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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Hi, everyone. Thank you for being here. Welcome to Brookings and to the launch about the Pakistan Index Project, which is now available on the web, as well as the general discussion of the Pakistan Indices and the debates about metrics in these two important ongoing parts of the world and the broader policy questions that surround the metrics debate.

I'm Michael Hanlon and will be moderating today, and I've had the good fortune of being involved in all three of our Index projects starting with Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan.

But Jeremy Shapiro is the lead senior scholar on the Afghanistan Index, and he will speak later.

Jason Campbell has been a crucial part of all three of the indices and has spent much of the last few months essentially building the Pakistan Index, and we're very grateful that we're to have him part of the panel.

And then rounding things out will be two of not only our best Pakistan lines but the nation's best Pakistan experts, Bruce Riedel and Steve Cohen.

And so how we'll proceed is that I will say a few more words here about how we think about these metric projects in general terms, and then we'll turn things over to Jason, who again understands the Pakistan

Index very well, having created it, and then Bruce and Steve will speak about Pakistan more generally, and they're free to talk about metrics within the Pakistan debate or not as they see fit. I'm sure you'll all bring them back to metrics in the discussion if they don't spend a lot of time on it in presentations. But we're not trying to confine the conversation today to only the metrics issue. We do, however, want to begin from that.

And then Jeremy Shapiro will speak about Afghanistan, and again the metrics debate there being so hot and so topical we didn't feel it made any sense to talk about quantitative indicators of progress in major stabilization efforts these days without involving Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Index as well.

Let me also say by way of general introduction that we remain deeply indebted to our friends in Norway for a great deal of support for the Afghanistan Index, and we are very grateful to a friend, Malla Gunkar, for helping us create the Pakistan Index; and we also are involving a broader group of people in both of these projects but especially now the Pakistan Index than just Brookings individuals. We alone are responsible and accountable and of course to be blamed for mistakes, but we have a number of Pakistani friends who already aware of this project and will be providing us with further ideas, inside sources, and critiques for sure and we hope in the coming days. So, to the extent that people see this as, you know, an effort to assess progress and the grades will not

always be glowing, that's not in the spirit of academic discourse and trying to provide information on important policy debates rather than as any attempt by Brookings to act like the next government accountability office in critiquing the aid program towards Pakistan or Pakistan itself. This is more about information. And we're actually trying to create a bit of a bilateral but informal working process with a number of Pakistani colleagues in the ensuing weeks and months. Yet it's blame us if you see things you don't like, but please be aware that we will continue to be reaching out and hope very much to have that spirit of inclusivity.

Let me say a couple of words now about methodology and about what these databases are all about, and maybe one way to do it -- and I do apologize for taking a little time here in the introduction. I think it's important to give you a little spirit of what we're trying to do with these projects. We recognize that metrics are often used and abused in policy debates, and certainly anyone who remembers the lessons of Vietnam where we had metrics like body counts and the so-called crossover rate, we thought if we killed enough Vietcong regardless of sort of almost how well we did it or how many people might also be caught in the crosshairs in the process, that ultimately the Vietcong would not be able to recruit enough followers to sustain themselves. That would be a pathway towards victory. It was an incorrect assumption. It was a bad metric, and it was certainly bad to think of that as the predominant metric, and I would

argue it led us to tactics that were actually counterproductive in the war. So, metrics can be abused, and we're fully aware of that in constructing these indices today, which is one of the reasons why we try to have a fairly broad range of indicators so that we don't overly narrow down or claim more precision in the process than is possible. We leave it to you, the users of the indices, and sometimes to ourselves if we put on a different hat and become analysts to have a debate about which metrics are most important, most indicative, but we do not try to be overly narrow with a short list of quantitative indicators ourselves, because we're aware of the lessons of history that suggest that one needs to avoid that.

There are a few other points of sort of warning -- you know, users guides for how not to make mistakes in using these indices that I'm sure will come up in the conversations today.

Let me also just mention more now and then turn to our panelists, and that is that there is a temptation to measure what's easily measurable and talk about what's easily quantifiable, and we have to be careful about thinking we've figured out which metrics really are the most important or indicative or telling of the progress of a war or a stabilization mission just because they are things that we can somehow associate with a nice reference or a nice source of data, and again we're very attentive to that. Jason and I have been working very hard on the Pakistan Index, Jason and Jeremy on the Afghanistan Index, to try to again broaden the

horizon and look for information where it may not always be easy to find or totally reliable or totally precise but nonetheless where it's important not to fool ourselves that we have the right answer just because we have the right give indicators that can somehow be well documented.

