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PANEL 4: MANPOWER AND READINESS:

Moderator:

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Panelists:

CHARLES A. McLEAN, II
"Repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Implementation Considerations for Quartering the Force"
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps
Federal Executive Fellow
The Brookings Institution

COLONEL GREGORY DEWITT
"Strategic Black Officer Capital Investment: Increasing Competitiveness for General Officer"
The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY POUNDING
"Capturing the Human High Ground: Developing Army Leader Adaptability"
Texas A&M University

P R O C E E D I N G S

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MR. O'HANLON: Good afternoon, everyone. We're proving this is a Military Fellow-organized event by starting a minute early. But I want to take credit for us civilians -- it's Peter Singer who deserves the credit, because he was the one who just told me we should begin now. And so we're trying to learn from you. Just as, in theory, people say they benefit from the year here, we certainly -- and I, certainly -- over the years have benefitted greatly from this Military Fellows program.

So let me begin by a work of thank-you, collectively to the current members of the FEF program, and previous generations, as well, for all we learn from your presence at Brookings.

We've got an excellent panel. In fact, there's been some joking about how we only have the diehards left in the audience. But I think, in the design of the panel, people saw that you could not get a much more exciting set of topics, you know -- and, I guess, General Mixon and a few others have done some advanced billing for us this week to make sure that was the case.

And so we have three topics that you need no convincing from me about the importance of issues concerning the way in which we find, recruit and train, motivate people with the U.S. military, and how we build a community of committed individuals and capable individuals. You know the importance of this, and how it can't be taken for granted.

The broader public probably needs some reminders that you don't create the General Petraeuses of the world by luck. You don't get guarantees of having the excellence that we see in the young officers who are walking the streets of Iraq and Afghanistan today by luck. You've got to work to create a community of people that has that kind of talent that has that kind of a learning process.

And I would simply say, by way of general introduction to this topic, which is really about military readiness and personnel issues writ large -- and I won't try to pin it down more than that -- that I've been struck, as a civilian watching DoD, by how much DoD has learned and adapted in the last seven or eight years. And it's incredible.

And let me just put it starkly, a little bit bluntly perhaps for some of your taste -- but an Army and Marine Corps and military in general that was losing a war in Iraq for four years, then figured out how to win it. And that kind of dramatic shift -- and I think it was quite dramatic. And I don't think it was an accident, I don't think it was luck, and I don't think it was primarily decisions that were beyond our control. I think it was primarily decisions made by the U.S. Armed Forces, more than anybody else.

That led to one of the greatest turnarounds, certainly in American military history, and one of the greatest turnarounds by any organization -- if you think more broadly about the way organizations in our country perform in the private sector, the educational sector, the governmental sector -- the kind of learning that happened, that the military proved it was capable of, is quite striking.

And so I think to maintain the kind of people, and encourage the kind of thinking that we've seen evidenced in this Iraq turnaround, our speakers today, this afternoon, have addressed some of the core issues that go to the heart of readiness: people, capability, education and so forth.

You've got their bios. I'm not going to say a whole lot. I will begin by saying that Colonel Chip McLean has taken on, bravely, one of the most controversial issues, that I alluded to earlier -- "don't ask, don't tell" -- and issue that it's remarkable how many senior military officers are now being asked for their opinion in public, and feeling that they should respond in public. And God bless them. Good luck to them -- and I don't think -- I'm not sure General Mixon will be the last one to take a hit on this issue.

And so we look forward to hearing, in a moment, from Colonel McLean.

We also are privileged to have two other Colonels from out and about the country. One from about four blocks away -- and that's Colonel Gregory Dewitt, who is thinking about an equally sensitive topic, at least in terms of broader issues in our society, which is the question of minorities in the military and, specifically African-Americans. And, you know, we have to be careful in our country -- you'll forgive me and permit me a quick word here. We sometimes

think we have a problem solved, you know. We had a Colin Powell, and we now have a Barack Obama in the White House, so it must be okay. These problems must be solved -- right?

Well, I think Colonel Dewitt will be the first to say that the issue of how we maintain a military that has strong communities within it, and appeals more generally to the different communities within our country -- and he's focusing on the African-American community specifically, but it has more general implications, I think. This remains very important, and not to be taken for granted. And not a problem that we have somehow definitively resolved.

And then, as we go to issues of education more generally, we have Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Pounding from Texas, but also from Afghanistan, Haiti and few other choice spots around the work, in terms of his operational background. And he is now a member of the Army National Guard. He's an active officer within the Army National Guard, and is at Texas A&M University.

And his topic really is the general question of education, and the general question of an asymmetric war, and the kinds of challenges that we see in not being able to predict the nature of the next fight, or even of how the current fights may evolve, and just thinking through how do we build an Army officer corps, or a military officer corps, that's capable of being as responsive in the future as we've seen the military officer corps be in the last few years.

So I've taken a little bit of prerogative to give a somewhat lengthy introduction. I'll stop there.

We appreciate your presence. We appreciate your staying power. We'll have some presentations, and then some discussion.

Over to you, Colonel.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Thanks, Mike.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm happy today to discuss this issue with you. It's a paper that I've been working on for the last several months.

Throughout my career, I've watched the debate over U.S. Code Title 10, Section 654, and its implementation guidance, known as "don't ask, don't tell". Much of that time, I didn't

concern myself with the details of the issue for several reasons -- but foremost, because it didn't appear that the law would change any time soon. So I resigned myself to passing discussions and whatever sound bites and news articles happened to come across my path -- the quality of which was certainly variable.

Over the last year or so, the law has come under closer review by Congress. Additionally, the President has made it clear he intends to change the law, and the Secretary of Defense has undertaken a study to prepare for the potential of a change.

Foreseeing these developments early last fall, I began to think -- what would happen if the law changed? I determined that whatever decision is made, we, the military, need to be prepared to follow orders, just as we are for many contingencies which may or may not occur. So I began to study the issue more deeply.

Having just left command, I decided to focus on where, in my mind, the rubber meets the road -- and that's in the barracks, where the Marines live, the soldiers, the airmen live, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

It struck me, would one of my troops refuse to live with a fellow troop who was gay? Would there be disobedience or, worse, violence?

I was in good company with my concerns. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Mundy, has argued just such personnel disruptions would occur -- saying, quote, "There would be some who would resist living with homosexuals very actively. And you'd have to deal with them. You might have good troops who say, 'I'm just not going to live in that barracks with him,' and then you have to decide what to do."

An Army Commander equally debated, "Do we discipline a soldier for not adhering to Army values if he complains about having to pull guard or share a bunk with an openly gay soldier? Send him to sensitivity training?"

So, being proactive, my discussion today will focus on what we can expect to unfold in the barracks, and what we can do to mitigate any potential disruptions if the Congress decides to change the law.

What my research determined is, segregation is not a suitable course of action. An inclusive quartering option has worked in militaries of all our major allies without causing disruptions. It can work in the U.S. military, if we take several measures that have proven successful in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

At the risk of preaching to the choir, military life is different. It requires troops to live in conditions that are often Spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced intimacy, with little or no privacy. Our men and women recognize these conditions are part of the many sacrifices they make in the service of our country.

