

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CREATING "AMERICA'S TEACHER CORPS"

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. WHITEHURST: Good morning, thanks for coming out on this rainy and not entirely pleasant Washington Monday. I'm Whitehurst, I'm a Senior Fellow here at Brookings and Director of the Brown Center on Education Policy. This is the second in a series of events and reports that are occurring at the Brown Center under the general rubric of rethinking the federal role in education.

The project is organized somewhat unusually in terms of typical academic panels in that we identify leading experts, academic experts, and we ask them to generate policy recommendations that are grounded in evidence, but also politically possible.

And so it's important to understand that we're not here to review the literature and engage in a typical academic exercise, we are self-consciously generating policy recommendations that we hope will be interesting enough to catch the attention of the administration and/or Congress and have some impact on policy within the relatively short term. We think of a year as our kind of window for action. So our recommendations aren't compelled by research, but they are suggested by it. For this project, our concern was how federal policies around teacher quality could better serve the need to raise academic achievement, particularly for children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. The current federal law in this area titled to No Child Left Behind is largely – focuses on credential, it assures that every child has a teacher who is certified by that child's state, but we know that, at best, that's just the beginning of the challenge of getting qualified teachers into the classroom.

So teachers, what do we know about them? How many of you can remember fondly a wonderful teacher in your life? Raise your hand if you can. And how

many of you can remember someone who was a disaster? I would expect, if you're like me, there are lots of them that fell in the middle somewhere, that you may, depending on how old you are, have trouble remembering at all at this point, you have to go back and think hard, you know, who was my fifth grade teacher, I can't actually remember at this point in time.

So it is our intuition as former students that there are good, bad, and indifferent teachers. I'll slip in the anecdote for a moment and describe how my wife and I, when our kids were school age, had to play our intuitions in a public school district on Long Island, an affluent, one of those private/public school districts that Fordham has written about recently. So the deal was, if you were an involved parent, you talked to other parents who had kids in the grade to which your child was ascending, and you found out via word of mouth who you really wanted and who you should avoid.

The system in the Three Village School District, however, did not allow you to write a letter to the principal or to the district superintendent indicating which teacher you wanted your child assigned to. If you named a teacher, the letter would be thrown away, that was district policy.

So part of the challenge was to find out characteristics of these teachers, the ones you wanted to avoid, that you could put in the letter asking for your child's assignment.

So if the teacher was known, for example, for yelling and being abusive, you would say things like, my child thrives best in a calm environment in the classroom; or if you knew the teacher happened to focus on lots of kind of theatrical exercises and happened to be really good, you would say, our child loves drama and has always thrived in environments in which he's allowed to express himself creatively. So our intuitions about these differences in teacher effectiveness, the research has finally caught up to our

intuitions, so we know a lot more about that than we used to, and we'll be hearing about that today. So teachers are important, not only intuitively, but from research.

The second thing we know about teachers is that current evaluation systems don't capture either what we know from research or our intuitions about these differences.

In a speech at the National Press Club earlier this year, Randi Weingarten, the FT President, said, teacher evaluation procedures are broken, cursory, perfunctory, superficial, and inconsistent; we agree with her conclusion, and you'll hear some more about that today.

The third thing we know is that compensation and contractual practices for teachers are unusual compared to other labor markets. There's no extra pay for working in hard to staff schools, there's no extra pay for being one of those teachers who parents want their child to be in the classroom, there's no extra pay for high demand skills like teaching math or science. How do you get the highest pay in benefits as a teacher? You start teaching early, you stay in the same place for 25 years, and you amass post graduate credits, that's the secret to retiring with the highest pay and highest benefits.

It's hard to identify another labor market that works exactly like that, and we think it's non-optimal for the goals we have in line, which are making sure that the best and brightest are likely to enter the teaching profession, that once in the profession, they are willing to work in schools that are more challenging and difficult to staff, that their ways, once in the profession, for getting better at teaching through a body of professional knowledge that's derived from contrasting effective and ineffective teachers, and that good teachers are retained in the profession, they are not lost at high rates.

And so our proposal for doing that is called America's Teachers Corps, and that's what we're here today to talk about. It is a relatively straight forward proposal, it's that teachers who serve in districts in which they can be shown to be highly effective through the district or state evaluation systems would receive visible recognition for that, they would be identified nationally as a member of America's Teacher Corps, and conditional on service in high poverty districts, they would get a substantial salary bonus and a portable credential that they could take from one state to another without having to jump through any additional hoops.

We think this proposal compliments other efforts to reform some of the conditions around the labor market for teachers, and we think it would be a useful jump start to those efforts because it appeals directly to teachers who we think know when they are highly effective, want to be recognized, and would be – want to be part of districts, could allow that recognition to go forward.

So with that as an introduction, I will introduce the panel and then have them flush out this concept for you and then we will open the floor for comments and questions from you. So if I could start at this end and ask my panelists to introduce themselves.

MS. LOEB: Hi, I'm Susanna Loeb, I'm a Professor at Stanford and Director of the Institute for Research on Education Policy and Practice. My of my research has been on teacher labor markets, and in particular, on the sorting of teachers across schools.

MR. STAIGER: Hi, I'm Doug Staiger; I'm Professor of Economics at Dartmouth. Most of my work in education has been on measuring teacher effectiveness and models of value added, and related work, I do similar things with hospitals and physicians.

MR. GOLDHABER: Hi, I'm Dan Goldhaber from the University of Washington, and basically if you melt what Susanna and Doug said about their background, that's my background, connecting teacher characteristics to student outcomes and investigating teacher labor markets.

MR. GLAZERMAN: Hi, Steve Glazerman, Senior Researcher at Mathematica Policy Research. My research also focuses on teacher labor markets, particular teacher evaluation, compensation, certification, and preparation and training.

MR. WHITEHURST: And I'll ask everyone on the panel who is not an economist to raise their hand. All right. I want to turn first to Dan Goldhaber to pick up the theme I introduced briefly on the importance of teachers to student learning and flush that out for us, Dan.

MR. GOLDHABER: Is there really only one non-economist? I saw one person raise their hand in the audience. So Russ basically set up what I'm going to talk about really nicely by having you all raise your hands in memory of a teacher that was very effective and a teacher that was very ineffective, and basically what I'm going to talk about is connecting those anecdotal impressions to the statistical work that basically reaffirms those impressions.

And I should caveat what I'm about to say by saying that everything that I'm going to talk about here onward is based on value added models, so we are going to talk about teacher effectiveness and teacher quality in relation to teacher contributions to student achievement, which I think is an important, albeit narrow, measure of what teachers are doing in schools.

So we basically know that teacher quality, teacher effectiveness is important because of the advent and build-up of large longitudinal state data sets, so it's

really only in the last decade or so that the statistical work has caught up with the individual's anecdotal memory of teacher quality.

