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VELVET REVOLUTIONS FROM PRAGUE TO TEHRAN:
WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THEM?

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MR. PICCONE: Good morning. My name is Ted Piccone. I'm a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy here at Brookings.

Welcome to this event on the Velvet Revolutions. This is an auspicious occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Velvet Revolutions of 1989, which was, as most of us remember, a time of great tumult and excitement, not only in places like Prague and Warsaw but also throughout the world, as the curve of history seemed to bend toward a new paradigm of peaceful democratic change.

Here, at Foreign Policy at Brookings, we're marking this historic milestone by focusing our thoughts on a critical piece of that story -- the role of people power in upsetting the status quo and establishing a different model of governance built on the principles of representative democracy, human rights and liberal ideals.

Since those heady days of 1989, a lot has happened around the world to lend both hope and dismay about the prospects for nonviolent methods of political reform. On the one hand, pluralist democracy is now the norm throughout Europe, and spreading eastward, while electoral democracy has set strong roots in Latin America and increasingly in parts of Asia and Africa. In these cases, citizens have taken to the streets to demand an end to conflict and a better quality of life.

On the downside, despite dramatic and peaceful outpourings of civil engagement, authoritarian rulers in Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran and Belarus,
for example, have turned back popular movements for change. In each case, the political will of the international community to get involved has been seriously tested and largely proven lacking.

As a new administration settles in, here in Washington, it faces an array of difficult choices in whether and how to exercise the United States’ traditional, though I would say highly uneven, leadership role in supporting nonviolent movements for change. It is grappling, as we speak, with reevaluating policy toward such countries as Burma, Cuba and Syria, toward a posture of principled engagement. As they consider those options, they would do well to consult the burgeoning literature on the experience of nonviolent movements as agents of change, and they could start right here with the book I’m holding, Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Actions from Gandhi to the Present, which examines most of the major cases of civil resistance over the last 50 years.

The book is co-edited by our lead speaker this morning, Timothy Garton Ash, who’s a Professor of European Studies at the University of Oxford and Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony’s College there. He’s also a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His eye-witness account of the Velvet Revolutions of 1989 was published in the U.S. as the Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague.
After hearing some comments from Professor Garton Ash, we will hear from Tom Carothers, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Director of its Democracy and Rule of Law Program. Tom is a leading authority on democracy promotion with eight critically acclaimed books on the subject under his belt.

We'll also hear from Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy Studies here at Brookings and an expert on Iran. A former member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, Suzanne will bring us forward to the current political dynamics in Tehran and how, if at all, the United States -- and its allies -- can place itself on the right side of history, to borrow a phrase our President’s like to use.

After some discussion among the panelists, we will then turn to the audience for comments and questions.

Tim.

MR. GARTON ASH: Well, thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be back here at Brookings where I spoke as recently as yesterday.

I have been given 10 to 12 minutes to summarize a huge chunk of world history, so this will be like the Reduced Shakespeare Company which performs the complete works of Shakespeare in two hours; Hamlet takes about two minutes. So it will be truly telegraphic in style.
Twenty years ago, there was this extraordinary, magical set of events in Prague which was christened, by the way, by a western journalist, the Velvet Revolution, and I and others subsequently described what had happened in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, as Velvet Revolutions. But, at that point, it was still possible to think that this was a one-off, a unique set of events to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Twenty years on, we have a whole series of cases which have many of the similar characteristics of those Velvet Revolutions -- the Baltic States, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, South Africa, I would say in many ways a negotiated revolution, Chile.

Some would say Kyrgyzstan; I put a very large question mark. Some would say Lebanon; again, I would say a very large question mark.

And, of course, the failures -- Belarus, Burma -- or at least the failures in the short term.

And, as Ted mentioned, as we speak, the extraordinary events in Iran over the last few months which have been christened by the regime, Velvet Revolution, using precisely those terms, so christened in an attempt to strangle it.

So the proposition, the first proposition I want to put before you is it may be that what happened in 1989 has established -- I don’t say invented, but established -- a new model of revolution, supplanting the old model of 1789 which was, of course, the model also for the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949.
The 1789 model: violent, utopian, class-based, definitionally violent. Mao Tse-Tung said, famously, revolution is not a dinner party. He said, a revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another.

The 1989 model, the new model: definitionally, programmatically nonviolent, non or anti-utopian, not aspiring to build a new heaven on Earth, not based on one class but on attempting to build the broadest possible social coalition, definitely mass participation. Trotsky called revolution the eruption of the masses into history. These are mass events, that where the mass social action is channeled into a negotiated compromise.

The simple of 1789 was a guillotine. The simple of 1989 is a roundtable where you negotiate.

The 1789 model was, in some sense, the polar opposite of an election. The 1989 model often crystallizes around an election, either the mobilization for an election or a plebiscite or, most often, a mass mobilization in protest against a stolen or rigged election. Again and again, we have seen that happening -- most recently, obviously, in Iran.

Now, not everything that is called a revolution is, in fact, a revolution. I don’t just mean those usages you see in the press such as a revolution in Italian cooking or a revolution in vacuum cleaners. I mean even in the sphere of politics. You have to have not just a revolutionary situation and revolutionary events but also a revolutionary outcome.
So let me give you this short definition of revolution, new style. It comes from George Lawson in a book called *Negotiated Revolutions*. Revolution is, I quote, “the rapid, mass, forceful, systemic transformation of a society's principal institutions and organizations.”

Rapid, mass, forceful -- not violent, but forceful systemic transformation.

By that criterion, everything that happened in Eastern Europe certainly qualified -- the Baltics, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, I would say, South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, Portugal. Georgia, probably. Ukraine, really coming to a quite borderline case, I think, whether we can truly say there's been a fundamental systemic transformation.

Kyrgyzstan, clearly not. Lebanon, I'd like to hear Suzanne, but I think highly questionable.

Then, of course, we have the failures -- Belarus, China, Burma.

Now what we do in this book is to look at most of the major cases, not just of Velvet Revolution but of the use of civil resistance including Uganda, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and ask analytically and historically what determined the success or failure. This is not a book of prescription. It's a book of rigorous historical analysis.

What I want to do today, however, is to try and tease out some possible lessons from it, and, of course, everyone can learn their own lessons. I'm going to leave aside that whole huge area which is the lessons that could be learned by the actors involved and the countries
concerned, both the strategies for opposition and the conditions for success and, of course, the lessons that can be learned by the rulers.

I want to focus on the international context, which in almost every case is an extremely important, if not decisive, factor.

And, I want, for the sake of this introduction, to assume that we democrats, democracies, would like Velvet Revolutions to succeed. There is a whole argument to be had there, and I absolutely acknowledge that you have to make the case from country to country. It’s not always the case that our interests and our values automatically coincide, right.

I would be prepared to make the case in subsequent discussion that in general Velvet Revolutions tend to produce the kind of regimes we would like to see, tend to strengthen liberal international order, but let me leave that aside.

Let’s assume we would like these processes and outcomes. How, if at all, can we respond to them positively, facilitate, support them?

I want to say this is actually not easy. It is quite difficult to do well particularly because, as Ted mentioned in his introduction, in the last five years, roughly speaking, authoritarian regimes -- from Iran to Russia to China to Belarus -- have quite systematically identified Velvet Revolution, or sometimes they say Color Revolution, as a threat to their power, have thought often quite cleverly about how to prevent them, how to do, if you will, Velvet Counter-Revolution or not so Velvet Counter-Revolution.
One of the things they have done is to identify Velvet Revolution as a western subversive plot and specifically to identify it with the United States. This was very clear in Belarus. This is very clear in Iran.

