THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

LOOKING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
Panel One: The New START Treaty

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010

PARTICIPANTS:

PANEL 1: THE NEW START TREATY

Moderator:

STEVEN PIFER
Senior Fellow and Director
Arms Control Initiative
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation
United States Department of State

THOMAS MOORE
Minority Staff
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

STROBE TALBOTT
President
The Brookings Institution

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PIFER: Good morning. My name is Steven Pifer. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and also the director of the Arms Control Initiative and it's my pleasure to welcome you all to our conference today on Looking Forward on Nuclear Arms Control.

Arms control came back under the agenda in a very big way with President Obama's arrival at the White House last year. And I think over the last five or six weeks, you see not only nuclear arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear weapons policy all come to the front pages of the newspapers.

So there's a lot going on, there's a very rich agenda, and we're going to use our conference today to look at several parts of that. There will be three pieces. First of all, our first panel, which I'll introduce in a moment, is going to look at the New START Treaty. At noon we're going to have Jon Wolfsthal from the Vice President's Office and the National Security Council who will talk about the administration's broader approach to nuclear challenges.

There will then be a short break for a buffet lunch at 1:00, and then we'll reconvene here at 1:30 for our second panel, which will take a longer term look at the challenges of moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

So let's start with the New START Treaty. The treaty was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, along with the protocol on April 8 in Prague. This is what it looks like. So anybody who was curious what Rose was doing in Geneva for all those last months, she was actually working quite hard.

Actually, the treaty itself is only the first 17 pages. The bulk of this are the annexes and the protocol. But the treaty and this package I'm told goes up to the Senate formally sometime within the next week. I think they announced yesterday that the first formal hearings will be on May 18. So the process of the Senate examining the treaty and giving its advice and consent to ratification will then begin.

So to discuss the treaty, we have three excellent panelists, which I'll introduce each briefly. You have the biographies in the program. We'll start with Strobe Talbott. Strobe is president here at Brookings, but he has long experience in arms control, first as a reporter writing about SALT

II, INF and START, and then during the 1990s and the Clinton Administration as a practitioner of nuclear arms control. And he's going to talk about how arms control fits into the broader relationship between Washington and Moscow.

Our second speaker will be Rose Gottemoeller, also with long experience in arms control, both outside and inside government. Just inside government, she started at the State Department, and I think actually --

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You were my boss.

MR. PIFER: I think I actually sent you off to your first START negotiation.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Did, indeed.

MR. PIFER: And then she went on to bigger and better things. She served at the National Security Council staff, several senior positions at the Department of Energy and for our purposes today, she's now Assistant Secretary of State for Verification Compliance and Implementation, and she was the lead negotiator on the New START Treaty. She'll still talk a bit about the main points of the treaty.

And then our third speaker is Thomas Moore, who is a professional staff member on the Republican side of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also with a lot of experience in nuclear arms control. He worked very much on strategic programs, on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, but he now has a broader mandate including nuclear weapons programs, conventional weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons. And Tom will talk a little bit about some of the issues that are likely to come up when the Senate sits down and takes a look at this rather lengthy document. So without further introduction, I'm going to turn the floor over to Strobe.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks very much, Steve, and good morning to all of you. I must say as I look across the faces gathered here this morning, a lot of them are familiar, and particularly familiar in the context of decades of interest in arms control, any number of colleagues of mine, and mentors going back over the years, and there's kind of a sense of the re-gathering of a tribe or a clan now that arms control is back front and center, and I'm really glad that Brookings can be part of that.

And as for the panel, Steve has already made one personal connection. When I

came into the State Department in 1993, I needed a true guru on these issues, and Steve, who was a professional Foreign Service officer, was good enough to join the outfit that we were setting up in the department. Rose was the Department of Energy representative on an interagency team that worked on a lot of these issues. And as for Tom, he and I have seen each other over the years, but one of the senators, one of the more important senators he works for, Dick Lugar, is somebody who has been trying to keep me on the straight and narrow with regard to arms control and nonproliferation issues, going back to my early days as a reporter here in town. So this is -- we're allowed to have fun on subjects like this, and on these premises, this is kind of fun, and I look forward to getting into a conversation with all of you.

MR. PIFER: We have a strange idea of fun sometimes.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, right, but so do all these people or they wouldn't be here. What I thought I would do by way of kind of establishing some context is take it even a little more -- stretch it out a little bit more broadly than just the U.S.-Russian relationship and put it into a global and historical context.

There are obviously a lot of troubles and perils that we're going to be talking about in the context of proliferation and that we talk about all the time here in this auditorium, but I just want to underscore the good news of our time and the way in which the subject we're talking about today relates to the good news of our time.

This is the first extended moment in human history when all the major powers of the world are at peace with each other, and not only are at peace with each other, but are working on institutionalized ways of cooperating with each other both to advance common interest and to deal with common threats in a way that is absolutely without precedent in human history.

You go back any year or decade you choose, going back to, you know, 10,000 years, and you will not find a period when there weren't major wars between and among the major powers. That is not the case today, and moreover, I think it is safe to say there is not an imminent danger of such a war. We can get into specifics if you want, but I would put that forward as a proposition. And that is in no small measure as a result of nuclear diplomacy, and in particular, nuclear diplomacy between the United States and the USSR. And the reason for that is very simple,

that is, at the very dawn of the nuclear age, responsible officials in the key governments, which in those days meant basically Washington and Moscow, and I use responsible in both senses of that word, realize that there was a paradox in nuclear weaponry, and the paradox was that the ultimate weapon, that is, the ultimate instrument of war rendered war suicidal, and, therefore, kind of put the lie to the famous Clausewitz axiom that war is the conduct of politics or policy by other means, that was no longer the case. You can't advance political goals of your own country if your country is going to be destroyed.

So there was a revelation or a conceptual breakthrough, as Henry Kissinger might have called it, that was translated into a process that goes back over many decades, and a process that was driven and guided largely, not exclusively, but largely by the United States of America and its leaders, both on the conceptual side and also on the practical side.

It goes back at least 11 presidencies, and that means six Republican presidents, five Democratic presidents. I'm just going to tick them off with sort of one sentence for each, just to give you a sense of the scope of the thing. You go back to the Truman Administration; it was under Truman, who had both the Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, which put forward the hope, the end point of the international control of nuclear power. And we'll come back to that now that it's relevant to today in a moment. As for Dwight D. Eisenhower, he went before the United Nations and proposed the Atoms for Peace Plan, which, of course, was the basis for what became the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

That, of course, was a multilateral concept, but it was rooted in a bilateral relationship between two nations which were so antagonistic on both geopolitical grounds and etiological grounds that they would have gone to war multiple times during the, or at least one big time during the second half of the 20th century had it not been for the paradox of nuclear weaponry, and that, of course, was the United States and the USSR.

So the process, very quickly, in the '60's went into a bilateral track between those 2 countries, which was appropriate since today they have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons on the planet and an even higher percentage back in those early days.

That takes us to Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, and to slightly over

simplify, but not too much over simplify the story of the Cuban missile crisis that frightened the two sides into getting serious about what became the Limited Test Ban Treaty. That led to Lyndon Johnson, who accepted the proposition of mutual assured destruction, which was very much the concept of the late Bob McNamara, a trustee of this institution. And one of the more interesting and with the wisdom of hindsight, we can say ironic episodes of that period was that the United States, including Bob McNamara, had to work very hard on the Russians to get them to accept the principal of mutual assured destruction and accept the need for the regulation of strategic defenses to proceed in parallel with the reduction of strategic offenses.

I think all of you know the subject well enough to understand why there's some irony in that given what happened subsequently.

Then, of course, came Richard Nixon, who actually achieved with Leonid Brezhnev a two-part agreement, the SALT Treaty, which limited on a bilaterally acceptable basis offensive weaponry, and regulated under the ABM Treaty strategic defenses.

After Nixon came Gerald Ford, who didn't have a whole lot of time to work on the issue, but he kept the process very much alive and moving forward with the Vladivostok accord. Then came Jimmy Carter, who completed, but was unable to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Nonetheless, the SALT II Treaty, absent ratification, pretty much stayed in force. Then came Ronald Reagan, and he, of course, took the process of limiting strategic nuclear weapons to the level of actually reducing them, replacing SALT with START, and also was able to achieve the zero option on intermediate range nuclear forces, and, quite pertinently, was an early enthusiast for abolition of nuclear weaponry, although with the very relevant and rather complicated tie-in to a universal defensive system, which was DSDI.

Then came the Bush 41 presidency, and that President Bush was able to finish the START Treaty. Bill Clinton, whom several of us in this room worked for, spent a good deal of time during his first two years in office making sure that there would only be one nuclear arms successor state to the old USSR, which is to say the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, Ukraine being a particularly tough one that Steve spent a lot of time working on. And he signed the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has never been ratified, but we hope, some of us hope will

be before too long. And then the last president before the current one, of course, the second President Bush put in place with the Russian leadership a bare bones successor to the START process called SORT. And if Steve were to hold up a copy of that for all of you, it would be a much thinner document, but nonetheless did keep, generally speaking, the process moving forward. So Barack Hussein Obama is the 12th president in this unbroken succession of chief executives who have kept this bipartisan venture going.

Just a couple of words about the START Treaty, because we're going to talk about the New START Treaty, which we're going to talk about at some length with the rest of the panel. I just want to underscore what is I'm sure obvious to all of you, and that is what extraordinary credit is due to Rose for her persistence and skill and success in negotiating this to a good conclusion.

But the New START Treaty itself needs to be seen in a broader context. As Steve alluded to in opening the panel, it is a very, very important part of Joe Biden's famous reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship, kind of in a way that is analogous to the way SALT was instrumental to getting detente going back in the '60's and '70's. So START -- New START is instrumental to the reset, and it has also improved -- Joe, come on up, there are plenty of seats up here. I don't think I've said anything you'd take wild exception to so far. In addition, it is contributed to a positive atmosphere between the United States and Russia on key issues, including at least one that has an important nonproliferation dimension, and that is Iran. The other issue where it has helped is on Afghanistan.

Additionally, and I'm sure we'll touch upon this, the breakthrough on New START has accentuated the need to address in a careful and constructive way the linkage between strategic defenses and their regulation and strategic offenses and their reduction. How exactly to do that is one of the big challenges going forward. And there's also, of course, a tie-in between nuclear weaponry of intercontinental range and shorter range nuclear assistance right down to tactical and to conventional weapons.

But I think it is more plausible that we are going to be able to address those other arenas of arms control now that New START is in place.

And then finally and very crucially, there is the connection between progress on

nuclear arms control and progress on nonproliferation. And this, of course, is the linkage that is built in to the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. And to have the United States and the Russian Federation moving in the general direction, albeit not at the speed of light towards zero, does help us make the case for restraint and, indeed, self-abnegation with regard to nuclear weapons on the part of those countries around the world that have not gone nuclear.

And this is -- all fits in I think to what is a very high priority for President Obama. You, of course, all remember his Prague speech, and then he won the Nobel Prize largely because of his commitment to nonproliferation and arms control, and he returned to the themes of his Prague speech. And Oslo, when he gave his Nobel speech, he had committed himself to global zero during the campaign, and he has reiterated that commitment, including standing side by side with President Medvedev since he's been in office.

So all in all, I think what we have here is a narrative that brings us back kind of full circle to the Truman Administration, before the Russian Federation, or the Soviet Union, excuse me, I usually make the mistake in the other direction, before the Soviet Union itself had nuclear weapons, and that was the American idea of international control of nuclear power, both in its military and civilian dimensions. That has some resonance to the idea of international control of the nuclear fuel cycle, which I think will continue to come up with increasing force during the discussions over how to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The last point I would make, maybe two more, one is, if you'll pardon me for some preoccupation with what I see is the other existential threat facing our country and our planet, in addition to nuclear proliferation and the danger of nuclear war, and that's climate change.

There is a link between an effective global nonproliferation regime and climate change, because pretty much everybody recognizes that some kind of nuclear renaissance, so called, is going to be required in order to make the transition to a no carbon or low carbon global economy, and that would be a dangerous thing to do unless we were much more confident than we are today about being able to under gird the safety and security of peaceful nuclear power installations around the world.

The last point I would make is, while a lot of the conversation, of course, is about

diplomacy and government to government relations, the really tough negotiating during the remainder of this year and into next year is going to be here in Washington, D.C., and it's going to be on the issue of ratification. We're going to talk about the prospects for ratification of the New START Treaty during this panel this morning. To coin a phrase, I would predict that while it's not a slam dunk, it will be a cake walk compared to the ratification debate next year over the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I'll stop there.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Strobe. Rose.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Steve, and thank you to both Steve and Strobe for their kind words with regard to the negotiations. But I look out over this audience today and I see several members of both my delegation and the backstopping team back here in Washington, and I want to say, yes, I did a lot of work on that fat book, but that book would not be of the quality it is without my very fine team in Geneva and the very fine team back here in Washington, so I wanted to make that message clear for this audience, and it's by way of thank you to those who are here today and to those who were not able to come today from our teams who worked on the New START Treaty.

In general, it's really great to be here today. I see so many friends and colleagues in the audience, thank you very much for coming. And, you know, since my return from Geneva a few weeks ago, I have had an opportunity to speak about the New START Treaty before many audiences and several venues. Today I would like to give you an insight into how, in my view, this treaty also looks to the future. It is a transitional treaty in many ways from START to the future, but it is also one that sets in place a very good foundation I think for the future, and so in that sense, it is very, very relevant to your conference, and so I welcome the chance to speak with you about it.

We have been doing a lot of work to try to introduce the treaty to -- not only to our Senate colleagues, and that process is going forward a pace, we can say some more about that, but also to international organizations, non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, think tanks, and most critically to the American public.

It's been a long time since we negotiated a big strategic arms reduction treaty, and I think it is important to work as hard as we can, as intensely as we can to get the word out. So once again,

thanks to Brookings for this opportunity today. I think each of these opportunities gives us a chance to discuss how the treaty is important for U.S. national security, how it will improve international security, and also how it advances the nuclear nonproliferation agenda. And if it didn't do all three of those things, we shouldn't be in this business, that's all there is to it.

As you know, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference began in New York on Monday this week. By the way, I don't know how many of you know, but also Ambassador Steve Ledogar passed away on the very day that the NPT Review Conference opened in New York.

I'd just like to say a personal word of tribute to Steve and his role in advancing the nonproliferation regime over the years and many, many treaties that he worked on, including the CFE Treaty. I see Craig Dunkerley here in the audience and some other very important regimes. So he's a great loss to our field overall.

I'm very pleased that we have a New START Treaty in hand, and I think the whole Obama team is, because it's a powerful example of responsible U.S.-Russian leadership and managing and reducing our remaining nuclear arsenals. You may be interested to hear that next week, on May 11th, my counterpart, Ambassador Anatoly and I will be briefing the NPT Review Conference in New York, talking together about the new treaty and how it advances national security for both our countries and the world community as a whole. A joint briefing of this kind, I think it's a first in the history of arms control. It's a bit of an experiment, we'll see how it goes, but I do hope it will be a productive exercise overall.

I am sure you will appreciate that our work on this treaty also, and Strobe pointed it out very well in his remarks, it draws on a strong foundation. I place the strongest foundation for this treaty in detail on the legacy of the INF Treaty, the START Treaty itself, and the Moscow Treaty; all of those have provided a strong foundation for this treaty.

And, you know, our many years of joint experience with the Russians in implementing these treaties was both very important to forming the substance of the new treaty, but also very important to the speed with which we were able to negotiate it.

The fact that we had our two teams with many, many inspectors from both the Russian side

and the U.S. side on the teams really lent a tremendous foundation of experience to the process of negotiating this new treaty. It's hard to believe it, but it was just over a year on, on April 1, 2009, that President Obama and President Medvedev met in London and agreed to launch the negotiations toward a replacement treaty for START. With their direction, we embark on this new and unchartered path to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement, reflecting progress in arms control, but also, very importantly, changes in the world that have occurred since the START Treaty was negotiated 20 years ago.

And I want to underscore again that message for this audience, that we wanted to take this treaty beyond the Cold War, decisively beyond the Cold War. And I was very pleased that within a year, we were able to conclude the substance of the treaty. As Strobe and Steve have both pointed out, it was on April 8th, a little more than 12 months after Obama and Medvedev first met in London on the treaty that we were able to bring it to the presidents to sign in Prague.

And very soon the treaty and its protocol, along with the associated documents, will be transmitted formally to the United States Senate. My view is, I'll be recommending to Tom and his colleagues and bosses that the Senate provide its advice and consent for ratification of the treaty. The treaty will ensure and maintain the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower and verifiable levels appropriate to the current security environment. It will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic forces over the 10-year life of the treaty. In sum, the New START Treaty will definitely strengthen U.S. national security.

I would like to walk you through just a few of the main points of the treaty. Many of you are already familiar with them; I'm not going to dwell on them, but to just emphasize a few points.

The new treaty will limit deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 on deployed ICBMs and SOBMs, as well as those nuclear warheads counted for nuclear capable heavy bombers. This is about 30 percent below the maximum of 2,200 warheads permitted by the Moscow Treaty. When it is fully implemented, the treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the dawn of the nuclear age.

The treaty has a limit of 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SOBMs, and deployed

nuclear capable heavy bombers. This limit is more than 50 percent below the start limit of 1,600 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. There's a separate limit of 800 on the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SOBM launchers, and nuclear capable heavy bombers. This third central limit was a late entry in the negotiations. We'll give the Russians full credit; they have the intellectual capital for this proposal. And, in fact, we thought it was very useful because it does drive us forward to elimination of systems under this treaty and a considerable amount.

The new treaty gives each side's military the flexibility to deploy and maintain its forces in ways that best meet each nation's national security interests. And we will maintain our triad of bombers, submarines and ICBMs for nuclear missions under this treaty.

Now, looking forward to the future of arms control, there are several ways in which this treaty takes us beyond where we were under START. With some new and innovative provisions, this treaty is unique and appropriate to this post Cold War era, a time that is very different from 1991, when President Bush and President Gorbachev signed START.

First, the counting rules in this treaty are a significant innovation. Under the new treaty, the actual number of warheads carried on deployed ICBMs and SOBMs will be counted. As a significant step forward in information sharing, data on aggregate number of warheads for each party deployed on ICBMs and SOBMs will be exchanged and made publicly available. And that is very much in line, I'm pleased to say, with the announcement that Secretary Clinton made earlier this week in New York regarding transparency into the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpiles and reductions over the last now 20 to 30 years, so very much in line with that is the approach in this treaty to reducing and releasing, I'm sorry, aggregate warhead numbers.

Furthermore, since heavy bombers on both sides are no longer on alert and no longer carry warheads on a day to day basis, we agreed on an attribution rule of one warhead per heavy bomber rather than counting bombers at zero warheads.

We agree that an attribution rule was needed since these bombers have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons even if they are not ready to do so on a day by day basis. So the attribution rule is an expression of the continuing nuclear mission of the bomber force despite the fact that it is moving steadily, at least on the U.S. side, moving steadily into more convention roles.

Second, the notifications required under the treaty will provide a living data base which will be updated on a continuing basis throughout the life of the treaty. The new treaty puts in place a system for providing regular updates that will give us important insights into the changes and shifts in Russian strategic nuclear forces as they move through their life cycle, from the production end through the deployment stages into conversion or elimination.

The new treaty requires that each ICBM, SOBM, and heavy bomber will be assigned a unique identifier that will enable us to monitor individual systems over the life of the treaty.

Third, the treaty contains detailed provisions that supplement national technical means to form a strong and effective verification regime that will also reduce implementation costs and mitigate operational disruptions to strategic nuclear forces that each side experienced during the 15-year implementation period of the START Treaty.

