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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Introduction:

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Keynote:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: I'm Peter Singer. I direct the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings, and today I have two great honors. The first is to welcome all of you to this first ever Military and Federal Fellow Research Symposium. Over the last year, a number of military officers and government officials have served at universities and public policy institutions across the nation, with many of them conducting their own independent research that culminates in monographs and journal articles. This Symposium, organized by these fellows themselves, is intended to provide a platform for these fellows and their research, building greater awareness of the cutting edge, independent research work that these leaders are preparing on key defense issues. Now, I have to emphasize the words "independent" and "research" here. The findings and statements of these officers who will present today is a result of scholarly research that was conducted in fulfillment of their military and other governmental organizational fellowships, but solely carried out by these individuals, that is the views that are expressed by -- that'll be expressed today are by the authors. They do not reflect the official position or policies of the institutions that hosted them, nor of the agencies that they are serving in or of the U.S. Government. And that's what makes this event such an honor for us to host. We see it not only as a means to better inject their unique blend of scholarly research and professional experience into the Washington, D.C., policy discourse, but also as a vivid demonstration of the intellect and expertise of the men and women who serve our nation.

And that leads very smoothly into the second honor that I have today, which is to introduce our keynote speaker, Lieutenant General John M. Paxton. Lieutenant General Paxton graduated from Cornell University with a bachelor of science and a master of civil engineering. He's, in fact, so busy that he didn't know the score of the game last

night. We had to break the bad news to him out in the lobby.

A career infantryman, the General's commanded Marines from platoon level all the way up to division and has served in all three active Marine divisions. He's had a range of experience that illustrates the demands that we've been placing on the Force, including deployments in Bosnia, Korea, Somalia, as well as Iraq where he served as chief of staff for the Multinational Force Iraq, and before that as commanding general for the 1st Marine Division. His other general officer assignments include his Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Western District, and as Assistant Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources. Today, he serves as Joint Staff Director for Operations, which gives him the perfect vantage point to introduce our topic of Defense Challenges and Future Opportunities. But most importantly, though, General Paxton has had one other experience which makes him the perfect speaker to kick us off today: that was his service as a Federal Executive Fellow with Brookings back when he was a Lieutenant Colonel. And so we're delighted and honored to have you join us here today. Welcome back!

LTG. PAXTON: Thank you, Peter, and for Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, my good friend, thank you kindly for the invitation. I'll use a joke that I think the Moody Blues did on one of their tours. He said the last time we played for you was when our hair was brown and our teeth were white. So 15 years ago here I checked in. There were four of us here at Brookings to include Harry Donn, and Randy, and Steve Sargeant, now a major general of the United States Air Force. But we checked in the same month as Dr. O'Hanlon did, and you get to be fast friends. And I'll come to that at the end of the discussion today for those of you who are wearing a suit, but would otherwise be wearing a uniform, and why you're out here and what your service and our nation expects of you during your year as a FEF.

If I can, what I'd like to do -- and again, thank you kindly for the invitation; David, good to see you again -- I don't have a keynote address for you. I know that'll break

your hearts, but what I hope to do is just in a few moments set some context. But what I think Brookings would like to do today with the 21st Century Initiative -- what I think you all hope to get out of this as a federal executive fellow and maybe a little bit more to show you, at least from my vantage point because you're always a victim of your experience, I'd like to kind of set the stage for the Joint Staff and OSD about the way that we look at the world today, perhaps the world in the near-term, and then maybe a few of those things over the horizon that we wrestle with, but at least in my billet, not as often as I should and not as deeply as I want to. So I'll use that as a context and a stage setter, and then I'd like to kind of fast forward to your role, and then hopefully we'll have a few minutes and Heather said we'd open up for some Q&A at the end.

If I start -- I'm a horrible joke teller, but you always have to have an attention getter, especially early in the morning if you haven't had your second cup of coffee. So I always start by today in history, whether it's Marine history or world history, and Jim Trahan is laughing at me. So today in history -- and I'll give you a latitude -- two weeks plus or minus -- so end of March, beginning of April, any year, any service, any war, any country. What's going on around the world in the past? All right.

1775: Patrick Henry, Virginia House of Burgesses, "I know not what course others might take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death." Now I say that because today is inspirational. Two hundred and some years ago, it was aspirational, and it ties in very well to what we're watching with the elections in Iraq and the aspirations that many people have over there, how we hope we can get to good governance, and certainly where we hope to go in Afghanistan perhaps in September.