There are many concerns related to repealing “don’t ask, don’t tell,” but one in particular has resonated throughout the debate -- the loss of privacy. Proponents of the ban state that requiring heterosexuals and homosexuals to live together, or forced cohabitation, is a violation of privacy directly akin to requiring men and women to live together, and will result in sexual misconduct and a general breakdown of good order and discipline.

Many authorities have articulated various aspects of this issue. But the polls of military personnel and internet perhaps best show the level of concern. In a recent survey, 58 percent of military personnel said they would be uncomfortable sharing a shower area with a gay or lesbian. Granted, polls on the matter vary, but even a focused search Nexus and the internet will produce volumes of articles, op-eds, letters and blog and web entries on this very same issue.

Such concerns have led to serious consideration of segregation over the years. However, from Clinton’s administration until even recently, such separate-but-equal notions have been roundly criticized as impractical, discriminatory and outright offensive. General Mundy again states it best, saying -- quote— “The last thing you ever want to think about is creating separate facilities for separate groups, or separate meeting places, or having four kinds of showers. That would be absolutely disastrous in the armed forces. It would destroy any sense of cohesion or teamwork, or good order or discipline.”

So that leaves us to consider an inclusive option, such as that adopted by our allies. With over 20-plus years, in some cases, of experience in this matter, there isn’t a lack of

international examples of gay and lesbian military service to review. At present, 25 countries, including many who are participating in combat operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, allow gays and lesbians to serve openly. These include combat forces from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Germany, France and the Netherlands.

In reviewing the numerous U.S. and allied government studies, such as those done by Rand, GAO, and the Army Research Institute, as well as multiple independent reports, peer-reviewed studies and press accounts, there have been no findings showing degradations to combat effectiveness or military readiness caused by inclusive service policies -- to include in-the-barracks -- of our allies. In fact, the latest study reports that no consulted expert anywhere in the world concluded that lifting the ban on openly gay service caused an overall decline in the military.

Some argue, however, that those foreign military cases are just that. They're foreign. The military and cultural differences are too vast, our responsibilities too great. In short, our superior military is a role model for other countries, not the other way around. They conclude the U.S. does not, cannot and should not compare itself to others.

For the sake of brevity, I'll suffice with the following counterpoints.

While not exactly identical to the United States, the cultures, societies and militaries of Britain, Canada and Australia certainly bear more similarities than differences. The military organizations of the three nations bear close resemblance in military hierarchy, equipment and training, and readiness priorities to those of the United States.

More importantly, as part of a professional military education, all U.S. military leaders are taught to study foreign military cases as a means of distilling the salient and relevant strategies, tactics and, more importantly, the human factors of war.

So, while these case studies are perhaps no perfect analogies, they're very close, and offer numerous lessons learned about human nature and military service. Moreover, when these three cases are reviewed in light of the experience of the other 22 arguably dissimilar

countries that have had no problems integrating gays and lesbians, they hold even more promise for showing human nature, and how repeal would unfold in the U.S. military barracks.

So let me briefly highlight our allies' privacy concerns prior to lifting their bans.

In short, not surprisingly, they were identical to those being debated now. Proponents of maintaining the bans in those countries argued that forcing heterosexuals and homosexuals into the same close quarters would violate privacy, leading to misconduct, harassment, violence, and a general breakdown of order and discipline. Polls of military personnel reflected these concerns.

In Britain, for example, a working group was tasked to review the U.K.'s ban and report if changes were needed. As part of the appraisal, they surveyed the attitudes of 13,500 service members, and found that an overwhelming majority -- 79 to 88 percent, depending on the mail survey and the actual physical interviews -- felt that it wasn't acceptable to share a room or a shower with a homosexual. In Canada, a working group surveyed 6,500 service members and found substantial privacy concerns among male soldiers, 62 percent of whom stated they would refuse to shower, undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier. In Australia, while no official polls were found, one leader of a veterans group stated that 98 percent would be disappointed by the removal of the ban, and would find it uncomfortable to work with homosexuals.

Despite the dire predictions, experiences with open gay and lesbian military service has proven uneventful in the case examples. None of their armed forces chose to segregate homosexuals from heterosexuals as part of their change in overall policy.

Overall, the lifting of the British ban in January of 2000 was, in a word, a non-issue. Despite all the prior doom-and-gloom commentary, an independent study, as well as that of the Ministry of Defense's own internal assessments conducted at the six, 10 and 30-month points, respectively found that the change in policy had caused no discernible impact on operational efficiency, and that the armed forces' social code of conduct had been well received.

In regards to privacy, a British officer who studied the issue and helped develop their social code of conduct to regulate behavior and mitigate privacy concerns, characterized the response of the troops as, quote, “Being very short-term complaints, very loud, but short lived. And, as far as I know, the armed forces of the United Kingdom has only lost three people who resigned over this issue.”

Other officials -- another official said, quote, “The media likes scare stories about showers and what have you. A lot of people were worried that they would have to share body heat in close quarters, or see two men being affectionate, and they would feel uncomfortable. But it was proved at first look that it’s not an issue.”

According to several official sources, the lifting of the ban in Canada went equally well as in Britain. A *Washington Post* account sums it up -- quote—“The nine months since the court case induced Canada’s military leaders to open the ranks to gays have been virtually casualty free. No resignations, violence or harassment have been reported.”

Gay soldiers, while remaining discreet about their private lives, say they are now -- they feel more comfortable now. The straight soldiers -- not only those who have concerns about gays, but also those who don’t -- say they have accepted the new regime. One survey found no reports of sexual harassment or sexual misconduct in the years following the ban, and that sexual and personal harassment rates decreased for several subsequent years.

In Canada, like Britain, they did not segregate homosexuals, and made no exceptions for accommodation in the new policy. Doing so, however, didn’t create the privacy issues that had been expected. A Canadian Army general reported, quote, “We have no significant issues which would indicate that there is an impact on unit cohesion, morale, conduct or anything to do with the mission of the forces deployed. There has not been issue with respect to showering. Heterosexuals and homosexuals shower together.”

In Australia it was the same. The most comprehensive study found that there were no, quote, “ -- identifiable negative effects on troop morale, combat effectiveness,

recruitment or retention, or other measures of military performance. Little harassment, sexual harassment, bullying or other forms of sexual misconduct were reported."

So what are some of the lessons learned from these cases?

Foremost is that polls, surveys and other attitude indicators do not accurately predict how individuals will behave in real-world scenarios, especially within tightly regulated environments and cultures. Behaviors, especially among military personnel, are tightly regulated by what troops think is expected of them, or standards that we set, what they see and experience, or the actions of others in command climates, and by what resources or options are made available to them.

So the focus must be on behavior and not attitudes. In this regard, each country issued codes of conduct that applied equally to all sexual orientations. These codes focused on individual dignity, and forbid any form of behavioral misconduct, sexual or otherwise, that might damage trust and the unit's cohesion or combat effectiveness.

Each country's leader sent strong, clear messages of support for the new codes, and reassurances that the troops could handle it, and that there would be no problems. They stressed zero tolerance for bad behavior, inappropriate conduct and disobedience throughout the ranks.

There were no mass coming-outs. Few gays and lesbians come out for years after the bans are lifted, and those that do respect their service cultures and norms.

