THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SERVICE OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN ALLIED MILITARIES

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PANEL 2: SCHOLARLY STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. FRANK: I'm Nathaniel Frank of the Palm Center. I'm happy to begin the second panel this morning. If anyone cannot hear me or anyone else, just raise your hand or do the ear sign.

A couple of very quick announcements. This is -- there is a live feed for those of you who are interested, although you're all here, but if you want to tweet, or something like that, it's http://bit -- that's b-i-t.ly -- bit.ly/DADTforum, as one word.

Please remember to turn off all of your phones again, including the panelists up here on the stage with me. And a quick reminder that there's plenty of information if it's still there out on the table, some of the research that we'll be referring to that's been very, very useful for this discourse. And if there isn't enough out there, there's plenty of us that you can contact or speak to briefly to get copies or get web links, et cetera.

So I'm very honored to be here and to introduce the next panel. Again, there are details about their biographies in the handouts that you have, but I will just say a few of them starting at the very end.

Dr. Victoria Basham is an assistant professor in politics at the University of Exeter and a research associate of the Center for International and Security Studies at York University, Toronto. She is also a co-author of the *Gays and Foreign Militaries 2010* that I worked on with the Palm Center, and I was happy to have her help. She's currently writing a book entitled *War, Identity, and the Liberal State* to be published next year by Routledge.

Next to her is Dr. Danny Kaplan, an Israeli anthropologist and psychologist. He is the author of *Brothers and Others in Arms: The Making of Love and War in Israeli Combat Units,* and also of *The Men We Love: Male Friendship and Nationalism in Israeli Culture.* And he has the masculinity track of the gender studies program at Bar Ilan University, and is a captain in reserve duty in the IDF, Israel Defense Forces.

Next to him is Dr. Alan Okros. Dr. Okros is deputy chair of the Department of Command Leadership and Management at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He, too, was a co-author of the *Gays and Foreign Military Studies from 2010,* and he served in the Canadian Forces

from 1971 to 2004, retiring at the rank of captain.

And to my right is Mr. Karol Wenek. Mr. Wenek, is the director general, military personnel, for the Canadian Department of National Defense responsible for developing strategic personnel generation and personnel support concepts. He is also the deputy human rights coordinator for the Canadian Forces and author of *Canadian Forces Leadership Doctrine.* He wrote conceptual foundations paper, papers for the Defense Ethics Program.

He also played a very important role as an author of the CF Charter Task Force established in 1985 to review evidence relating to what was then the exclusionary policy on gays and lesbians in the Canadian Forces. And he was senior policy analyst for human rights and oversaw production of several of the policies introduced pursuant to the 1992 change.

I'm going to allow each of the panelists to make some opening remarks, and then we'll follow a similar format to have my colleague, Aaron Belkin, ably ran the last panel. So we will begin in reverse order with Mr. Wenek.

MR. WENEK: Thank you, Nathaniel. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's a pleasure to be here. I'm going to cover the period 1985 to 1995, when I was most actively involved in this file. In the context of lessons learned, let me just say a few words about how the Canadian Forces manage policy change, and I'd be happy to elaborate on later.

First, the change was implemented quickly.

Second, the change was unequivocally supported by senior leadership.

Third, the change process was low key and explicitly communicated an expectation of normality in the work environment.

Fourth, commanders at all levels were engaged in communicating the rationale for the change and encouraging its acceptance, and they were also provided with information to assist them in responding to the personal concerns of some CF members.

Fifth, the communications package affirmed the principle that military personnel should be judged on their ability and not their demographic or social identities.

And finally, clear uniform policies applicable to both heterosexuals and homosexuals were promulgated to regulate military behavior, specifically policies on sexual conduct,

harassment, and interpersonal relationships. No attempt was made to change beliefs or attitudes.

As a final comment, I think there's one other idea worth mentioning that should inform policy choices on this issue. And that has to do with differing conceptualizations of the military institution. So what kind of military are we going to have?

For many years Canada implicitly subscribed to the classical view articulated by Huntington that the professional military is an institution set apart from society, is granted special license and exceptions, is relatively homogeneous in its makeup, and has rigid social and professional conditions for membership.

In the alternative view advocated, for example, by Sarkesian, profile by David Segal in his book on the postmodern military, a professional military in a democracy should or is fully integrated with its parent society, is imbued with the values that it defends, is diverse in its makeup, and has permeable boundaries. So I think a fundamental question for liberal democracies is, do we want a military along the lines of Praetorian Guard, or a military that encourages the participation of all citizens who are qualified and willing to serve?

Thank you.

MR. FRANK: Thank you. Dr. Okros?

DR. OKROS: The Canadian military has continued to evolve policies and practices and experiences as is being highlighted by my colleague, Karol Wenek, as well as by General Semianiw. I'd like to just highlight a couple of things of where things have gone and then raise some broad questions that I think need to be thought about.

The Canadian military continues to understand the benefits of diversity, has really reached out to include the gay communities. For example, members in uniform are now participating in Pride Parades, and there are both gay and straight members of the Canadian Forces that take a lot of self-satisfaction of being able to reach out to these sorts of communities. So there's an active involvement and an interest in bringing members of the gay community into the military.

You've heard about a number of the other things that have changed in terms of policies and programs on support, et cetera. So the CF continues to evolve, and that reflects evolution from the perspective of gay members of the military. One of the individuals who was

responsible for one of the landmark cases, Michelle Douglas, who was quoted by Aaron, a few years ago made the statement that gay members of the military did not want to be really, really out; they just wanted to be safe from being fired.

