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# PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THE NOMINATING SYSTEM

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GALSTON: Okay. This group is not sufficiently disorderly to enable me to call you to order, but I'll do so ritually anyway.

I'm Bill Galston, a Senior Fellow here in Governance Studies at Brookings, and I'd like to welcome you to the latest episode of our long-running hit series, "Governing Ideas." And let me explain a little bit about this series.

Washington is obsessed, and rightly so, with the daily flow of politics and public policy. These events shape our lives, whether we like it or not.

It's easy to forget in this daily flow that politics takes place in public policy gets made in a much broader context, a context that moves much more slowly, much less visibly, but which, nonetheless, has an enormous subterranean impact on the outcome of events.

These subterranean forces are religious and cultural. They are also historical and institutional, and we frequently overlook the extent to which the shape of our institutions shapes the behavior within the institutions and, conversely, how much time and attention people in a position either to be harmed or to be benefited by the functioning of institutions spend thinking about how their shaped, how they work, what kinds of incentives they provide, and what sorts of biases, for good or for ill, they introduce into the political system.

Well, we're here today to hear about and to discuss a really exciting new entrant into the institutional history sweepstakes, really

exciting first of all because it deals with the processes that determine who the presidential candidates are going to be, and exciting as well because this unknown institutional history of the modern presidential primary system is enormously exciting to learn about; and it's enormous fun to hear about the sorts of people who've been involved in the process.

I think it's fair to say that these people have shaped the institutions that we now live with and the institutions that we now live with shape the people who now lead us, and, in many respects, determine the identity of the people who now lead us.

The author of the book under consideration today is I would say the perfect person to write this book. She is a well-known political scientist who has studied with some of the finest political scientist and in the country and has learned an enormous amount from them.

At the same time, she has participated in presidential primary politics, going all the way back to the late 1970s. And so, the story that Elaine Kamarck tells in this book is a story that she has both studied and lived.

Social scientists talk about participant-observers. Well, I think Elaine Kamarck is the quintessential participant-observer.

As you know, right now, she's a lecturer in public policy who came to the Kennedy School at Harvard after a career in politics and government. She led Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government Initiative while in the White House.

She's the author of a previous book, which has also been discussed here at Brookings, entitled *The End of Government as We Know It: Policy Implementation in the 21st Century*.

I am enormously excited and pleased to be able to welcome her to the podium because she offers such a unique perspective on the sorts of things that we talk about every day, not really realizing that we're talking about the tip of the iceberg and not the iceberg.

With that, Elaine, the podium is yours.

MS. KAMARCK: Thank you very much, Bill. It's nice to see all of you here -- some old friends that I haven't seen in a while, and thank you very much for coming.

I want to talk about presidential primaries. They are unique in democracies around the world, and they are unique in American democracy.

In fact, primaries are so unique that the British Labor Party, God forbid, has recently been reading this book, and I think I want to tell them, "Stop. Wait. Wait."

But in most democracies around the world, healthy well-functioning democracies, the method of selecting their party leaders is dramatically different. We are the only place in the world that selects our major party leaders through this kind of convoluted process, which I talk about in the book.

Now there are two main reasons why this is so different from other democracies and from other elections in the United States.

First of all, this is a sequential system. There are almost no other electoral systems in the United States where you are dealing with a sequence of elections, each one of which has an impact upon the subsequent elections. So this sequential nature is quite unique.

Secondly, this is -- these are the elections where the election outcomes matter sort of, and they matter sort of because the election outcomes are selecting delegates, and it's the actual delegates who matter.

Hence, you've got two things that really don't occur in any other electoral system. And this system has surprised many people over the years. It has surprised many presidential candidates from Mo Udall, who was surprised that there were Iowa caucuses, to John Glenn, who was surprised that Iowa caucuses weren't primaries, to Rudy Giuliani, who was surprised that you could actually -- that you couldn't really skip them and be out of the new for two months no matter how popular you were down the road.

And this year, for the first time, this system surprised the American public. This year, for the first time, people were talking about delegates and particularly superdelegates.

Now, to me, this was pretty funny. I'd been a superdelegate to the Conventions in 2000 and in 2004. Nobody had ever noticed; okay? And, in fact, in 2008, what was particularly surprising is that my grown children looked at me with new respect. My colleagues at Harvard, when I

would go into a faculty meeting, my colleagues would introduce me as the superdelegate. Okay?

Suddenly, this phenomenon -- suddenly this factor in American nominating politics was a phenomenon. I did a lot of radio and television around that time, and one of the other things that I realized was there was an entire generation, the Millennial Generation, or, in political terms, I suspect they'll come to be known as the Obama Generation, not only were they fairly appalled at the existence of us superdelegates, they were appalled to find they were delegates at all. You mean our votes aren't the end? You mean our votes actually elect other people who could theoretically change their mind? Yes.

So this was the system that kind of in the spring of 2008 kind of burst on the American psyche in a way that I hadn't seen it happen in all the 30-some years that I've been doing both studying and being active politics.

And so, I thought to myself, "Hmm. I actually have a doctoral dissertation someplace. I ought to dust it off."

The doctoral dissertation was so old that I literally had to scan the copy into the computer because the Apple IIe that it was written on was at the bottom of a dust heap someplace, and I had to sort of start from scratch, and, courtesy of Brookings Press, I said are you interested in this, and they said, "You betcha'." And I proceeded to update work that I had begun in 1983, '84, and '85.

Hence, you will see in the book interviews from many years ago with people who unfortunately many of whom are no longer with us. In fact, the very first chapter talks about Jimmy Carter, and Jimmy Carter as being the first presidential candidate to really get the new nominating system.

It was Carter who understood that this was a sequential process, and that in any sequential process being first an winning first is what mattered.

And I just want to give a nod to two people who are not with us -- Hamilton Jordan, and, of course, recently Jodie Powell, who I interviewed not long ago again for the book, and who really understood what had happened in American politics and how new this was.

There's a lot in the book about what Jimmy Carter discovered, which was the fight to be first; that once Jimmy Carter understood sequence, once presidential candidates kind of got it about what sequence meant for politics. Iowa and New Hampshire, long before the rest of the country, realized this; understood that man, oh, man, they were sitting on a gold mine, and they were going to protect it at all costs.

And I detail in the book the various strategies they've used through the years to protect their favored place in this system, including a regular habit of blackmailing presidential candidates who dare to think that they would, in fact, skip Iowa and or New Hampshire. And, of course, they've ganged up on this as well and work together.

But to a lot of Americans, the presidential nominating system sort of begins and ends with Iowa and New Hampshire. And, in fact, to many presidential candidates, to their detriment, the nominating system begins and ends with Iowa and New Hampshire.

Now there's a reason for that, which is that in many of what we call the post-reform era, so we're talking about elections from '72 to the present, in many of those elections, the actual campaign did begin and end in Iowa and New Hampshire. And sometimes, however, it doesn't.