The regime calls for on site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed systems at the same types of facilities that were subject to inspection under START. And furthermore, it includes exhibitions and demonstrations. The treaty allows for on site inspections of reentry vehicles that are more intrusive than what we were able to do under START. We will be able to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on missiles rather than just confirming that there are no more than the number attributed, as was the case under START.

This is not only important for verification of this treaty, but it sets the stage for possible future agreements that may include looking at non-deployed warheads in storage facilities, in other words, in getting into a more intrusive regime. In this treaty, we are beginning to acclimatize both countries to the notion of more intrusive verification involving warheads, per se, under a future treaty.

This will be increasingly a critical part of our future treaty negotiations, getting to the point where we can actually focus on warheads and reducing warheads.

The treaty provides for an exchange of telemetric information on up to five ballistic missile flight tests per year by each side. Exchanging telemetric data is not required for the verification of this treaty. However, we consider it, and the Russians agreed, we considered it to be an important transparency measure to pursue with regard to future missile developments in both

countries. When we began this negotiation, we sat out to ensure that there would be no constraints on our current or planned ballistic missile defenses. And I can't tell you the number of times I repeated to my Russian counterparts that this negotiation is and was about strategic offensive armaments.

I want to emphasize that the treaty in no way constrains the development, testing or deployment of current or planned missile defense programs. We were completely successful in ensuring the treaty would in no way impinge on our missile defense programs. In addition, our ability to develop and deploy global strike capabilities is also protected should we opt to pursue such capabilities.

The treaty recognizes that the United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces because today's most pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of a large scale nuclear attack as under the Cold War.

The new treaty demonstrates the continuing commitment of the world's two largest nuclear powers to reduce the nuclear arsenals consistent with their obligations under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such actions enhance the U.S. ability to convince others to help curb proliferation, strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, and confront proliferators. This treaty is one in a series of concrete steps the United States will take to reduce and limit the number and role of nuclear weapons and to set the stage for further reductions in global nuclear stockpiles and materials.

As we say in the preamble to the START Treaty, to the New START Treaty, we see it as providing new impetus to a step by step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms with a view to expanding that process in the future to a multi lateral approach.

We will also seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed weapons in future negotiations. Such steps would truly take arms control into a new era. The agenda is ambitious with a short term focus on ratifying the New START Treaty, that is priority number one, and a longer term focus on other elements including the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and Strobe has already mentioned the ratification of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each of us has a role to

play in these efforts, and I look forward to working with each and every one of you as we try to bring this agenda forward.

Thank you very much.

MR. PIFER: Thank you, Rose. Tom.

MR. MOORE: Thank you, Steve. It is an honor to be here today. I do have to start out by saying I feel a little bit uncomfortable. I am not a member of the tribe that traveled often during previous administrations to Moscow for this. And I feel a little bit like a soft camel flying next to a squadron of B2s at the moment. So you'll forgive me also that it's not my usual role to be answering questions and making statements; usually I write questions and statements for somebody else.

But I agreed to do this today on condition that if I offended anybody, someone would find me a job. So while holding to that, they didn't specify what kind of job it would be or even tell me whether they would.

As Rose mentioned, the focus on this treaty now moves to the stage of ratification. We do expect, that is, I've been told to expect that the treaty will be transmitted to the Senate within the next few weeks. The first official hearing on the treaty itself is set for May 18. It will feature Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullin. This is part of the standard set of hearings that our committee holds on arms control treaties for many years. We will then proceed to get views from the intelligence community, probably at a hearing with the director of National Intelligence. Can everybody hear me?

And I think also we will obviously have Rose and her very able colleague, Ted Warner from the Department of Defense, in front of our committee. I should also admit that I have not yet had the honor and pleasure of locking myself in a room with Ted Warner to drink from the fire hose, as it were, on the new inspections regime that's laid out in this treaty, so I won't pretend to be any kind of expert on that just yet.

What I will talk about are some of the issues that I think senators have mentioned and what I think some of the possible answers to those might be.

Let me start off first with what we're still owed in the Senate, importantly the treaty document. As I said just a second ago, that'll come in the next few weeks. That will contain an

article by article analysis, which is incredibly important to the Senate's consideration of any treaty because it will provide the State Department's analysis of what the treaty article means, the protocol terms mean, and the annexes mean. Second, and I'll deal with this in more detail shortly, the report that was required under Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This report was the result of an amendment co-sponsored by several senators, including Senator Lugar, on the floor last year to the Defense Authorization Act. It will be submitted, I understand, at the same time that the treaty is.

Third, and most importantly for my colleague to my left, the verification assessment. When the President submits an arms control treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, a formal assessment of verification is done to establish the degree to which the components of the new treaty can be verified. This document is prepared by Rose and signed by the Secretary of State per Section 306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Secretary Schlesinger concluded at our April 29 hearing last week that verification under this treaty is "adequate." Others have gone further to conclude it is already effective despite the lack of a formal conclusion yet in this regard, so I eagerly await that assessment.

Lastly, a national intelligence estimate, or an NIE, will be done as we have done by the intelligence community for all of these strategic treaties. We are told this may not be done until later this year. Its completion will also effect the submission of a verification assessment and the ability of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to hold its hearing on the treaty.

Also, the Senate Armed Services Committee, by custom and practice for many years, has provided my committee with its views on the new treaty. We've discussed the synchronization of ratification with the Russians. The United States Senate Committees barely synchronize well with each other, to say nothing of the fact that we don't very much like to synchronize anything with the executive branch regardless of who's in charge. But I am relatively confident that those committees will complete their work.

Let me also say something else that others have alluded to, and I think Secretary Talbott did a good job of summarizing sort of the long history of this. But we are in a nuclear year right now. I think I can say this without embarrassing the person who asked me, but an assistant to

one of our senators who doesn't generally deal with ballistic trajectories asked me, why wouldn't you merv an air launch cruise missile, and I had to go through a very long explanation of why you wouldn't need to reenter the atmosphere, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, but it does show that we've not dealt in any substantive detail for a long time with ALCOMs , SLICOMs, GLICOMs , ASBMs, terms that sound a little ancient to a lot of people.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Merv.

MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, even merv, yes. So also on top of that we're dealing right now with the fact that the Senate is simultaneously going to consider a treaty when we have NPT Review Conference going on in New York where I think I can safely rely on the Iranians to be saying a lot of fairly interesting things, and so senators will be reading in the newspapers in the morning about that, wondering why we aren't holding hearings on that.

We also have had a nuclear posture review submitted this year which contained a number of new policy outlines for this administration including a revised negative security assurance that people on the left have criticized by saying that now the IAEA won't find anybody in non-compliance anymore, and people on the right have said, now the IAEA will be in charge of figuring out who we target. We can get more into that, and you will later with my friend, Jon Wolfsthal. I don't know whether the agency plans on sending anybody to STRATCOM on a permanent basis, though, so that's a joke. All of this has amounted to a considerable degree of confusion among senators and staff, so we have a lot of work to do in our committee to educate people about what's in this treaty.

Let me also touch briefly on the subject of modernization because it's an extremely important subject that, as I mentioned the 1251 report will cover, and that several senators have decided to make the most important part of their determination on whether or not they support this treaty.

In 1992, when the START 1 Treaty was submitted, the United States hadn't yet, I don't think at the time the treaty was presented, made a decision to stop testing nuclear weapons, although that happened that year. The United States had a modernization program for its strategic systems. And Ron Layman, a good friend of mine, made a point of saying that the treaty was consistent with our modernization program.

We don't have one of those, per se, anymore, so senators decided to ask for one. Now, the report is required to be submitted at the time the New START Treaty comes to us, and it's the report on measures to enhance the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, measures to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, and it will also require a description of the plan to enhance safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States, a description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving that, and the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of nuclear weapons work force, including designers and technicians, and a description of the plan to maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, and an estimate of the budget requirements, including the costs associated with plans outlined above over a 10-year period.

Now, we do have a future years defense program, we have a future years nuclear security program, but those are all five-year plans. So a lot of us are going to be very interested to see how the administration deals with these out year requirements. But in addition to what was in that section, I'd like to point out there was also a sense of Congress which I'm sure we'll have to revisit, and it said the following: It is the sense of Congress that, one, the President should maintain the stated position of the United States, that the follow-on treaty to the START Treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapon systems of the United States.

I believe we will have to deal with this sense of Congress when we consider this treaty in view of what's in it, in view of the fact that whether it's prompt -- strike or Article 5, paragraph three, which contain the limitations on the placement of missile defense interceptors and existing IC launchers, and SO launchers for that matter, senators will want to revisit what the sense of Congress said.

Although I think the administration is doing that job of outlining why nothing we've actually agreed to has constrained us in any meaningful way, as a formal matter, people will say that the Congress concluded when it voted on the Defense Authorization Act and its sense of Congress that the treaty shouldn't contain that.

You'll hear a lot more about the nuclear posture review today and other aspects of modernization to all of those things, and I will respect the armed services committees jurisdiction fall outside of my jurisdiction, and I'm certainly no expert on them. But as Secretary Schlesinger said when he testified before our committee last week, the United States does not have the kind of rotation of weapons on a 10-year basis that the Russians have. We don't manufacture pits for our nuclear weapons primaries anymore.

And I think a lot of senators see this, they see and are about to see on the 9th of May modern Russian topple missiles paraded through Red Square. And I think when they see that, they'll ask why aren't we modernizing things. So I think the administration needs to outline these things in the 1251 report, it needs to identify future U.S. force structure under the treaty, and it needs to lay out a credible plan on modernization.

Let me talk about missile defense very carefully. Missile defense has proven, as we all know it would be, to be a particularly problematic issue. On the one hand, New START appears to relieve us of some of the constraints that Article 5 of START 1 imposed, such as air-to-surface ballistic missiles and waterborne launches of certain targets that could be used to provide better data and improve geometries and testing for our ballistic missile defense system or BMDS in the Pacific. Its obligation appears only to apply to things the United States did not contemplate undertaking on the date of the signature of the treaty, and as its last sentence states, does not apply to existing ICBM launchers that were converted to house interceptors on April 8 of 2010.

On the other hand, New START's Article 5, paragraph 2, limitation on the placement of ballistic missile interceptor missiles, has caused considerable consternation. Also, notwithstanding the pros and cons, some senators feel that they were told the new treaty would not contain anything other than a preambular clause acknowledging the relationship between strategic offense and strategic defense, not any binding language.

Still more confusing to me have been expert opinions that hold various views about the advisability of the placement of interceptors and sub green effort in SOBM launchers, or even ICBM launchers that exist now. And we can get more into this in the questions, I'm sure we will.

Senators will want to consider this issue in particular very carefully, weighing what

they are told regarding what is planned, what we are capable of doing, and what we would want to be capable of doing in the future. Let me talk briefly about convention strike or prompt global strike. There's been considerable attention devoted to this issue by several senators. How many of these systems, whether it's conventional warheads on top of ICBMs or submarine launch missiles, will we deploy and when seems to be the issue.

Now, last week Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller said in response to a question regarding whether prompt strike systems will count against New START limits, and if so, would further nuclear cuts be required to accommodate them, that "if we were to put a conventional warhead on an ICBM with the traditional ballistic missile trajectory or an FLBM with the traditional ballistic missile trajectory, then it would be accountable."

Now, he also went on to further state, though, that "when the Department of Defense previously proposed the conventional tribe modification, that system had this sort of trajectory and would have been accountable." The numbers associated with that were two missiles per boat at 14 times per boat, which would be 28. Now, some senators have questioned given that we don't need to arrive at the 700 and 800 deployed and non-deployed launcher limits in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the New START Treaty for 7 years. When and how many of these kinds of systems we plan to deploy, because I believe the recent CRS paper counts this against the warhead limit, obviously a conventional warhead without its ICBM isn't much good, so it would sure count against when it's deployed, if its trajectory is ballistic for more than half of its flight under the 700 and 800 non-deployed limits in Article 2 of New START.

So there's a question as to, if you count these, how much further down are you pushing the nuclear reductions inside the treaty. Do 28 missiles really count for all that much? I don't know. The United States had a preferred limit of 900; we've come down substantially from that to 700 in the deployed limit, so I think senators will generally be interested in what and when its administration plans to do with prompt mobile strike.

I don't really want to talk about boosted hypersonic glide vehicles because I just don't want to talk about it. Let me talk briefly about tactical nuclear weapons. It's true that in virtually every hearing I've ever been in on strategic arms control, this subject has come up, and it's come up

for a very important reason, as many of this audience and everyone on this panel knows, and that's the Russians maintain a lot of them. It was the subject of particular concern for Secretary Schlesinger, who stated, "In a way, this aspect is reminiscent of the clue in Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that did not bark." While New START may be accountable in the narrow context of strategic weapons, it also needs to be considered in a much larger context.

In particular, it must be viewed in terms of the evolving Russian doctrine regarding tactical nuclear weapons use and on balance between Russian's substantial stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, which are excluded under this treaty as strategic weapons.

I think that the Senate will want to find, and I actually don't believe that the administration will have very much problem with this, ways of speaking to this issue as it considers the START Treaty, because it's an issue that's been around for a long time, and as our floor structure changes, our strategic numbers go down, the relative importance of tactical weapons will go up.

And I think Secretary Schlesinger alluded to that mirroring language in the preamble on missile defenses with strategic weapons. The next set of concerns senators have espoused, and experts, relates to whether the limits in this treaty are actually real. Now, in a sense, they're more real than what we have under START, because, as we all know, under START, something like the B1B or an empty silo still counted, even though it no longer had a weapon in it. But it's been particularly the case that New START has been criticized for its treatment of bombers, heavy bombers, air breathers.

Again, I'll refer to Secretary Schlesinger's statement. He said, "The 700 limit constitutes only one count, the heavy bomber, against the 700 launcher operational limit even though bombers can carry many more weapons." A bomber can carry 16 to 20 air launch cruise missiles. The force of 65 to 70 bombers could readily carry upwards of 500 additional strategic weapons.

The official Russian press has already bragged that under the New START counting rules, Russia can name 2,100 strategic weapons rather than the 1,550 specified in the treaty.

Now, I did a little bit of work on this subject, and went back and found, again, another Ron Layman quote, and testifying before our committee on START 1 in 1992, Ambassador

Layman stated with regard to that treaty's limits on bombers, "even as we establish lower ceilings on the most destabilizing ballistic missile systems, we sought flexible treatment of bombers and cruise missiles, and we succeeded in achieving our objective." The Soviet Union accepted START counting rules that would treat more liberally air breathing systems that the United States favors. Because of their slow speed, bombers can have a stabilizing effect. Because they also face air defenses and have lower alert rates, we sought rules that would favor bombers over missiles and also protect our bomber force with its conventional missions and leave our technological advances and cruise missiles and conventional technologies essentially unconstrained.

It would appear New START continues this tradition. But I think some are concerned that at lower levels, the more liberal treatment of this seems to make less sense. And you could possibly state that true.

Senator Lugar asked in our April 29 hearing what kinds of forces we envision developing under New START in both Russia and the United States. START 1 and 2 moved us toward fewer heavy fixed ICBMs that were incredibly vulnerable because of their high probability of kill to a more stabilizing mix of forces and survival of the forces in Russia that improve crisis stability. It's not clear to me what our goals under this treaty for the future are, and we can get into that more on the subject of verification. I would ask my colleague a question, how much of old START informed New START, and what have we set ourselves up for in terms of the future of arms control?

A respected friend and colleague said, and we'll discuss telemetry I'm sure later today, that we no longer need it for "the modern era." While it's true that we don't need telemetry on missile flight tests to verify the limits contained in this treaty because we don't care or didn't specify throwaway verification -- need to verify, excuse me, telemetry matters less in this treaty. It's a transparency mechanism.

Also, we do not have the continuous monitoring we had at -- which was our portal parameter continuous monitoring facility, where up to 30 U.S. people lived to verify or to look at containers exiting the portal parameter area for the final assembly of solid rocket loaders at that facility, the machine building plant.

These two important aspects of verification under START are now contained in New

START. And I think Rose has done an incredible job of saying there are reasons why, for one thing, a heck of a lot fewer missiles come out of -- than used to come out, and there are fewer parts of the Soviet production base that remain. But I think the question that we will look at is, how much verification is enough for this treaty, and since the administration has argued that it sets important precedence, what precedence is it setting for the future? How much verification is enough? And I tend to believe, like an old friend and colleague of mine, that you can never have too much verification.

Ten years ago seems like a very short period of time, though a lot has changed. Having to agree -- having rather agreed to less than START 1 and having a regime that treats as transparency measures what START 1 included as a central verification, when we return to a negotiation with Russia in ten years, will we ask for any of the things back that we don't have in this treaty?

If Russian numbers continue to decline, but overall assessments of other production and strategic offensive capabilities also decline proportionately, will we care? Are we going to be better friends in 10 years than we are now? If so, then what else goes and what else stays? Unique identifiers, what? Senator Lugar, in a speech he gave last January, called for more attention to the overall question of verification, and he stated, "It may be the case for the next 10 years our existing knowledge based on what we learned through the START regime and the -- program will provide us with sufficient competence in making assessments of Russian missile capability. But that competence will diminish with time. As a matter of national priority, we must maintain an ability to judge with high confidence the capabilities Russia pursues."

Verification issues are going to play a very important part of our assessment of this treaty. That's part of our committee's essential function in the Senate. And whether it's telemetry or inspections, we will need to compare and contrast what was in START 1 and what's in this treaty and make a determination about truly whether it is effective for this treaty.

Let me say a brief word about inspections, and let me -- here, most of these are staff concerns at this point. I haven't really heard any senators talk about this yet. You're limited over the lifetime of this treaty to 100 inspections total of type one and type two. Type one, you get 10

a year for deployed systems, and type two, you get 8 a year for conversion and elimination inspections, non-deployed systems. There were over 600 inspections, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan under the START Treaty, but there were many more inspections. In arms control, we talk about the frequency and intensity of the inspection activity.

And I think an early assessment, and again, this is a personal opinion, is that while the frequency of inspection activity will go down under New START, which is largely a function of the decision to make the regime more cost effective and efficient, the intensity of the activity may actually increase, and that's certainly something that we're going to focus on a lot, as I mentioned, when I get locked in a room to drink from a fire hose on the inspection regime.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You know that Ted Warner was our secret weapon.

MR. MOORE: Let me sort of close this out by pointing to a couple other issues that have proved a little bit nettlesome, but yet haven't migrated up to the level of concerns for senators. The first is road mobile ICBMs and the second is rail mobile ICBMs. Under START 1, we were -- we had a cap under Article 4 of that treaty, I believe 210 off the top of my head, I don't have my copy of START 1 with me, road mobile missiles. Now, these systems are the kinds of systems the Russians in their modernization program greatly favor. Now, there are stabilizing aspects to that. They're highly survivable systems that are very hard to kill and find. And that might be a good thing for the future as we go to lower numbers.

But looking at the window of vulnerability, some people have argued, what if they had many, many non-deployed, non-declared missiles and non-deployed, non-declared warheads that they could go ahead and rapidly put on those.

And given, as I've said, we've lost the ability to -- or we don't have telemetry reporting in the way we did under START, and we can get more into that in the question and answer session. We won't necessarily know the numbers of warheads they're testing their weapons for. What kind of future force does that show us the Russians want to have?

Absent the numerical limit contained in START 1, some people have said also that they'll have many, many, many of these systems, and because we will essentially be peering down through national technical means of where they go, we won't have a great ability to know how many

of them there are. On the other hand, people have argued, well, you know for sure at least that they had probably no more than 210, you have the data base under START, and you have 15 years of START implementation, and when you couple that, and this gets to my question about how New START informed -- or how old START informed New START, do you arrive at a conclusion that the network of inspections and notifications would be able to capture any scenario where Russia was not doing something that it was supposed to do under the treaty. Again, that's something that we'll be dealing with and developing more in hearings.

