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PARTICIPANTS:

Moderator:

JONATHAN LAURENCE
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Featured Speaker:

OLIVER RUSS
Advisor, Office of the European Counterterrorism

Discussant:

DANIEL BYMAN
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. LAURENCE: Good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. My name is Jonathan Laurence. I am a nonresident senior fellow here and a Professor at Boston College. On behalf of Fiona Hill, Director of the Center on the U.S. and Europe, and Strobe Talbott, President of Brookings, I'm very pleased to welcome you to the latest installment of the trans-Atlantic dialogue on terrorism.

Our distinguished guess speaker today is Dr. Oliver Russ of the Office of the European Union's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism. He will speak today on the topic of coordinated counterterrorism policy, Experiences and Possibilities for Enhancing U.S.-European Cooperation.

We're also very fortunate that Daniel Byman of Brookings and Georgetown will serve as discussant for his remarks, and I will introduce them both in a moment.

The trans-Atlantic dialogue on terrorism aims to deepen the strategic understanding between the U.S. and Europe on the trans-national terrorist threat and its causes as well as to expand opportunities to develop complimentary counterterrorism policy. We are very grateful to the European Commission for the support that makes today's events possible. I'd also like to extend a particular thanks to Andy Moffatt, the CUSE assistant director.

The European Commission's encouragement of this crucial discussion is extraordinarily timely. Unfortunately, the challenges of radicalization and terrorism are still as topical today as they were when former CUSC Director Daniel Benjamin first launched a trans-Atlantic dialogue on terrorism five years ago. But the nature of the threat of violence and the framework for trans-Atlantic cooperation have changed dramatically.

For much of the past decade American observers often assumed that radicalization was a European phenomenon, that we in the U.S. were mostly worried about it by proxy. How could we help them to stem the threat emanating from their quarters in order to protect ourselves from another 9/11 or to help them avoid another 3/11 or 7/07?

The home-grown terrorism threat discussed mostly in this European context whereas in the United States we debated the ramifications for the Visa Waiver Program, or the exchange of passenger records. It was often assumed that the danger faced from the domestic populations of the U.S. and Europe differed strikingly.

To be sure, there were major reforms of the way that U.S. intelligence agencies organized and share information with one another and with their European counterparts in the member states and at the E.U. level. And federal and local officials began working more closely with local communities to improve relations and familiarity with American Muslim

communities. But for years the occasional arrests of suspected terrorists holding U.S. passports seemed almost accidental, and, in general, their hubris far outpaced their capacities.

Even as the intelligence community became increasingly concerned with apparent connections in some immigrant communities here in the United States, our confidence in the integrating power of the American Dream was unfazed for a number of reasons: Muslim Americans upward mobility; our proud tradition of religious pluralism; our sincere belief in the successful model of the melting pot or stir-fry or salad bowl.

Many in the U.S. felt if not immune, then at least safely ensconced. Our citizens, it was thought, would be wholesale resistant to any siren call of terrorist recruiters, thanks in part to educational and employment opportunities, and thus our national debate focused more on the Constitutional implications of our detainee policies or our judicial procedures rather than on the potential for home-grown terrorism. How could we in the U.S. offer lessons to Europeans on living together peacefully and, in the meanwhile, how could be keep the bad apples with European passports at bay?

Our self-confidence may have peaked with the election of Barack Obama, whose presence in the White House and reframing of U.S. foreign policy it was hoped would help reduce the spread of violent

extremism; but today's meeting finds us somewhat chastened. All the while instances of serious radicalization were, in fact, taking place within our own borders. Recent events and arrests in the past few months, few weeks, few days, have offered ample proof that American citizens are not immune to religiously-framed appeals to political violence.

During the eight-year period since September 11th, the trans-Atlantic relationship has experienced ups and downs, but inter-intelligence sharing and interagency cooperation mounts , counterterrorism always remained strong even while U.S. and European leaders confronted one another in the U.N. Security Council or debated the wisdom of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and even used one another as straw men in election campaigns, a quiet, constructive relationship endured and led to increased cooperation on police and judicial affairs and border control.

Recently, we have seen the E.U. and individual member states assisting in facilitating the closure of Guantanamo Bay and in the ramping up of military and civilian support for the Artak mission in Afghanistan. Now, American officials still hope for more support on these and other fronts, but in many ways it would seem that the window of opportunity to enhance trans-Atlantic coordination on counterterrorism has never been open wider. According to recent polls, our citizens share similar perceptions of the terrorist threat. The American President's

popularity in E.U. member states is off the charts, and in his major declarations from the Inaugural to Addresses in Cairo and at the U.N. General Assembly, the President has heralded a new era of U.S. multilateralism.

Under the leadership of the E.U. counterterrorism coordinator, there have also been many strides made on behalf of creating a single counterpart for U.S. authorities. Whatever cultural differences exist among America's 18 intelligence agencies, one can imagine that coordinating counterterrorism policy amongst the agencies of the European Union's 27 individual member states is perhaps an even greater challenge.

We are very fortunate to have with us today two individuals who are well-placed to discuss the evolution of this strategic understanding. Dr. Oliver Russ is the advisor to the E.U. Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles De Kerchove and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Before joining the Office of EUCTC, Dr. Russ served as deputy head in the Counterterrorism Division of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior where he mainly dealt with militant Islamism.

Dr. Russ holds a doctorate in European law and Constitutional law from (inaudible) in Berlin.

Our commentator Daniel Byman is Director of Georgetown Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies as well as an associate professor in the School of Foreign Service. He is a Senior Fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy here at Brookings.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your participation. We will first turn to Oliver Russ.

DR. RUSS: Yeah, thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for the invitation. It's an honor for me to speak here on behalf of the E.U. counterterrorism coordinator. He's very sorry that he cannot join us today, but he sent his best regards for a fruitful discussion and a successful conference and, as you might know, he's very active also in the trans-Atlantic arena. I think in the last three months he was at least four times or five times in the United States to discuss CT issues here with several partners around.

So thank you to the organizers, to the Brookings Institution, of course, also we in the General Secretariat. We are following your activities very closely, and thanks to the European Union, and we try to follow your activities even closer.

So I'd like to address the following four questions:

What is the current CT strategy within the European Union?

Then, second, the Lisbon Treaty long discussed, in a way, and now it came suddenly into force, some kind of surprise and what has changed. Just to get you some ideas of the changes, we will have a more coherent foreign policy, better coordinated between internal aspects, external aspects of European policy. And I think and I hope that will be also that make a trans-Atlantic cooperation much easier in the future.

