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INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN:

A REPORT FROM THE FIELD

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Okay, good afternoon, everyone. My name is Elizabeth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement.

We're delighted to welcome you to this session to talk about internally displaced persons, IDPs, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and particularly as we have four representatives based in the region who can talk to us a little bit about what the situation actually is on the ground.

Afghanistan, of course, is a country with 30, 40 years of experience with displacement, successive waves of people displaced internally, returning refugees who become IDPs, but an issue that seems not to be very high on the international agenda given the full range of needs inside Afghanistan.

We'll then turn to Pakistan, and as you know, about a year ago, 2 million Pakistanis were displaced within a 2-week period. I think the present estimates are that 1.4 million remain displaced, and we will be hearing about the particular needs and issues that are raised by them.

We're in a nice display of interagency cooperation. We're going to go back and forth. We're going to begin with IMC, hearing about the experience in Afghanistan from Robert Lankenau, who's a country director of Afghanistan. He's been there about a year, previously served in Gaza, Sudan, and other places.

I won't read the biographies as you have them with you.

We'll then turn to Sidney Traynham with Church World Service, who's going to be talking about both Afghanistan and a little bit of Pakistan, and providing a seamless transition then as we move into discussion of the situation in Pakistan.

Wajahat Latif, also from Church World Service, worked in Pakistan for many years, was with us last year also talking about some of the issues around displacement in Pakistan and welcome back.

And finally we have Jehangir ali Khan, who's the country director of Pakistan for International Medical Corps, who will also be talking about some of the -- particularly the health issues that IMC is working with in Pakistan.

You are all most welcome. We hope to keep this informal and each of our speakers will talk for about ten minutes and then we'll have time for questions.

So, again, welcome, and we'll turn to you Robert.

MR. LANKENAU: Great. Thank you very much, Elizabeth, for the warm welcome. Thank you to the audience for coming this afternoon.

I'm going to give you -- really, my presentation or our talk here is really from an operational standpoint. I'll tell you a little bit about our programs in Afghanistan, the situation in Afghanistan, and then also what programs we have and how programs relate to the IDPs and their situation.

Let me just begin with a quick overview of IMC, the International Medical Corps. As IMC, International Medical Corps started in

1984 and we have our provenance in Afghanistan like many other NGOs -- Doctors Without Borders, and some other humanitarian organizations -- really started during the Soviet-Afghan War. And IMC has been in the country for something like 26 years now, and over the years we've been one of the largest health players in Afghanistan and we've really seen a broad spectrum of beneficiaries: refugees, IDPs, invalids, women and children, you name it. And we have now, in the last 25 years of being in Afghanistan, really graduated, as I like to say, graduated a generation of health workers. I mean, thousands of people have been trained by the International Medical Corps, thousands of people have worked for the International Medical Corps over the course of 25 years and have really kind of -- so, we've really contributed to a health cadre, many of whom now work in the Ministry of Public Health, which we have, over the years, come to regard as one of the best ministries in Afghanistan. So, we're very proud of our legacy in this regard.

And IMC, we work in some of the worst provinces of Afghanistan, in Eastern Afghanistan and Southeastern Afghanistan, and those provinces are Kunar, Nurestan, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktia, all of which really border Waziristan, or Pakistan in general, and experience some of the problems that are happening on the other side of the border. And I think by working in these areas we really distinguish ourselves from other NGOs which choose to operate in some of the safer areas in Northern Afghanistan and the central highlands, and remain to this day despite the

needs to work in some of the dicier areas. A lot of other NGOs choose to continue to work in the safer areas which leads to a lot of the humanitarian needs that IDPs experience and others, and leads to these needs not being addressed adequately.

Programmatically, IMC really focuses on technical capacity building, training of health workers, and we do this in two large hospitals, public hospitals, in Kabul, but we do this in all of our rural and provincial projects as well. And in addition to capacity building and training, we really also provide direct service -- direct health services to a lot of beneficiaries and in the eastern region of Afghanistan, Nangarhar and Kunar, we actually work in nine returnee camps and provide the health services in those camps and also provide gender-based violence education. And while these camps are spontaneous settlements, as they're officially called, are primarily settled and populated by returnees from Pakistan, you do find a lot of IDPs in those settlements as well. So, a lot of our programs directly and indirectly also benefit some of the IDPs.

The situation on the ground in Afghanistan, as you pointed out, Elizabeth, is a protracted crisis, protracted situation. A lot of the IDPs' current estimates suggest that there are something like 300,000 IDPs. Most of the IDPs, more than two thirds of the IDPs, are actually displaced since before 2003 and of course the recent Operation Moshtarak, the military offensive by ISAF and the ANA, has led to a further displacement of something like 29,000 IDPs, many of whom remain IDPs now within

Helmand.

And in addition to the roughly 300,000 IDPs that have been displaced by acts of violence or the insecurity in the country, or the conflict, there is something like 90,000 IDPs that are displaced by natural disasters. Some areas of Northern Afghanistan and Eastern Afghanistan experience almost yearly flooding, especially in the spring after the snow melts. A lot of areas are cut off in the winter for six months on end, and Eastern Afghanistan, in particular, experiences almost annually, earthquakes. So, there are, in addition to conflict-related IDPs, there are a host of naturally displaced people.

And unfortunately, not -- some of the displacement that takes place in Afghanistan, not everything is due to the, let's say, Taliban-ISAF conflict that we -- you know, that is publicized in the media and that's very apparent to anyone that follows the news, but some displacement also really takes place due to ethnic reasons, to ethnic tensions, and this is something that's always -- or, it seems to be downplayed. I mean, in Central Afghanistan and Northern Afghanistan, there are pockets of Pashtuns, which previously were, you know, associated with being aligned with the Taliban. So after the invasion of Afghanistan, if you want to call it that, the ouster of the Taliban regime, the Northern Alliance and a lot of the militia affiliated with the Northern Alliance turned on their Pashtun neighbors and forced them out. This particularly happened in Western and Northern Afghanistan, so you, over the years, had a steady flow to Southern Afghanistan where the

Pashtuns reside of Northern Pashtuns.