And, hence, we come to the second piece of the story of modern nominations, which is the whole process of actually selecting the delegates, and how they are allocated, and what mathematics means here; what winner-take-all means; what proportional representation in the weird and bizarre way that the Democratic Party has interpreted it over the years means.

It's an interesting story because it's a window on some of the fundamental differences in values between the two parties.

The Democratic Party has literally twisted itself into knots over the past 40 years trying to be fair. They have worked so hard at being fair that, in fact, sometimes they have put allocation systems that, for all practical purposes, have rewarded loosing as opposed to winning.

The Republicans want to win. And so, the Republican Party has, first of all, allowed systems that really reward winners, and, secondly, the Republican Party has been true to its states rights kind of, you know,

state power kind of philosophy and allowed a lot more variation in the states in terms of how they award delegates.

We saw this so clearly in this 2008 campaign. On the Republican side, you had a party -- one -- a big faction of their party desperately in search of a hero; that hero emerges as Mike Huckabee. Nobody really sort of saw that coming, but he becomes the right wing and conservative religious hero of the Republican Party, and in the book, I have a little table that shows Mike Huckabee couldn't win for winning; okay; that winner-take-all rules really kept him from ever being a serious challenge to McCain; and, therefore, he was -- did not go into the Convention with power.

On the Democratic side, the fascinating thing -- and I have -- my favorite section of the book is called the “Rookie and the Pro.”

And the reason is that for most of the 40 years of American political history which I tell in the book, the rookie in the presidential race makes sort of fundamental mistakes, misunderstanding the nature of the race; okay; and just kind of doesn’t get it.

They don’t understand Iowa. They don't understand sequence. They don’t understand delegates fights or delegate slating, and the pro gets it.

In the Democratic race in 2008, the roles were reversed. The rookie, Barak Obama, played the nomination system like a pro. The hero of the -- if there’s a hero of the book, I’ll call it -- it’s Jeff Berman, who

was Obama's delegate hunter and his campaign manager, David Plouff, who had a profoundly sophisticated understanding of this process.

And, of course, the irony was that the pro in the race, the person assumed to have all the institutional power and knowledge, et cetera, Hillary Clinton, in fact, made some rather fundamental mistakes in playing out the nomination system.

It's probably all summed up in one table hidden in the middle of the book, so you have to go look through the book for it, where all I do is a simple bit of mathematics, which is always -- I think Bill and I agree on this -- the simpler the math, the more powerful the political science as opposed to our colleagues in the discipline who like complicated math.

But it's a simple piece of math. All I do is look the delegates won by Obama and Hillary in the caucuses and get -- and the average, and I look at the delegates won in the primaries.

Obama has an average of plus-10 delegates won in the caucuses. In the primaries, he has no advantage over Hillary at all. They are statistically perfectly evenly tied.

So Obama understood -- or Obama's campaign understood how to win delegates, so he was focusing on the second unique part of this system and built up a delegate lead that, in fact, had him in good stead because, of course, it brought superdelegates along with him as the season went on.

Finally, conventions. Every four years, like a mantra, everyone, including some of the distinguished members of the press say why do we have conventions. Aren't they a waste of time?

And most of the time, for the past 40 years, when you've asked that question, the answer was, yes, they're a waste of time.

But conventions don't matter anymore until they do. And, in fact, in the last 40 years, there have been three conventions that mattered. The 1976 Republican Convention where President Ford and Governor Ronald Reagan were literally 100 delegates apart. It was a fight all the way to the end. It had to be resolved somewhere. It was resolved at that Convention.

The 1980 Convention where, even though Jimmy Carter and Senator Kennedy were about 600 delegates apart, Kennedy had a kind of momentum, an emotional momentum behind him, that allowed him to take this race all the way to the Convention.

And, of course, the '72 convention -- Democrats, which was right at the beginning of this process, where the anybody but McGovern forces teamed up to try and take the Convention away from McGovern.

What these three instances, and these are three instances among many, many elections in this period, what they show is that usually the convention doesn't matter, but guess what? In a sequential system where there are delegates, it still matters. There are times when you could have a tie.

If you replay the 2008 Democratic race with Hillary Clinton having money to spend on caucuses and splitting those caucus delegates with Obama, you probably have a convention scenario that is very, very close to the 1976 Republicans.

So you can't -- we still have to have these conventions. You can't count them out. They still do matter once in a while depending on what happens in the six months before.

We are now in the season where -- and these will be my final remarks -- where the two parties will start to look at this all over again. The Democrats do this as if it was a nervous tick. If there was a convention, they must have a Rules Commission to talk about the change.

And let me stipulate at the beginning that almost any single plan offered by any political actor or political scientist is more rational and more orderly than the plan we have now.

People are always sending me these plans; okay? I get these plans with great regularity. But the plans require an orderly system, and the problem with getting an orderly system is there is no decider in this to sort of paraphrase George Bush. There is no decider in this system.

Let's look at it. Who plays? Well, one way to get a big system is to have 50 state Democratic committees and 50 state Republican committees all magically decide to do the same thing: have their primaries on the same day, et cetera.

Okay, that's not going to happen. Another way is to have 50 state legislatures decide to hold their primaries in a certain order, in a certain sequence. Okay. That's not going to happen.

The third way is to have the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee decide to do things in a certain way. Well, that I -- a lot of us are kind of hopeful that a least this year they might decide on one thing, which is the start date for Iowa. And frankly, if they can decide on the start date for Iowa and not have us -- not have people like Dan and Walter having to go to Iowa and ruin their New Year's Eve, if they can decide on that, that's probably the limit of their capacity to do that and for a very important reason: it's not for an unwillingness to try, et cetera. It's because, in the end, the national committees don't have a lot of power. They have power to not seat delegates. In a television age, et cetera, people have now understood that not seating delegates isn't exactly the same thing it was when Jack Kennedy was nominated president or Richard Nixon was nominated.

So the national committees really don't have a lot of power.

A fourth actor, Congress. Congress has not shown itself to be very interested in this topic. In fact, over 700 bills have been introduced over the years. None of them have ever seen the light of day.

Even if one got, say, a little further along, there's the question of what's the sanction that Congress would use. Would they really cut off New Hampshire's highway money if New Hampshire if New Hampshire refused to go along with the calendar that Congress initiated?

Would they take the naval base out of Norfolk if Virginia didn't go on the right date? I mean, come on. What is Congress really going to do in this?

And even were Congress to act, the question is is it constitutional. It's almost inevitable that this would go to the Supreme Court, and there would be a constitutional question because of the long-held implied power in the Constitution that states set elections and states have the authority over elections.

So, here's what you have: you have a truly federal system. You have a system that is the result of the federalist structure of the American government.

You have a system that emerges organically, that emerges as complex interaction of a variety of players, and the most important players in that, I argue, are the presidential candidates themselves, not just the candidates who seek to move the dates of primaries around in order to get strategic advantage or try to get one state to be winner-take-all versus proportional for strategic advantages, but also the candidates who lose, because the candidates who lose and their supporters within the parties who lose also have an interesting impact on the system because they're in the process of trying to right the perceived wrongs that caused their man or woman to lose.