We are at a turning point in the E.U. at the moment. We will have a president now. We will have a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs. We'll have a new Commission with new portfolios and, yeah, several other changes within the Treaty that makes European policy also internal aspects, security aspects, but also the foreign aspects much easier to handle in the future.

So, yeah, hopefully that will be a change and I would like to speak about it later a bit. But we have to keep one thing in mind even though we have now a new treaty president, et cetera. The European Union is not a federal state. We are not a federal state, and special nationalistic security issues will remain in the competence of the member states. So, but that's just because expectations sometimes run high with the Lisbon Treaty, especially outside the European Union. That is to say that not that much has changed as somebody might have hoped.

Yeah, as I said, we are on a turning point, so you could ask that maybe too early to discuss the further cooperation because the

president just has to settle himself. The high representative has just taken office, et cetera, and but I think it's still and the introduction it was said, it's a very good point to discuss also trans-Atlantic cooperation in the CT area because first of all, from a petitioner's perspective, from a academic perspective, we have urged to advise the new politicians what might be the best way to achieve common goals in the future.

And also we have already new guidelines for the E.U. The Stockholm program on security-relevant policy was adopted last Friday by all heads of states of the European member states. So we have a very recent new program, and I hope that will also make cooperation easier and so by that we have already put particular guides in the programs for the future.

The counterterrorism coordinator had issued on this also a discussion paper that I'd like to present to you, briefly, later on: What are the key challenges from his perspective on counterterrorism policy? And then finally, I'd like to, yeah, just to make some points what might be open to discussion where do we see possibilities for cooperation in common challenges, and just three points that might be of interest, for example, in deepening parliamentary cooperation; the rule of the Congress and the Senate here in the United States. I think it's often underestimated from the European perspective. We normally, we only look on the government as a player, and now we have in the European parliament, with the

European parliament, also a very powerful and active player that would also be relevant for CT issues. So this might be one issue we could talk about later.

Another one is the growing sense of CT fatigue all around public in Europe but maybe also in the United States. I would be very interested to learn more about this because this CT fatigue, of course, it is a security risk.

And another one is that violent extremists are watching our measures. Of course, they are learning to hide better, to communicate different, some the case in he walks in sheep's clothing, I would say, using more legal ways of propaganda while pretending the worst things in secret. So these will be the aspects I'd like to draw your attention on.

What is the current CT strategy in Europe? I'd like to start maybe with a short look on our view on the threat, the terrorist threats in, from a European perspective. Of course, Islam as terrorism remains the most significant source or threat to the western world. Whatever organizational dislocation Al Qaida suffered, propaganda especially remains very powerful to inspire, especially young individuals. And you have learned it now also in the United States to get involved into terrorism, to go to other countries to involve in terrorist training. And also weak states like, for example, Zahil or Yemen, they remained very -- receive a threat to our societies to be a safe haven for terrorist organizations.

And finally, also the Internet. I just mentioned home-grown terrorism is very important, too, for radicalization and recruitment. So some examples of the last of arrests, for example, or attacks in Europe in the last three months. We had, for example, an attack on an army barrack in Milan in Italy where typically a home-grown terrorist blew himself up at the gate of some barracks.

Then we had the arrests in the United States that were linked also with a plot to attack maybe the Danish newspaper that has published the cartoons of the prophet. And that also is something very boring, I would say, that the French Police arrested in the beginning of October a scientist from the CERN Institute. That's a nuclear scientific facility in Switzerland, and this scientist, later on he confessed that he has spied and contacted Al Qaida in the Islamic (inaudible). So he had close links to a co-Al Qaida affiliated organization. And that's something, of course, what worries us in the European Union.

So the number of verdicts also was stable. In the last years we had 198 verdicts in 2007 and 2008, 190, a very high number. That is also a sign of the system threat.

What are the four pillars of the E.U. counterterrorism strategy, like in many other countries and many other institutions, the area of prevention protects, pursue, and respond? In this four pillars, we are

our actors, and I would like to draw your attention more on the aspect of prevent.

First, of course, in the European Union we also have to ask why do we have to do it in Europe on the European level? Why not in the member states, and just to answer this question I'd like to refer on opinion polls, and the fight against terrorism is one of the key areas, the key areas in which, according to some surveys European citizens see a need for common European response. Eighty-one percent wish more European activity in the fight against terrorism, and I think that's a very extraordinary high number compared to other issues.

So I start with the work stream on prevention. We have a lot of projects. As I said, we have a European roof, I would say, and under this there are the different member states, actors in counterterrorism politics. And we used this division of labor in a way to say several member states take project leads on project where they are most interested in.

And, for example, the United Kingdom initiated a work stream on media communication and strategic communication in the area of prevention. For example, they set up a network of communicators, operated the Institution of Corrective Engagement with Arabic media, established a network of researchers and a webs model to, yeah, improve media and strategic communication in the area of prevention.

Another project is Imam training that was taken over by Spain, and it's the idea to, yeah, first nip all the Imam training activities in the different member states and later on to make an assessment of the needs to improve training of Imams, not to in a way give way to preachers of hate but to have a better controlled and better organized system of Imam training where you have moderate voices as Imams.

And community policy, for example, is a very important issue where Belgium draws attention to the Netherlands at work. A lot of local authorities, and we never have to forget that the local level is the most important level for CT activities. Of course, we can make some strategic decisions, we can pass some laws, et cetera, but when we come to concrete prevention, it's the local level that's the important area where we have to improve our politics and where we also have to support people working on the ground, I would say. And I just would like to mention some groups of people active. They're welfare workers, teachers, of course,, youth workers, and also prison staff or district managers not only to organizations. And the idea of the Netherlands is to, yeah, to give them tools to handle prevention and de-radicalization in a better and easier way.

Another thing that might be also of interest for you, and it's an example of quite, I think, new way of transparency, is that Denmark is now engaged in a disengagement de-radicalization, particular for young people. And what is very special in this project is that openly the Danish

Security and Intelligence Service is involved in this project, and I think that's something quite new because normally intelligence agencies are working more behind. They don't like to show their involvement, and this time they declared, publicly, to also participate in such a project.

Another thing, as I have mentioned, the Internet and the role of the Internet for de-radicalization to recruitment already. It's the check, the West Project, also European Project, and I'm very happy that a colleague from Germany that has done a lot of effort is this is today also attending this conference. So, in case you might have -- I can't see at the moment there in the last row. If someone asks some question on this project, she might be able to answer your questions in the break.

And this project is about burden and labor-sharing in the area of monitoring Islamist activities in the Web, and to say so that we have many different member states active in this. And if you have a more, I would say, integrated approach upon this, a more coordinated approach, you can, of course, achieve much more by not everyone monitoring the same site, doing the same work over and over again.

