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LOOKING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
Panel One: The New START Treaty

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PARTICIPANTS:

PANEL 1: THE NEW START TREATY

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. PIFER: Good morning. My name is Steven Pifer. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and also the director of the Arms Control Initiative and it's my pleasure to welcome you all to our conference today on Looking Forward on Nuclear Arms Control.

Arms control came back under the agenda in a very big way with President Obama's arrival at the White House last year. And I think over the last five or six weeks, you see not only nuclear arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear weapons policy all come to the front pages of the newspapers.

So there's a lot going on, there's a very rich agenda, and we're going to use our conference today to look at several parts of that. There will be three pieces. First of all, our first panel, which I'll introduce in a moment, is going to look at the New START Treaty. At noon we're going to have Jon Wolfsthal from the Vice President's Office and the National Security Council who will talk about the administration's broader approach to nuclear challenges.

There will then be a short break for a buffet lunch at 1:00, and then we'll reconvene here at 1:30 for our second panel, which will take a longer term look at the challenges of moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

So let's start with the New START Treaty. The treaty was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, along with the protocol on April 8 in Prague. This is what it looks like. So anybody who was curious what Rose was doing in Geneva for all those last months, she was actually working quite hard.

Actually, the treaty itself is only the first 17 pages. The bulk of this are the annexes and the protocol. But the treaty and this package I'm told goes up to the Senate formally sometime within the next week. I think they announced yesterday that the first formal hearings will be on May 18. So the process of the Senate examining the treaty and giving its advice and consent to ratification will then begin.

So to discuss the treaty, we have three excellent panelists, which I'll introduce each briefly. You have the biographies in the program. We'll start with Strobe Talbott. Strobe is president here at Brookings, but he has long experience in arms control, first as a reporter writing about SALT

II, INF and START, and then during the 1990s and the Clinton Administration as a practitioner of nuclear arms control. And he's going to talk about how arms control fits into the broader relationship between Washington and Moscow.

Our second speaker will be Rose Gottemoeller, also with long experience in arms control, both outside and inside government. Just inside government, she started at the State Department, and I think actually --

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You were my boss.

MR. PIFER: I think I actually sent you off to your first START negotiation.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Did, indeed.

MR. PIFER: And then she went on to bigger and better things. She served at the National Security Council staff, several senior positions at the Department of Energy and for our purposes today, she's now Assistant Secretary of State for Verification Compliance and Implementation, and she was the lead negotiator on the New START Treaty. She'll still talk a bit about the main points of the treaty.

And then our third speaker is Thomas Moore, who is a professional staff member on the Republican side of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also with a lot of experience in nuclear arms control. He worked very much on strategic programs, on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, but he now has a broader mandate including nuclear weapons programs, conventional weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons. And Tom will talk a little bit about some of the issues that are likely to come up when the Senate sits down and takes a look at this rather lengthy document. So without further introduction, I'm going to turn the floor over to Strobe.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks very much, Steve, and good morning to all of you. I must say as I look across the faces gathered here this morning, a lot of them are familiar, and particularly familiar in the context of decades of interest in arms control, any number of colleagues of mine, and mentors going back over the years, and there's kind of a sense of the re-gathering of a tribe or a clan now that arms control is back front and center, and I'm really glad that Brookings can be part of that.

And as for the panel, Steve has already made one personal connection. When I

came into the State Department in 1993, I needed a true guru on these issues, and Steve, who was a professional Foreign Service officer, was good enough to join the outfit that we were setting up in the department. Rose was the Department of Energy representative on an interagency team that worked on a lot of these issues. And as for Tom, he and I have seen each other over the years, but one of the senators, one of the more important senators he works for, Dick Lugar, is somebody who has been trying to keep me on the straight and narrow with regard to arms control and nonproliferation issues, going back to my early days as a reporter here in town. So this is -- we're allowed to have fun on subjects like this, and on these premises, this is kind of fun, and I look forward to getting into a conversation with all of you.

MR. PIFER: We have a strange idea of fun sometimes.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, right, but so do all these people or they wouldn't be here. What I thought I would do by way of kind of establishing some context is take it even a little more -- stretch it out a little bit more broadly than just the U.S.-Russian relationship and put it into a global and historical context.

There are obviously a lot of troubles and perils that we're going to be talking about in the context of proliferation and that we talk about all the time here in this auditorium, but I just want to underscore the good news of our time and the way in which the subject we're talking about today relates to the good news of our time.

This is the first extended moment in human history when all the major powers of the world are at peace with each other, and not only are at peace with each other, but are working on institutionalized ways of cooperating with each other both to advance common interest and to deal with common threats in a way that is absolutely without precedent in human history.

You go back any year or decade you choose, going back to, you know, 10,000 years, and you will not find a period when there weren't major wars between and among the major powers. That is not the case today, and moreover, I think it is safe to say there is not an imminent danger of such a war. We can get into specifics if you want, but I would put that forward as a proposition. And that is in no small measure as a result of nuclear diplomacy, and in particular, nuclear diplomacy between the United States and the USSR. And the reason for that is very simple,

that is, at the very dawn of the nuclear age, responsible officials in the key governments, which in those days meant basically Washington and Moscow, and I use responsible in both senses of that word, realize that there was a paradox in nuclear weaponry, and the paradox was that the ultimate weapon, that is, the ultimate instrument of war rendered war suicidal, and, therefore, kind of put the lie to the famous Clausewitz axiom that war is the conduct of politics or policy by other means, that was no longer the case. You can't advance political goals of your own country if your country is going to be destroyed.

So there was a revelation or a conceptual breakthrough, as Henry Kissinger might have called it, that was translated into a process that goes back over many decades, and a process that was driven and guided largely, not exclusively, but largely by the United States of America and its leaders, both on the conceptual side and also on the practical side.

It goes back at least 11 presidencies, and that means six Republican presidents, five Democratic presidents. I'm just going to tick them off with sort of one sentence for each, just to give you a sense of the scope of the thing. You go back to the Truman Administration; it was under Truman, who had both the Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, which put forward the hope, the end point of the international control of nuclear power. And we'll come back to that now that it's relevant to today in a moment. As for Dwight D. Eisenhower, he went before the United Nations and proposed the Atoms for Peace Plan, which, of course, was the basis for what became the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

That, of course, was a multilateral concept, but it was rooted in a bilateral relationship between two nations which were so antagonistic on both geopolitical grounds and etiological grounds that they would have gone to war multiple times during the, or at least one big time during the second half of the 20th century had it not been for the paradox of nuclear weaponry, and that, of course, was the United States and the USSR.

So the process, very quickly, in the '60's went into a bilateral track between those 2 countries, which was appropriate since today they have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons on the planet and an even higher percentage back in those early days.

That takes us to Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, and to slightly over

simplify, but not too much over simplify the story of the Cuban missile crisis that frightened the two sides into getting serious about what became the Limited Test Ban Treaty. That led to Lyndon Johnson, who accepted the proposition of mutual assured destruction, which was very much the concept of the late Bob McNamara, a trustee of this institution. And one of the more interesting and with the wisdom of hindsight, we can say ironic episodes of that period was that the United States, including Bob McNamara, had to work very hard on the Russians to get them to accept the principle of mutual assured destruction and accept the need for the regulation of strategic defenses to proceed in parallel with the reduction of strategic offenses.

I think all of you know the subject well enough to understand why there's some irony in that given what happened subsequently.

Then, of course, came Richard Nixon, who actually achieved with Leonid Brezhnev a two-part agreement, the SALT Treaty, which limited on a bilaterally acceptable basis offensive weaponry, and regulated under the ABM Treaty strategic defenses.