Considering this, given the estimated 66,000 gays and lesbians serving in the U.S. military, I extrapolated that rate down to where the most tension would probably arise -- that being male, active duty, living together in the barracks, sharing barracks rooms, between heterosexuals and homosexuals.

When I factored that down, there may be one -- and, again, this is looking at, like E5 and below, sergeants and below, who typically continue to live in the barracks. Because at a certain rate, they get their own apartments out in town -- that the rate would be about one homosexual per 1,000 service members in the active forces. The numbers are a little higher on

the Guard side, because apparently, according to the survey, there are more homosexuals in the Guard forces -- which kind of, in a sense, makes sense, because they don't -- they don't live together all the time in the barracks. They're called for the weekend a month and two months a year -- two weeks a year training.

So this would seem to indicate that very few active-duty, male heterosexual service members will ultimately come into contact, or conflict, living closely with another male service member whom they know is homosexual.

To further mitigate this issue, housing facilities, such as the barracks dormitories, increasingly provide more space, privacy -- space and privacy. And younger service personnel are increasingly more tolerant, making more room assignments less problematic -- making room assignments less problematic than might be expected.

So at least in an active-duty garrison setting, the number of heterosexual service members who might confront a situation where they have to closely live and shower with an openly gay service member may be very small.

Lastly, we see that privacy isn't that big of an issue when it comes down to it. Privacy norms are not innate, but learned and dictated by each society, and therefore are always shifting. Despite societal influences, privacy or modesty is a very flexible personal concept that we adapt routinely to the setting -- whether the doctor's office, the beach or the gym showers.

People routinely exercise norms of discretion or etiquettes of disregard. We grow up teaching our children not to stare, for example. And also we give each other as much privacy as the settings permit.

Privacy concerns also emanate from people who usually do not want to change their routine or habits, or cope with a new situation. Those concerned with modesty and privacy will adapt their behaviors according to the situation.

My conclusions. Considering these findings, if Congress repeals "don't ask, don't tell," the U.S. military should adopt the same quartering policy as our allies -- that sexual orientation is a private matter and, as such, not germane to the assignment of quarters.

The framework for implementing such inclusive policies should include the following recommendations: promotion of overall policies in the establishment of command climates that focus on fair and respectful treatment of all personal, regardless of race, gender or sexual orientation. These shouldn't focus on gays and lesbians, but on equal treatment for everyone.

Adoption and strict enforcement of a social or professional code of conduct, based on those used by our allies, and fostering equal treatment and good order and discipline. The focus should be on adherence to this behavior code and conduct, and not on changing attitudes or beliefs about homosexuality.

Senior leadership needs to communicate with clear, consistent and positive support the policy changes down to all levels. This should include strong messages of reassurance that the leadership expects that service members can and will handle the change in policy, it will not have negative effects, and the institutions values and culture will not change. Existing service themes that highlight commonalities -- can-do attitudes, mission-first, people-always imperatives, teamwork and inclusiveness -- as well as other diversity themes should be incorporated into these messages.

Implementation of final barracks policies should be rapid, simple and complete, without phased approaches, which may signal hesitancy and lack of commitment on behalf of the leadership. Overall change will be self-regulating and occur over time, phasing itself in as the institution becomes more comfortable and tolerant.

Empower subordinate leadership to implement the policy and resolve individual personal issues appropriately. Leaders should receive some prior training and guidance related to the overall policy, and how to handle general situations or questions. The British Service Test provides an excellent example of working guidance leaders can use to handle these challenges.

Continuation of efforts to provide improved quarters, and afford all members as much privacy and physical security as appropriate and feasible, both in garrison and the field.

And, lastly, continued general education and awareness on topics concerning equal opportunity, professional conduct, and sexual harassment, sexual assault and sexually transmitted disease prevention. There should be no sensitivity training or other education focused specifically on gay and lesbian issues. Such training, targeted on changing attitudes and beliefs, will only be counterproductive to fostering cohesion and equal treatment.

In closing, there's tremendous value in holding frank, objective discussions with out allies on these issues. We will find in the end that their experiences in this matter are perhaps not as foreign as we may think.

Thank you. And I'll look forward to the discussion.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you very much, Chip.

Colonel Dewitt, over to you.

COL. DEWITT: Well, thank you. I'm glad to be here today.

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Diversity and Leadership conveyed to me, it's not about counting heads, per se, but it's about making heads count -- regarding diversity.

In the summer of 2009 -- this past summer -- the Military Leadership Diversity Commission was formed, at the recommendation of Congressman Cummings, to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies to provide opportunities for promotion and advancement of minority members of the armed forces -- including minority members who are senior officers.

So, there's a Congressional-directed commission that will provide a report this summer, based on the findings.

My research included DoD studies, which there's plenty of -- everything examining from looking at the accessions from the Army standpoint, all the way up to how do we grow senior executive officers and DoD. Multiple Rand studies that are out there. Journals. Department of the Army policies. The United States Accessions Command. The Army Diversity Office -- at least their draft report. And then interviews with cadets. And I also had the

opportunity to talk to Lieutenant General Freakley, the Commander of the United States Army Accessions Command.

Well, my research focuses on increasing the number of college-bound youth at the point of accessions, and enabling a larger pool of competitive African-Americans who can eventually compete for general officer. So I did not look at once they're in the military, because it's all about increasing the pool of officers that we bring on to the active duty.

Right now, African-Americans account for 8 percent of the Army general officers. The Army's goal should be about 14 percent, based on my research, which is predicated on the current population projections -- and I know there's some debate out there about that -- and the percentage of African-American service members, which is about 18 percent. So, set a goal for about 18, achieve 14 percent.

Minimizing institutional barriers facilitates equal access for everyone. Why is this important?

Diversity is a national imperative. The strength of our nation is ground in our diversity as a people -- diversity of culture, thought and experiences. Officers should be reflective of the nation and the Army population it serves. An investment is required now, since it consumes more than 25 years of education, training and experience to produce a general officer.

Today, the Army needs more talent -- needs more talented, college-bound African-Americans choosing to serve their country. The emergence of the improved Leader Development Strategy, grounded in the corporate domain of talent management, further necessitates the Army's need to increase the pool of African-American commissioned officers.

Notwithstanding, all the armed forces and the business communities are competing for the same talented group of college graduates, increasing this talent pool is difficult.

I began my research by reviewing historical significant events, then examined four elements -- awareness and education, accessions, making an officer. I touch on mentorship, grooming an officer. And then leadership and accountability -- setting the stage for reducing

impediments through policies, programs and resources, coupled with senior leader diversity accountability.

A few historical events regarding African-American officers.

World War I, African-Americans served as surgeons and chaplains, outside of the Black militias that were relegated to supporting combat troops. In 1917, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, through the Central Committee of Negro College Men, met the challenge of obtaining 200 college students by enrolling more than 1,500 for the Army's commissioning program.

In 1948, President Truman's Executive Order established equal treatment and opportunity for those serving in the armed forces.

Change was not well received by the Army's senior military leadership. Of note, three years later, Cadet Roscoe Robinson entered West Point, destined to become the Army's first African-American four-star general, promoted in 1982.