And then recently, more recently, there's been ethnic tensions over grazing rights where in the central highlands and the Hazarajat, Hazara, which are ethnic -- it's an ethnic -- separate ethnic group and usually of the Shia affiliation, nomad -- they're called Kuchi, which are nomadic Pashtuns, they have clashed repeatedly in the central highlands with Hazaras, and have, you know, forced several thousand of those to flee. And the pattern of displacement in Afghanistan is that a lot of IDPs actually migrate to the cities, so you have most IDPs actually coming to Kabul, to Heart, to Kandahar, and Jalalabad, and then of course most recently to Lashkar Gah, which is capital of Helmand where the Operation Moshtarak took place. And the fact that a lot of IDPs migrate to the cities make assistance -- make the provision of assistance to them very difficult because they become very hard to distinguish from economic migrants. So, in many cases, you know, they move in with families, they settle in neighborhoods of their own ethnic affiliation or they end up in what I would call slums. And later it's just very difficult to distinguish who's who and who moved to Kabul or who moved to the cities, for what particular reason. So that makes identifying the IDPs difficult and then of course tailoring the assistance to hem also very difficult.

Well, in addition to that there is also then the temp -- not all IDPs are permanently displaced. In some instances, people move back and forth, especially once IDPs have come to Kabul and have discovered that

income generating opportunities and life in general is better in the cities than in some of the communities in which they lived before, a lot of IDPs choose to stay there or just partially return, so some family members stay in the cities, some go back to their communities. So, there is also the problem of, you know, temporary displacement. So, again, all of this makes IDPs very difficult to categorize and to provide -- and makes it difficult to come up with proper assistance for the specific needs of the IDPs.

What's happening programmatically, the International Medical Corps and other NGOs are now looking, especially in Kabul there has been -- in general, there's a feeling that the health -- and I can only speak from the health perspective -- there's the feeling that a lot of the populations in formal settlements and IDPs are not assisted or under assisted in their health needs and that the public health system in Kabul is, ironically, it being the Afghan capital, is actually very inadequate.

So, while the Ministry of Public Health focuses a lot of its assistance into the provinces and to the districts, the public health system in Kabul is atrocious and you basically have to pay to be seen by anyone -- by a doctor, by a nurse, by a midwife. And unless -- you know, and vaccination campaigns for children and pregnant mothers are very difficult to conduct in a city like that, and this -- the fact that you really have to pay for health care makes it very difficult for the poor and for IDPs to seek treatment. And there is now a recognition by the UN, WHO, in particular, that the health needs are neglected. And this is something we're now, as an International Medical

Corps, we, in conjunction with some other NGOs, have started to set up mobile clinics to some of these informal settlements or slums, whatever you want to call them, and start treating people. And I know that some other NGOs are starting to look at livelihoods projects and water and sanitation projects because if it weren't for the interventions of international NGOs in the capital city of Kabul, with 4-1/2 million people, these populations would be neglected. And the same is true in other cities, in Kandahar, in Lashkar Gah, and Jalalabad, that ironically the needs of the urban poor, which include many IDPs, are often very neglected.

And I already mentioned our programs in Eastern Afghanistan in the refugee returnee camps or settlements. IMC has been working in those for three years and has been providing primary health care services to those returnees and increasingly we've seen IDPs appear in those settlements, taking up shelter in those settlements, and certainly utilizing our health services.

That really is the situation in Afghanistan and I look forward to your comments, questions, and to have a lively discussion.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Robert. We'll turn then now to Sidney.

MR. TRAYNHAM: Sure. My name is Sidney Traynham and I am not the person who's supposed to be sitting in this chair from CWS. My boss, our regional representative, Marvin Parvez, who is Pakistani, he was applying for a British visa with the British High Commission in Islamabad,

and his passport is one of several thousand that is now lost, and so I came a bit on short notice. Wajahat and I flew together on Sunday, and I actually wasn't -- we were talking earlier today, I wasn't aware of this sort of Times Square situation and so I come into the country with like several Afghan visas and Pakistani visas in my passport. And Wajahat is a former ambassador, so he sort of sails through Customs. And then me, the American citizen, gets detained. You know, have you ever had any military service or training? No, I haven't. What are you doing in Pakistan? Working for an NGO. So, eventually I get through and we were looking at the news earlier today, Wajahat actually said that he thought I looked, you know, more threatening than this guy on television.

So, in any case, it's good to be with you and glad to share with you today.

Maybe, I'm going to focus most on Pakistan, but I can talk a little bit about our work on the Afghan side and maybe the way to do that is actually to talk about how our work started in Afghanistan. And so we've been in Pakistan for just close to 60 years and one of our longest running programs is in Mansehra, which is north of Islamabad. It's only about maybe 100 miles or so, but it's like a 4-hour drive. And we work with Afghan refugees there and provide health services over three camps to about 56,000 refugees for the past 30 years.

Back in the '90s, as some people from the camps we were overseeing were moving back to Afghanistan, we wanted to use that

opportunity to actually try to set up some health projects across the border. So, in terms of our health work, it's greatly, greatly community based, working with local mullahs, local elders, local community leaders, and so as some of those people were moving back, we used that relationship to begin working in the Nangarhar and Laghman provinces in Eastern Afghanistan. And so the way that basically worked, we got a letter from one of the mullahs and then took that to the Taliban's embassy in Peshawar in Pakistan, presented the letter and said, we'd like your authorization. And they stamped the letter and then we take that to one of the vice presidents in Kabul with the Taliban regime, and he says, well this all looks very good.

You know, we are a faith-based organization. Our name is Church World Service, but because of the trust that came from these other -- from the mullahs that we were -- in the communities we were assisting in Mansehra in Pakistan, it was all approved. And so we start doing women's health work during the Taliban regime in Eastern Afghanistan in the '90s, before the Taliban fell.

So, that's how some of our work actually began in Afghanistan, relying greatly on the trust of communities, on the community networks that we had built up over our time in Pakistan.

What we're seeing right now on the ground, particularly in Nangarhar and Laghman where we have health services, we have a clinic, we do health care in Tora Bora, and one of the things we're seeing in the communities is about 50 percent of the population are returnees from

Pakistan -- mostly from Pakistan, but also from Iran -- are returnees who were former refugees. But now still within Nangarhar and Laghman, you know, on the scale of maybe 20,000 people are internally displaced who are returnees, came back hoping that things would be better and they end up living with host communities or in camps or whatever the case might be.

So, the internal displacement situation really can continue when people return from being refugees and likely find things to be a lot more difficult because they no longer have refugee status outside the country where they can have better access to medical services or to education services through distributions, whatever the case might be.

So, you know, when we look at Afghan refugees that I've spoken with in Mansehra, the two reasons they say they don't want to return, one is security and the other is livelihoods or employment issues, and now as the security situation in Pakistan has greatly deteriorated, it's less -- you know, it's like, well, if it's insecure here, if it's insecure there, you know, I guess we'll just stay where we have better services and if there's not jobs that are available, readily available across the border.