As an example as I wrap up here, in Iraq for a long time we thought that the more Iraqi soldiers we trained the better off we'd be. Turns out Steve Biddle was right, other scholars were right who warned that in fact we were not doing a very good job training the Iraqi security forces and we were effectively preparing none for a civil war, which they later held in a way that involved some of the very people in the security forces that we had helped train, because we couldn't easily measure political reliability and the purging of militia influence in many of these groups. And so trying to track what was easy to track -- number of people put through basic training, number of rifles conveyed to people in units in the field -- was not actually the best way to understand the progress. We're aware of this. We hope your questions and your comments will continue to explore some of these kinds of issues; and the Pakistan Index, like others here, will be a work in progress where your input is appreciated and where we are aware of the need to keep improving things.

So, with that long lined up -- and I appreciate your patience, but there were some important methodological points that I needed to get off my chest -- we will turn things over to Jason. And I will say in the

Pakistan Index, there are security indicators, economic indicators, and politics/governance/public opinion indicators. So, those three bins of data, just like we've had with the other two projects here, and there are some very interesting and sometimes counterintuitive trends that emerge. I'll let him talk about what some of those may be, and we can also, then, go back to that in discussion.

So, without further ado, after a lot of ado, let me now ask Jason to please go ahead and tell us about this project. And again, thank you, Jason, for your effort, and congratulations on what you put together.

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, thank you, Mike, and thank you all for being here this afternoon.

I think to begin it's worthwhile to briefly mention a few important ways in which this particular index project is unique from what we've done thus far with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan. I think the most important distinction is that unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan is not currently battling an insurgency while simultaneously trying to rebuild a national bureaucracy. So, comparatively speaking, Pakistan has a greater institutional capacity to the broad range of issues that can help foster greater stability. So, I think again in comparison with what we've done with Iraq and Afghanistan as Mike alluded to in his opening statements, we are going to be going forward, working with Pakistani officials and

scholars in trying to shape and mold this into a project that they can hopefully be able to optimize the utility with.

Another important distinction is that there is a much more minimal American presence in Pakistan, obviously, and due to that the reporting of key metrics that we rely on in Afghanistan and Iraq that come from places like the Department of Defense or the State Department simply aren't there from the same sources, so we've had to rely more on the Pakistani government statistics, reports put out by their much more robust NGO community, some of their media reports. So, there's a sort of unique angle with regard to where we're getting this data, and it's worth mentioning that everything we do use is cited in end notes in the back. So, you'll see that just glancing over it a lot more of the data we use is coming from non-American sources.

So, finally, looking at some of the broad takeaways, as Mike said, with regard to security, economic, and political issues -- you know, I think the utility of this project is that you can see in, you know, a number of fairly comprehensive pages that there is no coincidence that there's a strong correlation between insecurity and a lack of economic opportunity or development, particularly when you're able to drill down to a regional or provincial level, which we are able to do in most cases here, which is, from our experience, always the best way to do it when you can drill down at least to the provincial level. And I think it goes without saying that in the

areas where you see the least security, you know, again, keeping at the provincial level, the North West Frontier Province -- FATA, Baluchistan -- it's no coincidence that these areas by and large have the lowest literacy rates, the lowest employment rates, and a poor access as to health care, poor availability of potable water and sewage, poor freedom of movement. And, you know, intuitively it makes sense, but it's also helpful when you can show it quantitatively; and hopefully over time we'll be able to show that in improvement or a decrease in some of these non-direct issues, that that all contributes to stability -- we'll be able to see some sort of an effect on regional insecurity.

One thing I would like to highlight, too, is that the Pakistani government has shown recently I think an increased recognition that sustainable stability is going to require a more broad approach that goes beyond some of the more typical security measures. One in particular thing -- over the last couple of years they've been able to form more forward-looking and far-reaching provincial development plans with dedicated budgets that go out 7 to 10 years with a much more greater focus on a lot of quality-of-life issues, like education, like employment, and a host of others, and we're able to highlight that a little bit in the Index, particularly with regard to FATA, which is an area that has been I think most neglected over the years.

Another area where a more broad national level they've started to look at more is spending on education. Much of the past decade, they've devoted only around 2 percent or so of GDP per year to education spending, which is about half of what UNESCO recommends for countries to spend about 4 percent. Just a couple of weeks ago, the Pakistani cabinet signed off on a very ambitious plan to increase government spending on education to 7 percent by the year 2015, so you are seeing signs of improved recognition that a lot of the non-direct security issues need to be addressed to foster greater stability.

