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PANEL 1: IRREGULAR THREATS:

Moderator:

DAVID KILLCULLEN
Author, The Accidental Guerilla (Oxford University Press, 2009)

Panelists:

MATTHEW FRANKEL
"The ABCs of HVTs"
Federal Executive Fellow
The Brookings Institution

JOHN GRIFFIN
"Putting Somali Pirates Out of Business"
Captain, United States Navy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

ANTHONY POPIEL
"Protection of Our Waterways"
Captain, United States Coast Guard
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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: Thank you again, General. If I can ask your next panel to go ahead and join us up on stage we're just going to flow into the next session.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Well, thank you everybody for coming. My name is Dave Killcullen and I'm moderating this panel on "Irregular Threats." The bios of the guys presenting are in the pack that you have in front of you so I'm not going to spend a lot of time introducing them, but I'll just run briefly through who we have.

Captain Anthony Popiel from U.S. Coast Guard down the end, he's a FEF here at Brookings and he's a specialist in near-shore operations. He also did the coolest job I think I've ever heard of on anyone's bio. He was a deck officer on an icebreaker in Antarctica which is just way cool. And he was in the Senate Liaison Office for the Coast Guard in '04 to '07. And his specialty in terms of research has focused very much on protection of international waterways.

Then sitting next to him is Captain John Griffin from the Navy, who is at CSIS as a FEF. He's a Navy helicopter pilot and has had multiple deployments to the Arabian Gulf. His specialty in research has been piracy in Somalia. So I'm looking forward very much to hearing some thoughts on that.

And then finally, to my immediate left here is Matt Frankel, who is a fairly well known and respected Iraq analyst with a lot of time in Iraq. An IMINT analyst by background and somebody who is focused very heavily on high-value targeting in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. And he's also here at Brookings.

Let me just give you a couple of opening remarks before I throw to these guys to strictly 12 minutes each of commentary and then we throw the floor open for discussion. The panel is entitled Irregular Threats, so we should ask ourselves what do we actually mean by that. And I apologize to Andrew Exum, who is sitting there in the middle

who heard me say basically exactly this at a travel engagement workshop yesterday. What is irregular? It doesn't mean uncommon and it doesn't mean unusual. If you look at the correlates of war database, which is a scholarly database that's maintained by a number of U.S. universities and has been run continuously since the 1960s, it tracks every conflict worldwide since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. There are about 485 conflicts all up. Of those, 79 -- or about 17 percent -- are what we would consider to be conventional. That is wars between the armed forces of nation states. The other 83 percent are what we consider to be unconventional, or nontraditional, or irregular. So, in fact, irregular warfare is actually the most widespread and most common form of warfare both now and throughout at least the period since the beginning of the 19th century.

There are dozens of different definitions of irregular threats or irregular warfare kicking around. The one that I and most other people in our field use is simply armed conflict where one or more combatants is a non-state actor. So if you're engaged in organized conflict and you're engaged in fighting against insurgents, terrorists, pirates, militias, bandits, or any other kind of organized non-state group, then you're engaged in irregular warfare. And it's irregular, not in the sense that it's uncommon, but literally in the sense that it's unrelated. It's outside the rules. It's a set of forms of conflicts that don't follow the established preferences of the people that set the rules, which is us. And so it is, and always has been, and probably will remain, the form of warfare of choice of people who don't have anything to gain by playing by our rules. And we'll talk about that in a lot more detail in a moment.

Final comment before I throw it over to the panelists is to ask ourselves what is irregular warfare going to look like in our lifetime and where is it going to be? We've got a fairly good feel, I think, for the current forms of irregular warfare that we're seeing in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other parts of the world. But if we look forward,

one of the most important influences on irregular threats in the future is going to be urbanization. As of April 2008, for the first time in world history, the world passed the 50 percent urbanized mark, which meant that according to the United Nations' survey which was done in that month, more than 50 percent of humans on the planet live in a city that has 500,000 or more people in it. And if you then map where those cities are, 80 percent of major cities on the planet are within 50 miles of a coastline.

So what we're looking at is the urban lateral -- the urbanized coastal fringe where you're looking at the sea space that's adjacent to those coastal cities, the cities themselves, and the land -- hinterland that surround them. And that is the environment that we need to be focusing on, I think, very carefully when we think about where we're likely to be engaged in the future.

So without further delay let me throw over to Anthony Popiel. Matt, you can start.

MR. FRANKEL: Thanks, Dr. Killcullen. It was a good intro because, again, focusing on these new threats in the paper that I'm talking about today is one way that we confront these threats, which is on high-value targeting. And by that I mean removal of leaders, commanders, or key facilitators from insurgent and terrorist groups. Now, this is a discussion that's obviously vaulted into the public view over the last few months, especially with all the press over the drone strikes in Pakistan. Without any force present in that country, the United States has been able to remove from the scene over 30 Jihadists over the last couple of years. The most notable of those was Batula Massoud taken out last August on his rooftop while receiving medical treatment by U.S. remote airstrike.

Now, it's pretty clear that the killing of Massoud was a success in terms of eliminating a known enemy of the United States, but what's less clear and what I'm going to talk about today is these long term effects of high-value targeting in the greater COIN-CT

fight. In the case of Massoud, when he was removed from the scene, his brother Hakamoula quickly filled his leadership slot. Over the next several months we saw continued attacks on the Pakistani Taliban. So the question is where do we have strategic success? In which cases and in what circumstances does high-value targeting work and when does it not work?

For my research I looked at a broad swath of high-value targeting cases -- 20 different cases since 1945. Everything from Iraq to Algeria to Chechnya to Japan. And I came away with six key lessons that have important implications for the United States as we move forward. I'll get to the six lessons in a second, but first I want to talk for one second on why high-value targeting is used.

At first glance it's easy to see why attacking forces would focus on the removal of key leaders. You want to degrade the leadership. Removing leaders has a psychological impact. If you take people out by airstrike the ones that remain tend to be more security conscious. They might keep their heads down. High-value targeting serves to strengthen host governments. It can also, as we've seen in Pakistan, limit sanctuary for insurgent and terrorist figures. Additionally, I think, in the ambiguous world of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, high-value targeting provides a clear metric. Like General Paxton talked about, the difficulty in finding metrics. And this is one metric that can be a clear point. You've identified the top 10 figures; you've removed six of them. The problem is that progress along this metric does not automatically equate to strategic success, lest we forget the insurgency in Iraq spiraled out of control at the exact same time that we were hyping the number of the Iraqi deck of cards that had been killed or captured.