Just a brief word on rail mobile missiles because the blog eruption on this was significant. I think that if you look at the definition of a rail mobile system and define term number 45 in isolation in this treaty, you read that, and it says mobile launcher of ICBM means "an erecter launcher mechanism for launching ICBM's and the SALT propelled device on which is mounted, your automatic reaction is, well, what about the locomotive that pulls the rail car."

As it turns out, my boss presided over one of the decommissionings of the last SS-24s in Russia, and I believe the last 24 base was destroyed in 2007. The negotiators have said that they didn't seek to define the treaty, rather things that don't exist right now, and that, oh, by the way, pursuant to Article 52 of this treaty, if a new kind of strategic system -- I guess in this case a new, old kind -- were emerging, you'd have the right to discuss it with the Russians. So I'll stop there actually I think.

MR. PIFER: Okay. Well, Tom, thank you. I think you've done a good job of highlighting a number of the questions that, you know, we're now hearing will come up in the discussion in the Senate.

I guess before opening the floor to questions, Rose, let me ask you whether you'd like to respond to some of those issues.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I'll just take a few of them, not all of them, but this was a very, very good overview of the concerns. And we've had already a number of opportunities to go up to the Hill and talk to the staff and get some insight into what issues are coming up, so I'm grateful to Tom for reviewing them here, because it's helpful for all you to know about them, as well.

I'm just going to take a few of them. If people are particularly interested in things I

don't touch on, please raise them during the question period. You know, the bomber counting rule, and I mentioned it, Tom also -- I'm grateful, Tom, for bringing the Layman quote forward, that was -- from the START period, that was a good quote, I hadn't actually read it. The concern seems to be about upload potential on bombers, and that's, you know, indeed, the kind of reflection you're hearing from the Russian press, as well, that there could be some, you know, ease of upload.

The only thing I'll say about that is, in an upload contest, I wouldn't want to bet against the United States of America, that's all I want to say about that. And it's an interesting thing to me that, as a matter of fact, the discussion of that issue was not something that played in this treaty negotiation as much as I had expected.

But, you know, that concern I think has to be tempered by the realization that the United States -- if things start going bad with Russia, and I don't expect them to, I think our relationship now is very good and I think that this treaty bespeaks a new phase in our relationship. I certainly have heard that said by President Obama and President Medvedev both. And my expectation is that the relationship will continue to improve and to underpin both for the reductions in the future, but also underpin cooperation in strengthening and enhancing the nonproliferation regime. But if things go badly, we will have strategic warning and we will react. The United States of America will react. So I think that we should all bear that in mind when we reflect on how we approach bomber counting under this treaty.

And, in fact, I thought it was not a good thing for us to be counting bombers as zero nuclear weapons. That's the implication of the counting approach we've come to under this treaty and embrace, that is that we will try to more precisely count the number of warheads on delivery vehicles. It applies perfectly to the ICBM and to the SOBM force. But if you applied it to the bomber force, you would have to list bombers as having zero warheads on a day-to-day basis. That made no sense to neither the U.S. side or the Russian side in this negotiation.

A very good question, how much old START informed New START, 100 percent, and that was first inscribed in the July 2009 Summit statement officially by President Obama and President Medvedev, that we would use START as the basis for a thoughtful look forward and thoughtful constructing of this new treaty, and indeed, New START very much informed of the

concept and also the verification regime, per se, the inspection regime, per se, but all aspects of the treaty were developed in -- position and in thoughtful consideration of what was in START, and that was why it was so valuable to have on each team, on the U.S. team, on the Russian team, people who had been involved in the depths of each other's strategic forces, going to ICBM basis, SOBM basis, bomber basis, to have the inspectors involved, because they knew the START Treaty inside and out, and they knew how they wanted to make improvements. They could see, you know, what would make their jobs easier under the new treaty, and so we really benefited from their participation in the delegations.

The business about inspections, maybe not all of you have had a chance to look at the way the inspection regime is put together, but one thing I will say is, I agree with Tom's comment that the intensity is deeper. What we tried to do in order to minimize operational disruptions which had afflicted both parties, Russia and the United States, during the implementation of START, you know, for example, we only have two submarine bases, one on the West Coast and one on the East Coast, and you know, with frequent inspections, it means a shut down of operational tempo or a slow down of operational tempo, and so I think both parties wanted to look at ways to ease that problem. And so what we've come out with is a series of inspections. The inspections basically embrace a number of tasks that were carried out under individual inspections under START; now you can carry them out under a single inspection under the New START Treaty, and so it helps with that issue of ops tempo and ensuring that we're not disrupting the legitimate operations of the strategic forces on either side too many times, but I do feel that the intensity is an important point.

The other thing to think about when you think about the 600 START inspections against the 180 New START inspections is that the Russians have closed down a large number of facilities since START was in force, and they continue to shut down their strategic facilities every year.

So the number of objects with inspection or, that's the Russian word, sorry, the facilities to be inspected, inspection targets have been cut by the simple fact that the Russians are closing facilities and will continue to do so. So those are the three comments I wanted to make immediately. I look forward to questions.

MR. PIFER: All right. Let me go ahead and open up the floor to questions. If I could ask, wait for the microphone, please keep the questions short, and we'll start right over here. And if you could also identify yourself, please.

MR. CULP: David Culp with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. A quick question for Rose and Tom. It sounds like the last piece in the package to go to the Senate is the national intelligence estimate. What's your guesstimate on when that might be submitted to the Senate? And, Tom, if things go well, how long will it take your committee to mark up the resolution after you get the last piece of the package?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Just a comment. Tom mentioned the process of putting together the article by article and getting the package together to go up to the Hill. I'll just say once again that this process has been a very fast moving and intensive one. The inner agency has pulled together very, very well, and I do expect that in early May, the package is going up to the Hill, so I can confirm that.

As far as the MIE is concerned, you know, the MIE process, I've been told, usually takes six -- eight months. We knew we didn't have that much time. I understand the IC is working on this very intensively. It's not going to go up at exactly the same point as the article by article, the treaty to protocol and the annexes, but I do not expect it to be, you know, lagging by months, I'll put it that way, it will be going up in a fairly short period of time.

MR. MOORE: Dave, to answer your question, it'll take as long as it takes.

MR. MCDONALD: Bruce McDonald, United States Institute of Peace and former Senior Director to the Strategic Posture Review Commission, the Perry-Schlesinger Commission. A quick question for Rose. Why a 10-year duration rather than 15 for START?

And then for Tom, in the hearing where Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger testified before your committee last week, Secretary Schlesinger spoke very convincingly about the fact that both Russia and China could overwhelm any defenses that the United States might seek to put up, can you conceive of any limits, even if somewhat high, but would be sufficient to allow a very robust defense against countries like North Korea and Iran, but still would not threaten the credibility of the deterrent of Russia and China, is that even within the realm of possibility for a follow on agreement, or is that

just -- do you think politically beyond the pail?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you, Bruce. Why a 10-year duration? As I mentioned in my opening remarks, from the outset, and from when the presidents first met in April in London and launched this negotiation, this treaty was seen as a bridge between START and further reduction negotiations, so in that light, we thought that a 10-year duration was much more in line with that kind of aspiration.

And furthermore, you'll note, if you've read the treaty carefully, that it says that this treaty may be superseded at any time if we are able to accomplish a new treaty during the period, that's fairly standard, but it is picked out specifically in this treaty.

Furthermore, the way that we have put in place a possibility of extension of the treaty, if, you know, we're still negotiating with its lifetime is coming to conclusion, we have put in place a flexible mechanism for extension of the treaty.

We were, you know, I can say put somewhat in a bind by the way that the START Treaty, you know, you could extend it for five years and that was kind of it, that was your choice. And the Bush Administration and President Medvedev had agreed even before the Obama Administration arrived in office that a kind of, you know, very, very strict five-year extension was not the way they wanted to go. And so we tried to make this treaty more flexible at its close. If we wish to extend for a shorter period, we will have the opportunity of doing that, and we will have the opportunity also of superseding it at any time with, of course, a new treaty once it's negotiated.

MR. MOORE: Rose has a little different job than I have. I have a treaty in front of me that I have to consider. Talking about potential future treaties might be interesting, but I'm not here to talk about them today. And moreover, I think that in this regard, I would like to caution everybody that when the United States Senate is considering this agreement, it will be important to consider this agreement.

And to the extent we talk about further reductions, when we've had testimony from various senior military leaders regarding delivery vehicles, reductions beyond those contained in this treaty, may or may not be advisable. So I will defer for now on the question of what size force do we need to deter, people we need to deter, but remain in rough parody or stability with Russia and China,

because I don't have that treaty in front of me right now, and actually I still don't have, to be frank, this one.

MR. TALBOTT: Bruce, I should say that Steve and I have infinitely easier jobs than Tom and Rose, so we can enter into this area. And it's not directly responsive to your question, but it's a thought that comes to mind on hearing your question. At some point, bilateral isn't enough. This process is going to need to be tri lateralized, and indeed, multi lateralized, especially, well, for all kinds of reasons, including hard military strategic reasons, but also diplomatic reasons connected to meeting the Article 6 requirement of the NPT.

The five, as it were, NPT approved nuclear weapon states are all going to have to be part of this. China is clearly a front and center issue, but recent comments of President Sarkozy make pretty clear that the French are not super eager to be drawn into it, but will need to be at some point.

MR. PIFER: I just might add to that, I mean as I read the preamble, in fact, in the preamble language, when it talks about step-by-step reductions, it actually includes, I think language is --

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Including to a multilateral --

MR. PIFER: So that's actually, you know, out there as a possibility.

MR. MOORE: Hinted at, yeah.

MR. PIFER: Hinted, yeah. I have a question up here in the front.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Carefully calibrated.

MR. PIFER: Is it calculated ambiguity?

MR. COLINA: Thank you. Tom Colina, Arms Control Association. Thank you all for being here. First a comment and then a question. My comment is that, Tom, you refer to the 1251 report as the "modernization report," as many people do. My comment is just that it actually is asking for modernization in one context, the weapons complex, but then it asks for plans for enhancing warheads and maintaining missiles. So just to be clear on what exactly the modernization report, if we use that term, is asking for, and it's not asking for modernization across the board.

My question is, in the hearing with Secretary Schlesinger, he quite clearly said that

this New START Treaty should be ratified. And my question to you, with danger of getting a non-answer, is, to what extent did his comment on the advisability of ratifying this treaty, how will that effect other senators on the committee and more broadly?

Thanks.

MR. MOORE: Oh, dear. I think Secretary Schlesinger is very well respected by everybody. I think his comments will carry a lot of weight, but it's the first of many hearings in which there will be opportunities for others to comment. People of equal weight will appear before us. It's not about whether one gray beard or the other says something, it's about whether we establish a credible record supporting a decision on the committee, and right now we've only had one hearing, so that is my non-answer.

MR. PIFER: A question back in the back.

MR. POMPER: Hi, Miles Pomper from CNS. First of all, congratulations, Rose, on the negotiation. I have a question on tactical nuclear weapons, and you talked a little bit about it in your beginning, and obviously, there was a Talon Summit recently with Secretary Clinton and so on. The sort of endpoint of that summit seems to be that there's not going to be any unilateral moves by the United States or others to remove the weapons from Europe at this point, and the idea is to negotiate this issue with the Russians. My question is what's the incentive for the Russians to negotiate? I mean, Secretary Schlesinger also alluded to this I believe at the hearing, but as you know, the Russians have said they don't want to talk until we pull our weapons out of Europe, so how do we encourage them to actually have a discussion on this issue when we've removed the one thing that they say is needed to move forward?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I think your first comment, Miles, deserves to be underscored, and that is, we did not want to move out on this question without standing and being arm in arm with our NATO allies. And very important that the NATO strategic concept is currently under review and discussion, and that process will go forward over this year, and the Lisbon Summit will, toward the end of the year, draw, you know, draw some conclusions with regard to not only nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, but also a number of other military and security issues related to the strategic concept. So we did not want to get out ahead of that process in NATO, and I think that

is very, very important to underscore.

Second, you're absolutely right, and everyone in the arms control community has known this for a long, long time, that, you know, that trade cannot be a direct one. The TAC nukes in Europe, we have a couple of hundred, and Russians, you know, their numbers are much higher than that. So we will be looking to the future I think to develop a comprehensive agenda for future negotiations that will provide for some more complex trade-offs. But I'm not prepared, nor I think have we done an adequate study to tell you what those will be at this time.

SPEAKER: Could I just, Miles, add one thought here. It'll be a real tough one when it comes for two reasons that many of you are aware, but just to make them explicit: one is that, going back to the history of the last 6 decades, 5 decades on this, there has been an interesting and in some ways welcome and in other ways very complicating 180-degree shift.

The United States, of course, originally needed, developed, and deployed its nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Europe largely to offset or compensate for Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, at least numerical superiority as it was seen. And now we're in a situation where the Russians are quite open in talking about this, at least in track two settings, and I assume in track one, as well, that their tactical nuclear advantage is an offset to what is seen as the west and NATO's conventional superiority. So this is very much tied up in their persistent and to date at least incurable hang-up, which I think is conceptually flawed and strategically flawed, but it's there, nonetheless, with NATO enlargement.

And, of course, the other complicating factor is Georgia. And any discussion of conventional weapons is certain and should get into the question of the virtual annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Russian conventional forces there.

Nonetheless, I think it's to the credit of the Alliance of the United States that we, the Alliance, and we, the United States, are taking that one on. There was an interesting interview by Secretary General Rasmussen, I think it was in the Times a week or so ago, hitting this fairly head on. And, of course, the Obama Administration has appointed a very able diplomat in Victoria Nuland, our former Ambassador to NATO, to work this issue, but they really had their work cut out for them.

MR. PIFER: I just might add, to plug the Brookings papers, we put out a paper

about two months ago looking at the options for conventional forces in Europe. It's on the web site, but I think if you go through that, you see that the options for moving forward really get into some very difficult issues, both diplomatically, not just with the Russians, but I think also among NATO allies. So that is going to be a task that may make the last ten months look rather easy. A question back --

MR. YOUNG: Hi, Steven Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Rose, thank you again for your wonderful work, it is an amazing job. But I want to try and do you a favor and prepare you for the questions you're going to face that Tom raised, one of the ones you didn't talk about, the missile defense question.

I think senators will say we're promised -- at all -- in this treaty, yet Article 5 -- has a limit right there, why is it there? You say it won't affect us at all, but it's still in the treaty, it's a problem for us, but how do we respond to that question?

Second, I'm pretty sure you're going to be asked for a full history of negotiations in the treaty by senators -- can provide that, is that on the table by being discussed, where does that stand?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: On your second question, Steve, to begin with, we are committed to working 24/7 to, you know, keep the flow of information going up to the Hill. As I mentioned, I've already been up to the Hill four times now to brief staff, and so forth and we are very committed to ensuring that the Senate has the information they need to make a decision advising and I hope consenting to the ratification of those treaties. So I just want to underscore that point, that we are working really hard already and we are prepared to work even harder to get the questions answered that will be asked, and I know, I'm expecting hundreds of them. So that's a personal commitment, but it's also a commitment of this administration.

The second point, with regard to missile defense, there's lots of opportunity to continue this discussion. But one thing I'd like to say about Article 5, paragraph 3, is that there were -- it's a general statement to begin with.

One of the big goals we had in this treaty was to resolve a lot of issues that had arisen in the implementation of START and not carry them forward as a canker into this new treaty.

We wanted to get off the table a lot of the issues in the compliance and implementation of the treaty that had caused -- of START that had caused problems between Washington and Moscow, and I believe that we did a very good job on that, on achieving that goal. And one of the key issues that arose again and again was the issue of the missile defense interceptors at Vandenberg that had been converted from the offensive silos, ICBM silos. So that -- I think it's important to read Article 5, paragraph 3, in the context of that effort to grandfather once and for all the Vandenberg interceptors to assure that that issue did not arise again and to make sure that we had a mechanism in place.

And there is an aggrieved statement that also firms up what appears in Article 5, paragraph 3, gives more detail about how we are going to ensure that these are off the books forever under this new treaty.

So I think it is important to read Article 5, paragraph 3, in that context. To me, that is the most important implication of Article 5, paragraph 3. I know it has aroused some concerns. Tom has very clearly articulated them this morning. We will continue the discussion.

I'd also refer all of you, if you haven't had a chance to look at it, to the recent testimony of General Patrick O'Reilly talking about his view, as head of the Missile Defense Office, his view of the treaty and how it absolutely does not constrain anything that the missile defense folks are planning to do. So that I think is also going to be required reading for all of us and very important to the consideration of this treaty.

MR. PIFER: Okay.

MR. CHATTERJEE: My name is Samar Chatterjee from Safe Foundation. I guess I have a short comment and then a question.

The comment is that this treaty seems to be that both parties, the United States and Russians, both have stipulated when they can get out of it when there is a disagreement. And, Rose, you just pointed out that in the case of Obama-related issue, America would be hard to bet against. And the Russians have also indicated that the missile defense could be the breaking point.

Given that I consider this as an ad hoc starting point to the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, now the question is, do you think that there are -- particularly this question goes to the minority staff member, that there are some Republicans already thinking of

calling this as a fatally flawed agreement, and any agreement you sign with the Russians will not be kept or is it meaningless, something that Mr. Reagan once said, and that became a long drawn dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. Is there something in the works that could happen in the near future to jeopardize this whole process?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Let me just make a few comments. First of all, my comment about the bombers, I want to emphasize that, in fact, again, this treaty was negotiated and concluded after the Cold War, it's now long over. It's a much different strategic environment, I do believe, and can already see signs that it is underpinning a very now productive relationship with the Russian Federation.

And I talked about the work that we had been doing with Russia at the Rev Con this week that's going on to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. So I think we must bear in mind that the overall strategic environment has changed, and I do not expect this kind of worst-case scenario to emerge.

But, of course, every nation must be prudent about its national defense and security, and so we must know if the worse case does arise, if things go sour or wrong with Russia, what, you know, steps are available to us. So it was in that context that I made that remark, but I do not believe that we are in that kind of a relationship with Russia now, nor do I expect that we will be so in the future. I think we are at a new stage in our relationship with Russia, and the post Cold War era, I believe, is truly now -- we're in the midst of it, I think we're going to have to stop calling it the post Cold War era and think of a new term.

You mentioned the withdrawal from the treaty; I just would like to say that withdrawal clauses are standard in international treaties of all kinds. I think it is very important for countries involved in negotiating such treaties that if they feel their national interests, their national security is no longer being served by a treaty, that they have the right to withdraw from it as, you know, prematurely, before the treaty has run its course.

So that, again, I don't see anything special about that, that is -- the withdrawal clause is a standard part of treaty practice. And as far as implementation, you made the point about some people say, you know, well, why sign up to this treaty, you know, there's going to be problems,

or it won't be implemented, in fact, the record of implementation of the START Treaty is excellent. And I think both countries agree that, although there may have been some problems in terms of implementing parts of the treaty on both sides, by and large, implementation of the START Treaty went forward very well and provided a great I think security boom to both the United States and the Russian Federation.

MR. MOORE: I've worked in the United States Senate for 10 years and I've learned that you don't make predictions about what senators do or won't do. And the Constitution of the United States sets a sufficiently high bar that two-thirds of the senators present and concurring therein, a resolution of advice and consent agreed to.

Look, we've got a lot of work to do on our committee, we haven't got the treaty yet, we're a long way off from being able to make those kinds of statements. And maybe we're close to closing, but I would leave everybody with one more Schlesinger quote. It's been his day here. Again, we only had one hearing.

But testifying on the START 1 Treaty in 1991, he said, "The irony is that when arms control agreements might hypothetically be most helpful, they may not be achievable." By contrast, when arms control is achievable, it may achieve little more than the natural course of events without arms control. However, even in those circumstances, agreements may serve the useful purpose of codifying these changes. So I think that that's a historical quote that you can use to judge this treaty by.

MR. PIFER: Yeah, time for one last question.