Let me shift now to just talk about maybe two or three different areas of the Pakistani displacement situation and then also focus a bit on the overall U.S. assistance strategy for Pakistan, the Kerry-Lugar Bill.

First, right now, if I had to describe it, the displacement situation in the Northwest is immensely complex. And when we had the Swat displacement last year it was a lot of people, millions of people, moving

within a matter of a few weeks to relatively the same areas. And now there's multiple military campaigns going on at different times, smaller numbers of displaced people, maybe around 1.2-, 1.3-, 1.4 million people who are displaced, but it's at every stage of displacement, from new displacements where people are in need of immediate relief to longer term displacement. For some it could be they've been displaced for a year and a half from Mohmand or Bajaur areas, and this may be on some of the maps that you have. And then you've got people who are displaced from this campaign in South Waziristan by the Pakistani military, and those people who are displaced have been displaced for maybe six months now. And then you've got people from Swat who have returned or most have returned, and you have early recovery needs. And so it's this really sort of complex situation that doesn't lend itself to easy fundraising or media campaigns and the funds just aren't flowing at this point in time, for lots of reasons.

What, in other countries, is called the UN cap, in Pakistan it's called the PHRP, or the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan; slightly or massively delayed over the course of several months from the end of last year into this year. The total appeal, I believe, is around $537 million and it's only funded just over $100 million right now, and a lot of that, from the most part, has come from the U.S. Other governments as well. The U.S. has certainly been very generous, but again, it's not enough in terms of the needs on the ground.

For us, as we try to address some of the needs, we try to take

a more complex approach that looks both at displaced people who are newly displaced, those who have been displaced for a period of time, and also the host communities as well. So, in some of our health work that's funded by European donors in Swat, we also work back in the host communities where people have left, where resources are greatly depleted, and also we do the same thing with our food security work.

One of the key challenges to funding is that international donors, whether it's the U.S. -- not so much the U.S., which is a separate issue, but certainly DIFID, British-backed donors, are generally funding more and more what we would call pooled or multilateral funding mechanisms, which means that either civil society or international NGOs, national NGOs, have less access to that money because it's either intended for military or even -- mostly civilian government projects within Pakistan, or for UN agencies. But more and more for us it means letting off staff, it means closing projects. And it's not just the case with CWS, it's the case with many, many NGOs. So, we're seeing just a great decrease in the amount of available funds.

Right now it's, again, at 20 percent and it's a 6-month appeal which ends in June or July, and so we're not so hopeful that dramatic funds are going to some. And so some of the recommendations that we would have overall for the humanitarian community and for the international community is that we have be very pragmatic. We're only going to get the funds we're going to get, and so we need to use those in the best ways

possible, for life-saving interventions, first and foremost, but then certainly, how can we best address the needs of displaced people.

The second thing is, certainly, we need to mobilize more funds. As we've talked with some Senate staff and others this week, I think the message we're hearing from the U.S. side is they're trying to leverage their relationships with other donor governments to increase funding, but so far this hasn't borne a lot of fruit.

The second area I can talk about briefly, in terms of Pakistan, is what we would call humanitarian space or humanitarian access as well as some civil military issues.

One of the key issues, like when the South Waziristan displacement started, was the ability for international NGOs to access displaced people. The government of Pakistan would resist granting access or would say only local staff can go, no expatriate staff can go, only local partners can work there. And, you know, they would justify their denial of access for lots of reasons. First and foremost, they want to -- they don't want to see NGOs attacked because the blame would then fall on them, and so they want to be very, very careful in how they grant access. And so then the mode that we have to work in is then to rely more and more on local partners which puts local partners at greater and greater risk. And in the case of Swat, just back in February and March, there was a series of bombings and there was just one on Saturday, and the largest city in Swat, called Mingora, a suicide bombing. And we had three staff from a local

partner that were not targeted -- it was not a targeted attack, but three staff killed by being in the wrong place at the wrong time at a police checkpoint. And so, as we're denied more and more access, the risk gets put more and more on local partners.

On sort of the civil military coordination side or coexistence, one of the areas where we're engaged along with other NGOs and OCHA, is to really develop a set of guidelines that we would hope would be agreed to with the military in terms of access, in terms of police escorts, in terms of sharing of things like beneficiary lists which we don't want to share with the military, and so to work on a set of guidelines. The humanitarian community basically has done that and now the process is waiting for the military to come back and to say, you know, what they can compromise on or what they would agree to. So, that's where that sort of fits right now.

What's unique about the situation in Pakistan in these sort of civil military coordination guidelines is it's the first time that it's ever been done with a sovereign, national military. If you think of Iraq or Afghanistan or Congo, it's with international forces or with UN peacekeepers, so this is the first time it's with a sovereign, national military and we have good hope that they want to put this together. The one thing that's sort of tricky is it's not a binding agreement, it would be a non-binding agreement which means it's a piece of paper, but hopefully it can be a useful piece of paper. So, we're waiting to hear back how that will move forward.

One of the things that is key, I think, for the international

community, for donors, donor governments, is to -- as they have interactions with the Pakistani military and the Pakistani government, to push for the unfettered access of humanitarian assistance, both for international NGOs as well as national NGOs. It's key.

Maybe I could just share a few things about the overall U.S. assistance package. It is also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Burman Bill. It's about $7.5 billion over 5 years for development -- mostly development assistance, but also humanitarian assistance. The key sort of policy shift that's sort of still, I think, being discussed within the State Department and within Holbrooke's office, is how to disburse this money. Certainly they want it to go to the line ministries of the Pakistani government -- the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, a focus on energy projects, and then also to local civil society in Pakistan and less so with international -- with American contractors or international NGOs.

Overall, I think, as us, we think this is a good thing. This is certainly, for more and more, for local civil society to be engaged and have direct kinds of donor relationships, and to develop the capacity of local civil society is a good thing. At the same time, we don't like not being able to also participate in U.S. Government projects and the significant U.S. Government funding because we think we have some significant value to add in how we work and how we can bring together local actors in different ways, in different consortiums, and it's still -- I think, overall it's a work in progress. We've seen some really -- I think, some good feedback that's

come from Senators Kerry and Lugar back to Clinton and to Shaw with USAID, on how -- some challenges they see with the overall assistance package, but, that would be, I guess, the first point, that we certainly would want to see more of a role for international NGOs in the process.