Let me just read you a couple of sentences from the indictment in the mass show trial of reformist and opposition leaders in Iran. I quote, this is from the indictment: "The Velvet Revolution have three arms -- intellectual, media and executive -- and each of these have relations to a number of American foundations, and there is a kind of division of labor amongst them. In this triangle, sedition. Each of these American organizations perform a certain function," et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

You get the idea.

So this is what we're up against, and so I think it's important to say in advance two things very clearly:

First of all, in no case, has the West created these events, made these events happen. That is not a diplomatic piety; it is an analytical statement. In every single case, it is the people on the ground who have made these things happen. Democracies have simply responded, facilitated, at best, supported.

Secondly, the first imperative of our policy should always be the Hippocratic Oath, as formed by doctors. First, do no harm, and we should be very clear that in this constellation some things we can do can do harm.
Let me then, in my last few minutes of this slightly extended 12 minutes, give you, just to open up the discussion, a few bullet points of the things that I think democrats and democracies can usefully do. And, let me say, first of all, that as a general rule I think the most effective things we can do are long-term. The closer you come to the short term, to the immediacy of events, actually the more difficult it becomes and the more problematic it becomes to be proactive.

So, here then, are my nine bullet points:

First of all, clearest lesson of the Cold War, the most important single thing we can do is to keep our own societies strong, open, dynamic and attractive. Connor Dald and I talked about the Magnet Theory, that the free societies of the West would be a magnet for the unfree. That, I think, is still true today.

Secondly, in order to unfold that magnetism, people in closed societies need to be able to see, experience, sense what it’s like to live in an open society, so that the question is not so much engagement or not engagement. It’s not even principled engagement versus unprincipled. It’s effective engagement versus noneffective engagement.

By effective, we mean, amongst other things, such that the people we want to help, the people in the countries themselves benefit from these exchanges, like for example, long-term student exchanges, and not simply the regime.
Point number three, information, information, information -- probably the most important thing of the lot. To make available to people in closed societies, information not only about open societies and the world outside but also about their own societies. What Radio Free Europe or the BBC did in the Cold War. Here, I think we have not begun really to use the possibilities available to us.

If I may say so, I think the United States in particular has not been very effective over the last 20 years, for example, in using broadcasting. If you take the Iranian case, I don’t think one can say the Voice of America has been a shining success. Whereas, BBC Persian satellite TV, internet using user-generated content, has had a terrific impact.

Here, too, the Hippocratic Oath is of great importance. One of the worst things that have happened over the last few years, in my book, is the fact that Nokia Siemens Networks sold to Iran a highly sophisticated internet monitoring facility with which they can actually identify, monitor, censor the use of the internet on social networking sites, internet-based phone calls and so on. That’s a classic example of what we should not be doing.

We should, I think, be thinking about how we can open up the internet in closed societies, not help authoritarian rulers to close it down.

How we share across the internet knowledge of what has happened in other countries, how it has been done elsewhere, and, not least, the question of international media coverage -- it’s very striking that in most of
the cases we’ve looked at the international media coverage played a crucial role in the dynamic of the events themselves, including, by the way, the fall of the Berlin Wall. In half these cases, the name by which these events are known, like Velvet Revolution, was actually given by a foreign journalist.

What we see now is a desperate -- a desperate -- crisis of foreign news coverage worldwide, and that crisis of foreign news coverage is itself a problem.

Number four, and again I’ll just give you these as bullet points, I mentioned the central importance of elections. Everything that has to do with election monitoring, international standards for elections, trying to establish international norms for elections, including, by the way, abiding by our own standards -- Afghanistan -- is, I think, a significant contribution.

Point five, increasingly, the cases we’re looking at are way outside the cultural historical West in even the broadest definition, including the worlds of Orthodox Christianity in Latin America. Often the crucial partner will therefore be not the United State and its allies, but non-western democracies.

Now non-western democracies, like India, very often do not see it as their business to encourage such developments in their neighbors. With colonial experience, with a strong sense of their own sovereignty, they’re rather more sympathetic to the sovereignty argument. So I think the conversation with non-western democracies, for example, in the
context of the so-called Community of Democracies, is a very important one.

Point six, when you talk to policymakers, and I’ve seen this over 30 years, again and again, they are so focused on the diplomatic process -- that negotiation, this timeline, that ally -- that they often do not see the dynamic in the country concerned. Quite often, they don’t even have the information, the intelligence in the broader sense, to understand it.

Can I put it this way? They’re so focused on the physics of diplomacy that they don’t see the chemistry of domestic politics.

I think a really important lesson from this history is that in our policymaking process we need to have the capacity to analyze the chemistry of politics and not just the physics of diplomacy. In every case, to ask: What will be the impact on the internal dynamics of this or that policy action?

If I may say so in passing, I was discussing this with someone in the State Department, and they cited as a shining exception the case of Suzanne Maloney and her analysis of Iran in the last administration as feeding into policymaking.

Point seven, the question of financial and economic linkages and how we use them, assuming, of course, that we’re in the desirable position where the state concerned is dependent on us rather than us being dependent on them, which is increasingly the case.
Point eight, the question of what to do in the immediate short-term response when an event is unfolding. Here, I come back to the title that I suggested to Ted we give this session, which is “What, If Anything, Should We Do About These Events?”

President Obama has been somewhat criticized for his extremely downbeat, low-key response to the Green Movement, the popular protest in Iran. My own view is that if he got it wrong, it was only by a few degrees of calibration because in a context where the regime is trying to discredit the movement by identifying it with the Great Satan, the United States, and the Little Satan, Britain, actually you do have to be extremely careful to do no harm by even giving a hint of a suggestion, in an often quite conspiratorial-minded society, that this is promoted, this is backed by the United States.

If you look at 1989, this is a fascinating example. The George H.W. Bush Administration, in the first nine months, the crucial first nine months of 1989, was unbelievably laid back, partly, by the way, because they misread the situation. They were too skeptical of that changes that were happening, but they were unbelievably laid back. They did nothing to stir up, quite the contrary.

I would say as a historian, with the wisdom of hindsight, that was the best possible thing the United States could have done, in that moment. The situation was ideal because you had done all the work in the 30 years beforehand. You had helped to create the conditions in
which people on the ground could make this happen, and then you step back. You hold back in the moment of action.

Last and final point, follow-up. It is characteristic, almost definitionally characteristic, of these events that since it is a negotiated transition, which leads to a compromise with elements of the old regime, there is a major danger of backsliding. So I think another lesson we can learn is once you have the transition, once you have partners who want to work with you, the engagement on the follow-up for the consolidation of a democracy is actually crucial.

As I say, that was the Reduced Shakespeare. Each of these points would have taken at least half an hour to develop, but I hope we can at least come back to some of them in discussion. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. PICCONE: Thank you, Timothy. That was an excellent, crisp rundown of the big issues, and we have a lot to talk about.

I'm going to first turn to Tom Carothers to make some comments, and then Suzanne.

MR. CAROTHERS: You'd like me to stay seated?

MR. PICCONE: Sure.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you, Ted.