The one thing that will be brand new in the 2008 to 12 cycle is that for the first time in this modern era, the Republican Party will be able to play in this game after -- in the interim period. For all this period of time the Republican Party only had the authority to make changes to its

rules at its Nominating Convention. And what that means is that, for all practical purposes, all the fooling around with the system that you occasionally see the Democrats do, the Republicans were prohibited from doing.

As the result of a kind of last-minute deal, as all these things are, which I talk about at the end of the book, this will be the first time that the Republican National Committee has the authority to make some changes in its system before the next election.

And so, the Republicans have now entered into a period and a process which, for the last 40 years, has been more of a Democratic game than a Republican game.

And that will be extremely interesting. This is a really interesting piece of American politics, and it's really consequential because it gives us the people who we get to choose from for president.

So with that, thank you very much. Thank you for coming.

MR. GALSTON: Well, thanks for much, Elaine, for a characteristically incisive and humorous summary of a not short and not uncomplicated book.

To offer commentary on Elaine Kamarck's book, we have with us today two of the most seasoned political reporters and analysts in town. Seasoned is a synonym for all sorts of things. Let me pick one at random -- grizzled.

But in -- you know, in all seriousness, we're thrilled because we could not have done better, as I'm sure everybody knows. And let me

just very quickly introduce to people who need no introduction to this kind of audience in this place.

Dan Balz, to Elaine's immediate right, is, as you know, the national political correspondent at the Washington Post. He joined the Washington Post -- I can hardly believe this myself -- 31 years ago, and is now, I think, Mr. Post. Congratulations.

You'll get to turn the lights out.

MR. BALZ: Don't go there.

MR. GALSTON: You know, in addition-you know, in addition to being an enormously hard-working and prolific reporter, he's the co-author with Haynes Johnson of the recently published New York Times bestselling book, "The Battle for America 2008: The Story of an Extraordinary Election."

He also co-authored, you know, another very good book with Ron Brownstein another well-known reporter in town, in 1996 called "Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival," which is an analysis of the Republican victories in 1994, the forces shaping that. This is an episode that I remember very, very clearly. I'll tell the story sometime, if you're interested.

And Dan received the American Political Science Association's Carey McWilliams Award in 1999 for his distinguished political coverage.

Walter Shapiro, to Dan's right, is a PoliticsdDaily.com columnist, as we speak. He has covered the last eight presidential

campaigns as a columnist and political reporter, and he reports that along the way he's worked for two newspapers, namely the USA Today and the Washington Post; two news weeklies, Time and Newsweek; two monthlies, Esquire and the Washington Monthly; and two online magazines, namely Salon and Slate, which sort of makes me wonder whether the pattern will repeat itself one more time so that you can have another dyad.

You know, Walter has another distinction which is a little bit less known and that is he is on everybody's list of the top three best standup comedians among political analysts and commentators, which sets a very high bar for him to meet in the next few minutes. But I'm confident.

Dan, it's all yours.

MR. BALZ: Thank you, Bill. I want to start by saying thank you for all of you to come out this morning and but particularly thank you to Elaine for this book.

Elaine has done for the delegate selection process, I would say Strobe Talbott did years ago for arms control, which was to make the arcane interesting and lively and understandable.

I've always thought that for as long as I end up covering politics, the last story that I will probably cover will be the appointment of a new commission by the Democratic National Committee to change the rules so that all of us, as Elaine suggests, will have the pleasure of spending New Year's Eve in Des Moines one more time.

MR. SHAPIRO: Second prize, Ames.

MR. BALZ: Oh, I could think of a lot of other second prizes there, actually.

MR. SHAPIRO: Oncheydan.

MR. BALZ: You know, I think one of the messages out of this book is that -- and we saw it again in 2008, and I want to talk a little bit about that -- is that these rules don't matter until they do, and when they do, they really, really matter.

It is easy to ignore the work of this commission or that commission or to say to yourself I really don't have to understand what the changes are this time or how this system works. Political reporters do that at their peril, and certainly candidates do it at an even greater sense of peril.

I remember a breakfast I had in September of 2007 with Steve Hildebrand, who was Barack Obama's Deputy Campaign Manager, and one of his chief field organizers, and I had noticed on the calendar that there was an upcoming rally that Obama was doing in New York City some time within the next 10 days. And this was a time when Hillary Clinton was 30 points ahead, and in national polls she was cruising almost everywhere except Iowa, which was then competitive.

Obama was struggling. There was a lot of question about why he had not really risen to the moment; why he hadn't been able to move poll numbers; why with all this money he wasn't doing better. And I

said to him, “Why are you guys going to New York at this point?” I mean, you know, I mean you’ve got to worry about Iowa and New Hampshire.”

And Steve said, look. He said, “Here’s our view of the world. It is very possible that there will be a nominee after the first four contests -- Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina. But it is also quite possible that there will not be a nominee at that point. And, if that is the case, then this will be a battle for delegates, and we are in the process of figuring out how to win a battle for delegates.”

And I remember I went back and I wrote a piece for our website that day talking about this and laying out some of the thinking inside the Obama campaign. And I had a much, much later post-election conversation with one of the people in the Clinton campaign, who said, “I remember reading that piece and thinking what in the world are they doing?”

And it turned out that the Obama team, as Elaine writes in her book so well, knew how to take this system apart and put it back together in a way that that would benefit them most. Bill Carrick, the California strategist, recalls a conversation that he had with the hero of Elaine’s book, Jeff Berman, sometime in the summer or early fall of 2007, and Jeff called him and said, “I would like to go through every congressional district in California with you so that we can figure out where we ought to put our resources.”

And Bill said -- I said to him, “You guys can poll. You’ll have polling data. You’ll know this, you know, when the moment comes.”

And he said, “We will never enough money to do the polling. You understand the state as well as anybody. Let's go through each district, and we will then figure out based on the demographics, the history, everything else that they could learn about it which districts were worth playing hard in and which weren’t.”

And what we saw was a strategy put in place by the Obama campaign that paid enormous dividends. You know, this did become a battle for delegates, and I want to just use a few states to talk about the disparity between the Clinton campaign strategy in the Obama campaign strategy.

Elaine talks about the importance of the caucuses. By the end of February, by the end of the Wisconsin primary, there had been approximately 2,200 delegates selected. Eighty percent of those delegates had been selected in primaries; 20 percent in caucuses.

Obama’s lead at that point was somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 or 120 delegates or whatever. But 80 percent of his lead in delegates came from that 20 percent of the delegates selected in the caucuses. Take New Jersey and Idaho, my two favorite states from Super Tuesday.

New Jersey had 107 delegates at stake. Idaho had 18. New Jersey was a primary. Idaho was a caucus.