If I could just say a word, too, on the last component Mike mentioned on, and that's public opinion polling, which we find is very important in these studies. You know, it allows us to transpose some of the hard data we look at onto how it's affecting public perception, and ultimately counterinsurgency is not going to be successful unless you're addressing the issues of the public.

So, just real quickly here. Broadly speaking, while public perception cannot be considered at this point good, there are signs that it's less bad than it's been in past years. More respondents in a poll this past spring -- about 40 percent said that they feel safer now than they did a year ago. Back in the fall, only about 20 percent of the people said they felt safer. We're also seeing a slight uptake in those who feel that they're

better off economically than they were a year ago, although that's still fairly modest.

One very important data point with regard to the polling, there's been a dramatic shift in support for the presence of the Pakistani Taliban or al Qaeda in just recent months. From the fall of 2007 to this past spring, the number of respondents who classified the activities of local Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda as a critical threat to Pakistan has more than doubled (inaudible) just over 80 percent. Support for the suicide bombings and other acts of violence against civilians in order to fight the enemies of Islam -- 90 percent in a recent poll said that that is never justified. Only back in 2005, only about 42 percent said such acts of violence on the public is never justified. So, you're seeing the public collectively move against its support for the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Nevertheless, this has not corresponded to a greater support for the U.S. government. Pakistan has been one country that has remained effectively Obama-proof here in the last year, as the most recent poll shows that about 60 percent of Pakistanis have a very unfavorable opinion of the U.S. government whereas just last fall it was only about 40 percent. So, we're seeing an increased tension in public opinion of the U.S.

Just in closing here, a couple of quick sort of observations here. I think given this lack of support for the U.S., it's imperative that the

U.S. remains cognizant of the sensitivities concerning outside intervention and continue to provide assistance in ways that minimize political blowback to those who we're trying to help.

And as far as the Pakistani government goes with regard to our efforts here, one important thing they started to do in the last few years is to separate FATA as a separate entity with unique issues that need to be addressed, which is certainly an important step forward and traditionally hasn't been the case. You look at historical data and FATA is usually lumped in with the NWFP -- the North West Frontier Province -- as one single entity when it comes to a host of government statistics over time, and I think it's important to be able to discern some of the issues that make FATA unique and be able to judge the improvement. And one important, which just a couple of years ago -- the Pakistani government issued a very broad-reaching FATA development plan that goes over 10 years and not only is it important that it establishes the goals for that region, but it also presents a baseline from which to judge that progress. So, it was only back in again 2006 where we really had good data to begin a baseline from which to judge progress. You go prior to that and it's very tough to disaggregate that from the NWFP. So, I would certainly encourage that to continue.

MR. O'HANLON: Before we go to Bruce, Jason, just a couple of clarifying questions, and thank you for a very good presentation.

It lays out the basic approach of the Indices and, you know, the different parts of the country you're looking at.

Do you see any change in trends in security environment? You mentioned public opinion polling and people being a little less fatalistic about their security environment even though they still say it's pretty bad. But do you see any actual data that signifies whether the situation on the ground is better or worse?

And then, secondly, do you see any data yet that allows you to assess whether any improvement is going on in the northwest areas in terms of the building -- we call it the building phase in the counterinsurgency literature, the idea of improved access to health care, education, you know, these sorts of things; or is it just too early yet to know?

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, with regard to your first question, I think one interesting indicator here to watch is displacement. One thing that -- a policy that the Pakistani army has adopted here in going into the places of the North West Frontier Province, like Swat, is that they're going in and informing the public to leave the area and, you know, something that they haven't traditionally done from what I've been able to see. So, that's an indicator of where, you know, you're about to see a certain level of instability. We're seeing it now in South Waziristan to a certain extent, in which we have seen a much greater displacement recently. But it's so

fluid. I mean, you get daily updates now on the number of families being either newly displaced or repatriated back into their district. So, I found that to be, again, a bit muddled and different hook to follow, given that it's a day-by-day basis. But it has, again in my limited research, been a decent indicator of the situation on the ground when you look at a district-by-district level.

With regard to some of the building efforts of the Pakistani military, it's early to say now, although I have seen in reports in recent weeks some causes for concern. Particularly in the Swat valley, there have been a lot of reports of some extrajudicial killings being carried out by some of the Pakistani security forces of suspected Taliban insurgents or sympathizers, and, again, it's largely anecdotal at this point, but there have been numerous reports of families of these people claiming that they have to do with the Taliban, and I think that's certainly something that could help to limit some of the security successes they've had there. So that's -- it's -=- that's the one data point I have, but it's unfortunately one in more favor of being concerned rather than having another good story to tell.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

As you all know, Bruce Riedel has spent much of his career in the intelligence world looking at South Asia at large and wrote a book that was published last year by Brookings, *The Search for al Qaeda*; is

writing currently on Pakistan; and chaired the President's Task Force on Afghanistan/Pakistan Policy earlier this year. So, we are thrilled to have him here as well.