Moving forward to the Korean War, by 1951, the Army was fully integrated -- three years, three years, after the Presidential Executive Order. Nevertheless, many emerging opportunities were realized by young African-American officers.

The first senior, most senior level, three- and four-star general officer, Lieutenant General Becton, was promoted to the third star in 1978. He served during his timeframe.

The confluence of educated African-American officers, the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought an end to segregation, followed by an era of tremendous opportunities. The first African-American Secretary of the Army in 1977, presided over an unprecedented number of African-American general officer promotions. During his tenure, the Army increase its population by over 400 percent, from eight to 30.

The Army has always led change. It has always been the most diverse institution among other armed services. But there is room for improvement.

Recently, the current Education Secretary described education as the civil rights movement of the modern era. It begins with awareness and education to promote military-

sponsored education and leadership opportunities, become a part of the community-centric initiatives among under-represented areas, and build upon science, technology, engineering, mathematics, stem programs, Junior Reserve Office Training Corps, and affinity groups.

Unfortunately, these programs will not reduce the gulf reported by the *Journal of Blacks in Education* on post-secondary education barriers, which are negative racial campus environments, inadequate college preparation, lack of family support of higher education, and insufficient college funding. By accessing the top 100 colleges and universities that have a high African-American graduation rate and academic standing, the Army can mitigate two -- the campus environments and the college funding -- of the four educational barriers, through its commissioning program.

Next, it's about balancing accessions. Research suggests that Army accessions distribution among West Point, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the Officer Candidate School are out of balance. And Lieutenant General Freakley mentioned this last month during an interview on the Army War College Strategic Institute's website.

We've been out of balance for about eight years. In 2002, you saw an increase that eclipsed -- increase of OCS accessions that eclipsed the ROTC non-scholarship. And that's important. And I'll make that correlation here in a minute.

In 2007, African-American college graduation rate, about 8 percent. And that's what the Army uses to determine whether or not they're meeting their accessions requirement by ethnicity.

The Army G-1 reported total accessions of 13.5. So one might assume that we're over-producing in the Army. However, if you look at just the African-American population for accessions, 42 percent of the commissioned officers were OCS.

Most will not compete for general officer because of their active Federal service time. If they're in-service OCS, spend five or seven years as an enlisted soldier, they get commissioned and they retire at about the lieutenant colonel level. So they'll never have the opportunity to even compete at the general officer level.

There are two -- there is one study from 1977, DoD, and then there was a paper provided by the Army War College that talks to OCS relative to West Point and ROTC scholarships. And I quote— “The Academy, West Point, or ROTC backgrounds, often with technical training provided by scholarships, have been important for advancement in the military.” If a predictor of future success captured by initial officer performance data in newly assigned positions are closely associated with officers who attended West Point or received a four-year ROTC scholarship, than reducing OCS commissions appears practical. My research does not suggest that OCS graduates are less capable, but in many cases leave the Army before they’re considered for the senior Army level.

Department of the Army G-1 Accessions Command and reviewing the accessions process. The branching model and distribution of combat arms and combat support assignments among the commissioning sources. African-American disproportionately request non-combat arms branches, placing them at a greater disadvantage. A larger portion of our general officers come from the combat arms.

Cultivating leadership requires mentorship. It needs more energy at the commissioning sources, followed by first-line supervisors to minimize army culture-shock, and promote social interaction. Army has a webporter, but it’s underutilized.

Lastly, leadership and accountability. The Defense Four of 2004, and Fortune 500 companies with superb diversity programs, stated diversity is a CEO-top management responsibility. Historically, the senior civilian leadership champion opportunity. The Army Diversity Office now reports that Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, align with U.S. Code Title 10 responsibilities. This structure is probably the most appropriate, but time will tell, based on diversity initiatives and programs.

In summary, the time for investment in the unrepresented communities through community-based diversity programs is now, especially during the recovery, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

Review colleges and universities that have an above-average African-American graduation rate for commissioning programs.

Balance accessions among the three commissioning sources. Increase Reserve Officer Training Corps, and reduce Officer Candidate School requirements.

Mentorship begins early. Utilizing community based programs and continues through an officer's career.

Ensure our most senior leaders are responsible for diversity.

Maybe it's time to consider an accessions campaign plan. Accessions is currently decentralized, and coordinated among the Department of the Army G-1, the United States Army Accessions Command, and the United States Military Academy, West Point.

Reducing barriers creates opportunities at all levels. Invest in developing a larger pool of African-Americans for the future Army -- our senior officers pool.

Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you very much, Greg.

Colonel Pounding.

LT. COL. POUNDING: Thanks, Mike. And I realize that I'm the only thing between you and the door, also. So let's get started here.

Contemporary counterinsurgency and counterterrorism requires full-spectrum military operations, in which victory in both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare will be essential.

Military leaders need to capture the human high ground in order to ensure strategic victory and not just victory on the battlefield.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces has won the kinetic fight, only to struggle with the non-kinetic battle for the population. The United States is capable of controlling the geography, disrupting the enemy's phasing and timing and, to a lesser extent, hindering its external support. But the U.S. has had difficulty in winning the war of ideology, thereby winning the support of the civilians, and ensuring their alliance to the central government.

In asymmetric warfare, an enemy's well devised and thought out narrative can be an effective weapon in turning popular support to the weaker force. To counter this asymmetric threat, the United States Army needs leader that have the non kinetic skills necessary to win the hearts and the minds, amplify the friendly narrative, and reduce the host-nation negative perceptions of Americans.

Army leaders must have a mindset based on agility of though and adaptability of action to be effective in this strategic fight. Military leaders need to be equipped with the right adaptability attributes. The problem is, military education and training does not yet provide our leaders with the proper skill sets necessary to ensure adaptability and, therefore, victory.

Adaptability has been a part of the Army's vision since the inception of the war. In 2005, the Army embarked on a long-range study to define, develop, measure and assess a means to teach adaptability. The purpose was to provide a prototype set of methods to develop adaptable leaders, and train the battle command skills required to lead soldiers effectively in complex and unfamiliar environments.

Adaptability was seen as a meta-skill, and four sub-skill sets. Each skill set defines particular attributes and abilities, and these were leader adaptability, multi-level influence strategies, cross-cultural competencies, and leading multinational teams.

Leader adaptability includes critical thinking, creative problem-solving, self-regulation and assessment. And currently, leader adaptability is called "adaptive thinking."

Multi-level influence strategies is the term provided to describe affective and cognitive skills important in social intelligence, and influencing others.

Cross-cultural competency is the third area. Cultural general competence provides the foundation and breadth to quickly learn and adapt to any culture. It is a set of characteristics that enable learning about and adapting to unfamiliar cultures, even when in-depth knowledge of a specific region is lacking.

Lastly, the skill set of leading multinational teams is seen as the next step to developing Army leaders. It focuses on building adaptable organizations, with the purpose of this

subset to enhance leadership and team effectiveness in complex organizations. This final skill set builds upon the need to have an understanding of the previous three adaptability skill sets.

Precedence has established the need for adaptability in Army leaders, and the Army validated these needs through research and study. Actually, over the last seven years, the Army has done no less than 30 studies on adaptability.