Ted asked me to make some comments today, I think with two things in mind. He wanted me to take Tim's opening presentation and tie it to the U.S. policy community, and then, secondly, I think he also hoped
that I would be at least a little bit contrarian for the sake of, for the spirit of things.

I can’t be a really strident contrarian here, first, because I have an enormously high regard for Timothy Garton Ash’s work and in particular for this book, which I think is a really fine effort, and also because I believe in democracy and democratization. I think they’re good things. I’m not against them.

But, nevertheless, I do have some slightly contrasting views on at least a few points and at least sort of one major question for Tim, which I’ll come to at the end.

I’d like to structure my remarks by really talking a bit about the backlash against democracy assistance that we’ve seen arise in this decade because I think it gives an interesting perspective on some of the things that Tim was talking about. This backlash, as you know, has arisen in the last six to eight years, and it’s quite significant. The Russian government has carried out really the most systematic against international democracy assistance that I’ve seen any government mount. But it’s not just the Russian government.

Governments in Central Asia have taken rather strenuous actions to deny access to democracy assistance providers. The government of China has become very concerned about Color Revolutions and taken various measures to restrict different kinds of freedoms as a result.
A number of governments in the Middle East, not just Iran, have also taken measures.

In South America, Bolivia just closed another aid program, USAID program of a certain type. Venezuela, of course, has been concerned about this.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, we’ve seen a number of governments take actions as well.

So this backlash is interesting. It’s important. It’s a waking-up to the international democracy assistance community. It’s a waking-up that was sparked by two things that looked interrelated to people in the world but actually weren’t very much, and that’s one of the things that’s interesting.

They woke up after the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and said: What’s going on here? What are these foreign people doing in our countries and are they the cause of these revolutions?

Keep in mind that the Color Revolutions occurred on the heels of the invasion of Iraq. Now, actually, the invasion of Iraq and the Color Revolutions were not very much related. The United States had been assisting democratic activists in Ukraine since the early 1990s, and the U.S. policy towards Ukraine really hadn’t shifted very much in the early years of this decade. If anything, the Bush Administration was rather happy with the Ukrainian government in certain ways because of its support of the war in Iraq.
So it's ironic, but this was seen in many parts of the world as, well, the United States is now on a forcible march. Some governments, they overthrow with the U.S. military; other governments, they overthrow with their quieter methods, but it's all part of the same thing.

The combination of these two things, they really sparked concern. I think it's important to see that we're not going to be able to go back and put that genie back in the bottle. In a sense, the 1990s was a bit halcyon in the sense that there was a lowering of sovereignty in many ways, and a certain many of these governments were not paying very much attention to these assistance programs. We're not going to go back to that.

Now it's surprising in some ways that governments like Russia, those in Russia and China, are so concerned because with regard to the Color Revolutions political scientists really have identified a series of characteristics of political systems that make them vulnerable to the kinds of events that occurred in those countries -- countries that allow a certain amount of opposition and countries that allow a little bit of independent media, countries that have had regular, relatively free and fair elections, countries that have a weakened leader and so forth. Russia and China, and a number of other countries, don't fit those conditions and probably don't have very much to worry about, at least if they have political scientists to believe.

It's also a bit puzzling that they're so concerned because those of us who sort of live and study the world of western democracy assistance
know that it was not the driving force behind the Rose Revolution in Georgia, nor the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, nor even the downfall of Slobodan Milošević.

And, it’s a bit puzzling that these leaders give so much credence to the idea that these relatively modest western assistance programs are really so powerful, but they do. Yes, they sometimes use that fear as a justification for what they want to do in terms of repression, but there is genuine fear out there.

Why is that? Well, I think first because the assistance, to us, may look rather homegrown and rather kind of not always that organized or that effective. On the other side, it looks very purposeful and very sophisticated. They see groups, whether it’s the National Democratic Institute or the National Republican Institute, Freedom House, so forth -- one can name a number of organizations -- these groups look to them to be very purposeful, very sophisticated.

Secondly, they’re backed by a very wealthy, very powerful government. They receive funds from that government and act in a sense at the behest of that government in various ways, and that looks scary too.

Third, such political events of the type Tim was describing are unpredictable, and governments go to bed at night and wonder at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, what do we do tomorrow morning if there are 100,000 people in the central square of the capital city? It’s scary. It’s very unpredictable and very hard to manage.
That ties in also to the fact that these are governments that tend to believe in foreign subversion. They use the tactic themselves. The Russian government believes in the idea of trying to influence political events around it through cash in envelopes or assistance programs of different types or bluster or pressure and so forth.

And, they also tend to believe in mass movement revolutions -- the Russian government, the Chinese government, the Iranian government. That’s how they came to power. As people in the Iranian Secret Police said to some of the people who have been questioned in Iran, they said: We were the original Velvet Revolution in 1979. We know what you’re trying to do. We were the ones who invented this technique.

So they tend to believe in this technique very much because they feel they’ve been the beneficiaries of it themselves.

Now I’d like to just make a couple of remarks about the reaction of the U.S., in particular the U.S. democracy assistance community, to this backlash because one of the things that struck me in the last five or six years is the U.S. community, when faced with this backlash, has in some cases, in my view, been either rather naïve or in a state of denial about why is it that people are so concerned. There’s a number of, I think, approaches that the U.S. community has taken and things that they have overlooked or ways that they think about it, that put them in a state of either naïveté or denial that makes it hard sometimes to have a really
focused and honest discussion about what we should in particular contexts.

What do I mean? First, there’s a tendency of the U.S. community to move very quickly past what looks like to the U.S. community, ancient history, which is that in the 1960s and 1970s and even 1980s, at least, there was covert assistance by the U.S. government to political parties to try to influence elections in Western Europe.

In Latin America, in 1982, the CIA helped fund Duarte’s campaign. At the same time that we observed those elections and we supported free and fair elections in El Salvador, a different part of the U.S. government was giving money under the table to one of the political parties to try to help it win.

Now we tend to say, that was a long time ago, or, we don’t do that anymore. We somehow expect others silly to believe that and to say, yes, that’s ancient history. Whereas, what appears to be ancient history in Washington doesn’t look so ancient in many other places.

Secondly, we tend to believe that lines that we draw here in Washington will look sharp and clear abroad. I think it’s very important that the National Endowment for Democracy is a private organization. It’s a very important distinction in terms of how it operates within the U.S. policy framework, and that the National Democratic Institute and the National Republican Institute are private organizations run with private boards of directors and so forth.
Those distinctions, however, don’t look so sharp abroad. They do all receive U.S. government funds. They seem to have a cooperative relationship with the U.S. government in various ways. When we say, no, these are private groups that are doing this, this isn’t really U.S. foreign policy that’s working with the opposition parties in your country, for example -- well, that looks hard to understand. It’s true in some ways, but it’s hard to understand.

Third, we tend to make a lot out of successes and not talk very much about failures in this decade. There’s been so much attention to Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and this concept of the Color Revolutions. We feel like, gee, we’ve really been pretty successful.

You look at annual reports of different groups. They have pictures of lots of people in national capitals on them, and you think, boy, we’ve really been involved in some impressive things.

Well, there’s also Belarus which has largely been a failure. Azerbaijan hasn’t really gone anywhere. Cuba, 40 years of such support hasn’t really led to anything. Burma hasn’t really led anywhere. Kazakhstan, not much change. Egypt, not very much. Zimbabwe hasn’t led anywhere, and so forth. Actually, I think the failures speak a bit louder than the successes.

