

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CHINA'S CHANGING VIEWS OF AMERICA:
INSIGHTS AND OBSTACLES

Washington, D.C.

Monday, November 9, 2009

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

JULIA CHANG BLOCH
President, US-China Education Trust
Former Ambassador to Nepal

[KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL](#)
Director, [John L. Thornton China Center](#)

Moderator:

[CHENG LI](#)
Director of Research, [John L. Thornton China Center](#)
Featured Speakers

ZHOU QI
Professor
China Academy of Social Sciences

SUN ZHE
Professor, Tsinghua University

TERRY LAUTZ
Consultant, Ford Foundation

Discussants:

DAVID MICHAEL LAMPTON
Dean of Faculty, School of Advanced International Studies
Professor of Chinese Studies, Johns Hopkins University

PRISCILLA ROBERTS
Associate Professor of History
The University of Hong Kong

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. LIEBERTHAL: (in progress) opportunity to have a serious discussion with serious data about Chinese views of America and how Chinese scholars study America. Obviously, we have the presidential summit coming up this coming week, so such issues are very much in the air, and I know that one of President Obama's major goals in going to China is to help try to let Chinese understand his view of America and his view of U.S.-China relations and where they might head.

I think of it somewhat differently. I think that in terms of the importance of this particular meeting today, I'm really struck by how much the agenda of U.S.-China relations has changed in the past 12 months. If you think back 12 months ago, our agenda was still almost wholly on narrowly bilateral issues or issues immediately around China's periphery, like North Korea. Twelve months later you'll see, as President Obama is in China a week from now, the agenda is global issues: the global economic and financial crisis, the global issues of clean energy and climate change, and the global issue of nuclear proliferation, which has a North Korean dimension but also an Iranian dimension and a Pakistani dimension and so forth. The shift to global issues really reflects China's increasingly important role in the world and its impact on a global level.

The U.S. has long been a global power, and now we've run into everywhere and have to take up these big issues.

In this context, our capacity to avoid working at cross purposes are the major issues. It is increasingly important to the world's ability to manage effectively the most difficult issues that all of us face. A major element in this mix will be the evolving views of each side that are held by the people in the other country. Every national leadership is sensitive to what the parameters are of popular understanding in their own country in the image of the other country that their own populations have. So, that makes this meeting with this report of the findings of two major studies on the Chinese side, to my mind, of particular value. And I have to say I haven't seen either study. So, it's a little hard to make comments about the studies that I look forward to hearing about. So, before seeing the new data, let me make just a couple of remarks.

It is kind of conventional wisdom -- it has been for many years -- that Chinese with any education as a whole know more about America than Americans with any education as a whole know about China. Right? Every Chinese with any education knows about Theodore Roosevelt and knows about the New Deal and knows about the American Civil War and this and that and the other thing. You ask Americans, and it would be embarrassing to see how little most Americans -- average

Americans -- know about those kinds of details of their Chinese equivalents.

I think that, in fact, reflects the reality that for many years, now, America has been more important to China than China has been to America. But I've also sensed that because we're both continental powers, in fact -- again, without having seen the data of these studies -- if you're asking any real detail about the understanding of the average, moderately educated person in each country about the other, it is shockingly low. You know, there may be some names they know or some events, but the understanding is really not there. I think that's because we're both continental powers, and as continental powers people inevitably are enveloped by their own cultures and their own histories and their own issues. And in that context it seems to me that the views articulated by public intellectuals and by officials in both societies therefore become of particular consequence in shaping popular perceptions, and that makes the content of American studies in China particularly important, and I'm delighted that this afternoon's panel is going to address specifically that issue: How do Chinese study America? How do you train your American specialists in China?

Let me make a couple of frank and perhaps controversial comments just to kind of get this kicked off.

Cheng Li is laughing, because he knows I can't resist doing this.

I think America's China specialists tend to study China more comprehensively than China's America specialists study America. When we train our students who will study China as a major area of their focus, we train them to study China's domestic politics, China's social developments, the major domestic short- and long-term challenges, the economic evolution of China, the political economy of China, as well as China's foreign policy and security affairs. In addition, the views of Americans who study China tend to be more independent of an American national agenda than I think are the views of Chinese who study America, which is to say we train our students of China to seek to understand China itself, regardless of U.S. foreign policy concerns and priorities. My impression is that is less true in the other direction, that while the studies may be deep and rigorous, the agendas are highly informed by national interests and not quite as much by just intellectual curiosity and a desire to understand the dynamics of another society as part of understanding the social science.

Now, the data presented this morning should provide us with a far more textured understanding of China's views of America. And the afternoon discussion will then take up priorities and recommendations for American studies in China in the future.

I want to thank in particular Julia Chang Bloch for asking us to co-sponsor today's meeting; to thank the various presenters, discussants, and moderators for coming here, some of you all the way from Beijing and elsewhere along the Chinese coast to make the trip, to come here, to participate in this meeting.

I certainly want to close just by expressing my hope that this proves to be a memorably fruitful conference.

Thank you.

MS. BLOCH: Ken, thank you very much. You can't imagine how much we agree, so I particularly can say that it's with great pleasure that the U.S.-China Education Trust joins Brookings today to call attention to the landmark developments in the ways that America watchers or Chinese scholars who are America watchers assess and interpret events in the U.S. to Chinese audiences.

You said a number of times that you have not yet seen the studies. Well, it seems this book is published in Chinese and you could (inaudible) it up, because you have a copy, and our CAS study, which I'll mention later also, is in both Chinese and English, but it is not yet ready for publication. And I say this, because there is so much written in Chinese about the United States that we Americans do not really have easy access to, and this is one of the reasons why we are having this meeting today.

And, Ken, you mentioned President Obama's Asia trip next week. I think it underscores the serendipity in the timing of our program today, because it really, really emphasizes the importance of our giving attention to the study of the U.S. in China. The President's itinerary reflects the increasing importance of Asia, and especially China, to everything from financing U.S. debt and driving the global financial recovery to climate change, which I know that you've done a great deal of work on -- and very excellent work -- disease control, and containing nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran. None of the great issues of the day, in fact, can be addressed, I would say, without Chinese cooperation. So, understanding how Chinese views of America have evolved over the years is therefore more important than ever.

USCET has been working with the American studies community in China for the past ten years, developing a network that today is 42 members strong. To understand the state of the field and the way forward, which we will hopefully focus on this afternoon at our workshop, we commissioned two studies that have already been mentioned, one from Professor Sun Zhe, now out of Tsinghua University -- at the time he was at Fudan University -- on Chinese writings on American politics and foreign policy 1979 to 2006 and another from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 30 years of American studies in China. And we are very pleased to bring you -- to be able to bring you --

Professor Sun and CAS representative Professor Zhou Qi to focus on just one part of these studies and to help us understand what is America's image among educated Chinese. How much does China understand about the U.S., and how do America watchers affect China's policies and positions in U.S.-China relations.

And here I would, again, agree with Ken. It is conventional wisdom that the Chinese understand America better than Americans understand China. However, if you look at it a little bit more deeply, I totally agree with Ken, and I've said this many times in China, that our American-China watchers understand China in a much deeper way than the Chinese-America watchers, and this is another reason why American studies in China is so important.

Let me end again by expressing my gratitude also to many of those gathered here today and others that have made this event possible.

First, I must thank the Luce Foundation, represented today by Helena Kolenda, for their indispensable support of USCET's programming in American studies. Thank you, Helena.

Then, Ken, to you and Lisa and others at Brookings, thank you for intellectual collaboration and for hosting us today and for allowing us to have a larger room. Thank you.

And to the speakers, panelists, and discussants all, we appreciate your prospectus and expertise and welcome your giving us an open window into what Chinese-Americanists are really researching, writing, and saying about the U.S., and this is of course of particular benefit to those of us whose Chinese is not quite up to snuff. So, thank you very much.

MR. LI: Well, first I want to join my colleagues, Ambassador Julie Bloch and Dr. Ken Lieberthal, in welcoming you all to this event. I also want to thank Julia and Ken not only for your initiation of this timely and very important panel discussion but also for your many years of leadership in promoting cultural and educational exchanges across the Pacific.

As President Obama begins his amazing trip to PRC this weekend, U.S.-China relations will receive a great deal of media coverage. To a great extent, his trip will be judged by the degree of cooperation he's able to secure in crucial issue areas, such as global and regional security, climate change, world economic rebalancing, and progress in dialog on human rights and democracy.

Less noted but perhaps even more consequential is whether this presidential visit can significantly improve mutual understanding between the two countries, as well as forging even stronger ties in the reign of educational exchanges.

As I stand here moderating this panel on China's changing views of America, in my mind I'm far away and long ago. The place is Fudan University in my home city of Shanghai. The date is April 30, 1984, the day when President Reagan spoke there. Now, this was the first speech by a U.S. President in the PRC campus. President Reagan began the speech with these lines of greetings.

I quote: "I bring you greetings not only from my countrymen but from one of your own countrymen. Some of you know Ye Yang, who was a student here. He graduated from Fudan and became a teacher of English at this University. Now he's at Harvard University, where he is studying for a PhD in comparative literature. Mr. Yang -- Mr. Ye wants you to know he is doing fine with all the straight A's. He asked me to deliver a message to his former students, colleagues, friends, and family. He asked me to say, for him," Reagan said in Chinese, '*Wo xiang nian da jia*' (I'm thinking of all of you)." End quote. What a great speech. How powerful educational exchange is (inaudible) promoting goodwill, respect, trust, and friendship.

Those of us who have had the privilege of participating in U.S.-China education exchanges consider ourselves extremely fortunate. Our intellectual lives and professional careers have been profoundly enriched by this experience. I'm sure that the men in the room here share this sentiment. By the way, Mr. Ye Yang --

Do you know him? Do you know him? Okay.

-- Mr. Ye Yang, the student who President Reagan referred to 25 years ago, is now a professor in Chinese language and literature at the UC Riverside. He frequently goes back to China to be a guest lecturer in Shanghai's Fudan University.

Now, we are here this morning, however, not mainly to celebrate how far U.S.-China relations have advanced due to broader cultural and educational changes but rather to discuss how much work still needs to be done. In moving forward, we must address lingering misapprehensions, unfulfilled missions, and the new challenges.

I'm glad that we have such distinguished panelists and discussants to address these issues this morning. Their bios are available in print, in think, that you can pick up outside if you haven't done so. I don't need to repeat them here. Instead, let me just say a few words about each of them in a more personal way.

Professors Zhou Qi and Sun Zhe received their official degrees, including science, in the United States and are now the leading China scholars in the field of American studies. Their academic writings, policy commentaries in the media, and advice to senior Chinese leaders have greatly shaped the Chinese understanding of America.

Dr. Terry Lautz, on the further side, served as the vice president of Henry Luce Foundation for decades and has been widely

recognized, along with Peter Geithner at the Ford Foundation, as one of the two most instrumental foreign friends in helping China to rebuild its educational system after the culture revolution.

Now, Professor Michael Lampton, who will join us just in a few minutes -- he is teaching an exercise -- is a Dean of Faculty of SAIS, but in the minds of many he is the Dean of American Studies on U.S.-China relations. He is a mentor of many generations of PRC-born scholars, including Dr. Zhou Qi and myself.

Last but not least, Professor Priscilla Roberts, of the University of Hong Kong, is in the front line of both teaching international diplomacy and witnessing the unfolding drama of the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century. Welcome you all.

Now, each of the panelists will speak for 20 minutes, and each discussant will speak for about 10 minutes. We will make a break between the presentation and discussion, and our Q&A session will occupy the later 40 minutes or so. And please join me welcoming our speakers.