MR. BRITENBUCKER: My name is Joseph Britenbucker . I'm a private citizen. My question, or my, first of all, comment basically that once you get the treaty in the Senate, in many ways the treaty and its discussion goes outside the beltway, because then the press picks it up, picks up the hearings, et cetera.

I would think one way to help with the implementation or the ratification of the treaty would be to point out to the public, number one, what the cost of the implementation might be, and more importantly, the long range possible savings of the treaty. Is there any -- are there any estimates on that?

MR. MOORE: Well, we're required to put in our report a CBO, a Congressional Budget Office, estimate of the budget implications for the treaty. That will be based in no small part on questions that we ask, because, as I said earlier, a major goal of -- was to reduce cost of implementation when it came to destruction and inspection and the like. I don't have a quantifiable number off the top of my head to give you right now because we haven't done any of the analysis because we don't have the treaty yet, but that is a part of the formal record when we consider treaties.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I'll just add that I'm very happy you raised the question about public attention outside the Beltway, because it's been many years, once again, I'll say since we've negotiated and concluded a strategic arms reduction treaty, and one of this girth. I didn't quite expect it to end up that big, but it's --

MR. PIFER: And I should point out, some of these are actually double-sided pages.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Right. So I think it will be very important to get outside the beltway and to talk to people about this treaty and about what it means for the United States and what it means for U.S. security. I hope that my colleagues and I will have some opportunities to do that.

MR. TALBOTT: I might just tag onto that a comment not just from the think tank community and the NGO community, which is well-represented in this room, but everybody in this room by definition, by virtue of the fact that you're here is in a position to be part of the public education effort here, which is absolutely essential in general for the workings of our democracy, but particularly on what can be confusing and difficult and esoteric subjects, but of great national importance like this one.

MR. PIFER: Okay. We're now going to have about 15 minutes, then please be in your seats for our next presentation, which will begin promptly at noon. But first can I ask you to join me in thanking our panel for a very good --

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

LOOKING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
Keynote Address: Jon Wolfsthal, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Nonproliferation

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010

PARTICIPANTS:

Introductory Remarks:

STROBE TALBOTT
President
The Brookings Institution

Moderator:

STEVEN PIFER
Senior Fellow and Director
Arms Control Initiative
The Brookings Institution

Speaker:

JON WOLFSTHAL
Special Advisor to the Vice President for
Nonproliferation
Vice President's Office

MR. TALBOTT: Before I say a word or two of introduction to Jon, I'm going to do something that is a violation of the position I hold in the program, which is to single out a couple of people, and thereby, inadvertently fail to recognize others. But we have two towering figures in the history of American national security and arms control here, conveniently both in the first row: Max Kampelman, who has -- yeah, let's do it. (Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: I don't need to finish the subordinate clause on either of these guys. And Stanley Resor over here. This is one of the few audiences in Washington where I could say MBFR and you'd know what I was talking about. Okay. You're all part of -- some of you are eating your sandwiches, and that makes you part of the great Brookings tradition of eating and talking at the same time, at least collectively, not individually. And I don't think Jon has gotten his lunch, but you're the main course for us at this event.

I was telling Jon a little bit about the morning session, and it was really terrific, not least, by the way, because of the quality of the questions from all of you. Tom Moore, whose remarks you should spend a little time looking at because they relate to what you and the VP and the President are doing, said that -- called this a nuclear year, and it's a good phrase, and, therefore, I will plagiarize it.

And it's really been a nuclear month, or at least a five-week period, as you all know. Here we are just 13 months after President Obama's Prague speech, and just in the last 5 weeks, we've already had the nuclear posture review come out. The President returned to Prague to sign the New START Treaty with President Medvedev. I can't resist a plug for Brookings, as well. President Medvedev was here right at this podium during the Nuclear Security Summit last month and had quite a bit to say that I found to be reassuring and enlightening about the Russian perspective on the treaties. He seemed to be reasonably confident about its ratification by the way. And we've also had the Nuclear Security Summit, which I already referred. And then on Monday, the NPT Review opened up in New York.

But as a couple of us had occasion to refer to during the morning session, the really tough and interesting negotiations are going to be here in this town on the issue of ratification, and that means not just of the New START Treaty, but also looking ahead to the comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty next year, when the United States Senate is going to have an opportunity -- this is an editorial comment, but we're allowed those around here -- when the United States Senate will have a chance to make an even wiser decision than it made 11 years ago.

And to talk about this whole range of issues, we're lucky to have John Wolfsthal with us. Jon, as I think all of you know, wears two hats, and very important hats they are: director of nonproliferation of the NSC, and also special advisor on that issue to Vice President Biden. He has a very solid background. He, like Rose, is an alumnist of the Department of Energy, and he also has worked on Think Tank Row, two particularly fine institutions that we do a lot of work with here at Brookings: Carnegie Endowment right next door and CSIS. He's been a participant from time to time in our events here at Brookings and they've always been better as a result, and, Jon, we're very glad to have you with us today.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Thank you, it's a great pleasure to be here this afternoon. I can't resist, Strobe, not only would people in this room know what MDFR is. In a discussion with the Vice President three weeks ago, he threw it out as if everybody in the room would know -- I nodded knowingly, because I was the only person who had, in fact, heard the term and knew what it was. So you're not only in this room I assure you, you're in the White House as well.

Thank you so very much for the introduction. I don't know how to do this without either looking really young or making you seem sort of old, but, of course, many of my first readings were from you on the subject, and being introduced by you means a lot to me personally.

And, Steve, I just want to thank you for the invitation to be here today. It's been very helpful to be working with you over the past several months, and I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today.

So my charge here today, as asked by Steve and Strobe, is to try and tie some of the many strands of the administration's nuclear policy together, and it's understandable that there's a desire to have somebody do this since we have been very active on a number of fronts all at the same time. There's really been an unprecedented level of activity, at least in my lifetime and the period of my studies, and we've been working over a critical range of issues.

As Strobe mentioned, both the completion of the New START Treaty, the release of

the Nuclear Posture Review, the holding of the Nuclear Security Summit, and just on Monday the start of the NPT Review Conference, it seemed like a good time to actually take stock of where we are, how these pieces are fitting together, and then also to take a very good look at where we still need to go.

So let me just state very simply and firmly at the beginning that the President and his entire administration have no higher priority than making sure that America and Americans and our allies are safe from the threat of nuclear weapons. It is both a constitutional responsibility for the President and a personal priority for the President, and we are sparing no effort, no energy, and no approach to ensure that nuclear weapons do not spread to new countries and the terrorists never get the materials they need to build a nuclear weapon.

In this effort, as the people in this room know all too well, there is no silver bullet. Our efforts are multifaceted because they have to be multifaceted. No one tool, whether international cooperation or sanctions or military force, can achieve this important mission by itself. And that is why we continue to rely on our full toolbox of options to deal with these multiple challenges. There are times when we can, must, and will act alone, but we know that our results will be more successful and more enduring if we lead in international and, indeed, a global effort.

So we hope that our organizing principle is clear for all to see. If there is one major theme, it is the recognition that despite our great power and influence, preventing nuclear threats requires broad international cooperation. This is true for all facets of our nuclear policy. It is true as we work to secure nuclear materials so that a terrorist group cannot steal or buy them; it is true as we work to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our own arsenal and in the arsenal of other states, including Russia; it is true as we work to promote transparency and stability among nuclear powers; and it's clearly true as we work to ensure that states that violate the rules of the nonproliferation regime face real and significant consequences as a result of their actions.

As Strobe mentioned, in many ways the speech President Obama gave in Prague is a touchstone for this administration. It gives us both an organizing framework and a detailed agenda. And today, just 13 months after that speech was given, the administration has delivered already on a number of the pledges in the speech even as we recognize that we have much more

work to do.

Let me just list a few of the things that we feel that we've made great progress on:

Last month, as Strobe mentioned, President Obama and President Medvedev signed a New START nuclear reduction agreement, and I know that Rose and Tom Moore, and Strobe and Steve all this morning discussed this in great detail. But let me simply make the point that this agreement is not only in America's security interest on its own merits, but we are already seeing how its completion has set a positive tone for the NPT Review Conference in New York. It helps consolidate our leadership in the nonproliferation system. It enables us to work on the very difficult challenges of preparing and reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime and the NPT, which stands as a cornerstone.

We will continue to engage the Senate, and we hope that the long history of bipartisan support for nuclear arms reduction agreements, negotiated both by Democratic and Republican presidents, will be continued by the Senate.

Number 2. In April, we released an historic Nuclear Posture Review. This document for the first time is completely unclassified, bringing out our policies and the direction of our nuclear strategy for the next 10 years and beyond. It sets an example for transparency. We encourage other nuclear states to follow.

The review makes clear that our nuclear capabilities will be dedicated to addressing the major threats we face today: that of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. And while we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons are needed for our security and that of our allies, we will work to reduce the number of nuclear weapons we have, the role they play, and to achieve the conditions that will allow us to adopt a sole purpose nuclear strategy, even as we pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, as the President has stated. And I know that this will be of some interest. I look forward to engaging in a conversation on the NPR during the Q&A.

We are also pursuing the President's ambitious but achievable agenda to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. The historic Nuclear Security Summit saw leaders from 47 countries make an unprecedented global commitment to nuclear security, and we have laid out a

work plan that will enable real progress in keeping nuclear materials off the black market and out of the hands of terrorist groups. And we look forward to the Republic of Korea's hosting of the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012.

We have also made significant progress in isolating Iran over its clear and repeated violations of the nonproliferation system. Having been found in noncompliance with its safeguard obligations and having failed to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, Iran finds it has few friends willing to defend its actions and is facing the prospect of new and tougher sanctions over its nuclear activities.

The statements by the UN secretary general and the IAEA director general on Monday in New York are but a sampling of the kinds of global chorus you will hear over the coming days, making clear that Iran's room to maneuver is shrinking. As Secretary Clinton said, for all the bluster of its words, the Iranian government cannot defend its own actions, and that is why it is facing increased isolation and pressure from the international community. And as my boss, the Vice President, pointed out, the Iranian regime is more isolated domestically, regionally, and internationally than it has ever been. Our actions to date not only make it easier for states to support tough actions on Iran, but harder for states to resist such steps.

And we have also shown North Korea that their proliferation and traditional crisis tactics will not bring them anything other than isolation and economic pain, and that the only path for them is to return to the six-party talks and to resume their denuclearization activities.

Now, this is just a listing, a sampling of the efforts we're taking. Now, my prepared remarks, I won't get into detail on a lot of other steps that we're taking to prevent nuclear smuggling of materials and technology, to improve the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect illicit nuclear activities even while promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology, our efforts to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, or to ratify and bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We are doing all of these and more, and we are doing them not only because they are the right way to protect the country, but also because they are the right way to prevent proliferation, and because it is what the President said he would do when he ran for the office of

President.

Now, this long list of activities doesn't really answer the mail. I was asked to try and tie some of these things together, and I think it's useful to explain that for us these seemingly stovepiped activities are all interrelated. These actions have benefits for our security in an of themselves, but together they create a momentum that is undeniable and equally beneficial for our security. Each step reinforces the others and helps reduce the role that nuclear weapons play today and can play in the future.

And just by way of example, as I mentioned at the outset, it's clear that the completion of New START with Russia has had a positive impact on the start of the NPT Review Conference. Every country that spoke on the opening day of the conference welcomed the completion of New START with the exception -- expected exception -- of Iran. Despite that one predictable omission, it is clear that the concrete steps we are taking to reduce our own nuclear weapons set the right tone for the conference just as it makes possible -- just as it made it possible to achieve some of the tangible outcomes from the Nuclear Security Summit.

So, as discussed this morning, I'm sure it's important to keep and note not only what the treaty does in and of itself for reducing nuclear weapons and promoting transparency with Russia, but what it means for our leadership in the international nonproliferation effort.

Another example of how these pieces are interrelated is how our pledge not to develop new nuclear weapons or add military capabilities to our existing weapons has had an impact internationally. But at the same time we've made very clear at the highest levels our commitment to invest what is needed to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

This not only helps us achieve lower numbers by ensuring that the weapons we retain remain reliable, but it also makes clear to our friends and allies that they do not need to worry about our ability to protect their interest as well as our own. By doing so, we make clear that we will defend our allies in the face of current and emerging threats, including those posed by states violating their nonproliferation commitments.

In so many ways, these puzzle pieces fit together, and the more puzzle pieces we lay down the clearer the signs that we are making real progress. Just Monday, Indonesia, citing the

progress being made in the nonproliferation and disarmament field, announced that they will immediately pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, helping to reinforce the global norm against the testing of these weapons.

No, not every challenge has yet been met. Some will take months and years, and the President himself has said that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons may not be achieved even in his lifetime. But we are on the right path and making steady, significant, and demonstrable progress.

And so as we acknowledge, even after our nuclear spring -- I hope it's not a nuclear year because I think the pace, if it keeps up at that level, may burn out most of the people in government -- even after that investment in the recent activities we have a long way to go. The New START Treaty, again, which we hope will receive, grow strong bipartisan support by the Senate, is just the beginning of what we want and need to achieve in bilateral nuclear reductions with Russia.

As we have said, even before negotiations of this agreement started, we see New START as an interim agreement that will put us on a strong foundation to pursue deeper cuts, including the tactical nuclear weapon arsenals of both countries. In addition, while we successfully resisted Russian attempts to make New START about missile defense, we welcome discussions with Russia on missile defense cooperation and on the full range of offense/defense issues in the next round of talks.

We are also committed in engaging in a dialogue with China to promote a more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationship. We will also not rest until we reverse the nuclear activities in Iran and until North Korea is completely denuclearized.

As we continue to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, we will continue to make clear that we cannot achieve this goal if new states are going nuclear. The burden of making a nuclear-free world rests with all states, not just states that possess nuclear weapons. Just as we have made clear that the NPT is not a favor to any group of states, nuclear weapon states, nonnuclear weapon states, but is in the interest of all states, so, too, is achieving a world where nuclear weapons are no longer needed, and in this effort all states must be full and contributing partners.

Day by day we are working to advance the President's ambitious agenda to keep America safe. Just two days ago we released historic information about America's nuclear stockpile showing the clear progress we have made in dismantling the Cold War's nuclear arsenal. Just today there was P5 statement issued at the NPT Review Conference reaffirming the role of the P5 in achieving and pursuing nuclear disarmament, and even I haven't had a chance to digest all of its parameters, but it's a clear sign that as the old DJ saying goes, the hits just keep on coming. And we continue to see continued progress and momentum on these efforts.

But in the end, the actions need to be directed on the key challenges we face. Since the Vice President and President took office, they work diligently to make sure that the threats of the 21st century are being addressed today. This is clear in the new direction we are taking on missile defense, on the work we are pursuing to dismantle the Cold War nuclear structure, and to shape our remaining limited nuclear capabilities on the appropriate challenges for today and tomorrow as well as in the efforts we are taking to repair and reinvigorate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the broader regime it supports.

We want to be clear to you just as we've been to our international partners that we know that in this effort there will be setbacks. We know, for example, that it will be hard if not impossible to produce a final consensus document at the NPT Review Conference in New York. Iran and a few other countries will try to block efforts to improve the regime's ability to respond to actions such as those being taken by countries such as Iran.

But the NPT Review Conference for us has never been seen as a finish line; it is a weigh station. It is an event that will allow us to show that the vast majority of states see a less nuclear world as a safer world, and to show that the majority of states want to improve the treaty and the regime it underpins.

We fully expect to see a flood of stories in late May about how the lack of a consensus document is somehow a consensus -- is somehow a setback for our efforts. But we are not measuring success or failure by that yardstick. We will judge it by what countries say at the conference about the regime and what they are prepared to do with us after the conference is over in the months and years ahead. But we take comfort in knowing that we are on the right course, that

we're making real progress in ensuring the security of our country and of its citizens.

Thank you for your attention, and I'll look forward to your questions. (Applause)

MR. PIFER: Jon, thanks very much for covering and giving us that picture of the administration's overall effort at tackling the nuclear challenge.

Before opening up to questions, I guess I'd like to put one question to you. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, and I think in terms of the various pieces that you talked about, there is something of a pivot now in terms of the orientation of American policy on nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation away from sort of the traditional reductions with Russia, and before that with the Soviet Union, now really to focusing on nonproliferation nuclear terrorism.

Just in your sense of in terms of generating the sense of urgency in other countries, I think the administration's done a fairly good job making clear that this is now at the top of its priority list. How are you seeing that in terms of our partners around the world, in terms of do they begin to see this as the same sort of a urgent issue that the Obama Administration sees it?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Well, I think just as, you know, the implementation and the policies that we've laid out in the NPR is part of a transition, you know. We're not simply leaving behind the needs to maintain strategic stability deterrent for ourselves and our allies, but we're in some ways expanding -- and I guess I should speak carefully here -- we're not expanding the role of nuclear weapons, but we are expanding the things that nuclear weapons need to be mindful of as we shape our policy. And we have now pivoted to that new area of nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism.

But at the same time the NPR is not the only vehicle by which we're trying to demonstrate and to get a sense of urgency from other countries. And in that respect I think not only is the response to the Nuclear Posture Review telling, but I think the Nuclear Security Summit is really a clear sign of how that has begun to create some additional momentum.

Imagine what the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit would have been had we taken a much different direction than in the Nuclear Posture Review. Because of what we were doing for our own security and for its own content, we were able to create a dynamic where you could have multiple countries from different perspectives, nonnuclear weapon states, nuclear

weapon states, countries with nuclear materials, countries without nuclear materials, countries in the nonaligned movement, countries in different alliances all sign onto this global regime.

"Regime" is a strong word, but this global approach to ensuring that nuclear materials are secured, eliminated wherever possible, and that weapons-usable materials are reduced in their usage. And that's something that I think would have been very difficult to achieve if we had not been demonstrating in multiple ways, including the way we manage our nuclear arsenal, that our top priority is nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism. Had we signaled that somehow we were expanding the role of nuclear weapons or had we decided to pursue new nuclear weapons, I think it would have greatly complicated our effort to achieve positive results from the Security Summit. And again, just an example of what we're trying to achieve and, I think, why we see these different pieces fitting together.

MR. PIFER: Now let me open up the floor to questions. Again, please keep questions short and have a question mark at the end, and identifying yourself before posing it.

MR. YOUNG: Stephen Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Thanks, Jon, as always. I hope to ask you what I hope is a hard question, following on from what Steve just said that the primary focus of U.S. nuclear policy is now terrorism (inaudible), and coupling that with the fact that in that context you don't need 1,500 warheads to do that job, one would think, and the fact the Bush administration was very clear that the U.S. no longer sets Russia as a reason why we have our arsenal and made major cuts in the arsenal -- obviously, was what Russia did in terms of their NPR -- and this NPR doesn't do that or your NPR doesn't do that and actually says our forces are still sized because of Russia, in my view that's a backward step. Why that backward step? Why are we saying that in this new context?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: The language that Steve's referring to in the NPR is -- and I'll forget the precise words -- but that largely our arsenal is sized, in large part, in response to the size of Russia's arsenal. And I think that's just a recognition that in looking at strategic stability and our desire to ensure that neither country, should circumstances change, could view a situation where they were either vulnerable or where they might be able to see an advantage that there is some benefit to rough parity.

I won't speak to the Bush Administration's approach other than saying for us we want to go to lower numbers; we think that one way to do that is to engage with Russia both in implementing the New START Treaty should the Senate give its advice and consent, and to moving on to further and deeper reductions. And we think that there is a considerable room to run in going to lower numbers, assuming that we're able to bring other countries with us.

And I think that gets to my point that it should not be a shock to anybody here that the United States is not going to eliminate all of its nuclear weapons unilaterally. That has never been what the President has talked about. It is the desire to lead an international effort to create the conditions where we can adopt a sole purpose strategy for our nuclear weapons and to eventually lead the world in eliminating all nuclear weapons. But we can do our part, we can lead it, as the President said, but we need other countries to play their part as well.