Bruce, over to you.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you, Mike. Thanks for the very nice introduction.

I'd like to pick up where Jason has left off here and do a kind of progress report, status report, on Pakistan's war against terrorism.

How well is Pakistan doing? Not surprisingly, the bottom line is a mixed picture. You wouldn't expect it to be either all positive or all negative. But I think one thing that is significant to note here is that we're seeing some evidence of some significant progress. Compared to a year ago, two years ago, there are more positive indicators than we would have sensed before.

Now, it's very dangerous in this environment to claim victory or it's suggested somehow we've turned a significant corner. I would suggest that much of the progress we've seen is very tenuous at best, could easily be reversed, but nonetheless it's important to look at.

First, just to put the facts into perspective, how big a problem do we have? The National Counterterrorism Center, which is the official U.S. repository of counting terrorism, and which has a fairly rigorous methodology for doing so, reported that in 2007 there were 890 incidents

of terror in Pakistan. In 2008 it rose to 1,839. Now, one can quibble over the 39, the 40, and stuff like that, but the general trend, I think, is very easy to see, and anyone who watches the news or even pays a little bit of attention to Pakistan can see that this problem is growing and becoming worse everyday. We don't have numbers for 2009, but I think it's safe to say that the pace of incidents is even faster in 2009 than it was in 2008.

If you look at where those incidents occurred, what's also striking is the geographical disbursement. Yes, 60 percent of them take place in the North West Frontier Province in the federally administered tribal areas, but a good 40 percent of them take place outside of there and a significant number of them now taking place in the Punjab, the heartland of Pakistan.

Now, these levels are unprecedented. We've not seen this kind of violence in Pakistan before. We have seen it localized in parts of Pakistan before. Certainly, Karachi earned its nickname back in the 1980s and 1990s as the terrorist capitol of the world. But we haven't seen it spread across the country like we have here.

So, what's the positive news? Well, Jason's also referred to it. The army's offensive in the Swat Valley. There were many naysayers about this offensive when it began, many who said that the internally displaced persons would never go back to their homes, that the Taliban wouldn't be routed out, that this was all going to be theater and not much

reality. And there are disturbing parts to what's going on in the Swat Valley. There's no question that there seems to be some extrajudicial killing, there seems to be a lack of accountability in some of these operations.

But putting all that aside, I think it's unquestionable that we've seen here the first major military operation by the Pakistani government in almost a decade against a serious terrorist insurgent force. And we've seen significant casualties in this operation. The Pakistani army has put out a bewildering variety of statistics about exactly how many casualties took place, but one of them is quite revealing that came out over the last several days, which indicates somewhere around 5,000 dead Pakistani soldiers and 10,000 wounded over the course of the last couple of years, the vast majority of them being in the Swat operation. The Pakistani military would help itself -- and I would argue it would help the Pakistan Index immeasurably -- if it would be more precise about these kinds of numbers.

Now, of course, this operation was also greatly facilitated by an operation carried out by the United States government, the CIA drone attack that killed Baitullah Mehsud. It was a U.S. operation but done in close coordination with Pakistan. More importantly, the Pakistani intelligence services were very quick to follow up on the drone attach and divide and seek to create confusion and dissention within the Pakistan

Taliban in the weeks afterward. They used classic tactics of counterterrorism of trying to pit one group another, and they had a fair amount of success. If you don't believe it, look at the eulogy that Ayman Al-Zawahiri put out last week about the Baitullah Mehsud. He drones on for the better part of an hour talking about what a great loss it is to have this man martyred. If South Waziristan is indeed next, that would be a significant move. For my part, I'll wait and see before I believe it.

Combined with these operations of course have been the CIA drone attacks against the al Qaeda presence in Pakistan over the last nine months. Here, again, the data is hard to get your hands on. And even those people inside the intelligence community who know more about it than anyone else will tell you they're never really sure just how effective a drone operation is. But overall, I think it is safe to say that more pressure is being put on al Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan today than any time since 2003 and 2004.