The update that I would provide is that with the evolution over time, the expectation has changed from gay members that are serving in the Canadian Forces. They expect to be judged one thing and one thing only which is their performance. That -- it is now a clear expectation, and that's part of why you've heard these comments that this is not a big deal.

And so let me talk to, briefly, to three things that I think are important. Lot's of discussion around cohesion. Cohesion is important in the military. Militaries have known for about 3,000 years how to generate high levels of cohesion amongst groups of people that come from very, very different backgrounds. Anybody that wants to say that a military's cohesion is going to be affected by having open service of gays is making a public statement of a failure of leadership. It's as simple as that. It's a leadership issue, and militaries know exactly how to do this stuff.

The privacy issue gets raised from time to time. I would argue privacy is somewhere on the scale of importance with creature comforts, regular working hours, and overtime. Okay? It's a bit of a pedicures , okay, but it's not a big issue. If you're going to join the military, you're going to serve under certain circumstances, certain conditions. You're going expected to do very difficult, arduous work in very complex situations. If privacy is something that is really, really important to you, you probably don't belong to the club.

So I think those are the lessons that I would suggest that the CF has learned over time that could be inculcated by others.

Thanks.

MR. FRANK: Thank you, Dr. Okros. Now, to Dr. Kaplan.

DR. KAPLAN: Thank you. I would like to go directly to the issue of social cohesion or unit cohesion. Following the survey that I did in collaboration with Aaron Belkin -- Aaron Belkin of Palm Center -- in 2002, a survey of 420 combat and noncombat soldiers, and as opposed to most studies that have been asking specific attitudes of military personnels, what's your attitudes about gays in the military, this survey had only one question about gays. It was, do you know a gay service

member?

And it had many other questions about interpersonal measures of social cohesion, and I would just briefly say -- and by the way, there was a handout up at the reception desk of the findings, so if anybody has these colorful charts, you can look at them now, and maybe I can extend it around. But basically the findings were that 80 percent of respondents reported knowing gay soldiers in their units.

Interestingly, the same number is exactly under "Don't Ask Don't Tell" in two surveys that were conducted in the U.S. And no significant differences were found in knowledge of gay peers between soldiers in noncombat or combat soldiers. And really the main finding, the men in our case were asking -- and this is the second chart -- whether knowledge of gay peers and combat position, each separately and together, have significant effect on social cohesion. And so we found that soldiers in combat positions scored higher in measures of social cohesion than the soldiers in noncombat positions, and that would be expected. You expect more cohesion in combat units, particularly in Israel and the concern about that there. But the main issue is that there was no correlation between knowledge of a gay peer and social cohesion.

So soldiers who knew they had gay peers in the unit, those 80 percent, had no effect on their experience of social cohesion. We're talking about IDF in 2000. Maybe I can respond to other issues later on.

MR. FRANK: Thank you. And Dr. Basham.

DR. BASHAM: I've been researching personal issues in the British Armed Forces for the best part of about eight years, thus far anyhow. And in that time, I've closely examined policy debates pertaining to the service of gays and lesbians in the British military. I've spoken to a number of the key players, as it were, in the transition from a policy of excluding sexual minorities from military service to include England.

In addition, I carried out extensive qualitative research into the attitudes of serving members of the UK military towards issues and policies pertaining to gender, to race, to sexuality, in their institution between 2003 and 2006. Now, as this research was carried out only a few years into the new policy on sexuality as a private matter in the British Forces, one of my primary

considerations was to elicit in-depth accounts of how service personnel had negotiated a policy shift, and how I felt about the prospects, or the reality of working alongside gay, lesbian, and bisexual personnel.

What I found was the Ministry of Defense's claims the policy change was a nonissue for operational readiness and effectiveness was supported very much by my data. This isn't to say that all of my interviewees were happy with the policy change in Toto. All of the gay personnel that I spoke to had found it completely unproblematic to disclose their sexuality to their peers, which I can say more about later if need be.

But the policy has really had no discernable impact on military functions. The key point, I think, here to reemphasize and reiterate some of the things that have already been said, is of the overwhelming body of literature on cohesion suggests soldiers in the UK Armed Forces bond through shared commitments to tasks and to shared practices, not because of the interpersonal relationships.

So, in shorts, the British military's post-2000 measures on sexual orientation have been successful because they prioritize the need the address the impassive behavior on military effectiveness and not assumptions about what impact the presence of sexual minorities in the military could or might have.

In line with how it is if you like on-the-ground, British military policy now judges all soldiers on their behavior, on the commitment to unit tasks to priorities and discipline irrespective of their sexual orientation. Thank you.

MR. FRANK: Thank you so much. Thank you all for keeping your attention to the time.

In graduate school, we learned that the easiest way to tear down someone's book was to basically tell them they should have written a different book, maybe easiest but not necessarily fair. Nevertheless it's kind of fun. So I'm going to sort of do that.

Dr. Basham, you mentioned a qualitative research, and I think some people have sometimes a concern or skepticism about whether amidst all of the research that many of us have found showing that lifting bans in various countries is a nonevent, and suggesting that the likely

impact on cohesion readiness, recruitment, retention, et cetera, that the Pentagon is now assessing will be nil or will be negligible or manageable. But even with all of that research, sometimes what's really being measured is more compliance than cohesion and impact on cohesion. Is there a control group? Is there some way of actually assessing cohesion with a control group, or some way of giving real confidence to the extensive research that suggests no impact or low impact?