MS. QI: (Inaudible) introduction. It's really my pleasure to be invited here to give a talk. The topic of my talk is -- this what Chinese view of Americans -- a survey and analysis. Actually, I'm going to introduce a survey conducted by my colleagues in the Institute of Micro Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It's not my survey, so --

but I was allowed to use the data for this talk. So, if any of you would like to cite the data of this talk, please, you know, do it with agreement.

First of all, let me introduce a little bit about survey. This survey was conducted in 18 cities around China -- everywhere in China -- and altogether the research was collected -- 3,559 questionnaire forms -- but 185 were invalid. Because of the limits of funds, time, and resources, samples were not selected randomly. Forms were -- because forms were distributed by selected persons, they are -- most of them are in universities or in governmental departments in local level. So, that means, you know, not -- maybe we cannot say it can represent Chinese view of Americans, but this we can say. It's probably a Chinese intellectual's view of Americans.

Here's a map where the questionnaire forms are collected. I will not go to detail of it, but you may have an impression of it.

Here you'll see where questionnaire forms are collected. We have gender, occupation, age, and education.

Gender -- about -- I mean, 1,750 females and 1,697 males, about even; the -- you know, the number is about the same.

And occupations -- 441 people didn't tell us about their occupations, and there are many colleagues, students, including the graduate students, 1,458; and public servants, 487; teachers in schools at different levels and professors, 231; workers, including employees in

banks and the post offices, drivers, (inaudible), cashiers, accountants, and the cooks were, together, 300-something, like 22. And then company managers and employees, 467. Self-employees -- in China we call them *Ge Ti Hu* (个体户) -- 111. Lawyers, medical doctors, and nurses -- these are fewer, so I don't give the number here, and some unemployment workers.

Age -- age is, you know, ranging from 17 to 80 is quite a big range, but most of them are under 35, so 74.1 percent are under 35. Above 35 years old, including 35 years old, altogether amount to 62 -- I mean, 26 percent. It was also the fact that most of them have got college education or are studying in colleges right now. So, the education -- amount, 3,559. 2,986 have had college education or are studying in colleges -- amount to about 84 percent.

So, here the question -- one of the questions -- here is the fourth question: How do Chinese people learn about the U.S.? The answer is they learned about the U.S. from TV programs, 83 percent or 84 percent -- about 84 percent. And books, newspapers, and magazines, 65.4 percent. Internet, 63.15 percent. Here the number means, you know, you can't give one than more answer.

Then the question is: The false impression of the U.S. Some choices are given: arrogance, 28 percent. Wealthy and powerful, 27.6 percent. Democracy, freedom, and (inaudible) society, 25.9 percent.

World police, 17.8 percent. Well, actually, this answer is better than the answers given -- I mean, the survey made by *Global Times* several years ago.

The impression about the U.S. -- the answer not so good, not so bad, 51 percent -- 55 -- 51.55 percent. Having favorably impression, 15 percent. Having no favorably impression, 23 percent.

Then the Chinese view of American power. The U.S. is getting more powerful. The answer is this: 16 -- about 16 percent; declining, 27 percent. Not much -- there's no much change, 37.03 percent anyway. Do not know -- quite high, about 20 percent.

Then general assessment on Sino-American relations. This design of questions are different from those of -- those given by *Global Times*, so the answer is quite different. The U.S. is China's competitor and cooperative partner, 55 points, 44 percent. (Inaudible) state -- very low, about 1 percent. Cooperative partners, 5 percent. (Inaudible) state, 11 percent. Competitor, 18 percent. The U.S. important to China, 84 percent. The U.S. is not important to China, 6 percent. So, most people believe the U.S. very important to China.

Now, here is an assessment of Sino-American relations in recent years. Partly good, partly bad. Not stable enough, 50 percent. (Inaudible) of the development -- sorry, okay, 8 percent. Not so good, about 30 percent. The U.S. attitude to China's reform and opening --

supportive, 11 percent; opposed, 16 percent; complex, 64 percent; don't know, 7 percent. How do Americans view China's rights? Complex, about 50 percent; opposed, 35.66 percent; supportive, 2 percent. Many respondents are suspicious about the intention of U.S. strategic policies with China, it means.

Okay, here's China's view of Sino-American relations. With win-win nature, 42 percent. The U.S. gains more, 20 percent. China gains more, 4 percent. Bringing about more frictions, about 20 percent. So, it sounds -- many people believe the U.S. gain more from U.S.-China cooperation, China -- then motivation of U.S. -- accusation of China's human rights, to undermine China's stability, 32 percent. To uglify or defame China, 20 percent. Do not know much about the conditions in China, about 20 percent. Perceiving from the American notion of human rights, 18 percent. To promote China's democratic construction is very Chinese (foreign phrase), about 6 percent.

And then people asked how do you think the Chinese should deal with U.S.? Then how the principles about flexible tactics -- about 80 percent. This (foreign phrase), 80 percent. (Inaudible) policy, 13 percent. Conciliating and compromising policy, 4.73 percent. So, that means most of the people believe we should not become, you know, competitor or rival of the United States.

Which is easier? Which has the biggest impact on Sino-American relations? No. 1 is Taiwan, 46 percent -- always like this. If you look at the way it's conducted by *Global Times*, the answer, the No. 1 answer for this question is always -- you know, No. 1 answer is Taiwan. Could be as high as 80 percent. Mutual strategic trust, 10 percent. Ideology, 11 percent. Human rights, 7 percent. Treat, 9. Tibet, 5. Energy and the environment, 4.

Here is -- which is it, U.S. or China, can be cooperative? I'm looking at the environment. 74 percent is very high. Work as a (inaudible), 43. Human rights, 18. Taiwan, 23.

It's very interesting that, you know, many people believe U.S.-China can cooperate on Taiwan issue. I think it is fact that since recent years -- I mean, probably since 2005, the U.S. and China has cooperated with each other contentment (phonetic) of Taiwan's advantage.

Here's a conclusion of differences between groups. First (inaudible), no big difference, age. The (inaudible) impression over the U.S. goes up with age increasing of sorts, but -- it's a Chinese character -- so between the different groups of the age -- you'll see the differences but not very much. But as I have told you, most of the people are young -- are quite young, most under 35. And education -- those who have college education or above won't believe that the U.S. attitude with China's reform

is complex, 67. That belief is opposing or opposed, 14 percent. Sino-American relations are important for China, 87 percent. Those who are -- no -- who have no college education, the answer is complex, about 45 percent, opposed, 28 percent or 29 percent, twice of the R group (phonetic). Sino-America relations are not important for China, 65.31 percent. So, there is this obvious difference.

Here, area differences, false impression. Okay, in coastal areas, wealthy and strong, 30 percent. Democracy, freedom, and (inaudible) to society, about 30 percent. In inland areas, arrogant or arrogance, 31 percent. Wealthy and strong, 26 percent. So, that means that more people in coastal areas believe that U.S. is containing China, and more people inland areas reply do not know.

Neutral and compromising. It's interesting to note that most people's answer neutral or compromising. Most of the questions say seven questions. Mainstream perceptions are neutral or compromising. That (inaudible) perceptions are (inaudible).

Questions, for instance, how to deal with U.S. -- how the principles (inaudible) flexible tactics, about 80 percent. What is the U.S.-China policy? Combinations of cooperation and containment. Here should be engagement and containment, 56.5 percent. The relationship between the U.S. and China. Competitors and the cooperative panels, 55 percent. For U.S. (inaudible) China's reform and opening, complex,

64 percent. The impression of the U.S., not so good, not so bad, 51 percent. So, for these key questions, the majority of the Chinese reply quite neutral, not that radical.

(Off record -- technical problem)

So, then is my analysis. Because time is limited I will not talk long, but, you know, just give some points of my view.

First of all, is there change of Chinese view of Americans? I think during the early years of the reforms and opening or from the end of the 1970s saw the early and the mid-1980s the Chinese favorable impression of the U.S. reached the peak after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the U.S. in 1979. However, from the late 1980s, the Chinese view of Americans has not changed much if you look at some surveys conducted by different newspapers, especially *Global Times*, since 19 -- I mean, 2005 to 2007. But one thing is worth noting, that surveys also show that the Chinese has believed that the U.S.-China relations have been relatively good since the second part of the first Bush administration.

Then the second question is where does the favorable impression come from? The answer is it comes first and foremost from historical perception. In 1784, the American commercial ship, *Empress of China*, arrived at Ghangzhou in contra between the two countries in the beginning of a long journey of China's understanding of the U.S.

In the next 225 years, with exception of the Boxer Rebellion and the Korean War, the two countries had no direct military confrontation, therefore, leaving no painful war memories. In World War II, the two countries were allies in the fight against Japan in the Asian and the Pacific areas. The support and aid from our American governments and the people left long-lasting memories in the Chinese mind.

Then we should answer where does the negative opinion of the U.S. come from? The answer is also first it comes -- first and foremost from historical perception. In (inaudible), Chinese foreign relations in historical perspective, he understands that for such Asian people as the Chinese people, history remains important. For those people 100 years human aiding, history left a deep and fresh impression of that memory -- the opium war in 1840 -- and it was the fourth unequal treaty to China in recent Chinese history. From then on, unequal treaties between China and the Western powers were signed one after another, including with U.S., France, Germany, Russia, and Japan.

La Casa De Sovereignty, which was -- it deals with China -- by the end of the 18th century later -- time? Okay, later became a tool in the hand of the Chinese to oppose division and aggression by (inaudible) powers. Autonomy and independence had been constant goals of the Chinese for the next 100 years until the establishment of the PRC in 1949. According to Beijing Mainland, the company, the Chinese public has lots

of memories, both pleasant and unpleasant moments, in Sino-American relations.

There are (inaudible) parties -- the Korean War, which no matter what causes the war, has been condensed into a collective memory that Chinese resolution and heroism and the Korean War (inaudible) between China and the U.S, the most powerful Western state. It has become a symbol to the Chinese of the Chinese heroism, resolution, and encouragement. Because the memory is history to most of Chinese, the Chinese government can be, and should be, allowed to be criticized by ordinary Chinese people but cannot be criticized by Western powers. Otherwise, it will be seen as a (inaudible) of intervention of Chinese domestic affairs (inaudible) the Western part of (inaudible) Chinese history. This trend stimulates Chinese nationalism in 60 years after the (inaudible) of the PRC.

Then the (inaudible) is no mutual trust. Because 118 years are the end -- are the contemporary events, such as bombing of Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia and the 83 causes, the Chinese has no real trust of Americans -- only the U.S. governments. Continuous arms sales to Taiwan, resistance of China's hosting of Olympia games by the American Congress, etc., sources over the Chinese suspicion of American motivation in dealing with China -- mutual trust is liking (inaudible).

Whenever any event good in China occurs, it tends to be seen as intentional.

How do (inaudible) China (inaudible)? The new factor for the liking of trust is a thinking of -- think about China's (inaudible) in recent years, especially among Chinese (inaudible) and on the current situation of the global economic crisis. Many Chinese believe that a Democratic political system is not necessary in Western style without the power of separation of check and balance and the multi-party system, as long as they are a rule of law (inaudible) between CPC -- the CPC's -- all the parties between the leadership and the constitutions. At different level, economical development can be achieved, and hundreds of society can be built. This reinforces the suspicion of the U.S. performance of price in other countries, including China, to democratize its political systems -- their political systems.