Something else, now I came to the second pillar of protection. It's that we have put a lot of effort into the area of security of explosives. For example, there was a big conference in this autumn where also some colleagues from you, from the United States, took part, and they agreed that European Union there is in the lead, and that maybe

you also can learn about it from this project whether it's very advanced, the implementation of an action plan.

And, finally, also some new developments. It's around the area of response. We just have adopted a CBR. an action plan for the European Union. It was just adopted by the Council of Justice and Home Affairs ministers, and they're -- Europe now hasn't got an integrated approach to count of the very important and (inaudible) aspect of CBRIN (inaudible).

And, finally, in foreign policy we have the so-called stability instruments that I think are also very important aspect for trans-Atlantic cooperation. That means the activities of the European Union in, for example, weak states and developing states where we have no money, and a lot of money also to invest in security-related field of counterterrorism.

Yeah, this is very current strategy, and now some remarks on the Lisbon Treaty and the new changes, so you are in a way seeing a new Europe with a new treaty laying behind and other competences, et cetera, et cetera. And, yeah, we also have to get used to this new treaty within the European Union because despite of eight years of discussion it came quite of a sudden.

As I said, last week we had. just an anecdote, the foreign ministers were quite shocked that suddenly they may not members of the

European summit anymore. They have discussed the treaty, they have negotiated the treaty, and by accident they have negotiated themselves out. And they later on realized in the text they agreed, they were not mentioned. And so they weren't part of the European summit anymore. I think we will have some other surprises that will arise in the near future.

But to come to the maybe more or better effect of it, we would have now not three different areas of European cooperation, in former times what was the integrated policy. Then we had a foreign defense policy, and we had the area of intergovernmental cooperation on justice and police. And now everything is combined in one, yeah, one treaty and one policy, and that makes a coherent policy much easier. And in a way we put together under the European roof of free tillers (phonetics) and not -- now the roof didn't fall down, but we have more solid walls and hopefully no gaps in between that terrorists can sneak through, I would say.

Yeah, what are some other changes? We have now a solidarity clause in the treaty where a state, member states in case of a major terrorist attack, will help each other. We'll have a new external action service that will represent the foreign policy of the European Union all around the world. And also this is another step forward to have a more integrated and one, yeah, streamlined European policy, even though that

will take, I think, some time just to get the common spirit, the common identity.

And, finally, at last but not least, of course, we will have a president now of the European Union. It won't be a president like you have in the United States, giving Europe his direction, but, hopefully, it will be a president that gives Europe one direction. And I think that's also a very big step forward.

So we will ask someone that's in the old process, we had to informathons with different member states taking over presidency, et cetera. We have now one person giving Europe one direction and taking up the initiatives, the ideas of all the 27 member states and bringing it into one line and to one move forward. And I think that's a very big step forward, even though maybe from your perspective from the United States. it's still something that, of course, is not on the same level like it is here. But I think it's a very good step forward.

And we'll have a high representative and, of course, we will still have a counterterrorism coordinator that again, yeah, it was stated he will continue to cooperation in counterterrorism issues internally but also in the field of foreign relations.

I have already mentioned the Stockholm program. The Stockholm program is several years the program what a European Union and member states will be accessed in security policy and also in

counterterrorism politics. And here it was again stressed in this program the, yeah, that it's very important in the whole fight against terrorism to respect the fundamental rights, of course. It calls for reinforcement of the prevention strength to develop mechanisms in particular to an early detection of signs of radicalization of threats, including the threats from violent militant Islam. Then, also, it calls to improve initiatives to counter organizations in all vulnerable populations and calls that more be done in understanding the methods used for dissemination of terrorist propaganda, including the Internet.

And, finally, it also draws the attention on the area of charitable organizations, so terrorists -- find and (inaudible) charitable organizations for one field of activity for the European Union in the last years.

So now you saw we have some new framework with the treaties. We have a new Stockholm program on CT issues, and now we also will have at the beginning of January an incoming, upcoming Spanish presidency. So every though we have a president and a high representative, we will still have all the different member states having presidencies in the European Union. So it's a way, a mixture. As I said, we are not a federal state. The members states are still very important in the E.U. arena, and so in a way we combined the continuity of a president, of a high representative with the idea to bring in member states, bringing

in new ideas, bringing in their identity, their energy into the system of rotating presidencies. And this year it will be the Spanish presidency.

So if you like sun and CTs, Spain will be the right place to be in the next year, and the priorities of the Spanish presidency will be to enhance the cooperation between national counterterrorism centers, to establish the informant structures, also to focus more on radicalization and prevention, and also they will develop an internal security strategy for the E.U.

So, so much for the background, and now, as I have promised, I will tell you something about the key challenges from the perspective of the counterterrorism coordinator. He issued a discussion paper. It was discussed in the -- with the Justice in Home Affairs ministers of the E.U., all 27 member states. And we had also -- the paper was given to the European summit to all heads of state last Friday. So it's also a quite recent discussion, and we are looking forward to get input and responses on all the ideas in this paper.

One thing is to focus more on victims. Victims need more support. The victims of terrorism, the victims of an attack directed to the society of the whole, and every society has to show solidarity and recognition and support. But it is also very important to look more on the victims of terrorism to delegitimize and to deglamorize terrorist activities, and I think that's also something very important CT fatigue and on the

discussion on human rights issues that we easily forget the victims of terrorism, and there are many.

Another point he made was to intensive and broaden and prevent work, of course, cross-control dialogue, et cetera, and to work more on local communities. Another aspect is development and security, including the European security and defense policy. And that was we have to work more on fading and failed states that might provide potential havens for terrorist organizations and all other sides of crime. And, yeah, we have to combine better our policy insecurity and also the de-development process, development policy to handle this problem.

Another aspect he proposed to the ministers is to look again on the legal framework, the legal framework to handle terrorist activities and, for example, the aspect of participation is a very important one. We have in Europe some member states where participation in terrorist activities are visiting Etteros (?) training camp is already a crime.

But there are others where it isn't, where you don't have a legal framework for this, and it is a very difficult thing to get the right legislation to handle this problem. And I think you might have the same problems with now your citizens arrested in Pakistan that wanted to join a terrorist training camp. It's a very difficult issue in case the people haven't done anything yet. They might not be affiliated to any terrorist

organizations, so they haven't done anything so can you convict them? That's a very important question.

And we have to keep in mind that a clear fair and undiscriminating legal framework that is accepted by a vast majority of the population. Also maybe some relevant migration community is essential to prevent radicalization.