And it probably goes without saying, but the reason that we focus on teacher quality is because there's a lot of variation in the teacher work force. So when we talk about teacher quality, it's implicitly suggesting that there's a lot of variation, because if teachers were all the same, then the concept of teacher quality and the importance of individual teachers would, of course, be irrelevant. So typically we measure teacher quality in standard deviation units, and I'm going to try both for this audience and the audiences later on today not to get into the weeds on that except to say that I'm going to basically benchmark what we know about teacher quality relative to other kinds of investments that schools make or other kinds of teacher characteristics and talk about a one standard deviation change of teacher quality.

So we're talking about roughly moving from a teacher who falls at the, you know, 33rd percentile to the 67th percentile in terms of effectiveness.

And basically, from the empirical research, we know that that kind of a change in teacher effectiveness is quite large relative to investments like changes in class size. So we know a good deal about the investments of class size and the returns, and the effect size of changing teacher quality is roughly equal to a change in class size, a reduction of class size of 11 to 13 students.

So we're talking about, you know, a really, really significant size effect of changes in teacher quality. We also know that the difference between being assigned to an effective versus an ineffective teacher can be the equivalent of more than a year's worth of learning growth. So if you were to measure it relative to what students typically learn in a year, again, the effects are really quite profound.

And if you were assigned to an effective versus an ineffective teacher over several years, then that's estimated to be enough of a differential to close the size of the learning gaps that we typically see between advantaged and disadvantaged students.

So I'm trying to give you some means of putting – wrapping your hands around just how important teacher quality is. I forgot a couple more. Relative to teacher credentials, the variation of teacher quality within a teacher credential or within a teacher characteristic is very large compared to the difference between teachers who hold different credentials.

So we know, for instance, that teachers get appreciably better early on in their career. But if you look at the difference between an effective versus an ineffective teacher at any particular stage in a career, with a particular number of years of experience, those differences within an experience category are much, much larger than the differences that we see from going from say one year to two years worth of experience. And that plays out really regardless of whatever credentials we're looking at. So there is research that connects teachers who pass and fail licensure tests, there's research that connects teachers who come into the work force through different pathways. In fact, a lot of this research has been done by folks that are on this panel.

And just to give you one more anecdote, not anecdote, give you one more sort of statistical nugget, I believe it's some work that Doug has done, and similar to the work that Susanna has done in New York City, shows that there are statistically significant differences between teachers who come into the New York City school system through different pathways, but the difference between an effective and ineffective teacher within a pathway is roughly ten times the difference, the average difference between teacher pathways.

So I'm going to stop there because you're going to hear a lot more from other panelists about the connection between teacher credentials and student achievement, but the big message is, which is a message that – what I'm basically teaching to the choir, that teachers matter.

MR. WHITEHURST: Doug Staiger is going to talk to us about the current state of the evaluation of teachers by districts and states.

MR. STAIGER: Okay. So while there's I think universal agreement that there's wide variation in teacher effectiveness, whether you focus on the value added and the achievement or any way you measure this, you're always hit by this.

The current teacher evaluation system just fails, at least in most districts, fails to identify the variation. So a lot of these problems for people who read the Widget Effect, which was a report put out by the new teacher project, are documented there, but they're also documented elsewhere.

So the first place is there's just very little differentiation at all in most formal evaluation systems. All teachers are good or great, right, it's the – will be gone effect, everyone is thought of as superior, excellent. So most districts use binary ratings and classify more than 98 percent of teachers as satisfactory in the top rating. You know, the few districts especially identified in the Widget Effect report that had more categories, over 90 percent were in the excellent and superior kind of categories. You know, with this kind of, you know, with this kind of variation, it's going to be very hard for people in those kind of ratings to stand out, right. When everyone gets A's, it's hard for people to know that you are a superior student.

So the flip side of this is that there's very little recognition of excellent teachers in any of these teacher evaluation systems. In the survey that the Widget Effect did of teachers and administrators, over half of teachers and administrators agreed that

we're not doing enough to recognize and reward the most effective teachers. That's not surprising in a system like this which basically focuses on identifying very sub par performance in the classroom, the one or two percent who you're willing to flag as not satisfactory.

At the same time, there's very little use of these evaluations for professional development. Three quarters of teachers say their most recent evaluation didn't even identify any areas for development. They're very perfunctory, and in a system like this where everyone is great, it's not easy to give feedback or there's no avenue to give feedback about where you're not great and where you could improve. Along with this, there's surprisingly little attention paid to novices, to new teachers, right. Most novices in these systems get the top category of performance rating, even though they're brand new in the classroom. Tenure is fairly automatic, so New York, 93 percent of teachers receive tenure, in LA, it's 98 percent. When they ask principals in New York, have you ever denied tenure or not renewed a non-tenured teacher, only 40 percent said they had ever done that in their career.

But at the same time, you know, without this kind of feedback, there's also very little ability in these systems to target professional development on new teachers who are the least effective, help novice teachers who are ineffective to improve, or you know, along with that, to identify, you know, the highly effective teachers who are tenured who can serve as mentors. There's just not the system in place, the teacher evaluation system, to do that.

And so with all this focus on how excellent everyone is, it's not surprising there's a lot of unaddressed poor performance in the system. Sixty percent of teachers, 80 percent of administrators say they know tenured teachers in their school who are performing poorly, and it's much higher in schools that have the most disadvantaged

students. The teachers and principals are much more likely to say that. Surprisingly, in a survey like this, almost half of the teachers actually will say they know tenured teachers who should be dismissed. Now, that's an incredibly strong statement to make about – given that 98 percent of the teachers are superior or excellent on the formal rating. So, clearly, the formal evaluations and ratings aren't capturing the variation.

Part of the problem is there are problems with the evaluation process. So evaluations are generally short and infrequent, and done by untrained administrators, principals or others who have no formal training in how to evaluate classroom performance.

It might be based on one or two typical principals even with novices, with new teachers, spend – visit the classroom once or twice, and are spending about an hour total observing the teacher in the classroom, so very little being done there, and little use of any rubrics or formal evaluation in most districts, so any formal way of evaluating what's going on in the classroom. The expectations among teachers are basically that everyone will be above average. And with those strong expectations, giving someone a bad rating causes a lot of turmoil, and there's very little reason for administrators to do otherwise. A recent study in Chicago, where they had removed barriers to dismissing or teachers before tenure, they removed a lot of the barriers, even there, a large fraction of the principals just failed to act. So even when there was no barrier, just these kind of norms, and the fact that principals had very little reason to identify excellent or sub par performance meant that the result was, everyone got A's essentially.

But even though this sounds – oh, wait, sorry, one other thing, the other thing that's generally missing, although it's changing over time, is very little use of kind of quantitative data like value added, student surveys, parent feedback, very little use of that kind of evidence in evaluating teachers.