As so our relationship with Russia and as we go down our relationship with other countries that have nuclear weapons have to be a part of that calculation.

MR. PIFER: Okay, back there?

MS. KELLERMAN: Thanks. Michelle Kellerman with National Public Radio. I had a couple of questions about Iran, one just broadly. Why do you think sanctions will make a difference? There have already been three rounds.

And, second of all, what's the status of the Teheran research reactor deal Ahmadinejad made clear this week that the ball's back in your court?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Again, no surprise to anybody here. Our strategy has never been just to achieve sanctions. Our strategy is to make clear both through diplomatic engagement, if possible, but, if necessary through the application of sanctions, that Iran has an opportunity to return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its obligations, and to engage with the broader national community.

And, unfortunately, Iran has chosen to ignore our diplomatic approaches and to fail to respond to them in a constructive way. And we believe that now that we have to pivot, unfortunately, to engage in an approach that uses sanctions to convince Iran that there's a penalty to pay for actions and to encourage them to actually return to the negotiating table in a serious way.

So will it make all the difference in the world? I don't think we have the answer to that. We know that we have tried diplomacy. That has not been successful yet to date. We are now pursuing the sanctions approach. We believe that that will have an impact; it's already having an impact inside Iran, and we want to change the calculus of the Iranian leadership and bring them back to the table, and we think that right now sanctions is the right way to motivate them.

In terms of the Teheran research reactor, Iran claims that they have accepted the terms of the deal, but they have not. In Geneva last year, or earlier this year they said that they would accept the terms which would require them to ship out their stocks of LEU and then at a point later, probably a year after that material was fabricated into fuel plates, to receive fuel in return.

The President was very clear that the value of that agreement was as a confidence-building measure, that if Iran was prepared to give up its stocks of LEU and buy time to build confidence if their intentions were peaceful. What they are talking about now is a straight swap which we believe -- and it's not a question of our belief, it's clear -- would not remove that material for any length of time and therefore it doesn't build the confidence that Iran needs to build and, therefore, is not an acceptable counterproposal. That was the basis of our deal; that was the one that the countries we've been working with signed onto and, despite the statement of the Iranian president, it is up to Iran to accept the terms that they accepted previously and that they've now rejected.

MS. GUNTER: Linda Gunter with the NGO, Beyond Nuclear. I'm one of the people who don't know what the outcome that you mentioned in the beginning stood for, maybe the only person, because I'm a little bit on the outside of the arms control environment, and for that reason maybe can hold onto a little bit more idealism as well.

But there seems to be an inherent contradiction which I wanted to ask you about in the way this discussion is framed in terms of the language that's used. On the one hand, there's a discussion about needing nuclear weapons, the need for nuclear weapons, how many do we need? And that word "need" comes up quite a lot.

And then on the other hand, there's the talk about how we achieve a world free from nuclear weapons which seems to contradict the idea that anybody at all needs nuclear weapons.

And the second part of the discussion that seems to be so intellectually confusing or contradictory is this idea of deterrence. But, on the one hand, we say, well, we have to have nuclear weapons as a deterrent since this is what's worked before, and, on the other hand, we need to get rid of them. And it seems from a common sense point of view patently obvious that if no one had nuclear weapons, then we'd be a lot safer than using them as a so-called deterrent, which, you know, I happen to think is a myth to stop other people from using a weapon which essentially is only useful if you never use it, which sort of raises a question about whether it even qualifies as a weapon at all.

So I'm just curious to know, you know, how you accommodate these two contradictory clashing philosophies.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I miss Dupont Circle. You actually get to think about these broad issues, and this is why I valued my time in think tanks, and I hope one day to return to think tanks.

I mean, I understand the point you're trying to make, and, unfortunately, whether you realize it or not, by being here you're now part of the nuclear geek crowd, so, you know, welcome. And I'm sure there's a Brooking paper in MDFR that we can dust off and hand over.

I think the key missing piece in your question is time. We are transitioning from a world where there is a consensus -- maybe not a consensus, but a broad majority -- of thinkers, politicians, elected officials in the United States who were convinced that we needed nuclear weapons to defend ourselves and defends our allies. And our allies felt that we needed to have nuclear weapons to defend ourselves against what was seen as the Soviet intent, and stated intent, to dominate the world. That was the nature of the Cold War balance.

We are still moving away from that, and I think Rose's point that we need a term other than the "post-Cold War world," but we are still living with a Cold War overhang, and we are working day by day to try and get rid of that hangover, that shadow. And that's part of what you've seen over the past several weeks and months. When we talk about no longer needing to threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries allied with nuclear weapon states, that the big -- one of the big changes in the Nuclear Posture Review, that our new statement is that we will not use nuclear

weapons against nonnuclear weapon states in compliance with their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

It's clearing out that old and we think no longer relevant approach to deterrence which said you needed to have nuclear weapons to deter all these conventional attacks and other types of threats that we faced. We're working assiduously to narrow the range of issue where we feel we do need nuclear weapons in order to make sure that we and our allies are protected when we want to keep making progress in that area.

The Vice President, in a speech at the National Defense University in February, said that we are going to increasingly shift -- and the QDR also makes this point -- increasingly shift the burden of deterrence away from nuclear weapons and to other capabilities, not just military, but including military means -- missile defense, advanced conventional capabilities, because we want to move away from a world where nuclear weapons are seen as being needed.

So I don't view it as a contradiction. I view it as a transition, and one where we're in a difficult period and where we are going to have debates over what is the appropriate number, what is the appropriate role of one where we feel we've moved out in a new direction and one that we feel has at least the potential to go somewhere where the United States is much safer through a world where there are no nuclear weapons.

MR. PIFER: Back in the red (inaudible).

MS. BINDI: Hi, I'm Federiga Bindi. I'm a senior nonresident fellow here at Brookings. I have three very quick questions, the first related to Iran. Don't you think that having started to talk about sanctions before the time line for the diplomatic talks expired was somehow harming the diplomatic talks?

And the second question, don't you see a contradiction between on the one side asking the Iranians to comply with the TNP while they have not formally broken yet, and on the other not doing anything in having Israel and India and Pakistan being part of the TNP. So I'm wondering whether you are working on that side.

And the last question, if I understood well your comments before, you're already assuming that the revision conference will somehow fail. Is that correct?

Thanks.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Let me take them in reverse order. No, I don't think that the NPT Review Conference is going to fail. The point I was trying to make is that, having been in Washington now for -- four review conferences? -- four, that every five years there are stories that are written, and they judge success or failure by whether there is a consensus final document. And that is, I think, a poor measure of success given where we are today.

What we want and what we expect is that the vast majority of countries will talk about the need to restore the regime and the vitality and the relevancy of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regime. And if we, as we've already begun to see, hear that chorus, then we think the treaty will be successful, particularly if that leads to action down the road and steps that we will take on a broad range of issues, whether it be on promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, whether it is on encouraging and promoting broader steps toward disarmament, and, yes, on reinforcing the need for countries to comply with their obligations.

So I don't think it's going to be a failure. What I was saying is that we will judge it by a different yardstick. That may or may not be successful, and, obviously, the people that only tune in every five years it will be like, okay, did you get a document? No. Okay, gee, then what was it for? But we think it's more complicated than that.

In terms of, you know, whether we can ask Iran to comply with the treaty despite the fact that there are countries that are not in the treaty, I think that they're completely unrelated. Iran signed the treaty voluntarily. They complied with the treaty for a long time and then they violated their safeguards obligations. They have been found in noncompliance with their safeguards obligation by the IAEA Board of Governors.

They are currently in noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions. They are not in noncompliance and they're not in violation because Israel, India and Pakistan are not members of the NPT; they are in noncompliance because they were hiding significant elements of their nuclear program that had to be declared in under inspection to the National Atomic Energy Agency and because they have not answered questions that the Agency has posed to them for several years.

Do we think that the NPT should be universally applied? Yes. The P5 statement released today talks about wanting to achieve universalization of the NPT. We are interested, as the President has said, in building the peace and security of the world without any nuclear weapons, not just for countries that are NPT nuclear weapon states, but for all countries. So I don't think there's a contradiction there at all; I think that the two are completely separate.

I think to the extent that Iran wants to point at countries that are not in the treaty, that are not judged by the same yardstick, I think it's another sign that they are trying to deflect attention from their own noncompliance.

As Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, the onus is on Iran. It's not on the United States. It's not on countries that are not members of the NPT. It's Iran who has taken these actions and needs to take other actions to come in compliance.

In terms of the timeline and whether or not talking about sanctions somehow poisoned the diplomatic process, I think if you believe as I do that the President and our government was sincere, as we have been from the beginning, about wanting a negotiated solution with Iran, then you can't really believe that somehow a discussion of whether sanctions will be appropriate or beginning to engage in discussions with allies about what those sanctions might look like if needed to poison the process.

I mean, you have to judge and look at the two countries and their behavior, and you have to make up your own mind about whether you think the United States and President have been sincere in our efforts to negotiate a solution to Iran's activities. I know that we have been, and I think that's been clear for all to see, and I think you can judge Iran's behavior for itself.

MR. WEITZ: Thank you. Richard Weitz, Hudson Institute. A question about the administration's policies towards China. I notice in the NPR there was some discussion about delegations treated dialogue and stability talks and so on. In terms of the formal arms reduction process, when you're thinking about what might follow the New START Treaty, if it is ratified by the Senate, are you thinking about how you might engage China either formally, although we know their position, as you have to get down to their levels before they would consider that, or some other unilateral arrangements.

And then, secondly, with respect to the Korea situation, it seems to be has not got as much attention at the conference, at least in terms of what's being covered in the media, as the situation in Iran. I wasn't sure if the administration has given any, or advised any of its thinking on that, perhaps go for a comprehensive approach as this is the sub-Korean government's thinking, or some other new approach. And somewhat related, I'd be interested in how you're thinking about that.

Thank you.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Thank you. On China, we haven't given a lot of thought to how we take what we have been doing for many, many years, first with the Soviet Union and with Russia, and broadened that out.

The President talked about in Prague wanting to broaden out the arms reduction process, but -- you know, I can't believe I'm saying this in front of Strobe and others in this room who, you know, literally wrote the books on this -- you know, arms control is not just about reducing a missile, blowing up a silo, cutting up a bomber. It's about transparency and predictability and accountability.

And before we can get to a situation where we can engage with China in any kind of formalized arms reduction process we need to engage with them in a dialogue on what they view their nuclear weapons as for, how many they intend to have, how they want to deploy them, how they control them.

We have great, because of the arms reduction process, great visibility and great understanding about how Russia views these issues and, as a result, we can engage in a reduction process knowing that there's predictability. We don't have that with China, and that's something that we will continue to engage with them on. We have proposed and pursued military to military talks for some time. We have proposed and engaged in track 2 discussions, track 1-1/2 discussions, track 1 discussions, but we have not yet been successful, and that's part of a process we intend to continue.

In terms of Korea and whether we need a new approach or whether, you know, it's gotten the attention and needs to at the NPT, you know, indirectly there's obviously going to be discussion of North Korea at the NPT Review Conference, particularly as it deals with withdrawal and

whether or not countries can violate the terms of the treaty and somehow be absolved of their violations by withdrawing from the treaty. We don't think countries should be able to abuse their withdrawal positions.

But we don't think we needed approach. We have an approach that we know can work, and we're not going to engage in a process where North Korea can find some other way out of that box. North Korea has one path before it. This is what the members of the six-party talks, minus North Korea, have agreed to.

If they come back to the six-party talks, we engage in the full range of discussions that North Korea has themselves said that they want to engage in, but that path has to lead through denuclearization. And we have seen time and time again, and having working in North Korea on the agreed framework, during a very cold winter, you know, we've been -- we've seen this movie before. And any time we try to reshape the playing field, North Korea takes advantage of that, resells us the same horse, and we simply are not going to play that game.

MR. PIFER: In the front?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I think we're going to get to the CTBT questions now.

MR. PIFER: Do you think so?

MR. KIMBALL: It's not about that.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Oh, okay.

MR. KIMBALL: Daryl Kimball with the Arms Control Association. Thanks for being here, Jon.

As we know, success on ending reducing the nuclear threat doesn't just depend on U.S. leadership, it depends on others. And one of the ways in which that will likely play out, as you know, is at the review conference whether the states can make progress on one of the key issues that led to the extension of the treaty in '94, the Middle East resolution, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Now that it appears are though they've reached an agreement on having three subsidiary bodies to discuss these issues, it looks as though there will be discussions in this regard.

Based on my readings, my soundings, it looks as though the U.S. approach in this

and the P5 approach combined with Egypt's approach, which is now chairing the NAM, a group could lead to some practical -- agreement on some practical steps forward.

Could you just explain -- because I've run into a lot of misinterpretation about this issue and the U.S. position -- what the U.S. view is on this subject and why -- why you think this is important for the NPT as a whole?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I will be careful because I am not -- of course, I'm not the point on many of these issues, but I'm definitely not the point on the negotiations up in New York, and you know these people as well as I do, Daryl.

You know, just let me state a couple of basic things which is, one, the United States stands by our past statements at NPT Review Conference, and we stand by the resolution from 1995 that we, as the other parties in the region, support a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. But we also recognize that that cannot take place, cannot be fully implemented out of a context with what is happening in the region. And that's something that has to be considered as we engage in this process of determining how to make progress towards that goal while at the same time not letting it be a hindrance to ensuring that the treat remains viable and can be reinvigorated.

And so we are engaging, as a number of other countries are, in discussions on how to pursue the implementation of the weapons-free zone in the region. Just as we have announced our support for other nuclear weapon-free zones, we continue to support the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. But it's really beyond my capability to sort of give you a sense of exactly where we're going to end up.

I think in a broad context our point is very simple. There are going to be a number of specific issues that are on countries' minds whether it be Egypt, or Indonesia, or South Africa, or Russia, or whomever. They're important issues, but they have to be subsumed under the broader goal that we believe most if not all countries share, and that is that the NPT be reaffirmed, that the norm of nonproliferation be reinforced, and that the ability to detect and respond to violations of the regime be pursued.

And so we're prepared to work with all of our partners on these other issues, important as they are, as long as we keep in mind that larger goal within the treaty.

That's sort of a non-answer, and I apologize for that. It's just not something that I have, you know, full authority on.

MR. PIFER: I don't even need the mic. Is CTBT a question mark?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Yes. Exclamation point. Next question.

So, as Strobe was kind enough to note, I wear two hats, and my one hat for the National Security Council is working on the CTBT. That's my full NSC responsibility. We're fully committed to the treaty. We believe it is in the security interest of the United States, and we believe that reinforcing the norm against the testing of nuclear weapons is in the interest of all countries.

We would like to see the treaty ratified and to have it entered into force at an early date. We were extremely pleased at the statement by Indonesia and the leadership that they have shown that they will not wait on U.S. ratification before ratifying the treaty themselves, and we call on all countries to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.

We are also very mindful that, despite now 18 years of evidence that we can maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing, and 18 years of evidence that we can detect other countries' activities, particularly nuclear explosive activities, that we have to educate and work with the members of the Congress to give them that same comfort level.

In today's environment, we don't think that's going to happen tomorrow or the next day. We also know that we have the immediate priority of ratifying the New START Treaty. We hope that the process of gaining the advice and consent of START will be extremely helpful in bringing a lot of senators, many of whom have never dealt with an arms control treaty before in their times in the Senate -- remember, it's been some time -- that we will improve their comfort level with the process. And as Under Secretary Tauscher talks about, we'll rebuild the muscle memory in terms of how to go about this debate and this discussion.

We also believe that we have a very important job in doing our homework. It has been a number of years, throughout the entire Bush Administration, where we haven't looked at a lot of these technical issues: what -- how has our verification capabilities improved over the last 11 years? They have demonstrably, but we have to quantify that.

How has our ability to maintain our arsenal improved over that time period? I'm very comfortable that the secretary of energy, the head of NNSA, and the lab directors will all be extremely strong in their stockpile stewardship program and state clearly that they do not need nuclear testing to manage the risks inherent in maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

So while I'm optimistic that we will gain ratification, we don't have a time line right now because part of it is doing our homework, part of it is getting New START done, and part of it is seeing what the political dynamics of the Senate are. But we hope that once New START is completed we can move on to really engaging on this in a serious way.

MR. PIFER: Could I maybe have a quick follow-up?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: It's your house, you can do what you want.

MR. PIFER: Another set of initials, it's not quite an acronym, but it's more contemporary than MBFRs RRW. And a number of us were next door at Carnegie when then secretary of defense, now Secretary of Defense Bob Gates spoke about the CTBT, and it was in a week, I think, of the election. And you're obviously already getting a lot of questions on that issue.

Could you just give us a sense of the answers that you're providing?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I was fortunate enough to be in the room in October of 2008. For those of you that weren't there and don't have this burned into your memory, what then and current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said was that we would not be able to maintain an effective arsenal without either a new weapon or the resumption -- excuse me, without testing or nuclear modernization. He did not say we needed a new weapon to maintain an effective arsenal.

Our response to that is in the forward to the Nuclear Posture Review where Secretary Gates states very clearly that the investments we are requesting and the life extension program planned that we have laid out in the NPR to him represents as credible modernization plan that both implicitly and explicitly, we believe, answers the question of whether or not the plan we have laid forward which will not develop new nuclear weapons, which will not add military -- new military capabilities to our existing to our existing weapons, but will simply extend the lifetimes of our current arsenal, exploring on a case-by-case basis the different technical options available to us,

including reuse, refurbishment and replacement, that that represents a credible modernization plan.

And we have already shown, I think, in the testimony from State Department, Defense Department, and NNSA, and the Joint Chiefs on the Nuclear Posture Review, shown that everybody is very, very comfortable with that approach, including the laboratory directors. We have to make that case. We have to explain why we're comfortable with that, and the senators themselves have to be comfortable with that, not only for the issue of START -- because we do believe start needs to be viewed on its own merits -- but we think this is the right thing to do regardless of whether we have the CTBT or START treaty. For today, the United States needs to maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal. We believe this is the best way to do that, and we need to make sure that we are explicit in engaging with members of the Senate, and the broader Congress and the policy community, and explaining why we think we're comfortable with that and why we think that's the right way to move ahead.

MR. GIBBONS: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Wolfsthal -- Dan Gibbons, by the way -- I'm wondering about the strategic approach that the administration is crafting to move towards global zero in the long term. We know that we have a deterrent relationship vis-à-vis Russia that probably will need to be evolved in order to have significant reductions in weapons, and presumably some extension of that reduction process would be necessary to accomplish a significant, similar significant, reduction with other states.

But how many states are required to consider that a global non-deterrent environment which would be a world without war kind of thing would be the way to get there? Or is it possible that we can get there prior to the worldwide peace situation?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: As I said in my remarks, pursuit and achieving a world-free of nuclear weapons is not simply an issue for the nuclear weapon states alone. I can't list for you all of the different steps that we would have to achieve in order to pursue or get to a world without nuclear weapons because I don't think anybody claims to know exactly what that world looks like. But I can give you a couple of examples of things that we know we will need to achieve, not only will all of the countries that have nuclear weapons have to be able to give up those weapons and to feel comfortable doing so, but countries that have weapons-usable materials have to agree to either

eliminate those materials or to ensure that they are so well monitored and cannot be diverted without, if not timely immediate detection, that the other countries are comfortable that they don't need to be acquiring nuclear materials as a hedge in -- you know, we're sort of backing in a guns-of-August situation.

So, you know, the verification requirements would be extreme. The government, the United Kingdom has been engaged in an effort on that which I think is extremely useful, one that the United States supports, and I think you'll be -- in the NPR we talk about needing to invest in advanced research and develop on improving our verification capabilities. So we recognize that there is a tremendous set of hurdles that we would have to achieve. But at the same time we recognize that a world without nuclear weapons is a world that is inherently safer for the United States and for all countries.