High-value targeting campaigns can also exacerbate the problem. They create unnecessary collateral damage. They spawn a new wave of what I like to call accidental guerillas, which would be a good book topic I think. (Laughter) High-value

targeting efforts also spur retaliatory attacks. The devastating suicide bombing against the CIA outpost in Khost earlier this year was retaliation for drone strikes into Pakistan. And as we've seen, it doesn't always degrade the enemy force.

So when does high-value targeting work? Well, let's look at the six lessons from historical cases. Lesson number one, high-value targeting campaigns are more effective against centralized opponents. Unfortunately, decentralization is the trend. Okay, well, the first part of this is pretty obvious. The more centralized a group is, the easier it is to degrade by removing the key figures. There's more single points of failure.

A couple of good examples of this -- the Kurdistan People's Party, PKK, which basically fell apart after the capture of group leader Abdul Osolon in 1998. There's also the Japanese cultist terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo. For those who don't remember, this was the group responsible for the brazen 1995 chemical attack on the Tokyo subway. Killed 12, caused thousands to seek medical attention, and caused the U.S. State Department to add this group to our terrorist list. At its peak, the group reportedly had 40,000 members, but two months after the attack the Japanese captured charismatic group leader Shoko Asahara and the group basically faded into obscurity. It conducted no successful attacks since that point.

The problem is in the post 9-11 environment, the enemies that we face now are less centralized entities. Amazing advances in global communications and the Internet means that physical proximity isn't nearly as important as it was in years past. Groups have naturally decentralized. So now we're facing groups like the al Qaeda franchise that are more resilient to high-value targeting.

Let's take, for example, al Qaeda in Iraq. This was the group that was responsible in the early days of the insurgency for the most devastating attacks in Iraq. And the U.S. military had made its absolutely number one priority to find and eliminate group

leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. And this search consumed the U.S. military, eating up thousands of man-hours, thousands of predator hours. All the hard work finally paid off. In June 2006, Zarqawi was located and killed in a U.S. airstrike. Now, the death was a major PR victory; there's no disputing that. But if you look at what happened to the insurgency after that it was clear it had little to no impact on the fortunes of AQI. So the week before Zarqawi was killed there was 950 anti-coalition attacks in Iraq; 3 months after Zarqawi was killed, 1,400; by the beginning of 2007, 1,600. And high-profile attacks, which became more clearly linked to al Qaeda in Iraq, followed the same trend.

The underlying lesson is Zarqawi's death didn't lead to the decline of AQI. It took the surge and the Anbar awakening and a number of other factors to do that.

Which gets me to lesson number 2. High-value targeting campaigns don't work in a vacuum. What this means is that high-value targeting campaigns absent larger COIN or CT efforts will achieve little more than fleeting and momentary success. Now, this conclusion probably won't make a lot of people at JSAC very happy, but if we rely exclusively on drone strikes or other similar methods, we're basically just playing Whack-A-Mole. For example, look at Yemen and Somalia. These are two cases where we've targeted Jihadist leaders. And yet we're not doing traditional counterinsurgency there as we're doing in Afghanistan and other places, so our HVT efforts there are not lasting or sustainable.

One of the biggest successes of the last year was the killing of al-Shabaab leader Saleh Ali Nabhan last September in a Special Forces raid. It was the removal of the leader of an organization. But yet, because nothing else was done it didn't seem to slow down the organization at all. Two days later they conducted a retaliatory assault on an African Union peacekeeping base killing nine. And two months after that they captured the important south port city of Kismayo, al-Shabaab remains a key player in Somalia to this

day.

Now, we have also made this mistake in areas where we do have forces operating. And again, the early days of the Iraq war are testament to this point. The U.S. military's overemphasis on hunting down the deck of cards to the exclusion of all else -- a lot of the raids were done in brutal and insensitive fashion; created more enemies; and with their Ba'athist focus the military was slow to realize the insurgency had spread to tribal and non-Ba'athist figures.

Lesson three. Indigenous attacking forces have the best chance of success in high-value targeting. Now, in the 20 case studies I looked at, local forces had the lead in eight of them and six of these ended in success. So a much better ratio than when outside forces take the lead. Now, why is that? Well, the primary reasons seems to be I think local knowledge. And by that I mean a better understanding of local dynamics and local networks. It's something the U.S. has struggled with in Iraq and Afghanistan for years, and something that cannot be gained through drone strikes.

The best recent case of local success in a high-value targeting campaign was the Columbians against the FARC. And the pivotal event here was the operation in March of 2008 that led to the death of FARC leader Raul Reyes. Now, it was the first time a member of the FARC Secretariat had been killed or captured by government forces. More importantly, the raid also captured massive amounts of targeting data by getting computers. Simultaneously, government reward offers led to the assassination of another secretariat member. At the same time this was going on, government sponsored amnesty programs -- remember my point that I just made about not operating in a vacuum -- led hundreds of FARC members to switch allegiances to the government. Now, since Reyes' death, kidnappings, a FARC staple, are down 63 percent. Most analysts believe now that the FARC has been significantly degraded through these actions.

Local forces produced similar success in Peru in the early '90s. The government there created a dedicated police force to track the Shining Path leadership. Working closely with local peasants, the police infiltrated the network and captured Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzman in 1992. His capture basically put an end to the Shining Path as an anti-government force.

Two of these cases that fall under the local force lead umbrella, what I refer to as hybrid cases because in this case the local forces took the lead, but they were operating in areas that really weren't under central governmental control, which makes it a little more difficult. These cases are -- the Israelis against Hamas in Gaza and the Russians against the Chechens in Chechnya. In the Israeli case, the difficulty of operating in Gaza has forced them to rely much more heavily on targeted airstrikes. Now, although the targeted killing campaign in Gaza earlier this decade, which culminated in the 2004 killing of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, a Hamas leader, did not damage Hamas' viability of political prospects. It did improve the security situation. Fatalities from Palestinian suicide bombings dropped from 140 in 2002 to just 10 in 2005.