And so my question is, how convincing, how deep is the research that you've done -- starting with you, and then we'll come this way -- how persuasive, how deep is it, is there qualitative research? And what do you say to skeptics who suggest that while you haven't found problems, have we really done controlled experiments and really measured in empirical ways the impact, if any, on cohesion?

DR. BASHAM: Hmm, interesting. I guess perhaps the best way for me to respond to that is just talk about, I think, some of the strengths of my research, if you like, or in defense of my colleagues who do qualitative research. So I think that prioritizing the accounts of military personnel themselves, as told in their own words, qualitative research is able to provide a good sense of how, if you like the realities, the -- of scholars and policymakers envisage, actually relate to the realities of soldiers themselves.

And so although qualitative research can't be generalized in the same way as quantitative research can in terms of statistics, these findings can be evaluated in terms of their sort of plausibility given existing knowledge on the issue, the topic under consideration. And they can also be assessed for the sort of theoretical applicability.

So I think the strength of those kinds of studies, and perhaps Dr. Kaplan might have more to say on this, too, given he's on so much important ethnographic and qualitative research as well as quantitative studies, if that they compliment our knowledge from -- of quantitative sources and build on what we -- the knowledge we have. So I think all of these things are important.

We've also been talking quite a bit about culture and about how service personnel relate to these issues on emotional and personal levels and so forth. So that, I think, is the value of drawing in some of this research.

I don't know if that addresses your question adequately.

MR. FRANK: Yes, thank you. I think we'll pass it to Dr. Kaplan. Now, you've done some specific research, and I wanted to give you the opportunity to elaborate on that with the same framework in mind.

DR. KAPLAN: Okay. Yes, I'm all in favor for qualitative research as an anthropologist, but as a social psychologist, sometimes I have to do quantitative research. And this is what I've done here. And the thing is there's a very important distinction that's been done by Robert McCoon and others differentiating between task cohesion and social cohesion. And much of the literature shows that what is really important for effectiveness is actually task cohesion.

On the other hand, "Don't Ask Don't Tell" has many fears in its code. And one of the fears is that it's also the interpersonal attraction in itself, which is social cohesion that would be an unacceptable risk, not just effectiveness but also what people feel. If they feel bad about having gays in their unit, that emotion in itself is an unacceptable risk. This is how I read the reality, or the real rationale behind "Don't Ask Don't Tell", not combat effectiveness, what people feel in their units.

And since my focus is on emotions, again what I did in this survey is an inventory of emotions, interpersonal emotions like intimacy, love, affection. These are the words that were offered for the respondents, and at first you could tell that combat units in Israel, (inaudible) combat soldiers think they feel much more affection to their fellow soldiers than the noncombat soldiers, so you have here kind of a validation that this measures what they feel toward the soldiers, and in combat units they showed much more affectionate, intimate, and other words that I picked up from my qualitative work, to their peers.

And again, having said that, you see that if you ask them in the same questionnaire but you don't make a big fuss out of it, just ask them, do you know a gay soldier, that was the only question about homosexuality in that survey. It was about 18 percent in both combat and noncombat soldiers, and, most importantly, there was no difference. Knowing a gay soldier did not affect these measures of social cohesion. So you knew all the gay soldiers, it doesn't mean you are less intimate with your fellow soldiers. That's really the main issue here.

What's even more interesting, and I mentioned that very briefly, that those figures of 18 percent -- I call it the magic 20 percent because I looked then surveys of -- I know of only two

surveys that's been done on this in the United States: one by in 2000 by Beakler and the naval officers, and recently in the Zogby survey in 2006. And the numbers were more or less the same, 20 percent.

So under totally different polities, totally different military, in Zogby it was surveying Iraqi and Afghanistan soldiers that just came back from the war. And so it was totally different conditions of those 3 surveys, and still the average answer was about 80 percent of respondents know of a gay or lesbian soldier in the unit, which shows that policies are very -- and this is really my main point and more as an anthropologist than a psychologist -- policies don't matter so much in military life.

From my work in my book, I noticed that the interviews that I interviewed the gay veterans, some were before 1993, which is when the ban was lifted in Israel, some were after. They didn't even know what was happening with the policy. I'm talking about the gay veterans, not even the straight veterans that I worked with later on.

So what matters is what happens on the ground. And it goes back to things that have been (inaudible) here earlier about leadership. If you have an officer or even an NCO, or even -- I don't know if there's anything listed on NCO in terms of leadership, that is homophobic, the climate in that particular unit will be homophobic and nobody's going to get out. Nobody's going to come out. And it's all about leadership, and so policies high up I don't think go -- well, eventually, they have some effects, but not that quickly, and I don't think they will have that dramatic effect as some people might imagine.

MR. FRANK: I want to ask you a quick follow-up, and the distinction between task and social cohesion bears, I think, dwelling on for a minute. The idea here is that while cohesion matters to performance, there are different kinds of cohesion, and social cohesion is a matter of affection, emotion, and how people feel about one another. That seems to matter less, and in fact no research has tied measure of social cohesion to performance at all that I've ever encountered.

But task cohesion, by contrast, is the cohesion that develops around a common mission, and you don't have to like one another in order to develop that kind of cohesion which does have a bearing or may have a bearing. I'm not saying that the presence of gays disrupts task

cohesion, but that there are correlations between task cohesion, right, and performance.

But you're saying in the charts here that nevertheless, social cohesion seems to matter. Is that because it matters to the political debate? Or can you state again why, why are you looking at social cohesion if the research finds that it has no bearing on performance?