Then we also want to focus more on soft targets like transport system, of course, and also on hotels. I started a dialogue with some international hotel chains because hotels are a key target for terrorist organizations. We want to look more on critical infrastructure and cyberspace, because cyberspace, being very important for our modern societies, is a very relevant arena also for terrorist activities. And to handle this we want to focus more on public-private partnership because many infrastructures, et cetera, are handled and organized in the ownership of private partners, and therefore the E.U. has begun a dialogue on what's between public and private entities to, in the CT area, for example, ISP Internet service providers to come up with new ways of cooperation t take down illegal content in the Internet.

And, finally, what's the idea to put more on security-related research? So that's the key challenges from the counterterrorism coordinator's perspective.

So now to the discussion, what might be some possibilities for cooperation and what might be some common challenges. As I have mentioned in the beginning, CT fatigue is a very, from my point of view, a very important issue. We have to avoid mistakes from the past by relaxing our guard. We could put ourselves in the pre-9/11 thinking and thus enabling a repetition of history, and that we have to prevent another aspect accounting CT fatigue, as I have mentioned already. It's victims' voices and counterradicalizations for the one item for the Spanish presidency, also. And also to have a good cooperation and dialogue, of course, with the United States based on common principles and values like it was stated in several E.U-U.S. joint statements from this year.

The second thing is to examine similar challenges in prevent activities. I just want to mention the trend of charitable activities, young westerners continue, are increasingly traveling to conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, border area, or increasingly to Somalia in order to train there terrorists and to join Al Qaeda. So we have to discuss and to be a close exchange about this development. We have to explore more the relation between diaspora communities and conflict zones like some in Pakistan and Somalia, and we have to continue the dialogue on how we can counter radical violent contact in the Internet.

And by all of that, I think you would achieve something what I would call understand radicalization better, explain radicalization better,

and by that prevent radicalization better. And there might be some possibilities of a change on the E.U. counterradicialization project. We have also a radicalization recruitment excellent plan already decided in 2005 with a lot of practice that's already finished, ongoing. And only when what's better understanding of the whole process of radicalization, we can create a better understanding in the press, in the public, and also for our decision-makers, and hopefully decision-takers. And then we have the chance to continue our policy to address the future challenges and get the backing we need to continue our up-to-now successful counterterrorism policy in the European Union.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Good morning, and thank you very much for listening to my remarks. The job of the discussant, I think, is both to be brief and to be provocative. I will try to be both and hope we succeed at least in one of those two.

What I want to talk about very briefly are problems that I see within Europe in counterterrorism, and also American problems in counterterrorism cooperation dealing with Europe. Many of these problems are known; a number of them are longstanding. But I think given the tremendous change, organizationally and legally, that is going

on in Europe, it's worth bringing some of these up again in the context of our discussion today.

One of the biggest challenges from a counterterrorism point of view in Europe, I believe, is that it's easier for a terrorist to be European than it is for a government to be European. And if you think about this, one of the great successes, to me, of European integration is the mobility of individuals across Europe. And this is something quite impressive and, to me, historically amazing. But at the same time while individuals can move, police and intelligence officials cannot. Legal codes are different.

As is well known, it is exceptionally difficult in the United States to get different parts of the same bureaucracy to talk to each other. It's even more difficult to get different bureaucracies in the United States to talk to each other, and when you then say those bureaucracies should be talking to foreign partners, you're talking one level of challenge behind.

In Europe this is the same. At times in a number of countries, actually, much, much worse. I mean historically you've had cases where, you know, French intelligence has been investigating itself where parts of French intelligence have investigated and cooperated with foreign governments against other parts of French intelligence. So when you then take this bureaucratic rivalry and animosity and bring it at a cross-national level or at a super-national level, it's exceptionally difficult.

So the problem is we've enables, if you will, a relatively small number of -- a technical term of "bad guys" here -- a relatively small number of bad guys to be much more effective in the European sense. But the barriers are still there for people who are fighting terrorists.

A related problem is a lowest common denominator sort of problem, which is, if you think about counterterrorism, now the thing that most people focus on, and understandably so, are the shooters, are people who are, have gone, they're planting bombs and so on. But so much of effective counterterrorism actually has very little to do with them. A lot as to do with the logistics network. So you go after people who recruit; you go after people who provide false documents; you go after people who do training.

But in Europe you have very different laws by country on these issues. A number of the laws still focus, primarily, on the shooters. And as a result, individuals can do the logistics. They can do some of the recruitment and even to a certain degree some of the training in one country and then operate in another. So a country's own vigilance I don't want to say is irrelevant, but a country

s own vigilance is limited by the actions of their neighbors, because you can have one European neighbor acting in a way that affects the security of another.

This is, the lowest common denominator problem that was natural, and, to me, must be a huge problem for European officials, because I think European states face a quite different problem. There is certainly a kind of nature of the problem in the sense of whether it's the Pakistani community in the United Kingdom or the North African community of France, but beyond that there are a number of member states that in my opinion face very little terrorism challenge. And, as a result, a policy that has to go across the entire Union has to square those that face a rather severe problem and a rather minor one is, to me, exceptionally difficult, and it's going to face problems.

Not surprisingly, we see huge issues within your -- huge differences within Europe I should say. To me, a core question when it comes to radicalization, which is the government attitudes and societal attitudes towards first, second, third generation Muslim communities. And here, to use the word "Europe" exceptionally misleading. I think three's far more variation within Europe than there is variation between Europe and, say, the United States; that if you look at the United Kingdom and other ones in France, for example,, you have very different ends of the spectrum with the French, in particular, being quite coercive on these issues.

As I'm a professor over at Georgetown as well as a scholar here at Brookings, and from a professor's point of view, that's a wonderful

thing because we have this thing called "variation." We can study it and look at what works. I think from a counterterrorism point of view, though, it's quite dangerous and disastrous because, inevitably, you're going to have some significant failures in this area. And these differences again are going to affect the neighbors of those that are doing more sensible policies.

The U.S. problems with European, in my view, stem from a number of these issues. One of the biggest ones is that, as was pointed out briefly in the introduction, the Visa Waiver Program was mentioned. That, from the United States point of view probably the most dangerous terrorists are European. And part of this is because of easy access to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program. But it's much more than that in my opinion.

If you take -- there's been a lot of focus on the madrassas in Pakistan, and if you take those, if you look at the average graduate of that, that person is illiterate; he or she has barely left their village; the idea that they're going to hop on an airplane, travel to Washington or New York, stay there for nine months, scout the area out, acquire explosives, function in an advanced weapons society is completely unrealistic to me. That person can pick up an AK-47 and go fight in Afghanistan, but in terms of sophisticated counterterrorism, we're not going to see it. And the plots that have been disrupted since 9/11 in Europe showed that, showed very

different personalities, show individuals who are quite well educated and very at home with functioning in western society. And, yes, of course, those individuals could come to Washington or New York, or another American city and function quite effectively.