So this sounds discouraging, and one reason you might think that the evaluation process is so poor is that it's difficult to evaluate teachers. But, in fact, it's possible, and there's a lot of evidence that you can systematically identify the most effective and the most ineffective teachers, and there are a number of ways to do this, some of which are better for a formal evaluation process and some which aren't. So there's evidence that administrators, even untrained administrators who are doing these kind of subjective evaluations based on visiting the classroom a few times, there's evidence that they can identify the most effective and ineffective teachers, and that they – the information in their ratings, untrained – to their untrained eye, in some sense, is still, you know, provides extra information on top of what you'd know from quantitative measures like student achievement gains.

So there's real information there, and the principals know this, or the other evaluators, but it's not showing up in the formal evaluation or necessarily being fed back to teachers.

More recently, there's evidence on rubric based classroom evaluations by trained evaluators that suggests that those can identify teacher effectiveness, can identify teachers who have much larger impacts on student achievement gains.

And some of these are research studies, but also there's a study of sinusinity where this is really being done in practice and as a system for teacher evaluation that documents that it's – that these measures can identify that variation across teachers. Finally, there's a fair amount of evidence that student achievement gains themselves from the past can predict which teachers will be effective going ahead, so student achievement gains these value added models from early years of teaching can predict performance in later years of teachers.

So I have work that I've done on some of this, a few studies, but not many now, have used – have randomized teachers to classrooms to validate the measures, and there will be more going ahead.

And a number of districts are now starting to use value added. You know, in the last five years there's been a growth of this, you know, in Texas, in Florida, in New York City, of using these student achievement gains in teacher evaluation.

The last thing is, you know, so a lot of evidence that bits and pieces are useful and you can evaluate teachers, and there are a lot of current efforts underway, Gates Foundation and others, to basically develop more of the evidence base on these practical measures that could be used in teacher evaluation based on a portfolio of measures, not just on test scores, but, you know, for untested grades, other classroom evaluations, students evaluations, et cetera. So it is doable, and I'd say the key is, all of these approaches can identify large differences between the teachers who are at the top and the bottom, large differences in the sense of approaching the magnitudes, the kind that Dan was describing. So we aren't doing it in the current evaluation systems, but it can be done.

MR. WHITEHURST: Fundamental to our report is that the need to reform the nature of teacher evaluation. It's hard to imagine any of the other changes that advocates of various stripes view as desirable for the profession unless there can be evaluation systems in place that make meaningful differentiations in terms of teacher performance.

Once differentiated, the question would be, how would those differences be rewarded, and Steve Glazerman is going to talk a little bit about the current pay and credentialing system through teachers. Steve.

MR. GLAZERMAN: Thanks, Russ. So the proposal that we're here to talk about today is motivated, as Russ indicated, not just by the desire to generate better data and see better evaluation of teachers going on at the state and local level, and also to recognize those states and districts that are innovating this area, but to use the information that comes out of these evaluation systems in a way that helps to make sure that effective teachers are working with the students who need them the most, the most disadvantaged students.

So we only have to talk about two systems within teacher labor markets that need to be addressed through a policy like the one that Susanna is going to talk about in a few minutes, and those areas are teacher compensation and teacher certification, so I'm going to talk about those each one at a time, starting with teacher pay.

So for decades, we've all heard criticisms about traditional ways of compensating teachers, primarily the uniform salary schedule, where teachers are paid almost – teacher salary is determined almost exclusively by years of experience and degrees or course work.

Now, research on the distribution of teachers and mobility patterns of teachers within this system have pointed out to – really one of the features of this system is really that there's no way for an ambitious, hard working teacher to sort of earn more pay or get promoted any faster, to work their way up the ladder, because there is no ladder. In some ways, this may be a feature of the teaching profession and its horizontal structure, but in the absence of an explicit career ladder where compensation is a reward for consistent performance over time, there's a defacto system of promotions to schools, not with better pay, but with better working conditions. And unfortunately, better working conditions tends to translate into schools with fewer disadvantaged students. And this

system really works against the interests, the policy interests of helping the most disadvantaged students.

Now, there is considerable momentum for coming up with ways to differentiate pay as a way to recognize these policy goals. It probably wouldn't be fair to say that all evaluation is flat in all states and districts, or that nobody has ever experimented with alternatives or supplements to the uniform salary schedule.

There have been several attempts over the years to differentiate pay. In particular, the area that we want to focus on, which is providing incentives or additional supplemental pay for teachers to serve in hard to staff areas, and these can include subject areas, but most pointedly, to work in schools that serve primarily low income students.

There is evidence where this has been tried. It's been effective in North Carolina, a relatively modest supplement of \$1,800 was found to have an impact on teacher attention in underserved districts in that state. But often these attempts to provide incentives aren't selective, and that's really where we want to take it a step further and focus on the most effective teachers, because it's one thing to say, all right, as a certified teacher, you would qualify for a retention incentive or a recruitment incentive for choosing to work in a hard to staff school or district, but it's another one to be selective about it and to say, well, this is really reserved for the top teachers because we want to undo some of this maldistribution of teacher quality.

So we need mechanisms that raise the pay and prestige of working with students of the greatest need, and this is something that the ATC proposal I think -- the America's Teacher Corps proposal addresses and advocates for salary supplements for teaching in high poverty schools.

And the goal is really not necessarily to establish a performance based pay program, instead, the goal is really to acknowledge and recognize teachers who have established a strong track record in the classroom and offer them a pay supplement for remaining in or transferring to high poverty schools. So this is one part of the picture, our teacher compensation system, which currently, you know, thwarts the goal of serving the most disadvantaged students, but we also have a teacher credentialing system that, in its current, most predominant form, limits the mobility of teachers or limits the ability to recognize strong teachers in a more formal way, that can make it possible to fairly administer the kinds of salary supplements that we've been talking about, the ones that are selective.

So we don't have a teacher credentialing mechanism now that's national or that's portable or highly selection, per se. There's initial licensure, which is what we usually – what we mean when we usually refer to teacher certification. This is the credential that says you are legally allowed in the state to be in the classroom, to be teaching.

But there's a patchwork; every state regulates teacher certification in its own way, and these are not portable, so as a result, if you look at – let's take the most common exam used to help screen prospective teachers, which is the praxis to exams. This is – it's the same examine that a number of states, not all states, but many states use as part of their teacher credentialing regime. And the same score that might qualify you to teach in say ten states doesn't cut it for Nevada or Utah, states that have the highest cut scores on this test. And it's not necessarily clear why there's something about Nevada or Utah that makes teaching there so much harder, I think really the issue is that we just have – we don't have a coordinated system.

While there are reciprocity agreements in place for some groups of states, it's still not anything like it needs to be.

Now, there is – there have been attempts to create a portable credential for entry. A well known example is the American Board for Certification of Teacher Excellence, ABCTE. Now, ABCTE is built on the idea that if you pass exams – if you get a subject area and have a bachelor's degree, then you would be then, given this credential that allows you to teacher in states that recognize the credential.