The Clinton’s loved primaries. The Clintons hated caucuses. They came to loathe the caucuses for a lot of reasons, some of which may

be legitimate. I mean there are quirky things about caucuses that probably should be reformed and may well be reformed.

But the decision by the Clinton campaign not to play in caucuses, frankly a decision when Haynes and I did our book, we could not get anybody to give us what we considered a real explanation of how they dropped the ball on this, but so 107 delegates in New Jersey and 18 in Idaho.

Hillary Clinton wins New Jersey by eight or 10 points. She gets a net gain out of that of 11 delegates over Obama.

Obama wins the Idaho caucuses by it's like 79 percent of the vote. He gets net plus 12. So he has wiped out New Jersey by playing hard in Idaho.

New York and Illinois. Hillary's home state of New York, her former home state of Illinois, Obama's adopted home state of Illinois. This goes back to the breakfast with Steve Hildebrand.

Their view was she's going to win this primary, but there are a lot of places, given the way delegates are allocated, where we can pick up delegates with a minimal investment.

So if you look at those two states, Hillary Clinton should have come out of those two states with probably a decent advantage, because there were 232 delegates in New York; I think 155 in Illinois.

In reality, because Obama played harder in New York than Hillary Clinton played in Illinois, Obama came out of those two states with a net plus of nine delegates.

So all through this, the Obama campaign, as Elaine says, totally outmaneuvered the Clinton operation. I think there's another piece of this, which also is described in the book, which is very important, and that is not simply those states where people were playing, but those states that didn't get to play, i.e. Florida and Michigan.

Ironically, it was several people in Hillary's campaign or Hillary Clinton supporters on the rules and by-laws committee at the Democratic National Committee that voted to sanction Florida and Michigan.

The consequence of that may be that Obama is now President of the United States and Hillary Clinton is not. David Plouff at a conference at Harvard right after the election said if Florida had been a real event, Hillary Clinton might well have been the nominee and, therefore, President.

The reason for that was that Florida moving to just before February 5th would have provided Hillary Clinton with a circuit breaker to stop the momentum of Barack Obama after South Carolina, which people thought he should and probably would win, though nobody thought he would win it by quite a margin he did, and, therefore, give her a lift heading into Super Tuesday, which was always the most difficult day on the calendar for the Obama campaign.

The Obama campaign, you know, in the presence of David Plouff and Jeff Berman, knew the consequence of this as this debate was playing out at the Democratic National Committee in the summer of 2007,

and they worked as hard as they could to say if we're going to penalize, you've got penalize fairly and you got to penalize severely -- none of these half measures.

And Plouff remembers that the day that those sanctions were imposed was a day of great relief for the Obama campaign because it wiped out a day and an event that could have put them in deep hole.

Finally, superdelegates. Elaine didn't get to this, but she has already concluded that superdelegates are a relic, and I think we learned in this campaign that the superdelegates really have no independent function anymore. It is -- and again, I give the Obama campaign credit for beginning in making and consistently following through on the argument that superdelegates should not overturn the will of the people. That was certainly not what superdelegates were created for. Superdelegates were created for the opposite; that, in fact, they could be a, you know, a second look. They could overturn.

But, in fact, the Obama campaign -- and I think the way this process has developed over the years -- now makes irrelevant. And Elaine says get rid of them. I think that's probably a wise choice.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, Dan, I found -- all this is fascinating. And I loved Elaine's book and I learned things. For example, I have covered eight presidential campaigns; did a book on the 2004 Democratic primaries, and until I read Elaine's book, I didn't fully understand exactly how the Republicans award delegates and states after South Carolina.

And the other -- my favorite chart in Elaine's book, which I thought she was going to refer to, which is even more -- which is even simpler, the chart that says if delegates to the Democratic Convention were allocated the same way we pick a local votes, by a statewide winner-take-all measure, as I recall Hillary Clinton would have been about 300 delegates ahead of Barack Obama.

And it is in that sentence that conveys why these rules matter. So let me ask -- raise a paradox. I can think quite absolutely Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama only were President of the United States because of these rules. I can make a case that if there was not the South Carolina firewall in the Republican Party, John McCain could easily have swept to the 2000 Republican nomination and, given the Clinton fatigue at that time, might have been elected in a year when he was much more apt to be a good president and reflect the times -- 2000.

So I'm willing to go to three presidents were elected because of these rules.

And yet, when I look around the room, it has the look -- as wonderful as all of you people are -- of what it must have been like to be discussing Esperanto as a universal language in 1926. There would be all of these nice conversations with earnest people, filled with the detail. There would be subcommittee's on the use of verbs and adverbs, and you look around the room and we're talking about a universal language and but bizarrely enough you probably didn't have to get here early to get a seat.

And it is really in an era where the most minutest, where it is standard on cable television to discuss who won the week politically or who won the afternoon, where there's a website that advertises political news up to the minute, and I have suggested that perhaps 13 months from a congressional election we might get by with political news up to the hour, and yet, when you get into these topics, where the details are destiny, it is almost impossible to arouse even the sort of people who were clicking on the floating averages and real clear politics seven times a day and could talk for four hours on the sampling problems with the Rasmussen polls.

And I think it has something to do with the human brain and time sequencing, not the sequencing Elaine's talking about, but the fact and I'll give a perfect example: Hillary Clinton, a woman who's been mentioned a lot today, failed to demonize caucuses, even though they cost her probably the nomination.

Barack Obama demonized superdelegates totally successfully. There was only one caucus she challenged the legitimacy of them that challenge was echoed in the press and the public. And that was the Nevada caucuses, which I believe were the only caucuses she won.

But I remember back in 2006 when the Democratic National Committee, in its infinite wisdom, after a commission, decided to have four states go in sequence -- Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and then the Nevada caucuses. And I remember talking with a certain member of the Democratic National Committee's Rules and By-Laws Committee, who

felt very strongly about this, but will remain nameless -- by the name of Elaine -- and we both picked up two years in advance what a disaster the Nevada caucuses would be, not that there was anything wrong with the Democratic Party's idea of having a western state with large Hispanic population and a heavy union presence to be in the early decision-making. But it should not have been a caucus.

As there was a caucus, it probably should not have been in a state as weird as Nevada. And I wrote this wonderful piece at the time filled with the fact that the Nevada caucuses get tremendously important instead of the standard question of candidates to voters in Iowa: How long has the farm been in your family? The question would become: Oh, is the snake used in your act?

As near as I can tell, it was a wonderful piece. It was prophetic. It was important.

And as near as I can tell, the reason I'm repeating it by word of mouth is I think I could triple the readership just by reading it aloud here today.

I mean the wonderful thing in working for an online publication is you get these very precise numbers of how many computers in Colorado click onto your pieces.

As near as I can tell, and I think there were two pranksters in Norway as part of this, the entire global count for this article, including both my wife and a certain member of the Democratic National Committee's Rules and By-Laws Committee, was seven.