DR. KAPLAN: Because of the way I read the rationale of "Don't Ask Don't Tell" is not about performance; it's about values. And it's about values of what I feel toward the fellow members.

I don't want to go into the whole discussion of homosociality, but I just say the military is a homosocial institution, which means it's not a homosexual institution, but it also is -- it's a big contradiction in that it's really a whole different kind of discussion. But because of those values I think it's the emotions that are more important. I don't think those values were -- don't come up in "Don't Ask Don't Tell" very explicitly, but I think they do come up implicitly. And that's why it thought it was better to target that issue of social cohesion because even if you show that in social cohesion those things don't matter, gay soldiers do not affect it, then obviously in task cohesion, which is what you're referring to, which has been shown to be less influenced by social emotions, then obviously in task cohesion it even matters less.

So I was trying to pick up the thing where it's like the most stringent case and expand from that.

MR. FRANK: And in some sense how it has a bearing on the discourse that we're having today, politically.

DR. KAPLAN: Right, yeah.

MR. FRANK: Thank you. So moving to Dr. Okros, I want to pick up on that question of leadership. Clearly, from the research and from asking anyone who's been in the military in a leadership position or non, leadership is essential and is essential to making a transition like this, it's essential to the entire military operation.

There seems to be a sense among those who are reluctant to lift the ban or have it imposed upon them that, sure, leadership matters, they recognize that. But I think there's a concern that among either civilians or progressives, or those who are pushing more toward repeal, that the

idea that leadership could be a panacea is a little bit naive. The idea of that, you know, either because leaders aren't behind this, or because it's not fair to put all of this on the plate of junior officers or those who will have to do the leading.

So I'm wondering if you can dig a little deeper about what we know about leadership and whether there are answers to those concerns about how leadership really can make the difference in this kind of a transition.

DR. OKROS: Certainly, leadership -- it's very clear from any of the academic models and any of the academic research in terms of the power of effective leadership in the military context. Again, the military goes out of its way to generate both the position based on the personal power that individuals use to be very effective as leaders.

Having said that -- and I'll go back to General Willis' comments that he had made in terms of the importance of making sure that you have got all of the supporting policies and programs in place when you make the change Leaders need to be armed with an appropriate toolkit. They need to have clear statements of principle, which is what they base their leadership behavior on. They need a clear, simple narrative. They need to be able to explain this to their troops in very simple, straightforward terms: What are the first principles? What are the objectives? What does this mean? So leadership is critical, but leaders need to be supported with that.

The other comment that I would make is, then, there needs to be very clear statements in terms of emphasizing this as a leadership issue. I'll use one very brief example from the gender integration experience in the Canadian Forces.

The first time that we had women that were going to serve in the support occupation on board of one of our supply ships, briefing was being given to the CO and the senior leadership team of the ship about what the change meant. And halfway through it, one of the senior chief petty officers stood up and did the -- turned to the CO and said, come on, sir, you know, we know this is all social engineering. We know that this is not -- you know. This is not going to work out, this is not what we want.

To which the CO turned over to the executive officer and said, Chief So-and-So has just declared he's unfit to lead in today's Navy. He is to be ashore in four hours. Is there anybody

else who is willing to declare that you're unfit to lead?

I mean, you need clearer statements, and on occasions there may need to be clear decisions and clear actions like that to prove that this is a leadership responsibility, and that's what people are expected to do.

So give them the tools, give them the knowledge, give them the effective clear policies and programs and then hold them accountable. And it works very effectively.

MR. FRANK: Mr. Wenek, there seems to be some concern about what may end up being a kind of sensitivity training. There are a lot of slippery slope fears about this change in the U.S. I think some of that is political, some of it is grandstanding, some of it is a tactic to make this seem more complicated than it is by asking about sort of all the doomsday scenarios that may be just over the horizon.

But some of these concerns I think are genuine. And you mentioned something about that it's important not to change or to focus on changing attitudes but on behaviors. How, if there is virulent antigay sentiment in at least some pockets of the U.S. military, can this be achieved successfully without those fears coming true of violence or undiscipline, or problems with order and cohesion? Could this transition be made successfully without addressing those attitudes? And is addressing behavior sufficient, and can you sort of reassure people that we really aren't after sensitivity training here?

MR. WENEK: Thanks for the easy question.

Let me say up front that I think in part our approach was premised on the notion and well explained by Gregory Herrick in some of the work that he's done, that according to the functional theory of attitudes, attitudes serve different motivational purposes so that for some individuals an attitude towards an individual or group is a way of organizing knowledge or beliefs about a group or individual. It's a way of organizing knowledge or belief about an individual, and in other cases attitudes serve a value-expressive function. In other words, they're intimately related to deeply held core beliefs.

So I think what you tend to find, then, and certainly we found in our research in the mid-'80s, that for those who held sort of strong views about -- based on religion or moral views that

homosexuality was wrong or bad or evil, it seemed to be directly related to those core values and beliefs.

And those are the kinds of attitudes that are the most difficult to change, quite frankly, because it's intimately related to who you are as a person, the person who holds that value belief. Those that are more changeable are those that are based on perhaps perceptions picked up in the media or stereotypical information that circulates here and there, and over time those are more susceptible to change.

So to give you an analogous kind of situation, think of the debate on abortion, for example, and there are two opposing camps on that. But I think as a society you have to make a decision as to whether you're going to live under the rule of law. And if the rule of law says, you know, abortion is okay, or the service of homosexuality is okay, then you comply with the law.