After Nixon came Gerald Ford, who didn't have a whole lot of time to work on the issue, but he kept the process very much alive and moving forward with the Vladivostok accord. Then came Jimmy Carter, who completed, but was unable to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Nonetheless, the SALT II Treaty, absent ratification, pretty much stayed in force. Then came Ronald Reagan, and he, of course, took the process of limiting strategic nuclear weapons to the level of actually reducing them, replacing SALT with START, and also was able to achieve the zero option on intermediate range nuclear forces, and, quite pertinently, was an early enthusiast for abolition of nuclear weaponry, although with the very relevant and rather complicated tie-in to a universal defensive system, which was DSDI.

Then came the Bush 41 presidency, and that President Bush was able to finish the START Treaty. Bill Clinton, whom several of us in this room worked for, spent a good deal of time during his first two years in office making sure that there would only be one nuclear arms successor state to the old USSR, which is to say the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, Ukraine being a particularly tough one that Steve spent a lot of time working on. And he signed the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has never been ratified, but we hope, some of us hope will

be before too long. And then the last president before the current one, of course, the second President Bush put in place with the Russian leadership a bare bones successor to the START process called SORT. And if Steve were to hold up a copy of that for all of you, it would be a much thinner document, but nonetheless did keep, generally speaking, the process moving forward. So Barack Hussein Obama is the 12th president in this unbroken succession of chief executives who have kept this bipartisan venture going.

Just a couple of words about the START Treaty, because we're going to talk about the New START Treaty, which we're going to talk about at some length with the rest of the panel. I just want to underscore what is I'm sure obvious to all of you, and that is what extraordinary credit is due to Rose for her persistence and skill and success in negotiating this to a good conclusion.

But the New START Treaty itself needs to be seen in a broader context. As Steve alluded to in opening the panel, it is a very, very important part of Joe Biden's famous reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship, kind of in a way that is analogous to the way SALT was instrumental to getting detente going back in the '60's and '70's. So START -- New START is instrumental to the reset, and it has also improved -- Joe, come on up, there are plenty of seats up here. I don't think I've said anything you'd take wild exception to so far. In addition, it is contributed to a positive atmosphere between the United States and Russia on key issues, including at least one that has an important nonproliferation dimension, and that is Iran. The other issue where it has helped is on Afghanistan.

Additionally, and I'm sure we'll touch upon this, the breakthrough on New START has accentuated the need to address in a careful and constructive way the linkage between strategic defenses and their regulation and strategic offenses and their reduction. How exactly to do that is one of the big challenges going forward. And there's also, of course, a tie-in between nuclear weaponry of intercontinental range and shorter range nuclear assistance right down to tactical and to conventional weapons.

But I think it is more plausible that we are going to be able to address those other arenas of arms control now that New START is in place.

And then finally and very crucially, there is the connection between progress on

nuclear arms control and progress on nonproliferation. And this, of course, is the linkage that is built in to the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. And to have the United States and the Russian Federation moving in the general direction, albeit not at the speed of light towards zero, does help us make the case for restraint and, indeed, self-abnegation with regard to nuclear weapons on the part of those countries around the world that have not gone nuclear.

And this is -- all fits in I think to what is a very high priority for President Obama. You, of course, all remember his Prague speech, and then he won the Nobel Prize largely because of his commitment to nonproliferation and arms control, and he returned to the themes of his Prague speech. And Oslo, when he gave his Nobel speech, he had committed himself to global zero during the campaign, and he has reiterated that commitment, including standing side by side with President Medvedev since he's been in office.

So all in all, I think what we have here is a narrative that brings us back kind of full circle to the Truman Administration, before the Russian Federation, or the Soviet Union, excuse me, I usually make the mistake in the other direction, before the Soviet Union itself had nuclear weapons, and that was the American idea of international control of nuclear power, both in its military and civilian dimensions. That has some resonance to the idea of international control of the nuclear fuel cycle, which I think will continue to come up with increasing force during the discussions over how to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The last point I would make, maybe two more, one is, if you'll pardon me for some preoccupation with what I see is the other existential threat facing our country and our planet, in addition to nuclear proliferation and the danger of nuclear war, and that's climate change.

There is a link between an effective global nonproliferation regime and climate change, because pretty much everybody recognizes that some kind of nuclear renaissance, so called, is going to be required in order to make the transition to a no carbon or low carbon global economy, and that would be a dangerous thing to do unless we were much more confident than we are today about being able to under gird the safety and security of peaceful nuclear power installations around the world.

The last point I would make is, while a lot of the conversation, of course, is about

diplomacy and government to government relations, the really tough negotiating during the remainder of this year and into next year is going to be here in Washington, D.C., and it's going to be on the issue of ratification. We're going to talk about the prospects for ratification of the New START Treaty during this panel this morning. To coin a phrase, I would predict that while it's not a slam dunk, it will be a cake walk compared to the ratification debate next year over the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I'll stop there.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Strobe. Rose.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Steve, and thank you to both Steve and Strobe for their kind words with regard to the negotiations. But I look out over this audience today and I see several members of both my delegation and the backstopping team back here in Washington, and I want to say, yes, I did a lot of work on that fat book, but that book would not be of the quality it is without my very fine team in Geneva and the very fine team back here in Washington, so I wanted to make that message clear for this audience, and it's by way of thank you to those who are here today and to those who were not able to come today from our teams who worked on the New START Treaty.

In general, it's really great to be here today. I see so many friends and colleagues in the audience, thank you very much for coming. And, you know, since my return from Geneva a few weeks ago, I have had an opportunity to speak about the New START Treaty before many audiences and several venues. Today I would like to give you an insight into how, in my view, this treaty also looks to the future. It is a transitional treaty in many ways from START to the future, but it is also one that sets in place a very good foundation I think for the future, and so in that sense, it is very, very relevant to your conference, and so I welcome the chance to speak with you about it.

We have been doing a lot of work to try to introduce the treaty to -- not only to our Senate colleagues, and that process is going forward a pace, we can say some more about that, but also to international organizations, non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, think tanks, and most critically to the American public.

It's been a long time since we negotiated a big strategic arms reduction treaty, and I think it is important to work as hard as we can, as intensely as we can to get the word out. So once again,

thanks to Brookings for this opportunity today. I think each of these opportunities gives us a chance to discuss how the treaty is important for U.S. national security, how it will improve international security, and also how it advances the nuclear nonproliferation agenda. And if it didn't do all three of those things, we shouldn't be in this business, that's all there is to it.

As you know, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference began in New York on Monday this week. By the way, I don't know how many of you know, but also Ambassador Steve Ledogar passed away on the very day that the NPT Review Conference opened in New York.

I'd just like to say a personal word of tribute to Steve and his role in advancing the nonproliferation regime over the years and many, many treaties that he worked on, including the CFE Treaty. I see Craig Dunkerley here in the audience and some other very important regimes. So he's a great loss to our field overall.

I'm very pleased that we have a New START Treaty in hand, and I think the whole Obama team is, because it's a powerful example of responsible U.S.-Russian leadership and managing and reducing our remaining nuclear arsenals. You may be interested to hear that next week, on May 11th, my counterpart, Ambassador Anatoly and I will be briefing the NPT Review Conference in New York, talking together about the new treaty and how it advances national security for both our countries and the world community as a whole. A joint briefing of this kind, I think it's a first in the history of arms control. It's a bit of an experiment, we'll see how it goes, but I do hope it will be a productive exercise overall.

I am sure you will appreciate that our work on this treaty also, and Strobe pointed it out very well in his remarks, it draws on a strong foundation. I place the strongest foundation for this treaty in detail on the legacy of the INF Treaty, the START Treaty itself, and the Moscow Treaty; all of those have provided a strong foundation for this treaty.

And, you know, our many years of joint experience with the Russians in implementing these treaties was both very important to forming the substance of the new treaty, but also very important to the speed with which we were able to negotiate it.