And as a consequence, I really know we're going to go down these roads again, and what I just want to take a few things to talk about some thoughts that Elaine's book prompted in me and it caused me to really think about somebody who's covered presidential campaigns since the Wilson election -- not 1912, I was too young to realize -- is what is really important here as far as the public and the press as a proxy for the public is concerned. We all, just like the Esperanto people had their obsessions about cognates and dependent clauses, I'm a primary calendar junkie in the sense that I really think not only is sequence important, as Elaine so clearly points out, but I think it is imperative for the country and for the candidates and for the interaction between the candidates and the voters to resist all the pressures pushing us towards a de facto national primary.

What this means -- and I've told the Party Chairmen of both -- the Democrats and Republicans in New Hampshire is I will do nonpartisan infomercials upholding the New Hampshire primary anytime they want. And while I have a bit of problems with the Iowa caucuses, the caucus structure, with 220,000 or 230,000 Democrats turning out in 2008, the Iowa caucuses are fast becoming the Iowa primary.

But what is tremendously important is to have a sequence of three or four states -- South Carolina has become essential for both parties -- where voters can actually see the candidates not in rallies, but actually answering questions from voters.

And it is the Iowa-New Hampshire sequence that happens over and over again, and I think of anything in the entire American political tradition running up to the Conventions the most important thing to be preserved is that small state feel at the beginning of the process.

Another calendar obsession I have is the fact that while the party rules did not dictate this, everyone in both the parties and the press for the longest time thought it was in everyone's interest to get these presidential races wrapped up as soon as possible.

Do we have to wait until early March to have a nominee? Can't we do it in February? And there was a logical reason for this. As Elaine points out, candidates were often broke at the end of the primary season, even if it's a short season, and, as soon as you had a nominee, the party could begin to spend soft money on the candidates' behalf.

That logic ended after the 2000 election when the McCain-Feingold bill outlawed soft money. So there's no longer this pot of party money in the same way that could be spent on behalf of a broke candidate, and also since no one participates in federal matching funds anymore, there's no longer a spending limitation on the candidates, so there's no longer this sort of logic of competitiveness for ending the contest early.

The second argument was that these contests are so brutal, like 1968 and 1980, that they will destroy the party by going on and on.

It is interesting to me and that Barack Obama carried two of the most unlikely states Barack Obama carried, states that no one would

have thought a Democrat would have carried in, say, 2005, were North Carolina and Indiana.

And both benefited from coming very, very late in the sequence, and, as a result, the Democrats lavished time and organizational abilities and list making on states that they had never protractedly campaigned in. And I think this is the biggest argument for stretching out that is in the interest of both the American people and the political parties; so stretch out the candidate choosing structure as long as humanly possible rather than front loading it.

I'm going to add two -- one last thought, and I'm sort of -- as I thought about Elaine's point about the Democrats and the weirdness of their session with proportional representation I have my own micro reform that will avoid one small problem, which is the fact that as the Obama campaign realized early on there is no sense in campaigning or spending any money in any congressional district where the two candidates are evenly divided and there are an even number of delegates, because if there are four delegates and they're evenly divided, almost any outcome will have the delegates divided, two-two.

So, as a result in this bizarre disenfranchisement, congressional districts with odd number of delegates actually got tremendously more attention from the campaigns than congressional delegates -- districts with even number of delegates.

I think as we get into this, this is both important. I think -- this is also why this is not going to be a prime time series, and my only

small modest outsider proposal in the interest of good government is why don't the Democrats for whom these crazy rules have been built, at minimum, only have odd number delegates in all congressional districts or, number two, only do their proportional representation by state, which would with the same 15 percent threshold to get rid of minor candidates; and probably the reason you can't do it by states is because what happens if we have a Caroline Mosley-Braun, who only is campaigning in all black districts or the equivalent.

After Barack Obama's presidency, I really don't think America really has to do its parties rules based on enfranchising minorities with obscure protest candidates who are playing only for speech fees, not to win.

I don't -- let me end by just saying I don't know how many of you were here at the 1963 Brookings conference where we had a fascinating discussion of the implications of the 1932 Democratic switch to majority nominations from the two-thirds rule and how it looked with a 31-year perspective.

Actually, had this looked -- had we had a conference in '63 anything like this, we probably would have talked about the relevance of the Convention System and how important the 1960 Convention was and how vibrant the Conventions are because look Jack Kennedy just barely won the nomination, and, of course, that was really the last relevant convention of our lives, despite the three that Elaine pumps up a little greater than they might be pumped.

And so the -- my final thought is the world changes in politics so often and often by looking too much backwards even to the last presidential election, one doesn't realize that that last presidential election may have been the last presidential election of a certain type rather than a trend that will continue ad infinitum.

MS. KAMARCK: Thank you.

MR. GALSTON: Well, those were two terrific commentaries on the book and so in the past 55 minutes, you have now heard, dare I say it, almost collectively, almost a century of accumulated political wisdom -- impressive.

We've now reached the question and answer phase of this session. Let me just preface it, stepping out of my moderator's role for just a minute, with two very brief comments.

First of all, I don't think it's entirely surprising to discover that a political party that is so heavily dominated by lawyers has produced a system of rules that only highly experienced and specialized lawyers can understand. If we were a party of generals and admirals, I suspect we would look a little bit more like the Republicans.

But point number two is more serious, and here I'll put on my political philosopher's hat for just a minute, and it was very tellingly noted along the way that Hillary Clinton's effort to de-legitimate caucuses fell flat. Barack Obama's efforts to de-legitimate superdelegates was tremendously successful. Why is that?

Here's my answer: We have gone through a nearly half century process in the United States where the idea of governance by elites of any kind has been progressively de-legitimated. If you wanted me to drop a reference at this point I might go all the way back to the early 1960s and the Port Huron Statement, which was, among other things, an argument against representation and an argument in favor of directness in the democratic process.

And I think this is one of these areas where the slow penetration of new ideas creates a context in which things that were previously legitimate and unquestionable becomes first questionable and then illegitimate altogether.

And I think the superdelegates are the last in a long chain of people who have been invested with a certain sort of deliberative power based on their assumed expertise and wisdom, the last in the long chain of such groups to be dethroned in the name of an ever-greater democracy, small "D," where democracy is understood as direct as possible rather than as mediated; where everything that happens has to be to quote John Adams, "A microcosm of the people." There should be no filtration of the people. There should be no room for independent deliberation in the people's better or best interest.

Those ideas which were fundamental to the construction of our constitutional order are now very, very hard to defend in public. And with one more financial crisis, a bastion of elite deliberation known as the Federal Reserve Board, I would predict, would be in very deep doo-doo.

With that, the floor is yours. And I have three pleas as you raise your hands: number one, identify yourselves in any manner you see fit; number two, in fact, ask a question; and, number three, in deference to the other people who would like to ask questions and get answers, be as brief as possible.

Yes, sir. Right on. Oh, okay.

MR. HUTAR: Hi. I am Helis Hutar at the Netherlands Embassy.