1913: When I was here at Brookings, we had another fellow here, Susan Woodward, who had just finished Balkan Tragedy, a great in-depth study of the wars that were going on in the Balkans and what we were trying to do. In 1913, the Balkan Empire

was striking out against the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, further south, you know, two years later, the British and the Australians were going into the Dardanelles. So they're getting ready to celebrate ANZAC Day here in a little while.

Now you fast forward from that war to the "war to end all wars" that didn't happen again until 1945. And if you're a Marine, you realize that last night, they had the last formal counterattack on Iwo Jima. And after 26 days, we finally could say that the island was secure: 6,000 killed, over 20,000 wounded, 3 times that many Japanese. But that gave us the foothold to land the B29s to do the strikes on mainland Japan which would eventually terminate that war. Critical battle for us, but it presaged the last battle of the war, which was Okinawa. So a week from now -- we hadn't even finished with three divisions on Iwo Jima -- but a week from now, we land three more divisions on Okinawa. The landing on Okinawa was Easter Sunday. It was also April Fools Day. So we weren't sure which one was going to take hold. Okay? But it was Sunday, April 1.

Now I could keep fast-forwarding to more wars, but I think you get my point. Not only is history important, but you can see the mix between regular warfare, conventional warfare, major combat ops, asymmetric war, and the things that we have wrestled with since time immemorial that we still wrestle with today. And I will tell you that that's probably the biggest exchange, the biggest debate, the biggest source of both opportunity and friction that's on the plate of the Joint Staff today. So let me use that as a start point if I may.

What I'd like to do is kind of walk around the world a little bit, but talk about where our major combatant commands are, the six geographic commanders, and the four functionals to show you the scope of things that we wrestle with that each of you does, too. You may have done it in a previous job or billet. You may be doing it now. Perhaps you have an area of focus academically that you'd like to look at. But it's all a matter of balance and it's a matter not only of balance for your time, but nationally it's a balance for resources,

too.

The panelists and the moderators that you have set up today I think will elaborate and kind of go in-depth on this today. And it's very good because you're going to take a look about manpower and readiness. You're going to take a look about asymmetric warfare. You're going to take a look about our industrial base and our resourcing and our capacity nationally and worldwide to resource not only the defense establishment, but perhaps the capability to project power and to wage conflict if you need to, so really good dialogue here. David Killcullen is going to talk I know about the asymmetric warfare. I think you'll have a look at piracy and a few other things. So it all ties together.

The start point if I may is I'd like to start at Central Command, and that's probably a good place to start because right now they're consuming about 85 to 88 percent of all our resources: people, ISR, vehicles, certainly time and attention. Okay? And that's not a bad thing because like Douglas MacArthur said, "The very object of war is victory and not prolonged indecision." So we are awaiting the effort in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Been in Iraq now a little over seven years as you know. National election was about two weeks ago. The tally for the votes in Iraq is over 95 percent right now, almost 11 million voted, probably more than voted in the United States in terms of percentage of the population. Okay? But probably only about 10- or 12,000 difference between the State of Law and the Iraqiya/Al-Iraqiya parties. So there's a lot of consternation there. I think you'll find out that both UNAMI and IHEC will certify that the election process was valid, accurate, and credible. There'll be a couple of minor challenges. They've had several hundreds that have been registered now, probably only three that have any degree of validity. They've got a four-part process to go back and do all the recounts. It's really a good process over there, and I think it will stand the litmus test and the scrutiny and the election will stand up.

So now we're going to move to the next phase: How do you do

governance? And you want to have a rule of law, but now you have to have built coalitions out there. So the issue will be how well these parties and how well these individuals can figure out how they want to constitute the Council of Representatives, how they're going to work the presidency and the vice presidency, how they're going to do 140, how they're going to bring in the Kurds up north, and so there are a lot of challenges with the actual movement from, you know, stability, security, relative peace, free elections, recounts, and into governance. And this will paint itself out here certainly over the course of the next 60 days, but obviously within the course of the next 6 months.