And so that's one way, I think, of approaching the issue. And I have to admit up front here that when we changed our policy, this was not an exercise in objective and rational policy decision-making. The law was the instrument of social change in our case under the Human Rights. Under our Human Rights code, we were told we were in violation of the law, and, therefore, we had to change. So that's one issue.

And I guess the other thing that I would throw back to you is, well, is that, you know, the U.S. Armed Services had had lots of experience with this kind of issue where there has been deeply-held negative attitudes towards various minority groups. To African Americans in the past and, more recently, I guess I have to think of how well you're doing in terms of some of the negative attitudes towards Muslims that emerged after 9-11, and particularly after the Fort Hood killings.

So if you can manage that, I don't see it so difficult to manage attitudes towards homosexuals and to really focus on the regulation of behavior and really implementing a policy which says we're going to have zero tolerance for gay-bashing, we're going to have zero tolerance for crimes of violence against gays.

MR. FRANK: Thank you. I'm going to ask one more set of questions which I'm going to bundle and throw up somewhat more informally to the panel, and then we'll turn it over to the audience. And this bundle of questions somewhat overlaps with the questions that were asked

in the last panel, but because we're looking at this from a scholarly and research perspective, and we'll build on what we've just been discussing, it is potentially very helpful to discuss what the research says about the specifics of this kind of a change.

So I'll throw out a few of the questions that I think have been a big part of this discourse and see if there's further research that you want to elaborate on to address them.

One is the question of relevance, and that may be a question that is equally or better addressed by U.S. scholars studying the American situation. But as we heard before, some people say that the U.S. military and our culture are in a class by themselves. We have the most powerful military in the world. We have a more conservative culture than some of our allies, so the question there is what does the research say, if anything about how relevant these lessons are from other nations, how relevant they would be to ours, as well as how the change was imposed. Does it matter if the change comes from the military itself? If it comes from legislative or court decision, executive, et cetera, does that matter?

Second is the time when this happens, either during a war or not during a way, or whether this happens quickly or over the slow roll, is there research specifically that addresses that as opposed to simply experiential lessons?

And then the third one is the question of privacy, how important is privacy, and how important are attitudes given what we've just been saying. For instance, one concern has often been that recruitment and retention could suffer, and that even, if you show that the impact and cohesion is likely to be small, that people in the U.S. in particular, where there is a potentially a more conservative military subculture, could leave in droves.

And in Canada and Britain there were polls done before the bans were lifted that suggested that large majorities of people would refuse to serve with open gays and would actually leave. And yet when the bans were actually lifted, the number of people who left as a result of that could be counted on one hand in each of those countries as opposed to the thousands that had been predicted by those polls. So what, if anything, does the research tell us to help explain that?

So with apologies for the barrel of questions, I wanted to speed things along by asking them all at once, turning that over to any of you, and then we'll open it up to the audience.

DR. BASHAM: I'll take the one on privacy, I think. I think perhaps the key distinction that can be made here is between concerns and actual problems. I think that's kind of what I take from the kind of British concerns.

In 2002, when the MAD reviewed its policy change for the second time, the issue of showering and sharing accommodation with gay personnel was raised as an ongoing concern among some, at least some members of the UK Forces. So it didn't just go away. But I think that there are a number of kind of reasons why those sort of concerns that were spoken about didn't actually translate into significant problems -- headlines, you know, and so on -- and reports of difficulties in the military itself.

Firstly, for better or worse if you like, the number of personnel who disclosed their sexuality at that time so their peers was relatively small, and I think that, you know, coming out, if you like, is a very complex process, and we need to not kind of oversimplify that, and perhaps it warrants a little bit more attention from us as researchers.

But I think, you know, assessing the climate of your units is very important in undertaking that decision. So that would have been an interesting kind of thing to consider for individuals.

Secondly, in 2002, so around the same time of this review was carried out, MAD launched the single-living accommodation modernization project in the UK, in recognition that privacy is something that pretty much everyone these days regardless of their sexuality tends to value, and that single people should perhaps have similar rights to married couples in terms of having their own space, and that this could be an important issue for retention.

So alleviating concerns around privacy and sexual orientation may have been a byproduct. It wasn't the intention of a policy, but it may have been a byproduct of that very practical change.

And then, finally, I think that the absence of any major incidents around kind of privacy issues means that military personnel in the British military are perhaps more likely to trust the message that sexual orientation is not the same as sexual misconduct, as emphasized by the British social code of conduct. So I think that message is getting through.

DR. KAPLAN: I'll try to comment then to two things: First maybe, and the most important thing, implementation, the idea of getting to any implementation. There was a policy that was changed in 1993. As I said, nobody even knew about it, it wasn't such a big issue in the media either. The officers on the ground didn't know about it. And in 1998, as far as I could tell from a scholar who got a message from the IDF speaker, I think, just written in the Knesset, but to this day now we have simply no policy at all. So there wasn't an issue of implementation.

The only thing I can actually say, and I don't think it's even recorded anywhere, but I did get that from soldiers on the ground is that -- and that goes to the privacy issue -- is that a soldier, especially in basic training or in settings where they have to shower like very fast and sometimes together in the same barracks or showers, a soldier can ask, can address the social worker -- I think that's the term, the closest that I know; I don't know what's the military term -- in his unit and ask her, if she is a woman, to get showers, you know, in his private time, like to have his private seven minutes of the shower. That's the only kind of implementation that I had managed to figure out from what I hear on the ground or from military personnels.