When your best successes are the Color Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, when you compare those to this litany of countries where the United States has made some significant efforts, or
U.S. groups have as well as the U.S. government, but not really produced much results, it’s puzzling that we talk so much about our successes and not put the picture in a somewhat more sobering light.

Fourth, there’s a tendency to insist that when we involve ourselves in elections in other countries, which we do, that we’re acting in a nonpartisan way to support free and fair elections, and we have a right to do so because we believe in the principle of free and fair elections.

I do too, and I think we do. It is our business to involve ourselves in elections in other countries for the principle of defending free and fair elections, but it’s murky territory.

If you look at the package of activities that tend to go into a comprehensive program in a country with a very contested election, some of them are quite nonpartisan, but others are rather partisan. When they are contending political groups in that election, it does look like we’re taking sides.

So, when you look at the typical panoply of activities, there’s usually some work for the electoral commission. There’s work with domestic observers. There’s work with political parties, usually with an opposition coalition of some type. There’s work with democratic civic education, and there’s work with strident civic advocacy groups, student groups or others. Some of those things have a very partisan quality.

I remember very vividly when I was doing research on Serbia, I interviewed some people at USAID about their Get Out the Vote campaign
in Serbia, and they said, well, of course, getting out the vote is a very nonpartisan kind of thing to do because a higher vote level is just a good thing for democracy.

Then I went to Serbia, and I was sitting in the Get Out the Vote headquarters in Belgrade with the organization receiving U.S. assistance, and they showed me this really nice map of Serbia colored in blue and red, with all the blue areas were the anti-Milošević areas and the red areas were what they assumed were the pro-Milošević. They showed how their Get Out the Vote campaign was highly focused on turning out the anti-Milošević vote, and it was a very sophisticated partisan effort designed to increase the anti-Milošević vote in that election.

So you say, well, you know, it’s a free and fair election we want. Yes, we do. But there are groups in the country who are using our money and carrying it out to try to get one side to win an election and not the other. That may be pro-democratic, but arguing that it’s nonpartisan, that we’re not taking a side in that election is, I think, hard to say.

Then, fifth and I think the most important point is the question of -- and this comes to my question for Tim -- are we treating this category, both in this book and I think in our minds, that we’ve built up in the last 20 years, too broadly as a unified category -- in the sense that, Tim, you’ve described a series of activities around the world in the open face of your book which shows the map of the world with different places pinpointed.
When I look at it and I think about it a bit, I think to myself, are these really all examples of the same thing and, if not, are they examples of different kinds of things that have some similar characteristics?

Could one, for example, argue that there are sort of three different types of cases that you described in the book, that are different from each other in certain ways?

First is the collapse of communist systems, which has certain characteristics that are similar in parts of Central and Eastern Europe and at least parts of the former Soviet Union.

The second is when you chase out a dictator, like in the Philippines or Pinochet in Chile, for example, which is not the collapse of an entire system but rather the chasing out of a dictator. Life in the Philippines has changed somewhat with Marcos gone, but it is not a revolution in that country. A number of powerful, wealthy families are still in charge of the Philippines, and the leaders who have come in the Philippines since then have had dictatorial characteristics or at least characteristics that are not very democratic.

Then the third category is contested elections between different groups in which one side is in power and entrenched and is somewhat authoritarian but is allowing an election that’s somewhat plausible, like in Ukraine. Ukraine was not a dictatorship when the Orange Revolution occurred, in Georgia, in Kyrgyzstan and possibly some other places.
They seem to me to be quite different from each other, and that’s why the term revolution makes me uneasy because some of those, particularly the latter two categories, aren’t really revolutions. Or, sometimes they are and maybe sometimes they’re not. I don’t think most people would argue that, as you say, Ukraine has had a revolution or that Kyrgyzstan really had a revolution. They certainly had one group of power, one group of elites take over power from another group of elites, but the constitutional order wasn’t significantly changed and so forth.

So the question is whether the concept of civil resistance, an extremely broad and appealing concept, is being used in a way that’s sometimes, I think, analytically confusing because in some cases there’s a sense of denying the political nature of these activities by using the term civil resistance and civic movements -- in that the Color Revolutions were about one group of political parties fighting another in an election, and the election produced a series of events that brought people out on the street to protest the results of the election or the behavior in the election, but ultimately it was an election between some political parties and others, which is different from the Velvet Revolution, for example.

And so, I’m concerned about whether the concept of civil resistance tends to deny the essentially political nature of some of these events or in saying that civil resistance is used for higher order of principles like democratization, decolonization, civil rights, as you do in the introduction of the book.
Isn’t it also sometimes a characteristic simply of fairly naked political struggles, naked in the sense of power between contending elites, that aren’t very much about higher principles?

And, shouldn’t we be careful about an overly broad concept like Velvet Revolution being used to describe a series of much more complex political events?

Thanks.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks, Tom.

As usual, Tom has also given us a tremendous amount to think about and comment on, but I’m now going to turn to Suzanne and ask her to give us five or seven minutes on Iran.

MS. MALONEY: Sure. Thank you, Ted, and thank you to Professor Garton Ash, who I think has produced a really remarkable volume and very useful to those of us who do focus on a particular country, to appreciate the comparative dimension, both the similarities and differences, and distinctions.

I was asked to speak specifically about Iran for the obvious reason that Iran is sort of the perfect storm when it comes to the idea of a Velvet Revolution. As Tom suggested, Iran was perhaps the antecedent to the fall of the Wall and the developments in Eastern Europe. This idea of a mass population coming to the streets in a largely nonviolent way and changing the system of government was surely seen in 1979.
Much of the analysis of the Islamic Revolution in Iran has tended to focus on the most obvious characteristic -- that, of course, of the religious dimension, both of the operational elements of the revolution and, of course, of the state that followed.

But, in effect, what happened in 1978 and 1979 was very much a popular movement, one that involved millions of people coming out in the streets, in an organized and disciplined fashion, day after day, week after week -- in a fashion that helped produced the collapse of the system that had only months before been described as an island of stability by no less than the U.S. President.

So this development in Iran, I think, is important to think about when we talk about the idea of Velvet Revolution but also when we think about subsequent events in Iran because it was, in many respects, I think a cautionary tale for Iranians. They had, of course, been involved in this in one way, shape or form. They had come to the streets in massive numbers, and they had helped bring down a government.

The outcome was, as Professor Garton Ash suggests, negotiated in the aftermath of this popular movement. The negotiated outcome was one that was very disappointing and very much not what most of those who came to the streets in the prelude to the revolutionary change in Iran would have envisioned, had they had an ability to bring about the outcome they wanted.
So I think understanding that Velvet Revolutions are not necessarily developments that produce an automatically improved life for the population or an automatically more benign government, as one of the dimensions in which we can talk about Iran and think about Iran, is relevant to the wider concept of the Velvet Revolution.

The other obvious reason why we would talk about Iran in the context of a Velvet Revolution is that the past four months have produced, I think very unexpectedly for many of us who focused on the country, a series of developments that are quite profound and quite, I think, optimistic in the sense that for the first time since the period of 1978, 1979, you’ve seen Iranians in very large numbers come to the street to protest not simply the stealing of an election -- the fraudulent outcome of the June 12th election was the immediate precipitant -- but also, I think, to vent their frustration and disappointment and anger with a system which they did not believe was serving their interests or in fact representing the best ideals of the Iranian people.

