for prevention of those communities. I don't believe we will have that work done completely before something of 18 months to 3 years, but it's the mandate of 4 and 5 itself. It demanded that it has to be that way, and that's the reason it takes so much time.

One thing you can do is you can call our 1-800 line. You can go to a (inaudible) but the best place to go when somebody's getting a threat is to go to someplace that everybody knows which is the Personería Municipal. In the Personería Municipal, somebody not only should say what am I being threatened of, but it also would be clear the land that is under threat, that is under pressure, and we have a system in which we'll put an annotation on the title of that land so it cannot be disposed during that time. We have made that for 300,000 different titles over the last 6 years.

So, that is, let's say, basics. I wanted to say something else, but I forgot.

MS. FAGEN: I'll try to be brief.

MS. FERRIS: Yes.

MS. FAGEN: And most of the questions were addressed to me, so, I'll just try to --

MS. FERRIS: Right.

MS. FAGEN: I apologize, and --

MS. FERRIS: We are under pressure of time.

MS. FAGEN: I'm just (inaudible) for being superficial.

In the first place, I do agree, Armando, with what you said, that the CCAIers have made life bearable and better in many, many places, and for all the reasons that you give. But the point I wanted to make, two points, and the one was that by not focusing on those areas where life is already better and making sure that they stayed better, but by focusing resources and attention on the areas where there's still conflict and where it's going to be difficult for quite some time, it becomes counterproductive for IDPs. It is not necessarily to their benefit in those zones. It's a glass half full, glass half empty, if you like, but that is the situation.

Transition, the gentleman from the embassy raised the question of translation assistance to IDPs and to people in the CCIA areas. Yes, there is transitional assistance. It's not a cash donation. The transitional assistance, at least the AID transition and the other donors, mostly, it's income generation, it's helping people get settled. It's helping people grow alternative crops, and that is exactly why the fumigation is so negative because if people are just beginning to get started and their crops are fumigated, the good along with the bad, it really destroys a lot more than even the crops. It destroys people's confidence. So, that kind of practice should be very carefully reviewed and return to these areas.

I totally agree that if people can go back, they should go back, but there have to be conditions, and those conditions have to include a stronger element of security than is now the case and land security, which is not the case in a number of instances, and transitional assistance won't help if the family doesn't have a title to the land in which they're to earn a living.

So, there's a lot more to be said about that, and I'm superficially answering it, but I think still there are those points.

On the law 387, you said that there was a model which, of course, was for assistance and protection, and it's not being implemented. Well, that sounds like a recipe not for changing the whole model, but for making it work better, which I totally agree. And, besides, the international community can't do very much to change the model because the law is Colombian and the implementation is Colombian.

I'm sorry for such a brief answer. It's a long discussion, I realize.

The integration process, it's a very good question. A long, long time, IDPs in general, not just in Colombia, but in general, IDP humanitarian emergency because the underlying assumption was IDPs would go home, eventually, we'll solve the problem and IDPs will go home. It's only as the international community recognizes that IDPs often can't go home, and that after decades, they don't want to go home, that the question begins to arise in Colombia because there's so many, but in other areas, as well, that you can't just assume a humanitarian emergency and have a durable relief program.

You need something that's going to last a longer time and it's going to allow people to stay where they are. But it took a long time, it has taken a long time, and the Brookings Institution sponsored a series on when does displacement end, and front and center in that discussion was well, it ends when people are no longer subject to -- what was the phrase?

MS. FERRIS: No longer suffer the consequences of having been displaced.

MS. FAGEN: Yes.

MS. FERRIS: Martin, the last word.

MR. BISSIG: I found the question interesting, you asked: How can we determine today who is displaced? I've said before, you can declare displacement even if the event was 10 or 15 years ago. How can you have testaments, how can you prove that you were at this place? How can you, today, have objectivity in that subject?

I think that's very difficult for any actor engaged in that, not only for the administrative *publico* (inaudible) or for example, for us. So, we have to be aware that within those millions of people who want help, there are many who are not displaced as such that maybe they're poor, maybe they have other needs, maybe they have different sufferings, but they're not to be characterized as displaced. So, then to find out how to prove that to them. That's not going to be easy at all. So, you need a very good local knowledge.

I think the state has the possibility of Municipios, the Personeros in Municipios. We try to delegate in the field that conflict is in order to be updated always in the cities where the people come to know what's really actually going on there. We have a bit easier because in NIC, we only assist the 3 months, not the 10 years ago, but there is, indeed, a grey zone, which one has to decide to accept the person or not. That's in humanitarian relief business always the case, and that's in Colombia particularly difficult.

The figures have quotas. Do not take into account that there is a certain percentage of grey zone. Quotas accept almost 100 percent of people who say they are displaced. *Acción Social* reduces the number with a certain percentage, which I don't want to discuss. Also, in our case, we have refusal rights, which are very high to more than 50 percent of the people who claim, who come to our office and say we are displaced, please help us. We have to say sorry, you don't comply with our criteria.

So, it is a very complicated and tricky business, which is not easy to master and we have to very careful with the interpretation of those figures.

MS. FERRIS: Well, I began in my introduction talking about the complexity of displacement in Colombia, and I see that we're ending up with exactly the same issue of some of the grey areas and complexities of determining who is a displaced person, how long does displacement end? What kind of programs are most effective?

And I want to thank all three of our panelists and all of you for your excellent questions. Sorry I didn't get to call on all of you.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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Expires: November 30, 2012

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