Then Washington coast -- Washington consensus. When American economic and political scientists come to (inaudible) the effects of Washington consensus not only are (inaudible) own economy but also are the economy of the American countries the (inaudible) global financial crisis. The Chinese asking why China should follow it blindly. Why does the U.S. often measure China in its own (inaudible)?

Finally, tolerating pluralism, domestic -- many people think the U.S. -- Americans are, you know, can tolerate pluralism, domestic rate, but, you know, at the same time pursue democracy board exclusively.

Many Chinese not understand why Americans are relatively tolerant about multiplicity or pluralism domestically. Therefore, there is a co-existence of liberalism and conservatism ideas that become into a small government, and small government, realism, idealism, and so on. But they are not really tolerant about the existent of a different political system in the world, and always try to change those -- that I've not seen much theirs -- into Western style democracy.

American exceptionalism or chosen people by God or city upon a hill -- it's not -- I mean, it's widely and deeply understood by ordinary Chinese, even Chinese -- many Chinese intellectuals who are in the field of (inaudible) studies. So, it's very -- it's easy to lead to a belief by many Chinese that arrogance, aggressiveness, or tendency of intervention are proper words for discrediting American characteristics in terms of their foreign policies. Though it is also recognized by those Chinese that the U.S. is a democracy with freedom and a pluralist society.

Thank you.

MR. ZHE: Thank you very much. I'm very grateful to many people in this room. I saw a lot of -- a couple PhDs from Columbia University -- Mr. Richard Byrd, Ken Lieberthal, a young brother, Scott, who

is working Iran; and I also am grateful to two former council generals -- (inaudible) -- when I was working in Fudan University as a professor and deputy director of (inaudible) Center for American Studies they gave me a lot of opportunities and that (inaudible) is American people.

And I am also grateful to Julia, and we worked together a couple years ago to try to establish a network of American studies in China, so I learned a lot from you.

I think what I'm trying to do is trying to apply what I learned in a state, you know, and to the Chinese practice of study of American politics. Here, -- I think the use of -- I was wondering whether I'm looking at the United States through a straw -- you know, what I see is real, but the research is not that big, not broader, so that's question I'm thinking. And also I got Professor Zhou Qi's PPT last night and so I think I should add a couple of footnotes before I introduce my own book.

I think the key point I want to emphasize give you a historical evolution of the Chinese perception of the United States. Especially in -- from 1946 after the Civil War to late 1950, United States was seen as a paper tiger. That's one label I think the government gave to the United States. And from 1979 after the reform begins, I think the mainstream of thinking of the United States is something like although the United States is a capitalist country, we can tactfully exploit our relationship, because Deng Xiaoping decided to establish diplomatic relations with the United

States on December 15th, 1978. And then three days later, you know, he -- the 11th, the 3rd session of 11th Chinese (inaudible) plenary session was open. Deng Xiaoping decided to have open door reform agenda in China. So, establishing diplomatic relations with United States and China's domestic reform are intertwined in 1979.

After the 1989, I think the Chinese perception also changed. Today most of the Chinese people think the ordinary Americans are just like ordinary Chinese. They are generally simple, sympathetic, and easy going, because you do feel -- if you go to China, you do feel some kind of a natural affinity with Chinese people compared to the Chinese feeling of working or making friends with Japanese, with Germany -- you know, with Russians. You have that kind of a natural affinity. But, however, there's still what you'd call -- you can call it love/hate syndrome or whatever, you know, like Professor Zhou Qi presented.

I think the general observation is the Chinese will further distinguish American people from the administration, so it's -- overwhelmingly the majorities are favorably impressioned for markers at WAM (phonetic) open and successful what I call the natural affinity. And only (inaudible) think otherwise, But, however, there's different views on whether United States is on a peaceful -- on a (inaudible) or peaceful decline, that a too-favorable term used in China is whether China is on peaceful rise and whether United States is on peaceful decline. That's a

big question we have to consider. And I think the -- another -- for knows how good we want to make and so (inaudible) -- why China have that kind of a thinking. I think the Chinese -- China's image of the United States largely is mirror image and it reflects China's own national identity and the cultural. For example, we all think that the United States a leader of the world, but in Chinese -- to the Chinese leadership, lingdao (领导), a Chinese word, must be essentially (foreign phrase). Only you have to be a moral example yourself. You know, for example, when Obama was advocating the climate change so that people -- Chinese people are watching how serious his commitment is, how much he's going to spend, you know, and whether he's willing to share of the technology he can work with Chinese on this -- in this area. So, I think (inaudible) should be morally example to a lot of Chinese, America after 9/11, especially after the Iraq war and become a country that everyone loves to hate, so that is something of a different perception.

And secondly, it seems the end of the Cultural Revolution the term of ideological ideologies not as important as, you know, as previous years, so Chinese people begin to become very pragmatic. So, it's very difficult for the Chinese -- for a lot of Chinese to understand the American idealism and religious belief, you know. They are rather skeptical of the American concerns about human rights in China and tend

to think these concerns are simply a policy instrument to serve other goals -- you know, exporting, democracy, whatever.

There are certain elements I would like to (inaudible) that a lot of people in China don't understand the check and balance system here, so your (inaudible) simply (inaudible) some kind of invisible hand. You know, when you have a dialog, even Congress and the President executive offices. So, the (inaudible) -- it's very hard for them to understand how an American NGO can work abroad on its own without being supported by the government, by the American government, so, you know, something like that. A lot of misperceptions on this, because misunderstanding of American political system.

So, talking about my book, it says -- this one is called *American Study*. It's Chinese writing on American politics and foreign policies. Sometimes I really feel I'm in a very awful situation, because when Julia and I work together we have two groups of professors in China. They are both called the American expert. We have a general scene called war and peace, you know, in American history. The one group of professors is talking about Hemingway's, you know, novel, *War and Peace*, and the Political Scientists are talking about escalation of war, you know, like a chicken duck -- we're speaking different languages. So, that's why I think we only look at the United States through a very tiny

straw. So, my summarize (inaudible) these writings so that basically the foreign policy and American politics.

So, this book -- the -- what I really want returned is a review of developments of the feud of American studies in China. And also studies on American politics and diplomacy and Sino-U.S. relations. And also I surveyed -- I gave a list of what I think the most important books and articles published in China in the period since 1979.

The question I was wondering -- when I was -- began writing this book is about three, four years ago, and I have three questions in my mind. First, what is America's image to the educated Chinese during China's period of reform opening up area? Is America a friend or foe? And how much does Chinese understand about American domestic politics and diplomacy in particular? Is political, economic, and the military affairs hold up the developments of American studies as academic discipline affect China's policies and positions in U.S-China relations?

As you may not know, one of my dreams is trying to build up American studies as a discipline in China, because we don't have a major for undergraduate students, you know, and so that's the reason we really want to build up our school for American studies -- either at Beida, Tsinghua, whatever. So, let's get undergraduate students to study American politics, study American business, study American society and the cultural -- these kinds of things.

So, that's three question what's in my mind, and the main areas covered in this book, because I only surveyed -- only gave examples of people who write about American politics and American diplomacy and U.S.-China relations, and I didn't check out books writing on American cultural, American society, religion, this kind of things. So, that's probably the straw -- where the straw is. And so this is the area of studies I surveyed.

And let me go over the chapter first. As a matter of fact -- and I think Terry Lautz did a wonderful job and I'm very grateful to you. I have a summary -- English summary of my book, so whoever want it and just give me an email and I'll send to you and so I don't need to repeat all this kind of stuff.

And there's a couple of chapters, and actually they begin with the survey of the study of why turning people -- Chinese people -- the growth of America as a country, you know, as something like American history. Then why Chapter 2 is on Chinese people's perception of the United States. To a lot of Chinese, actually to a lot of Americans, China is also "beauty and the beast." You know, the beauty part of it is a cultural, and same thing. You know, when Chinese think about the United States, would think about the horror movies, think about the education, science, innovation of science and technology. But thinking about the government -- people have different perceptions, right? It's very interesting, so this is -

- the Chapter 2 is just using different surveys -- gave a description on how do the Chinese see the United States over the period of time.

And the Chapter 3 I think was talking about the developments of the field. American studies as a discipline. It begins early in 1980s about 30 years ago, almost after the 1979 open door reform area and began with the American Institute. The American Institute was established at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1981. Then begin with Nanjing-Johns Hopkins Center. Then in 1985, the CAS, Center for American Studies at Fudan University. Now there are over 30, almost 40 universities in China have a kind of a center for American studies or U.S. relations, so over the last 30 years. So, that's -- in this chapter I gave a list of, you know, links of these institutions.

I think the -- what I really want to spend -- spend a couple of minutes here is something like the research institutions. It's different. Some research institutions are affiliated with universities -- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Some research institutions are affiliated (inaudible) agencies and the Chinese Embassies in the states, you know in different area. And also the -- if you study the geographical distribution of research institutions, they are only in two places, Shanghai and Beijing. Beijing has most of the institutions, and Shanghai is probably another city.

And this -- I have a separate paper on this. Here -- the people who study the United States -- what kind of role they play. My

China observations is something like the play -- there's a limited participation in the decision making process. I think the (inaudible) people participated in the diplomatic decision-making process as they play five roles. The first role is as policy advisors. They write report to President Hu Jintao -- you know, to the higher authority. That's their job, you know, to try to write some kind of a policy proposals. And also I think they play a role like information channel. They pass the message. You know, whenever you have a crisis you see these people traveling, you know, across Pacific region. You know, passing message -- messengers, you know. And the third role, I think the information carriers, something like a Track 2, the (inaudible) Track 2 activities, you know, and in negotiations. And also some older people after they retire from research of -- retire from the certain institution that become very senior people. They become the policy critics. They can criticize, you know, the policy proposals, you know, so there are a couple of roles they play in Chinese political system.

And also I have a survey on where the public is in the books and where the public's books and academic papers and something like that -- and I have appendix of these books and papers. So, I think there is a couple of challenges for future studies in China as Ken just mentioned at the very beginning of the conference. I think we really need to -- Chinese experts really need to understand the complexity, complicated nature of the natural operation of the American government system and also have

to understand domestic influence on American foreign policy. Otherwise, you know, it cannot push forward the (inaudible) making this progress in this area of research.

Now, to leave more time for Q&A, and thank you very much.

MR. LAUTZ: Good morning. I want to salute Cheng Li, Li Tung (phonetic), and Julia Chang Bloch, and Ken Lieberthal for organizing this forum today.

My duty is to say a few words about the American perspective on Chinese study of the United States, and I have to offer a disclaimer right at the outset, because I am not trained in American studies; I am trained in Chinese studies, and so I'm not an Americanist per se. I've done some work on U.S.-China relations, but I'm part of the problem. That is to say that the relationships that have been constructed over the past 30 years, which have been very, very fruitful, have primarily been between people like me and Ken Lieberthal and Mike Lampton and many others who have been trained in China studies and people in China who are the America watchers, like Sun Zhe and Zhou Qi and others. And --

Sorry, yes.

-- and so we have something of a mismatch. We're not exactly talking to the right people on these two sites.

Why am I up here talking this morning if I'm not really qualified for this? Well, the Ford Foundation, after I retired from the Luce Foundation last year, asked me to do a project to review the state of American studies in China, and I thought it was an interesting challenge, something I've been curious about, and I've learned a lot, and I'm grateful to a number of you in this room, including Sun Zhe and Priscilla Roberts and Helena Kolenda and David Adams, who is here, for the interviews that they've provided over the last few months, and I'd like just to try to -- realizing that I'm very much like the frog in the well that Mencius has described who saw just one little piece of the sky and thought that represented all of the world, I'd like to give you my little piece of the heavens, my little piece of the world.