The fact that we had our two teams with many, many inspectors from both the Russian side

and the U.S. side on the teams really lent a tremendous foundation of experience to the process of negotiating this new treaty. It's hard to believe it, but it was just over a year on, on April 1, 2009, that President Obama and President Medvedev met in London and agreed to launch the negotiations toward a replacement treaty for START. With their direction, we embark on this new and uncharted path to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement, reflecting progress in arms control, but also, very importantly, changes in the world that have occurred since the START Treaty was negotiated 20 years ago.

And I want to underscore again that message for this audience, that we wanted to take this treaty beyond the Cold War, decisively beyond the Cold War. And I was very pleased that within a year, we were able to conclude the substance of the treaty. As Strobe and Steve have both pointed out, it was on April 8th, a little more than 12 months after Obama and Medvedev first met in London on the treaty that we were able to bring it to the presidents to sign in Prague.

And very soon the treaty and its protocol, along with the associated documents, will be transmitted formally to the United States Senate. My view is, I'll be recommending to Tom and his colleagues and bosses that the Senate provide its advice and consent for ratification of the treaty. The treaty will ensure and maintain the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower and verifiable levels appropriate to the current security environment. It will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic forces over the 10-year life of the treaty. In sum, the New START Treaty will definitely strengthen U.S. national security.

I would like to walk you through just a few of the main points of the treaty. Many of you are already familiar with them; I'm not going to dwell on them, but to just emphasize a few points.

The new treaty will limit deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 on deployed ICBMs and SOBMs, as well as those nuclear warheads counted for nuclear capable heavy bombers. This is about 30 percent below the maximum of 2,200 warheads permitted by the Moscow Treaty. When it is fully implemented, the treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the dawn of the nuclear age.

The treaty has a limit of 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SOBMs, and deployed

nuclear capable heavy bombers. This limit is more than 50 percent below the start limit of 1,600 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. There's a separate limit of 800 on the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SOBM launchers, and nuclear capable heavy bombers. This third central limit was a late entry in the negotiations. We'll give the Russians full credit; they have the intellectual capital for this proposal. And, in fact, we thought it was very useful because it does drive us forward to elimination of systems under this treaty and a considerable amount.

The new treaty gives each side's military the flexibility to deploy and maintain its forces in ways that best meet each nation's national security interests. And we will maintain our triad of bombers, submarines and ICBMs for nuclear missions under this treaty.

Now, looking forward to the future of arms control, there are several ways in which this treaty takes us beyond where we were under START. With some new and innovative provisions, this treaty is unique and appropriate to this post Cold War era, a time that is very different from 1991, when President Bush and President Gorbachev signed START.

First, the counting rules in this treaty are a significant innovation. Under the new treaty, the actual number of warheads carried on deployed ICBMs and SOBMs will be counted. As a significant step forward in information sharing, data on aggregate number of warheads for each party deployed on ICBMs and SOBMs will be exchanged and made publicly available. And that is very much in line, I'm pleased to say, with the announcement that Secretary Clinton made earlier this week in New York regarding transparency into the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpiles and reductions over the last now 20 to 30 years, so very much in line with that is the approach in this treaty to reducing and releasing, I'm sorry, aggregate warhead numbers.

Furthermore, since heavy bombers on both sides are no longer on alert and no longer carry warheads on a day to day basis, we agreed on an attribution rule of one warhead per heavy bomber rather than counting bombers at zero warheads.

We agree that an attribution rule was needed since these bombers have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons even if they are not ready to do so on a day by day basis. So the attribution rule is an expression of the continuing nuclear mission of the bomber force despite the fact that it is moving steadily, at least on the U.S. side, moving steadily into more convention roles.

Second, the notifications required under the treaty will provide a living data base which will be updated on a continuing basis throughout the life of the treaty. The new treaty puts in place a system for providing regular updates that will give us important insights into the changes and shifts in Russian strategic nuclear forces as they move through their life cycle, from the production end through the deployment stages into conversion or elimination.

The new treaty requires that each ICBM, SOBM, and heavy bomber will be assigned a unique identifier that will enable us to monitor individual systems over the life of the treaty.

Third, the treaty contains detailed provisions that supplement national technical means to form a strong and effective verification regime that will also reduce implementation costs and mitigate operational disruptions to strategic nuclear forces that each side experienced during the 15-year implementation period of the START Treaty.

The regime calls for on site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed systems at the same types of facilities that were subject to inspection under START. And furthermore, it includes exhibitions and demonstrations. The treaty allows for on site inspections of reentry vehicles that are more intrusive than what we were able to do under START. We will be able to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on missiles rather than just confirming that there are no more than the number attributed, as was the case under START.

This is not only important for verification of this treaty, but it sets the stage for possible future agreements that may include looking at non-deployed warheads in storage facilities, in other words, in getting into a more intrusive regime. In this treaty, we are beginning to acclimatize both countries to the notion of more intrusive verification involving warheads, per se, under a future treaty.

This will be increasingly a critical part of our future treaty negotiations, getting to the point where we can actually focus on warheads and reducing warheads.

The treaty provides for an exchange of telemetric information on up to five ballistic missile flight tests per year by each side. Exchanging telemetric data is not required for the verification of this treaty. However, we consider it, and the Russians agreed, we considered it to be an important transparency measure to pursue with regard to future missile developments in both

countries. When we began this negotiation, we sat out to ensure that there would be no constraints on our current or planned ballistic missile defenses. And I can't tell you the number of times I repeated to my Russian counterparts that this negotiation is and was about strategic offensive armaments.

I want to emphasize that the treaty in no way constrains the development, testing or deployment of current or planned missile defense programs. We were completely successful in ensuring the treaty would in no way impinge on our missile defense programs. In addition, our ability to develop and deploy global strike capabilities is also protected should we opt to pursue such capabilities.

The treaty recognizes that the United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces because today's most pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of a large scale nuclear attack as under the Cold War.

The new treaty demonstrates the continuing commitment of the world's two largest nuclear powers to reduce the nuclear arsenals consistent with their obligations under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such actions enhance the U.S. ability to convince others to help curb proliferation, strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, and confront proliferators. This treaty is one in a series of concrete steps the United States will take to reduce and limit the number and role of nuclear weapons and to set the stage for further reductions in global nuclear stockpiles and materials.

As we say in the preamble to the START Treaty, to the New START Treaty, we see it as providing new impetus to a step by step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms with a view to expanding that process in the future to a multi lateral approach.

We will also seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed weapons in future negotiations. Such steps would truly take arms control into a new era. The agenda is ambitious with a short term focus on ratifying the New START Treaty, that is priority number one, and a longer term focus on other elements including the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and Strobe has already mentioned the ratification of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each of us has a role to

play in these efforts, and I look forward to working with each and every one of you as we try to bring this agenda forward.

Thank you very much.

MR. PIFER: Thank you, Rose. Tom.

MR. MOORE: Thank you, Steve. It is an honor to be here today. I do have to start out by saying I feel a little bit uncomfortable. I am not a member of the tribe that traveled often during previous administrations to Moscow for this. And I feel a little bit like a soft camel flying next to a squadron of B2s at the moment. So you'll forgive me also that it's not my usual role to be answering questions and making statements; usually I write questions and statements for somebody else.

But I agreed to do this today on condition that if I offended anybody, someone would find me a job. So while holding to that, they didn't specify what kind of job it would be or even tell me whether they would.

As Rose mentioned, the focus on this treaty now moves to the stage of ratification. We do expect, that is, I've been told to expect that the treaty will be transmitted to the Senate within the next few weeks. The first official hearing on the treaty itself is set for May 18. It will feature Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullin. This is part of the standard set of hearings that our committee holds on arms control treaties for many years. We will then proceed to get views from the intelligence community, probably at a hearing with the director of National Intelligence. Can everybody hear me?