This is a movement that I think is very much in its most nascent form at this stage. I think it would be premature to suggest that it has either succeeded or failed. It is very much, I think, the responsibility of history to assess whether June 12th and the immediate aftermath was the start of a Color Revolution or whether it was simply the first salvo in what will probably be the latest development in what has been a very long history of the Iranian people’s struggle for a truly democratic outcome.
But we know that it was profound. Nothing of this size or scope has been seen in the past 30 years in Iran. There have been a number of dramatic developments over the years. There has been an enormous amount of elite contestation in Iran. There have even been, on occasion, clashes that have involved tens of thousands of people. But never since the earliest days of the revolution have we seen hundreds of thousands, and at least in one estimation perhaps three million -- people on the streets of Tehran -- again, almost in a sort of reminder of what happened in 1978, 1979 -- in a very organized and disciplined fashion, protesting their government and demanding some sort of a change to a policy and to the rigging of the election.

So I think that was a dramatic development, and we're all going to be watching to see what happens.

I am at this point, probably to some extent, cynical in the sense that I think what we have seen was a provocation. What we have seen is something dramatic and certainly a breach of the past as it has been in the past 30 years with Iran. But we have not seen yet -- and obviously there's a certain degree of opacity when everyone talks about Iran from outside the country -- the organization, the leadership, the momentum that we can say has certainly put Iran on the course of some sort of revolutionary change.

We are seeing very dramatic events often taking place in fits and starts. Certainly, some of the subsequent protests that have taken place
in August and September have been quite notable but certainly not of the scale of what we saw in the early weeks after June.

The repression, to some extent, has worked. I think that is another dimension of the Iranian story that is important to understand and appreciate and think about when one talks about the broader concept of Velvet Revolution.

Let me just also comment on the question, the issue of the paranoia and the extent to which the idea of Velvet Revolution has become a tool for autocratic regimes because, again, this is another case where Iran is an unfortunately shining example.

The idea of a Velvet Revolution seems to have served as the immediate precipitant for the decision to rig the election in the blatant and dramatic fashion that it was. The political commander of the Revolutionary Guard, only several days before the June 12th election, was quoted as saying that what he was seeing in the supporters of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the primary Reformist candidate, was in fact the start of a soft revolution and that this was not going to stand.

If you look at the YouTube videos of the sort of developments that transpired in the final weeks of the campaign in Iran, you get the sense that this was something more than simply a normal election campaign. Thousands of people, literally stringing the street, the largest street in Tehran that runs for miles from the south of the city to the north, clasping hands in a green wave that I helped to, I think, coin the name of the
Mousavi movement. This was seen very clearly by the hardliners in Iran as some sort of not simply popular movement against the regime but an externally-organized and externally-orchestrated popular movement against the regime.

Of course, as Tom suggested, they knew all about this because this is something that they had been involved with, in many cases through their own participation in the revolution 30 years before, but it also had been a subject of some fixation for the hardliners for several years. You saw these sorts of allegations get tossed about against Iranian Americans, including Haleh Esfandiari, the leader of another think tank here in Washington, who were arrested when they visited Iran in recent years.

You saw it waged it and lobbed against members of the Iranian democracy community themselves, if they had the temerity to participate in an outside conference.

Reporters who simply were covering events outside the country were often arrested on their return and accused of being part of some larger external conspiracy.

This, again, is one of the dangers of speaking, I think, from the U.S. government perspective in too broad terms or too ambitious terms about our own role in these developments.

I think it also plays into what at least one prime historian of Iran, who is featured in this volume, Aran Debrabamian, has called a kind of conspiratorial interpretation of politics, that has a long track record really
before this regime in Iran and spans the entire political spectrum in Iran, that there's a kind of us versus them mentality. To the extent that you can accuse the them, the others -- the (Persian) in the Iranian vernacular -- of being somehow affiliated with outside interests, that makes their crime of opposition, of dissent, that much more treasonous and that much more subject to repression.

It's a powerful motif that, as I said, predates the revolution itself, predates the regime itself and is one of, I think, the important dimensions of this internal understanding that is so important to have when one thinks about policymaking toward a country.

Let me just close with a few comments on U.S. policy. Iran is, of course, prime on the American agenda, on the Obama Administration's plate and, obviously, as a result of the events that have taken place over the past few months, a much more contested issue in the political debate than it might have been otherwise.

The President campaigned on the idea of engagement, and he certainly did receive some pushback even within his own party on the idea that one could engage with an adversarial regime, but this was clearly the direction of his policy. Yet, as a result of the June elections, even some of his supporters, even some of those who had long been advocating engagement, specifically on the nuclear issue but more broadly on a wider range of differences between the U.S. and Iran, I think had some real doubts about the utility of this sort of approach, given that the regime had
so narrowed its based, given that the regime’s credibility was in such question after its own refusal to countenance even a fair election within the very strong restrictions of the Iranian electoral system.

So I think those are legitimate doubts. I think it’s also appropriate for the Obama Administration to continue to try to engage with the Iranians, and we’ve seen at least a positive start to that process in the first meeting between the two sides, involving a broader array of international parties last week in Geneva.

This is not to suggest that the democracy movement should in any way be abandoned, that the issue of human rights should come second or third on the agenda, but there is a clear and obvious relevance of Iran to U.S. policy. That is the nuclear issue. It has a certain timeline associated with it, and that has to be dealt with.

I think to suggest otherwise, to suggest that we should somehow put our policy on hold until things sorted themselves out in Iran, was unrealistic and, in particular, given the long history of the Iranian struggle for democracy, unrealistically assume that there would be some clear sorting out of the situation in Iran in a short period of time, which I suspect is rather unlikely.

So I think the idea of engagement, even with a country that has witnessed such dramatic events, that is still in the throes of what we all hope will be a sustained and long-term movement for a better, more democratic future in Iran, is still an appropriate tool. But one has to go
about it, I think, with a more sharper idea of what we are doing to support those forces that we now know exist in Iran.

There, I think it’s easier to suggest what we shouldn’t be doing than what we should be doing. What we shouldn’t be doing is replicating the Bush Administration’s approach, to simply throwing a pot of money at the idea of creating an opposition or sustaining an opposition in Iran. The announcement by the Bush Administration of $75 million, which later trickled down to about $66 million, in support for democracy in Iran was a disastrous step.

It did not, of course, create the paranoia of Iranian hardliners. That predated the announcement and will long post-date it. But it certainly played into it, and it certainly enabled the regime to use the card of outside support against all of its opposition. It facilitated a broader crackdown and entrenched and intensified the paranoia that already existed.

I think quite clearly, to the extent that we heard opposition to the idea and to the institution of the funding by almost all of the most noted voices of the Iranian opposition, both when it was first announced in 2006 and continuing up until this day, what Akbar Ganji, what Ahmed Bakli and what some of the other leading lights of the Iranian opposition suggested to us is that they don’t need money.

We have to think more creatively, and we have to think, I think, more strategically about what it is that we as a government and what it is that we as a people can offer to specific organizations and individuals in
Iran and to help create more of a facilitating environment. What Iranians have said in the past often is that they want interaction, that they want opportunities, that they want information, that they want the sort of technology that will enable them to overcome the regime’s ability to repress their ability to communicate among themselves.