No U.S. official has ever said, nor would I want to give you the impression, that in order to get rid of all nuclear weapons we have to change human nature and eliminate the prospect of war. We're not trying to create a -- set a goal that is so difficult to achieve that it makes the pursuit of a goal meaningless. We believe it is achievable, and we believe it is not only achievable but necessary. And it's one that we're going to continue to work on aggressively throughout this administration.

I think they were saying one more question.

MR. PIFER: Back there in the back. We have time for this question and then one more.

MR. POMPER: Hi, Jon.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Hi, Miles.

MR. POMPER: Miles Pomper from CNS. Question: The administration has taken a number of steps, as you noted, in the NPR and in other measures that respond to the nonaligned movement's criticisms about Article 6, such as the movements on negative security assurances, disclosure of the arsenal, and so on.

My question is, do you see any reciprocal measures coming from the other P5 states? I mean, how much effect -- and how much effect do you think this would have on advancing

the nonproliferation goals of the United States and the other P5 states if you don't see those kind of reciprocal measures?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I'm sort of -- it's nice to see you, Miles. I'm sort of reminded of the line in *Casablanca* where, you know, he says, "Round up the usual suspects." It's nice to see you (inaudible) here, friends who I don't get to see that often anymore.

You know, we were very clear in the NPR that we're taking these actions because they're in our security interest, and we do think that they have a positive effect on the global nonproliferation system. We're not in a position where we're going to try and dictate to other nuclear weapon states what they should do. We do believe that countries that have nuclear materials as well as nuclear weapons need to make sure that they are protected at the highest standards capable, highest standards possible. So we do think there are certain global responsibilities that countries have.

But we're not going out and telling Russia that, oh, yeah, by the way, you should do this in order to make sure the NAM is happy. Those governments speak to members of the nonaligned movement as often as we do, if not more often. And we believe it's up to them to decide what's in their own security interest.

But I think if you look at what other countries are doing, particularly other nuclear weapons states like Russia, like France, like the United Kingdom, and we hope soon like China, that there will be a positive impact on reinforcing the nonproliferation regime if all of the nuclear weapons states are taking steps to reduce the role the nuclear weapons play in their security thinking.

And so Russia, by signing the New START Treaty, they have helped add to that dynamic. The U.K. initiatives over the past several years has been an important building block in that momentum. As we've said, we think one of the outliers is China. We want to engage with them in a dialogue that we think would be extremely helpful, not only in terms of their own security, but in the broader nonproliferation regime, which China is a member of and a supporter of. But again, we're not going to tell other countries what they should do in order to reinforce a nonproliferation regime. I think they have a very clear sense of that themselves.

MR. PIFER: Okay, we have time for one last question.

MS. MACKBY: Hi, Jon, thank you for being here. It's Jenifer Mackby, CSIS.

I just wanted a follow-up question on North Korea. I was at the NPT for the last few days, and you know the secretariat has a list of states' parties, and there's an asterisk next to the North Korea thing. It has announced its withdrawal.

But is there a unified theory among the three depositaries as to its status?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: I hear your fight there. I want to talk to Joe, my, you know, my astronomy expert on, you know, unified field theories. And I think that focusing on whether North Korea is or is not currently a party to the NPT is not a particularly useful debate to engage in. The tactic used by past presidents of taking North Korea's nameplate and sort of putting it in their pocket as if they are somehow just going to take that off the table, you know. I don't know what I would do if I were ever elected to the president of the NPT Review Conference -- not likely to happen -- but, you know, I think it's much more important that we focus in on what happens the next time a country tries to withdraw.

North Korea has a particular set of challenges, ones that we're trying to address through the six-party process. The end goal that is where North Korea is a full and compliant member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But I think the debate, the legalistic debate of whether they are or are not members, whether they are able to exercise the withdrawal provisions while they're in violation of the treaty is a legalistic one. I know I'm not qualified to respond to, and one that I don't think helps in pursuing a more robust regime.

MS. MACKBY: Well, just to follow up, I'm just wondering, because it obviously has repercussions from the NPR discussion on security assurances and so forth.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: There is no question, whether you think that North Korea is or is not a member of the NPT, that they are not in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. Even if I were to take the NPT out of it, they are not in compliance with the North/South Denuclearization Agreement. They are not in compliance with other agreements they've signed, including the Six-Party Agreements, and so there's no question, we have said publicly, that North Korea would not be eligible for the negative security assurances that we have issued in the NPR.

MR. PIFER: Jon, you covered a lot of ground. Thank you very much for joining us

today. It's been a great job.

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Thank you very much. (Applause)

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

LOOKING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
Panel 2: The Challenges of Moving Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Moderator:

FIONA HILL
Senior Fellow and Director
Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):

Panelists:

RICHARD BURT
United States Chair
Global Zero

DARYL KIMBALL
Executive Director
The Arms Control Association

DEEPTI CHOUBEY
Deputy Director, Nuclear Policy Program
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

* * * * *

MS. HILL: Well, I think we'll get started on the final session of today's conference. I had also people who were rushing from the building as I came back in. He said that they wanted to stay, but, unfortunately, he'd been pulled away for other things and we're passing on apologies. So I don't think the fact that we now have slightly less people in the audience than we had earlier is reflective at all of the interest in this topic.

MR. TALBOTT: How gracious of you to say that.

MS. HILL: Well, I know it's not. Look, Strobe's still with us at the back here still, too.

This final panel for the day is going to push us even further forward than where we've been over the last two sessions. We started off with the most recent issue with START and, obviously, the focal point of the bilateral nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia. We heard from Jon Wolfsthal about the current plans for the Obama Administration. And with this panel we're going to look really far forward into the future on some of the near future issues on the bigger agenda of the nuclear weapons discussions of moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons, which, of course, has been a long-held desire of many people on different sides of the Atlantic.

Someone when I first came in was asking me if I'd ever in my youth been a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament back in the day in the U.K. I wasn't, but my aunt, who was one of those women from Greenham Common who tied us up to a fence, but I don't have much contact with her these days. She's actually the mayor of a small town, so it shows that people move on from some of their earlier activism and start to think about things much more seriously.

And we've got today a really distinguished panel to get us off into this future. We have on my left Richard Burt, who, in fact, is heading up a distinguished

commission, people thinking about getting to global zero.

And on my immediate right, Daryl Kimball, whose publication -- Daryl, you have it with you here -- was available outside for those of you who came early, and I hope many people got copies. And Daryl's work, *The Arms Control Association*, is available I think at all the websites, and other issues I'm sure many of you are familiar.

And then Deepti Choubey, who has just arrived on the train from New York, where I think you were getting your credentials for actually taking part in very important sort of meetings on this topic.

What we're going to do is ask our three panelists to give some short opening remarks, about seven to eight minutes, and then we'll leave the rest of the time for discussion with all of you. Obviously, given Richard's role on this distinguished commission, we're going to actually ask him to talk about the challenges that need to be overcome for getting to global zero, which, of course, is a proposition that's one in the future.

I will ask Daryl to talk about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a number of issues that he's been working on actively.

And we've asked Deepti to talk about proliferation, or rather our efforts to stop proliferation and the challenges thereof, and to talk to some degree about some of the major challenges to the various nonproliferation treaties, and treaty with North Korea and Iran and other issues that Deepti would like to draw our attention to.

So without any further ado, I will turn over to you and --

MR. BURT: Thank you.

MS. HILL: -- look forward to hearing what you have to say.

MR. BURT: Thank you very much. And before I sort of launch off, I just would -- and if it hasn't been done before, but I do feel the need to pay homage to my friend and former colleague in government, Max Kampelman, who has been enormously

important, I think, in stimulating this, this new wave of interest in nuclear reductions and elimination.

And Secretary Stan Rieser, it's great to see you here as well.

Our chairman began by referring in part to her -- was it your aunt --

MS. HILL: My aunt.

MR. BURT: -- who chained herself to the Greenham -- the Air Force base at Greenham Common. And you said that she was an activist, but over time became a serious thinker. Maybe I'm just the opposite. Maybe I was once a serious thinker, but now I'm an activist. But because I remember not your aunt in particular --

MS. HILL: It wasn't particular, huh?

MR. BURT: -- but I do remember the Greenham Common women, and they were a big problem in our efforts many years ago to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing 2s in Europe, a great story that was documented so well by Strobe Talbott.

But when I talk to groups like this, and I point out that I'm not your sort of typical peacenik, I was a strong defender and contributor to thinking about nuclear weapons in the 1970s when I first arrived in London at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, writing about them in competition with Strobe when I was at The New York Times, and then being part of the policy process in the 1980s and into the early 1990s.

But I think the fact that I was a great believer in the merits of deterrence theory and the contribution that nuclear weapons made to deterrence in that era underscores for me not that my view about international relations or deterrents or nuclear weapons have changed so much as the world has fundamentally changed. And I think it's really understanding how the world has changed, no must militarily, but in important other facets, I think you can begin to understand the case for global zero.

And I'm going to talk very briefly, really address three issues, before we talk

about to get to zero. I think we first have to address the key issue of is it desirable to go to zero? There will be -- there are a lot of people out there who says that it isn't. You have to, I think, address also, because it's going to be looming in the ratification debate and was brought up in the last session we had, the linkage between arms control and seeking reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons by existing states, existing nuclear powers, and the issue of proliferation.

MR. BURT: And then lastly, if it is desirable, there is such a linkage, how do we get there and what are the issues you have to address in getting there?

So, first of all, on the desirability point, I'll make the very broad argument to begin with: clearly the world has changed. We are no longer locked in an existential confrontation with a superpower rival, with open ended goals, who want to not only -- would -- not only sought to establish a position of global hegemony, but wanted to sort of basically change the way we live and the values that we live by. That world no longer exists. There is no ideological struggle with the then Soviet Union. There is not an existential threat that we face or our allies face in Europe or in Asia. And we don't worry militarily about a disarming first strike, nor a large-scale conventional attack that could potentially cause us to use nuclear weapons first.

So, my key argument here on desirability is that not only has the relevance of deterrence declined, but the relevance, to the extent we need deterrents, the relevance of nuclear weapons for deterrents has declined. And I think I can clearly demonstrate that and we -- you might want to come back to that in questions and answers, but I want to say that that overarching strategic reality is reinforced by some other changes. One is the problem of technical proliferation. The fact of the matter is -- and I was thinking about this the other day -- that we are now 70 years or so away from the development of the world's first nuclear weapons. That is as great a period as the period between the Wright Brother's first flight

and a man landing on the moon, and the proliferation, the accessibility of the know-how, of the materials, and to a lesser extent -- and to a lesser extent, the actual weapons themselves, has grown substantially.

Nuclear weapons in the 1950s, '60s and '70s were great power weapons. They were weapons that could only be produced and deployed by countries with the technological and economic wherewithal to do so and there were only a few states that were in that category. That is clearly no longer the case.

What we now have when we look at proliferation is essentially an emerging markets problem, or even a pioneer markets problem. With countries like North Korea, Pakistan and Iran are the most likely proliferators and I don't need to say very much potentially about the potential of non-state or sub state actors acquiring nuclear -- the know-how or more likely the weapons through state proliferators.

And then of course in another technological sense, we have new conventional arms technology that can undertake operations which in the past could only be reliably undertaken by nuclear weapons. But from a purely American -- selfish American perspective, we don't have the need that we had in the '50s and '60s to counterbalance our nuclear -- our conventional weakness with nuclear forces.

We now have -- we're in a position where our conventional forces are preeminent so it's hard to argue that we need to rely on the nuclear crutch in the same way we did during the Cold War with our kind of focus on the threat posed by the Red Army.

But lastly here on the issue of desirability and the question of deterrence is, I think it all stems, in terms of thinking about the desirability of Global Zero in terms of how you really perceive international relations. If you think we live in a Hobbesian world, and nearly every country is potentially a threat to every other, then deterrents and nuclear weapons may be the best approach to pursue, and there probably have been periods like

the Cold War when we faced the Soviet threat where deterrents and nuclear weapons was the most reliable and stabilizing military strategy to adopt. But I would argue we are moving into a different kind of period, particularly one where great powers, I think, have by and large given up the kind of traditional goal of global conquest. You don't have a Germany seeking *Lebensraum* in the then Soviet Union. You don't have a Japan seeking a greater Asian co-prosperity sphere. What you have instead are very dynamic economies who recognize that they're going to pursue their national interests, not through conquest and occupation, which I think in the last hundred years has been not a very successful strategy, but through investment and trade in developing growth -- internal economic growth.

So, it's not as though national interests have changed, but the tools of achieving those national interests have changed. And so Russia is relying on a strategy not of using its military force to achieve its interests. It's, as it's done just recently vis-à-vis the Ukraine, it's using its natural gas and energy capabilities and they will probably be much more successful in the process. And the Chinese, through their policy of peaceful rising in Asia, is going to be far more successful, in my view, in achieving its goals than militarily threatening Taiwan or Japan.

So, I think that if you take these issues together, I think increasingly you can make the case that nuclear weapons are not attractive means of pursuing national interests particularly by the great powers, by countries who already have those weapons. And ironically, nuclear weapons are becoming much more suitable for weak states who desire a means of deterring stronger states. I mean, one of the most -- maybe the law of unintended consequences after the Gulf War, I think it was an Indian Defense Minister who said the real lesson of the Gulf War in 1991 is if you're going to get into a fight with the United States, you better have nuclear weapons.

So, ironically, nuclear weapons in a new era are weapons of the weak, not

the strong.

Now, I want to address very quickly this linkage with nonproliferation. John Kyle was asked about the New START Treaty and he said -- and was asked, what about the new threats we face like nonproliferation or terrorism -- nuclear terrorism, and he said, well, this treaty has nothing to do with those issues. I think he is really profoundly wrong for two or three important reasons.

One, any treaty that gives us greater information and transparency about a current status of the Russian nuclear arsenal and improves the dialogue between the United States and Russia is helpful from the standpoint of proliferation simply because Russia is potentially an unconscious proliferator given its nuclear assets, stockpiles, scientists, et cetera.

Two, and I think more important here, if you see New START in isolation, then maybe it's hard to draw that connection, but if you see New START in the way that we at Global Zero do, as part of a potentially 20- to 25-year process of phased reductions that bring in new participants to get down to very low levels and then finally to zero, then New START is the critical first step in the process of zero. And if you believe that getting down to zero creates or changes the dynamic for would-be nuclear states, if you believe that measuring the pros and cons of proliferators, then they see nuclear states disarming and the political obstacles to acquiring nuclear weapons are higher, then -- there is then clearly a linkage.

And then finally I will get to the point of next steps. You can put them in two buckets, one are the near term issues and the end game issues. In terms of near term issues there are two or three. One, the very next step would be, in our view, another round of negotiations with the Russians which would be designed to go down to a level of approximately 1,000 weapons. It would include a broader category of weapons, not only the

strategic -- not only warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, but also tactical nuclear weapons as well as stored weapons. That would be a big jump. It would require vastly more verification than we currently do now, but we think it's an essential step for taking the next big step which is then to multilateralism the arms control process, in other words, bring the other nuclear weapons to the table.

I heard -- I know that the Chinese position, for example, is they will enter the negotiations when the United States and Russia get down to their levels. I think there is politically a plausibility that they would come to the table if the United States and Russia got down to 1,000 or so weapons. I think there's a kind of tradeoff here between, kind of, Russian concerns and Chinese concerns.

If the Russians believe that their further reductions will bring the Chinese to the table, I think the Russians will be more willing to enter that process and if the Chinese believe that the nuclear threat they face from Russia, particularly in terms of tactical nukes, they will be more inclined to do so. And thus in our so-called action plan, what we propose, actually, is the United States and Russia getting down to 1,000, but only implementing that if and when the other existing nuclear powers agree to cap the existing size of their arsenals. If we could achieve that then we could move to a next phase which would be a multilateral phase, which would bring in the Indians. If the Chinese are at the table then the Chinese are going to obviously want the Indians to be there and the same is true for the dynamic between India and Pakistan.

And we've laid out, and I'm not going to spend too much time with the numbers, but we think that there could be two phases of further reductions until you get to what I called earlier, the end game. The end game poses a number of really unique issues. It poses the issue, the most obvious one, of getting down to zero of the verification required for that. You would need, clearly, a system of any time, any place verification. The end

game raises issues of breakout. Needless to say any of the existing nuclear powers, even if they did eliminate their weapons to zero, would have the capacity to, in a crisis or in some form of deception, to try to reconstitute their capabilities very quickly. I might note that already there are would-be or potential nuclear powers that have had that capability for some time. Japan, for example, is probably capable of building a nuclear capability or deploying the nuclear capability in a very short period of time.

I've been told that Sweden has a similar capability. There are probably several states that have that capability but we would need to take the reconstitution issue into account. Enforcement would obviously be critical and my old boss George Schultz, who is a Global Zero supporter, has emphasized this in his presentations. We have not done a good job on enforcement. In other words, what would the signatories to a Global Zero Treaty -- and they would not simply be the nuclear powers; they would need to be a long list of potential nuclear powers -- what would they be prepared to do in the event that there was some clear evidence of cheating? Without an adequate enforcement mechanism, it would be difficult, I think, to get governments to support the goal of zero.

In conclusion, there are some difficult issues in the end game. We -- our group is now working on those issues. We think they're soluble and I think one point to make is that we're not trying to get there in two years or five years. We're talking about a process that would take 20 years or longer and thus I think the process of exchanging data, of creating greater transparency, and generating a process of compliance and exchange on these issues, I think over time would make the end game issues a lot easier than would be the case if we were trying to do this quickly and without the kind of interaction that would build up over a period of time.

So, in conclusion, I think the argument is clear, in my view at any rate, that it is a desirable objective. There is a clear linkage between the process of reducing existing

nuclear powers arsenal to raising the political costs for states to proliferate. And finally, I think it is possible through the kind of technically verifiable, politically, and politically plausible strategy that we've laid out, to get to zero.

MS. HILL: Well, thanks very much. That was a very comprehensive overview of this whole issue and I think leads very nicely where you finished into the question of whether the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, can be one of the tools in this arsenal, so to speak, of moving towards zero.

Daryl, what are your views on this?

MR. KIMBALL: Well, thank you. It won't be any surprise that Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association thinks that CTBT is important. What I want to talk about is why and why the prospects for the CTBT, I think, are still better than they ever have been since the treaty was signed.

But before I do that, I want to remind us of a couple things. We just started talking at the beginning about activists and deep thinkers and the interplay. I personally think we need all of these people to make progress and if any of you were here just a couple of weeks ago when the Nuclear Security Summit happened, there was one funny reminder of that. On many of our bus stations there were pictures of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and I got a visit from a Kazakh film crew that week asking me what my thoughts were about the role of the president in bringing an end to nuclear testing. You know, he closed down the test site formally in Kazakhstan. And I had to remind the film crew, which worked for the government, that it was the people of Kazakhstan who lived near Semipalatinsk, who came out by the tens of thousands during the Soviet days to tell the government to shut the test site down because of the terrible damage the tests were causing and that's what led the president to see the light and to understand that this was part way a ticket for him to help Kazakhstan break off from the Soviet Union.

So, it takes a confluence of historical opportunities, the right people and the right places, the people pushing their government leaders to make progress, and that's no more -- there's no other nuclear risk reduction initiative other than the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty where that is true, and this idea -- we're talking about going forward, but this is actually one of the oldest ideas on the nuclear risk reduction menu, but it still is an extremely important idea for this time.

As I think just about everybody in this room knows, the U.S. was the first country to sign the CTBT which bans all nuclear test explosions and sets up an international monitoring system to verify compliance with the treaty and to detect and deter cheating. And as President Obama said in his statement yesterday in response to Indonesia's announcement that they will ratify the CTBT, he, the President, said, "Reinforcing the norm against nuclear testing will help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and support our efforts to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." The CTBT is an essential next step on the road towards the end goal that Rick Burt was just telling us about, is necessary and achievable.