Well, currently there are nine states that recognize the ABCTE certification. So it hasn't reached the level of a nationally portable – And also, to date, there really isn't enough evidence to show that the credential holders are exemplary. I mean the evidence that we do have shows ABCTE teachers just keeping up with their peers in terms of raising reading achievement, but trailing significantly in terms of raising math scores.

But ABCTE is not meant to be an advanced credential; it's really just an entry requirement. But we do have an advanced credential, a non-governmental advanced credential out there that's widely known. Many of you I'm sure have heard of national board certification. National board certification, which is issued by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, is meant to be more of a – not a requirement to teach, but a signal of teachers being highly accomplished.

But it takes time and it takes money to become – to go through the process and become national board certified. And the onuses on the teacher, in cases where it's subsidized on districts and states that decide to support this credential to go out and get certified and go through this process.

And the result of, you know, many years of national board certification has been that we, based on the research and evidence that's accumulated, is that,

number one, it hasn't attracted enough teachers to low income school to really address the needs that we discussed earlier; and number two, the national board certification research has not conclusively shown that national board teachers are out performing their peers in a way, as conclusively shown that they're out performing their peers in a way that would say that it's met its goal of being an elite credential in terms of distinguishing performance in the classroom.

So we still have this need that's not being filled by the traditional teacher certification, by alternative initial teacher certification, nor by advanced certification.

So we need to fill these voids, and also think of ways to do so, not necessarily at the expense of individual teachers, putting the onus on the teachers themselves, nor on – relying on sort of the patchwork of state and local authorities that decide to support it. So it really is time for thinking about a national or a federal push or solution to this kind of problem. And I think that hopefully sets up, you know, what Susanna is going to describe, which is America's Teacher Corps proposal.

MS. LOEB: Okay. So from the prior presentations, I think it's clear that there are ways to improve teacher employment so that we can recruit and select more promising teachers, we can provide opportunities for potentially good teachers to realize their potential by identifying areas of growth that they need and supports that they need to get there, to keep the very best teachers in the profession, and to motivate teachers to serve in places where they're needed the most.

But in order for these changes to happen, we need better systems for understanding and monitoring quality teaching, as well as incentives for the best teachers to serve where they're needed.

We're proposing the creation through federal legislation of America's Teacher Corp, which I'll call ACT after this. So here highly effective K-12 public school

teachers, as documented through district or state evaluation systems that comply with some federal standards, would qualify for membership in ATC.

Members of ATC would receive visible recognition for teaching excellence, and if they serve in high poverty title one schools, they would receive a salary supplement and across state portable credential.

We anticipate that the ATC would have four primary measurable goals. The first is that it would increase the equity of student access to highly effective teachers. Second, it would accelerate the development and deployment of evaluation systems that make meaningful differentiation in teacher performance. Third, it would reduce the number of top performing teachers who leave teaching because they move from one state to the other and find the process of reentering the teacher labor market to be confusing or onerous. And fourth, it would make the teaching profession more attractive to perspective teachers, particularly those who feel that they would be among the top performers. So here are the details of the program.

In order to qualify for ATC, teachers would have to have their school or district provide documentation that they have averaged in the top quartile, the top 25 percent of teachers for their most recent three years of service.

This top quartile ranking would be within any aggregation of teachers that's large enough to produce stable results. Typically the ranking would be within a district, if it's a large district, or within categories of schools within the district, like elementary schools, but it could also be at the state level for states that have the requisite data bases to produce this evaluation, or among consortia of schools or school districts like small rural districts as needed to create a data base of sufficient size to make teacher's evaluation scores meaningful relative to an overall distribution.

The evaluations that form the basis for the average three years rankings would have to occur at least annual, so the teachers would be evaluated annually, and each of these three years they'd have to be in the top 25 percent.

ATC teachers would need to recertify as highly effective every five years in order to retain the federal salary supplement associated with employment in a high poverty title one school. Okay.

Thus, in order for the – to qualify, the district in which the teacher teaches must have an evaluation system that meets the standards of ATC. This evaluation system would be the same one or could be the same one used by the ranking entity for other purposes; it doesn't have to be one especially for this.

The only federal mandates would be the following, and there are five of them. The first is that the system is carefully documented. The second is that the system includes a spread of verifiable and comparable teacher evaluations that distinguish teacher effectiveness, so that we don't just have 98 percent on one group and two percent, there has to be this range that it produces. Third, that the system include value added data in subjects and grades in which the necessary assessments are administered, though it doesn't have to only be in value added. Fourth, that the system not include requirements that penalize early career teachers. We'd like this to work for early career teachers, as well. And fifth, that the system be demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable to support identification of persistently superior teaching. So we'd need the system to be reliable.

For the value added component, the weighting of the value added estimates relative to other components of evaluation such as peer judgment, principal ratings or parent satisfaction would be at the discretion of the ranking entity.

Examples of data that would permit the calculation of value added components include beginning and end of the year test scores in something like chemistry or biology, or they include year gains in the standardized tests that we have now, the state-wide assessments, such as those required under ESCA. So the ATC credential would also be portable from state to state, as we talked about before, and Steve talked about how most of the credentials are not now portable across states. States accepting title one funding would be required to establish an efficient and expeditious credentialing mechanism for ATC members from other states who accept positions in high poverty title one schools in their state.

The credentialing mechanism would have to require no additional course work or examination. States would not be required to accept ATC credentials of teachers who migrate to the state that are not teaching in high poverty schools, although we expect that many would do so anyway.

A teacher migrating to a non-state and obtaining certification by virtue of ATC membership and initial service in high poverty title one schools would retain that certification. So this would count as full certification in the state that they move to as long as they taught at least initially in a high poverty school.

Districts would be responsible for paying the salary bonus for service in high poverty title one schools directly to the ATC members and would be reimbursed by the federal government. Recognizing ATC membership and acting as the pay agent for the ATC salary bonus would be a condition again of receipt of title one funds for school-wide programs under the reauthorization of the SCA. To simplify the program administration, as well as to make the cost estimates more straight forward, we assume that the bonus would not be including in the calculation of fringe benefits, so this is just a bonus for teaching and not part of the regular salary.

Thus, other than the administrative costs associated with managing payroll, districts would incur no additional expense for paying a salary bonus to ATC members.

We are suggesting a relatively large incentive. The average teacher salary in the U.S. is about \$50,000, and we propose an annual salary supplement for ATC teachers who serve in high poverty title one schools of \$10,000 a year or approximately 20 percent of the average base salary.

As teacher salaries rise over time due to inflation and more is learned about the effects of ATC and teacher career decisions, Congress could adjust this bonus amount. We estimate that the total cost would be no more than \$200 million per year in its initial years of operation. This calculation is based on our estimates of the number of teachers who would qualify based on experience, performance and geographical proximity to high poverty schools. It's also based on assumptions about take-up rates of eligible teachers. And I'm not going to go into the details of that here, but it's in the proposal.

The ATC has similar goals to other federal legislation of increasing teacher effectiveness and incentivizing the development of evaluation systems. So, clearly, this isn't the only proposal that does this, but we think it's different for a couple of reasons.