And I think also we will obviously have Rose and her very able colleague, Ted Warner from the Department of Defense, in front of our committee. I should also admit that I have not yet had the honor and pleasure of locking myself in a room with Ted Warner to drink from the fire hose, as it were, on the new inspections regime that's laid out in this treaty, so I won't pretend to be any kind of expert on that just yet.

What I will talk about are some of the issues that I think senators have mentioned and what I think some of the possible answers to those might be.

Let me start off first with what we're still owed in the Senate, importantly the treaty document. As I said just a second ago, that'll come in the next few weeks. That will contain an

article by article analysis, which is incredibly important to the Senate's consideration of any treaty because it will provide the State Department's analysis of what the treaty article means, the protocol terms mean, and the annexes mean. Second, and I'll deal with this in more detail shortly, the report that was required under Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This report was the result of an amendment co-sponsored by several senators, including Senator Lugar, on the floor last year to the Defense Authorization Act. It will be submitted, I understand, at the same time that the treaty is.

Third, and most importantly for my colleague to my left, the verification assessment. When the President submits an arms control treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, a formal assessment of verification is done to establish the degree to which the components of the new treaty can be verified. This document is prepared by Rose and signed by the Secretary of State per Section 306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Secretary Schlesinger concluded at our April 29 hearing last week that verification under this treaty is "adequate." Others have gone further to conclude it is already effective despite the lack of a formal conclusion yet in this regard, so I eagerly await that assessment.

Lastly, a national intelligence estimate, or an NIE, will be done as we have done by the intelligence community for all of these strategic treaties. We are told this may not be done until later this year. Its completion will also effect the submission of a verification assessment and the ability of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to hold its hearing on the treaty.

Also, the Senate Armed Services Committee, by custom and practice for many years, has provided my committee with its views on the new treaty. We've discussed the synchronization of ratification with the Russians. The United States Senate Committees barely synchronize well with each other, to say nothing of the fact that we don't very much like to synchronize anything with the executive branch regardless of who's in charge. But I am relatively confident that those committees will complete their work.

Let me also say something else that others have alluded to, and I think Secretary Talbott did a good job of summarizing sort of the long history of this. But we are in a nuclear year right now. I think I can say this without embarrassing the person who asked me, but an assistant to

one of our senators who doesn't generally deal with ballistic trajectories asked me, why wouldn't you merv an air launch cruise missile, and I had to go through a very long explanation of why you wouldn't need to reenter the atmosphere, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, but it does show that we've not dealt in any substantive detail for a long time with ALCOMs , SLICOMs, GLICOMs , ASBMs, terms that sound a little ancient to a lot of people.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Merv.

MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, even merv, yes. So also on top of that we're dealing right now with the fact that the Senate is simultaneously going to consider a treaty when we have NPT Review Conference going on in New York where I think I can safely rely on the Iranians to be saying a lot of fairly interesting things, and so senators will be reading in the newspapers in the morning about that, wondering why we aren't holding hearings on that.

We also have had a nuclear posture review submitted this year which contained a number of new policy outlines for this administration including a revised negative security assurance that people on the left have criticized by saying that now the IAEA won't find anybody in non-compliance anymore, and people on the right have said, now the IAEA will be in charge of figuring out who we target. We can get more into that, and you will later with my friend, Jon Wolfsthal. I don't know whether the agency plans on sending anybody to STRATCOM on a permanent basis, though, so that's a joke. All of this has amounted to a considerable degree of confusion among senators and staff, so we have a lot of work to do in our committee to educate people about what's in this treaty.

Let me also touch briefly on the subject of modernization because it's an extremely important subject that, as I mentioned the 1251 report will cover, and that several senators have decided to make the most important part of their determination on whether or not they support this treaty.

In 1992, when the START 1 Treaty was submitted, the United States hadn't yet, I don't think at the time the treaty was presented, made a decision to stop testing nuclear weapons, although that happened that year. The United States had a modernization program for its strategic systems. And Ron Layman, a good friend of mine, made a point of saying that the treaty was consistent with our modernization program.

We don't have one of those, per se, anymore, so senators decided to ask for one. Now, the report is required to be submitted at the time the New START Treaty comes to us, and it's the report on measures to enhance the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, measures to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, and it will also require a description of the plan to enhance safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, a description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving that, and the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of nuclear weapons work force, including designers and technicians, and a description of the plan to maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, and an estimate of the budget requirements, including the costs associated with plans outlined above over a 10-year period.

Now, we do have a future years defense program, we have a future years nuclear security program, but those are all five-year plans. So a lot of us are going to be very interested to see how the administration deals with these out year requirements. But in addition to what was in that section, I'd like to point out there was also a sense of Congress which I'm sure we'll have to revisit, and it said the following: It is the sense of Congress that, one, the President should maintain the stated position of the United States, that the follow-on treaty to the START Treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapon systems of the United States.

I believe we will have to deal with this sense of Congress when we consider this treaty in view of what's in it, in view of the fact that whether it's prompt -- strike or Article 5, paragraph three, which contain the limitations on the placement of missile defense interceptors and existing IC launchers, and SO launchers for that matter, senators will want to revisit what the sense of Congress said.

Although I think the administration is doing that job of outlining why nothing we've actually agreed to has constrained us in any meaningful way, as a formal matter, people will say that the Congress concluded when it voted on the Defense Authorization Act and its sense of Congress that the treaty shouldn't contain that.

You'll hear a lot more about the nuclear posture review today and other aspects of modernization to all of those things, and I will respect the armed services committees jurisdiction fall outside of my jurisdiction, and I'm certainly no expert on them. But as Secretary Schlesinger said when he testified before our committee last week, the United States does not have the kind of rotation of weapons on a 10-year basis that the Russians have. We don't manufacture pits for our nuclear weapons primaries anymore.

And I think a lot of senators see this, they see and are about to see on the 9th of May modern Russian toppler missiles paraded through Red Square. And I think when they see that, they'll ask why aren't we modernizing things. So I think the administration needs to outline these things in the 1251 report, it needs to identify future U.S. force structure under the treaty, and it needs to lay out a credible plan on modernization.

Let me talk about missile defense very carefully. Missile defense has proven, as we all know it would be, to be a particularly problematic issue. On the one hand, New START appears to relieve us of some of the constraints that Article 5 of START 1 imposed, such as air-to-surface ballistic missiles and waterborne launches of certain targets that could be used to provide better data and improve geometries and testing for our ballistic missile defense system or BMDS in the Pacific. Its obligation appears only to apply to things the United States did not contemplate undertaking on the date of the signature of the treaty, and as its last sentence states, does not apply to existing ICBM launchers that were converted to house interceptors on April 8 of 2010.

On the other hand, New START's Article 5, paragraph 2, limitation on the placement of ballistic missile interceptor missiles, has caused considerable consternation. Also, notwithstanding the pros and cons, some senators feel that they were told the new treaty would not contain anything other than a preambular clause acknowledging the relationship between strategic offense and strategic defense, not any binding language.

Still more confusing to me have been expert opinions that hold various views about the advisability of the placement of interceptors and sub green effort in SOBMs launchers, or even ICBM launchers that exist now. And we can get more into this in the questions, I'm sure we will.

Senators will want to consider this issue in particular very carefully, weighing what

they are told regarding what is planned, what we are capable of doing, and what we would want to be capable of doing in the future. Let me talk briefly about convention strike or prompt global strike. There's been considerable attention devoted to this issue by several senators. How many of these systems, whether it's conventional warheads on top of ICBMs or submarine launch missiles, will we deploy and when seems to be the issue.

Now, last week Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller said in response to a question regarding whether prompt strike systems will count against New START limits, and if so, would further nuclear cuts be required to accommodate them, that "if we were to put a conventional warhead on an ICBM with the traditional ballistic missile trajectory or an FLBM with the traditional ballistic missile trajectory, then it would be accountable."