You can read all the dialogue that's going on in the open-source press and the meetings that are happening there. I think our assessment is that the parties, individual and collective, in Iraq have kind of backed in from the edge now. They realize that they had a stake there either to contest the elections physically up front or intellectually as they were going on or in terms of the vote count afterwards. None of those have held any water now, and the elections have been conducted and it's been good. So now they have to get on with the business of how to govern and how to do it best for the people of Iraq.

The Iraq success story, if you will, as many of you know, hard earned, hard fought. Seventeen brigades, brigade equivalents, on the ground at one time over almost 180,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. We've gone from 10 to 12 to 17. Now we're in the process of going back 12 to 10, eventually down to 5. Okay? Last July, we renegotiated, and we have a security force agreement over there.

In the next window, if you will, the next phase line is this August. And by August we'll be down to what would have been five BCTs, but we'll call them AABs -- advise and assist brigades. So by the 31st of August, we'll have advisory and assistance brigades there that will work the transition piece from 31 August this year to 31 December next year, by the terms of the Security Force Arrangement, when the United States is supposed to be

out of Iraq.

Now what's the definition of "out of Iraq?" You tell me, okay? And we're working through it, and I don't say that in terms of being flip. But, you know, what is our standing agreement, our standing relationship? What's best in the national interests of Iraq, in the bilateral interests of the U.S. and Iraq, in the regional interests for security and stability in the Middle East at large? So we have to figure out, you know, what is our security force arrangement? What do we have for mil-to-mil relationships? What do we have for foreign military sales for our military arrangements? Where are we with professional military education exchanges? And more importantly, what do we do with alliance building, coalition building, in the area?

So these are the things with General Odierno right now. Certainly Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates, with the rest of the interagency partners, will be working through that. So that's Iraq. Okay?

Meanwhile, as we're trying to do security and stability in a phased, responsible, drawdown in Iraq, we're looking at now what we call the "uplift" in Afghanistan. It's a great British and Australian term, and it precludes us from using surge twice, which had all kinds of redline significance here. So we have the uplift in Afghanistan.

Uplift, of course, General McChrystal went in last June, did his assessment of the situation on the ground, released the assessment back to the Chairman in August, went through the better part of 90 to 100 days review process with the National Security Council, the President, members of the interagency, members on the Hill, before the President made his announcement at West Point in December. Okay? But the agreement was we will instead of counterterrorism, we will do a fully resourced COIN strategy. And the first increment of the fully resourced COIN would be 30,000 additional troops. We're trying to negotiate there between the U.S. contribution and the NATO and allied contribution, but

30,000 in the uplift which will take us from 68 to 98 in Afghanistan.

Focus of effort was supposed to be in RC South. Degree of stability, degree of success in RC East, where the Army has been for the last couple of years, RC South split between the Army and the Marines, heavy fighting down there by our great allied counterparts, primarily the Brits, but also the Canadians and the Australians, from Oruzgan through Kandahar and out to Helmand. Okay? But we're going to double down on the bet. We're going to put allied coalition forces in Helmand. We're going to work through the Central Helmand River Valley as the first focus of effort. The reason we're going there is because that's the ratlines from Balochistan up, from Pakistan in the Pashtun Belt over. And you can't get through the capital of the Pashtun Belt in Kandahar unless you can open up freedom of movement in the Central Helmand River Valley. So we're going into Marjah. We're going into Natalee. We're going into Lashkar Gah. We're going to try to stabilize that area as a first focus of effort; then we're going to shift gradually to the second focus of effort, which will be over by Kandahar, and then we're going to work north. And we have supporting objectives as we move north up towards RC East, and then we have economy-of-force operations where the Norwegians, the Germans, and all the other great allied partners are in RC East and RC West.

But it is a phased campaign plan, and we have been given not only the resources of 30,000, but about 12 to 18 months, depending on when you want to say that clock started to tick, when 2 may have got into the ground last June or when the assessment was delivered in August. But we know it's a finite amount of resources in terms of people and a finite amount of time, and we're working through the metrics of the interagency process now in how you judge success. And the metrics piece, as Dr. Killcullen will tell you, is vitally important because you don't get what you expect, you get what you inspect. And so we have to figure out what we're looking at and what is a true measure of effectiveness.