The second thing is there is a big focus on high impact, high visibility projects, particularly in the sectors of energy, and certainly we think that's quite important. At the same time, when you have these high impact, high visibility infrastructure kinds of projects which are needed, it also can ignore the kind of invisible community-based development approaches that are so useful when it comes to projects like health and working with groups of women on any number of health issues, education issues, livelihood issues, things that initially appear to be quite invisible within a community, but over time actually can transform communities to be much more self sufficient. So we would want to see a balance between -- with what one might call initially invisible assistance, and then the high impact, high visibility that certainly the U.S. Government wants to make happen.

Another point would be just to ensure that there's an equal or equitable geographic distribution of the U.S. assistance package, that it doesn't all just go to FATA and the Northwest where there's certainly significant issues with the Taliban and militant groups, but that all of Pakistan would be able to receive from this development package.

Maybe the final point, and this is a concern that we've shared with a few different groups, is that we wouldn't want to see -- if all of the aid

goes -- or much of the aid goes through the government and then a good portion goes through local civil society. We wouldn't want to see local civil society perceived by the Pakistani people as just becoming an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, that if all this money gets pumped in, I mean, certainly Pakistan needs a vibrant civil society. And if the perception is that they're just -- you know, all these aid groups are just going after these $10 million USAID grants, that they really become instruments of a counterinsurgency strategy or a U.S. security strategy, that maybe would be stretching it a bit, but at the same time we wouldn't want to see civil society -- the view of civil society to be -- to erode within the Pakistani public.

So, maybe I can pause there and pass over to my colleague Wajahat.

MS. FERRIS: Great. Thank you very much. I'm sure that many questions are occurring to you as you hear the speakers, but hang on to the questions and we'll come back to you in a few minutes.

Please, Dr. Wajahat.

MR. LATIF: Thank you, Beth. I shall be brief and say a few things with regard to the context in which all this is happening, the sort of political climate in Pakistan in which all this humanitarian assistance and all this work is going on. And as I said, I'll be brief, and expect you to ask questions which we can try to answer.

Since we met here last, Beth, several good things have happened. I think there have been some encouraging developments in

Pakistan, some of them large, some of them small. For one thing, we managed to end the army rule and we moved on to a democratically elected government. We had elections, general elections, although just before the general elections in 2008, we had at the end of 2007, a very popular leader was assassinated and it was feared the elections might be postponed, but that didn't happen. The elections were held after a week or so delay, and a government was installed.

The next good thing to happen is the establishment of a completely independent judiciary. The high judiciary had been handpicked at one time. And after being maligned and restrained, in fact, at one stage, the people had to organize a massive agitation spearheaded by the lawyers, which went on for several years until the government was forced to reinstate the judges who are all independent and who are now giving out independent decisions. That creates a few problems, which I'll mention later, but it's, I think, a very encouraging development to take place.

The new government has moved fast and they have now undone the powers that the previous president had reserved from the democratically -- from the prime minister. Pakistan is supposed to be a parliamentary democracy and mostly the chief executive is supposed to be the prime minister, but because we had military presidents, they gradually changed the constitution and usurped some of the significant powers. Now they have been reversed by the so-called 18th Amendment to the Constitution. It has some problems, too. It is not an ideal amendment, but

the fact remains that the president has had to lose some of his critical powers like the power to dissolve the parliament, dismiss the government, the power to appoint service chiefs, and so on and so forth. These powers are back to the prime minister.

There is, because of the 18th Amendment, there is -- the positive side of this is that there's an emergence of institutional identity. The parliament is asserting itself. The parliament thinks that it is all powerful and the Supreme Court does not have a role in the determination of the constitutional interpretations. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, thinks that it can. Things are before the Supreme Court. A lot of things are being reported in the media. There is activity in the country, and you can clearly see that there is a danger of confrontation and conflict between the two institutions, but I would, for the time being, mention the plus side in our view of the development, namely the emergence of the institutional identity.

This never happened before so that's an advance that we have got.

There are less terrorist incidents. I don't want to speak too soon because every time there's a gap and we believe that things have cooled off, suddenly a bomb pops off or a suicide bomber blows himself up killing several other people, targeting certain sensitive points, but it is not -- doesn't have the same momentum as it had last year.

And certainly, the so-called Taliban, or the extremists who are fanning insurgency in various parts of the country, are less strident. They're

not as strident as they used to be.

Now, that is the good part. The bad part, however, is that the army action in the tribal area is going on. It is, as we speak, it is going on. It is going on in Waziristan, it is going on Kurram, it is going on in Mohmand, it is going on in Khyber, it is going on in (inaudible) Bajaur from time to time. And there are civilian casualties taking place.

The drone actions are on. They have been -- in fact, it has gained momentum. The drones are attacking various areas in the FATA, and there are civilian casualties there as well. Indeed, some of the al Qaeda stalwarts have been eliminated, but the fact remains that the collateral damage has been extensive as well as intensive in that area.

Indeed the acts of terror are up and down, but this is not to suggest that the sense of insecurity has disappeared. The sense of insecurity continues to be intense because of the presence of the military, the paramilitary and the police forces in public places in large numbers in the shape of checkpoints, in the shape of other investigative inspections. There's a sense of insecurity which is at large and pervasive.

As I said, just as the institutional identity is emerging, so is there a danger of conflict, particularly between the Supreme Court and the parliament which can have its own implications, which can be dangerous because it might, if the issue becomes too serious, then the situation might become ripe for an army intervention which is in nobody's interest out there.

The next point is very important and I think this has plagued us

for a long time. It is bad governance. We have had bad governance for a very long time and there is lawlessness. The enforcement of law is very weak. There is corruption. The public service departments are corrupt. There is corruption in the private sector also and that's a major drawback that we have which we have not been able to get around.

The economy is down. The cost of living is shooting up. That is, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing. Income inequality is a major issue today. There are power outages, there are power riots everywhere -- not everywhere, but in major towns from time to time. There are strikes, the teachers go on strike, the clerks go on strikes, the doctors and the nurses have gone on strikes, so there have been strikes and there's been a strike over an increase in the transport cost. There is this -- the food shortage, the food shortages and the food prices, the rising food prices, are affecting the people and there are clear signs of restlessness in the people at large.

This is -- in Pakistan, in fact, the major challenge is that of governance. We believe that a lot of space gained by the Taliban and the extremists was provided in political terms by bad governance in the country for a long time. This area continues to remain unaddressed properly.

I will conclude by saying that this being the case, we have to focus on governance. What is happening is, that yes, we are dealing with insurgency very firmly, which can continue and be supported. We are also engaging with the insurgents and addressing some of their real grievances

on both sides of the border. It's happening in Afghanistan, it's happening in Pakistan. That should continue. But I think until the issue of bad governance is addressed properly, we will not be able to make a significant move forward.