We also have to remember that with or without the CTBT the United States, it's highly unlikely, and I think that's an understatement, that the United States will ever conduct another nuclear explosive test. There's no technical or military reason to do so, nor is there the political will. At this stage, 17 years after the last U.S. nuclear test explosion, a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing would have very negative effects for our security for the nonproliferation cause and more.

At the same time, it's in our interest to prevent other countries from testing because testing would help, could help countries that already possess nuclear weapons to perfect newer and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and for those countries that could be nuclear armed countries like Iran, without nuclear test explosions, they are going to have

an extremely difficult time if they choose to do so, to develop and proof test the more advanced warheads that are needed to put on those ballistic missiles that they are building.

So, it's in our interest to do everything we can to prevent other countries from conducting nuclear test explosions to increasing the costs of violating the de facto global nuclear testing norm and of course as we see this month, the test ban treaty is essential -- U.S. ratification of the test ban treaty is an essential step towards reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It was, of course, an essential part of the bargain in 1995 to indefinitely extend the NPT. And as we see in speech after speech coming out of the review conference this week, countries continue to call for the prompt and early entry into force of the CTBT which now requires, if Indonesia follows through, just eight countries to ratify, including the United States, to achieve entry into force.

And ratification and entry into force of the treaty, as I mentioned earlier, is going to improve our already powerful capabilities to detect and deter clandestine testing.

There are those who argue that this treaty -- and they argued in 1999 -- this treaty is not verifiable. No treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but one thing that's clear is that without this treaty we are in a much worse position to detect and deter cheating. And it is going to be impossible for the United States to act on credible reports, if they occur in the future, that a country of concern is conducting a nuclear test explosion, in an effective way without all the tools of the CTBT.

So, for all these reasons and others, there's much -- there's nothing to gain and much to lose by delaying action on the CTBT.

Now, the fact that it makes sense doesn't necessarily mean that the U.S. Senate is going to provide its advice and consent. Let me talk a little bit about the political prospects for the CTBT. As I said, I think the prospects for ratification today are better than they ever have been since the treaty was open for signature in September of 1996. If a vote

were held tomorrow, our estimate is that there would be at least 60 votes for the CTBT. Sixty is not 67, but you have to recall that there has not been any serious discussion in the United States Senate since, about October 14th, the day after the last vote, on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Few senators have taken a look at this since then. This is within the reach of President Obama to secure the necessary votes. The effort by this administration that was promised in April of 2009 at the Prague speech to immediately and aggressively pursue Senate reconsideration and ratification, has not really begun.

I'm disappointed by that, many people are disappointed by that, but in many ways I think it's understandable. It has been an extremely busy year. A New START Treaty was negotiated, a New START Treaty has to be ratified, it's first in the queue in part because the START-1 Treaty expired in December of 2009. The administration has begun laying the groundwork for reconsideration by commissioning key technical studies that have to be done to make sure that the Senate is fully and well informed. There's a National Academy of Sciences study that's being done, something of an update of their 2002 report, and there's a National Intelligence estimate that is nearing completion and these will be rolled out, I think, before year's end and it will put the administration in a good position to bring the CTBT forward sometime in 2011 and after the New START Treaty is approved by the Senate.

And when it does, I think that what the Republican senators who will be needed to support this treaty will find, if they look closely, is what former Secretary of State George Schultz found. And he said last April, "Republican senators might have been right voting against the CTB some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now based upon new facts."

And I just want to kind of finish up in the next couple of minutes by pointing out one of the key sets of new facts on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that's very

important now, it will be very important during the debate on the CTB itself and that is the evidence that has built up over the last decade about the ability of the United States to maintain the stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive testing and the pursuit of new design warheads.

It is clear that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is now 15-plus years old, is capable of maintaining the arsenal in an effective, safe, and reliable fashion using non-nuclear experiments, sophisticated super computer modeling, and life extension programs that replace the non-nuclear and, if necessary, some of the nuclear components of the warheads.

The adjacent independent technical advisory group just last September looked at the life extension program, compared it to the warhead replacement option, and they found that the lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades with no anticipated loss in confidence. And these findings are reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review that the administration just put forward a few weeks ago.

And while there are going to be concerns, I think, from some protesting senators, like Jon Kyl, that the replacement option has been closed off, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the administration has made clear that while they're going to pursue refurbishment and replacement -- I'm sorry, refurbishment and reuse options for the life extension programs, if necessary, they will examine and if necessary pursue the replacement of warheads -- nuclear warhead components, if necessary.

So, all of the options are on the table, if necessary, but what is clear is that no nuclear testing is required.

And secondly, there continues to be complaints from Senator Jon Kyl once again that there is not a credible plan or a budget for nuclear weapons modernization. This 1251 plan -- Section 1251 plan that we heard about this morning is going to be delivered,

along with a START package, but I think we already know what the contents of that are going to say. Based upon the Fiscal '11 budget from the administration which increases the National Nuclear Security Administration's weapon budget by 10 percent to $7 billion and they make it clear that they will be investing at least a billion more over the next 5 years to maintain the nuclear weapons infrastructure necessary to follow through on these life extension programs.

So, there is a plan in place. There is more than enough of a budget to help the labs do what they're supposed to do to maintain the stockpile. And Robert Gates said it best in the Nuclear Posture Review and Jon Wolfsthal quoted this, he said, "This is a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support the nation's deterrent."

So, the debate about whether we need nuclear testing to maintain the arsenal really should be over. I think it is over, and if senators look at the evidence, I think they're going to come to similar conclusions and it is time now, with these resources, with this plan, for the administration and for the Senate to reconsider and ratify the CTBT.

And then just very finally, I think we have got a lot of people here in this room who have been working in the nonproliferation arms control field for a long time. I think it was mentioned this morning by Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, but Steve Ledogar, who was involved in many negotiations, passed away this past week. He was a lead negotiator on the CTBT. His testimony in 1999 was very powerful in support of the treaty and we're going to see it as our work, our job, to carry on the important legacy that he left with us with the test ban treaty.

So, thanks for the time and on to Deepti.

MS. HILL: Thanks, Daryl. And Deepti, you're going to push us out further from the domestic challenges that Daryl has looked at, to some of the external challenges to

this and to other regimes.

MS. CHOUBEY: Great. Thank you very much. I was in Geneva two weeks ago and I was asked to brief, in about 20 minutes, a group of midlevel officials from different countries on Iran and North Korea, and I thought, 20 minutes to do Iran and North Korea? That's pretty tough. I've been given eight minutes to do Iran, North Korea, and other challenges and challenges to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. So, let's see if I can accomplish that in the quick timeline and my hope is to also give a few provocations to stimulate the discussion between us afterwards.

So, the starting point for me in this idea of what are proliferation challenges and challengers to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is that there are two fundamental conditions required for getting to a world free of nuclear weapons and that is, that acknowledged NPT nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States, will not disarm until other nuclear armed states do so and until they can be assured of no further emerging nuclear weapon states. And I think Ambassador Burt has done a great job talking about that first condition about how you bring other nuclear weapon states into the mix, but the second condition for me illustrates that proliferation concerns are directly linked to prospects for disarmament. And there are two obvious challengers -- North Korea and Iran -- to the nonproliferation regime and as long as concerns about them persist, they present an obstacle, but in different ways, to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. And rather than state the obvious about how North Korea poses a challenge and how they are very few good ideas, I think, in the current moment about how to move that process forward, let me simply state that although prospects for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula seem slim now, it's likely that other external developments is what will be required for us to try to change the dynamic of negotiations. This may come in the form of what happens when Kim Jong-il really passes on and what the successor plan is and what is the role of the military

officials who seem to have been gaining more and more control over particularly the nuclear set of issues, but also their food security issues that seem to temper the actions and behavior of the North Koreans.

One of the things also, just to tie back to what Daryl said is, imagine a world where we start seeing more ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty except for North Korea. What does it mean where every state in the world signs up for this except one state that is continuing to test? Is that really the awful scenario that we think it is, that shows that the CTBT is maybe not as effective as it should be since it hasn't entered into force, or do all those other ratifications add up into a fully strengthened global norm, except for one state, and that states will actually take action in different ways or start to be a little bit more creative about what to do about North Korea?

So, in this way I'm one of these people who thinks that, yeah, when really bad things happen, sometimes opportunity comes out of that particularly for galvanizing action from other states. But I think the one thing we can probably -- you know, if I was a betting woman what I would bet on is, if we did nothing on North Korea, what we could always count on is that the North Koreans inevitably overplay their hand and when they do that, I think, there's always opportunities for either further pressure or engagement.

So, North Korea -- and then the one other actual contribution I will say North Korea has created in terms of establishing conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons is the way in which they withdraw from the NPT has left open questions about Article 10, both the process and consequences for withdrawing, although my hope is that the NPT review conference occurring right now addresses this issue. I'm not very -- I don't know that they'll actually get to any real outcomes on it but it at least underscores that it's a problem and it's one of the problems that will need to be solved if we're trying to get to a world free of nuclear weapons.

So, let's put North Korea to the side for a moment and let's talk about Iran. I think Iran in some ways is a more worrying problem to the regime as compared to North Korea because it's more integrated despite its lack of relations with the United States into the international order. North Korea has a very specific pathology of a kleptocratic state whereas the conditions surrounding Iran's presumed nuclear ambitions may be more relatable to other countries and this could be -- you could name it prestige, you could name it security, you know, what have you. And some evidence to support this is the -- what you can call the open-mindedness, at least, of particularly non-aligned movement states in the last several years as Iran has spun its narrative, that it has done nothing wrong, that efforts against it is basically an effort from Western states to unfairly oppress the Iranians and to infringe their Article 4 rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I think the cracks are starting to show in that narrative, particularly with the revelation of the second secret enrichment facility and this month's review conference will be interesting to watch to see whether states grade Iran's declarations with acceptance or criticism. The one thing that we should keep in mind, despite things you may hear in the media or from commentators, the review conference is not the place to resolve concerns about Iran's noncompliance, but it is a chance to see whether states feel the urgency to counteract the bad example that has been created by Iran and North Korea. But it also won't be the last opportunity to do so. I would hope that we could get a progressive, substantive, meaningful, final declaration. I think it's unlikely, particularly with the opening salvo that President Ahmadinejad presented on Monday at the review conference.

You know, I don't think their presence there is meant to be a constructive one. I think they're setting themselves up to obstruct any kind of meaningful outcome, but what we've also been trying to do, many of us, is think about what are alternatives to success at the review conference. And when the review conference ends, there will still be

opportunities to try to shore up the regime particularly in the areas where we need it to be strengthened if we ever want to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

And I'm sure that none of us actually want to see Iran further develop or declare a nuclear weapons capability but we should consider what would happen to the regime if they did. After Ahmadinejad's most recent protestations to the world about Iran's program and his, what I think was a rather transparent and desperate ploy, and other recent acts of nuclear theater, such as the conference that they held in Tehran, you know, imagine six months, a few years from now, what have you, that the Iranians declare capability? Would that development finally galvanize states to take action? Would they realize that the past decade has not been about abstract and ideological and polarizing debates between the west and the developing world, but instead about real threats from within? Would there be a willingness to further innovate the regime to keep peace with an increasingly complex security environment and advancements in technology?

If so, we might actually then see the actions needed to bolster verification or compliance in particularly enforcement measures. And without faith in the regime's ability to detect cheating when it occurs, or to deter it with sufficient threat of punishment, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will remain elusive.

So, when the discussion focuses, I think, on these necessary elements of verification and enforcement, it becomes clear to see how disarmament is a joint responsibility amongst nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. It's not just a pitched battle between some members of the UN Security Council and some identified proliferators.

For instance, the IAEA has unequivocally stated that they need comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol to be in place for the watchdog to be able to detect the diverging of materials for weapons purposes, and there

have been several calls for universalizing the additional protocol, but as a first step I think more should be done to ensure that non-nuclear weapons states with active nuclear energy programs, such as Brazil and Argentina, actually adopt the additional protocol. Unfortunately when you bring it up, particularly with the Brazilians, we're kind of in this old conversation about who goes first on disarmament and nonproliferation. The Brazilians say you nuclear weapons states haven't done enough. Why should we take on additional obligations? We have these other ways of assuring that we're not going to develop nuclear weapons. I think that's a really limited view about what the value of the additional protocol is. I actually think the additional protocol isn't necessarily about nonproliferation. I think it's a necessary condition for facilitating disarmament because, again, it's a way of verifying whether there's any cheating taking place.

But I also think that Brazilians should look down the road a little bit in terms of their own neighborhood. There are -- have been recently increasing concerns about what Venezuela might be thinking beyond just exporting whatever uranium they may or may not have to Iran, you know, are they thinking about a nuclear weapons program? Wouldn't you want to set the condition that if you have an active nuclear energy program you also have the additional protocol so you would know that your neighbors are not cheating?

So, I think there needs to be a bit of reframing about how the additional protocol relates to disarmament measures and that it's not one or the other, but certain measures can actually serve both goals.

And I think another opportunity for non-nuclear weapons states to allay proliferation concerns and facilitate disarmament activities is for them to address the proposition that was articulated in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review, that without the United States' extended nuclear deterrence commitments to specific allies, that those allies would develop nuclear weapons on their own. This is a very worrying proposition for me

and it should be for anybody who eventually wants to get to a world free of nuclear weapons, and it's worrying because I think it's both misplaced and it's too facile.

In the case of NATO allies, I think current debates particularly around whether to remove tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, they actually are a proxy, I think, for newer NATO states who are concerned that the Article 5 commitment within NATO doesn't apply to them and particularly if they're in trouble. So, if they're in trouble they don't think the rest of the alliance is going to come to their aid and for me this begs the question of, well, what exactly are the threats facing these states and are obsolete nuclear weapons with no military utility the best way to address them.

And perhaps it's because I'm a woman, but I'd really prefer we actually have an open conversation with our allies, find out what it is that's bothering them, and see whether we have alternative and more effective ways of actually addressing it. And if those real security threats are from regime destabilizing cyber attacks or migration issues or things of that like, then I think it behooves us to have that more rigorous and honest dialogue with our allies and see how we can actually help them with the problems they face.

But for our Asian allies, like Japan and South Korea, it's a little bit of a different picture because part of their threat perception is a nuclear North Korea that is, you know, acts in variable ways and oftentimes belligerently. And I think that extending nuclear deterrents commitments, particularly for this moment and as we don't make progress on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, it probably does make more sense, but I think we need to challenge ourselves on this proposition of, well, what happens in the future? If we can find a way to roll back the North Korean program or to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, how do we further test this idea that Japan and South Korea still need a nuclear deterrence commitment from us in order for them to feel safe? Are there other ways that we can assure them that we are committed to deterring the perceptions of, you know, anything

that they feel threatened by?

But my other issue here, and Japan, I think, is a good example of why this argument made by the NPR is a little too facile is I think it's actually unfair to the Japanese people and the government to say that if we did not provide an extended nuclear deterrents commitment, that they would somehow sprint towards creating a nuclear weapons capability, you know. And this has been said many times before, but as the only country that has actually experienced a nuclear weapons attack, I think there is very deeply engrained values in their society. It's in their laws, it's in a lot of the efforts that they do internationally across different agencies, that they're not going to develop nuclear weapons. So, I think we just should be a little bit more sophisticated in some of our argumentation about that and I think it will have major policy implications.

So if our allies in conjunction with us cannot find a way to eliminate the threats or address them through non-nuclear means and instead give further credence to the concept of extending nuclear deterrents as a nonproliferation strategy, this would be an instance where nonproliferation is actually the obstacle to disarmament. To me this seems a little perverse, but I feel like that's what's happening with the Nuclear Posture Review.

And the last thing I'll simply say, because it probably needs to be said, is in the effort to create a world free of nuclear weapons, it's not just about the relations and threats among states. As we know from the Nuclear Security Summit that recently occurred, we also have to think about the threat from non-state actors and the threat from fissile materials and the weapons themselves. I think some important progress was made at the Nuclear Security Summit. I think there was what has been lacking in the past few years is a common understanding of what the threat is. I think until this happened, you know, there was a lot of developing countries that were resistant to taking certain states because their assessment was that if a nuclear bomb is going to go off, it's going to go off in Washington

or London. It's not going to go off in Kigali, so why should they care?

And I think one thing that has really -- you know, one thing the President has achieved is trying to get people on the same page that there are different aspects to how non-state actors would try to get to fissile material and use it. And that actually impacts a lot of these states, and if they want to forestall the consequences of being affiliated with any of those steps, it's worth them getting involved.

I think locking down materials, securing arsenals, stopping the further production of weapons and the materials needed for them, those are all key steps and if particularly in stopping the production of fissile material, perhaps we can start reframing the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as actually an antiterrorism measure and maybe we would see the Indians and other states get on board with serious negotiations.

So, this is my, you know, very quick attempt at giving a picture of some of the obstacles and there -- I think they're challenging, but I think it's the broader picture of what's really needed for us to get to a world free of nuclear weapons.

MS. HILL: Thanks very much, Deepti. I think some of the issues that you raised here, there are some questions that Richard Burt began with. You said in many respects the deterrence picture has changed very much because nuclear weapons are now looking like the last resort of weak states, which the North Korea picture firmly seems to fit into. But from listening to Deepti, the Iran issue is a little bit more complex than that. And some of the issues that you mentioned about NATO allies or other allies looking, in fact, at the potential or at least the debate going on in some of these countries about should they acquire nuclear weapons, most certainly relate to different perceptions of threat, but it's not necessarily related to state's perceptions of weakness. In the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe discussion, for example, there's been speculation about whether Turkey or other similar states might consider a nuclear weapon program. But Turkish (inaudible) debates

about this, which of course have been, you know, somewhat general, so certainly aren't proceeding from a perception of Turkish weakness. It's more the sense that Turkey is a regional power. A certain prestige element is going to come into that discussion, which is certainly one of the cases in Iran.

And on the other hand, in terms of disarmament and countries that are actually discussing getting rid of a nuclear arsenal, which aren't really all that many, we already have the example that Daryl brought up about Kazakhstan, which happened at a certain set of very important circumstances, the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as you said, there was a great ground swelling against actually the effects of the Soviet nuclear weapons program on Kazakhstan itself which felt more of a victim, perhaps, of the program rather than one of the inheritors of it. But of course, Ukraine, which our colleague Steve Pifer and many others here worked on very closely with in terms of its disarmament, had a very complex set of things to think about, was more of a partner, perhaps, in the development of the nuclear program with Russia within the Soviet context.

But the other instance of a discussion that may of course be affected by what happens tomorrow and the general actions is the UK. While a lot of the discussion about getting rid of the nuclear weapons has been actually from the perspective of, we can't really afford them anymore, and do we really need them in the European context which is not necessarily perhaps a great symbol for others who are thinking about the nuclear weapons if Britain gets rid of them because they just simply can't afford to maintain the arsenal. It doesn't necessarily, perhaps from one perspective, get us further forward because it's maybe not giving up the nuclear weapons with the rationale they may couch it like this, if they do, and that's not kind of clear that if there's a change in government that we'll have the same kind of debate.

But that raises a lot of the questions here about the calculations that go into

this on the part of other states and I just wondered if I could encourage the three of you to push that out a little and then turn over to our colleagues in the audience for further comments and questions for the next half-hour.

MR. BURT: I'm happy to make just a couple of brief remarks. First of all, you know, I think that -- this isn't original, I think it's been said many times -- but there are really two different rationales, I think, that lead countries to think seriously about acquiring nuclear weapons. One is a pure security rationale, which is a function of weakness or perceived weakness. And looking at recent proliferators and would-be proliferators, I think the countries that fit into that pocket are North Korea and Pakistan, for example. And then there is the kind of status rationale, announcing to the world that you have arrived, that you can master this technology, you're now a more important country. It often resonates with public opinion. And there's a mix, of course. I mean, in Pakistan there was a security concern, but also there was great dancing in the streets when the Pakistanis announced they had a nuclear weapon.