How do you measure stability, insecurity on the ground? Is it the number of marketplaces and bazaars that are opening up? Is it the number of farms that are there? Is it folks who are coming up to you and voluntarily telling you where the IEDs are? Is it the number of police chiefs who have turned others in on the force and there's evidence that they're going to decrease the amount of internal corruption? What are those metrics? How do you state them? How do you measure them? How frequently do you look at them? Weekly? Quarterly?

This is the exact debate that the commanders on the ground are having, the PRTs in the interagency teams in the theater are having, and that we're going to have back here in Washington. So I would challenge you -- for those who have been over there or those who are getting ready to go -- for not only what are you going to do, but how are you going to measure your success?

Now those two theaters, as I said, that's the campaign. That's the areas we have authorized use of military force. That's about 85 to 88 percent of our assets, the people in the ISR. Meanwhile, there are 8 other, 9 other, combatant commands, and certainly a lot of other folks who are clamoring for their piece of that 12 to 15 percent of the pie. And that's where the challenge lies.

You can go right next door to either European Command or AFRICOM and some of those commanders -- AFRICOM will tell him he's in a Phase Zero campaign. He would be worried about how to do nation building, mil-to-mil exchanges, digging wells, medical and dental. But what he realized when General Ward got in there was he is now in charge of the best ungoverned spaces there. And he is worried about what's happening in the Horn of Africa, in Somalia with al Shabaab, and East Africa al Qaeda. He's watching the Lavant and along the Mediterranean with AQL. He's watching the Trans-Sahara region with Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and across the Middle Belt. He's watching ECOWAS in Nigeria on

the further coast, and he's watching the stability down south. But he's got a huge continent with a huge amount of demographics, economics, health problems, and he's trying to do that literally on two or three cents on the dollar. Okay? And that's a challenge for them out there about how you create nation building, how you get mil-to-mil presence, how you can set the environment, OPE, a little operational prep for the environment which you're doing in a very resource constrained environment for us.

Meanwhile in Europe, you're trying to do the same thing. Europe has become the bill payer. EUCOM is very stable, very important, but Admiral Stavridis over there is engaged with his NATO allies in terms of what are troop-contributing nations going to do to assist in ISAF and in Afghanistan. What is in their national interest? What is in the regional interest? What is in the world interest? How do you approach NATO members, NATO allies, for troop contributions? Meanwhile, NATO is the bill payer because when we need stuff to go to CENTCOM for a short period of time, when you have to take planning effort and aircraft to assist AFRICOM, it all comes out of EUCOM. So Admiral Stavridis is feeling important and feeling engaged, but he's also feeling like people are playing poker with his chips. So another challenge there.

Let me shift to this hemisphere, to SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM, extremely busy out there right now, but things you wouldn't think about. Let me give you an anecdote. I checked in two years ago as the J5 -- on the Joint Staff before I went to the J3 -- J5 does strategy plans and policies; spent a lot of time in the National Security Council. The first week I'm there I have about five or six officers come running into the office, their hair on fire. "Sir, sir, you have to go over to the National Security Council. You're going to talk to Dr. Hadley."

I said, "Okay."

They said, "Sir, we've got a read ahead."

I said, “Come on in.” I said, “Now what’s the brief on?”

“Sir, LRA.”

“I’m an infantry guy so LRA, I don’t have this.”

“Sir, it’s long range aircraft. It’s Tu-95 Bears. They’re coming out of Ukrainka. They’re flying over the Aleutians. They’re coming in over Alaska. We have to figure out what our policy is. Are we going to intercept them? Are we going to intercept by radar? Are we going to escort them? What are we going to do?”

So infantry guy, grunt, takes me a while. They brief me up on it. I’m fine. I go over and do the NSC meeting. We still don’t have a policy, but we have some reaction procedures, and we’re working through LRA. About three weeks later I’m in the office again, Friday afternoon, just like always. We call them the “Friday follies.”

A different group of people come in, hair on fire. “Sir, sir, you have to go to the National Security Council. You have to see Dr. Hadley.”

By this time I’m used to the Friday episode. “Okay, well what’s the discussion?”

He said, “Sir, it’s on LRA.”

I said, “I got it. I got it. Long-range aircraft, Tu-95.”

He said, “No sir, it’s Joseph Kony, Lord’s Resistance Army in Africa.”

Now for those of you who are used to working with OSD, you know, you can’t have one acronym mean two or three things. Okay? You have to watch it.