I think that needs to be the kind of conversation that we’re having here: What are the tools that we can provide? What is the kind of support that we can provide? And, how can we find a way to listen to, anticipate, identify the people within the country who are, of course, the primary actors of what is, one hopes, the first stage of a new democracy movement?

I want to just close my remarks by suggesting there are a few people in this audience I can see who have direct experience and expertise in the Iranian democracy movement, and I look forward to hearing their contributions to this debate.

MR. PICCONE: Great. Thank you, Suzanne.

I’m going to pose a comment and a question and get the panelists to react, and I’m sure some of them will have thoughts about what each other said, and then open it up to a round of questions from the audience.

I’m struck, in terms of a comment, your point about short and long-term measures and how to approach that. In the case of Suzanne’s example of putting aside a pot of money to help civil society in Iran, that I would categorize as a long-term kind of approach, but it completely
backfired. I think partly it backfired because of the actor itself, whether it’s the Bush Administration or just the United States making that kind of initiative is loaded with problems.

There are other ways of doing that through, say, multilateral mechanisms. You mentioned the community of democracies as another example where you need to get other actors involved in this effort. There are lots of ways of doing that, and I’m hoping that this administration can figure that out, including through the UN Democracy Fund -- which it’s remarkable that such a fund exists under the UN, that is actually supporting nongovernmental organizations doing a range of the long-term work that’s needed around democratization.

My question, though, I want to take some pivot off of the Iran question and also think about more generally in the Middle East. One of the enduring debates we’ve had in Washington for some time is who do you support democratization in that part of the world, if at all.

As your book points out, Timothy, in your chapter, President Carter’s human rights policies may have had the unintended consequence of actually contributing to the triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini and an Islamic regime at great odds with the United States.

Do we face a similar dilemma today in not only Iran but in Egypt and Algeria and Syria, places where Islamists could come to power through democratic means, and what would that mean for our strategic alliances in that part of the world, and what would it mean for the rise in real liberal
regimes? So I’m wondering if you can reflect on that set of questions as well.

MR. GARTON ASH: Well, just briefly on that, it’s the liberal democracy problem, isn’t it, the Hamas or the Hezbollah. As we all know, liberal democracy involves a great deal more than just having an election. It’s all the other dimensions of democracy.

It is striking that almost all the examples of what I would say are clear positive revolutionary outcomes -- positive revolutionary outcomes -- not our successes, their successes, that we can find are in, broadly conceived, the cultural-historical West, including Latin America and the world of Orthodox Christianity. So the interest of the Iran case or the Burma case is precisely that it’s in a very different cultural context.

Can I take off from that to say three quick things in response?

Number one, to Tom’s question, this book is a most extraordinary, nuanced, rigorous examination of extremely different cases. We have Gandhi. We have the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. We have Kosovo. We have Northern Ireland -- all of which have only one thing in common, that the means of nonviolent action played a very significant part, often not an exclusive part, the means of nonviolent action.

So the exercise is to say: In all these cases, you have this means of nonviolent action. How did it pan out?
What we’re saying is that very often this is an extremely complex interplay of many domestic and international factors in almost every case, much more complex than is often assumed.

Therefore, if I may say so, Tom, your earlier part of your remarks, in a way illustrates a problem we have, which is that the framing is much too narrow if one frames it as international democracy assistance, which, as you rightly said, is only a very small part of the story of success or failure in every case.

I so much agree with you that what we should avoid is talking about these as our successes or our failures in our brochures. I mean it’s understandable in organizations lobbying for funds to say, we brought down the Berlin Wall and we’re beyond the Green Revolution, but they’re not.

They’re their successes and their failures, and the determinants are a much more complex set.

This goes to your long-term point and actually to what Suzanne said, if you take my nine bullet points, I think only one of them, or one and a half, is international, democratic democracy assistance. All the others are much broader things.

A global information platform and structure is not international democracy assistance in the national sense. It’s a global public good. Right?
The opening of our societies, what you talked about, the interaction, student exchanges -- this is, again, I would say, a global public good. One of its long-term desirable consequences is that it facilitates.

International election monitoring, again, I think and I think you rightly said it, precisely what we need to avoid is that this comes to be seen as a partisan western action. We wish, we should be formulating that in the most universal terms, working with non-western democracies, and the desirable long-term consequence may be a success for people in the countries concerned.

Last point, what Suzanne said, in many of these cases, the characteristic is that it takes a long time partly because nonviolent action can take longer to succeed. The motto of nonviolent action is, in a way, Samuel Beckett: Fail again. Fail better. Right?

It can take five, it can take ten years in Ukraine and Poland, but in the end you succeed and have a better outcome.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks.

Tom?

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. I appreciate those clarifications, and I agree actually with what you said, Tim, in both the spirit and the substance.

The book is highly nuanced, and the different case studies do emphasize the different results. Maybe I was confused by it when you started, when you talked about the 1789 paradigm and the 1989
paradigm, by describing the 1989 paradigm as a paradigm, Velvet
Revolution, and then saying we've seen over the last 20 years a number
of different examples. There's a tendency there to sort of create
something that's not just a description of a means but of a result, which
was a democratic revolution that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1988-89,
and to say that's become a paradigm by which we might look at other
cases, whether it's the Philippines or Kyrgyzstan.

Perhaps what you're saying is that's, in a sense, not an ideal, but
it's a certain type. And, some of these cases are quite similar to it, and
others aren't very similar to it, but we can use that as kind of lens.

But I think there's just a danger of people sometimes will use a
concept like that rather loosely. You're a rather precise thinker. Others --
Washington is not famous for its analytic precision when it comes to policy
categories -- will say, oh, we have a category here and we have to go
around the world (A) looking for these and (B) encouraging them and then
celebrating them.

I think there's been a bit of a tendency towards that and the misuse
of a category by sort of putting all of these things together which are not
really very similar.

MR. PICCONE: Suzanne, do you want to comment on a general
kind of where we are more broadly, Middle East democratization and the
choices the administration has and whether Iran is in any way going to tell
us a story about what's happening more broadly in that part of the world?
MS. MALONEY: I think what I would say is that we shouldn’t impute what has happened in Iran to other parts of the Middle East. Iran has a very distinct, unique political history. In a sense, what played out in June and what continues to be happening on the ground is very much the product of a political system that has allowed a certain degree of contestation over the years, that has developed a sense of entitlement -- and I mean that in a positive fashion -- by the population because they have had a very limited ability to influence their government over the years and because you had this history of contention that has created these breaks within the leadership.

I don’t know that that kind of an example, I don’t know that that model of history could be easily transposed to, say, Egypt which is another big problem of democracy promotion in the Middle East, or certainly to a country like Saudi Arabia which has an entirely different cultural and national identity.

So I think Iran is a unique example. I don’t expect to see these sorts of developments elsewhere, and I think this is the critical part of how we go about both looking at, analyzing. To the extent that we try to be supporting these sorts of movements in other parts of the region, we have to recognize that the appreciation, the understanding for the indigenous context is so critical because without it you’re trying to impose a template on countries that may be entirely inappropriate.
MR. PICCONE: Okay. I see lots of hands. Maybe we can get someone who also wants to comment about Iran specifically, as Suzanne invited.

Are there microphones that could come down towards the front here?