Not only has it validated the requirements, but it also has demonstrated that leader adaptability could be trained, educated within four adaptability meta-skill sets. Through proper training and education, agile Army leaders can learn to adapt to new and complicated environments. The next step is to establish and implement programs, courses, needed to teach Army leaders.

Now, this is where things begin to slow.

There are a number of good things occurring right now pertaining to training leader adaptability in the Army. First, it has defined adaptability by attributes and skill sets. And, of course, an adaptable leader should be able to possess certain attributes to support adaptability. These are: the ability to have knowledge and past experiences to solve ill-defined problems, come up with unusual or clever ideas to develop creative ways to solve problems; be able to remain level-headed, even-tempered and calm when confronted by adversity, distress or difficult situations; be receptive to new environments, events in a curious and broad-minded way; be able to perceive change as a challenge and an opportunity for further development; be interested in or desire to effect results and master tasks beyond others' expectations; set difficult and challenging goals, work hard to accomplish them, while showing a drive to succeed; be able to work effectively with others towards a common purpose while giving and taking, in an effort to achieve group goals and develop constructive relationships.

Be able to have a sense of ease within social situations; understand situational appropriate behavior; be empathetic to feelings, motivations, behaviors in others; and, lastly, to do this all across cultural boundaries.

Now, this construct is not unlike Mark Moyar's argument in *The Quest for a Command*. He suggests that counterinsurgency is a leader-centric warfare, in which superior leadership attributes prevail and usually win. Moyar identifies these leader attributes as initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity and organizational capacity.

A second part that works in education pilot -- excuse me -- a second part that works is education pilot studies in critical thinking, and establish programs to build domestic, domain-specific skills as negotiating, use of interpreters, understanding non-verbal cues, and so on.

The Army has also developed four enduring courses, currently in effect, recognized as adaptive in concept by the Department of Defense. The four courses are the adaptive thinking training -- a concept that had been accepted by TRADOC; the special forces qualification course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School; adaptive leader methodology, developed by Don Vandergriff from TRADOC; and the last, which is kind of unique, is the combat advisor mobile training teams, which is the only course that utilizes adaptability to deploying soldiers.

Now, what is not working is compartmentalization, lack of synchronization, and proponents that focus only on their areas of influence. Numerous programs established by the Army develop adaptability sub-skills, but no one program incorporates all components of the meta-skill of leader adaptability. For an Army leader to be fully capable of adapting in any environment, he or she must possess all four of these subsets.

But most importantly, what is not working is that we are not deploying leaders with those critical skills needed to succeed in the non-kinetic mission. Little adaptability education or training has made its way into pre-deployment venues, either for the active or the reserve force. This is partly due because of the FORSCOM Southwest Training Guidance, and the First Army Command Training Guidance that have few non-kinetic requirements.

After most of a decade of study in Army leader adaptability, the Army has no process to ensure Army leaders are educated and trained in this critical meta-skill to meet the current requirements. Many organizations across the Army are working adaptability methodologies, but a few common problems hamper the accession into the training and education cycle. In the meantime, an adaptive enemy is pressing the U.S. Army's capabilities in asymmetrical warfare.

The Army must train its leaders now, without any delay, to counter and overcome clear and present threats. The Army must remove the proponent turf wars and compartmentalizations. There needs to be a single point of entry of knowledge for Army leader adaptability.

A single adaptability entry and knowledge point will integrate all dimensions and capabilities of educating Army leaders into a common operating picture. An integration organization could synchronize all adaptability skill sets into a non-kinetic war-fight construct. A non-kinetic capabilities integration team, per se, would provide the Army with a bridging strategy to provide the necessary training to all leaders deploying forward in the war fight.

This bridging strategy would be established through the Department of Defense and the Army, and validate adaptability constructs for future integration into a professional development cycle.

A collaborative approach can be effective in merging pre-deployment components of COIN, cultural awareness, leader adaptability into a non-kinetic leaders course.

I suggest that both COIN and cultural awareness training could be implemented prior to adaptability, to provide a foundation of knowledge and understanding of these domain-specific skills, and how they really relate and synchronize into adaptability.

Building and enhancing Army leaders is no simple task, and requires years of research and study prior to implementing a permanent training policy. President Obama has suggested that Afghanistan draw down could start as early as 2011. There are strong

suggestions that the Army adaptability research will continue through Fiscal Year 2013. Many Americans hope that major combat operations in Iraq Afghanistan have run their course by then.

Regretfully, the United States does not have the luxury of time to wait for the Army's adaptability research to conclude. The United States will either be a victor or a loser, in part on how well we have trained our Army leaders to be adaptable to the non-kinetic battle.

The Army must execute how it trains leaders today so they have the skills necessary to be successful and agile and adaptable during an era of persistent conflict. The Army puts countless hours training and educating and ensuring that Army leaders are prepared to overwhelm the enemy in kinetic phases of the operation, yet comparatively little investment to ensure our leaders have the non-kinetic skills to make rapid and logical decisions, influence others, and foster the trust and credibility needed to win their hearts and minds.

It is my argument that the Army needs to re-prioritize these requirements. A bridging strategy can be implemented so Army leaders deploy in the war fight with the non-kinetic skills to win the asymmetric war. This isn't 100 percent of the solution, but it is a good fit. And this will provide time, while the Department of Defense and the Army validates an adaptability construct, and for the future integration into a professional developmental model.

There is a means to supply the war fight with the adaptable leaders that have the proper skills to operate and be successful in this non-kinetic fight. The implementation of adaptability pre-deployment program is a needed next step for the Army. There is no time to waste. And we must capture the human high ground.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Colonel.

I'll open it up in just a minute, and look forward to the conversation. I've got a number of questions, but I'm just going to ask one, and it's going to be of Colonel Pounding, because I would like to ask you -- you've done all this research. You've got -- I think you've earned the right and the prerogative to give us a little bit of a specific concern you might have -- if you are willing to put things in these kinds of terms -- about a particular kind of skill, knowledge that current leaders are not getting, right now, for the operations that we're currently carrying out.

In other words, your argument is very theoretically robust --

LT. COL POUNDING: Sure.

MR. O'HANLON: -- and rich. But I'm wondering, does it lead you to any particular concerns -- whether about our understanding of Afghan or Iraqi culture, or the nature of leading men and women in that kind of an environment?

Are there -- ? Because to me, it looks like we're learning a lot and adapting reasonably well in broad terms, although I'm sure I'm missing a million things.

So can you be more specific on a couple of points?

LT. COL. POUNDING: Sure.

First off, very good point. If you've read Dr. Leonard Wong's article on the crucible experience in Iraq. He goes and tells about the fact that, through a crucible experience of trial and error, Army leaders have learned to adapt. But the problem is, is that, in effect, through adapting, they make mistakes, and learn from those mistakes.

That is something that we just don't want to have happen during war time.

So it's better to train soldiers in how to make logical and rapid decisions -- which we are doing to a large extent -- but also how to influence, not only within the command structure, but also outside, within our joint services, within our partnerships with coalitions, and with dealing with host nation personnel.

And that's one thing, and that's one set of strategies that we don't do well at training. How do we interface with people? How do we build social intelligence and cultural competencies.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay, why don't we open it up?