Now, that's not to say the Israeli targeted campaign has gone smoothly. As we've seen from all the fallout over the Goldstone Report and other things lately, unless of course you probably remember in 1997 an attempt to assassinate Hamas leader Yehia El-Mashad in Amman, Jordan, went horribly wrong when the attackers were run down by Mashad's bodyguards and were quickly discovered to be Israeli spies and forced the Israeli government not only to provide the anecdote for the poison, but also to release Yassin from prison in the first place in order to appease the Jordanians. We're seeing the Israelis face a similar backlash now for the killing of Hamas official, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai.

The fourth lesson is sort of the flipside of this. A third party high-value targeting success is more difficult to achieve. And by third party I'm talking about generally

colonial occupying powers. Now, one of the reasons for this is the local knowledge piece that I already addressed. But one of the additional hurdles is part of one of the natures of counterinsurgency itself, is that the key to success in counterinsurgency is strengthening the host government so that the locals will take the side of the host government against the insurgent force. The problem is when the operations are being carried out by an outside force it almost undermines the legitimacy of the host government. It looks like -- makes it appear that the host government is unable to provide the security for itself and must rely on an outside power.

So, when things go well, the host government does not get the credit for it, but when things go poorly, like a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan that kills civilians, the host-government often takes the blame for allowing this to happen. We've seen from polling, 40 percent of Pakistanis believe that Pakistan is fighting "America's war." The U.S. has been wrestling with this in Pakistan for the last year plus. Now, it looks like it's potentially paying off -- that this continued pressure is paying off in what we've seen in the detentions of the members of the Quetta Shura over the last couple of months. But it remains to be seen sort of how that dynamic is going to play forward.

The key lesson here is that the objectives of the third party force and the host government must align or success is not going to happen. And in Iraq we learned that hard lesson with regard to the Sadrist militants. We'll go back to May 2006 when Nouri al-Maliki first became prime minister, in part because he had Sadrist support. At that time, the U.S. was going hard and heavy against the Sadrists. The EFPs were starting to emerge on the scene. But Maliki took a strong stand and was very restrictive in what he allowed Coalition forces to do because at the time, remember, sectarian violence was at nearly its highest point, and the Sadrist militants were targeting Jihadists and Ba'athists, who Maliki saw as the preeminent threat to the Iraqi state.

So he had no interest in helping us go after the Sadrists. As a result, there were no-go zones. The U.S. had to get pre-approval for targeting lists. And even when we captured Sadrists, often times the government would intervene and force the release of that person.

Now, the situation didn't improve until 2008. With sectarian violence on the wane, Maliki now saw the Sadrists as an obstacle to his extending his writ across the entire country. When he turned his attention to the Sadrists, it allowed us to take the gloves off and then we saw charge of the nights other large scale operations that basically degraded the Sadrists as a militant force. But again, this success didn't happen until both sides were on the same page.

Lesson 5: Capture when you can; kill when you have to. There's two goals to a high-value targeting campaign, kill the target or capture the target, and historically, one is not necessarily a better predictor of success than the other. There's pluses and minuses to both. Ideally, the goal is capture because of the intelligence value to steal a little bit from John's presentation. Dead men tell no tales. So the proven case demonstrates the value of this. When Guzman was captured, he gave up in his debriefings tons of information about the top leadership that allowed the government to go in and wipe out the top tiers of Shining Path.

When capture is not possible, however, technological advancements have made targeted killing a much more viable option, as we've seen in Pakistan. Technology allows forces to strike the enemy across borders, eliminating the age old concept of sanctuary. No longer is sneaking across the border an automatic get out of jail free card, although political considerations do still come into play. The U.S. did not, however, target Sadrists that fled across to Iran after Charge of the Nights.

Despite the increased risk of collateral damage, targeted killings can also

help circumvent some negative outcomes associated with the detention of insurgents or terrorists. For example, the radicalization of accidental guerillas in Iraqi and Afghan prisons. Another case with capture is that there are often retaliatory strikes or kidnappings to try to barter for the person that's captured. The Sadrists did this with Qais al-Kazali, the leader of League of the Righteous, capturing western hostages to exchange for Qais al-Kazali.

Really quick because I'm running out of time. Lesson six. Understanding the enemy, organizational dynamics is vital. Meaning we have to have an understanding of what comes next if we remove certain pieces from the puzzle, and I think historically the U.S. military is not really strong at this. The rationale tends to be, well, if we remove X individual, Y organization will be degraded. And we've seen over history tons of missteps on this front where the rule of the wrong person has served to radicalize the organization. It happened in Algeria. It happened with the Russians when they killed Chechen leader in Dubai with an airstrike. Then they ended up with Shamil Basayev.

So, to close, the implications. What does this mean for the United States? As you've seen from my six lessons, we've demonstrated that the U.S. tends to come into this situation at a relative disadvantage. We're facing a more dispersed enemy. We're doing so farther away from our home turf and often with a limited understanding of local dynamics.

So the three key takeaways that I'll leave you with are areas where the U.S. needs to improve. Number one, we must work with local forces and make sure the goals and objectives are on the same page. The ideal case would be to leverage the local knowledge of the forces there with our technological superiority. We're starting to see that in Pakistan. We saw that in Anbar, where we were able to bolster the tribal awakening against al Qaeda.

Number two, we need to continue to leverage new technologies. One of

the biggest hurdles in HVT campaigns is the collateral damage problem. Hopefully, new technologies, like the Air Force's Gorgon Stare, which will allow a broader view of a surrounding area will help mitigate that.

And finally, we need to include high-value targeting efforts as part of a larger strategy. If we continue to conduct high-value targeting operations in a vacuum, as we did during the first two years after the fall of Saddam, we'll continue to be doomed to failure.

Thanks.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Thanks, Matt. I look forward to the discussion of that. John.

MR. GRIFFIN: Good morning. This morning I would like to convey that Somali piracy is growing. It's a problem for the international community, the U.S., and the U.S. Navy. And also Somali piracy is a business or enterprise. I think the most effective way to contain and ultimately eradicate it is to make it unprofitable.

Despite broad spectrum international efforts, Somali piracy is growing and flourishing in frequency, range, and sophistication. The number of attacks is rising. The 217 attacks in 2009 more than doubles the number of attacks in 2008 and represent a six-fold increase over 2005 attacks. A total of 47 vessels and 867 crewmembers were taken hostage in 2009 and four crew members were killed. The range of attacks is increasing. Ships are now being attacked by Somali pirates more than 1,000 miles from Mogadishu. And also, they're becoming more sophisticated. To conduct long-range attacks, pirates are using mother ships and have access to weapons and advanced navigation/communication equipment. They're actually counting the ransoms using the same currency counting machines used in foreign exchange bureaus worldwide, and there's even a sort of Somali pirate stock market where investors can invest in upcoming ventures.