Now when you move through this hemisphere, though -- I was reminded of that when I was talking about NORTHCOM -- NORTHCOM, obviously, a lot of great work with the Canadians and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to make sure the Olympics were staged successfully. Now, that was invisible to most of you, but a lot of planning going on there. As our Canadian allies and counterparts would say, “Look, this is a sporting event

at which we hope a little security may be evident. We don't want to make this a security event at which a sporting hockey match happens to break out." But there was a whole lot of effort to take a look at security in Vancouver, British Columbia.

You take a look at the Straits of Juan de Fuca, if you go up there -- for those of you on the naval side, both aviation and surface, and you know the tidal changes up there. You know some of the cross-border issues, so you can imagine what our Department of Homeland Security and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were doing -- so there are things that we take for granted that we're watching very closely. And in the midst of that, we're still watching the long range aircraft which have been making a more visible presence as Russia has more out-of-area deployers than they have had for the last 15 years, to include some that are now going out over the Pacific and challenging PACOM. And we're trying to see, look is this just a statement of national sovereignty? Are they pressing the envelope here? These are things that are on PACOM and NORTHCOM's plate all the time.

SOUTHCOM, another Phase Zero command. And without being flippant, MEDCAPS, STENTCAPS, digging wells, mil-to-mil engagement. And that's fine until you get an earthquake in Haiti. Okay? SOUTHCOM has lots of plans on the table. I will tell you in all candor that they reorganized the command center at SOUTHCOM about five or six years ago, and it was called the PFACC, and it was the Partnership for the Americas Coordination Center. And it was designed -- how many of you have been there or are familiar with it? It's a great organization, very well organized, very well manned, forward leaning, and it does the preparation that you want to do with our Latin American/South American counterparts. Okay? But it was designed for a most likely course of action. It was not designed for the most dangerous course of action.

So when the earthquake hit Haiti, as it has done numerous times since the -- for hundreds of years, but certainly since the 1930s, there is no plan on the shelf for an

earthquake in Haiti. It was all crisis response. There's a plan for mass migration from Haiti. Okay? There's a plan for health issues in Haiti, but there was no plan for an earthquake in Haiti. So you saw how quickly it took us to get about 21 ships and about 12,000 soldiers and Marines down there to get the Comfort manned up and out of Baltimore. But those are resource equipment. Okay? When the Comfort goes there, those are doctors who are probably -- and hospital corpsmen, who are probably in-dwell, getting ready to go to Afghanistan and Iraq. So -- but you have to do that. And, of course, for the U.S. Government and for the State Department, our presence in this hemisphere and the stability that we afford Haiti is very important. Of course, three weeks later, as we're just winding down from Haiti, you have the earthquake in Chile. So there are things, obviously things, you're unable to predict, but these are more draw on the resources.

So I solicit -- I offer you -- when you get to the panel about our industrial base, you know, things about BRAC, you know, the base realignment and closure. There was a reserve air station down in Miami that was absolutely critical to executing the Haiti operations, and it was full of reservists and National Guard that we mobilized to bring in there. But we stretched it to the absolute limit because the airport in Haiti is single-lane, one runway. The MOG, or the max on the ground, is listed as seven; it's really only three. And of the three that get there, you are manually off-loading the equipment and the gear on two of the three. That's how antiquated the facilities are.

Now just like we had the same problem there in SOUTHCOM, if you go over to NORTHCOM on the other coast when we were doing the Olympics out there and in support -- lost my train of thought here -- I was going to say the command and control apparatus at NORTHCOM was also worried about things with Canada and missile defense of the United States. So STRATCOM and NORTHCOM have issues that they're working on there.

Let me use that as a segue to our functional commanders here: STRATCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM. These folks are functional commanders. They work in support of our geographic or regional commanders, but these are the ones who integrate at the scenes.

TRANSCOM wants to make sure that we don't have to bank on seven consecutive miracles to be able to win these wars. So TRANSCOM is now worried about how you get all the aircraft staged and get the people where they need to go. Most of you I don't think -- and I certainly was not aware -- when the President decides "I'm going to Indonesia," you can imagine, it's important. I mean, we need to go down there. We still have issues from 30 years ago with Kapasos and the Indonesian Armed Forces and things that we're looking at. But to get the President to Indonesia, to get the advance party there, to get the secure vehicles there, to get the helos that will ferry him around, to get the main body, to get the stay behind, it takes -- I won't tell you because it's classified -- but it takes a whole lot of C-5s and C-17s. And when you put those C-5s and C-17s going into Indonesia with the President, then that means they are not taking people to Afghanistan or people from Iraq. And this is part of the trade space that we need to establish there.