I guess two things have come out of this study. One is that the priorities on the Chinese side really do seem to be changing. There is more capacity for understanding the U.S. There is a kind of a base, a foundation that has been constructed over the past 30 years, which is not a very long time after all. But there now I think is the capability and the interest to go further and, as Sun Zhe was just saying, to look at the complexity of the detail at the way in which domestic issues relate to foreign policy issues.

The agenda, as Ken Lieberthal mentioned at the outset this morning, is being globalized, but at the same time China policy specialists

are saying very consistently we've been looking in a focused way through a straw, if you will, at the immediate policy issue, and we need to get beyond what President Obama or President Bush said yesterday. We need a deeper, more nuanced, more comprehensive approach; and this suggests what they all go on to say is that we Chinese need to be looking more closely at cultural issues -- what are the drivers, religious studies -- and human rights has been mentioned this morning. How does that relate to an understanding of American society and American behavior?

You know, China has, I think, traditionally asked two or three questions about the United States, been interested in what explains America's technological superiority. You go back to the 19th century and you consistently this fascination with technology. What explains America's very rapid economic development, very young country, relatively small population? How is that explained? And then, third, what -- and this is a question I think that's still very prominent and maybe even more so today - - what explains America's political stability? So, development and stability.

These are questions that are in China's self-interest. But increasingly, Chinese scholars are saying we need to get beyond the surface. We need to look at that in more depth. There have not been enough studies in China, according to people I've interviewed, on domestic U.S. politics or domestic U.S. economy, domestic U.S. social

issues. There's relatively little field work done by scholars from China despite the fact that we have so many Chinese scholars, talented Chinese scholars, coming to the U.S., and many of those coming with an interest or background in American English or literature or American cultural studies or even American policy studies end up doing what?

Well, they get here and they find that they have a comparative advantage and they're being recruited by American faculty to do Chinese studies. So, many of the best and brightest who might be recruited if we had the resources to be in China or be in the United States doing study at the United States end up doing Chinese studies either here or there. And that's been wonderful for the China studies field. But I think it does speak to an imbalance between the two sides that needs to be addressed.

I've also been looking specifically at the question of how American studies in the United States and American studies in China relate. What are the connections, what are the relationships? What are the mutual interests. It turns out that if you look at American private foundations, there's more money available for the study of China and the study of U.S.-China relations than there is for the study of the United States. This is American private foundations. But I think the issues go beyond that, and I would like to mention three in particular.

First is the perception that American studies, study of the U.S., is the responsibility of the United States government. And this is common I think in many countries around the world. That's the way it works. It's the government who takes charge of that.

The second -- and I'll come back and talk about this in more detail -- but the second notion is that American culture is pervasive, and it's very open. It's very accessible, and anybody who wants to know about American culture can get it; they can find it; it's out there.

The third is a structural issue, and I've already alluded to this, and that is this mismatch between the way American studies is defined and the way it's been built in the United States and the way it's structured in China.

So, going back to the role of the U.S. government, certainly the U.S. government does play a very significant role worldwide through the Fulbright Scholars Program, which David Adams represents here, through the International Visitors Program, the State Department sponsor's dozen or so institutes for study of the U.S. for foreign scholars coming to American University for two or three weeks. But the problem is that most of this is on an individual level. It is not sustained in any longer term institutional way. It is short term, and even a Fulbrighter goes to China for one semester or even a year. There's not necessarily any follow-up on that.

Why isn't the U.S. government doing more? Why can't we just say please take care of this; this is growing in importance, and this needs to be addressed? Well, as you may recall, the cold war came to a rather screeching end, and in 1990 it -- 1989, 1990 and -- 20 years, and in 1999, the USIA -- U.S. Information Agency, or USIS as it was known overseas, was disbanded and it was replaced by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. And I think the reality is that ECA does very good work, but it does not have the same visibility, the same autonomy as USIA. The U.S. government, of course, is more focused on the Muslim world rather than East Asia. There is less funding available. And, sad to say, if -- for any of us who've been to U.S. embassies almost anywhere in the world now, there is more security issues, and so we're not in a very good position to build or construct cultural centers. We don't even have what have been called America corners -- corners in libraries and universities in China. That has not been possible, not only because of funding but also because of opposition as suspicions from the Chinese government.

Minister -- Counselor of Education -- Zhou mentioned last night that there are 60 now -- 60 -- 60 Confucius Institutes in the United States. There's no equivalent in terms of a Lincoln Center or a Thoreau or Emerson Institute or a Dewey Institute, whatever one would like to call it, in China. So, that's problematic I think.

Second is this notion that American culture is very accessible and it's pervasive. Both popular culture and commercial culture is indeed widespread, and that's to I think the advantage of the United States. Information is widely available. It is easier to travel. Teachers and scholars come to the U.S. We have three representatives here from Shandong University, from Hunan University, and from the Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. They have attended the Association of American Studies Conference, which met here in Washington this weekend, and that's terrific, but I think there's a way in which Americans often take it for granted that American culture is so easily available. It's so -- we just feel that if -- that others will be interested.

And we need to realize I think that popular culture -- commercial culture -- may be an appetizer, but it's not a main course. It's not going to sustain us. Soft power, to put it another way, U.S. soft power should not be a femoral power. It needs to be more substantive.

The third issue that is the definition of American studies in China and the United States, and here in the U.S., of course, the field grew out of the study of history and culture. In China it's grown out of two streams, as was mentioned -- the chicken and the ducks -- I don't which is which, but one is the English language and literature stream, and the other is the policy -- U.S.-China policy in particular in international relations studies stream. And those don't necessarily match up very well, but on

top of that, in the United States over the -- since the 1960s -- the field really was invented in the '30s and then started to boom with assistance from not only private foundations but U.S. government and other sources start to boom after the cold war, and there really wasn't international dimension. But with the 1960s and questions about values and norms within American culture, there's been much more attention to issues of ethnicity and identity and race and of cultural criticism and so forth, and some of these issues become very, very, very detailed, very particularistic. And so we've moved in American studies in the U.S. from what was a unitary view -- books in the 1950s to explain the American mind, right? -- you probably -- we were all familiar with that -- to a much more detailed understanding of how the U.S. is constructed, and that's all to the good. But I think Chinese and others outside of the U.S. are still concerned about the big picture, the unitary view, if you will, and what are the drivers, what are the issues that explain American behavior and that determine American domestic and foreign policy.

So, this pluralistic view of the U.S. and the unitary view of the U.S. don't always match up. It also turns out that we have very, very few university-to-university partnerships or exchanges in American studies. These really are two worlds, two universes. They don't seem to have very many intersections. We have plenty of U.S.-China exchanges looking at bilateral increasingly transnational global policy issues. But we

have very, very few exchanges that examine study of the United States per se. Increasingly, American universities are setting up campuses in China, of course, to do Chinese culture. But we need to figure out ways I think to have it work the other way around.

Earlier this week I was at a major university of the Midwest and I had shared a report that I'd done for the Ford Foundation, a discussion -- roundtable discussion -- in New York in September on this subject, and people that were interested and so they brought together people from their American Studies Department and -- they call it American Civilization -- and their Chinese Studies Department. They had never met before. They had never had this conversation before. And so I think that's symptomatic of the need and the way in which these connections have not yet been made.

Let me end, though, on a more optimistic note, and that is on the American side, there is a increasing interest in an international perspective, what many American studies scholars call a transnational perspective on the U.S. looking at the U.S. not just from inside but from external perspectives. There's still more theory about this than there is practice. But I think it's a very, very active discussion. There is a new journal of transnational American studies that's published online. It's free. And they're quite interested in the possibility of publishing articles in the native -- the original foreign language as well as English translation.

On the Chinese side, as I've already mentioned, there I think is more interest, more capacity, more need to look at the deeper issues, norms, and values, and things like religious studies. Religion is a particular interesting and important case, because I would argue that you just can't begin to understand American politics without understanding some of these religious dynamics, some of the history of religion. But it remains a sensitive issue in China. There are literally a handful of scholars -- is -- one at CAS that I know of, one at Fudan University of Shanghai -- who are working on this, and Suri Wa (phonetic) at Fudan is actually receiving Chinese government support for his work on religion as an international affairs factor -- international affairs issue.

I'll save my recommendations for this afternoon and just say that I think because this relationship is changing so fast, as Ken Lieberthal was saying, because it no longer is a case of America being more important to China than vice versa, we need to give more attention in the private sector. Government may have its constraints. We may not be able to do much about that at this particular moment. But the private sector and universities in think tanks, nonprofit organizations, foundations, we really need to think this through and start to build a case so that we do have more reciprocity and we have genuine mutual benefit and genuine mutual understanding. It's just too important not to do that, and right now I think we have not only a trade imbalance but we have an intellectual

imbalance or deficit in terms of the resources that are allocated in the United States to encourage more understanding, deeper understanding of the United States of America.

Thank you.

MR. LI: Well, thank you so much, for -- those were three excellent presentations. Really, very rich. I hope that Terry will share -- letting your recommendations not this afternoon but also in the Q&A. And I think as some of us probably want to know and the media want to know, I think President Obama probably also, still preparing his delivery in China, I think that dimension is also about what you needed.

I think that certainly we have a lot of questions. I do have a lot of questions myself. But let's take a break, then the two discussants will give comment, then we will open floor for Q&A.

Fifteen-minutes break. We will resume, like, 10:50. Okay.

Thanks.

(Recess)

MR. LI: I think that we should resume, and I already introduced two distinguished discussants, so I don't need to say anything more, but I'll probably just -- Professor Lampton, you speak first and then Professor Roberts. Okay.

MR. LAMPTON: Good morning. I was very interested in reading the papers that we had and then receiving the PowerPoint

presentation that everybody saw. I had a number of reactions both from the materials and just some other thoughts I thought I'd briefly share with you in the 10 or 12 minutes available to me.

I thought maybe the first thing to note is that this is actually the 31st anniversary of what I take to be a very important event when Dr. Frank Press, then of the National Academy of Sciences, and -- well, later the Academy of Sciences, at that time the President's Science Advisor -- went to China in, as I recall, May of 1978, and made a fundamental agreement with the Chinese, Deng Xiaoping, to essentially allow -- which never happened with the Soviet Union -- the unlimited flow of Chinese scholars and students to America's best institutions and agreed on a number of Americans that would go and begin to do their research in China. These numbers have essentially become potentially unlimited in both directions, but we made a strategic decision in 1978 not to have scholar for scholar traded, lab for lab, field for field, discipline for discipline, and essentially let the market in both countries determine what was going to happen. And it's led to an enormous expansion, and I think if we're looking at Deng Xiaoping, that was one of the most important strategic decisions he made -- was essentially to open up China, not just in terms of trade and special economic zones but intellectually.

Also, I give Deng Xiaoping a certain amount of credit. When he visited in 1978, he not only set up the intellectual infrastructure that

we're effectively talking about today, but he asked a really terrific question about American studies. He was continually -- the image was of course the President of the United States is the most important in U.S.-China relations, very executive-focused kind of view of the United States, and -- but he kept hearing how this was checks and balances, divided government, the House, the Senate, 50 states. Finally, in desperation, he asked President Carter -- he said how many governments do you have here in the United States, which I think was a very actually informed, intelligent question that China is still coming to terms with.

So, in any case, I give Deng Xiaoping credit both for helping build along with I think a far-seeing (phonetic) American administration the intellectual infrastructure for a really true market-based, intellectually driven exchange, and I ask in the first good question about American studies how many governments do you have here?