Jessica?

QUESTIONER: Jessica Matthews, the Carnegie Endowment.

This may be a subversive comment in this setting, particularly to start the discussion, but as I listened I kept thinking the bigger threats in the world today are less from authoritarianism in what is still our Cold War lens and more from governments that are repeat offenders at being unable to deliver effective governance. Certainly, Pakistan hits the list, where, as far as I can tell, we’ve had a 20-year history of making things, if anything, worse, certainly not better, and the general policy prescription is let’s do the same thing, only more.

So I wonder, Tim or the others, whether there’s anything in the look at history that you’ve taken, that helps us think about American policy in that context.

MR. PICCONE: I’m going to take just one or two more questions in this round, and then we’ll come back because I see so many hands. Right here on the left, please identify yourself.

QUESTIONER: My name is Miriam Amhar Sadagy. I’m an Iranian American who’s been active with democracy, human rights promotion for
Iran. I am part of what Suzanne Maloney has called the disaster of democracy promotion. I mean I’ve sort of built my career, especially in the last five years, on assistance that’s been given primarily from the U.S. government but also from the Dutch government, to build programs for promotion of human rights and democracy in Iran. I’m very proud of that, and I’m very thankful that those funds have existed so that I and many others have been able to do the kind of work that we’ve done.

I want to give a sampling of the kind of things that we have done and ask if there’s any contradiction or difference between what we’ve done and what Suzanne Maloney think should be done.

We have done a lot of translation of classics of democracy. We’ve done a lot of translation of things that have been written in Iran, such as press releases from human rights organizations and civic activists, translated those to English, to give those people greater coverage for what they’re doing and greater protection when they’re in prison. We’ve started things like online magazines, conducted interviews with activists on the inside, created e-learning platforms for people on the inside and have, whenever possible, supported and advocated for the continuation of this kind of funding, so that broadcasting, RadioFarda and Voice of America can also continue.

I’d like to know if the sort of dialoguing and the sort of exchange and the conferences that Suzanne Maloney talks about are any different than what’s been done with the money so far.
MR. PICCONE: Thank you.

QUESTIONER: I also wanted to say something about the Iranian Revolution and whether it was a Velvet Revolution or really more of a revolution that is more like the 1789. I think there’s no doubt about the fact that it came to pass, that Khomeini came to power not through a negotiated settlement with his opposition or with other people that were part of the opposition, but massive killing and imprisonment and rape that happened in the prisons.

So, to say that the 1979 revolution has anything to do with what people in Iran today are doing, I think is sort of misunderstanding of history. Thanks.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you.

Actually, why don’t we come back to the panel, because I think those are two big, important questions? Suzanne, do you want to handle this last one and then Tim?

MS. MALONEY: Sure. I don’t want to make this a debate about whether or not the U.S. government should be providing democracy assistance for Iran because I don’t believe that was the intention of the panel, but I’ll speak in a little bit more detail about this issue because it’s obviously a contentious one, particularly among the democracy promotion community itself.
I think the difficulty of this sort of funding is, as I said, it entrenches some of the paranoia that already exists, and, frankly, I think it overstates our capacity to influence events on the ground.

I have no criticism with Gozaar, one of the publications of Freedom House. I have no criticism of RoozOnline, which is another externally-funded news source -- both of which have been, I think, fascinating, important publications and very useful. I am not suggesting that sort of activity shouldn’t go on.

What I am suggesting is that the U.S. government involvement with it has complicated it and has made it more problematic for Iranians who live inside the country now, to be engaged with. I think that sort of involvement and that sort of complication is an unfortunate development because, as you suggest and as I know you know, there are many Iranians who are waging this battle inside the country.

To the extent that we make their lives more difficult, to the extent that we endanger them, to the extent that our dramatic pronouncements which are largely for U.S. internal political value rather than for the interest of the Iranian people, only set back their own prospects and make it harder for them to work, make it harder for them to leave the country, make it more complicated for them when they do engage in conferences or interaction with the wider world, then I think that’s very much unfortunate.
I think in particular the initiative by the Bush Administration to put this very large pot of money, to announce it in a dramatic fashion was one that wasn’t really thought through, was one that no one really thought about what the implications would be within Iran. I think it’s quite important for the sort of work that you’ve been engaged in to go on.

As Iranians, including some of those who have been put on trial in the past few months, have told me in the past, they don’t want that sort of funding from our government. They want to continue that work. They want even the involvement of outside organizations. What they don’t want is the U.S. governmental involvement. And, that is the particular history of the Iranian democracy struggle.

I’m sorry, Miriam, we can’t engage in a debate here today, and I know you probably want to. But I think that it’s important, when we talk about the idea of a Velvet Revolution, to recognize that what happened in Iran in the past few months was entirely indigenous. We had no contact with it. We didn’t see it coming. I say that both with the people I know within the U.S. government and the people I know without the U.S. government, in academia.

No one here understood it because that is the level of Iranian politics that we have no contact with, what happens behind the scenes, what happens in the day-to-day discussions among democracy activists, Reformist politicians, intellectual, businessmen and others, the people who are doing the real hard work, student leaders. The people who are
doing the real hard work of advancing a democratic outcome inside Iran are operating largely without any contact with the U.S. government or with those of us sitting here in think tanks in Washington. And, I wish them all the best, but I don’t want my government’s actions to complicate their efforts.

I think it’s important to recognize, when we talk about U.S. Government involvement in democracy promotion, this whole issue of efficacy. I’m not convinced that had we had outside election monitors, the outcome would have been any different. I think what happened in Iran was powerful, was so important because it was an indigenous authentic response that was largely led, entirely led by people within the country and people who had been organized and operating together and, presumably, are continuing to do so.

QUESTIONER: (Off mic comment.)

MS. MALONEY: I’m sorry, Miriam. We can’t engage in debate here. It’s not the right forum.

MR. PICCONE: I think we have a good agreement here on the do no harm principle. But, Tim, do you want to comment? I took Jessica’s question really about the danger of failed states.

MR. GARTON ASH: Yes, with pleasure. I mean can I just say I very much agree with what Suzanne just said?

But, of course, and it was true of 1989 -- but, of course, we should have a better analytical capacity. In other words, it’s not our government’s
business or capacity to make these things happen, but they should have some notion that they might happen. I think this is a really important lesson, to have the chemistry of politics built into our policymaking, decision-making.

To Jessica’s question, which is an excellent one, I think I’m inclined to answer not really. I don’t think this species of nonviolent action that we’re talking about has a great deal to say to the cases you’re talking about, failed states or ineffective governments, except in the sense that a sort of negotiated transition with nonviolent action can be an alternative to war, a civil war -- so, if we think that one danger for Pakistan is actually descent into armed conflict.

But, actually it doesn’t necessarily, of itself, promote the desirable good of effective governance. Indeed, it can be a problem because you have these awkward compromises. I mean look at Ukraine, for example. We could hardly say that the way the Orange Revolution came out in Ukraine promoted effective government, quite the reverse, which is why I say again that particularly in these cases the follow-up on matters like, particularly, rule of law and governance is doubly important because they don’t secure themselves.