In particular, by appealing directly to teachers, the ATC would compliment the current federal program, the Teacher Incentive Fund, and the Obama Administration's proposed replacement, the Teacher and Leader Innovation Fund, both of which require applications from school district administrators for competitive grants.

The Teacher Incentive Fund, for example, is designed to provide financial support for school districts that wish to innovate and can generate a competitive grant application for federal funds.

However, most districts, particularly in the state I live in, operate under constraints that make it difficult for school administrators to introduce reforms in teacher's working conditions. The same constraints arise with respect to the Obama Administration's proposed replacement. And we believe that the federal grant program that depends on district superintendents to initiate applications to compete for funds to change the labor market practices for teachers is probably not sufficient to achieve wide spread reform.

The ATC, in comparison, is directed at teachers, not at districts. The incentives of extra compensation and substantial extra compensation of a portable credential and of national recognition could motivate teachers to encourage their school district to develop evaluation systems that comply with ATC requirements.

So just to reiterate, we're proposing this creation through federal legislation of the America's Teacher Corps into which highly effective K to 12 public school teachers, as documented through the district or state evaluation system, would qualify for membership.

And numbers would receive visible recognition for teaching excellence. And if they taught in high poverty schools, they would receive a salary supplement and across state portable credential. We should note, and actually Steve talked about this earlier, that the salary supplements are not designed to function primarily as pay for performance, whereas incentives to work harder or work smarter, instead, the salary supplements here are intended to encourage highly effective teachers to remain in the profession and to serve in high poverty schools.

We anticipate that ATC would accelerate the development and deployment of evaluation systems, would increase the equity of student access to highly effective teachers, would reduce the number of top performing teachers who leave teaching because they move from state to state, and would make the teaching profession more attractive to prospective teachers who believe they are among the top performers.

So just as a final little note, good education outcomes depend on good teachers, we heard that before, and must be able to identify the teachers who are most effective, recognizing their accomplishments and rewarding them for service where they're most needed.

America's Teacher Corps is a practical initiative to reform the labor markets for teachers in ways that will benefit the teacher profession and the students it serves.

MR. WHITEHURST: Thanks; just a comment or two before I open the floor for comments and questions. There's, obviously, a lot going on in this broad topic area. You will have noticed that the administration released its blueprint for the reauthorization of ESEA on Saturday. It has in it a provision that would call for a gradual change in the current teacher quality provisions under No Child Left Behind to a system that's based on districts being able to sort teachers into at least three buckets, highly effective, effective, and not those two. And the administration has – this administration, previous administration has invested heavily in giving states and districts the capacity to collect information on performance in the classroom.

So we really see what we're doing here is consistent with other efforts that are underway, but complimentary for the reasons that Susanna talked about. If you are a good teacher in a district that doesn't have a system in place that can identify a top performer, you're leaving recognition and money on the table under this proposal.

And you would want to work with your fellow teachers to have a system in place that you helped design that can demonstrate your persistent effectiveness. We don't know what's not to like about this, but I'm sure you'll tell us what it is. So I'll now open the floor for questions. Go ahead.

MS. BARRETT-SNOWDEN: (off mic)

MR. WHITEHURST: Joan, if you would just wait and have a microphone brought to you, there you go.

MS. BARRETT-SNOWDEN: I'm Joan Barrett-Snowden; I'm enthusiastic about this idea. I was the Vice President for Assessment at the National Board, and I think more issues could be related to that in this effort. But I was also on the Board of the ABCTE, which not only had an entry credential, but it was trying to deal with an advanced credential.

And I remember when I was the Vice President at ABCTE, the first thing everybody did was, they – oh, two things you've got to do, Joan, you've got to give all teachers a vocabulary test, and you have to give them – you have to have them send their scores in. Well, I said, well, what will I do with the scores, well, that was before Bill Sanders came along and all you guys.

But I still have an issue here. The problem that ABCTE had was that the scores for value added in New York City were different from the scores for value added in New Mexico, et cetera and so forth, in terms of getting to the top 25 percent. And so I'm wondering, in terms of crossing lines and credential, how you're going to finance that, especially since the federal government is now making 50 percent use of value add, a big incentive for states, so that's one question.

The second thing is, in terms of moving, we found that pension problems were much greater than all of the stuff we are chit chattering about now. The third issue

is, while everybody says 10K would be nice, my look at the history of pay for performance tap is a good example.

What's suggested and what ends up is, at most, 25 percent of what's suggested, which doesn't help as much in moving teachers because money is only one thing, but it can be a big thing if it's jumped up.

And finally, I'd like – I want to – everybody talks about this issue of teacher evaluation and not being able to identify the most effective in terms of what's going on at school, and I want to underline, and perhaps in other presentations you will, too, that without this ability to identify what effective teaching is, you have the teacher education programs, and even the alternative programs, putting people into the system who don't have a vocabulary to talk about excellence and don't have models for it. So I think one of the most important aspects of differentiating performance is, if you want it to be for improvement, you've got to know what the target is for improving. It can't be a black box where somebody says, Ms. Snowden, don't worry about your kid's concerns with his teacher, this teacher has the best value added score, so leave him in the classroom. So I'd like you to tell me what you're going to do about this variation and assessment and across state comparability.

MR. WHITEHURST: Anybody want it? Go ahead.

MR. GOLDHABER: Well, I'm not going to answer all of your questions, but maybe I can start out. So let me start out with the one that I think is the easy one, which is the 10K question. And I guess I would say two things, I'd say that, you know, you're talking to a group of economists, so more money is better than less, and so this puts money on the table that doesn't currently exist.

But the other thing is that I think that when people are thinking about the distribution of teachers, they often think about getting people to move, and it's, you know,

there's not a lot of investigation about the difference between getting people to move and getting people to stay where they are, but I think that most economists would say that it's a lot less expensive to get – to try and prevent people from leaving than it is to get them to move because you're not paying the transaction costs of the move itself.

So, you know, more money would probably be better for the purposes that we're outlining here, but this seems like a reasonable starting place given the cost concerns.

MR. WHITEHURST: If I could just add, and the way we'll do this is, jump in when you have something to say. Part of our design here was to set a pretty high bar. It's not the top quartile for one year; it's the top quartile three years running. There is instability in teacher evaluation systems. Value added, in particular, the correlation from one year to the next is like .25, and so there's a lot of instability there.

And one of the motives for doing that was not only to recognize truly excellent teachers, but to have a system that's affordable. So \$200 million, which I think is an over estimate of what it would take to roll this out for three or four years, is a modest investment with respect to just other administration and Congress supported discretionary programs. The new – the administration's new Teacher Leader and Innovation Fund has about a billion dollars associated with it. TLIF now is up over \$600 million. And then there's all of title two, which is huge. So we put a price tag on this where I think \$10,000 is affordable, so I would hope it would not – if Congress moves forward with it, they would not choose to reduce it to an amount -- yes. So you were going – go ahead, Dan.