So the level of danger, to me, is much higher, and I think there's a bit, if you look at, to me, the two most dangerous near misses in terms of attacks on the United States, Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, and the August 2006 planes operation that was disrupted in the United Kingdom.

Both of those were attacks on the United States from Europe. The logistics, the work was all done in Europe, and the goal was to use that network to then launch an attack on the United States. That to me suggests both the danger and the limits of some of European counterterrorism if that is the logical approach for doing a mass casualty attack on the United States.

A second issue, and related again, is the dangers of the failures of European integration on the safety of the United States. Now let me be clear. The United States is hardly perfect on this, and I'll single out American problems with the Somali-American community as a case where, in general, the American, Arab-American and non-Somali Muslim-American communities are exceptionally well integrated.

But the Somali-American community is not. But in Europe this is a much broader problem. It encompasses vast communities in several European countries. And if you look at failures, if you look at the hostility, I'll mention here very briefly the recent vote in Switzerland about the minaret, From the American point of view, these problems are not domestic European problems; these problems are American security problems. And they're ones that America, of course, can do relatively little about. I can't imagine the President of the United States or the Secretary of State going to Switzerland and advising on the referendum. But nevertheless, the United States has to deal with the consequences of this. And given the danger of the individuals, potential danger I should say, that's quite troubling.

A third critique. and this is probably common on both sides of the ocean, is that there's a sense that many of the European states are much better at criticizing than at helping. And if you look at the dispute about Guantanamo, this is the case where I think there was for years a tremendous, often legitimate, criticism at the U.S. policies in Guantanamo. But when there was a decision, actually late in the Bush administration, and then continued much more forcefully in the Obama administration to try to close this, there was a sense that actually Europe was part of the problem. You know, there were European requests for guarantees that these individuals would not return to terrorism before accepting them

which was, of course, the last thing the you know, was ever going to do because the you know, believed that a number of these people probably would return to terrorism.

And so there was the sense that Europe is -- well, I'll say Europe is somewhat like a professor which is the joy is I can criticize, but I actually don't have to deal with the problem and implement it, implement a solution, and there was a sense that Europe was in this.

And if you look at Afghanistan, and certainly that have been some small increases in the European troop presence on Afghanistan, but I will stress the word "small." I will stress a number of countries have made their contribution relatively clear making sure they will not be fighting. And so while it's certainly nice to have a number of these countries present, it's nice to have multiple flags at coalition headquarters. In terms of actually solving the problem, in terms of going after a very serious issue, there is a sense that most European states are actually not fully committed to this.

And this, to me, is a critique on both sides which is, I think the United States sees counterterrorism primarily as a foreign policy problem. And, as I mentioned, I think that it's a big misguided because a lot of what the United States should b concerned about is domestic policy and something like the 2006 decision in the United States to openly side with Ethiopia in its invasion of Somalia. That's a foreign policy decision of

tremendous domestic consequences with the Somali-American community.

But the European problem is the reverse, I think, which is when I think many Europeans think about terrorism they think about subway bombings, they're not thinking about foreign policy decisions. And what I tend to focus on in particular is Pakistan, which is to me, Pakistan is the nexus of so many dangerous problems beyond counterterrorism. But if you look at, and if you look at a fair number of the plots in Europe that have come up since 9/11, they've been traced back to Pakistan.

And I applaud the idea of more focus on the Internets, the new means if recruiting, but of far more importance, two terrorist organizations is having a sanctuary from which to operate, having a place for their leadership to have a sanctuary, having the ability to train, to organize on a large scale. And terrorist organizations have that now in Pakistan, and it's getting significantly worse. We've seen a dramatic, dramatic increase in the problem in the last three or four years.

Yet, I don't get the sense, to my surprise, that the European states see Pakistan as the problem that I believe they should. And with regard to Pakistan, I think there's been a lot of focus on development when, in terms of the kind of European foreign policy towards counterterrorism, and in my view that's a mistake. Development, to me, has benefits, a wide range of benefits well beyond counterterrorism.

But for counterterrorism I rarely see it as a benefit. I see it as simply there are times it can make things better; at times it can even make things worse. But it's a nice thing. It sounds good to say we're going to raise people's standards of living, therefore they won't shoot people when actually see relatively low evidence for that, and I can go on in great depth about that proposition if you want in Q&A.

But the irony is there are some bureaucratic weakness the United States has where it would be wonderful if the Europeans stepped up. In particular, there are two odd things about the American federal structure: One is that we don't have a paramilitary force that's nationwide. So we don't have a gendarme, and a number of European states do. The other related point is while we do have an FBI with intelligence duties, we don't have a domestic intelligence service in the European tradition. We don't have a Ministry of Interior that does intelligence rather and does parks.

And as a result, when two of the most important things that the United States can do in its foreign policy in helping other countries fight terrorism, which also helps the United States, is to develop their domestic intelligence services and develop their paramilitary capability, not their military capabilities. The United States has superb military training missions, but what they often do is train people to be relatively

cheap light infantry. And that's not what counterterrorism -- that's not what we do in counterterrorism in terms of or of low-level counterterrorism.

You want a very sort of different officer. And I do believe the U.S. military has been trying to learn these skills, but these are things a number of European states already have; they already know from their own experience. And from an intelligence point of view, from a paramilitary point of view, it would be tremendously valuable to have them more engaged and have these programs expanded rather than have the United States do them and, to me, in a very limited and at times weak way.

Let me conclude there and simply say I'm very glad we're having this discussion because to me there's a natural commonality of interest between the United States and Europe, and so a lot of the question is getting both sides to focus on the needs of the other, the problems of the other and, ideally, working together on the solutions.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. LAURENCE: Thank you. I'd like to give Dr. Russ the opportunity to respond to a couple of Dan Byman's points, and then I will turn to audience to solicit some more comments and questions for either of the speakers.

Dr. Russ?

DR. RUSS: Yeah, thank you. I mean some of the aspects especially addressing the European Union I think are part of the problem that, first of all, the European Union and especially some member states don't see themselves, and didn't seen themselves as a noble player in the way the U.S. sees themselves. And I think there's a lot of debate going on now that when you look quite some on Germany and the whole discussion on Afghanistan, there's a very, yeah, tremendous -- no, not tremendous -- how do you say a very quick development and discussion and a very just let's follow it. I mean very interesting.

And, but in general, I think it's -- that may be the problem that might be a little bit better with the Lisbon Treaty. But we will have -- still will have the nation states be responsible for something. We'll have the E.U. and in between the more operators it gets and the more concrete action has to be taken outside, it will still be typical of the European Union. I think we have done of these to make Europe move forward to have a single voice, to have a better organizational structure to work on this, and I think we've achieved a lot, but I think more has to be done and that the U.S. is, yeah, a natural partner to discuss this issue. So, so far for my side.