So, yes, I do think Somali piracy is a problem, even if attacks occur only in an extremely small portion of the world's overall shipping traffic because it creates a hazardous environment in a vital shipping and oil transport corridor for the mariners that work these waters. As I mentioned, 850 were taken hostage last year and four were killed. It impedes humanitarian aid to Somalia, and it adds significant cost to the commercial shipping industry in insurance, ransoms, delayed rerouted cargo, and measures to combat the pirates. And of course, it takes naval assets away that could be deployed elsewhere.

Potential problems also exist. Ransoms are a significant amount of money. In the vicinity of several terrorist groups, the money could ultimately be used to support their operations. High-value or sensitive military cargo could be hijacked, such as the met merchant vessel Faina that was hijacked with 37 -- with, I'm sorry -- 33 T-72 tanks aboard. And piracy could also expand or reemerge in other areas. And I think we may be seeing some evidence of this already.

I would also add that Somali piracy, I think, is a personal problem for the United States Navy. Its growth and continued presence can reflect poorly on the U.S. Navy's commitment and ability to support one of its stated core capabilities of maritime security. The Navy was fortunate with the Maersk Alabama incident, but an event without such a concise ending -- something like a hostage situation that drags on for, you know, for days or weeks in the 24/7 news cycle -- could ultimately make the Navy -- the U.S. Navy look weak.

The third point on which I'll elaborate is that Somali piracy is a business or enterprise. Viewing it in this way, I think, provides the best insight into what Somali pirates will likely do and how to actually best combat the problem. Going back to my previous comments on potential problems of expansion, I think viewing piracy as an enterprise supports this because successful businesses do tend to expand and adapt. They're also

typically copied or emulated. Notably, the reported number of worldwide pirate attacks jumped approximately 50 percent to over 400 incidents in 2009 compared to the average from the previous four years. There was also an increase in reported incidents in the waters off Malaysia, Singapore Straits, South China Sea, Bangladesh, and even Peru. And Nigeria continues to have a significant number of reported incidents with 28 in 2009.

And also back to the business idea. Successful businesses usually bring prosperity or are embraced by the communities they support. Undoubtedly, the Somali pirates enjoy a high degree of local support as well because they are reportedly transforming the supporting villages into little boom towns, and this makes eradication ashore increasingly more difficult.

But even more important, viewing piracy as a business is a useful lens of how to combat it. The key to a successful business, I think, or enterprise, is profitability. This ultimately, I think, is piracy's Achilles heel or center of gravity. Businesses have expenses and overhead. For pirates, these include money for safe haven, also known as taxes in the legitimate business world. And equipment costs. You know, weapons, the mother ships, skiffs, navigation gear, fuel, and employees. And as you know, with employees, some are more valuable and difficult to replace than others.

My focus in our current efforts are by increasing the overhead costs and decreasing the revenues we can shrink the business and ultimately eradicate or contain piracy as a more long term partner capacity building efforts have time to hopefully take route. The attack on the enterprise can be done within the framework of the current international efforts that run the full spectrum from diplomacy, military operations, to shipboard tactics, to forward attack. These efforts are actually quite extensive and I'm going to, within time constraints, try to quickly summarize what is being done.

Diplomatic efforts are anchored in a series of U.N. Security Council

resolutions. Most notable from the recent resolutions is the establishment of the Anti-Piracy Contact Group. Formed in January 2009, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group consists of a community of like-minded nations and international organizations spearheading a coordinated effort to halt Somali pirate attacks. It meets quarterly at the United Nations and consists of four working groups: Working Group 1 is the Military and Operational Coordination Information-Sharing Capacity Building Group, and that's chaired by the United Kingdom; Working Group 2, Judicial Issues chaired by Denmark; Working Group 3, Strengthening Shipping and Self-Awareness and Other Capabilities, that's chaired by the United States; and finally, Working Group 4 is Public Information chaired by Egypt. If you're interested in more on that you can visit the State Department website piracy link for more detail and updates.

Complementing the diplomatic and information-sharing efforts of the contact group are three former military task forces which provide protection to the shipping that transits the region. The operational counter piracy forces are: CTF-151, the UNA-4 operation Atlanta , and NATO operation Ocean Shield. Other contributing military efforts include the U.S. Navy-Africa Partnership Station, AFRICOM, 1206 programs to support increased maritime capacity, and Maritime Domain Awareness programs in countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. And negotiated agreements with the government of Seychelles for the operation of U.S. P-3s and unmanned aerial vehicles from Seychelles to improve aerial surveillance.

Also, there's been significant focus on tactics to deter and defend against pirate attacks. Collectively referred to as best practices, these are measures taken that make it more difficult for pirates to seize merchant ships, and these include Army merchant ships -- the most controversial is Army merchant ships placing armed parties aboard the ships -- crew training in anti-piracy measures, higher ship operation speeds and evasive

maneuvers, increasing lookouts, razor wire, electrical fences, high noise horns, and even water hoses to repel boarders.

So to combat piracy, it's not necessary to abandon what's currently being done, but I think to focus more efforts on attacking the profitability and the revenues. For example, I do think it's prudent to keep the diplomatic pressure on the Somali transitional federational government so that safe haven can be made increasingly costly and unreliable for the pirates. The best practice measures, I think they're expensive in the short term, but worth it if they prevent the hijackings. It would be better to stop revenues if people stop paying ransoms, but I don't think that is likely to happen, and I think it's much better to just prevent the hijacking in the first place.

However, the area I think that has the most potential for short term or immediate impact is increased operational focus on detecting and destroying Somali pirate equipment and capture key personnel. And to illustrate this I just want to read a quick article from the Washington Examiner from last week. And it goes like this.

"Pirates attempt attack on Dutch warship. Troops above the Dutch warship HNLMS Tromp fired warning shots Wednesday off the coast of East Africa at suspected Somali pirates and two small skiffs raced towards their warship. After the pirates realized they had made what spokesman commander John Harbor called a rather silly mistake, they turned around and fled. Naval force personnel tracked down the two skiffs and a third suspected mother ship, finding ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades onboard. The two skiffs were destroyed, but then the pirates were set free on their mother ship after it had been cleared of weapons."