Thank you. If you have any questions I will try to answer them later.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Thank you for giving us the political context of some of the current developments in Pakistan.

We turn now to the representative of IMC in Afghanistan -- I'm sorry, in Pakistan, Jehangir ali Khan. Please.

MR. ALI KHAN: Thank you so much, Elizabeth. And I am very thankful to my friends that they have given you such a great overview of the Pakistan, the general situation over there, which leaves me with no room for explaining it further. But I'll give you an operations standpoint, as we operate in the communities with the IDPs, with the Afghan refugees, and most part of NWFP.

To give you a little bit overview of IMC's operation we started working in Pakistan in 1985, started working for Afghan refugees and later we started working for the local communities as well. We are working in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan in some very important and difficult logistics as far as the operation is concerned. We are working in Swat, Buner, Swabi, Charsadda, Peshawar, FATA, D.I. Khan, Hangu, and Kohat areas.

After IMC started its operation one of our main forte is in the training of the health professionals. IMC has so far trained over 5,000 health professionals in Pakistan. The number is both for the Afghan refugees and for the Pakistani health professionals as well, and these health professionals include doctors, nurses, CSWs, traditional birth attendants and so on and so forth.

As far as our way of operation is concerned, we closely work with the line ministries of the government of Pakistan in order not to create any parallel lines of operations, but just to strengthen the government capacities and their line ministries.

I'll give you some more specifics on our operation for the IDPs. Currently International Medical Corps has deployed around 46 health teams in the districts which I mentioned earlier, these teams are providing health care services in different areas, like we are providing them free medicines, free consultations, free referral services, MCM services, which includes ante-natal and post-natal services, health education is also a regular feature of our services, and one of the successes is that we haven't seen any major outbreaks in our area of operation so far.

We have also trained the government staff in these effected districts of NWFP by providing them training in the WHO's Disease Early Warning System, the DEWS. We have trained them on the -- how to handle the GBB cases, the mental health cases, medical waste disposal. We have trained more than 300 of the government staff in this IDPs operation.

We have provided lots of medicines to the government health system, particularly in the NWFP, which is medicines, medical supplies and medical equipments. We have reconstructed some basic health units which were destroyed during the military operation and by Taliban in the D.I. Khan district in Mansehra, in Swat, and Charsadda districts.

Now, currently with the new influx of the refugees in Hangu and Kohat areas, with the military operation being started in (inaudible) and Kurram agencies, we are providing wash and health services to these refugees in camps and with the host communities they are living in the Hangu and Kohat districts.

Now I'll straight come to some challenges which we are facing in the operation. One, as everybody mentioned is on the security situation of particularly the KPK province. That has considerably deteriorated. I can quote a couple of examples as well, like a couple of months back there was a recent shooting incident which occurred in Mansehra district, which is considered relatively safer than the rest of the NWFP. I think five to six humanitarian workers were killed and there were several injured. There was a suicide attack on the WFP office in Islamabad and there are many other attacks on the UN and other humanitarian agencies offices as well.

We have also seen an increased rate of kidnapping of the humanitarian workers, particularly in the Northwest Frontier and in the farer regions.

The second challenge which is obviously the most important

and Sidney mentioned that as well, is lack of funding. That is actually threatening all the aid programs. We think that our program, because we do not have funding for our projects beyond June 30th, so it looks like if nothing firm comes from the donor community, we will have to close our IDP projects and our wash and help activities we have calculated some beneficiaries numbers that comes around a million IDPs which we are actually serving in all these sectors. So, it will be a great loss as, again, I would refer to Sidney gave you some statistics on the funding of PHRP. The total PHRP has been funding by around 20 to 24 percent, which is, again, an alarming thing.

We'll also give you a statement from actually the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs which says that, all the non-governmental organizations will face a serious shortage of funds which will jeopardize some basic life-saving activities in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These two regions are bordering Afghanistan and are a focus of the Pakistan government's effort to battle al Qaeda and Taliban militants in support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. It is really a big funding problem for Pakistan and it has consequences. New programs cannot be launched and existing programs are already being cut back for the lack of money. So, the donor countries, we request that they should understand the gravity of the situation and the situation of the IDPs is really far from over and again I'll refer to my colleagues when they mentioned about the recent bombing in Swat, that people have been repatriated to their places of origin, but there is

still a requirement of the reconstruction work at their places and there is also a need for providing them some basic health care and other social services.

With that, I think I'll say that we should avoid another human disaster if we leave them in the middle of nowhere and we do not support. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Thanks to all four of you. We have time now for some questions, but perhaps I could first ask about the funding situation. I mean, what are the reasons that, say, European governments are giving for not funding this large scale humanitarian crises and do you think it's appropriate to use the security angle, you know, the angle that says, you should support these people because of compassion, but because if you don't, there could be security implications? I don't know how you feel about using that kind of argument.

MR. TRAYNHAM: I can start. We don't like that argument. You know, we -- there's lots of different reports done by Oxfam, done by a guy named Andrew Wilder from Tufts that, you know, look at the reasons that people say militancy exists. Some say it's corruption, some would say that it's a lack of social services, but in either case, we certainly don't want to link aid to counter-insurgency operations or -- I mean, sometimes I would be even hesitant to use the word stability, because our goal -- our mandate as a humanitarian organization is to meet people's most basic needs, to uphold human rights, to address poverty, but one of our main needs is not to, you know, bring security. And so I would hesitate to link fundraising to that kind

of -- to security language.

MS. FERRIS: Even though sometimes members of Congress are more receptive to that argument than simple compassion?

MR. TRAYNHAM: They are.

MS. FERRIS: Not to say anything about -- anyway, let's open it up for discussion. Yes, please, and we have some microphones here. And if you could identify yourself with your name and institution.

MR. GAYA: Taha Gaya with the Pakistani-American Leadership Center. This question is for Sidney because I think we met exactly the same people you met with in the Senate when we pushed for more assistance because we saw the UN reports. And the feedback we got was not entirely unfair which said, you know, the U.S. has given something like 58 percent of the funding for -- you know, this is PHRP --

MR. TRAYNHAM: I think it's more actually, yeah.

MR. GAYA: Yeah, and so, you know, while we continue to push for more assistance from the U.S., question one would be, is there a target number we should be asking for in addition to what we're already getting?

MR. TRAYNHAM: A hundred percent.

MR. GAYA: Well, I mean, yeah, is there a more realistic target number that we should be pushing for? You know, there's obviously this $537 million PHRP request, but if we're looking for a more achievable number maybe to take to Congress. That's question one.