Now, he also went on to further state, though, that "when the Department of Defense previously proposed the conventional tribo modification, that system had this sort of trajectory and would have been accountable." The numbers associated with that were two missiles per boat at 14 times per boat, which would be 28. Now, some senators have questioned given that we don't need to arrive at the 700 and 800 deployed and non-deployed launcher limits in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the New START Treaty for 7 years. When and how many of these kinds of systems we plan to deploy, because I believe the recent CRS paper counts this against the warhead limit, obviously a conventional warhead without its ICBM isn't much good, so it would sure count against when it's deployed, if its trajectory is ballistic for more than half of its flight under the 700 and 800 non-deployed limits in Article 2 of New START.

So there's a question as to, if you count these, how much further down are you pushing the nuclear reductions inside the treaty. Do 28 missiles really count for all that much? I don't know. The United States had a preferred limit of 900; we've come down substantially from that to 700 in the deployed limit, so I think senators will generally be interested in what and when its administration plans to do with prompt mobile strike.

I don't really want to talk about boosted hypersonic glide vehicles because I just don't want to talk about it. Let me talk briefly about tactical nuclear weapons. It's true that in virtually every hearing I've ever been in on strategic arms control, this subject has come up, and it's come up

for a very important reason, as many of this audience and everyone on this panel knows, and that's the Russians maintain a lot of them. It was the subject of particular concern for Secretary Schlesinger, who stated, "In a way, this aspect is reminiscent of the clue in Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that did not bark." While New START may be accountable in the narrow context of strategic weapons, it also needs to be considered in a much larger context.

In particular, it must be viewed in terms of the evolving Russian doctrine regarding tactical nuclear weapons use and on balance between Russian's substantial stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, which are excluded under this treaty as strategic weapons.

I think that the Senate will want to find, and I actually don't believe that the administration will have very much problem with this, ways of speaking to this issue as it considers the START Treaty, because it's an issue that's been around for a long time, and as our floor structure changes, our strategic numbers go down, the relative importance of tactical weapons will go up.

And I think Secretary Schlesinger alluded to that mirroring language in the preamble on missile defenses with strategic weapons. The next set of concerns senators have espoused, and experts, relates to whether the limits in this treaty are actually real. Now, in a sense, they're more real than what we have under START, because, as we all know, under START, something like the B1B or an empty silo still counted, even though it no longer had a weapon in it. But it's been particularly the case that New START has been criticized for its treatment of bombers, heavy bombers, air breathers.

Again, I'll refer to Secretary Schlesinger's statement. He said, "The 700 limit constitutes only one count, the heavy bomber, against the 700 launcher operational limit even though bombers can carry many more weapons." A bomber can carry 16 to 20 air launch cruise missiles. The force of 65 to 70 bombers could readily carry upwards of 500 additional strategic weapons.

The official Russian press has already bragged that under the New START counting rules, Russia can name 2,100 strategic weapons rather than the 1,550 specified in the treaty.

Now, I did a little bit of work on this subject, and went back and found, again, another Ron Layman quote, and testifying before our committee on START 1 in 1992, Ambassador

Layman stated with regard to that treaty's limits on bombers, "even as we establish lower ceilings on the most destabilizing ballistic missile systems, we sought flexible treatment of bombers and cruise missiles, and we succeeded in achieving our objective." The Soviet Union accepted START counting rules that would treat more liberally air breathing systems that the United States favors. Because of their slow speed, bombers can have a stabilizing effect. Because they also face air defenses and have lower alert rates, we sought rules that would favor bombers over missiles and also protect our bomber force with its conventional missions and leave our technological advances and cruise missiles and conventional technologies essentially unconstrained.

It would appear New START continues this tradition. But I think some are concerned that at lower levels, the more liberal treatment of this seems to make less sense. And you could possibly state that true.

Senator Lugar asked in our April 29 hearing what kinds of forces we envision developing under New START in both Russia and the United States. START 1 and 2 moved us toward fewer heavy fixed ICBMs that were incredibly vulnerable because of their high probability of kill to a more stabilizing mix of forces and survival of the forces in Russia that improve crisis stability. It's not clear to me what our goals under this treaty for the future are, and we can get into that more on the subject of verification. I would ask my colleague a question, how much of old START informed New START, and what have we set ourselves up for in terms of the future of arms control?

A respected friend and colleague said, and we'll discuss telemetry I'm sure later today, that we no longer need it for "the modern era." While it's true that we don't need telemetry on missile flight tests to verify the limits contained in this treaty because we don't care or didn't specify throwaway verification -- need to verify, excuse me, telemetry matters less in this treaty. It's a transparency mechanism.

Also, we do not have the continuous monitoring we had at -- which was our portal parameter continuous monitoring facility, where up to 30 U.S. people lived to verify or to look at containers exiting the portal parameter area for the final assembly of solid rocket loaders at that facility, the machine building plant.

These two important aspects of verification under START are now contained in New

START. And I think Rose has done an incredible job of saying there are reasons why, for one thing, a heck of a lot fewer missiles come out of -- than used to come out, and there are fewer parts of the Soviet production base that remain. But I think the question that we will look at is, how much verification is enough for this treaty, and since the administration has argued that it sets important precedence, what precedence is it setting for the future? How much verification is enough? And I tend to believe, like an old friend and colleague of mine, that you can never have too much verification.

Ten years ago seems like a very short period of time, though a lot has changed. Having to agree -- having rather agreed to less than START 1 and having a regime that treats as transparency measures what START 1 included as a central verification, when we return to a negotiation with Russia in ten years, will we ask for any of the things back that we don't have in this treaty?

If Russian numbers continue to decline, but overall assessments of other production and strategic offensive capabilities also decline proportionately, will we care? Are we going to be better friends in 10 years than we are now? If so, then what else goes and what else stays? Unique identifiers, what? Senator Lugar, in a speech he gave last January, called for more attention to the overall question of verification, and he stated, "It may be the case for the next 10 years our existing knowledge based on what we learned through the START regime and the -- program will provide us with sufficient competence in making assessments of Russian missile capability. But that competence will diminish with time. As a matter of national priority, we must maintain an ability to judge with high confidence the capabilities Russia pursues."

Verification issues are going to play a very important part of our assessment of this treaty. That's part of our committee's essential function in the Senate. And whether it's telemetry or inspections, we will need to compare and contrast what was in START 1 and what's in this treaty and make a determination about truly whether it is effective for this treaty.

Let me say a brief word about inspections, and let me -- here, most of these are staff concerns at this point. I haven't really heard any senators talk about this yet. You're limited over the lifetime of this treaty to 100 inspections total of type one and type two. Type one, you get 10

a year for deployed systems, and type two, you get 8 a year for conversion and elimination inspections, non-deployed systems. There were over 600 inspections, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan under the START Treaty, but there were many more inspections. In arms control, we talk about the frequency and intensity of the inspection activity.

And I think an early assessment, and again, this is a personal opinion, is that while the frequency of inspection activity will go down under New START, which is largely a function of the decision to make the regime more cost effective and efficient, the intensity of the activity may actually increase, and that's certainly something that we're going to focus on a lot, as I mentioned, when I get locked in a room to drink from a fire hose on the inspection regime.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You know that Ted Warner was our secret weapon.

MR. MOORE: Let me sort of close this out by pointing to a couple other issues that have proved a little bit nettlesome, but yet haven't migrated up to the level of concerns for senators. The first is road mobile ICBMs and the second is rail mobile ICBMs. Under START 1, we were -- we had a cap under Article 4 of that treaty, I believe 210 off the top of my head, I don't have my copy of START 1 with me, road mobile missiles. Now, these systems are the kinds of systems the Russians in their modernization program greatly favor. Now, there are stabilizing aspects to that. They're highly survivable systems that are very hard to kill and find. And that might be a good thing for the future as we go to lower numbers.