So in reading that article, I don't know if anyone was a Roadrunner, Wile E. Coyote fan, but there was an episode where at the end of the day trying to kill each other all day, they each punched the time clock and they waved goodbye and I guess said see you

tomorrow. So I think our current approach is a little too much like that episode because although the skiffs were destroyed in this case and the pirates were released, their most valuable asset, the mother ship -- they were released on the mother ship to essentially go reload weapons and come back and conduct, you know, hijack -- revenue-producing hijackings far from shore on another day. It would have been much better and more damaging to the enterprise to hold for prosecution at least the most experienced and capable of the pirates and confiscate or sink the mother ship. Without the capability to operate far from shore, the pirates will be increasingly more vulnerable to maritime patrols, potentially tipping the situation towards greater security, rather than the expansion we see now.

So in conclusion, I think Somali piracy is a problem that is currently outflanking our efforts to contain it. However, we can gain the upper hand without kinetic operations ashore by more aggressively forcing on and targeting those things that impact the profitability of the Somali pirate enterprise.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Thanks, John. Anthony.

MR. POPIEL: Great. Thank you. Good morning.

The maritime domain has been evolving at an increasingly fast pace over the last 30 years. Technology advancements are allowing renewable energy platforms to be built in the oceans and oil and gas drilling to push farther offshore to sea beds that could not be previously accessed. The environment is changing as well as ocean temperatures rise and receding icecaps are making the Arctic more accessible to human activity. In fact, the U.S. task force has already been working to map the extended continental shelf so as to define the boundaries of our exclusive economic zone and the accompanying resource rights in the Arctic. Recreational uses of the oceans, including cruise ships, beach resorts, and diving are increasingly popular in all areas of the country. The cruise ship industry alone

has grown by more than 2,000 percent since the 1970s; 12.6 million Americans took cruises in 2007, with an economic impact of more than 35 billion.

More than half of the U.S. population lives in coastal watersheds, more than half of the U.S. GDP is generated there, and 95 percent of U.S. trade is transported via maritime shipping. Ocean policy and national security issues arise and must be addressed as we move forward. When adding other factors to the equation there's a variety of national security issues related to the rapid change in the ocean environment. This is a unique period of global growth with a rise of developing nations and populations are increased in an insatiable need to meet related demands for energy and food. It is forecast that worldwide energy consumption will grow by 45 percent by the year 2030, and new approaches to cultivating food sources will be needed to meet the burgeoning world populations.

The oceans provide a potential outlet for food and renewable energy sources, but a suitable national policy has yet to be put forward to manage this activity. The U.S. needs a strong, cogent ocean policy, especially as it relates to energy. And until that policy becomes clear, the private sector will withhold investments that are needed in these areas.

Similarly, security challenges are emerging in the Arctic where diminishing summertime ice coverage has made the region much more accessible to human activity. With less ice coverage, passages have opened that allow trans-Arctic navigation and potential exploitation of the resources contained in these waters. Accompanying this unprecedented access to the Arctic is a variety of potential national security implications, such as concern for freedom of navigation, strategic deterrence, pollution from increased shipping, search and rescue, and projecting maritime presence.

Conflicts are already brewing in the resource-rich areas of the Arctic. Russia is staking vast claims well beyond the traditional 200 mile outer continental shelf

limits. Denmark has raised concerns over military harassment and exploitation with Russia overflying Danish airspace more frequently. Canada has challenged Denmark regarding territorial rights in areas like the Lincoln Sea and they're beginning to challenge the United States for territorial rights within the Beaufort Sea, which is the area above Alaska. And, of course, Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage as internal waters will become a much more serious issue as the volume of shipping in the Arctic increases.

As we can see, there's many competing uses of the world's oceans and waterways. Just to continue it, as of 2008 there were more than 99,000 vessels over 100 gross tons involved in commercial shipping around the world, which is 35 percent greater than the fleet that operated in the 1980s. The volume of shipping is underappreciated by most because it occurs out of sight and out of mind. As mentioned earlier, 95 percent of the United States international trade is accomplished through maritime shipping; it's the lifeblood of our global economy.

The movement of people over waterborne rights is equally prevalent today. As I've said, the cruise industry has grown exponentially since the 1970s. The U.S. fleet operates 203 ships and employs at least 350,000 people. And just since 2000 alone there's been over 100 ships that have been introduced into the U.S. cruise fleet.

In terms of resources, the Minerals Management Service maintains more than 8,000 active leases covering approximately 43 million acres of the ocean seabed for oil and gas drilling. This drilling accounts for 15 percent of the U.S. domestic national gas production and about 27 percent of domestic oil production. And we expect that that's going to expand. Estimates in the Beaufort Sea, for example, have estimated over 8.2 billion barrels of oil and over 27 million cubic feet of natural gas. The vast ocean environment also provides ample opportunities for up-and-coming renewable energy sources related to wind, solar, and hydrokinetic sources.

There's great pressure on the ocean to meet skyrocketing global demands for food resources through traditional harvesting of wild fish stocks and expanded use of aquaculture or domestic fish farms. In the U.S. alone, Americans consumed on average 16 pounds of seafood per person, and collectively we spent over $70 million for fisheries' products.

Another competing use for the oceans has to do with not using the ocean. We've got 13 areas around the country totaling more than 150,000 square miles that have been designated as national marine sanctuaries. And one area has been designated as a marine national monument. These sanctuaries have been created to protect habitats, including breeding grounds for whales, sea lions, sharks, turtles, coral reefs, kelp beds, and historic shipwrecks.

Other uses include recreational use: anything from boating, sailing, diving, fishing, crabbing, swimming, and even sightseeing. And then probably most important to a lot of us in the room is the military training areas. You know, there's areas that are vital for training for naval forces. When we look at all these other areas that are -- activities are going on, I worry about getting squeezed out of the ability to train offshore.

Many of these activities and potential opportunities presented in the oceans are significant, but what is not clear are that national security implications associated with these uses and conflicts abuse.

Maritime transportation is the lifeblood of the global economy, but shipping lanes and port infrastructure vital to the flow of commerce are highly vulnerable to those who wish to cause harm. The simple sinking of a bridge or large vessel in a channel could interrupt marine thoroughfares and the flow of commerce in major ports. A coordinated attack on several major ports by state or non-state actors would have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy, as well as the global economy. And one can just look at the impacts

of Hurricane Katrina and the fact that it closed the ports in the Gulf for several weeks and see the potential impact on the economy.