I can think of a big downside and a possible upside to the primary process that hasn't been mentioned, and I wonder if you could comment.

The downside would be that it protracts the campaign season so long. The last campaign for the presidency can, well, be said to have lasted like two years, but that even upscales the role of money in the campaign politics more than it did before, and, in my view, the more money that is invested in campaigns, the more chances there are that somehow this leads to interest groups to some of sort of possible corruption. I don't know. That would be the downside. And an upside would be that the incumbent effect for a president who's -- well, a president who's the incumbent usually is said to have an advantage over a newcomer in an election, and I would say that perhaps the visibility of primary elections actually increases the chances for newcomers -- well, in the 2012 elections perhaps for the Republicans to get a handle on the elections -- on the general elections.

MR. GALSTON: I'll interpret that as a question.

MR. HUTAR: Yeah. I was --

MR. GALSTON: Respond, please.

MR. HUTAR: -- exactly.

MS. KAMARCK: I think there's a very simple answer, which is, yeah, they cost a lot of money, and that's because you are running in the whole country, and you're making a very important decision. The decision is the two people from whom you will choose the leader. It's a big country. It's expensive.

There isn't really an alternative other than a national primary, and a national primary would cost as much money, if not more, than the sequential system that we now have.

So I think you can't get around the fact that this costs a lot of money. I think we have rules that try to mitigate the influence of special interests, but I go back to the point Walter made: One of the reasons people who've been in the process a long time, like the four of us up here, like the sequential process is sequence does allow for the emergence of lesser-known candidates. Sequence does allow for the emergence of people who don't have gobs and gobs of money ahead of time.

And it allows for a kind of examination of the candidates that would be impossible in a national primary, where basically the candidates might as well just go sit in New York in a television studio for three months and not move, because that's what the campaign for all practical purposes turned into.

And so, there is something to be said about the way this system starts and not only my book, but lots of Dan's books, lots of Walter's books are filled with these moments at which the public gets a sense of these potential presidents as people because they are in places like Iowa or New Hampshire or South Carolina. And that wouldn't happen in a non-sequential system in a national primary, which is really the only alternative here.

MR. BALZ: Let me briefly pick up on a different aspect. I agree very much with what Walter said about the value of a long process, and I think one of the reasons -- one of the many reasons that John McCain was disadvantaged in 2008 beyond the state of the economy and dissatisfaction with President Bush was that the Obama campaign had put down roots in every state in the country, and the McCain campaign did not do that. They didn't have to do it. They couldn't afford to do it. They were at a tremendous disadvantage in just normal campaign apparatus organizing strategizing.

So there is a value in what we went through in 2008. I think, though, that the problem of the elongated campaign -- and I think you're right; I mean we are now beyond a two-year presidential cycle; we're closer to a three-year presidential cycle, and given what's going on already this year, we're at a three and half-year presidential cycle.

I mean the amount of time spent, words chewed up, talking about 2012 already suggest that the entire environment in which we are in is a kind of a competition for who will win the next election, and I think that

the effect on that is corrosive in a governing sense. And I don't know that there's any easy way -- I don't -- there's no easy way out of that. I don't think there's any way out of it.

But I think that is one of the consequences; that it has over time made it more and more and more difficult to get into a governing environment in which there is the possibility of real compromise, real coming together, you know not any kind of a Pollyannaish way, but in a way in which people with differing philosophical views can figure out how to move the interests of the country as a whole forward. And I think that's one of the problems we've got now.

MR. SHAPIRO: I just want to add one sentence. I realize there are other questioners.

It -- there's a quality is if there were rules that caused the primaries to start later -- to do, even having a truncated formal process which is of particular appeal to Europeans, what you will have is all of these de facto straw polls and other fake items coming first, eating up prodigious amounts of money, and it's always been thus.

As I recall in 1982, two years before the '84 Democratic primaries, Walter Mondale spent a fortune campaigning at something called the Democratic Mid-Term Convention, another aspect of the Democratic Party rules that thank God we didn't get into today and that the money Mondale squandered in 1982 would have fueled the Gary Hart campaign through most of the primaries of 1984.

MR. GALSTON: Yes. The gentleman on the aisle?

MR. WAGNER: My name is David Wagner. I would like to expand on one of the comments about the effect on governing. The purpose of the primary system is to choose a president who is then supposed to govern. But, as we saw in the Carter administration, the Clinton administration, to some extent in the W. Bush administration, a fantastic campaign staff makes for a mediocre governing staff.

Could you comment on the effect of the long campaign on subsequent governing?

MR. GALSTON: You first.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Very quickly. I totally understand that the skills necessary to run for president under any set of circumstances maybe not the same set of skills to decide exactly how much of the Baucus bill are we willing to accept and how can we negotiate with two wavering senators to get to 60 votes, let alone what to do in Afghanistan.

But just because a crackerjack campaign team doesn't necessarily create a great administration, it's really hard to argue that a bad campaign team automatically creates an administration of substance.

MS. KAMARCK: And can I just add? I haven’t looked at this systematically, but I suspect that in the pre-reform presidents, whether it was Truman, Kennedy, et cetera, basically even though they didn't win the nomination in the same way that campaign staffs win it these days, they all went into the White House. They went into the government.

They had a big role in the candidates. So I'm not sure there's actually a relationship between this way of winning the nomination and the governing question. I think we'd have to look at that historically, but I'm not sure that it's there.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah. I mean it does raise a very interesting question, though, whether as these -- you know, as the campaign becomes ever closer to permanent, whether you don't in addition to the impact on governance, whether you don't develop a really intense brotherhood and sisterhood of the fox hole, which accentuates the line between those --

MS. KAMARCK: The line.

MR. GALSTON: -- between those who were there fighting the good fight and those who weren't. And that may make it more difficult for new administrations to bring in or even listen to people who were not part of the fight, may have been on the other side, are not necessarily with the program as it was defined, but nonetheless have something to say about an administration.

MR. BALZ: Although, Bill, I mean you will recall back seven months ago there was all the talk about -- excuse me -- how the Obama administration was really turning into the former Clinton administration, I mean in a sense that there were too many Clintonites being brought in and why weren't they more loyal to the -- you know, this was supposed to be a new direction, not the old direction.

So there has been a blending in this administration of the Obamaites. Obviously, the inner circle is the Obamaites, but there are a lot of other people who were, you know, on the other side of this fight.

MR. GALSTON: This would be a long discussion. Mr. Mitchell.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report.

Elaine, with a book like this, I'm always interested to know what did the author learn. And you've shared some of that with us, but what I'm interested in specifically is as a consequence of having done this, did you find that you were -- that this book made you think differently about the process? Did it reconfirm what you had thought? Did open up some new territory for you? And just as a sort of throw away, what does this book say to Howard Dean and Rahm Emmanuel about the 50-straight strategy?

MS. KAMARCK: Gee, that's a good question. From now on, when I'm listening to authors, I'm going to ask the same question. Thanks.