And again, the message that comes from the IDF, basically, is that -- and we hear that all over the board are area panel that simply they don't deal with sexual orientation. It's not something that they deal with. I'm not sure that it's even something that they want to research in any way.

And I think I should say that there are advantages and there are drawbacks for that, because the advantage is, of course -- well, the drawbacks maybe first is that if soldiers have a problem, as a gay soldier, it's, well, they might have someone to approach, but they wouldn't know about it because nobody tells them that they have any special issues with the gay soldiers.

The advantage, though, is that unlike other minority groups in the IDF which are dealt with as a special group, first and foremost women, which there's a whole bunch of things done about women in the military, but also in new immigrants, so unlike those kind of minorities, getting no special treatment means that they're not -- gays and lesbians are not, you know, marked in any way as a special group. And I think marking can help you sometimes, but it's -- usually what it does, of course, is it can advance prejudges.

So that's the fact that there is no treatment, there is no temptation, there is just seems as business as usual, I think is beneficial for the gay and lesbian individuals.

DR. OKROS: A couple of quick comments. The U.S. is a unique military. Yeah, the U.S. has got kit that nobody else has got. There's no two ways about it. But the core of a military is people, and the social functioning, internally, within the military is identical from across huge numbers of militaries. We've done lots of comparative international research looking at the people part of it, leadership cohesion, these kinds of issues, they're very, very similar.

The other part that I would suggest with regards to what is being unique about the U.S. Services, during the Cold War, yes, the purpose of the U.S. military was to project force in accomplishment of national interests. I think the dialogue is changing in the U.S. It certainly has changed elsewhere. I think increasingly our citizens, including American citizens, are expecting their military to project values. And it's pretty hard to stand on the moral high ground, trying to go into other countries and help them establish peaceful working democracies if, at home, you're not living up to the kind of value statements that you're trying to promote elsewhere.

So I think increasingly people are going to be looking at the U.S. military, both domestically and internationally, in terms of the exemplar of what kind of values are you promoting?

Let me turn briefly to the question of the recruitment retention. Most militaries have the basis statement: You recruit the individual, you retain the family. We know that. We all know that. When we are denying that a certain number of members of the military do not have a family, they cannot talk about the family. That's going to be a real significant issue with regards to reenlistment and sustaining them.

And there's a deeper issue that I think we should also be paying attention to which has to do with psychological trauma. We've all recognized increasingly the amount of psychological pressure that we put on troops when we deploy them, the kinds of missions that we're putting them into. The research is very clear: Individuals who are socially isolated in their units are at increased risk for things like PTSD. Individuals that are not able to bring their loved ones, their families into providing social support are in increased difficulty in recovering from these sorts of issues. The U.S. Services are paying huge attention to this. This has become a big issue.

So I think it's important to think about what are the implications and consequences of putting people in -- they're volunteering to serve their country in uniform, putting them in harm's way, and then forcing them to deny who they are and forcing them to be somewhat differentiated and segregated, what is the risk that we're placing those individuals at? I think that's another broad question we need to be thinking about.

DR. OKROS: I'd just like to pursue the issue of relevance a little bit. One, first of all saying that I think it's a false argument to treat any culture as a monolithic, homogeneous entity. If you look across countries, usually there's more variability within any national culture than there is between cultures. And so I'm going to give you two kinds of arguments, I think, against the American exceptionalist argument.

One has to do with, I think, military practicality, and it's simply this: Is that if the U.S. military is so different from the Brits, from the Australians, from the Canadians, what are we doing together in coalition operations? If the cohesion in our unit is so fragile as to risk our operational effectiveness, then surely we must be unreliable partners.

The second point is really, I guess, an appeal to your better natures in the sense that from a sociocultural perspective, many countries still view America as it was imagined and is still yet to be as the promise of the Enlightenment. Remember that period? Thought, consideration for others, and so on. And in that respect I did a quick check on the Internet before I came here and looked at which countries allowed and which countries disallowed the service of homosexuals. So here, very briefly, the countries that disallow homosexuals for military service, either openly or otherwise: Cuba, China, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Jamaica, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, Yemen. Is that really the club you want to belong to?

MR. FRANK: Thank you. We have about 15 minutes for Q&A. Please keep in mind the ground rules which are to wait for the mic, to identify yourself, and to be brief and ask a question.

Yes?

LTC. McLEAN: Lieutenant Colonel "Chip" McLean, United States Marine Corps.

I'm a fellow here at Brookings.

My quick question is, is that the secretary of defense has initiated a study group review here in the United States. And one of the things that's going to be done is a survey of both the troops and their families. And so I was wondering, with all of your experience, what would you offer as, if you were going to conduct a survey, what things should be looked at? What would be the most beneficial way to approach that survey so that you get the most benefit out of the time you're going to take to do the survey? What types of questions, or how should the questions be approached, et cetera?

DR. KAPLAN: Well, of course, you can ask many questions. One thing I recommend not to do, not to write a survey on which the title is "Homosexuality in the American Military," which is what almost all services have done. If you really want to do a survey that has some kind of validity, you have to see how the relation to homosexuality is compared to many other, let's say, minority issues. That's one way of doing it.

Another way of doing it is, for instance, doing what I've done in this survey is again asking think-questions about what's your thoughts about social cohesion and then also ask, do you know a black soldier in your know? Do you know a gay soldier in your unit? Do you know different kind of minorities? And, you know, this is what I've done in this survey. And there you have a better kind of sense if there's any meaning to knowing a gay soldier in that unit.