Sir -- in the red tie. And then we'll move this way.

Please identify yourself, of course.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Hugh Grindstaff. And my questions are for Colonel McLean.

In your study, did you speak to former members, or current members, before and after they were outed?

And would a possible way around this be at the recruitment station? Making sure that people don't get in there.

And once they're in, will there be a certain percentage, you know, a semi-quota of people who should be promoted until equal rights laws?

LT. COL. McLEAN: Hmm. State the second one, one more time. I was --

MR. McINTOSH: -- I was focused on the first one.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Recruitment.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Recruitment. And the specifics there were, should the --

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Would there be a way of keeping people out?

LT. COL. McLEAN: Keeping homosexuals out.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Yes.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Oh.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: (Off mike)

LT. COL. McLEAN: Did I talk to current and former members before they were outed?

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Before and after they were outed. If they're accepted by (inaudible).

LT. COL. McLEAN: Before they were outed. So -- before they were kicked out.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: No, no. In other words --

LT. COL. McLEAN: Because if they --

MR. GRINDSTAFF: (Off mike)

LT. COL. McLEAN: -- I mean, how they were treated before anybody knew they were gay.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: (Off mike.) Yes.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Okay.

No, I haven't. Because, I guess, you know, how they were treated if they weren't -- if they weren't to be a known homosexual, I don't see the -- I don't necessarily see the

relevance to that. Because they would be treated, I'm sure, as anybody else would have been treated.

As for the recruit -- the recruiting, you know, it's been argued that the law, that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy was -- that was the problem, is that, you know, that barred people from asking the question at the recruit depots, as to whether or not you were homosexual and, therefore, would have been kept out.

I don't see the application to the barracks or privacy issue. To me, that goes more towards the policy debate about how it's been executed, and the effectiveness of the policy. So I don't see that as actually germane to what I was looking at.

And then the promotion quotas -- after the ban would be removed?

MR. GRINDSTAFF: (Off mike.) Yes.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Again, not an area that I focused on, but from what I -- and I think a great area to ask our allies about, as part of what I was talking about, is have they done that in their countries?

I haven't focused in that particular area, but from what my overall research has showed me is, is that, no. Because there's not going to be a block that you're going to check on your -- you know, it's a personal matter, it's a private matter.

So, for a promotion board to know what your sexuality is, is like to almost check a block, you know, that you're an African-American or something. I mean, they'll see that from the promotion photos -- so, in that sense, it's a little different in that regard. I mean, in that regard, it's probably a little tougher for an African-American, you know, to get promoted than it would be, perhaps, per se, to a homosexual, once the ban would be dropped. Because there's obviously the skin indicator, the color of the skin, that could be used to -- by the board members to look at it one way or another.

So I think in a perfect world, if the policy was executed, if Congress decided to remove it, well you wouldn't be focusing on that. Because, again, it's not going to -- it's not going to be something that you're going to want to bring up.

Again, the focus of the codes of conduct in Britain, Australia and Canada is, look, it's a private matter. If people find out about it, that's fine, you know, but it's not something that we're going to put on your promotion form, your promotion photo, wear on your uniform, et cetera.

So, I hope those answer your questions.

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, sir. Good to see you again. I think I saw you yesterday at a Korea event.

LT. COL. COOPER-SIMPSON: (Off mike) -- new interpreter.

Good afternoon. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Roger Cooper-Simpson. I'm a Royal Marines officer with some 21 years' experience.

There is no promotion quota in the British forces, so I can deal with that one immediately.

I agree completely with what Chip said, and his conclusions -- with perhaps the only exception that -- I think the only, the most important parts on which decisions need to be made, is that of combat effectiveness. Does it change or affect combat effectiveness to have homosexuals?

And the British experience is, no, it does not. Not in the slightest. I was one of the -- I think you said it was between 78 and 84 percent of people, when polled, in the British forces who said they would object to it. I was one of that. I've been in command for a big chunk of the last 10 years since the ban was lifted, and it's made not the slightest bit of difference.

I think the combat effectiveness aspect of this is affected -- can only be affected, really, by the degree to which perhaps romantic relationships might affect the cohesion of small units in combat. And I think that's overcome by a combination of regimental ethos, unit ethos, and the code of conduct which, of course, I think all the nations that have now instituted and allow homosexuals in the forces have instituted.

So, for the British experience, and my personal experience, is it's simply not an issue.

Having said that, can I just ask, I think, Colonel Pounding a question about the adaptive leadership a bit?

I'd like to ask -- to what extent do the U.S. Army studies to date show that the capacity to be adaptive is a product of an individual's education and background before he even joins the forces? To what extent is his native ability -- and, therefore, something that can't necessarily be enhanced to a particular extent by the training he gets in the forces?

And is there an extent, as well, to which the adaptive officer requirements of the U.S. Army can be promoted, can be enhanced, simply by promoting those that exhibit these capabilities?

And let's not forget, I think, that perhaps all our young officers deal with combat -- which is perhaps the most variegated environment on the face of the planet. All of these guys are pretty adaptive to start with.

Thank you.

LT. COL. POUNDING: (Off mike.) Sure. That's an excellent question.

First off, adaptability has been looked at for about 20, 25 years. So what they have found is that there are just not attributes than an individual has, but also life experiences, and how they start to change a mindset. Their skill set. Their ability to do well in whatever type of job that they do. They have to have a knowledge of that job to be more adaptable.

So there are a number of different, uh, characteristics that fall in to that. There also has to be a real sense of motivation. So if the motivation isn't there -- and often, that's learned or gained through different experiences -- you know, you will not have that.

This is of great debate in the Army today, whether adaptability traits, attributes, can be taught. The question is, is how you teach it. And that's where we're at right now.

I think, between a combination of different types of teaching events, of being able to use experiential scenarios to teach, to bring in peers, leaders that have been overseas to talk about what they've gained from this ability to adapt and work around cultural and social differences to problem-solve better, you get more buy-in.

So, yes, it is trainable. It does go along with other things, other than just attributes.

A person's background, their upbringing, is definitely involved in that. The question is not that you can have fantastic adaptable leaders. The question is can you enhance adaptability skills in all leaders. And I think that's what we're looking at doing.

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, ma'am.

MS. RUDINSKY: Marjorie Rudinsky.

This question goes to Lieutenant Colonel Pounding.

At what point in an Army leader's career should adaptability training begin? And I ask this because, you know, in my Army career, and as a young, you know, Lieutenant, you know, I observed cadets and lieutenants who were very risk-averse to making mistakes. And you mentioned before about the whole concept of, you know, making mistakes, and we don't want that to happen in the crucible of battle. We want that to happen in the training.

So how can we -- and maybe implicit in my question is, you know, is there some kind of cultural shift that has to go on in our training to allow young leaders to, you know, make those mistakes so that they can enhance whatever skills they already possess?

LT. COL. POUNDING: Yes, you're absolutely correct.

Truly, to build leaders, to have leaders be more agile in thought and adaptable in behavior and action, it's a lifelong learning process. Like any type of concept of leadership, it's lifelong.

The question is, we need this type of leadership in the current war fight. So do you start by teaching it at the basic educational and training steps of the military? Or do you inject it to those people that need it now?