It really is a good question. I'll tell you what it did. By having to trace the whole history of the post-reform era, you know, the big history of the actual McGovern (inaudible) reforms are written by a former colleague of mine at Berkeley, Byron Schaeffer, and that's a mammoth tome, which really takes that huge point in history and explores it.

By picking up where Byron left off and having -- and looking at this over the period of nearly half a century, what I realized was how much this had, and this goes back to Bill's point about representation, how much this had turned into a plebiscidary process, if that's the way you pronounce that word, which I usually only write as opposed to say.

MR. GALSTON: I'm impressed.

MS. KAMARCK: Yeah. I think that's the way you say it -- because and that sort of led me to my conclusion about superdelegates. I mean I was there at the creation of superdelegates, which was at a point where we were in two worlds. The political players who -- my -- then I was young, so they were my seniors in politics -- in the late '70s and the early '80s were people like Bob Strauss. John Sears was still around. I can remember actually being a young woman at a table where I watched John Sears drink for three hours straight, and listen to John Sears and Bob Strauss talk politics.

But they were -- there were still people in political life at that point who were from the era, which I describe in the first chapter of the book, when the nomination system and much of party politics was an elite system.

And it was a semi-public system. It was really inside political parties. Political parties were essentially private institutions.

There's some constitutional law which protects them under the First Amendment, although it's a messy picture because of white

primaries, but there's (inaudible) two strains in the constitutional law in parties.

And the -- that was a semi-public system. It was governed by elites. It was governed by a small group of people.

Now there were definite advantages to that elite system going back to the sort of conversation about governing, which could go on all day.

In that elite system, people did look at people with -- and make estimates of gravitas; right? Is this person ready for the job? I mean it is sort of -- if you're a European and you're a sort of a student of parliamentary democracies and you were to look at 2008, and you'd say, oh my God, here's Chris Dodd and Joe Biden with 70 years of experience between them, and they're like the nobodies in this race. Okay.

That's not what tends to happen in classic parliamentary systems, although if you look at David Cameron and the Tories in England right now, that's changing. They're becoming sort of -- they're getting the values of an American system, even though they have the structure of a parliamentary system.

But that '80s, there was -- you were -- we were still in a halfway world, and so the idea of superdelegates comes from people who understood the old nomination system and who believed that there was value in actually having people who knew the candidates and to make judgments about the candidates.

By taking that, then, forward to 2008 and looking at the polling and just living through this, I realized that there were now -- there was almost no one left in this electorate who remembered the nomination system at a semi-public system. And this was brought home by -- I gave a talk on my home on Cape Cod, which in the winter is all old people, and a lady comes up to me --

MR. GALSTON: Older people.

MS. KAMARCK: -- older people. She's well into her 80s, and she says, "You've just explained why conventions when I was young were exciting." And I said, yeah, because the Convention in the pre-reform era was the place where -- it was the first time that the public saw the whole thing. Okay.

If you go back as I had to do for some of this and you try to dig around, even in the New York Times and the Washington Post papers, right, you try to dig around for who's winning delegates in Montana and how many delegates are being won in Missouri, it is almost impossible to find -- almost impossible because this was really not a system that was visible.

Once the system becomes visible, people then expect that they -- the voters expect that they rule. And so one of the reasons I think superdelegates got -- it was so easy for the Obama campaign to, you know, make superdelegates look somehow illegitimate is that when you expand the franchise, right, you can't pull it back. Once you say to everybody you're voting for the Democratic nominee, you're voting for the

Republican nominee, they are not willing to say, oh, wait a minute, we made a mistake.

And even -- and given -- one final point is play this 2008 Democratic race with John Edwards doing really well, okay, and going into the Convention, knowing what we know now. N=

Now back in the ‘80s, what the -- in the debates around superdelegates and the discussions in superdelegates, people would have said, aw, the super -- that’s what the superdelegates are for, taking care of that.

Well, frankly, can you imagine that only superdelegates would know that? Right? I mean, you know, if he had, in fact, emerged, then all these stories which we now know about his troubled home life and troubled sex life, you know, they would have -- we would have known them. Right? We would have known them and average delegates to the Convention would have been making calculations.

In other words, this whole sort of super structure in this period of time kind of doesn’t work anymore. And so that’s what I learned. And going in, because I had been in favor of superdelegates back in the Hunt Commission, going in I kind of -- it really came home to me that for better or for worse -- and there’s definitely some bad parts to it -- we are in a totally public nomination process, and it's not likely that we can roll that back with any ease.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Well, Al Smith famously said that the only cure for the ills of the democracy is more democracy, and based on what Elaine just said, we'd better hope that he's right.

That gentleman in the back on the aisle?

MR. NIKRAZY: Thank you. My name is David Nikrazy. I represent Georgian Broadcasting Company, here in Washington, D.C.

As you all know, Barack Obama was awarded 2009 Nobel Peace Prize today. I was just checking the BBC web discussion and there are many different views in European countries. So the question is, what has the U.S. President done to deserve this prize, and I was wondering if could give me any commentary on Nobel Committee's decision, please? Thank you.

MS. KAMARCK: Anybody? Do you want to preview?

MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, yeah. I will jump for it. First of all, Barack Obama is the first winner of the Nobel Prize in the history of the world who won the Nobel Prize for being Barack Obama.

Secondly of all, what do we have a pattern here? Jimmy Carter, Nobel Prize. Al Gore, Nobel Prize. Barack Obama, Nobel Prize.

I would really hate to be having breakfast with Bill Clinton this morning.

MR. GALSTON: I told you how good he was. One of the vices of this room is that I end up neglecting hands in the back. Are there any hands in the back that I've neglected? I'm going to take then the last two questions -- the woman on the aisle and the gentleman on the aisle.

MS. TATE: Hello. I'm Nancy Tate. I'm the League of Women Voters of the United States, and we get a lot of questions -- complaints, really -- concerns about caucuses. How come so few people in some states have such a disproportionate say compared to all the people who vote in primaries?

So I'm asking the whole panel if that is -- you see that as a concern and whether or not you do if you see a trend towards more caucuses versus more primaries or are we kind of stuck in the number and the set up we have now?

MS. KAMARCK: I'll do a very short answer to that. I think that caucuses will be a form of debate because so many Hillary Clinton supporters were disappointed at what happened in the caucuses. But I think this is a value and Bill alluded to this, because this actually is a political theory question.

Caucuses are a very rich and meaningful form of participation. And so, because you actually have to make a commitment to be some place, to participate, to move perhaps from a first choice to a second choice, to a third choice. It's quite deliberation in intensive.

Primaries get lots more numbers because it's an easier thing to do. You drop the kids off at school. You go to the polling place. You vote. You're out of there. And so it's the values, right, are values of intensity and deliberation versus sheer numbers.

Now I would hate to see caucuses disappear. But again, going to my earlier point, in this plebisci -- with everybody thinking that it's

all about voters, voters, voters and numbers, numbers, numbers, you can see that there's going to be a lot of pressure to get rid of caucuses. And already we have caucuses that actually look like primaries; that are party run where you can just go basically put in a ballot and leave; okay?