Secondly, of course, in my -- most of my comments and I think in commentary you tend to look at the deficiencies. I mean, put bluntly, what are some of the deficiencies in the Chinese approach to understanding the United States might be the ungenerous way to put the topic. But I thought it might be appropriate just to say -- and because none of the papers really did -- where we've made some actual progress in understanding, and I thought I'd just tick them off.

First of all, I think one of the most important understandings of the Chinese (inaudible) begun to act on in sort of the study of the United States is that the United States actually is a pluralistic society and actually just even looking at the government Congress matters. And if you look at their policy apparatus, look at the Chinese Embassy, they've built up the resources for looking at the American system in an increasingly serious way and particularly Congress I think there's lots of nuance that maybe still gets lost in translation. But nonetheless, the understanding and capacity deal with the U.S. Congress has gone up. We can argue on a hundred-point scale what the absolute number is, but it was pretty close to zero in 1979, and I think it's made a lot of progress certainly from that point of view.

Certainly another area that I think the Chinese have come to a greater understanding of mostly in the practical policy-oriented way is the role of the America media, and they're building up capacity to deal with that, understanding that perceptions are important. American public opinion actually does matter in the formation of policy and so on. So, I think, you know, they've got lots of problems dealing with the mass media both at home and certainly abroad that could be improved a lot, but it's a whole lot better than it used to be.

Another area that I'm really quite impressed with is China's understanding of how policy gets made here, and I hearken back to a

really interesting article in *Caijing* magazine in -- as I recall, it was August 2000, and it was basically asking how does lobbying work in the United States and what is the rule of interest groups? And I thought it -- first of all, it was based on actual field research, which you've been calling for in a broader and more geographically and cultural orientation, but they engaged in several months of actually deep interviewing on all of the (inaudible) and the whole infrastructure here in New York and came to a number of interesting questions or conclusions about lobbying, one of which is if China wants to be effective dealing with the United States, we have to invest in the United States, create jobs and Americans will respond. They will put pressure on their leaders if they have an economic interest, and China has to create an economist in interest in the United States to motivate Americans in a more Americans in a more positive direction.

Any case, I thought that was really the beginning of a kind of -- it betrays a kind of understanding of society that I think you would not have seen, certainly 20 much less 30 years ago.

Having said all this, this now sort of segues into the papers and the presentations, and also an interesting study that was funded and sponsored and done by CAS on looking at American studies in China relative to the United States, a long study, very -- looking at discipline by discipline -- was really a great study.

What struck me in looking at that is in a way that American studies in China has gone in a similar kind of evolution that American political science itself went in -- an initial kind of focusing on institutions, process, sort of just describing the system at the crudest level, and now gone into more systematic data collection, more behavioral -- talking about informal ways society works, as well as formal. So, in some sense I think we need to -- I don't mean to be patient in a patronizing sense -- but I our own fields have gone through an evolution, and China's fields are going through an evolution, and so some of this is what I would say is what I would say is sort of the natural evolution of social science thinking. And I see China going through that as indeed in my own field; in particular, political science has gone through that.

A second thing that almost everybody noted but I think almost in -- I would say goes back to China's Confucian roots, and basically the definition of what a scholar is and their relationship to the state. Without putting -- being too crude but not putting too fine a point on it, I think the intellectual endeavor in China in many respects has always had a closer proximity to the state, policy, meeting social defined needs, serving the state in a way that's less intrinsically at least adversarial than many American academics would define their role. And so when we note time after time, paper after paper that China's been much more concerned with practical issues, lobbying, how do you influence Congress, what's the

role of the President -- all of these kinds of questions -- in part we're seeing the focus on just practical policy. But in part we're seeing an expression of the way I think Chinese scholars have always seen their relationship to the state. At least I'll put that forth as a proposition which people can shoot down.

Certainly another point I agreed with was with Sun Zhe's paper in particular, and I think -- because so many of us interact with Chinese intellectuals, just a few sort of authorized intellectuals -- but you made the point that there's a lot of diversity in views of the United States and China. And I'm struck by the diversity of views when you penetrate between the few, sort of, authorized touch points and get to a deeper dialogue with Chinese -- I was just at a meeting in September in Beijing. There was a military person -- I'll leave him unnamed -- but a quite intellectual and analytic person. He says, "You know, with respect to the United States, there are at least two broad schools of thinking with all sorts of schools underneath that." He said, "We have our conservative pessimists, and who are the conservative pessimists? They're basically the people that believe in the tragedy of great power politics. They're the kind of systems people. They're the people like John Mearsheimer that think power has certain necessities, that the international system is a jungle. You either dominate the system or you're dominated by the system. And their whole view of the United States is filtered through this

theoretical construct.” But he says, “We also have our” -- what he called “functional optimists.” And who are our functional optimists? They are the people that think interdependence, we need each other. We’ve got basically rational decision making. We will see that it’s too expensive to have conflict. We’ll develop conflict-resolving mechanisms. And we have to realize the pluralistic potential of the United States and build more interdependence, essentially a constructive attitude.” So that you basically have in China, as you have in the United States, a kind of dichotomized, analytic, world view that’s contesting. And they’re each scanning this relationship to find evidence, I guess, that basically upholds. And part of the politics in China is the contest between these views, as indeed it is, I think to some extent, in the United States.

Another interesting thing I thought in Sun Zhe’s paper -- it was on page 4, but it was throughout -- really was that the Chinese image of themselves affects their image of us. That is that -- this isn’t just, you know, looking at us through dispassionate eyes, but how China feels about itself goes a long way to explain how they look at us. And the long and the short of it is -- I was just in China, wrote a paper on this -- how China is coming to view the United States. And I think there are certain dangers -- and this might be left for Q&A -- but let me just put it this way: China’s feeling its oats. China feels good about itself. China sees us on a gradual, but nonetheless, I think, declining view, multi-polar world. The

U.S. is constrained by resources, doesn't have the budget, doesn't have the troops. China's preoccupied. China's constrained by public opinion. Americans want to focus on internal affairs rather than external. So I think China sees in that a sort of decline in America and of an international system that's making room for China. So point being, which I agree with, is how China looks at us has something to do with how China feels about itself. And incidentally, how they feel about themselves has something to do with their perception of where we as a society are headed.

Now I'll just wind up because I don't want to take too much time, but I thought I'd spit out what I -- in the various presentations and PowerPoint presentations, sort of some policy implications. I was interested in Zhou Qi's presentation on the need for an American studies information system. I thought that was really an interesting idea. It raises the issue of what is going to be -- what data are you going to collect, and why are you going to collect it, and what conclusions you might have from it -- but I would include in such a data system a lot more on local government in the United States, a lot more on public opinion trends at the local level, and so forth, cultural attitudes, cultural trends. Anyway, I thought it was interesting you wanted to create a systematic, over-time, comprehensive, data set, but I was left wondering what's in it and why would you put what's in it in it. So that's one issue.

Terry Lutz -- I thought both this morning in speaking and in other work he's done -- makes the point that, you know, the first thing Americans wanted when they went to China was field access. We wanted to get out in villages, and some of our earlier struggles really with the Chinese afterward were how to escape the bubble of Beijing and Shanghai and get out to where real Chinese people are confronting real problems. And China was resistant to that. It's interesting, the United States really needs you to get out in our villages, get out and understand what, you know, Beijing -- or I mean -- New York and Washington are interesting, important, places. But there is a vast country out there, and I don't think China's been as, you know, interested in systematically exploiting that. We've had some wonderful studies in the United States -- the Middletown studies about Muncie, Indiana, and we looked at politic studies of Atlanta, Georgia, and so on -- a wonderful literature that exists in the U.S. about how our communities work. I don't think China's shown - - at least to my knowledge -- as much interest as it should in that. Some of the best work in political science has dealt with particular places like Chicago and a guy named Banfield, Robert Dahl about New Haven, Connecticut, and so forth. I think China could learn a lot by getting out of the Library of Congress and getting out of libraries and interviews just in big cities and so forth -- get out into doing some more anthropological, sociological, kinds of research.

Both Terry and Sun Zhe called for targeted translation of key publications in both languages. I know the former USIA and now the State Department Cultural Public Diplomacy people have had a "Books in Print" program. All I would say is do more of that. That's really a terrific kind of thing.

I was very -- just wind up on a positive -- but I think one of the most important pieces of data you got on the public opinion polls that Zhou Qi talked about, she -- I think it was almost the last slide, at least in the printed version that I got -- talked about how educated people look at the international system, look at the United States versus persons with lower education. It relates to the whole question that Alastair Johnston also tried to say, "As people get more educated, as you develop a middle class, do they become more complex in their thinking about other societies? Do they become more moderate in their policy predispositions?" And Alastair Johnston -- not to do too much violence to us -- tried a quarterly article of some years ago basically argued that the data he collected gave hope that as people become more educated, more cosmopolitan, more acquainted with the facts of the situation, they become more moderate, cosmopolitan, and differentiated complex in their thinking. And to that degree, your chart spoke to that. Your data spoke to that. I guess the long and the short of it is that I think as China's class structure, educational structure, changes, it's getting a more complex

differentiated view of the United States. In the long and the short, that's a good thing. Thank you very much.

PROFESSOR ROBERTS: Right. Well, I'm the last formal speaker this morning, so I will try to be reasonably brief and give us some time for discussion. I must thank Julia for inviting me here to comment on this very stimulating session. I also want to thank Brookings, of course, but to Chinese speakers -- Professor Zhou and Professor Sun -- for their extremely sophisticated and nuanced papers about, in one case the state of studies of the U.S. in China, and also how Chinese look at the United States today. I think it's true to say that thirty years ago, it would not have been possible for Chinese academics to produce anything of that kind, having that kind of depth, and that perhaps would not have been the same possibility of looking at the U.S. in a nuanced manner.

Going back just a few years earlier to the mid-1970s, when Chinese went abroad, they had to go out in groups of three. That meant that if any two of them felt like doing something subversive, then the third was there to report on them. They were not allowed to speak freely to Westerners. Both of the first U.S. heads of the Liaison Office in Beijing -- David Bruce and then his successor George Bush -- lamented. In Bruce's case, he used the very words, "I have not made a single Chinese friend." He'd been ambassador to all the three big European powers. He was used to dealing on very warm and confidential terms with their elites. He'd

hoped to do the same in China, having heart-to-hearts with Zhou Enlai about the state of the world. Instead, he found himself there in a time of power struggle when no Chinese leader was going to speak to him in an unbuttoned way.

And the same was true at a much lower level. Now, 400,000 Chinese have come to study in the United States where they've had the opportunity to get to know Americans on a daily basis in very informal settings, to visit them in their homes, to study together. They may not always have liked all the Americans they met, but they at least had a chance to get to know them. And I think that's one very big change.

Also that American studies in China has escaped from the ideological straightjacket of Marxist interpretations, that there are now -- as David Lampton was saying -- contenting interpretations, not just of the American position in the world, but also of particular episodes inside our U.S. American relations in literature. In history there isn't one party line which people have to hew, or perhaps to competing party lines as to just how bad the United States is and whether it's worse than the Soviet Union. So when I first got Julia's report, I made a note that the message there was one of modified rapture about the state of American studies in China, that it had come a long way, but still had a long way to go.