So it's a combination. And that's why I suggest that we need to have a bridging strategy, per se. We need to work with those soldiers that need the skills right away, to enhance their capabilities of dealing in the non-kinetic fight of interfacing with host nation populace, with

dealing with war lords, with dealing with coalition forces -- to get them to have a better understanding of what they do and where they come from, a sense of empathy.

But you also need to be able to start at the foundation of a soldier's professional development. And you need to take that through all the stages of their educational development.

MR. O'HANLON: (Off mike.) Yes, sir. (inaudible).

CDR. WALKER: (Off mike.) I'm Philip Walker. I'm the Navy Fellow with the Atlantic Council.

I have a -- I have two questions, I think. The first is for Lieutenant Colonel McLean, and then for Colonel Dewitt.

The Chairman is very concerned with the health of the Force. He's concerned with the dwell time, bog dwell. He's concerned with wounded warrior, wounded, ill and injured. In very many ways, he views the health of the force as his responsibility -- especially coming back as a former service chief.

My observation is that no-purse budgets are at the highest they've ever been. That we're paying people to do things now that we didn't pay for before -- all sorts of broad skill sets that are out there, incentive pays.

We are, umm -- I in some ways view the individual augmentee program as a clever way to tap into preexisting military resources to get around reserve activation levels. I mean, you even heard the general this morning finger all of us for taking up billets that could be in Afghanistan.

My question about the "don't ask, don't tell" has more to do about recruiting, in that in your research, have you discovered -- at least I've seen anecdotal evidence that in the very difficult circumstances that soldiers and sailors work, more often than not -- sometimes—"don't ask, don't tell" is used as an administrative avenue to get themselves out of the military.

Umm -- so, that mechanism, that convenient mechanism -- I mean, first of all, do you have any idea of the impact of that? I mean, how do we know what's truly legitimate and

what's not? And if you remove "don't ask, don't tell", what's the impact been on retention? In other words, those folks no longer have that way out.

And then follow-on to that would be, so then what's the next avenue? What other -- what are soldiers and sailors going to turn to next? Drug abuse? Some other -- or some other kind of, you know, socially unacceptable behavior, to get out of -- to get out of military service?

I mean -- so it's really kind of a (inaudible) force. I mean, "Grow the Force," and all these initiatives. So that's that.

Then, Colonel Dewitt, first of all, I think -- correct me if I'm wrong -- and I'm asking you this because you've done, you're doing a lot of research in this. But it seems to me that the Latino-Hispanic community is the largest minority in our nation. And I wanted to -- if that's true, I wanted to learn if you've stumbled across any sort of indications about the same research that you're doing for the Black community in maybe the Latino community. I mean, are you seeing sort of the same kinds of things there?

So -- thank you.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Great questions.

You know, again, I haven't -- I focused on kind of the privacy aspect, to try and keep my research, you know, within a lane. Because otherwise this issue can go off into many, many areas.

So what I have heard and seen is that, you know, there is that conjecture, that a lot of these discharges for homosexuality were related to guys looking for excuses to get out of their commitments.

How you prove that later on down the line -- do you have to send an investigator to their house and check up on them? You know, I don't think you'll ever know.

I think that -- again, going to our allies, I think that looking at their retention numbers, looking at their recruiting issues, will be very telling, at least in how those came and cropped up with them. And even if they had any indications prior to them lifting their bans as to whether or not it was being used as an excuse.

So there may be some -- there may be some analysis that exists there that might tell us something more about what we'll keep on in the force and what we'll lose. And even, like you said, what's the next "easy out" -- quote-unquote -- that would be -- you know, is this going to drive up our drug-abuse numbers?

I don't think so. I don't think so. I think -- I think that they'll not -- you know, with that "excuse" -- quote-unquote -- being removed, that, you know -- I don't know what the next out is. That's kind of an interesting -- it's a very interesting question, something that I think -- I don't know if it's really for the implementation panel, the working group to look at, because I guess it could go to what's the next, you know -- is this going to cause a problem?

CDR. WALKER: (Off mike.) Second and third-order effect.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Yes, second and third-order effects.

But -- boy, I'd like to see, I'd like to see their report on that. Because I think that would be, I think it would be interesting to see how they, how they factor out those variables to say, okay, if we remove the ban, we're going to have more drug pops. Because guys are going to, instead of resorting to that, they're going to resort to something else.

I think it could be very highly speculative to be able to draw that kind of a variable association to that conclusion.

CDR. WALKER: (Off mike.) I just bring it up because, you know, the Army's been under a lot of focus --

LT. COL. McLEAN: Yes.

CDR. WALKER: -- for suicides, things like that. How it can affect those things.

LT. COL. McLEAN: The stress-on-the-force question about -- yeah.

CDR. WALKER: (Off mike.)

LT. COL. McLEAN: And, I mean, that's part of what the working group is doing, is to say, look, how is this going to place more stress on? And I guess, looking at it from my particular subject matter area, going to that piece, looking at the examples of the other countries,

it didn't -- it didn't cause -- there was no indications of increases in suicides, and then cases -- violence, there was no violence. The resignations were low. The recruiting didn't go down.

So, you know, did it stress out the force in Britain, Canada and the U.K.? The indications don't seem to be there. But, again, that's something more for the working group to look at.

MR. O'HANLON: Colonel Dewitt.

COL. DEWITT: In general, I did not look at the Hispanic or Latino community. But I did come through -- or had the opportunity to look at some of the studies. And talking with Lt. General Freakley, he made it, not necessarily clear, but he did say there's a greater problem, or a greater void, if you will, with the Latino-Hispanic community, because I think their numbers are a lot smaller than the African-American community.

A couple things -- family-centric. There is a sense that the officers are not remaining in the Army at the same retention rate as African-Americans. But some of the same programs, integration with the affinity groups, and going into the under represented populations, minority populations, will have a positive effect, whether it's a Hispanic community or an African-American community.

So Accessions Command is truly focused on that. And I know that because I sat down with General Freakley. And throughout my research, and talking with senior leaders, there's a sense of those that are comfortable discussing diversity and those that are not. And Lieutenant General Freakley is. Because he truly understands, if not all, most of the dynamics that affects a population and influences them, whether or not they're going to serve in the Army, or military service, in general.

MR. O'HANLON: (Off mike.) Question there. Thank you for your patience.

Did anybody else have their hand up? Maybe we can combine one last super round. It's going to be quick.

We have two more hands. We'll just do three questions, and then three responses, and hopefully it will even out. Everybody has 30 seconds.

COL. ADAMS: Okay. Colonel Adams, Army Staff, for Lieutenant Colonel McLean.

In your research, did you come across any information on how the other militaries in other nations, how did they deal with entitlements? Did they recognize marriages? Housing allowances? Insurance? SGLI? VA medical entitlements? Those types of things.

Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: (Off mike.) Sir -- in the back, and then we'll finish up.

LT. COL. FLEMING: Lieutenant Colonel Fleming, Army Fellow at Old Dominion University.

I just want to -- this is for Colonel McLean.