MR. LAURENCE: And if I could just follow up on one of Dan Byman's points regarding religious restriction, a restriction of religious freedom in various European countries, you worked for a number of years

at the German Federal Ministry of the Interior which, together with other agencies in Germany, looks very closely at distinctions among Islamist groups, including those who approve of violence, those who support the use of violence, that you are at prone to violence themselves.

And in the number of German lenders, well, you have had restrictions on the wearing of head scarves. This has, obviously, been a recurrent theme in French politics now with the Parliamentary Commission reviewing a ban on the burqa. Of course, Switzerland is well outside your purview, but can you envision any European role in this area of religious freedom? Do you see it as being relevant to this discussion on counterterrorism? Or is this something that like with the questions of national security that you mentioned at the outset will simply remain in the realm of national prerogative?

DR. RUSS: It's a good question. I think -- I mean it's a very delicate issue between the -- also from the tradition of the different member states. When you look on like from Poland, and I remember the discussion when that there was, when first before the Lisbon Treaty was discussed, a European constitution or Constitutional Treaty was the aspect in it if God shall be mentioned in the preface. And that was a heavy discussion between several member states for some, I think, between France and Poland, for example.

And so I think it will be quite difficult to find one line the E.U. level. But I think nevertheless that are very interesting projects and ways to deal with this issue on the European level that might be interesting also for the United States. I mean, for example, if you have mentioned the example of Germany where you can forbid, for example, organizations that are promoting violence politics in a way to overthrow the constitutional order. And that's something where I think this is an example where you can learn from to have a very clear procedure to, yeah, to deal with violent extremists and the propaganda activities and all the organizational aspects in behind.

So but that's more on the national level, and I think on national level you can have very interesting examples. But the European approach on this and the new future, I can't -- I can't see this. It's too much about identities, also, so in that 27 identities or even more.

MR. LAURENCE: Okay. I'd like to open the discussion to the floor. We will pass a microphone to the first questioner down on the left. Please state your name and affiliation before asking your question.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Diana Negroponte from The Brookings Institution. My question is for Dr. Russ. How do you draw the Brits closer into your coordination? They have a special relationship with Washington on the intelligence sharing, and they have a predominantly

Pakistan community with Commonwealth passports which permits any open transfer between the two countries.

DR. RUSS: To answer your question, first I'm from the General Secretariat, so we are serving the member states. That's a very political question, but just maybe this is an answer that first of all the U.K. now has the high representative and the person that is responsible for foreign policy, and also a lot of colleagues, especially in the security and CT areas, arena around me, they are U.K. citizens. So they are very active in this field and maybe, yeah, just often it's also interesting to look on the real work and practical engagement in this area compared also maybe to the public announcements. So that is a very political question, so it's difficult for me to answer. I'm very sorry.

Yes, sir?

MR. HERRIOT: Jud Herriot, documentary filmmaker. I'd like to address a question to Professor Byman. You raised the issue of a national gendarme, or paramilitary force like the Europeans have. How would such a thing work here?

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Here in the United States?

MR. HERRIOT: In the United States, yes.

PROFESSOR BYMAN: The United States doesn't have one, and in a way never needed one. I mean the U.S. military for a long time, you know, if you want to go back 150 years ago, had a kind of low-

level war function. So there's no need to create one for U.S. domestic problem.

But if you think about a number of countries that have a counterterrorism problem around the world, what they are often facing is a low-level insurgency, and it's an insurgent group that is linked to terrorism, involved in terrorism, but also does guerilla tactics at different levels. And to do that you need very different kinds of military forces than what you need to fight conventional war.

And so what you want are things such as a low-level infantry that focus in part as police. You want police units that can be the equivalent of kind of highly mobile and, you know, almost, you know, the jargon would be heavier units where they have more capabilities and are able to fight a more sustained battle that reinforced locals.

You want a very high degree of intelligence-sharing. And this is something that traditionally police are not trained to do. You know, when you think about police in the United States. they're not training to put information in a central database and ensure that's available to all police members in all 50 states. In fact, the opposite. There is a legitimate and appropriate focus on privacy, but that's quite -- that's because the privacy focus is there for domestic law enforcement reasons, not for intelligence in counterterrorism reasons.

And so I'm skeptical the United States could create one, and skeptical the United States should create one. But the fact is several European states -- Spain and Italy to single them out -- already have this in part because they dealt with various domestic issues this way. And since they have this tradition in place, it would be quite relevant, I think, to a number of foreign states an should be used appropriately.

MR. LAURENCE: I turn to the man on the left.

MR. KORE : It's Howard Kore from Black Watch Global. I have a question for both Mr. Russ and for Professor Byman.

Mr. Byman, you talked a little bit about how development, specifically in Pakistan, how there is a disparity or there's a lack of connection between development and radicalization prevention, and also a safe haven prevention. And also I was wondering if you and Mr. Russ should also talk on a little more about the evidence on the link between integration or the lack of integration of immigrant communities and terrorism radicalization.

It certainly seems like at least there's a lot of the terrorist attacks that have played most highly in the press in Europe and the United States, and including some folks that went over to Somalia, that it really wasn't a -- at least one could argue, especially in the second wave of the Somalis that went over to Mogadishu and Southern Somalia, that it wasn't an integration problem, it wasn't, certainly, a poverty problem, it wasn't a

problem of these folks, of these kids lacking the ability of upward mobility in Minneapolis.

So if one of you could speak on that a little bit.

MR. LAURENCE: Dr. Russ?

DR. RUSS: To be honest, I didn't get the question clearly, but --

MR. LAURENCE: The first question regarded safe havens. And the second --

MR. KORE: I asked between development and (inaudible) safe havens, and then the second, or really the second question is evidence between integration of immigrant communities and preventing radicalization.

DR. RUSS: Okay, concerning the first thing, of course, it's a moment when you don't have any kind of governmental control in some areas. For example, in North Mali, on some areas of Pakistan, then it's the problem of safe havens. So what kind of ways to address this in development policy is something very difficult, of course. But, I mean the lack of state control and of functioning governmental organizations that can enter several areas of Somalia, et cetera, I think it's quite obvious.

So and concerning the second question, maybe it's quite the contra-states, the lack of integration when you come to radicalization recruitment. That's true. It's one aspect. There are several other aspects

in the whole area when we look on some people that radicalize and on their detour, on their the whole way how they develop in their terrorist career in a way, I think there are several, yes, several factors that have an impact, and it's not only problems in the integration policy but it's one influence that you can influence apart from the personal effects that's occurred.