I'm particularly struck in some ways. I'm also -- I've done quite a lot of work in Sino-U.S. relations, but I also have been researching

for many years Anglo-American relations and over time the replacement of British by U.S. power. I'm struck oddly enough -- there are haunting resonances in the discussions today between what was going on between Britain and the United States in the period particularly between the great wars, with at least some British very much concerned that the U.S. was the next great power. That they needed to ally with the United States in order to maintain British power in the world. And with some of them -- I'm thinking for example of Lord Lothian, the long-time secretary of the Rhodes Trust and first ambassador to the U.S. during World War II -- very much concerned to improve both British knowledge of the United States and U.S. knowledge of Britain, both of which were felt to be defective. So in some ways I feel, well yes, I've ready all this, heard it all before, watching all of you today. I was rather struck by Mike Lampton's point. In fact, I'm afraid I was presumptive on that by saying that you'd better go first. But there are different schools of thought in both China and the United States as to how each should deal with the other. Here in this room today, I think we're mostly representatives of, shall we say, the moderate, conciliatory, let's incorporate China into the world international power system, as opposed to the hard line, very dark, international school of which there are examples in both China and the United States whom you mentioned. I can think of one in particular who turns up to nearly all of Julia's conferences, and informs us that the United States ought to be

driven out of Asia, and that China and Japan should get together to eject this now declining power from Asia and keep Asia for the Asians. And chairing one of his sessions, you always know there's going to be very lively discussion.

I do feel that one thing that perhaps could help American studies in China and indeed Chinese studies in the U.S. or studies of Sino-U.S. relations, but possibly there should be more of an effort to bring those kinds of voices more into the mainstream meetings such as this. At the moment I feel I'm in Church preaching to the choir. Is there anyone in this room who does not believe that amiable or at least cooperative Sino-American relations and efforts to address tensions and to improve the relationship are a bad thing, that you should just essentially head for the conflict and may the strongest one win out, and that the main task before us is to decide when is the best moment to strike. I suspect there isn't anyone in this room who would take that line. It might be less comfortable and more disconcerting, but I sometimes feel that at these kinds of gatherings -- here in New York, in Shanghai, in Beijing -- that it is the likeminded speaking to the likeminded, and I'm not sure that that is always a very representative sample. I was impressed by a lot of the figures that Professor Zhou has got together. For example, one could argue that only 15 percent of those she surveyed really have a favorable -- Chinese she surveyed -- really have a favorable impression of the United States. Yes,

they believe in competitive cooperation -- 84 percent do believe that the U.S. is important to China, though important in what way was not specified. And some of them think -- probably a majority or a plurality -- take a complex or nuanced view of most issues. But when they say, "When dealing with the United States, hold to your principles and adopt flexible tactics," now just how compromising, conciliatory, and moderate is that really? Or is this like the Internet, which if one avenue is blocked, simply takes another one to get the message through.

And I also have had the impression over the past ten, fifteen, twenty years, that public opinion is often very volatile come a crisis, and there can certainly be a lot of trouble blow up rather fast.

One thing, one -- thanks -- model that hasn't really been mentioned today as a model for the future of American studies, however defined in China in terms of internationalizing it, is that which I've seen in international history through the Cold War International History Project and other joint Sino-American, but also Sino-American and other nationalities - - projects bringing together Chinese, American, Russian, East European, British, and other scholars, of efforts to explore the same issue from a variety of perspectives and a variety of sources. This has led to the opening of many Chinese foreign ministry archives dealing with important periods and issues of the Cold War, archives that have only really been opened in the past five years in many cases. It's also led to a very close

cooperation between Chinese scholars still in China, mainland scholars who are now based in the United States but maintain close ties with China, who are again, I think, a group that has not been mentioned today but who are very important in many of the ongoing connections and an incredible variety of Western scholars. I'm an example. I'm a British woman teaching in Hong Kong -- teaching American history in Hong Kong with place ties with Americans and with Chinese and with people back in my own country. But there are Russians, there are East Europeans, there are French, there are Australians, there are Japanese. It's an incredible variety of scholars, and they are publishing very extensively, not just in China, but also bringing out the scholarship in the West, in English, in the Cold War Bulletin but also in books and edited collections. So this seems to me one very fruitful model for the way ahead.

I think at that stage I will finish up here perhaps by saying, Julia, you've said this morning, "None of the great issues of the day can be addressed without Chinese cooperation." Again, there were great resonances for me. I'm studying the Council on Foreign Relations and China Policy in the '50s and '60s. And there -- even though China was, there were no formal relations between China and the United States. Americans then, too, including, I think, Ken Lieberthal, who was on some of these groups in the '60s and '70s, also found that it was impossible to

address a very wide range of international problems without dealing with China. And at that, I think, I will finish.

MR. CHENG LI: Well, probably as moderator, I want to start the first round of questions for panelists and also for discussion as well. A few years ago, Dr. Thomas Fingar, who was the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, our nation's -- the top officer in intelligence -- asked a question, and he himself answered the question. But he's at Stanford right now as a professor. The question is, "What's the biggest problem with U.S.-China relations?" His answer is "Us," meaning the United States -- our poor understanding of outside world, in this case China, our lack of knowledge, and et cetera. So my feeling as the chief officer, how he can be so critical about the U.S. policy, U. S. views of outside world. Now my question to Dr. Zhou and Dr. Sun -- can be the same thing also said for China? The biggest problem in Sino-U.S. relations from Chinese perspective is Chinese poor understanding or misperceptions of the United States? Now in your presentations, both of you used the term "arrogance" with certain resentment that America has been, you know, lecturing China for a long time, at least during the past twenty-some years. Now can we also see the tendency Chinese become increasingly arrogant? So my question to you is, one is, will China's misperception be the serious problem with the Chinese arrogance also on the right?

Now for Terry, you are so modest. You said that you are the problem. Of course, you are not. And you really contributed at every stage of the U.S.-China educational exchanges. But you probably know better than anyone else where the problem lies. Now the problem is that the United States for the past thirty years tried to train China's best and brightest, but ironically, there's widely spread sentiment in China of American-led conspiracy against China. We use the term "lack of trust," "lack of respect." But the real sense is the wider spread view -- at least from my perspective -- about the Chinese public intellectuals, leaders -- I don't know how deep they hold that view, but I'm pretty sure how widely they share that view. Now what's the problem? I don't want you to give us a long list, but just a single most, you know, recommendation you will give in educational exchanges to fix that problem. What went wrong?

Now for Michael Lampton, you have been very supportive in U.S.-China education exchanges. Now my question is whether this exchange should be open in all areas or should restrictions be made in some very sensitive areas -- in high tech knowledge, science, and U.S. security -- should the U.S. open-door policy should really be open or should it be closed on certain aspects?

And for Professor Roberts, you have wonderful experience in British, teaching in Hong Kong, and also have solid knowledge of United States education system. Do you see the shift of, you know, educational

power in China's favor? Chinese government has been very aggressive to recruit the talents back to China, including Professor Sun, Professor Zhou, and many others, and also including many foreigners, you know, not only just PRC -- U.S.-educated people. Do you see that would at the expense at the loss of U.K., Europe, and particularly United States?

Now let me finish here. Probably you answer that first round, and then open to the floor.

PROFESSOR ZHOU: Cheng Li raises a very interesting question. I think many of the audience was also thinking of it -- what is the reason for Chinese to have misunderstanding or misperception of the United States or Americans? I think it is true that we cannot just attribute the fault to one side, the U.S. We have to think about China, too. Of course, there is obstacle. That is ideology between the two countries. But I think, you know, if you look at history, I mean, with respect to the early days of the establishment of the PRC, I think at that time it was the U.S., not China, which did want to have reasonably good relationship with, you know, between the two countries. And remember, in November of 1999 -- I mean 1949 Truman, President Truman, got the report from, you know, CIA that Zhou Enlai said China could not afford to have two enemies, but could have two, you know, friends -- that means the United States and Russia -- but could not afford to have more enemies. But at that time, the U.S. authority did not think about, you know, to an assessment of

normalization of the relationship between China because it wants to see a split between China and Russia. And it made great effort to do that until, you know, that year in the late 1960s.

Actually even in the middle 1950s, the Chinese government had made another effort to inform the U.S. China was interested in having reasonable good relation with the U.S. And it might send American journalists to China, but it was refused by the State Department. China did once again, but it was refused once again. And since then, I mean, since 1970 -- I mean, '57, China stopped making efforts to improve relation with the United States.

I mean, talking about ideology, I think the American side is much stronger than China in, you know, dealing with international affairs because, you know, anti-communism is really ideology, one of the basic ideology in the United States. I think it's, you know, I would not say it's bad or good, you know. I don't want to say, you know, to give -- how say - - say it negative or positive, but I like to say because of your fundamental ideology of liberalism. You don't like communism, right? So I will not say, you know, Americans are bad people. They all hate China. I do not say that. But I think, you know, you have your reasons to think that China couldn't be friends with United States.

Mr. LI: We got it. Basically saying that America has been too ideological, too dogmatic, that's part of the problem. But I hope that

they may also respond about the arrogance part, and maybe Dr. Sun Zhe can.

PROFESSOR SUN ZHE: Thank you very much. I think the first question, "What is the biggest problem," it depends on who define it. By President Obama, problem right now -- probably right now the biggest problem is climate change. For Chinese, maybe we like to talk about the Taiwan issue.

But last year, remember I had a conference with Mike Lampton. I use one saying. I said "The longest journey is the journey inward." To me, I would rather say the biggest problem for China is the challenge for the country to unshed its undemocratic coat, you know, in its political system. You know, and for -- so, what I mean is for China is probably how do you keep the stability, political stability, but also you push forward critical development -- that's one of the biggest challenge. Otherwise you have a lot of unnecessary misperceptions for U.S.-China relations.

On the second issue on the arrogance, Chinese arrogance, I think it is really true because at the beginning of the open-door reform, the U.S.-China relations more like a teacher-pupil relation. You know, China releasing a published article called (Chinese), you know, treating the United States as a teacher; (Chinese), you're trying to modernize China. So United States is seen as a role model for China's modernization. But

now after thirty years, you see the moving tendency that a lot of Chinese scholars either get the people begin to see the losing, what I call the losing institutional attractiveness of American model of politics, of governance.

So a lot of Chinese people begin to accuse the United States as a troublemaker causing the financial crisis in the world and also the lack of efficiency in the American way of governance. That's why when Brookings published Yuke Ping's book democracy is something good, right? So if democracy as a model, nobody criticized it; even the dictators in Africa, you know, always say democracy is a good word. But in China, people really have a thought. People think that democracy is something lack of efficiency. The Chinese way of doing business, we want it now. That's actually the American way of doing business. So that is something I think -- and also it's very hard to find the Chinese scholars who really want to come to the United States, spend a year or two years, to refresh themselves. You know, I think that is more other practice of informed policies like Chinese developments in Africa. You know, spread -- Chinese confine themselves to a compound whenever for Chinese factories. One of my friends who was a Chinese ambassador to small country of Botswana in Africa -- the African Botswana president complained to him and said "You Chinese have a prejudice against us." My friend said the Chinese ambassador was so surprised and why? And the president of Botswana said, "We have so many beautiful girls, but only

four Chinese man have married them.” So that’s something like -- I think that China -- a small story, but reflects of the isolation of Chinese people with local community, if even you want to do business there. So that’s my observation of either academic or the business practices. Thank you.

MR. LAUTZ: Thank you. Cheng Li, you asked why after all these years of exchange as so many relationships between China and the United States, why is there still suspicion? And I think it is the legacy of history. It’s the legacy of the past. This has never -- it did not start out as a symmetrical relationship. Americans sent missionaries and soldiers to China. China sent workers and students to the United States. I’m obviously generalizing, but we are still, I think, in a mentality of what Sun Zhe was just saying, this student-teacher relationship. We need to think much more seriously about a partnership. And that’s difficult in a field like American studies because so much of the work going on in China has not been translated into English as we said before.