So I guess I would start with those kind of surveys. But it's a survey that you don't put on the title, you know, we're trying to ask about policies, implementations, what to do, what not to do, because this is just begging the question. It's really asking them, are you against or are you for it? Or of a question inside that kind of -- those average surveys really wouldn't matter so much.

MR. WENEK: And I'll extend on that with a couple of things. First of all, the U.S. Services, and I'd say compared to the '93 work which some of the RAND colleagues here were involved in, the U.S. Services now as period of time of a policy of "Don't Ask Don't Tell," but you generally kind of know. So, I mean, I think it's important to start asking people.

I mean, I have been talking to some of my American service colleagues, and, you know, yes, that are individuals saying, "I didn't know, but I was pretty certain," you know. So what

has that experience led to? What is it -- what have people seen? What has been the implication on that?

The other part is, again to go back to this, this is not about attitudes. This is about the issue of if there is a clear policy direction that comes down, are you prepared to live in accordance with it, and are you prepared to support it? I mean, those are the questions that need to be asked, you know. And I think that, then, provides us with the real interesting difference between, for example, in the Canadian context, the '86 research that didn't ask those sorts of questions, why people predicted there were going to be huge problems, and they didn't happen.

We asked the wrong question. You know, the question really was one of saying, you know, if there is clear policy that is stated, are you going to continue serving in uniform, or are you going to live in accordance with that policy? That's the key question to ask. And I would suggest you're going to find the vast majority of individuals are going to say, I'm here to serve my nation, and I'll serve my nation under whatever policy regime is put in place as long as it's clearly explained to me.

I think that's the kind of research we need to be thinking about.

DR. BASHAM: Can I -- I'd just like to kind of yet reemphasize that I think that's very similar to the British case, the 1996 report by the homosexuality policy assessment team had, you know, some very, very negative survey data and also some qualitative data around attitudes toward gay, lesbian, bisexual service personnel. But as we've heard, you know, what happened in 2000, you know, non-issue, non-event and so on. Well, what accounts for that gap, I think asking the right questions is vitally important. What are we fundamentally interested in? Are we interested in military readiness, military effectiveness? I think so.

That is the bottom line, and I think if those are the things that are concentrated on and focused in on in surveys in terms of, you know, how closely soldiers invest in core values and standards and ideas around, you know, behavior rather than attitudes, and I think that is the way to go. That's the way forward.

MR. FRANK: More questions? Yes, please wait for the mic and identify yourself.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Larry Shaughnessy, CNN.

Dr. Okros, you mentioned about the problem of people who feel ostracized in a unit, off by themselves, tend to be at higher risk for PTSD. How would a change in "Don't Ask Don't Tell" remove the ostracism, them being ostracized if a new policy can't force members of their unit to suddenly become more open-minded about homosexuality?

DR. OKROS: My comment is not so much that the other members of the unit, it's the gay member of the unit is the particular. That's where I'd start. I mean, I think we need to think about what are the consequences to somebody when they are in a group setting and, I mean, we know the military is a very much a group environment. You're in a group setting, and you're constantly, constantly have to engaging in self-censorship, and you cannot open up and talk about who you are and what's important to you. We need to understand what the psychological consequences are to individuals having to do that kind of thing.

The other part, though, and a colleague of mine, a military anthropologist, did some research looking at diversity in rifle company in combat in Afghanistan. She deployed with them and lived with them for a period of several months. And what she pointed out in her research is, the kind of diversity variables that we use just really don't count. It isn't about age, it isn't about gender, it isn't about race, it isn't about religion. The things that count are when it comes -- when there's tough stuff to be done, do you pitch in, you know? Are you a hard worker or are you a slacker?

The second one she pointed out is, are you a joiner versus a loner?

And the third one, which most of us know from deployments, when the goodie package comes from home, are you a sharer or are you a hoarder? Okay? And these are the things that really matter to soldiers, to troops, to units, Army, Navy, Air Force.

So the issue is that "Don't Ask Don't Tell" forces people to be loners. It forces people not to be accepted and seen as much of a joiner in the group as if they were able to talk more openly about who they are. If they can just bring personal relationships into the casual conversation the way the straight person can talk about their wife and their kids, for them to be able to talk about their partner allows them to bring a bit of their personal life into that domain and join in. By forcing them to have to constantly censor themselves, to regulate their behavior, to pretend to be somebody they're not is putting people at risk in a workday setting, let alone with the kind of stuff that we're

exposing folks to in the deployments they're on right now.

So I think we need to understand it from a psychological perspective of the individual who's trying to fit in, who's trying to serve, and is trying to succeed. So that's where I come at from that.

MR. FRANK: A quick addition to that I think terrific answer, using moderator's discussion, is we did a study at Palm Center that's on our website called "Gays and Lesbians at War," which assessed dozens of gay and lesbian service members who served in Iraq or Afghanistan in which they demonstrate, and they clearly explain how this policy forced them to isolate themselves. And, you know, if you're a hoarder or a sharer, that also goes for information, not just actual goodies.

And to keep in mind that this is a policy that imposes that kind of isolation from on high, even when at the unit level among young people today, it often matters much less than those policymakers who are imposing this isolation. And so people are trying to get around it in funny ways that are consistent with the policy.

And then, finally, in terms of diagnosis of PTSD and that sort of thing, there are severely constrained forms of access to, for gay and lesbian service members, to doctors and psychologists and even chaplains because, rightly or wrongly, people are concerned that those professionals may out them. And so these are some of the consequences that are spelled out in that "Gays and Lesbians at War."