But looking at the window of vulnerability, some people have argued, what if they had many, many non-deployed, non-declared missiles and non-deployed, non-declared warheads that they could go ahead and rapidly put on those.

And given, as I've said, we've lost the ability to -- or we don't have telemetry reporting in the way we did under START, and we can get more into that in the question and answer session. We won't necessarily know the numbers of warheads they're testing their weapons for. What kind of future force does that show us the Russians want to have?

Absent the numerical limit contained in START 1, some people have said also that they'll have many, many, many of these systems, and because we will essentially be peering down through national technical means of where they go, we won't have a great ability to know how many

of them there are. On the other hand, people have argued, well, you know for sure at least that they had probably no more than 210, you have the data base under START, and you have 15 years of START implementation, and when you couple that, and this gets to my question about how New START informed -- or how old START informed New START, do you arrive at a conclusion that the network of inspections and notifications would be able to capture any scenario where Russia was not doing something that it was supposed to do under the treaty. Again, that's something that we'll be dealing with and developing more in hearings.

Just a brief word on rail mobile missiles because the blog eruption on this was significant. I think that if you look at the definition of a rail mobile system and define term number 45 in isolation in this treaty, you read that, and it says mobile launcher of ICBM means "an erector launcher mechanism for launching ICBM's and the SALT propelled device on which is mounted, your automatic reaction is, well, what about the locomotive that pulls the rail car."

As it turns out, my boss presided over one of the decommissionings of the last SS-24s in Russia, and I believe the last 24 base was destroyed in 2007. The negotiators have said that they didn't seek to define the treaty, rather things that don't exist right now, and that, oh, by the way, pursuant to Article 52 of this treaty, if a new kind of strategic system -- I guess in this case a new, old kind -- were emerging, you'd have the right to discuss it with the Russians. So I'll stop there actually I think.

MR. PIFER: Okay. Well, Tom, thank you. I think you've done a good job of highlighting a number of the questions that, you know, we're now hearing will come up in the discussion in the Senate.

I guess before opening the floor to questions, Rose, let me ask you whether you'd like to respond to some of those issues.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I'll just take a few of them, not all of them, but this was a very, very good overview of the concerns. And we've had already a number of opportunities to go up to the Hill and talk to the staff and get some insight into what issues are coming up, so I'm grateful to Tom for reviewing them here, because it's helpful for all you to know about them, as well.

I'm just going to take a few of them. If people are particularly interested in things I

don't touch on, please raise them during the question period. You know, the bomber counting rule, and I mentioned it, Tom also -- I'm grateful, Tom, for bringing the Layman quote forward, that was -- from the START period, that was a good quote, I hadn't actually read it. The concern seems to be about upload potential on bombers, and that's, you know, indeed, the kind of reflection you're hearing from the Russian press, as well, that there could be some, you know, ease of upload.

The only thing I'll say about that is, in an upload contest, I wouldn't want to bet against the United States of America, that's all I want to say about that. And it's an interesting thing to me that, as a matter of fact, the discussion of that issue was not something that played in this treaty negotiation as much as I had expected.

But, you know, that concern I think has to be tempered by the realization that the United States -- if things start going bad with Russia, and I don't expect them to, I think our relationship now is very good and I think that this treaty bespeaks a new phase in our relationship. I certainly have heard that said by President Obama and President Medvedev both. And my expectation is that the relationship will continue to improve and to underpin both for the reductions in the future, but also underpin cooperation in strengthening and enhancing the nonproliferation regime. But if things go badly, we will have strategic warning and we will react. The United States of America will react. So I think that we should all bear that in mind when we reflect on how we approach bomber counting under this treaty.

And, in fact, I thought it was not a good thing for us to be counting bombers as zero nuclear weapons. That's the implication of the counting approach we've come to under this treaty and embrace, that is that we will try to more precisely count the number of warheads on delivery vehicles. It applies perfectly to the ICBM and to the SOBM force. But if you applied it to the bomber force, you would have to list bombers as having zero warheads on a day-to-day basis. That made no sense to neither the U.S. side or the Russian side in this negotiation.

A very good question, how much old START informed New START, 100 percent, and that was first inscribed in the July 2009 Summit statement officially by President Obama and President Medvedev, that we would use START as the basis for a thoughtful look forward and thoughtful constructing of this new treaty, and indeed, New START very much informed of the

concept and also the verification regime, per se, the inspection regime, per se, but all aspects of the treaty were developed in -- position and in thoughtful consideration of what was in START, and that was why it was so valuable to have on each team, on the U.S. team, on the Russian team, people who had been involved in the depths of each other's strategic forces, going to ICBM basis, SOBM basis, bomber basis, to have the inspectors involved, because they knew the START Treaty inside and out, and they knew how they wanted to make improvements. They could see, you know, what would make their jobs easier under the new treaty, and so we really benefited from their participation in the delegations.

The business about inspections, maybe not all of you have had a chance to look at the way the inspection regime is put together, but one thing I will say is, I agree with Tom's comment that the intensity is deeper. What we tried to do in order to minimize operational disruptions which had afflicted both parties, Russia and the United States, during the implementation of START, you know, for example, we only have two submarine bases, one on the West Coast and one on the East Coast, and you know, with frequent inspections, it means a shut down of operational tempo or a slow down of operational tempo, and so I think both parties wanted to look at ways to ease that problem. And so what we've come out with is a series of inspections. The inspections basically embrace a number of tasks that were carried out under individual inspections under START; now you can carry them out under a single inspection under the New START Treaty, and so it helps with that issue of ops tempo and ensuring that we're not disrupting the legitimate operations of the strategic forces on either side too many times, but I do feel that the intensity is an important point.

The other thing to think about when you think about the 600 START inspections against the 180 New START inspections is that the Russians have closed down a large number of facilities since START was in force, and they continue to shut down their strategic facilities every year.

So the number of objects with inspection or, that's the Russian word, sorry, the facilities to be inspected, inspection targets have been cut by the simple fact that the Russians are closing facilities and will continue to do so. So those are the three comments I wanted to make immediately. I look forward to questions.

MR. PIFER: All right. Let me go ahead and open up the floor to questions. If I could ask, wait for the microphone, please keep the questions short, and we'll start right over here. And if you could also identify yourself, please.

MR. CULP: David Culp with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. A quick question for Rose and Tom. It sounds like the last piece in the package to go to the Senate is the national intelligence estimate. What's your guesstimate on when that might be submitted to the Senate? And, Tom, if things go well, how long will it take your committee to mark up the resolution after you get the last piece of the package?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Just a comment. Tom mentioned the process of putting together the article by article and getting the package together to go up to the Hill. I'll just say once again that this process has been a very fast moving and intensive one. The inner agency has pulled together very, very well, and I do expect that in early May, the package is going up to the Hill, so I can confirm that.

As far as the MIE is concerned, you know, the MIE process, I've been told, usually takes six -- eight months. We knew we didn't have that much time. I understand the IC is working on this very intensively. It's not going to go up at exactly the same point as the article by article, the treaty to protocol and the annexes, but I do not expect it to be, you know, lagging by months, I'll put it that way, it will be going up in a fairly short period of time.

MR. MOORE: Dave, to answer your question, it'll take as long as it takes.

MR. MCDONALD: Bruce McDonald, United States Institute of Peace and former Senior Director to the Strategic Posture Review Commission, the Perry-Schlesinger Commission. A quick question for Rose. Why a 10-year duration rather than 15 for START?