The second part of my answer is not only has there been an imbalance in terms of interest, but the U.S. because of its exceptionalism has sought to change China, to change China for Christianity, for capitalism, for democracy. You know, this is a very consistent pattern in the theme of U.S.-China relations. And this was reinforced by the events of June 4, 1989, in a very powerful way. Now that influenced the American public perception of China. And I think that feeds into this sense

of suspicion and questioning of motives and so forth. Again, it's a more complicated picture.

How to address this issue? I have a long list, but I would say very simply, we need to have sustained institutional partnerships that are providing resources, providing the intellectual fire power, you know, to have a more detailed understanding in the United States. I was extremely encouraged to learn last night from Professor Svinfra at the Foreign Affairs University in Beijing that she has set up a center for the study of culture and society -- social and cultural studies center -- at the Chinese Foreign Affairs University where most of the faculty specialize in international politics. Perhaps she would like to say something about that.

In terms of what's the evolution of this, I feel like we do need to think about the next generation of scholars in China. Mike Lampton said, you know, "There's a movement from institutional focus to process to data collection." What we're seeing now, I think, is more and more specialization for the next generation in China. And we need to make sure that they also understand the big picture.

MR. LAMPTON: Just two points. First on this, "Who's fault is it?" I generally agree with Tom Fingar -- and I don't know exactly the context in which he made that -- but I would say that it is mutual strategic suspicion is the core problem, if I had to say mutual is mutual, not one way, and I think that's what was said here.

I would just say, too, I think we learned a lot from the McCarthy period, and we built through the Ford Foundation and others an infrastructure that was really amazing for language study, serious research. We built a cadre of people to manage the relationship, as much as you can in a democracy, and we've had eight administrations that have carried out a fairly consistent policy despite all of the ups and downs. So I would say our efforts to provide stability haven't been without fail and knowledge has counted for something in the system. So, that's it on that discussion.

You asked me what I thought about, "Can we find more areas for cooperation?" And, "Are there some forbidden zones in effect?" Yes, I think there are some very politically sensitive areas for cooperation, and I would be in favor of pushing the boundaries on that -- and I'll specify in a minute what I mean. But I think it gets back to what I mentioned, Deng Xiao Ping visited Frank Press. We made a fundamental strategic decision, and I think that was a wise decision. And I don't think most people understand how important it was to open up -- particularly in the high-technology in the universities -- to essentially an unlimited flow primarily from China to the United States. And I was struck when I went to the Hopkins graduation a year and a half ago in nanotechnology, in biotechnology, in high-energy physics, and chemistry, and math, if you didn't have a Chinese surname or Korean surname or Indian surname,

there was a very high probability you weren't graduating with a Ph.D. in those. And I don't know all the nationalities of those surnames, but a lot were Chinese. And that's been the biggest technology transfer -- that was ultimately creating the basis to enhance Chinese comprehensive national power. And I would say we made that decision thirty-one years ago. You can argue with it, but that was the decision. And so, I think a lot of this discussion now about should we loosen up export control, should we cooperate in space, strikes me as kind of beside the point. We made the biggest strategic decision thirty-one years ago. We're going full steam ahead on it. And we now have research labs investing in China, which I'm in favor of. But if you ask about new areas, I mean, I think we ought to be -- look, we cooperated with the Soviet Union in space? And now it's a big controversy? I mean, I don't mean there aren't any dimensions of space we ought to be worried about, but, you know, the head of NASA -- the last one I think his name was Griffin if I recall correctly -- faced a real buzz saw when he even thought about NASA cooperating. I think we ought to be thinking about that. Why isn't China in the International Space Station? I think we're thinking too small. Thank you.

PROFESSOR ROBERTS: As I recall, you asked me as China hires more and more, well-qualified academics in every field, is this going to impact badly on the educational systems of the rest of the world? Well, I suppose that I'm always in favor of more jobs for well-qualified

academics and a better marketplace, but that would assume that there are only a finite number of good brains that can be trained, and that, therefore, China's gain is going to be the rest of the world's loss. And I don't actually see this happening. I think that many of my colleagues would be very glad to see their graduate students with chances of good jobs once they've got their PhDs. It's one of the big worries for many American academics and others what's going to happen to their graduate students. So I don't actually see that being a major problem or a loss to the rest of the world -- probably a win-win.

MR. CHENG LI: Okay, we have probably 20-25 minutes because we'll end up like at 12:15 -- we'll take 10-15 minutes more. So please identify yourselves and also just each one should have one question only, no two.

QUESTIONER: Scott Herald of the Rand Corporation. My question's for our Chinese guests. In particular, taking off or taking as a starting point Terry's comment on "legacies of history." You've both looked at Chinese understandings of America, and you've done it as political scientists. But insofar as history is an issue and insofar as Chinese studies of China's own history have been subject to, as Terry mentioned, politicization or a proximity to the state and its perceived interest at a given moment, Dr. Zhou, you mentioned in particular China's involvement and the U.S. involvement in the war in Korea. Having been

up to Dandong and visited historical museums related to that conflict, I know there is a very divergent interpretation of that history. Speaking to Chinese today, I know that Chinese today remember the bad days of Maoism and look at North Korea and think of that as something that China has gone through and is moving away from. Yet at the same time, of course, we hear that part of the problem of the relationship is this legacy of conflict with China. In American historical studies, we believe that China may have made a decision that today it would not make; to support a regime that essentially enslaves its own people. And instead perhaps would pursue a direction that would allow the emergence of a regime more like South Korea, which is in fact what we're seeing China transition towards -- a more free, liberal, society. So I'm wondering at the end of the day, is perhaps one of the avenues we should be thinking about greater Chinese studies of China's own contemporary history in an environment not corrupted by close proximity to state interests? Should Chinese be coming to the U.S. or to Europe or to other countries where they're freer to study their own history, away from the biases or political necessities attended upon that study of history than obtained in China? And, please, I would welcome either of your comments on that.

MR. CHENG LI: Maybe we take one or two more questions and then you answer. Yes, please.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is (name inaudible) coming from China Foreign Affairs University. I work as the dean of Department of English and National Studies and also Interactive American Social and Cultural Studies Center. My question is for the two American scholars here. I know you know China quite well. I'm very interested in Chinese studies here. My question is, you know, in recent decades or especially in recent five or six years after, you know, 9/11 and the Iraq War and also the world financial crisis, it seems people's perception about the U.S. has changed a little bit or they say not much. So as Chinese studies scholars here, have you witnessed this kind of changes of Chinese studies, I mean, from the view of American perspective? Thank you.

MR. CHENG LI: Yes, last question. The first one -- yes, you.

QUESTIONER: (name inaudible) professor. Okay, I want to make some comments about Chinese scholarship on America. Okay, as I know, the misunderstanding between China and the United States, not only from the 1940s, but we can trace it back to 1930s. Maybe you know some distinguished professors of the United States, you know, that we're knowing Chinese official as well as the scholars, Dr. Zhou, Zhou Xiaochuan. He's the governor of the China Bank. He received his Ph.D. from the United States. He's also the friend of the Secretary-Treasurer of the United States, Dr. Morgan. He argued, you know, that biggest

question between China and United States is a misunderstanding that is 1930s. Remember? Okay. So if you want to understand -- if we want to search the documents and the sources and papers, you can go to Stanford University to look at, you know, the document from Dr. Zhou Xiaochuan and Dr. (name inaudible). Also, you know, you can go to Stanford University.

That is not, you know, the historical perspective of transition not only from 1950s, 1960s, '70s. It, you know, trace back from 1930s, okay? So now, you know, the Chinese scholarship in America, we can divide it into two levels. One level is the professional studies. The second level is the non-professional studies. We have many associations and organizations. For instance, you know, Association of American Studies. This is taught at the government level. Maybe you know what Professor (name inaudible) from Beijing University. He's the president of the Association of American-China Studies. And, you know, for instance the history, the Association of History, a Sino-American History Studies. This is a sub-sector of the, you know, the association. And this is the specialty association. We have many associations, not specialties; many such as you know the Association of International Studies, Association of International Politics. Many, many scholars, professors, who study, you know, who engage American-China scholarships on America.

And the second level you see, you know, that long professional studies of United States, that is the question. I remember, you know, Friday morning I talked with Professor -- Ambassador Roy -- he mentioned, you know, the biggest problem between China and United States to understand each other is to train the young people. Okay, so the young people, you know, it's changeable. Okay? You remember 1989 the students went to the -- to the streets to have a demonstration. You know, most of the students -- I think all of the students, they favored American, you know, democracy, freedom --

MR. CHENG LI: Well said. I think we get your point.

QUESTIONER: But only ten years later, okay, 1999 also the students went to the street. They opposed the United States. So that is, you know, so changeable. So young people, I think you know it's a big issue for understanding between China and United States. Thank you.

MR. CHENG LI: So I think that you just have a comment, right? Well, we will have more questions later on, but do you want to respond? I think the first question was addressed to both of you. The first question -- then you probably answer the second question. It's for you. For the first one, it's about China's old history and a --

PROFESSOR ZHOU: Yeah, I think historical legacy has very big impact on China's image over the United States and itself, and also China's current policies towards the United States. I think that his

question was also related to Li Cheng's question whether the Chinese is right now so arrogant. I think, you know -- I pray for to use of freeze, that victim mentality -- that means, you know, because, you know, because I think there's a true size of a coin. One side China has such breeding. A several thousand-year history (inaudible) and the Chinese were so proud - - I mean, they are so proud of themselves. And suddenly, it was invaded and divided by Western powers. You know, there is a big shock to Chinese. So they felt, you know, -- they couldn't accept that as fact that China is backwater -- was backwater -- and they still had a, you know, a thinking that one day China will become or will recover its power in the world. So because of this, I think the Chinese -- many Chinese people tend to over self estimated, you know, China's power, and also over -- sometimes over reacted to events, you know, occurred in current -- I mean contemporary history.

So this victim mentality has always had an impact on China's image of itself and also the image of other countries, especially the United States because it's the biggest country and most influential in the world and on China's government. I don't think it's a good thing -- it takes time for China to overcome its victim mentality. It's not good, you know, if China wants to become a responsible power, you know, to take part in international governance, it should overcome its victim mentality as soon as possible. I think China has started quite fast, quite quickly, because,

you know, China has such a long history, I mean with such a long history, it's a county with such a long history, with a (inaudible) history, and had one hundred year of human (inaudible) history, but China has overcome this problem maybe within, you know, very fast in twenty or thirty years. You know, China right now has realized that it should become responsible power. So we, I mean, I'm optimistic that in not, you know, not too long time in the future, China will become best, you know, in how say, you know, has best victim mentality --

MR. CHENG LI: Are we calling things by their real name?

Now this is actually related differences, although we see the convergence of disciplines in both countries because as a result of the exchanges you do see the disciplines like they do in Sino relations, law, economics, sociology, they become so similar. But one thing is certainly is, in my view, still not happening in China because in this country, the emphasis is on social sciences talk about history of memories or selectivity of memories. It's the really dominant, the hot topic. But in China those areas are very, very weak. And so there are political reasons, but also academic reasons. So this is what he, you know, is leaning toward. Do you want to say something about this?