MR. GOLDHABER: So I think one of the other issues that you mentioned, Joan, is a tough one, and that is that, you know, cross state, making sure that these value added systems are comparable in some way, and I guess there I would say

that it's really important not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good, and that we've made – that progress in terms of getting value added right, that there's been leaps and bounds of progress over the last ten years, even despite the fact that there really haven't been very significant incentives to get it right, and this kind of a program, along with what the Obama Administration is proposing, is a real incentive to get value added right and figure out if, you know, one state system or one locality system really is better at, you know, identifying teacher effectiveness.

MS. LOEB: I'm just going to add a couple of things to that. One is that, also, that the value added is not the only component of the evaluation system here, which actually helps with reliability. We think because there's quite a bit of variation in the value added, some of these other measures may have less variation such as the principal assessment or student assessment or something like that.

So there can be a balance out of either different tests or different – or the unreliability of the tests just because we have the other elements.

The other thing I wanted to mention was what you talked about with the benefits of having good monitoring and evaluation system and that it creates a vocabulary for knowing what you're looking for when you're hiring new teachers, for targeting professional – that was very much our thinking in doing this.

Our hope was to figure out how to have evaluation systems be part of the decision-making in districts, and one of the ways that we thought would be effective in doing this is to create incentives for the development of this by the local areas or by the states in order that it becomes part of this other – these other conversations, as well.

MS. BARRETT-SNOWDEN: I forgot to ask you, do you have evidence that teachers who move from advantaged places can, in three – maintain for three years initially that they are the out performers when they go to disadvantaged places?

MS. LOEB: So, again, this isn't just for people to move there, it's for the high performance, it's an encouragement for high performers to stay in low performing schools. We were talking about this a little bit this morning, and we – no, there is no evidence on teachers who move from one to another, it's actually somewhat hard to look at those kinds of things. Not that many teachers were high performers and moved to lower performing schools.

But there doesn't seem to be, at least in the research so far, a lot of difference between the teacher who is effective for one group of teachers and the teacher who's effective for another, that it seems more that teachers are generally effective.

MR. GLAZERMAN: You raise an excellent question, Joan, which is, do high performing teachers or teachers who look high performing under, you know, one system, who then transfer into disadvantaged schools, do their skills transfer, do they continue to make the same kinds of gains, so that's really an empirical question. Fortunately right now, the Department of Education is conducting a randomized experiment to answer that question, and we're – this is a study that we're doing at Mathematica to study a program called the Talent Transfer Initiative, which we also call, this just rolls off the tongue, moving high performing teachers to low performing schools.

So we're following those, that's the medium length name, following those teachers now. They've actually been placed in over 60 classrooms in seven districts, and we're going to be following them for another couple years and adding three more districts, so that – we're trying to generate that evidence now.

The empirical evidence, based on observational studies, is pretty weak, because as Susanna was just pointing out, we actually don't have enough natural transfers in that direction to be able to estimate the effects of – that you described.

MR. GOLDHABER: Can I follow? Susanna made this important point that people should keep in mind, that a lot of this is trying to reward teachers who are already in low performing schools or in high poverty schools and get them to stay. And we do have evidence there, that, based on three years of past evidence in the classroom, that, you know, value added, that that can predict their future performance, both observationally and when you randomize teachers to classrooms, and I think there's about to be a lot more of that evidence, there are more experiments in the field by Gates and Department of Ed.

MR. APPLE: My name is Martin Apple, I'm a skeptical scientist. My first kind of question is, if you take out a fraction of teachers that you consider the highest performing in a school district any place and move them somewhere else, what happens to the performance in that school district without them?

Secondly, what happens to students in that district who have special challenges or special needs such as the highly gifted? Thirdly, what is the overall net scale that has to be operated on before you are convinced that this is the right process that ought to be done, and why should it be legislated first until you have the data?

MR. WHITEHURST: Well, on your first issue, which is a variant of the issue that Joan raised about movement, most of the movement that this proposed program would address is within districts, it occurs because seniority allows teachers to move from their initial assignment, which may have been a particularly high poverty school, into a school that's closer to where they live or has lower levels of poverty. So I don't think in any of our thinking about this we saw it as a program that generates huge teacher migration across state borders, but rather retains teachers in high poverty schools and perhaps encourages teachers within districts who are serving in less high poverty schools to move to a higher poverty school.

These are not title one schools, 40 percent free and reduced lunch. In our proposal, these are high poverty title one schools, 75 percent are higher, with free and reduced priced lunch. Anybody else want to –

MS. LOEB: Yes; I think while it is true that somebody is going to lose and someone's going to gain if you do this, there's plenty of strong evidence that the way that the labor market works right now severely disadvantages kids in the highest poverty schools, and balances it.

Think of all the gifted kids in those schools that don't have these teachers there right now. So I don't think it's just serving low performing kids, it's serving all kids in these high poverty schools, and it's trying to balance out what is clearly an inequitable distribution of teachers across schools.

SPEAKER: I guess I will just add one thing, and that is that, over time, the hope is that this would not be a zero sum game, too. I think there are two ways in which it is likely that it would encourage better teachers in general in the labor market. One, you're rewarding success, so you should see that people who think they're going to be successful, and there's evidence that people who think they're going to be successful actually turn out to be better teachers. You should be encouraging those teachers to – those folks to enter the teacher labor market.

And secondly, there's kind of a problem that no one talks about, and it's not clear the extent to which this is actually a problem, but, you know, we lose teachers simply because they cross states and have to go – be relicensed in a new state.

And it's not clear how many teachers are lost, it's not clear whether they're effective or ineffective teachers, and this would do nothing but encourage those folks to stay in the teacher labor market. So I think it's, you know, it's nothing but upside from that perspective.

MR. WHITEHURST: And to your question about why don't you have the evidence first before you do the policy; actually, policy never works that way. What we've done here is, propose a policy that's reasonably grounded in evidence, and we have in our proposal very strong statements about the need to evaluate this going forward on several dimensions. I'll take the gentleman – I'll take Jim Cohlmoos here, the guy in the blue jacket who's on the exterior of the row.

MR. COHLMOOS: Jim Cohlmoos from Knowledge Alliance, and also a participant in the first U.S. Teacher Corps in 1971 to '73. So when I saw Teacher Corps, I got very excited.

MR. WHITEHURST: We got you –

MR. COHLMOOS: It's a great program. You have indicated that incentives to get high performers to stay or possibly move, you haven't commented, I don't think sufficiently, on how much financial incentives effect productivity and performance, whether in education, or in other sectors, and Doug, you said you were doing some work with doctors and hospitals, because I think underneath all of this is this idea that incentives will improve academic performance, and is there evidence that that can occur?

SPEAKER: I guess – I would say the focus of this proposal is not on incentives, it's on selection, it's on trying to get the most effective teachers into the right places to teach and keeping them in teaching.