Where I was going with my bases and stations when I talked about NORTHCOM -- just like that reserve airstrip in South Florida was important for Haiti, there's another reserve installation up in Bellingham, Washington, that was critical for the Olympics, too. Now that's part of the BRAC process. Okay? We have a BRAC process out in Fort Ben Harrison. How many soldiers out here used to know where Fort Ben Harrison was? Okay? We now have Camp Atterbury out there in Indianapolis, okay, which is where we train our interagency partners to man up the PRTs before they go to Afghanistan and Iraq. So we're using all these pieces of terrain.

And I had the opportunity about two weeks ago to talk to an NDAA panel on

homeland basing, and my recommendation to them was to be very, very circumspect -- and probably to give them the Heisman here -- to tell them that we ought not to be turning over too many more bases and stations because we may be at the lowest common denominator here. And the ones we turn over, we will not get back. Now there will be a constant pressure and a constant threat from urban development, from other land use from the great citizens of this nation about why you shouldn't have an airstrip at El Toro or a base at Fort Ben Harrison. But when you give those away, you don't get them back, and you keep getting fewer bases and further away from the areas you need them. And then for our U.S. crises, if you do the homeland exercise about how do we handle a quake in San Moreno and San Francisco, you can't do the response up there. It's just not there.

Anyway, I walk around. The last two things I'll talk about for the combatant commands are cyber and space. STRATCOM, strategic command out in Omaha, is a global synchronizer. Just like special ops command in Florida is the global synchronizer for all things special operation forces around the world, and they have theater socks that work special operators -- soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines -- in the fight. When we redid the unified command plan two years ago, we made STRATCOM the global synchronizer for all things cyber and space. All right?

Many of you are aware -- I know Dr. Singer is certainly from some of his writing -- but the technology out there and where we're going with the world of computers, you know, we are hacked and we are intruded and we are probed every day, whether it's to deny us service, to spook us, or to steal data. And CYBERCOM and STRATCOM are watching this on a daily basis to make sure our databases are secure and are pure and there is both currency and accuracy of the data that we present there.

When you take a look -- and I just give you this as food for thought -- when you take a look at TRANSCOM and trying to set up those seven consecutive miracles for

putting people around the world, at some point TRANSCOM can't lift it all themselves. They go to DHL. They go to FedEx. They go to craft aircraft that come in from Delta and stuff because they have to contract it out because our defense dollars don't let us buy enough gray tails and enough air force to do this so we contract it out. The minute you contract it out, it becomes open source. It becomes biddable. It becomes releasable. It becomes foible and it's on the public Net. And then it becomes -- as opposed to the classified Nets we work on -- then it becomes discoverable if you're in China, if you're in Russia, if you're in Estonia or Latvia, and a lot of other places. So we really watch the security of our database there. And that database, you know, sooner or later if you can figure out what aircraft, what place, what unit, and you know where the destination is, then you can start to build the out-plans and the con-plans, so we have to watch that.

So that's kind of a walk around the world of those things that are on our plate. I will tell you that we spend -- just like I said, we have 85 to 88 percent of our resources in Afghanistan and Iraq -- we probably spend 60 to 65 percent of our day to make sure that we have a responsible drawdown in Iraq, and we have a timely, focused buildup in the uplift in Afghanistan, and that's where we're going right now. The other things are things that we think about for the next fight.

Now let me use that as a segue, if I can, to the real thing on the next fight. This gets into your last panel today on readiness and training. We are taking a real hard look through all the four Services and rightfully so about how you build our bench. Are we doing what we need to do with recruiting? Are we doing what we need to do with entry-level training? Are we doing what we need to do in terms of getting people out for follow-on training, like the FEF programs? How do you build the bench for people? How do you build the bench for bases and stations, as I said, with BRAC? How do you build the bench for equipment? You take a look about a lot of our programs, whether it's the JSF, whether it's

future fighting vehicles, and we have a lot of programs that are in jeopardy right now. Some have been cancelled the last couple of years because they're non-recruiting violations. They are cost overruns. They are not making key performance parameters. They're not making deadlines.