And then for Tom, in the hearing where Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger testified before your committee last week, Secretary Schlesinger spoke very convincingly about the fact that both Russia and China could overwhelm any defenses that the United States might seek to put up, can you conceive of any limits, even if somewhat high, but would be sufficient to allow a very robust defense against countries like North Korea and Iran, but still would not threaten the credibility of the deterrent of Russia and China, is that even within the realm of possibility for a follow on agreement, or is that

just -- do you think politically beyond the pail?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you, Bruce. Why a 10-year duration? As I mentioned in my opening remarks, from the outset, and from when the presidents first met in April in London and launched this negotiation, this treaty was seen as a bridge between START and further reduction negotiations, so in that light, we thought that a 10-year duration was much more in line with that kind of aspiration.

And furthermore, you'll note, if you've read the treaty carefully, that it says that this treaty may be superseded at any time if we are able to accomplish a new treaty during the period, that's fairly standard, but it is picked out specifically in this treaty.

Furthermore, the way that we have put in place a possibility of extension of the treaty, if, you know, we're still negotiating with its lifetime is coming to conclusion, we have put in place a flexible mechanism for extension of the treaty.

We were, you know, I can say put somewhat in a bind by the way that the START Treaty, you know, you could extend it for five years and that was kind of it, that was your choice. And the Bush Administration and President Medvedev had agreed even before the Obama Administration arrived in office that a kind of, you know, very, very strict five-year extension was not the way they wanted to go. And so we tried to make this treaty more flexible at its close. If we wish to extend for a shorter period, we will have the opportunity of doing that, and we will have the opportunity also of superseding it at any time with, of course, a new treaty once it's negotiated.

MR. MOORE: Rose has a little different job than I have. I have a treaty in front of me that I have to consider. Talking about potential future treaties might be interesting, but I'm not here to talk about them today. And moreover, I think that in this regard, I would like to caution everybody that when the United States Senate is considering this agreement, it will be important to consider this agreement.

And to the extent we talk about further reductions, when we've had testimony from various senior military leaders regarding delivery vehicles, reductions beyond those contained in this treaty, may or may not be advisable. So I will defer for now on the question of what size force do we need to deter, people we need to deter, but remain in rough parity or stability with Russia and China,

because I don't have that treaty in front of me right now, and actually I still don't have, to be frank, this one.

MR. TALBOTT: Bruce, I should say that Steve and I have infinitely easier jobs than Tom and Rose, so we can enter into this area. And it's not directly responsive to your question, but it's a thought that comes to mind on hearing your question. At some point, bilateral isn't enough. This process is going to need to be tri lateralized, and indeed, multi lateralized, especially, well, for all kinds of reasons, including hard military strategic reasons, but also diplomatic reasons connected to meeting the Article 6 requirement of the NPT.

The five, as it were, NPT approved nuclear weapon states are all going to have to be part of this. China is clearly a front and center issue, but recent comments of President Sarkozy make pretty clear that the French are not super eager to be drawn into it, but will need to be at some point.

MR. PIFER: I just might add to that, I mean as I read the preamble, in fact, in the preamble language, when it talks about step-by-step reductions, it actually includes, I think language is --

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Including to a multilateral --

MR. PIFER: So that's actually, you know, out there as a possibility.

MR. MOORE: Hinted at, yeah.

MR. PIFER: Hinted, yeah. I have a question up here in the front.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Carefully calibrated.

MR. PIFER: Is it calculated ambiguity?

MR. COLINA: Thank you. Tom Colina, Arms Control Association. Thank you all for being here. First a comment and then a question. My comment is that, Tom, you refer to the 1251 report as the "modernization report," as many people do. My comment is just that it actually is asking for modernization in one context, the weapons complex, but then it asks for plans for enhancing warheads and maintaining missiles. So just to be clear on what exactly the modernization report, if we use that term, is asking for, and it's not asking for modernization across the board.

My question is, in the hearing with Secretary Schlesinger, he quite clearly said that

this New START Treaty should be ratified. And my question to you, with danger of getting a non-answer, is, to what extent did his comment on the advisability of ratifying this treaty, how will that effect other senators on the committee and more broadly?

Thanks.

MR. MOORE: Oh, dear. I think Secretary Schlesinger is very well respected by everybody. I think his comments will carry a lot of weight, but it's the first of many hearings in which there will be opportunities for others to comment. People of equal weight will appear before us. It's not about whether one gray beard or the other says something, it's about whether we establish a credible record supporting a decision on the committee, and right now we've only had one hearing, so that is my non-answer.

MR. PIFER: A question back in the back.

MR. POMPER: Hi, Miles Pomper from CNS. First of all, congratulations, Rose, on the negotiation. I have a question on tactical nuclear weapons, and you talked a little bit about it in your beginning, and obviously, there was a Talon Summit recently with Secretary Clinton and so on. The sort of endpoint of that summit seems to be that there's not going to be any unilateral moves by the United States or others to remove the weapons from Europe at this point, and the idea is to negotiate this issue with the Russians. My question is what's the incentive for the Russians to negotiate? I mean, Secretary Schlesinger also alluded to this I believe at the hearing, but as you know, the Russians have said they don't want to talk until we pull our weapons out of Europe, so how do we encourage them to actually have a discussion on this issue when we've removed the one thing that they say is needed to move forward?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I think your first comment, Miles, deserves to be underscored, and that is, we did not want to move out on this question without standing and being arm in arm with our NATO allies. And very important that the NATO strategic concept is currently under review and discussion, and that process will go forward over this year, and the Lisbon Summit will, toward the end of the year, draw, you know, draw some conclusions with regard to not only nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, but also a number of other military and security issues related to the strategic concept. So we did not want to get out ahead of that process in NATO, and I think that

is very, very important to underscore.

Second, you're absolutely right, and everyone in the arms control community has known this for a long, long time, that, you know, that trade cannot be a direct one. The TAC nukes in Europe, we have a couple of hundred, and Russians, you know, their numbers are much higher than that. So we will be looking to the future I think to develop a comprehensive agenda for future negotiations that will provide for some more complex trade-offs. But I'm not prepared, nor I think have we done an adequate study to tell you what those will be at this time.

SPEAKER: Could I just, Miles, add one thought here. It'll be a real tough one when it comes for two reasons that many of you are aware, but just to make them explicit: one is that, going back to the history of the last 6 decades, 5 decades on this, there has been an interesting and in some ways welcome and in other ways very complicating 180-degree shift.

The United States, of course, originally needed, developed, and deployed its nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Europe largely to offset or compensate for Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, at least numerical superiority as it was seen. And now we're in a situation where the Russians are quite open in talking about this, at least in track two settings, and I assume in track one, as well, that their tactical nuclear advantage is an offset to what is seen as the west and NATO's conventional superiority. So this is very much tied up in their persistent and to date at least incurable hang-up, which I think is conceptually flawed and strategically flawed, but it's there, nonetheless, with NATO enlargement.

And, of course, the other complicating factor is Georgia. And any discussion of conventional weapons is certain and should get into the question of the virtual annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Russian conventional forces there.

Nonetheless, I think it's to the credit of the Alliance of the United States that we, the Alliance, and we, the United States, are taking that one on. There was an interesting interview by Secretary General Rasmussen, I think it was in the Times a week or so ago, hitting this fairly head on. And, of course, the Obama Administration has appointed a very able diplomat in Victoria Nuland, our former Ambassador to NATO, to work this issue, but they really had their work cut out for them.

MR. PIFER: I just might add, to plug the Brookings papers, we put out a paper

about two months ago looking at the options for conventional forces in Europe. It's on the web site, but I think if you go through that, you see that the options for moving forward really get into some very difficult issues, both diplomatically, not just with the Russians, but I think also among NATO allies. So that is going to be a task that may make the last ten months look rather easy. A question back --

MR. YOUNG: Hi, Steven Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Rose, thank you again for your wonderful work, it is an amazing job. But I want to try and do you a favor and prepare you for the questions you're going to face that Tom raised, one of the ones you didn't talk about, the missile defense question.