The impetus for change in Australia, U.K. and Canada, the motivation for the change. And what has been cited, with respect to the change here, with out policy, "don't ask, don't tell" is that, supposedly, 10,000 soldiers, airmen, sailors and marines were put out of the service over a period of 10 years, or over the period of a decade. And I started thinking about that number, that data, and with 3 million people serving, it's a very, very small percentage. For example, 300,000 would be 10 percent, and then 30,000 is 1 percent. And then 10,000 is, you know, one-third of 1/10 percent. And then that's just for one year. And then we spread that over a decade. It's infinitesimal. And going to the comment over here that it could be a way to get out of a service obligation. I don't know how that 10,000 breaks down.

But my point is, the motivation, the impetus for change. And if it is for political reasons, if it is to cater to a particular voting bloc, that is the wrong basis for making this change.

I just wanted to discuss that.

LT. COL. PUNJANI: Shahnaz Punjani from the Washington Institute.

My last question is for Colonel Dewitt.

You made a comment that African-Americans don't go into combat arms. And I just wanted to kind of get your feedback as to why that was. That's it.

MR. O'HANLON: (Off mike.) Chip, and then Colonel Dewitt.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Entitlements. The indications are, from the other countries that they're going to follow the laws of the land. If -- for example, marriage recognition, partners' benefits and those types of things. Unless the Defense of Marriage Act was to be changed, then we would have to, you know, the military would have to fall in line with those same things.

I think that in the U.K. -- interestingly enough, when you sit there and you talk about differences between countries and cultures, I went and I looked at it, and I said, "Jeez," you know, "Where are they at on marriage?" And I think it turned out that, of all the countries who have dropped the ban, only seven recognize same-sex marriage. You would think that, wait a minute, you know, if they drop their ban in the military, they're all going to fall -- you know, that's the popular argument -- they're all going to fall, dominoes. Everybody's going to recognize same-sex marriage.

Has not been the case. In fact, I think the U.K. and Australia don't recognize it -- right? I don't think you give same legal recognition to, a -- to -- I think you're having the same debate we are, whether or not to recognize same-sex marriage as equal to -- am I right? Or --

LT. COL. COOPER-SIMPSON: (Off mike.) I'm no expert --

LT. COL. McLEAN: Yeah, yeah.

LT. COL. COOPER-SIMPSON: (Off mike.) But I would say that it's exactly as you described.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Yeah.

LT. COL. COOPER-SIMPSON: (Off mike.) We've only recently recognized civil partnerships.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Civil partnerships -- yes.

But the gay marriage, you know, recognition has lagged behind this issue. And I think, like I said, only seven of the 25 nations, NATO nations, that accept homosexuals in the military have recognized same -- parity between gay marriage and heterosexual marriage.

So, again, not my particular area, on this issue. Looking -- that goes into base housing. And I thought about getting into that. But then, you know, that gets into a lot of civil-military issues about Defense of Marriage Act and that type of thing.

The impetus for change in the U.K. and Canada -- the U.K., the European Human Rights Court -- correct? -- basically there was a case that was brought before them. And they found that it was, in a sense, unconstitutional. And so, given that court ruling, the U.K. accepted that, and changed their policy.

In Canada, it was almost -- it was very similar. They were about to -- there was a court case that was put forth, and they were about to fight it. They had the arguments prepped and everything, and then their MoD lawyers looked at the case and basically said -- because, again, you couldn't -- you could not draw the correlations to combat efficiency and everything, so they were falling back at that time on the privacy argument. And when they looked at the privacy argument going before Canada's high court, or whatever their court of the land is, they realized that they were going to lose.

And so rather than wait for the court of overrule them and do it -- again, Canada went -- it went Australia, Canada and then, several years later, the U.K. And what happened there was the Canadian military just said, you know what? We're going to lose this case. And let's go ahead and make the change without our hand being forced, in a sense.

But in a sense, the courts in both those cases did force them to do it.

In Australia, it was a change of government. They, again, looked at -- they looked at the evidence, they looked at the research. And I can't remember what party it was, basically a change of administration. And they went to the military and they said, look, here's how it's going to happen. You're going to change this. They didn't have to go -- again, it hadn't been a congressional law, or whatever. It's kind of like if, for now, if it wasn't a law, if it wasn't Title 10, 654, then the Commander in Chief could much more easily have done it via, basically, an Executive Order.

And that's essentially what happened in Australia, as I understand it, is the ministers came down and said, "Change it," and so the military did.

So in all three cases, did the military do it of their own volition? What was the impetus for change? It was the courts, really, in two cases. And in a third case, it was a political decision.

But all three of those cases were based on, basically, recognition of equal rights, and the fundamental -- and I would say, the fundamental disparity between that, between saying that this group of people doesn't have a right. And then proving that, evidentially -- proving that evidentially in court, which couldn't be done.

And that's kind of the same point that I'm bringing up here, that it's been the case in these countries is, is that the debate needs to focus on reports. Evidence, analysis, facts -- not emotion.

You know, again, please, if there's anybody out here who knows of a report that categorically, empirically, shows that having homosexuals serve openly in their military has degraded combat effectiveness -- such as some allegations that have been made recently in the press about another ally -- then please, bring that report in to Congress, bring it here to Brookings. Because I would love to see the report. Because all the reports that I've read have absolutely found the total to be true. So, you now --

MR. O'HANLON: That's a very good, dramatic way to summarize. So unless -- and each of our questioners got at least one of the questions.

LT. COL. McLEAN: Yes.

MR. O'HANLON: So, if you don't mind, why don't we go to Colonel Dewitt for the last word -- the last word of a great day.

COL. DEWITT: If you look at it historically, African-Americans were pushed in the -- in more of a support role. Quite honestly, when you talk -- and even through surveys -- they'll talk about a skill set and then, when engaged, about leadership, this intangible notion of leadership, and what it translates to in the civilian world. The connection is not necessarily made.

So, really, it's about developing that skill that will suit me later, as opposed to leadership in order for me to -- which will allow me to run a company -- especially when you look out on the corporate world, and you don't see many people of color running companies.

So I think, based on what I've read, and even engaging cadets, they'll talk skill set. And when you talk the notion of leadership, they're like, "Okay, I'm not going to go combat arms. I'm going to go signal, so I have something to fall back on once I've done with school."

And also, the influence of parents. Their parents, or close confidants who were in the military were in the combat arms. So when they discuss, from a point of reference, it's what they experienced, which was not combat arms. And if they did, it may have been in the Vietnam era where casualty rates were proportionally higher than white soldiers. So, again, their frame of reference all supports, "Hey, don't go combat arms. Go service support." Even though the data shows if you go combat arms there's -- it's a greater predictor of success, especially as general officer.

MR. O'HANLON: (Off mike.) Peter, do you each have a word to wrap up? Or should we thank the audience – well, thank everyone here everyone here.

PETER SINGER: Thank you guys from everybody here. Especially the panelists.

I want to make three quick thanks. First is to the audience for coming out and seeing what's been a really great session. But, in a sense, it was to reach out to you.

The second is to thank our staff, Heath and Brendan, who helped put this together.

And then, finally, I wanted to thank our presenters, and the Fellows gathered here. I think you've seen a remarkable display of what happens when you combine intellect, scholarship and field experience. And what is amazing to me is that I don't think we could have had this kind of discussion, and see this kind of presentation anywhere else.

So please join me in a round of applause.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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