How you address those situations, I think, are sometimes different. I mean, in terms of the issue of status, I mean, what I was suggesting before is that when a country, I think, makes the decision or is in the process of making the decision, they have to weigh the pros and cons. And I would argue that largely, in recent years, if there is a security concern as well as a status benefit, the argument for pros has probably been stronger than the con because there really isn't a political -- much of a political cost or as big a political cost as there should be.

And that's the reason I was suggesting that a dedicated effort by existing nuclear powers to engage in a process of reductions, that were perceived as meeting their Article 6, as part of the process of moving to meet their Article 6 requirements, but more importantly kind of politically arguing that these weapons are no longer kind of acceptable

instruments of political power. I think you can change that calculation.

You're not going to completely -- there's no silver bullet here. You're not going to do this very quickly and it's not going to happen like a light switch. But if Iran, for example, believed that some of the arguments it was making about the built-in hypocrisy of the NPT were being chipped away by an effort to -- of the existing states to reduce, a serious effort, if the rational both for the Iranian public and for the international community became weaker, and nuclear weapons, over time, were seen as, again, being outside a kind of acceptable norm, then I think the arguments, the cons in that decision, begin to outweigh the pros. And I think that's what we want to do is change the dynamics here.

And I for one, for instance, in the case of India think that the Indians -- and I've spoken to many Indians over the last 18 months about this issue, including people who were not any great supporters of the Indian bomb, but helped actually build it and deploy it, who regret that decision, and they will publicly say that in the Indian debate, and there is a big constituency for Global Zero in India now because they recognize that it led -- it gave Pakistan the pretext to go nuclear. It canceled out their conventional preeminence, if you will, and so I think they're revisiting that decision.

And one last point on Iran. It's because I think you can change the dynamics of these decisions governments can make, if I were an Israeli, if I were Benjamin Netanyahu, I would adopt a nuclear free zone proposal, and I would say that with the necessary verification, including the additional protocol, that Israel was prepared to enter into a nuclear free zone without a political settlement with the Palestinians.

I would -- and I would base that on the argumentation that there was an argument for Israeli nuclear weapons earlier on when Israel was outgunned by conventional armies from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, but that isn't the strategic map of the Middle East any longer. The Israelis are clearly conventionally superior to any sort of Arab threat, and more

importantly, think about it both tactically and strategically, what does it do to the Iranians? It puts -- tactically it puts Ahmadinejad on the back foot. I mean, he loses his most important talking point about Israeli nuclear deterrent.

But strategically, again going back to my cost and benefit argument, it makes it, I think, politically that much harder for the Iranians to make the case for going nuclear when it can be pointed out that if they were to go along with an Israeli nuclear free zone proposal, that there was a pathway to eliminating the Israeli arsenal.

MS. HILL: Daryl?

MR. KIMBALL: Well, a couple quick points. We have a very patient audience, I think they may be losing their patience. I think this discussion, I think it brings home a very simple point which we may be missing for all of the different issues that we're raising and angles on it which is that, I mean, as you said at the beginning, Rick, the situation has changed since the beginning of the nuclear age. Nuclear weapons today in the 21st century are a greater liability than an asset, period. I mean, what are the threats facing all of these countries? It's not a massive attack by another country.

There are only a few countries that are tempted to pursue nuclear weapons -- North Korea, Iran -- but for these other countries that we're talking about, Turkey, they're part of NATO. I think it is a gross exaggeration for people to suggest that Turkey might pursue nuclear weapons even if their neighbors do, or if 300 -- I'm sorry, 200 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are removed from Europe. I think we have to be realistic about this and it's all based upon the simple fact that you draw out of this cost/benefit analysis which is that nuclear weapons today are a greater liability than asset.

And one of the reasons why this cost/benefit analysis looks this way today versus five years ago, ten years ago, is because of what Barack Obama has been saying, what some other world leaders have been saying, what Global Zero has been doing and

saying, and we see this in the Nuclear Posture Review. While the Nuclear Posture Review says that the United States reserves to use nuclear weapons for certain non-nuclear threats, it says clearly that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter other -- the use of nuclear weapons by others and there's only a narrow set of circumstances that require the United States to consider or to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons.

So, I mean, we have to recognize that there is an enormous shift that has occurred over the last 20 years and for many of the discussions inside the beltway here, in the think tanks, this shift is sometimes imperceptible because we keep talking about all of the hurtles on the road to disarmament and to a nuclear weapons free world. Yes, there are hurtles, but I think this is the fundamental shift that we're seeing that opens up these possibilities in ways that only somebody like Ronald Reagan could imagine in 1986.

MS. HILL: Deepti, any thoughts?

MS. CHOUBEY: Well, as somebody whose patience has been recently tested by the UN bureaucracy, I will save my time for the floor and let's go to a question.

MR. BURT: She was in line for almost four hours --

MS. CHOUBEY: Five and a half hours to move 200 feet, so.

MS. HILL: Did you actually get your credentials?

MS. CHOUBEY: I did.

MS. HILL: Oh, good. Okay. Well, at least there was success at the end of the long tunnel.

So, please if people could identify themselves, I'll just take a couple of questions and then --

MR. THIELMANN: Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association. I have a question for Deepti about one aspect of the new NPR report and its affect on the NPT Rev Con, especially about Iran.

We're obviously engaged in a battle of narratives at the NPT Rev Con. The negative security assurances aspects of the NPR seem to me to allow Iran to strengthen its narrative by saying that the U.S. is maintaining -- it's keeping its military option on the table, that is it's continuing to threaten us militarily, and by not extending negative security assurances to us, the United States has not complied with the NPT. It is threatening nuclear attack against us even in the event of a conventional scenario.

And, so, I guess my question is, is the U.S. being successful in what its intent obviously was, to strengthen the NPT and to strengthen compliance with the NPT with regard to its impact on this narrative?

MS. CHOUBEY: Great. I have exactly the same concern you had when I read the NPR and saw that. I mean, we've basically given the Iranians another talking point and probably one of the most compelling ones, which is we are being -- in that document the Iranians could say, we are being threatened with nuclear attack by a nuclear weapons state. And I think that's what probably emboldened Ahmadinejad to kind of make the speech that he gave on Monday and to try to, you know, change the narrative on that, you know.

And when I think about, well, how does that come about? And I think this is the problem of domestic politics on issues like Iran getting wrapped into the process of the Nuclear Posture Review.

One of the constituencies that the writers of the NPR had in mind was Congress. And I think we've all seen the many, I think, wrong-footed attempts by Congress to try to deal with Iran. And I don't think that this is the appropriate place for them, but there's been that sensitivity in the development of our Nuclear Posture Review policy and I feel like that negative security assurance language was a nod to those congressional interests. You know, how do we show that we're being really tough on Iran. And it was kind of this, in my mind, somewhat simplistic and overly stated idea that, well, look, we're still

reserving the right to nuke these guys.

Again, give me the scenario where we would actually use nuclear weapons to deal with what the problem is there. I think the last war with Iraq shows us the use of force doesn't work in dealing with proliferation. I'm wondering when we're going to learn that lesson.

So that's one part about how I diagnosed where that language came from and it just shows the messiness of when domestic politics gets involved in the formulation of these kinds of policies. In terms of how it'll play out at the review conference, I've been told from people who are on the floor that after the Ahmadinejad -- you may have seen this, and actually The Washington Post didn't fully report this, but they've reported part of it -- Ahmadinejad got up to give his speech, France was intent on staging a walkout. So France walks out. That forces the United States to walk out. And although they partially walked out because a lot of the delegation members were sitting in their reserved -- in seats in the back. This starts a chain reaction where other states are looking around with other people they're affiliated with, with confusion, and saying, well, I guess we need to walk out too. There are some states where I think like Austria looks at Germany and is, like, what's going on? And some folks are, like, did we miss something? I guess we better walk out.

And one of the problems with this is that the United Nations should be the one place where we can all just sit and listen. And you can open up your newspaper. You can laugh at ridiculous lines. I think there were other ways of trying to address what Ahmadinejad was doing with, again, what I think is an extremely transparent and desperate ploy, than having done this whole walkout. It just fed into that narrative about confrontation between Iran and Clinton. I'm like what kind of confrontation is it when one person speaks in the morning and six hours later somebody else speaks. You know. And, you know, and they're totally different speeches.

So I think what's going to happen on negative security assurances, we'll see some of that debate come out in the subsidiary bodies' meetings. They actually just agreed today to the procedures for that. We'll see some of that come out. I'm sure -- again, I don't believe there was anything we could have done that would have gotten the Iranians to be constructive, particularly since September, when I think they have felt pressure on them. I just don't think there was anything that we could have done to get them to kind of at least lay low and play nice. So I think they've decided on another track. And in some cases what does it matter then what the NPR said? They're going to still do what they're going to do.

MS. HILL: Thanks, Deepti. Let's take another couple of questions right from here, Sir, and then this side of the aisle.

MR. CHATTERDOO: Samar Chatterdoo from SAFE Foundation.

Two comments and two questions. One for Mr. Burt. Congratulations for having moved from the hawkish approach of your '70s and '80s when you were, you know, when you propagated the nuclear weapons and which attracted -- and you're right that India -- a lot of people in India feel that nuclear weapons are not really needed. But I don't think India developed their nuclear weapons for Pakistan. That may be the American interpretation. But it was developed as a counter to China. At least that's my understanding. Maybe someone else's is different. Because India did not need a nuclear weapon to defeat Pakistan, if it ever decided to.

And another point I want to make on Deepti's presentation, that because of two bad apples, North Korea and Iran, the big powers like United States and Russia and China and India is it would not be willing to get into nuclear elimination talks, I think is not really sensible because they are far, far behind. So it's like saying there are two fellows cheating in taxes, so I'm not going to pay because I'm paying millions of dollars. That's ridiculous, in my opinion.

So therefore that should not be our concern because a few bombs from United States can wipe Iran off the surface of the map, and so would North Korea. And so that's not really the concern.

The question is why did the United States still continue to say -- and I think you addressed it a little bit based on the earlier question -- is first, we've got the military option. And now on top of it we've got the nuclear option too against Iran and North Korea, which appears to me to be a little ridiculous. I mean, without saying so, they would assume that that is there. And so why keep repeating it? Is it just for the rightwing, to appease the rightwing? What would you think?

MS. HILL: Can I ask the gentleman across the aisle, just because of time issues, as well if you'd like to ask your question.

And then there was another question towards the back, this here.

But this gentleman here, yes, you wanted to ask a question, yes? And then --

SPEAKER: Yeah, this for Richard Burt. You said that verification is required to get to zero nuclear weapons. I just wonder how rigorous that verification needs to be. Because if a state develops one or two nuclear weapons, that seems to me to be not as serous a threat as if they were developing a large arsenal, and a large arsenal would be pretty easy to detect. So I wonder if we really need to be that rigorous on verification.

And one slightly related question is I wonder if you could talk about how the reported nuclear power renaissance might affect the proliferation problem as we approach the Global Zero.

MS. HILL: And then, sir? Right up here.

MR. WYNER: I'm Larry Wyner. I'm so glad that we had this recent reference to the negative assurance business. I wish this had happened during the earlier

session because I thought the answers given were really full of sophistry.

When we negotiated the NPT, we and the Soviets were absolutely agreed that the nonaligned, who were very insistent that we not create two different worlds with different rights, had a right to negative security assurances. And we spent months trying to work out language. And because of the structure of our forces in Europe we couldn't do it.

And it seems to me that the formula that was constructed by the administration for reasons that I think you're right in saying were political is really worse than the traditional U.S. position on negative security assurances. And I would hope that someday we can get off to the business and get back to a deterrent use only in our formulation. And it seems to me incredible we have a discussion of the nonproliferation effort generally and avoid, as we did this morning, this really central question.

I have one question about Zero. It's always you get down to the question of is it a practical thing. And then you get to the question of the one-eyed man is king in a nuclearized world. And, you know, the U.S. Government many, many, many years ago actually drafted, in interagency battles, outlines of three stages to get to zero. They were general outlines; half of them were for political-public relations purposes. But they were -- we had lots of fights in the government on this. And we ended up at the end in qualifying it. And it was that we would remove all nuclear weapons from national arsenals, which was the basis for the thinking then that you would meet this problem by having some sort of international stock, a minimum stock, to deal with the clandestine development of a weapon by someone.

And I just wondered if you've given any thought to that.

MS. HILL: (inaudible) that's an interesting point to raise.

Yes, please, Rick, and then we'll --

MR. BURT: Very quickly, on the point about cheating and somebody

keeping a couple of weapons under their mattress.

I mean, I'm largely sort of sympathetic with that point of view. But I think we have to be, again, realistic, politically realistic, that if you have a system where you really don't have very high confidence that you -- not necessarily that you can't find every last weapon, but if you kind of publicly acknowledge that, gee, maybe our system is porous enough so that people could hide some numbers of nuclear weapons, I think politically you're not going to get the support necessary for this.

So you do need, I think, a kind of any time, any place, short notification-verification capability coupled with a credible enforcement system. And this is mainly, you know, this is mainly going to be directed at existing nuclear states. Would be nuclear states, I mean, the whole process of developing and deploying nuclear weapons is verifiable, clearly verifiable. I don't think there has ever been a situation where a county has been able to develop a nuclear weapon without plenty of early warning for that.

On the question about the nuclear renaissance, that's a great question. And I just, because of time, but there does have to be linked to this process of phased reductions, another bilateral U.S.-Russia reduction, then a couple of phases of multilateral reductions, you've got to create a -- you've got to come to grips with the issues of the spread of the fuel cycle for -- or parts of the fuel cycle for power. And that means you've got to make progress on internationalizing those elements of the fuel cycle, like uranium enrichment of the sort of proposals that we've made to the Iranians, or plutonium reprocessing, so that countries aren't able -- and the adoption of the additional protocols so that countries are not able to step up to the line of going nuclear in a military sense through the guise of a nuclear power program.

On the question of negative security assurances, I mean, again, I think that the answer that was given about the need to draft the Nuclear Posture Review in a way that

was going to be politically acceptable to members of Congress and other important vested interests like the labs and others is the reason that I think the administration didn't go further. I mean, there's no reason given our military posture, given our conventional capabilities, that we couldn't adopt, flatly adopt, a no first use nuclear policy not just against non-nuclear countries, but against existing nuclear countries. So I think that'll happen. It'll evolve over time. The first small steps have been taken.

And finally on this issue of, though, of getting to Zero, and I was saying at the beginning of my remarks about, you know, a lot of whether you depend on a strategy of deterrence and the degree you depend -- you implement that strategy through nuclear weapons depends on your sort of perception of international threat and the kind of international system you're in. I think we are kind of evolving in a general sense, in a global sense, towards a more Lockian world, a world where geoeconomics are going to be the predominant way of expressing national power as opposed to the threat of the use of military force.

The problem though we face, and this goes back a different way of stating what was said earlier about Iran, is unfortunately the Middle East, the greater Middle East, is still a Hobbesian world. And that makes it much more dangerous. And the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the greater Middle East I think is rather high. And I think there is a danger, and here I may disagree with my friend Daryl, I think, you know, for a variety of political-military reasons Turkey might want to exercise the nuclear option and not rely on the American extended deterrent. Because I think Turkey is trying to find a more independent position for itself in the region, and one that isn't as closely tied to the West, and one that isn't so closely allied with the United States.

So the real threat here of Iran, in my judgment, is not the notion of a potential Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange, crisis, confrontation, what have you, it's that the

Iranian nuclear program could set off a nuclear -- a cascade of nuclear programs in other parts of the region. And it just unfortunately is the most volatile region in the world, and a region where they would be most likely to be used in anger.

MS. HILL: Daryl?

MR. KIMBALL: There's a lot to respond to here. I think let me just focus in on a couple points.

I want to come back to what you were saying, Rick, about the immediate next steps necessary to get us on the road to zero. There are a lot of questions asked about, you know, what is required for a verification system at the very end of the roads. He's got some very good ideas, but I think we need to begin figuring them out. But we've got to do some things in the next 5 to 10 years to get us on that path.

So I just want to bring us back to what he was saying before. I agree with him that we need to have another round of U.S.-Russian reductions. Whether that happens in a treaty or not I think is yet to be decided. This last negotiation was very difficult. There may be a better way of doing it through parallel reciprocal actions or perhaps unilateral actions that get us to the point where the United States and Russia have no more than 1,000 total nuclear weapons of all types. I think that is doable within the next five years. If that happens, then we can, as the Nuclear Posture Review suggests, engage China and others in a strategic dialogue on transparency and where we're going next and what these weapons are for.

In addition, there is a teachable moment this year which is important to getting us on the path to zero, which is the NATO Strategic Concept Decision. We don't have enough time to go into it here, but, you know, NATO can use this teachable moment to say that, you know, we don't need to have these relics of the Cold War. And, you know, the decision needs to be made to move ahead with the -- withdraw all these weapons back to

the United States. If they don't, I think it sends a horrible message that, you know, these countries need these weapons as a symbol of their political relationship. I mean, what worse kind of message could these countries send.

So I think these are three critical things that need to be done in addition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And then as we look forward beyond that, the U.S. and Russia and China and the other nuclear-armed countries need to move -- not just move towards but adopt this sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear weapons approach.

This is a real shortcoming in the Nuclear Posture Review. And I would respectfully disagree with each of you about the political reasons behind this. President Obama, I'm told, read this NPR twice. He owns it. Okay. He made the decision. There may have been factors going into this decision, but I think it is fundamentally inconsistent with a world without nuclear weapons to have a position on declaratory policy that is anything other than the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons. Well, I think that's a shortcoming. We've got to get beyond that problem if we're going to get on to the promise land that's somewhere out there.

MS. HILL: Well, thanks, Daryl. Is a good point there. And Deepti?

MS. CHOUBEY: I'm happy to throw it back to the audience.

MS. HILL: No, I think --

MS. CHOUBEY: Or is that a --

SPEAKER: We're done.

MS. HILL: Don't do that because a lot of people are already leaving. So if I were you I would give the people who've been brave enough to stick this out actually beyond zero because it's beyond 3:00 some parting thoughts. Because I think we've got actually another agenda for more discussions, which Steve is taking notes of. We have an

extended deterrence, I think, discussion coming up soon in our arms control program.

But, Deepti, some final things that you would like to leave people with.

MS. CHOUBEY: May I just say, you know, in terms of the conditions of getting to Zero, I urge everybody to take a look at a product created at Carnegie called Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, where George Perkovich and James Acton along with a set of international commentators have really looked at what the conditions should be. And on the verification issue --

SPEAKER: Good piece of work.

MS. CHOUBEY: -- you know, one is where will we finally, in a world free of nuclear weapons, where do we see countries that we're concerned about having the social and political rights in place so that whistleblowers would actually be protected. You know, and do we see some of the countries that we're concerned about, be it Egypt, be it Iran, be it any of these states, really enacting that anytime soon. And I think that shows a longer time horizon. I don't think that that means we don't do it. I actually think that in that way a world free of nuclear weapons is something that can create better societies for many countries. That it's not, this nuclear stuff isn't just hermetically sealed, it actually connects to a whole set of other issues.

So I urge you all to take a look at that. It's all online. And I think it provides a lot of detail.

MS. HILL: Well, thank you very much to all three of you. As our colleague here said, we raised a lot of questions and issues in this session that tied back to the previous two sessions. It certainly gives us a lot more food for thought for looking forward to where we go from here. We hope that you will join us again at future meetings. And of course wish you every success in all the very important work that all three of you are doing in your different contexts.

And also thank you very to everyone else in the audience here for sticking it out for so long.

SPEAKER: Brave souls.

MS. HILL: And we'll look forward to seeing you at other sessions. Thank you very much, everyone.

SPEAKER: Thank you.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012