I think senators will say we're promised -- at all -- in this treaty, yet Article 5 -- has a limit right there, why is it there? You say it won't affect us at all, but it's still in the treaty, it's a problem for us, but how do we respond to that question?

Second, I'm pretty sure you're going to be asked for a full history of negotiations in the treaty by senators -- can provide that, is that on the table by being discussed, where does that stand?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: On your second question, Steve, to begin with, we are committed to working 24/7 to, you know, keep the flow of information going up to the Hill. As I mentioned, I've already been up to the Hill four times now to brief staff, and so forth and we are very committed to ensuring that the Senate has the information they need to make a decision advising and I hope consenting to the ratification of those treaties. So I just want to underscore that point, that we are working really hard already and we are prepared to work even harder to get the questions answered that will be asked, and I know, I'm expecting hundreds of them. So that's a personal commitment, but it's also a commitment of this administration.

The second point, with regard to missile defense, there's lots of opportunity to continue this discussion. But one thing I'd like to say about Article 5, paragraph 3, is that there were - - it's a general statement to begin with.

One of the big goals we had in this treaty was to resolve a lot of issues that had arisen in the implementation of START and not carry them forward as a canker into this new treaty.

We wanted to get off the table a lot of the issues in the compliance and implementation of the treaty that had caused -- of START that had caused problems between Washington and Moscow, and I believe that we did a very good job on that, on achieving that goal. And one of the key issues that arose again and again was the issue of the missile defense interceptors at Vandenberg that had been converted from the offensive silos, ICBM silos. So that -- I think it's important to read Article 5, paragraph 3, in the context of that effort to grandfather once and for all the Vandenberg interceptors to assure that that issue did not arise again and to make sure that we had a mechanism in place.

And there is an aggrieved statement that also firms up what appears in Article 5, paragraph 3, gives more detail about how we are going to ensure that these are off the books forever under this new treaty.

So I think it is important to read Article 5, paragraph 3, in that context. To me, that is the most important implication of Article 5, paragraph 3. I know it has aroused some concerns. Tom has very clearly articulated them this morning. We will continue the discussion.

I'd also refer all of you, if you haven't had a chance to look at it, to the recent testimony of General Patrick O'Reilly talking about his view, as head of the Missile Defense Office, his view of the treaty and how it absolutely does not constrain anything that the missile defense folks are planning to do. So that I think is also going to be required reading for all of us and very important to the consideration of this treaty.

MR. PIFER: Okay.

MR. CHATTERJEE: My name is Samar Chatterjee from Safe Foundation. I guess I have a short comment and then a question.

The comment is that this treaty seems to be that both parties, the United States and Russians, both have stipulated when they can get out of it when there is a disagreement. And, Rose, you just pointed out that in the case of Obama-related issue, America would be hard to bet against. And the Russians have also indicated that the missile defense could be the breaking point.

Given that I consider this as an ad hoc starting point to the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, now the question is, do you think that there are -- particularly this question goes to the minority staff member, that there are some Republicans already thinking of

calling this as a fatally flawed agreement, and any agreement you sign with the Russians will not be kept or is it meaningless, something that Mr. Reagan once said, and that became a long drawn dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. Is there something in the works that could happen in the near future to jeopardize this whole process?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Let me just make a few comments. First of all, my comment about the bombers, I want to emphasize that, in fact, again, this treaty was negotiated and concluded after the Cold War, it's now long over. It's a much different strategic environment, I do believe, and can already see signs that it is underpinning a very now productive relationship with the Russian Federation.

And I talked about the work that we had been doing with Russia at the Rev Con this week that's going on to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. So I think we must bear in mind that the overall strategic environment has changed, and I do not expect this kind of worst-case scenario to emerge.

But, of course, every nation must be prudent about its national defense and security, and so we must know if the worse case does arise, if things go sour or wrong with Russia, what, you know, steps are available to us. So it was in that context that I made that remark, but I do not believe that we are in that kind of a relationship with Russia now, nor do I expect that we will be so in the future. I think we are at a new stage in our relationship with Russia, and the post Cold War era, I believe, is truly now -- we're in the midst of it, I think we're going to have to stop calling it the post Cold War era and think of a new term.

You mentioned the withdrawal from the treaty; I just would like to say that withdrawal clauses are standard in international treaties of all kinds. I think it is very important for countries involved in negotiating such treaties that if they feel their national interests, their national security is no longer being served by a treaty, that they have the right to withdraw from it as, you know, prematurely, before the treaty has run its course.

So that, again, I don't see anything special about that, that is -- the withdrawal clause is a standard part of treaty practice. And as far as implementation, you made the point about some people say, you know, well, why sign up to this treaty, you know, there's going to be problems,

or it won't be implemented, in fact, the record of implementation of the START Treaty is excellent. And I think both countries agree that, although there may have been some problems in terms of implementing parts of the treaty on both sides, by and large, implementation of the START Treaty went forward very well and provided a great I think security boom to both the United States and the Russian Federation.

MR. MOORE: I've worked in the United States Senate for 10 years and I've learned that you don't make predictions about what senators do or won't do. And the Constitution of the United States sets a sufficiently high bar that two-thirds of the senators present and concurring therein, a resolution of advice and consent agreed to.

Look, we've got a lot of work to do on our committee, we haven't got the treaty yet, we're a long way off from being able to make those kinds of statements. And maybe we're close to closing, but I would leave everybody with one more Schlesinger quote. It's been his day here. Again, we only had one hearing.

But testifying on the START 1 Treaty in 1991, he said, "The irony is that when arms control agreements might hypothetically be most helpful, they may not be achievable." By contrast, when arms control is achievable, it may achieve little more than the natural course of events without arms control. However, even in those circumstances, agreements may serve the useful purpose of codifying these changes. So I think that that's a historical quote that you can use to judge this treaty by.

MR. PIFER: Yeah, time for one last question.

MR. BRITENBUCKER: My name is Joseph Britenbucker . I'm a private citizen. My question, or my, first of all, comment basically that once you get the treaty in the Senate, in many ways the treaty and its discussion goes outside the beltway, because then the press picks it up, picks up the hearings, et cetera.

I would think one way to help with the implementation or the ratification of the treaty would be to point out to the public, number one, what the cost of the implementation might be, and more importantly, the long range possible savings of the treaty. Is there any -- are there any estimates on that?

MR. MOORE: Well, we're required to put in our report a CBO, a Congressional Budget Office, estimate of the budget implications for the treaty. That will be based in no small part on questions that we ask, because, as I said earlier, a major goal of -- was to reduce cost of implementation when it came to destruction and inspection and the like. I don't have a quantifiable number off the top of my head to give you right now because we haven't done any of the analysis because we don't have the treaty yet, but that is a part of the formal record when we consider treaties.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I'll just add that I'm very happy you raised the question about public attention outside the Beltway, because it's been many years, once again, I'll say since we've negotiated and concluded a strategic arms reduction treaty, and one of this girth. I didn't quite expect it to end up that big, but it's --

MR. PIFER: And I should point out, some of these are actually double-sided pages.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Right. So I think it will be very important to get outside the beltway and to talk to people about this treaty and about what it means for the United States and what it means for U.S. security. I hope that my colleagues and I will have some opportunities to do that.

MR. TALBOTT: I might just tag onto that a comment not just from the think tank community and the NGO community, which is well-represented in this room, but everybody in this room by definition, by virtue of the fact that you're here is in a position to be part of the public education effort here, which is absolutely essential in general for the workings of our democracy, but particularly on what can be confusing and difficult and esoteric subjects, but of great national importance like this one.

MR. PIFER: Okay. We're now going to have about 15 minutes, then please be in your seats for our next presentation, which will begin promptly at noon. But first can I ask you to join me in thanking our panel for a very good --