And second, I think -- and that's maybe the reason why you are facing, it's now more in the United States, it's the identity thing. And Europe with a longer tradition in also migration from Muslim countries now is in the third or fourth generation. In some areas where I think for many, or the majority of your population, it's in the second generation. And what we realized in the last years is that often radicalization is something what is more in the second, third generation and not so much in the first generations that entered into a country, because the identity challenge or the identity problem seems to be bigger in the following generations that are somewhere between their former states and their country where they have been born, where they went to school, where they, yeah, stayed all their lives.

And that's, I think, yeah, something more researchers to put in to draw down on. But -- yeah.

MR. LAURENCE: Professor Byman?

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Sure. Let me focus on the second part about immigration evidence for violence.

I tend to kind of turn that issue on its head. Where one thing you can look at is the idea of do poorly-integrated individuals turn to terrorism. That is to me there is -- that is, to me, is conflicting from what I can tell.

The easier question to me is, does integration help counterterrorism? And there the answer to me is clearly yes. You have -- just think notionally -- if you have a community that is well integrated, that works closely with law enforcement, that sees law enforcement as friendly, then suspicious behavior and problems are going to be identified earlier, and it's easier for authorities to act.

If the opposite is true, if the community if hostile to government, then even if there are individuals that the community doesn't welcome and want, it's much less likely to turn to the police or intelligence services to give that information away. And, in an odd way, there's very good news on this.

I don't want to read too much into the recent reports about the five individuals who traveled to Pakistan because there's a general rule which is the first reports are always wrong. So let me break that rule and assume they are correct. One thing that came out is the reason this came to the FBI's attention is because the local families contacted a

Muslim-American organization which contacted the FBI. That's what you want. That's how the system's supposed to work when local organizations realize there may be a problem and retell it to authorities.

If these organizations had poor relations with the authorities, it would be a very different situation and a much more dangerous one.

MR. LAURENCE: And then to the front here.

SPEAKER: Hi, Richard (inaudible), Dutch Embassy. I have two questions, one for Oliver Russ, the question being we have seen now almost nine years of European antiterrorism, SKONKA terrorism policy. How safe are European citizens now compared to, say, eight years ago? And how concerned should your citizens still be of European terrorists coming to U.S.? That's one question.

And the other question is for Professor Byman. We've recently seen the reports in the newspapers of these Virginia students that were arrested in Pakistan. Doesn't that defy your theory of a well-integrated Muslim community? And isn't it in fact so that U.S. is now facing the same problems as with the radical Muslims as Europe has had for many years? Thank you.

DR. RUSS: Yes, starting with the question concerning how safe are European citizens? How safe are U.S. citizens in this field? I mean there's -- we've achieved a lot, and I think Europe in the last years

has done a lot to improve their capabilities in a coordinated and cooperative approach on CT.

I just note also from my member state background -- there's a lot of cooperation also in the barital (?) level but also in the international level between all the members states, also in the intelligence community that is a very -- was a huge step forward. And by that I would say there's a lot of -- there are a lot of things that have been done to make Europe safer and to make tourists from all around the world safe in Europe.

There's a high awareness on the problem on the threat in the European Union, but, nevertheless, I mean you know it from the States, you know it all around the world, terrorists, you can never get them all. You can never say it's safe now. So safety or security in this area is something that you can't get a clear answer of it. Just I would say Europe is well prepared.

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Again, just to emphasize how little we know at this point about spying individuals, but assuming initial press reporting is true, to a degree, of course, any time you have a potential move towards violence, it challenges the idea of a well-integrated community. So, yes, it certainly does counter that.

The reasons I'm still a bit more optimistic on this, one is, as I mentioned, that the broader community was willing to work with authorities which, to me, is quite different from some of the reporting we've seen out

of the United Kingdom, for example, where we saw deep, deep hostility towards the broader, the non-Muslim community among significant segments of the Pakistan community in the United Kingdom. So that's one bit of brighter news.

The other is that these individuals didn't seem able to tap into a network in the United States. One thing that is very dangerous you see, I think, in many European countries is that when you have an individual who's radicalized, he can reach out to a recruiter who effectively brings him to the next step. He says, "Okay, you're an angry young man. Now you're going to go to Pakistan for further religious training and have contacts there," and puts them on a conveyor belt.

If you look at what the initial press reporting suggests about the five individuals, they were kind of wandering around Pakistan saying, "Hey, would you train us for jihad?" And while eventually someone's going to say yes -- that's of concern, I don't want to minimize that -- that's quite different than having someone meet them at the airport and takes them directly to the tribal area. So it suggests a certain level of, certain limits if you will, to the domestic networks in place.

But that said, yes, it does certainly suggest that some of the conference about the integration of the American-Muslim community may be overstated.

MR. LAURENCE: Now, one of the main obstacles to cooperation between the U.S. and Europe to bring this theme back into the discussion has been this assumption that the Americans used this war metaphor and that the Europeans used the law enforcement approach.

The second great obstacle has been agreeing on the criterion for what constitutes a legitimate, charitable group versus what constitutes a political activity.

Do you see at least in those two arenas -- and I would invite either of you to respond to this -- any significant progress on at least these two cleavages?

DR. RUSS: I would say of custody (00:11:02) the idea of law enforcement versus war is, I think, a little bit too easy. I mean because -- how do you say? -- but I think Europe has learned about also now in the Afghanistan engagement that law enforcement is not the only way or not the first tool that can be applicated when you come in an area where you have something like your insurgencies and we'll war against European soldiers, and it's something where you might have also in public limits.

The problem of the public perception of the work, Europe and European soldiers have to be, have done in Afghanistan, a divorce, yeah, more that European public, I think, saw it as more or only about development policy, and that is not also on using the literary means. And

that's something Europeans have to get more used to, that also European soldiers are in combats, that European soldiers getting behind terrorists and everything. That's a process, but I think the process is working right now, and the debate and the discussion and the cooperation with the United States has changed a lot in the last years.

So I think there's a lot of things have, on both sides I think, have approached in this area, looking on the importance of law enforcement, of trials of that's area. So having a judicial aspect on this whereas also Europeans have learned more on how to work in such an arena what is not like working in Paris or London, by two policemen knocking on the door and entering, of course.

So I think a lot has changed in the last years, if this answers the question, but --

PROFESSOR BYMAN: I'll try to tackle the charity issue a little bit. The irony is if you went, you know, 30 years back, this would be the other way around, where there are tremendous British complaints, for example, that U.S. citizens were actively eating the provisional IRA to a number of charities that in reality were -- were not helping widows and orphans but were directly or indirectly funneling money to shooters.