International conflict is a threat that must be taken seriously as development of outer continental shelves expand. In recent years we've seen disputes over fishing grounds and boundary disputes involving areas where rich deposits of oil and gas might be exploited. With more and more use and users in the ocean expected in the foreseeable future driven by the global demand for energy and food, it seems like more serious conflict is inevitable. Competition for resources is already evident, especially in the South China Sea where dozens of armed skirmishes involving China, Vietnam, and Malaysia have occurred over the last decade. It's not beyond reason to expect that these disputes could be carried into the Arctic region.

In anticipation of the opening of the Arctic, the race for resources brings Russia, Canada, and Denmark. They've all staked claims to sovereignty rights that extend beyond the normal 200-mile exclusive economic zone limits under international law. Even countries like China that are not a member of the Arctic Nations have begun exploration. They've got a new icebreaker and they've established a base on a Norwegian island up in the Arctic region.

With all these different uses, the issue that I see is that no single entity in the U.S. government has the big picture. When you look at oceans and coastal waters and the Great Lakes, the activities are governed by more than 20 federal agencies and departments who are administering over 140 federal laws. These agencies represent 11 of the 15 cabinet-level departments and four independent agencies. And then you add on top of that that the Congress and Federal Courts also have oversight through legislation and judicial review. And add on top of that you've got state oversight, tribal governments, and just a need to have a coordinated approach in the ocean environment.

And just some things that I see that maybe we could do to address the need to have a coordinated approach to manage the big picture, a couple of things. One that we already do, the Coast Guard and the Navy have been really promoting maritime domain awareness, trying to have the ability to know what's happening on the oceans. Part of domain awareness, we've got a system called the Automated Identification System where we're tracking all commercial ships over 100 gross tons that are doing business in the U.S. and around the world. We've also got the vessel monitoring system which is managed by NOAA and that tracks the fishing fleet in U.S. waters.

But that's mainly what we've got right now. I see a need to pursue other systems, sensors, that we can monitor the ocean and be able to again attain the bigger picture. And this is even more important in the Arctic where we basically have nothing. You know, we've got no resources, no ability to monitor the activity level that's happening right now.

One of the emerging practices that kind of dovetails with MDA and would help to manage the big picture is marine spatial planning, also referred to in the U.S. as coastal and marine spatial planning. This is a practice that's been adapted by quite a few countries around the world and it's getting a serious look by the United States right now. And one of the things within the spatial planning is looking at zoning uses. We can identify areas that are most suitable for various types or classes of activities in order to reduce conflicts among users, reduce environmental impacts, facilitate compatible uses, and advance national priorities.

A couple of other things. I think, again, there's no one agency that's in charge. When you look at -- there's been a variety of studies, probably 30 studies since the 1970s looking at this, they all talk about creating a national ocean department or -- I think that makes good sense, but as was brought up in a Senate Hearing in November, that still

leaves -- there's nobody in charge. You know, they talk about a council and you can't lead by committee. You've got to have somebody in charge. So there's -- I think the designation of an ocean czar somewhere in the office of -- the Executive Office of the President would give a focal point for the monitoring of activities and diffusing the conflicting uses.

Some of you may have heard of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty. This is something I think that we need to do immediately is accession to the treaty. The UNCLOS is a bilateral agreement that provides the direction on the use of the oceans and seabed. The U.S. is -- we're the only major country that has refrained from signing that. The treaty guarantees safe passage for military planes and ships in international waters and provides help to prevent international military incidents. Like I said, it's been debated since the 1980s, but the time has come to sign the treaty.

A couple of other things. I think that we need to make sure that our U.S. policy promotes the activities that we want to see. We need policy that promotes renewable energy. We need to basically streamline the permitting process, add some clarity, and provide incentives that will allow the folks that are putting these renewable resources out into the ocean environment. The same thing goes for aquaculture, for fish farms. You know, there's no national policy, no national strategy, and we badly need to put that together.

There's a few other things I could mention, but I'll just touch on a couple of resource needs just to put into perspective. We've got, you know, the U.S. only has three icebreakers right now, one of which is laid up. You look at countries like Sweden that have 17 icebreakers in their fleet. Russia, I think, has over 20. We've got other nations. Canada is building a fleet of patrolling vessels to patrol the Arctic and the U.S. just -- like I said, we haven't addressed our needs. And I know we've got a lot of competing needs for U.S. funding and resources right now, but like I said, I do think we need to focus more on what's going on in the ocean because of the big role that it's going to play looking forward in the

U.S. future.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Thanks, Anthony. All right. I'm going to throw the floor open to questions in a second. I'd like you each to make a brief follow-up comment first of all.

Matt, we've had a lot of successes, you know, in Iraq and Afghanistan with a tier two targeting approach. We recognize that hitting the top level of an insurgency creates an evolutionary effect. So I'd like you to talk about whether you examined that in your work and anything you might have found about the alternative approaches of hitting people at the second and third level of the organization.

John, you made a very good case for treating Somali piracy as a business and working to raise the cost while reducing the payoffs. Can I ask you to step out of your immediate research and examine the issues of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and other forms of criminal activity and ask whether treating those sorts of things as a business may also be something that we might want to think about.

And then finally, Anthony, you mentioned in passing the issue of the Northwest Passage with Canada. Can I ask you to just address real quickly issues of climate change and how changing ice coverage in the Arctic, changing patterns of coral dieback in the Pacific, fisheries changes, may affect some of these issues of international waterways protection that you talked about.

So give us a couple of minutes of each on that and then we'll throw the floor open.

Matt.

MR. FRANKEL: That's a great question, something I wanted to consider. It's difficult to find, I think, comprehensive data on that in the unclassified world. I think there are places where that does work. I think one area of sort of the sub-tier where we have

seen success is focusing on specialists that are much harder to replace. I think it's much easier to find a guy who will, you know, dig a hole or implant an IED; it's another thing to find somebody who has the knowledge to build the IED. So I think we've seen better impact in terms of focusing on very specialized folks, like bomb makers. Another case I think where we've had some success is on computer propaganda specialists. You know, for example, there's a group in Iraq called the Hezbollah Brigades. That's another Shiite group where the U.S. captured its -- basically its webmaster that was responsible for all its PR videos and things like that. And that had a significant detrimental effect on the organization. So I think, you know, not necessarily, you know, second tier writ large, but I think there are pieces within that where there has been positive impact.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Okay, thanks, Matt. John.