Now, there may be something in the background, you know, this may be giving incentives, as well, but it's not the focus, you know. Even if we thought teachers were born with their effectiveness, you know, stamped on their forehead, which we don't think, but if we thought that, this proposal would work, right, and that's the – it's really focused on the selection.

There is, you know, I would say there's mixed evidence on the incentives, a lot of it from other countries, but that, you know, you can give incentives that help teachers do a better job, but I'd say that's not what our proposal is about, if that happens, that's a side benefit.

MS. LOEB: There is some recent evidence on teacher peer effects, as well, so that if you get a bunch of good teachers into some of these places that have been difficult to staff, that can actually help the effectiveness of other teachers in the school, as well.

MS. CROSTEIN: My name is Linda Crostein, I'm the Public Editor for the Education Writers Association. I've spoken with many of you over the years, but now I'm going to take advantage of this brain trust of rock star teacher quality folks to clarify something that I help journalists with so regularly lately that I want to sort of clear it up once and for all maybe.

In trying to help them understand what the research on teacher quality actually says, it's first – when we talk about teaching – the teacher quality being the most effective element of student achievement, first I tell them that we mean in school, right.

But I want to ask – I mean, obviously, it's the most effective thing we've measured. Are there any significant or potentially significant things we haven't or haven't been able to measure that – or is that just, you know, I mean curriculum, principal, are there other sort of things out there that we haven't been able to measure in the same way we've been able to measure teacher effectiveness? I don't even know what they would be, but –

MS. LOEB: I hope so.

SPEAKER: I hope so, too. I do think that there's evidence that suggests that if there was something that was not being measured, that it has to vary from

classroom to classroom, because if you kind of parcel out the variation in student achievement, you see that a lot of the variation that's associated with schools is – seems to be at the classroom level rather than say at the school level.

So if it was something like, you know, a whole school reform or the use of particular curriculum materials, then you might expect that more of the variation would be between schools or whatever level that intervention applies to, and that just doesn't – it doesn't look like that's the case in terms of interventions generally, it looks like classroom to classroom is the level that's important.

SPEAKER: In the one – I'd say the one promising area that's come out of the recent research has been a number of studies, randomized studies of kids applying to charter schools, to selective schools that have been looking at the kids who were randomized out to those who were randomized in. So there's one, the Harlem Children's Zone, there's one in Lynn, one in – the Boston Charters, that I think to everyone's surprise have found just surprisingly large impacts, and very black box, not clear what that was, but that suggests there's something systematic that can be done at a school level, we aren't sure, that may just be purely selecting good teachers. But there's at least – I'd say there's a bit of an open door there.

MR. WHITEHURST: Well, and we actually don't say in the report that teachers are the most important thing in school, we say teachers are a very important thing in schools, so we are, in part, agnostic with respect to the question you raised.

I mean I've published work here showing that you can get very large effects from curriculum – curriculum effects in one year that are on the magnitude of a standard deviation in teacher effectiveness, so there are other things, and it's, you know, I'm off message here a little bit now, but it's always a mistake to focus on one thing that's

supposed to be the magic bullet for education reform there. The recipe includes more ingredients than just teachers, but clearly, they are very important.

MS. LOEB: I think, too, that most policies in education or practices work through teachers, so that you can imagine that curriculum or some other kinds of changes or reforms could be more effective with teachers who are more able to adjust in all of those kinds of things, so these things aren't necessarily just additive. This will be an incredibly specialized thing to look at, but I wonder if there's been any look into whether the variability of teacher effectiveness is different where teachers are following sort of more scripted curricula versus not, just because on a practical level that has so many implications.

MR. WHITEHURST: Good point. We're going to take a question from the woman in the – on the aisle here.

MS. PRESSLEY: Thank you, good morning. I'm Jennifer Pressley, the science math teacher imperative APOU, and I did do a lot of teacher quality work in Illinois. So if I could make a – I want to make a comment first that actually my colleague, Karen DeAngelis and I have just finished doing some work out of Chicago, where we had climate data, as well as some measures of teacher effectiveness, and that climate – the very lowest climates in schools really inhibit even good teachers getting in effect, so we need to pay attention to the schools, as well, so I'll just add that in to say that we can't just ignore that.

But I wanted to ask a question for clarification, that this – America's Teacher Corps, teachers would be able to get that label without compensation, right, so it also becomes an incentive to increase the stature of the profession; is that correct? And I don't think you should lose that when you talk about it. Don't only focus on the money,

because I think, having a way of identifying and bringing statues in the teaching profession is going to be incredibly important, as well.

MR. WHITEHURST: Thank you for that comment, it was very much a part of our thinking and part of our discussions among ourselves are the kind of ripple effects of such recognition and the possibility for other career ladders and opportunities to open up to teachers as – by virtue of being identified as persistently effective. The back – gentleman in the back row.

MR. MCCULLOUGH: Hello.

MR. WHITEHURST: Yes, we hear you.

MR. MCCULLOUGH: Oh, okay, perfect. Charles McCullough from the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. I have one comment, which leads to the two questions I have. First, a comment was made earlier that the results of the National Board Certified Teachers have been inconclusive, and I think that may have been based on some of the 2007 studies that were mentioned here in this report. But I just wanted to point out the 2008 National Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences study is congressionally mandated, which pointed out – the national board certified teachers make larger gains on student achievement test scores than those teachers that are not certified, and also spoke to – evidencing that they do stay in the field longer, which goes to your point in the middle, your comment that – and a lot of these things were not working at – that these are definitely consistent and complimentary goals, so where national board certification offers portability, evidence of highly accomplished teachers, and already have a set of national standards, my first question is, how do you see the American Teachers Corps concept working with the National Board, because we definitely are open to that, and incorporating national board certified teachers, that being the first question, and number two, that our program is already here

and has been running for the past 23 years, how long do you see your program to come up to scale considering, as was pointed out by Ms. Snowden's question earlier, there will be some time for some of these states to have the right program design, so those are the two questions, how you can work together, and when do you see HEC coming up to scale? Thank you.

MR. WHITEHURST: Well, if Congress gets to work immediately on this, and we're talking with them this afternoon, that will have a lot to do with how quickly this could come up. Frankly, you know, it's three or four years, and it would depend on location. If you look at some of the race to the top state applications, there are states who would be ready within a year or two to have all the teachers in the state evaluated in a way that would make those who are interested eligible for this program.

We don't wish to suggest in any way that the ATC is competitive with other programs. National board certification is an intensive process; it's intended to benefit teachers as they're going through it, a lot of process involved. We think that's fine. We view this as complimentary in the sense that it costs nothing once you've got the evaluation system in place, and it is – involves no process at all other than the identification of persistently high performance.

So we think this is more universal, and therefore, and it can sit on top of the existing and planned administrative systems and be a relatively inexpensive way of identifying highly effective teachers.

SPEAKER: (off mic) defacto members of ATC then?