MR. CAROTHERS: If I could just comment on your question, Jessica -- she’s my boss, but she’s a very tolerant boss. So I can say what I want.
Going a bit farther than Tim in the sense you’re really asking is democracy all that relevant, given that many other problems occur from bad governance and democracy doesn’t always produce it, two things:

One, if you’re a citizen in Zimbabwe, your life is really being ruined by a dictatorial regime. Or, if you’re a citizen of North Korea, a very unfortunate thing to be, your life is being ruined by an autocratic, authoritarian regime. Maybe your problems aren’t global problems and yours aren’t U.S. security problems, but, in human terms, a lack of democracy is causing a lot of suffering in a lot of places.

Now, it’s maybe not a Vietnam where the government is being fairly responsive to people’s needs, and there are a few examples of authoritarian governments that do okay, but a lot of non-democracies cause a lot of suffering.

It’s interesting in that regard to look at today in the New York Times there’s a little story about a spat between Richard Rothenberg at Harvard and somebody else about Africa Index List. Remarkably, it’s a good story, or maybe it’s the Post. I can’t remember.

But it says, here are the top 10 best governed countries in Africa and here are the lowest 10 governed countries in Africa. If you look at the 10 top and the 10 lowest, not coincidentally I think, most of the top 10 are the more democratic states in Africa and the bottom 10 are the dictatorial disaster states.
It's an iron law of politics that more democratic countries end up being governed better over time, but it's striking when you look at Africa in that regard.

Or, at Pakistan, you say our problem is a poorly functioning state. Well, maybe if Pakistan had had a more responsive and democratic state over the last 30 years and not allowed the military to burrow in and do the kinds of things it's done, in its opaque and undemocratic fashion with respect to the rest of the society, we wouldn't be where we are with Pakistan today.

So democracy today in Pakistan isn't really solving the problem, or the last year of democracy in Pakistan, but maybe it's Pakistan's troubled political development over the last 30 years that has led to some of the problem we're facing with Pakistan today.

MR. PICCONE: Let me take a couple more questions. The gentleman in the blue shirt in the back, would you identify yourself?

QUESTIONER: Yes, Nicholas Schmidle from the New America Foundation.

My question is a little bit about the international context and in cases where the support is not coming from institutions that are either directly aligned with governments or semi-indirectly.

I was wondering if you could comment on the case of CANVAS, the organization led by the Serbians who were involved in the toppling of Milošević, that sort of pride themselves on being involved in Rose, Cedar,
Orange and in the case of Maldives, and what the role of unaffiliated groups that are transferring knowledge of their nonviolent tactics to other protestors in other parts of the world, and whether it comes with the same obstacles and hindrances of government involvement or whether it’s something to be admired and replicated.

MR. PICCONE: Okay, this gentleman in the aisle, with the glasses, yes.

QUESTIONER: Jim McDonald with Bread for the World.

The question I have is actually there have been some passing references, but it seems like the elephant in the room, especially if you’re talking about the nonviolent aspect of a Velvet Revolution, and that is the role, the political role of the military. It seems to me that’s a huge factor in terms of outcomes and what happens in the negotiations and what happens if there’s repression or not repression, the extent to which there’s a crackdown.

So, within the military, there are factions, and they play a role in these revolutions. I didn’t hear anything about that, so I’d love to hear more.

MR. PICCONE: let’s see if we can take one more short question, and then we’ll come back for just a wrap-up set because we are running a little behind, and it will take five minutes to do that. This gentleman right here.
QUESTIONER: In the interest of keeping it short, let me expand on that last question.

MR. PICCONE: Please identify yourself.

QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. I'm David Wagner.

Let me expand on that last question and take it beyond the military to the whole government. We haven’t discussed what happens to the government that’s supposed to negotiate with the mass opposition. They’re illegitimate, to be sure, but do they also need to be demoralized? Could you address the issue of what the opponent has to be? Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: I’m sorry, what?

QUESTIONER: The opponent, the government in power.

MR. PICCONE: Tim, do you want to start?

MR. GARTON ASH: Yes, absolutely.

Well, to that third question, which is an excellent one, the answer is, of course, read the book because it’s a very important part of the story. It takes two to tangle. If you’re going to have a negotiated revolution, you need someone on the other side of the roundtable. You need your Gorbachev. You need your Yetaselski. You need, actually, your Chilean figures. You need your De Klerk.

The German writer, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, has a wonderful phrase for such figures. He calls them the heroes of retreat -- the heroes of retreat. And, you need your heroes of retreat, and they have to know
that they're not going to end up hanging from a lamppost, as do the military. Of course, we go into this in great detail in case.

There's one, a very interesting case by the way, which is Portugal, the Revolution of the Carnations which in some sense, if you want to use this term, in some respects you could say was the first Velvet Revolution. It's at the beginning of Sam Huntington's *Third Wave Democratization*. Here, of course, the active agent of change was the military. So that's also very important.

Two, your question about CANVAS, my view is absolutely to be admired and replicated. I think it made an important contribution. I've seen it myself, for example, in Ukraine, in the Orange Revolution. It's a small part of the story.

It's a resource that is available for activists on the ground but definitely not to be supported to taken over by governments. I think that kind of thing has to be done out of our civil society in a relationship with their civil society. As Tom rightly said, the problem we have with what in England we called QNGOs, quasi-nongovernmental organizations, is a real one. I think we have to get this stuff as far removed as possible from our own governments.

That goes -- this is a final comment, wrapping up -- to the sort of too easy branding of these events, which I think has become a problem. You get a few tens of thousands of people on the streets somewhere, and
immediately the Something Revolution label, the Cedar, the Tulip, the White, the Purple -- you name it -- is slapped on this.

In particular, is slapped on -- for example, the Cedar Revolution, I believe I am right in saying that the label was actually first used by a senior official in the State Department. That is precisely what should not happen. These things should be authentic. They should come out of the countries concerned. We should be cautious in our labeling of them.

Nonetheless, I come back to my initial proposition. I think if you look at the last 20 years it is remarkable how many examples of, broadly speaking, nonviolent revolution we have had as against how relatively few of old-style Jacobite-Bolshevik Revolution. It is, as Jean Enly may or may not have said when asked about the French Revolution, far too soon to say.

But I don't think it's impossible that there is something like an emerging default setting for oppositions in different countries which is first to try nonviolent revolution rather than immediately reaching for the gun.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks.

Suzanne, the role of the military in Iran?

MS. MALONEY: Well, there, you see one of many but one of the crucial differences between the way that the popular opposition to the Shah played out and its success and what's happened over the past few months. The regime's ability and capacity to use violence to keep itself in power has facilitated what has, thus far, been a successful crackdown on
the opposition. The fact that the Shah’s command and control of his own military was in such doubt and that his senior commanders didn’t have a tremendous amount of loyalty to him and that many of those on the street were unwilling to fire on protestors helped to facilitate this escalatory effect that you saw over the period of 1978, 1979.

We don’t know the end of the story, obviously, in the Green Movement or the Green Wave. So I don’t want to say that the military dimension has been critical to the wholesale repression, but I think at least in the way that it has undercut some of the momentum of what began in June -- the fact that the regime can still rely upon its military, that there is almost an eagerness, at least on some specific institutions within the military, to use force to crack down on a popular opposition -- is one of the crucial dimensions to its ability to retain power.

MR. PICCONE: Tom, do you have any final comments?

MR. CAROTHERS: No.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Well, we’ve run out of time. I’m sorry, we can’t take more questions. But thank you all for coming and join me in thanking the panelists.

(Applause.)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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