Further questions? In the back. There's the microphone in the aisle.

MR. LLOYD: Good morning. I'm Mr. Lloyd from the Maryland State Department of Education.

We consider the military as a very important fabric of our democratic society, so with the religious sector, the academic sector, the political sector and business sector, and all of the sectors, then why is it, what do you think are the reasons, why is the military only the focus of this LGB issue, "Don't Ask Don't Tell?" Why are these things not plaguing the academic sector or other sectors? As I said earlier, why is the focus only on the military?

Thank you.

MR. WENEK: Okay, I'll risk an answer. One of the things that we've been talking around but haven't really quite put our finger on yet is the issue of trust within units. I mean, I can as a former military officer that one of the things you do very quickly in a unit is, as you form, develop, train, and so on, is you -- one of the questions, though, that's uppermost in your mind is, who can I trust? Who can I trust to get the job done? Who do I go to when I've got a difficult task and I know this person will see it through to the end?

So I think the same kind of dynamic is relevant to this discussion. Trust is critical to the effectiveness of military organization in terms of trust between peers, trust in leadership, trust in support elements. I mean, it is the glue that really holds the unit together and makes it work.

So out of the slow and progressive development of trust, then that opens the door to self-disclosure. Some of you may have had the experience of sitting in an airplane beside somebody who tells you all the embarrassing details of his or her life in the first five minutes. And it's a little awkward. You know, who is this person? I mean, that's not the norm, it does happen, but for most people, I think, it's the other way around, is that you only disclose personal intimate details when you have developed a trust relationship with that person.

So when the trust is there, then there will be a tendency for people to disclose, and the disclosure will assist in relieving the kind of problems that Alan's just been talking about, but at the bottom of it, in terms of why it's so big for the military is again, trust is important to effectiveness.

MR. FRANK: We're going to have to figure out a way to wrap this up in three minutes or so. The panelists, raise your finger if you have something to say as a final -- okay, it looks like we do. Okay. So, unfortunately, we won't do more questions, and what we'll just give each of the remaining three panelists some very quick closing time.

DR. BASHAM: I just wanted to pick up on that question and how I think it makes the British case. I mean, I've argued that one of the kind of ongoing issues in the British military is that although the overwhelming evidence points to task cohesion, in a lot of the doctrine and kind of directives in the British military, there is a sense of that the British military clings to somewhat unreflexive claims about its identity that are more social cohesion-based. And I think have got tremendous attempts to plant equality and diversity policies, including those pertaining to sexuality.

So in spite of this evidence on task cohesion, I think British military doctrine still emphasizes social cohesion as normative framework for its institutional identity. I think that the UK military has long seen itself as a heterosexual institution regardless of the realities on the ground, as it were, and it continues to reinforce this identity through various rituals and practices. And, as a result, this might mean that some within the forces may feel that there is a need to guards against such non-heterosexuality to preserve tradition, if you like.

And this may happen in parts on the decisions of gay and lesbian personnel on coming out and so on, and negotiating their role in the (inaudible) Armed Forces. And this is why, as has already been said, leadership, firm leadership, firm directives on the policy are vital, and they cannot be, I think, understated.

MR. FRANK: Dr. Okros, do you want to take a minute or so? Either or is fine.

DR. OKROS: The choice is to kind of restate something I already said, but I think it comes up from all of the two panels that we had just now. Maybe it's too late, because it's already this kind of working group starting to do some kind of project of checking the intimidation issues. But I think the key here is not to make it as a special treatment issue and just to change the legal status of this policy and let the military figure out how it's doing it, like all those other seven cases that we're hearing have been doing it, and not making it into the doctrine of how we change, because there is no doctrine. That's it.

MR. WENEK: The two -- I think it's important to pay attention to two of the broad academic discussions around this. Carol referred to one earlier. This is the sixth -- the 50-year discussion of the Huntington versus Janowitz model, and which kind of model does the U.S. military wish to be? Clearly, in the U.S. case, it's still somewhat up for discussion. It's not in most other cases, and then the Canadian Forces has clearly adopted the Janowitzian approach that's been reflected in doctrine, it's been reflected in practice on the ground. I think that literature is important to think about and pay attention to.

The other one which we haven't really -- which we talked around as well is part of the warrior identity in many militaries is it comes across as the combat male warrior. Militaries do tend to be hypermasculine. This has implications for those that do not fit into that narrow stereotype.

We're increasingly recognizing it is about brains, not brawn. It is about the individual's ability to exercise judgment and discretion. It is about changing the parameters within which people operate.

That are as many issues with regards to how feminine women can be in the military as there are how often can gays be, so we need to be putting it in a proper context.

And the last thing I'd say is we should put this one in the real perspective. I understand the concerns with regards to roots, the things that could happen between gays and straights when gays serve openly. I've heard the discussions about the fact that straights may be subject to all sorts of unwanted sexual attention from gays. The minute that anybody can assure me that there isn't a single woman serving in uniform that's subject to unwanted attention from her male colleagues, then start worrying about the gays picking on the straights.

I mean, let's put it in context. Let's pay attention to where the real issues and priorities are. Thanks.

MR. FRANK: Thank you. We are going to break now for lunch and reconvene at 1:30 for the third panel, which is "Command Experiences and Lessons Learned." Please give thanks, great thanks to our panelists for coming and sharing information. (Applause)

(Recess)