MR. WHITEHURST: No; the rules for entry are the same for everybody. Now, to the extent that the National Academy Report is appropriately identified as National Board of Teachers, as ones that are persistently highly effective, then the data

systems would show that and they would find themselves, but it would be by virtue of demonstrated performance rather than national board certification.

SPEAKER: Just to –

SPEAKER: Just – yeah, I want to follow up.

SPEAKER: -- just a mention, this is a tough thing I think for non-researchers and researchers to talk about in the same language, because, you know, we often talk about – and this would apply to ATC teachers, as well, I mean we see this as a future evaluation problem, and just understand the impact that they have relative to their peers.

Now, in some sense, it's one thing to say that teachers from this group, whether it's ABCTE, or ATC, or NBC, or PDQ, or whatever it is, are more, you know, produce higher gains, the question is, do they consistently produce higher gains than other teachers, and by a magnitude that makes this credential meaningful.

So if I'm a principal who's hiring teachers, I don't want to know that, on average, this teacher – if I were to hire 100 teachers, I'm going to get, you know, a slightly higher mean achievement for my students if I hire from this pool rather than that pool.

I think the people who are doing the hiring need some more – need something a little bit more solid, and that really places a high demand on the research evidence for any of these – any of these credentials to demonstrate that they differentiate and distinguish teachers of different quality.

One of the things about ATC, and one of the reasons that ATC I think is couched in the way it is is that it's trying to go right to the very criteria that would be used to evaluate it in the end, which is performance in the classroom.

Now, I think it would be a wonderful thing, by the way, if you're a teacher and you say, well, I'm ATC certified and national board, you're a double whammy, and that would certainly be impressive, but I think it's useful to have – to be coming at it from different directions like this.

MS. LOEB: Okay. Just a slightly different complimentary take on this, which is that I think what the National Board has done is provide a great vocabulary for good teaching and lots of thought that can help the evaluation systems that districts or states could design to help identify highly effective teachers.

But a very important part of this proposal is if the evaluation systems are actually done at the local and state level, because it's not just for these high performing teachers, it really is to try to get the sense of what good teaching is incorporated into how HR decisions and other decisions are made.

MS. DOVE: Good morning, I'm Tina Dove with ASCD, and I'm going to sort of preface my question by saying that I – my brain may not have caught up with this question in terms of daylight savings, so if I sound confusing, forgive me. In the area of the teacher evaluation sort of piece of this, who exactly is going to be doing this evaluating? And from that question, sort of my mind says, if it's principals who are doing the evaluating, then how do you handle the situation that I personally, as a teacher, was in, where I had administrators who have less teaching experience than me, and yet they were responsible for evaluating me, and who is to say whether or not they had their chops enough to kind of tell me as a teacher if I was good, and that could be problematic, as well as, you know, if they are, in fact, the ones who are doing this evaluating, how do we sort of control for the issue that's already present in so many schools and that principals themselves are busy being building administrators, and therefore, really don't have the time to do the evaluation, which is why the evaluation system, in part, is already

kind of messed up, because they don't have the time to do it with all the other things that they're doing to make it effective, et cetera, et cetera?

And my second is, what about the issue of resources, professional development and support that, in many respects, do make teachers more effective as professionals, but maybe are not present, lack of funding, you know, some people may not see the efficacy of those things, and therefore, don't put them in place at their schools, and, in fact, in many respects, those are some of the things that key effective teachers in schools that are in most need, but those things may not be present, or you know, how do we sort of account for that given your system, or is this just completely unrelated, and again, I am a victim of daylight savings time?

MS. LOEB: Okay. So I'll take those two things separately. First of all, the evaluation systems would be built at the local level, so hopefully in agreement with teachers in the district, leaders in the district, families, whoever, there's a lot of flexibility in this proposal around what the evaluation system is as long as it's consistent, reliable, and gives the distribution.

I think in a number of places where they are doing these kinds of classroom observations, Cincinnati is one example, there's a combination, so the principal goes in a couple of times a year, there's also a group of teachers whose job it is actually to go around across schools and to observe in different teacher's classrooms, and it's done kind of more intensively for some teachers than for others.

There's a lot of flexibility in how you could design this. And we do not -- intentionally do not specify exactly what that is, because we don't know what the ideal system is, and so we want the ability to try different ones. As far as professional development and support, I mean I think, and this isn't necessarily in here, but I think that having this kind of information about, first, definitions of good teaching, and then also

areas of strengths and weaknesses can help very much in targeting professional development and supports where teachers need them.

We don't have direct funds, this isn't, you know, a huge part of the money, the federal money to schools, but there's other sources for that. We think this helps those other sources of funds be used better.

MR. WHITEHURST: I'll take one more question.

MR. SALCHAK: Hi, Steven Salchak with Education Week, and my question is really about the spread that Susanna was talking about in terms of really different shading at four or five different levels of performance based on performance based standards. And the reason I'm asking is because I've looked at Cincinnati evaluation system and the ratings have become inflated over time, so now most teachers receive like three or four on that system.

Even though I think most people agree that the descriptions of teaching are very strong, there are multiple observations of teachers, so I'm just wondering if you could talk a little bit about – whether you know of an evaluation system that does distinguish on that spread. And I think this maybe gets to these questions of norms that Doug was talking about. I mean, in other words, teachers will have to be comfortable getting two's, you know, and working toward the higher level. But let me – I not only ask, because I mean you're sort of asking district to kind of raise the bar, I think, right, in terms of how teachers are being evaluated. So if you could just maybe elaborate a little bit more on that, I think it would be really helpful.

MR. STAIGER: Yeah, let me say a word about the Cincinnati. There's a recent study that just came out of an MBR working paper by, wait, whose the first author?

MS. LOEB: John Tyler.

MR. STAIGER: John Tyler, right, and a number of – and a sea of co-authors. I think most of that data might have come before – if you said this happened in the recent years, a lot of the data they were looking at was a bit older perhaps. But they also had a lot of people in kind of the top two categories, but there was enough spread for it to predict a sizeable spread in teacher effectiveness measured by student gains, by value added.

MR. SALCHEK: (off mic) – John Tyler's research, was that like, you know, the teachers at level four were more effective than the teachers at level three, but they were still either a three or a four, and there's just nobody that was a two or a one.

SPEAKER: But actually, the way that works, there are a number of scores, and so you kind of – you differentiate, you know, it's on a scale maybe from a three to a four, but the three, the 3.1, the 3.2 actually predicts something, and predicts a sizeable amount when you scale it in terms of these value added – the student achievement gains.

So I think that's the hope and the, you know, in that application, and we've certainly seen this in other, but less high stakes applications, where researchers do this. So I think you're right, the key issue is, when you actually put this in place within a district, does it get captured and do you lose the variation that you begin with?

MS. LOEB: But it is a requirement of the proposal, and in that way, it incentivizes the distribution.

SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. WHITEHURST: Well, I thank you very much for your attendance today. Your questions were great. I hope you appreciate the efforts of the panel. Thank you.

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