MR. GRIFFIN: Yes. As far as treating other irregular threats as a business or trying to attack them in that way, I think it will get back to what drives it. If it's driven by ideology, I think it will be less effective, but if it's driven by profit -- drug trade, those types of things, and of course, piracy, which I do think is driven almost primarily by money -- then I think it can be effective.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Okay. Anthony.

MR. POPIEL: All right. And just about the Northwest Passage, depending on whose forecast you look, they're predicting that the Arctic will be completely ice free during the summer months by 2030; some say by 2040. And basically all the shipping that's been going through the Panama Canal, there'll be an ability to go through the Arctic. It'll save time and as we know, time is money. So they're looking at a significant increase in traffic up there. The Northwest Passage, I mean, Canada has claimed that as internal waters for a long time. And there's other narrow waters like that in other places of the world. Again, by the Law of the Sea Treaty, it spells that out. And that's something we're going to

have to deal with with Canada.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Okay. Thanks, Anthony.

All right. Let's throw the floor open. Does anybody have any questions they'd like to ask?

MS. KELLY: Thank you. Can you hear me? My name is Lorelei Kelly. I run the New Strategic Security Initiative. Thank you, gentlemen. That was very educational.

The question I have is sort of taking us out to more 30,000 feet. It's about the narrative that I see all of your issues fitting into which is in today's world sort of strategically we're finally recognizing that we're leaving the Cold War behind and we need to leave this notion of containment and replace it with pursuit of credibility or from containment to credibility. What follows that is, you know, borders become less important than relationships. Coercion is less important than persuasion. Isolation is less important than participation, and on and on.

But I feel like there's no larger narrative under which a lot of these issues fit, being expressed publicly and consistently, except of course, here at Brookings. Thank you, Peter, for these kinds of events. I certainly don't see it very much on Capitol Hill where I've been working for the last 12 years. Who and where do you think could put forward this consistent big picture narrative most consistently? It seems that the President does strike the notes every time he gives a speech, but are your organizations working on this, respectively? Thank you.

MR. POPIEL: I'll just make a quick comment for my topic. You know, I thought -- I thought about this topic about 10 months before I actually arrived at Brookings because that's when I found out. And boy, I thought I was going to be breaking new ground, but as I learned through my research, the President did commission an interagency task force to look at the ocean policy last summer and they are looking at a lot of these things

that I've been looking at.

MR. FRANKEL: I would just add on the high-value targeting issue it is completely looked at in the narrative of the global war on terrorism or whatever we are now calling the global war on terrorism. And it is defining how we are focusing on these issues. And both the war in Iraq and Afghanistan fall out of this, you know, narrative. And certainly, the cases in Yemen, Somalia, et cetera, all fall under that narrative. So we've moved to this, you know, hit them where they are sort of strategy or tactic, I think, as a replacement of containment in these cases.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Let's assume, Lorelei, that the new QDR takes out the term global war on terrorism, but consciously doesn't replace it with anything else.

Okay. Other questions?

MR. HAYWOOD: Yeah. I'm Bob Haywood from One Earth -- executive director of One Earth Future Foundation, and we have a project on oceans beyond piracy. And one of our efforts in that is to try to develop more of a legal prosecutorial response. And I'd be interested in your comments as to how much the lack of legal capacity to actually try pirates is affecting -- affecting, not infecting -- naval operations and your catch-and-release policy that is -- seems to be a problem. And what actions the military is doing to try and improve that or where you see that going.

I have a second question for the last speaker on the Law of the Sea. That was originally not signed in the Reagan Administration due to the provisions dealing with deep sea mineral rights and the creation of a fund, somewhat ungoverned by the United Nations for developing countries, which we saw at that time as a problem. Is that being seen as less of a problem? Or is there efforts being made to change those sorts of provisions?

And finally, just a comment, is we pulled together 15 of some of the most

senior international maritime and treaty lawyers in October. And if anyone is interested, I have a booklet that's a summary of those meetings and I'd be glad to share that with anyone who wants it. Thanks.

MR. KILLCULLEN: John, do you want to pick that up first?

MR. GRIFFIN: Sure. As far as prosecution of piracy, you know, I sat in on a briefing a few months ago and a fairly senior State Department official characterized the prosecution problem as not so much a lack of laws in place, but more typically it becomes a little bit of lack of will problem with some of our partners. So I think the law -- the framework is there, but it's hard to say there's maybe a lack of will. But within the contact group they are working the issue. And I don't have the exact figures, but I know a lot of money is set aside to build up the efforts in Kenya and places so that it does become easier to prosecute.

MR. POPIEL: And I'll just say quickly that the issue that you pointed out was one of the stopping points in the 1980s, but they went back to the table and changed that provision so it is to the U.S.'s satisfaction. And every administration since the Reagan Administration has endorsed signing the treaty; we just have to get Congress to pull through now.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Up in the front.

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MR. KILLCULLEN: We've got a mic coming.

SPEAKER: I read that one of the problems with Somali piracy or the cause of it -- the western countries raided the Somali fishing grounds and took away the fishing resources from Somalia and they couldn't -- Somalians couldn't make income from fishing anymore so they went into piracy. So has one of the solutions been discussed for the Somali piracy problem to restore the fishing grounds to the Somalians?

MR. GRIFFIN: I think overall a stronger government in Somalia would help

if they could enforce their own territorial waters. So, yes, I have heard -- I mean, that's -- some of the pirates were former fishermen from the research I've done. And I think, yeah, it would benefit us all if fishing became a better occupation once again rather than piracy.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Thanks, John. Over here.

MS. JOHNSON: Good morning. My name is Allison Johnson. I'm from Northup Grumman Corporation. And I would like to ask a question to Matthew in regards to your presentation.

I attended an event last week at the New America Foundation with Robert Pack -- Papp, excuse me, and his study of the basic tracking of suicide bombers going back actually to the early 1900s. If you are familiar with the report I won't go into details and you can answer the question and inform the audience a little bit about his research. But what was fascinating about his presentation was fundamentally the conclusion that the attacks from suicide bombers were generated by the foreign occupation forces in the countries where the attacks were occurring. And he is going to be making a database available for the public to look at the research he's been doing. And I wanted to know how it relates to some of the conclusions you shared. And what does that mean about our drone attacks and the extent to which, you know, continuing these foreign forces in areas, going into other territories and attacking and then the results that Robert is stating in terms of creating more suicide bombers.