And that's, of course, a problem with charities. If you can have a, you know, Hamas, ones real hostile to Gaza. And, you know, a huge part of this budget does go towards social services, but the social

services also aid the groups military wing directly and indirectly in a variety of ways. And it's almost impossible to tease out, you know, with a particular dollar how much of it is going to what because there is so much bleedover between the two.

And so in the end I think it's less analytic question and much more a political one. In the United States the Hamas and Hezbollah's efforts against Israel are widely seen as illegitimate terrorists. And in Europe they're widely seen as a legitimate struggle against oppression. And from there I think you have the views on charities, though it's much less to be about charities and much more about the nature of the struggle.

MR. LAURENCE: I'm going to take one last lightening round of questions from these four individuals. Please keep it very brief so that we can allow the participants to wrap up.

Starting in the front and going back, and we'll gather the questions.

MR. BEARY: Brian Beary, reporter for Europolitics. Mr. Russ, I'm wondering, are you happy with the current way that data is slowing between the U.S. and Europe, specifically with things like the Swift Agreement where Europe is basically outsourcing the job of finding no terrorist data because it doesn't want to breach its own data privacy rules, so it lets the U.S. Treasury subpoena Swift, and then U.S. Treasury

tips off Europe? And I'm just wondering if you feel that that model is a good model?

MR. LAURENCE: Thank you. Next question?

SPEAKER: Is there a threat from a domestic terrorism threat in the U.S. from nonimmigrant groups, by which I mean the, you know, far right, the militias, the groups that seem to be feeling very much alienated from American politics right now with the election of Barack Obama?

MR. LAURENCE: The third?

MS. TOLL: Gerde Tol from the Middle Eastern Institute and I have a question for Dr. Byman.

The radicalization processes show considerable variation among different E.U. countries, and my question is can state societal relations or the place of religion in the public sphere be a variable in this radicalization process? Thank you.

MR. LAURENCE: And the final question from the back row, please.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Just a couple of few remarks toward the presentation by Professor Byman and a question that stems from that.

MR. LAURENCE: Please keep it brief.

SPEAKER: I'll be brief, yes. I was a bit surprised. I thought I would attend a meeting on in-house and U.S.-European cooperation, and then I rather felt -- I felt to find myself in a meeting on American advice on European counterterrorism policy. I think there's a lot that can be said to what you criticized at the European level. I think there are very similar problems on the American continent, but instead of finger-pointing or doing the blame game, I'd like to actually hear where you see areas of cooperation and how that could function, and where we could learn from each other instead of expecting the other to be like oneself.

MR. LAURENCE: Thank you very much. I'm going to ask Dan Byman to respond first, and then allow Dr. Russ a final word.

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Let me take the last question/statement first. Yes, I was, of course, finger-pointing. And that, to me, is actually part of the point of these exercises, which is to air differences, to air criticisms, to air grievances because when you're within the chambers of government, it's very, very hard to kind of step out and talk about some of the deeper, more fundamental problems. That's just the nature of the beast.

And so to me part of the purpose of these outside exercises is both to remind people who are doing paroles duty, I would say, trying to improve the situation, that there are still deep problems, and for individuals who are futures, if you will. In the audience I see a number of young

people who are with faculty working on these issues, professionally, for them to be thinking about these so when they go into government they'll be thinking about solutions as well as the problem.

And, in general, I'd say I think actually pointing up problems is exceptionally important service, and it's something that, oh, yes, of course, we should also be focused on solutions. But you need to understand the problem. And I think there has been this media jump in a number of cases towards the minutia of bureaucratic reform without very serious looks at the nature of the problem. And this is something on both sides of the Atlantic, certainly, but I will only defend the importance of this sort of thing.

I actually did try to point out areas of mutual cooperation, so I stressed the idea that the Europeans have a lot to offer when it comes to training intelligence because Europeans have a much more robust domestic intelligence capability than the United States does. I will add that I mentioned paramilitary as well.

There's a broader issue when it comes to coordinating a policy towards Pakistan. One thing Pakistan is very, very good at doing is doing the least it can get away with in terms of avoiding international pressure. If the United States and Europe speak as one voice, that's exceptionally powerful. And that coordination is difficult for, certainly,

within Europe and also difficult within Europe and the United States, but when it can be done, extremely powerful.

And I mentioned Afghanistan. Here is something where I do feel I would like the Europeans to do more. I know that domestic political difficulty in most European states towards this, but when we say counterterrorism is a tremendous problem and then we neglect something like a gaping wound like Afghanistan, to me that's a huge, huge diffidence that creeps into the conversation.

One thing I'll add as well to the first question which, to me, is very interesting on the domestic threat from non-Muslim groups, certainly, absolutely, there is good and bad news in my judgment. I think these groups are energized in a very negative way by the election of Barack Obama. Of course, the first African-American president right there is a affront to a number of the truly crazy groups, and then even beyond that a number of his policies, or I would say projections of his policies, he's very internationalist. He's someone who is perceived as being in favor of issues like gun control. So even for the groups that are not energized by outright racism there's a concern about his policies as well. So, yes, I think that's a tremendous concern. These groups, I think, are getting stronger and when their concerns are kind of whiffed up, that's something I would watch.

However, I do think the FBI is paying tremendous attention to these groups, and for the most part they've been of very limited professional competence. These are groups that have some skilled and dangerous individuals in them, but in terms of their ability to organize on a mass scale, I believe the FBI has successfully gone after these groups since Timothy McVeigh and the militia issues in the mid-1990s.

So I have hope for the good guys, if you will, even though I'm very concerned about the bad guys.

MR. LAURENCE: Thank you.

PROFESSOR BYMAN: Sure.

MR. LAURENCE: We are running over time, I'm sorry.

PROFESSOR BYMAN: No, no fault.

MR. LAURENCE: Let me allow Dr. Russ to have the final word.

DR. RUSS: Okay, just short, briefly on the question concerning Swift and Data Protection. That was something where the coordinator was very much in favor of an agreement of going further in all the -- as well on the data protection as well as on tracking finance, terrorists' financing. And, yeah, just to maybe to sum it up briefly, I mean I think the discussion today was very productive seeing that maybe to explain to you that we won't be a European state, you being aware that you can't ask us for things that only European states could do. And for us

also, mentioning all the activities we have done in the prevention area where we are quite successful, that is also an aspect of what the colleague has said concerning internal domestic intelligence, but also in a broader local activities, and for you just more, I would say to look on the harder policy issues. And I think if we are cooperating there and listening more to each other, then we are a quite good way in terms of (inaudible) cooperation.

MR. LAURENCE: Please join me in thanking Dr. Oliver Russ and Daniel Byman.

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