And question two is, you know, when we talked to the Senate we said -- you know, they gave us exactly the same response that we're trying to leverage our -- you know, the international donor community and see what they give. But, you know, our question is, is there a deadline on that, and if the donor community -- international donor community doesn't step up, you know, is there a deadline for the U.S. to say, okay, now we will give, and how much we give at that point. Do you see what I'm saying?

MR. TRAYNHAM: Yeah. On the achievable target, besides being an idealist, if we were to be practical or pragmatic I would say, you know, during the Swat emergency, the appeal was funded 80 percent. Right now the current 2010 appeal is funded 20 percent. If we could aim for 80, at least -- I mean, the real issue, I think, beyond just life saving humanitarian response, but we're also looking at the ability for communities to actually rebuild, for people to be able to return, for people who still find themselves in a displacement situation. You know, another layer to this is sort of, I wouldn't go as far to say to the Pakistani military government forcibly makes people return to their home areas, even if they would hesitate, but there's certainly some coercion when it comes -- you know, if you go back, you get 25,000 rupees. If you stay, you know, you don't get that. And so the more funds that are able to come in we can ensure that people's rights are upheld so that they can choose to stay displaced if that's what they prefer for their family and that their rights are upheld as an IDP, though the Pakistani government would necessarily call people IDPs because they wouldn't even

use the term.

One of the reasons the PHRP was delayed was because of words like conflict, they wanted to call the overall thing a complex emergency, not a conflict. So, I would say 80 percent would be great.

On leveraging, if you look at DIFID, you know, they have allocated 20 million British pounds for humanitarian response for the next year. Eight of that has already been disbursed to ICRC and then 12 they're giving to one of three places, pooled mechanisms like the PHRP, another one called the Pakistan Emergency Response Fund, and then also some research they're trying to do. So, out of 60 million British pounds they're allocating 20 is for humanitarian response. And again, that doesn't even begin to get close to what we need, clearly.

The Saudis have promised $100 million. They wanted to just sort of write one big check which doesn't quite work. You've got to actually do contracts with individual UN agencies or partners, so we're still waiting for that $100 million, we've just been waiting since last year.

So, I don't know if that quite answers your second question. Maybe Wajahat --

MR. LATIF: Well, also the question is not only that the quantity of this overall funding, but how it is going to be dished out. For instance, are you going to spend this money only on the IDPs who are there in your control or are you going to allow this to be spent also on the IDPs who have gone back to their villages where there is nothing -- there is no

agriculture, no houses, no schools, no nothing? What do they go back to?

So, if you are restricting the funds, it seems to me, I don't know -- it seems to me the focus is on the IDPs as they come.

MR. TRAYNHAM: New displacements.

MR. LATIF: As they come. I mean, people are coming from Waziristan to (inaudible), okay, let's look after them. There is money for them. But what about the ones who have gone back? For instance in Swat, they go back and there is -- they have, as I said again, as I just said, there is no agriculture, there is no school, there is no this, no that, but you have no money to spend on them although I would imagine that they are as displaced as the people in the camps, for instance. That question also hangs.

MR. ALI KAHN: Yeah, would also further like to add to this that this PHRP is not only for the IDPs living in the camps. This is for both, like the operations which I am talking about that it will close after June 30th. This is in the districts of the returns as well, it's not only in the refugee camps, in the IDP camps. So, the money is required for this operation and, as Wajahat had said, we need this funding to actually resettle the IDPs back in their own districts.

MS. FERRIS: Yes, please. Next question?

MS. LINCOLN: This question is for Robert. My name is Debbi Lincoln. I'm with SAIC. You had mentioned about the 29,000 Afghans who were displaced from Marjah, and I would like to ask you if there are lessons

learned from the humanitarian perspective as to what could have been done in anticipation of that operation that can be applied to Kandahar given that we expect military campaigns to proceed later this summer? Thank you.

MR. LANKENAU: Great. Well, that's a very good question. I wasn't on the ground in Helmand so I can only give you a little bit of an outsider's perspective from Kabul. From what I understand it's actually that the planning for this IDP emergency was pretty well done and that the international community, ISAF, the UN, is fairly happy with how the IDP situation was later dealt with. So, I think there was proper planning done. I think ISAF in the lead up to this operation probably together with the UN did some planning. I mean, I know that funds were made available beforehand, supplies were set aside, non-food relief items were made available, so I think there was actually a lot of planning that went into the displacement that came in the wake of Operation Moshtarak, so from what I understand there are a lot of positive lessons to be learned that can then be applied in what might be starting in Kandahar at the end of this month or in June.

However, the Operation Moshtarak was a military offensive against the Taliban whereas I understand that what will be happening in Kandahar is much more of a policing operation where particularly the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will fan out from Kandahar City to other districts in phases. So, it's not like -- it's not a full force military offensive, but rather a policing operation, so -- and from what I've seen, there's planning -- the UN is planning on 6,000 to 10,000 IDPs that might

come to Kandahar. And I believe, again, from having observed this in meetings in Kabul that there are a lot of good lessons to be learned that can be applied to Kandahar.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, next question. Yes, please.

MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: Hi, Ann Hollingsworth, International Crisis Group. I have a quick question on the issue of the Pakistan IDPs. When we initially reported on this we were trying to talk here in Washington, make them understand that the IDPs were going to the host families and not in IDP camps themselves, so that the resources needed to go to help the host families. If you could talk a little more specifically on the current conditions for those host families, the resources, financial and otherwise, that are available to the host families through NGOs and the government itself.

MR. TRAYNHAM: Sure. Do you want to take it first?

MR. ALI KHAN: Yeah, there are very few camps, I would say, of the IDPs now, one of the biggest is the Jalozai camp, and there are a couple of camps being established now in Hangu and Kohat regions, that also is because of the capacity of the host communities over there. They cannot actually host this many number of people who are coming out of the Kurram and Orakzai Agency.

A recent estimate says that it's about 300,000 people who will be coming out of these areas because of the military operation. So, most of the communities are still -- like, most of the IDPs are still being hosted by the

host communities and major funding is going towards the host community's operations and that's one of the reasons that we are working out of the government (inaudible) units and we are supporting the district headquarter hospitals because while these IDPs are utilizing the social services in these districts, which were actually for the host communities and now they're sharing the burden, so, in order to build the capacities of those places, in order to provide them some good quality services, most of it is being invested in the systems off the hosting districts.

So, very less is going towards the IDPs in the camps.

MS. FERRIS: I think OCHA last week said that there were 130,000 in camps with 1.4 million total, so it's about 10 percent or so.