So is that the military's fault because we failed to specify what we need? Is it a contractor's fault because he can't deliver? Is it a technology and database fault because we're not training the right people in private industry in our colleges and universities to do it? Is it an organizational piece? Is it a congressional piece? Or is it a little bit of all of it? Okay? But the bottom line is we have a problem. We have a problem programmatically in terms of articulating what we need, measuring what we need, and delivering on time and on target. So -- and that's a great opening if I will for the last panel there in things for you to think about.

My last point then, if I may, is how does this all tie to you as federal executive fellows? I had the rare and unique privilege of coming here to Brookings 15 years ago, walked in the same time Dr. O'Hanlon did. And it kind of changed the way I looked at the Marine Corps, changed the way I looked at the Department of Defense. I didn't want to come here. I mean, you could see the skid marks. Not only did I not want to leave 1st Marine Division, and you could see the claw marks all the way across the country, but if I was coming back and going to top-level school, I wanted to go to Carlisle, I wanted to go to National War College, I wanted to go someplace where my mind expansion would be I'd have to talk to soldiers and sailors and airmen. Okay?

Now I love -- I really like soldiers, sailors, and airmen. I love Marines, but I really like soldiers, sailors, and airmen. But the mind expansion for me was to come here to Brookings to find people who are of both political parties, of all kinds of academic backgrounds, of all kinds of functional and geographic interests, from all around the world --

U.S. and international -- who are looking not only at a specific area of interest that had relevancy and they had experience in, but trying to show how that shaped our overall decision making. How it either shaped the policy, shaped the authority, shaped the allocation of resources. And it forced me to open my aperture and to say, boy, I really was pretty myopic there. I was really probably looking at things -- and I thought they were important, and I won't change my opinion, they're still important. But I've really got to change the assumptions I work in. I've got to change the metrics I use to look at this. And I'm going to have to change the way I do business and what really is the bigger, broader, better decision. Is it the better of two goods or the worse of two bads? Okay? There's never any perfect decision in this; it's never good or bad. But how does this change the way I look at the process?

And I would ask all of you who are here as FEFs -- let me see a show of hands, those of you who are active duty or are op-steps. I want you to know something. I went out and polled all the op-steps yesterday, and I think right now we have 159 of you out here. And you're using the taxpayer's dollar, and you're counting against our in-strength in Afghanistan and Iraq, so you'd better be doing good work. Okay? But this is a rare and unique opportunity for you, and it's a two-way street. You're going to learn a lot from the academicians, the students, the interns, as well as the fellows, the full-time fellows. But you're also going to contribute. You're going to give them exposure to what goes on to them behind the iron curtain. Okay? What's going on in the Pentagon? Well, what's the mean damage? What's the impact on that squadron if you have to, you know, do two additional bases and stations? Or if you have to be expeditionary and you have to build up in Manass? Okay? What's the implication on the ship, you know, if we don't get that right of passage or if the policy says we're not going to have freedom of navigation or we don't have viable counter-piracy, what's the impact on the ships and service ships in that area? Okay?

What is the impact on the Army and the Marine Corps, you know, if we bore into you and say, “It’s fully resourced COIN, but you can only have 30,000 -- and the real definition of fully resourced COIN was a lot more than that -- what’s the impact in terms of your ability to wage the fight, to sustain the fight, to expand the fight?”

So this is the great dialogue that needs to happen, and this is the vibrancy that makes our democracy so good. This begs the whole issue of how many people command and put the economic card on the table? Here we are in the worst recession of the last 70 or 80 years, so to put the economic lens on it is critically important, too. So I would ask all of you who are FEFs to make the most out of your year.

I think I already used the line before, “You never get what you expect, but you always get what you inspect.” And I would ask you to inspect a little bit. I’d ask you to kind of open the curtain and peel back either the onion or the grape, but look into this. And you will develop a richer appreciation for our country and for our academic institutions and for our governance and the dialogue we have. And you also develop life-long friends who you are pleased to call friends and continue to associate with, which is what makes the interaction so important.

So I give that to you just as a stage center. I don’t know where we’re at for time, Heather -- we’re done. I busted my limit. Thanks kindly for the invitation, Mike and Peter, and have a great day, and best of luck to all of you. Thank you.