And those are usually called firehouse primaries, party-run primaries. So it's -- caucuses have been decreasing in number over the years. They are generally found in smaller states for obvious reasons.

I do think there might be -- you might see the end of the Texas caucuses, which were particularly kind of confusing and difficult, but it's a different set of values in caucuses, a different set of democratic values, ones which I think we've seen here are in this day and age less respected, less valued in some way, than just sheer numbers and participation.

MR. BALZ: I had not thought about this way until this morning's discussion but in a sense you could argue that the caucuses are the new superdelegates, which is to say that there is a role for activists in this system, presumably, which may be different than the more casual, you know, spectator-participant. In a caucus state, particularly Iowa, because I think that's the one that obviously gets the most attention. Relationships have to be developed. Candidates make it more accessible for activists to take a real measure of them in the way that we used to think of party bosses taking --

MS. KAMARCK: Yes. That's right.

MR. BALZ: -- taking a measure of candidates. It's obviously not a, you know, a perfect analogy. But I think that there -- for reasons that Walter said that the value of the small states, the caucus process gives another dimension to otherwise a push more and more and more toward a sort of a national primary.

MR. SHAPIRO: If you have -- if you do anything else, it's only good with the Democrats, because they have the caucuses in public. The Republican sort of vote with a quasi-secret ballot. But just watching the actual physicality of an Iowa caucus is without a doubt is one of the great experiences in politics, because for a political reporter to actually see the faces of what the faces of Obama supporters look like compared to the faces of Edwards supporters or Hillary supporters in one room is dramatic. And the negotiating for the 15 minutes where you go from first to second choices is one of the most intense political -- it's as close as we're ever going to see to knowing what it was like to be on the floor of a convention in 1952.

And everything you wanted to know about the Democratic presidential contest I think was encapsulated in the caucus I was at in Iowa, where, as they're trying to get the second round votes from the Biden and Richardson and Dodd people, a woman, the Hillary organizer in that precinct is standing on a cafeteria table shouting, "Electing the first woman is change, too."

Hillary got -- Obama got 56 new second round votes. Hillary got three.

MR. GALSTON: That's a great story. Yes, sir, you get the last question.

MR. NOVIK: Hi, it's privilege to have last questions. My name Dimitri Novik.

My impression what all this conversation and it's laughing through tears, because if this is so good and you said that it's good system, sequential system, then why they select the worst president, two terms President Bush in the history?

Why President Obama tried to compress agenda in small time because (inaudible) life divided on election campaign and governing, and to be -- have no time for governing. It's terrible. And it's my question to all of you: If you think that this system is okay, don't answer my question. But if you think that something is wrong, what you personally do only first to change the system? You, you, and you -- and you, by the way.

MR. GALSTON: Well, who wants to go first?

MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, what the heck. Two quick answers. I'm not saying this is a perfect system. I'm saying many of the popular alternatives like a national primary are even worse.

MR. NOVIK: Why?

MR. SHAPIRO: Why?

MR. NOVIK: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: For the simple reason that it rewards too much money, too much name recognition, and too little deliberation. I

think the word that is important in understanding sequential primaries is deliberation. Voters should take some time to think things over.

Secondly of all, I'm not going to convince you, but I will say trying to reform our rules based on the system created George W. Bush is probably not the best and most logical way of going forward.

MR. BALZ: Phil Gramm, the former Texas Senator and failed presidential candidate, once said to me that this system that we use now and the more it has become the way it is creates a different kind of person who runs for president than in the old days. And he said what we will not know for many years to come is whether that produces better or worse presidents. We could argue about that all day long as to whether the system creates the kind of presidents we have, good or bad, or whether they are not a direct relationship.

I mean if I were changing any one thing, I would simply try to start the process much later. And, as Walter said, that's probably an impossibility because state parties and media and everybody else creates all sorts of early tests, irregardless of when the actual process starts.

But I would try to figure out a way to make it begin later and last longer, with incentives designed to make deliberation and reevaluation later in the process more valuable.

MR. GALSTON: Elaine?

MS. KAMARCK: I would try to come to a single starting date between the two political parties, because the absence -- the difference between the two parties is what has driven that early start date. So I

would -- with them, I would try to come to one date; make that date later as the start date.

The second thing I would do is try to establish loosely within both parties the notion that you should have different reward systems for different points in the campaign; that later states should be winner-take-all. Early states should be proportional; that if you're going to have a sequence, what you want to the sequence to do is sort of gradually weed people out.

So on the Republican side, what tends to happen is they lose people pretty fast because of a lot of winner-take-all either by state or by congressional district, which tends to have the same effect -- states.

On the Democratic side, we have no reason for voters in the later states to play. And so I would try to get in both states this notion that having different reward systems is fine, but that the way to equalize the power of the early voters and the later voters is to have the later voters be in winner-take-all states that are really, really important and the candidates would really go to and have the early states be proportional so you still have a lot of people.

And then I -- it's a way -- it's an imperfect way in a sequential system to try to get deliberation back in the system. In this instance, it would be voter deliberation.

MR. GALSTON: Well, I too will answer your question, sir, and I'm going to surprise you. You know, I am a Madisonian in the very strict sense of the term. And I have studied the history and the thought

that led up to the formation of our Constitution and the subsequent development. And I'm a great admirer of all of that.

And the great challenge laid down, you know, laid down at the time of the founding of the country and of the writing of the Constitution was how to bring together two fundamental values in our system: number one the competence to govern and number two the consent of the people to their governors.

Those are not the same thing and frequently people who are the most competent to govern are the least able to gain the consent of the people, and frequently the people -- those who are most able to gain the consent of the people are the least competent to govern.

And we have to hope that there's some overlap between them. I believe that the balance between those two fundamental values has been severely disrupted by the developments that have occurred in the past 40 years that Elaine has -- Elaine Kamarck has chronicled in her book.

And so, and may God strike me dead for what I'm about to say, but I will say it anyway, if you put me in a control booth with two buttons and those two buttons could shape alternate futures or to pick an example that, you know, that is surely familiar to you, if I were Stalin, and I had a choice between the system that we have now and the system, with all its flaws, that we had in 1964, I would chose 1964.

Having said that, I will tell you that there is absolutely no way that the status quo ante will be restored. And there is, you know, and

there's no way for reasons that are related to a previous comment that I made, namely the political culture of the United States has changed profoundly in the past half-century.

And in the same way that the old system was rooted in an older political culture, the system that we have now is rooted in, reflects, and to some extent exacerbates our contemporary political culture.

This, in a way, is the point of this whole series, "Governing Ideas," is to talk about the interplay of, you know, daily politics, institutions, and broad currents of political culture. And I think this is, you know, this conversation has just been a splendid illustration of how those three things come together even when you're looking at Rule 15C.

Thank you very much, Elaine.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

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