MR. TRAYNHAM: Maybe just a small point to add on that. I mean, particularly in places like D.I. Khan, where people have been there for some time and there's a lack of assistance, because among the patterns we see, as we've said, is that a lot of the funding from donors goes to new displacements. So when you have people that have been around for six months, there's less assistance, so people who don't have a lot of resources might start to look for daily wage labor kind of opportunities.

So, if you're poor and already living in that host community, then your job market has just greatly decreased because you have tons more people who are looking for kind of basic labor opportunities.

So, if people are going to be displaced for some period of time or not be able to return for some period of time, we have to be thinking

about, you know, some kinds of livelihood assistance as well, or food for work, or some kinds of things that address both the host community and the displaced -- people who are displaced.

MS. FERRIS: If anybody else -- okay, go ahead.

MR. GAYA: Sorry, that just raised another question for me. To what extent do you find that there's militant groups active in giving assistance to the IDPs or do you find yourselves competing with Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan or is that an issue, is that not an issue?

MR. ALI KHAN: Well, it's not an issue, I would say, because they are not providing any support to the IDP camps. If there are very small pockets of the IDP camps, unrecognized IDP camps, then maybe there is a chance, but I haven't seen any of these militant groups actually providing services to the registered IDP camps.

MS. FERRIS: Chareen.

MS. STARK: Hi, my name is Chareen Stark. I'm with the Brookings-Bern Project. Thanks so much for coming today. It's great to have you. Two quick questions, kind of different, one is, could you maybe discuss some of the health challenges that you find in your work? And how prevalent is sexual and gender-based violence, especially in host communities? I don't know if you have any type of information on that. I mean, I know it's a very sensitive issue in that part of the world.

My second question is -- actually, I forget, but maybe it will come back to me. Thanks.

MR. LANKENAU: Yes, maybe if I could start. Well, displacement is always very traumatic for people so you do see deterioration in the health of IDPs. When the displacement happens, for example, in that last winter in Kabul, there were reports that there was, you know, massive pneumonia amongst children in some of the settlements in Kabul and other IDP areas and certainly, you know, maternal and child health care is always lacking. This is well reported. I mean, Afghanistan is basically the second worst country when it comes to maternal and infant mortality and all these indicators that go along with it. So, that's even worse in some of the IDP populations.

At the same time -- so this is in the camps that we're providing these services to refugees and IDPs, we actually see now a decrease in these maternal and infant mortality rates and to a level that is below the national average, so I mean, I think that just shows you how necessary some of the services are and how effective.

And gender-based violence is a very, very hot -- it's a very sensitive issue in Afghanistan. It's a hot potato that's very difficult to touch. The International Medical Corps just started a program in the returnee camps in Eastern Afghanistan just about a year ago and we're learning some interesting lessons, one is that it's just a topic that is so sensitive that we've gotten a lot of threats, including from the Taliban, to stop our program. So, we've had to readapt our approach and repackage our message and how we -- and also how we have this dialogue and interaction with the

communities.

And certainly there is -- there's a lot of domestic violence, there's a lot of abuse of, especially boys, because it's a very gender-segregated society so there's a lot of sexual violence against boys and, again, we, in our work, we haven't been able to really collect a lot of hard data, as, again, as the population is very leery in coming forward and reporting cases, but the evidence that this is a big problem is there.

MS. FERRIS: Other questions? Please, yes.

MR. SYLLA: Hi, I'm Ben Sylla with the Education Policy and Data Center at AED. And I know you're all more focused on public health, but to the extent that you're able, I wonder if you could comment on how IDP flows have impacted the provision of education. I'm more interested in Pakistan, but happy to hear about Afghanistan as well. In particular you hear about IDPs being hosted in schools, at least temporarily. Has that had a negative impact for host children and host communities being able to attend school, and are there opportunities for IDPs to attend while they're in host communities? Thank you.

MR. TRAYNHAM: On the education we do do some work in education. I think -- I'll go back to the fund -- this isn't fair, but I'll go back to the funding question again that if little funding comes in, then all the money goes first to, you know, food, water, shelter, life saving activities, and education takes a back seat. I know other NGO colleagues who would argue that education is a life saving kind of intervention. In either case,

education doesn't always get the money.

For us, we certainly are doing some school reconstruction in what -- we have some earthquake affected areas in Pakistan where we're doing school reconstruction with money from UNICEF. I think one of the key things, as we think about education and rebuilding schools in Swat, that it's both, sort of what we call the hardware component, and then also the soft component of building community ownership for those schools at the same time.

In either case, as people are displaced to host communities, it's -- my view would be, it's easier in camps because we know where people are and it's easier to provide those kinds of activities whereas in host communities it's -- again, it's hard to know who's where and measure who's where in terms of schooling, but this is one area where I don't have quite as much knowledge.

MR. ALI KAHN: Initially the IDPs were put in the schools, you are very right, but that was the time that the schools were closed and there were, I think, summer vacations at that time that that situation occurred because there was no urgent response to this IDP situation and the government thought that it would be feasible to put all the IDPs into the permanent structure government buildings. And they never thought that the situation would be of such a nature that all of the sudden 2.5 million IDPs will come out and then it will be difficult for the government to actually place them in all these buildings.

So, yes, it was a problem in the beginning, but then later on when they established IDP camps, these people were then taken out of these buildings and these buildings were then slightly reconstructed as well because of the damage which was caused by the IDPs living in those areas.

MR. LATIF: But outside the camps, I think the CWS is in the area of Swat, is into the business of reconstructing schools, as Sidney said, and providing teachers and programs.

Now, this is related -- these are the people who have come back to Swat and where, as I said before, the structures, the infrastructure was damaged and was not adequate. We are trying to build there, if that can be a response to your question.

MS. FERRIS: But the other response is, I think we just don't know. We don't have hard data on how many IDP kids are in schools. I mean, it's really kind of shocking to see how little information we have about something so basic as education.

But may to close I could ask our panelist maybe to gaze into your crystal balls and think about where we might be in a couple of years with respect to internal displacement. If we were meeting here in 2012, would we still be talking about millions of people displaced in Pakistan, uncertain numbers, but hundreds of thousands, at least, in Afghanistan? Are there prospects for return? Resolution? Not to put you on the spot.

MR. LATIF: I think looking at the history of population movements and refugee movements, these things tend to acquire a look of

permanence as time goes on because you can't have money coming in all the time and they have their problems. For instance, in the case of the Afghan refugees, which Pakistan has hosted for a long period of time, would be hesitant to go back because the situation back in Afghanistan is unstable. Here it is comfortable for them, they speak the same language, they have a cultural affinity with people this side of the Durand Line, so -- and they are easily absorbed in the economic mainstream of the country and they can go right down to Karachi from Torkham. So there is this natural tendency of being absorbed, depending on what the host community is like.