PROFESSOR SUN ZHE: A quick reply. Scott, I like your question. I think what I want to say is China is searching their soul in the cause of modernization. There's a learning curve, you know, for China,

for China's understanding of itself and for China's gradual improvement in understanding the United States. So that's one question, because China sees -- I remember Terry's use of words called "wall of mirrors," right? You're looking at a wall of all the mirrors, just trying to -- the image is reflected, the image of the United States, and reflected in your soul. And you try to identify yourself. So that's the question.

As to the case of North Korea, I think China really doesn't want to give up traditional friendship, but basically is still seeing the United States leading, and United States they should talk with North Korea first. For China, it's also trying to on the one hand prepare the crisis management on the border area on the north side of -- the northeast side - - of China because most people enjoy peaceful life; if they didn't prepare -- if you haven't prepared for coming conflict or crisis.

And also remember a couple of years ago there is 200,000-300,000 people, illegal immigrants, from North Korea in Beijing, you know, trying to get into the foreign embassies. So China's trying to do all this work preparing for the crisis management. So this is exactly how history, you know, will learn from history, you know, on the case of Korea. Thank you.

MR. LAMPTON: Well, I'm not sure I fully understood U.S. -- or the China studies field has changed. I may have missed the core of your answer, but at least it elicited the response from me. But I think the

China studies field here has changed a lot in the last thirty years, and not all for the good, although I think on balance it's good.

I think one of the things that's happened is our younger people have been sucked into the disciplines and don't ask the broad questions anymore. The disciplinary rewards are not integrators. They're for specialists, and very data-driven and many respects the methodology is determining the question.

And frankly, you can only measure often the most meaningless question -- I mean with precision that's demand -- I mean a little. But the disciplines have been I think not entirely helpful to the development of China Studies here. That's the first thing.

Secondly, that when I was a graduate student if you asked, "Where do you go to China Studies?" There were about five places you'd go. They each had two or three people in each discipline -- really had a critical mass.

Now there's been a -- and in many respects a good thing -- the talent on China now is scattered all over the United States in both think tanks as well as academic departments, liberal arts colleges as well as research universities. And so now it's much more diffuse. I think that's good for democracy. It's maybe not so great for research on China studies narrowly defined.

So we could talk more about this. I think the other, from my point of view, maybe needs some correction. The private foundations, to my view, sort of went to this slogan of capacity building in China -- helping

build disciplines in China and so forth, and I have no problem with that. It's been very good. But it came at the expense of disciplined or let's say area studies building here to some extent, and I think now it's time for us to pay attention once again to our infrastructure to understand China. This goes back and forth.

So I think on balance it's been a good evolution, but it has its problems.

SPEAKER: Could I just --

MR. CHENG LI: Yeah. Go ahead.

SPEAKER: -- just very quickly. I -- following on what Mike just said, China Studies in the United States the big story, the really dramatic story, is that it has been institutionalized. It has been incorporated, and with an early assistance from U.S. government and from private foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, they help to provide the catalyst.

But now the universities themselves say this is in our interest. We will fund it from our own sources if necessary.

You asked about whether the field was affected by 9/11. I think it's so clear to so many people that China is important, that it really did not have an effect. It actually improved U.S.-China relations because there was this recognition that the U.S. had other problems. China was not an immediate threat, and both countries agree, yes, we have terrorists, for better or worse.

But there are still problems in China Studies. It is very difficult for American scholars to get access to Shinjiang and also to Tibet.

MR. CHENG LI: I just want to echo what has been said, that certainly that in this country it has some scientific (inaudible) or for more modeling that is certainly is a problem.

But at the same time we also have strengths, as early on Ken Lieberthal and Ambassador Julia Bloch mentioned, and we emphasize domestic politics or (inaudible), you know, history or many other things--so not just China-U.S. relations. We wanted to have a better understanding in terms of Chinese values, cultures, history, and many other things.

But in Chinese Studies, for some reason, there's urging people study about American politics. Sun Zhe was the first one to study about the U.S. Congress in a few years ago.

MS. ZHOU QI: No, he's (inaudible) I would say.

MR. CHENG LI: You are the first one. Second. Okay.

MR. SUN ZHE: Second generation.

MR. CHENG LI: Well, no, some of the (inaudible) study it was the Congress in their background. I think you are the first one. I think that comes clear that (inaudible) study.

You know, I think could you name another one to study U.S. Congress in that detail?

MS. ZHOU QI: Yeah. Many.

MR. CHENG LI: Okay.

MS. ZHOU QI: But you didn't notice. Anyway, it doesn't matter.

MR. CHENG LI: There probably is. Excuse my ignorance,

but that you refer to your database is the first one to study. But I probably -- you agree with the no database on that.

MS. ZHOU QI: But Sun Zhe was the famous one, no doubt.

MR. CHENG LI: But I think we all agree that, like, the (inaudible) is mentioned repeatedly. We did not also -- Terry mentioned that we did not pay much attention to the American value system -- religion and the grassroots, and how to understand the heart of America.

That partly explains why people very quickly think there's a conspiracy of the United States, not look at the reasons and et cetera. So there's some, you know, strengths and weaknesses we try to fix.

And we probably have a few minutes. Take another -- last round of questions. Yeah. Professor?

SPEAKER: I'm visiting from Norway here at Brookings, and this American concern that you like to educate the Chinese on democracy, on liberty, and human rights -- very important values in America and globally speaking, too, I find quite reasonable.

However, if you look at the Chinese side with a history of 4,000 years and have been having ups and downs but for the last 30 years have been very much on the ascending slope, and what topics would be of relevance for the Americans to get educated on as far as the Chinese experience is concerned.

I feel that this is missing we have discussions like this. It's sort of a one-way street, and I think that alludes very importantly onto this victimized feeling. If you feel that you are a victim, and gradually, almost all of the sudden, you became a global power, it is not good for anybody if

you have the feeling of being a victim because then you like to get back on whoever made you a victim in the first place.

So in terms of American-Chinese harmonious development in the longer-term, it seems very adequate and productive that the other side of the Pacific, namely where we are now, should be concerned about learning from China because that would reduce the feeling of being a victim would be my take on it.

So I would be very happy to have the (inaudible).

MR. CHENG LI: Yeah, Dave.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. Dave Brown from SAIS. I was struck in listening to the first two presentations by Professor Zhou and Sun that there was very little mention of rising self-confidence in China.

And so my question is, "What impact has rising self-confidence had on the way people think their government ought to handle relations with the United States?" Do people, for instance, who think of -- now think of China as a great power acting on the world stage as opposed to those who continue to think of it as a developing country have different approaches to -- that they would recommend for dealing with the U.S.? Thank you.

MR. CHENG LI: Yeah. Thank you. Good question. I also missed one thing. When did the CASS study was conducted? When was it conducted that survey?

MS. ZHOU QI: On Congress?

MR. CHENG LI: Three years ago? Yeah. No, no, no. The CASS.

MS. ZHOU QI: Oh, 2007. But we have another one in 2008. I compared them -- the almost very close, so I used this one because the other one also has not been published, and so I --

MR. CHENG LI: Just. Okay. Good. Yeah.

MS. ZHOU QI: -- yeah, I have to be very careful.

MR. TENG: Hi. Koyan Teng, Advisory Council Member of ESET. First, I apologize because I was not able to come to the earlier formal presentations, so you may have touched upon this. But most of the conversation has been on at the university and scholarly level, and, as was mentioned earlier, I do think formation of self image and the image of other countries is formed at the grade school, high school levels also. And I happen to know something about Japan, not so much about China, but there's always a controversy about the so-called textbook issue in Japan because textbooks are basically written for the government and for them to approve, and, therefore, how it portrays Japan's relationship with China, Korea, and other countries has been a very volatile and touchy issue.

So the question is how does China in its mass education in grade school and high school level treat its relationship, history, with the United States and vice versa in the United States?

MR. CHENG LI: Okay. Excellent questions. I think we have to close questions now, and anyone want to comment on any of these three questions? I think it's some addressed to, you know, American scholars; some addressed to you about maybe textbook issues. Again, how to improve understanding in high school or elementary school students' understanding of the United States? Is there any progress being

made?

In a way it's similar to Scott Harold's early question. Do you want to comment on this first? And also China's rising aspiration as a great power, how that affects the way China looks at the United States, looks at the international system, et cetera.

MS. ZHOU QI: Let me answer the first --

MR. CHENG LI: Sure. Sure.

MS. ZHOU QI: -- the (inaudible) question first.

Let me think -- maybe four years ago or so, there was an article published in American Studies, which is the official publication of the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Because why the article was written? This is on textbook of the middle school -- for middle school students.

There were a lot of mistakes in that textbook. So it was found by a scholar in my Institute -- Institute of American Studies. And he wrote an article on it telling how many, you know, misunderstandings there in the textbook.

It is true that, you know, because of ideological problems, it's very easy to -- for the official publications to tell just the negative side of the United States or not correct side -- correct, you know, comments on American political system or, you know, policies or something else.

Probably they will say, you know, too -- in the past and especially after the reforms and the opening, you know in the textbook, they could say the two major parties in the United States were both bourgeois, you know, parties. They compete each other, you know, to --

how to say -- to deceits of common people that they are different -- they were different or something like that.

But now, they would not say it anymore.

MR. CHENG LI: Oh, yeah. Professor Sun, do you want to respond to this one or the other one about the China's growing power?

MR. SUN ZHE: The raising self-confidence. I think the -- on certain issues, China still sees the United States the number one country in the world, because if you study GDP and the United States have a \$15 trillion, and the European Union only have \$4 trillion and China has \$5 trillion.

So one-third -- China's GDP is only one-third of the United States. So on the military -- in the area of military developments, China still also thinks the United States number one country in the world, so nothing changed I think in that area because even China have more self-confidence and still wants to keep certain stable good relationships with the United States.

But in some other area, for example, the -- in providing public goods, an international public good in certain areas or as well as the rules and norms, you know, setting. I mentioned one example whether the United States when Obama says climate change, emphasizes climate change, the China's have a never doubt -- it's kind of a conspiracy theory behind it, whether the United States is creating -- trying to create a big bubble like you're creating IT industry in 1990s, you know, you monopoly the technology and trying to let other people to invest in this industry and then sell high-technology in climate change back to China at

a very high price.

You know, there is really some -- what I heard from our scholars, you know, discussion. So that may have created some trouble, you know, in terms of a rising confidence of China in dealing with American affairs.

But one thing: I think the China is now ready, even though you mentioned the self -- increasing self-confidence, but China is now ready in seeing itself as an equal partner with the United States.

MR. CHENG LI: Thank you. I believe that is the last question. It's also refer to the fact that, you know, we people in the United States are certainly very critical about the Chinese government or Chinese scholars sometimes obsessed with the victimization mentality, at the same time the question, I think, also implies that maybe from our side we do need to be sensitive about the victimization, because there's a core thing for China's view of the outside world, because of history and still, you know, very -- have a long memory from Chinese mind. We need to address it in a more delicate way, more thoughtful way, respectful way, rather than just simply saying that you ignore certain other things only to emphasize that. This is my view on this. Do you want to have any comments?

MR. SUN ZHE: I would add one thing. People says China is 17-year-old Yao Ming. Physically, you have that kind of.

MR. CHENG LI: Okay. I think that we have wonderful, you know, morning discussion. I want to thank you for all the panelists and discussants for the really provide a stimulating and very comprehensive

research and give us a lot to think about that.

I also want to thank the audience. I think it goes from PRC come all the way to participate in the event, and thank you for the staff of both Brookings and also Julia's center and particularly thank Julia for really initiating the whole thing. You are really the role model playing a very important bridge role to help understand.

I think most importantly bridge minds across the Pacific and we are just for that purpose. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012