And a second quick question is at the American Society for International Law yesterday, for the first time the Obama Administration has vocalized the legalization or the legal argument for the drone attacks. And I would like to know if you can comment on the Legal Adviser Coe and his speech last night and whether you feel that we have a legal cover here on this issue.

Thank you very much.

MR. FRANKEL: Thanks. Great questions there. I intentionally, because I don't have a legal background, tried to stay away from the legality aspect of high-value targeting for the purposes of my research and instead, again, focus on sort of the effectiveness. Is it an effective strategy to use -- an effective tactic to use against insurgent and terrorist groups? I think the research on suicide bombings is useful. And again, we've seen that obviously play out in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm not -- in my research I'm not trying to sort of sanction whether I think, you know, occupation or foreign wars overseas are a good or a bad thing, but as a subset of that, you know, once we're there, what is the best strategic mission to approve? And again, I'm not saying that, you know, removing commanders is a bad thing. I don't think anyone would argue that, you know, the killing of Batula Massoud was necessarily a bad thing. I think what you need to do is understand the expectations of what comes after that -- that we can't go in there and expect to identify our top 20 list, remove the top 20 list, and expect to have success. And that's where I'm trying to walk through the paper. I mean, yes, there are certainly, you know, negative outcomes of occupation. We've seen that in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think the research sort of bears that out. But my point is, you know, once we're there, you know, what is the best way forward. And certainly where we've seen, I think, the shifts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I think this is starting to be internalized by some, but there are certainly parts of the military that do still very much focus on the metric of, hey, if we just eliminate X, then we will have -- that's totally what we saw with the deck of cards again the first couple of years after the fall of Saddam.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Okay. Over here I think we had a question in the front.

MS. PUNJANI: Lieutenant Colonel Shahnaz Punjani from the Washington Institute.

There's nobody in this room who probably has not seen Pirates of the

Caribbean, so I've got to ask you, are there any lessons learned from the, you know, pirate ops from that time period? You know, legalities and hunting down particular crews and that kind of thing.

MR. GRIFFIN: Yes, unfortunately, some of the lessons aren't so good because I looked and a lot of the same things we're doing today were the same things they did to combat the Barbary pirates. I mean, almost across the board. You know, hey, even best practices, that sort of thing. So, and ultimately it broke up the pirates essentially by going ashore, which I don't think is an option that we really have in Somalia right now. So there are, but they aren't necessarily -- they don't paint that good of a picture. The Barbary pirates kept on for 300 years despite the best efforts of Western Europe.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Up at the front here.

MR. WARREN: John, sort of piggybacking on what Dr. Killcullen said with regard to the businesses of other criminal activities like drugs, what makes this piracy thing interesting is that it appears that the people who make the money are actually legitimate businesses, insurance companies, in particular, unlike the drug business. If you -- as I understand it, if you look at the numbers for how much money goes to a pirate and his crew and et cetera, the numbers are sort of small. Maybe they're great for a Somali, but the middlemen, you know, really get the big piece of the pie. And really, the people making the big money are the insurance companies who are selling insurance to these shipping organizations. Vast amounts of money, you know, which make it a great business and a great tool for profit. I'm just curious if you ran into anything in that line and certainly it makes this particular challenge different than going after criminals maybe even harder because these insurance companies have a lot of power in their local politics.

MR. GRIFFIN: That's a tough one. Generally -- when you say the insurance companies, you mean the -- I mean, you're talking about Lloyd's, right , those sort

of folks. Yeah, I didn't go back -- trace it back to going after those. So.

MR. WARREN: They, in fact -- it appears that they are in fact sort of facilitating the pirates. If these people -- if somehow -- and I understand how it would be controlled or not, but because it's such a good business, you know, the pirates remain in business. If you understand what I'm saying.

MR. KILCULLEN: Tort reform. (Laughter)

MR. GRIFFIN: Well, that's an aspect of it, but, I mean, I still -- to me it comes back to stopping the money flow from the pirates. And, I mean, there are some folks who say that statistics you see -- there's a tendency to want to inflate that to make it worse to drive up the prices. So I have seen some things along those lines, but as far as what to do about that, I don't know. The threat is there and that does drive the insurance rates. As long as the attacks keep happening, the insurance companies have a pretty good case.

MR. KILLCULLEN: All right. We have time for one more question. I'm going to give it to my intellectual sparring partner and friend, General Dunlop back there.

GEN. DUNLOP: Thanks, David. Guess what I'm going to ask about? Drone attacks.

Mr. Frankel, your presentation was really brilliant and much to David's surprise I'm in violent agreement with your recommendations. The one thing that I would like to know if you've taken a look at, it seems to me, and there's some anecdotal evidence out there, that one of the biggest effects of drone attacks is on this psychology -- the mindset of the adversary. And it's driving them to behaviors which we want to drive them at. It's not so much the body count, so to speak. And how can we perhaps leverage that psychological effect if, in fact, you think there is one? Thank you.

MR. FRANKEL: No, it's a great point. I think there is a psychological impact, and I think there are other impacts as well. The argument has been made that the

continued drone strikes is what drove a lot of the Taliban leadership to Karachi and that made it easier for the Pakistanis to capture them. I think that's -- I don't know if you can prove that case, but certainly it's a reasonable argument.

In terms of how we can shape the way we do the strikes in order to have the maximum psychological impact, I think that's trickier. And again, it gets back to this idea of really understanding the networks that you're targeting. I think over time the U.S. military ended up with a better understanding, for example, of how the Sadrists worked and what messages can work and what doesn't work in terms of, you know, playing the Iran card. The Sadrists get support from Iran, but are painting themselves as a nationalist movement. And I think there are ways to play some of those psychological cards, but, again, that requires a fine tuning that I think sometimes the U.S. military -- it's not their strength. I'll leave it at that.

MR. KILLCULLEN: Thanks, Matt. Well, there's a huge amount of food for thought in all those presentations. And I think my main impression from it is what a large amount of very valuable research has been done here at Brookings and at CSIS and the Federal Executive Fellows program. So please join me in thanking the panelists.

(Applause)

MR. SINGER: So thank you again. I'm going to turn it over to our distinguished moderator.