Of course there are stresses and strains, but I would say in response to your question, I would say the normal tendency would be for people to stay and be merged, especially if they have links in the -- in another country. Otherwise, the IDPs who've come recently after being displaced would be happy to go back home to their own places, own villages, provided the conflict diminishes, provided the armies pull back, provided there is no fighting, of which there is just now very little prospect.

MS. FERRIS: Afghanistan?

MR. LANKENAU: Well, in the case of Afghanistan it's very hard to say how things might turn out. I really can't make any predictions. If -- unless the security situation worsens dramatically, I wouldn't expect many more IDPs to surface. I think Afghanistan will probably always have small episodes of small scale displacement, and I think one of the areas that's really neglected when looking at displacement are the natural disasters.

Some areas of Afghanistan are very prone to natural disasters, so due to that, I think you'll have a -- you'll have repeated episodes of displacement, localized displacement, and depending on how, in some areas, where different ethnic groups rub shoulders and experience conflict, you might also see some localized displacements in those.

But unless there's a massive deterioration in the security situation or, you know, just a complete letting loose of -- or, let's say, fighting between various factions and a breakdown of the central order, then I would think that the situation is going to stay fairly similar to what it is now.

MS. FERRIS: And I guess that's good. It's not great.

MR. KHAN: Hi, my name is (inaudible) Khan . I am a doctoral candidate and presently doing my fellowship at the embassy of Pakistan. My question pertains to IDPs from Swat and FATA area, and basically two questions. First is that in view of your efforts there and security being a major challenge, and obviously administrative issues that your people in the field may be encountering, how do you see yourself in coordination and future planning vis-à-vis those IDP once you are dealing with the military authorities there or the civilian administration, whether it is FATA, PATA, or for that matter other institutions of the government working there? That's the first question.

And the second question is that in view of the culture of people of FATA and the Khyber-(inaudible) area, how have the locals responded or respond to the NGOs who have an international face to vis-à-vis an NGO

with a local face? And if they have nuances there, which one do they prefer and for what reasons? Thank you.

MR. ALI KAHN: Yeah, I'll take your first question and then the second one. As far as the returns are concerned, as I earlier mentioned, that we are working on both sides -- we are working in the IDP camps and the districts which are hosting these IDPs and then we are working in the places of their origin as well, and we are dealing with all the military with the civil authorities and all that.

Except for D.I. Khan we have not faced any challenge in negotiating on behalf of the IDPs or offering of social services in the rest of the districts. FATA is a totally different subject. That is, you can say that there is total military presence there, they have a different administrative system as you might be knowing that. It's totally governed through the PAs, the political agents. So, that's a different thing.

The local response towards the NGOs, since this crisis is related to NWFP and as we earlier mentioned that NWFP has been the province which has been hosting Afghan refugees for over three decades now, and this NGO culture -- there were NGOs working before that as well, but the mushroom growth of the NGOs came with the Afghan refugees, both in the local face and in international organizations as well.

Acceptability is for both, I would say, whosoever delivers, there is acceptability for the international organizations and for the local organizations as well.

In your question I think that USAID's strategy as well probably behind that. With the local NGOs, we don't want to undermine whatever good services they are providing, but this is also true about their capacities, that they are lacking capacities in different areas like they don't have understanding of the U.S. financial regulations, they don't have proper HR systems in place, logistics, or administrative systems there. They also need training on the technical side of their programs.

MR. LANKENAU: I just wanted to respond actually from the Afghan perspective on the last part of your question because I think it does apply also. I mean, my experience is that -- and Jehangir confirmed this -- is that it really comes down to -- I mean, it really comes down to, can the NGOs deliver what they promised? I mean, it really comes down to, are you able to deliver what you promised? And your acceptance, really, derives from that. And there are -- you know, there are many cases where, like Jehangir also pointed out, is where local organizations just can't deliver as well as international NGOs and in those cases have experienced that our acceptance is greater than theirs. So, there are areas where, you know, international NGOs actually trump the national NGOs, and we have to be frank and honest, there are a lot of -- in a lot of conflicts, a lot of countries, national NGOs are founded during an emergency, not necessarily to assist the needs, but also to access funding. You know, so there are sometimes nefarious reasons for why local NGOs establish themselves and --

MR. ALI KHAN: Can I add one more point to that?

MR. LANKENAU: Yeah.

MR. ALI KHAN: I'll give you a practical example of IMC's operation in Pakistan. As I was mentioning about the recent operation in Kurram and Orakzai, we, with a local partner of the UNICEF are the only international organization actually working in Hangu at this point in time. So, there is acceptability for both, for the international and for the local organizations.

MR. LATIF: I think the point has been made very well that an international NGO can be an implementer and it can work through a local partner. Everything depends on delivery. If it is implementing and is delivering, it has a standing. We have the experience, we've been around in Mansehra for about six years and we have a (inaudible) fairly strong base in the community and whatever project we undertake. Some projects we've had to extend it beyond funding because people would let us -- for instance, the health project -- it was only for Afghanistan, but then it expanded and it became a -- it's a very useful hospital that we are running now in Mansehra for the local people.

So -- and we have experience with local partners also. Some partners are bad. It is -- you have to take them as they come, but some are very good. Where they are very good, there is absolutely no reservations. And where they are bad, there are protests. It goes that way.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Final thoughts anyone?

MR. TRAYNHAM: Maybe just to add on that, I think everyone

has said it, we choose our partners very, very carefully because a partner, certainly has to -- if we have a back donor, we're counting on that partner to deliver so that we can meet the obligations of our contract. So, we choose our partners carefully. And also, whether we directly implement or we go through a partner, it comes down to the acceptance and trust of the community. We're not going to work anywhere we don't have the trust or acceptance of the community because we won't be able to deliver properly the services we want to deliver and our staff wouldn't be secure.

Another, maybe -- I think your question was about international NGO and national NGO, less about Pakistani or expatriates, but for the most part, for international NGOs and national NGOs, it's Pakistanis who are out in the field, the ones doing the work. I'm the only American on CWS's staff.

MS. FERRIS: I was really struck in your presentations that all of you have such a long history in the countries in which you're working. I think the most recent was 25 years, you know, which does give you time to understand the community and to build up those trust relationships which are crucial.

I want to thank our panelists, all four of you, and thank the audience for coming.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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