Again, look at the complaints that you're hearing from al Qaeda. Ayman Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden have both been quite public this year in saying that they're under pressure and that they're under pressure from these attacks as well as from the Pakistani army. Nonetheless, no one should have any illusions that al Qaeda doesn't remain deadly and still alive. The court case involving the Afghan-American in Denver should be a wakeup call to all of us that al Qaeda is

still looking for operatives who will carry out operations in the United States.

The Pakistani army's actions in Swat -- and hopefully its forthcoming in Waziristan -- benefit from significant popular support. Jason's already alluded to this. The polling data in Pakistan this year is really quite interesting. Now, polling data in any country has to be taken with a grain of salt. Polling data in a country where large parts of the population are illiterate should be taken with an even bigger grain of salt. But we now have a significant number of polls, all of which basically show the same thing -- a very significant low back against the Taliban and al Qaeda and extremist tactics and Jihadist tactics in Pakistan.

There is new International Republican Institute poll that was released just this weekend. I don't think it's on our Index. Yeah, it will need to get up there soon. It shows that 90 percent of Pakistanis agree that these extremists threaten the survival of the Pakistani state. 69 percent supported the Pakistani army offensive in the Swat Valley. 86 percent agree that al Qaeda and the Taliban in particular are a threat to their interests and to their security. The data, though, as Jason also alluded to, also suggests very strong opposition to U.S. policies. Ask should Pakistan cooperate with the United States, 80 percent say no. Only 18 percent say yes. That's up from 61 percent say no in March of

2009. One has to draw the conclusion that the drawn operations also have their negative downside in terms of Pakistani public opinion.

If that's the positive side of the lecture, what's on the negative side? I think we have to point in particular to two problems. One is the problem of the Afghan Taliban. While the Pakistani army has been willing to take on the Pakistan Taliban, it has yet to make it clear where it stands on the Afghan Taliban. Mullah Omar may or may not be in Quetta; he may or may not be in Baluchistan. But what's clear is he's still operating -- rather openly and rather effectively. His henchmen are (inaudible) same thing. Whether they're on the Pakistani side of the border or the Afghan side of the border, they seem to move back and forth and they seem to move back and forth largely with impunity.

Mullah Omar, interestingly, is very, very clear not to associate himself with the Pakistani Taliban and not to criticize the government of Pakistan for its operations. In his annual Eid message this year -- and that's basically his state of the union message; it's also usually one of two or three messages he gives in the whole year, so the Eid message is basically the message you're going to get from Mullah Omar -- he went on at great length to promise that when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is back in power in Kabul, it will respect the sovereignty and territorial independence of its neighbors. He didn't say Pakistan in particular, but he seemed to be trying to go out of his way to make sure he

didn't irritate anyone on the Pakistani side of the border. Of course, General McChrystal's report is much more clear-cut on this and quite explicit in saying that if Afghanistan Taliban continues to operate out of Quetta and takes a step further that it enjoys at least the passive if not the active support of some elements of the Pakistani establishment.

The second area where there's still a lot to be done, in fact almost nothing has been done, deals with Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible last year for the attack on Mumbai. A handful of Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives may go on trial, but every time they're actually supposed to meet in trial, the judge postpones it again, and so we don't know if there ever will be a real trial. But that's really missing the whole point. There has been no systematic crackdown on Lashkar-e-Taiba and its fellow associates, like Jaish-e-Muhammad and their terrorist infrastructure since last November.

The *New York Times* had a very good piece on this just a week ago. Indeed, Lashkar-e-Taiba's development side, Chimatah Dowah , was one of the major operatives working with IDPs in the Swat Valley. So, in effect, the Pakistani state with one hand was swiping some jihadists with the other hand was encouraging another group of jihadists.

The leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba remains free, remains quite vocal, quite active according to well-reported press stories. Recruitment for Lashkar-e-Taiba is booming, and fundraising is doing very

well. Why? Mumbai. People tend to join terrorist organizations which look like they're successful. Why not some more serious crackdown? I think it can be summed up in one word. It's a family affair. Lashkar-e-Taiba, unlike the Pakistan Taliban, is a Punjabi group that recruits from the same basic families as the Pakistani Army recruits them to. Breaking down a Lashkar-e-Taiba would be far more difficult for any government in Pakistan, and so far we haven't seen it.

The bottom line? Another mass casualty attack along the scale of Mumbai could come at any time. The capability is there. The rule is there. And I would suggest to you another mass casualty attack along the lines of Mumbai could quickly be a game changer for the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Last point before I conclude. What's the U.S. role in all of this? Well, I would suggest to you the U.S. role is important but largely incidental. U.S. encouragement, U.S. pressure, U.S. handling, U.S. jawboning probably encouraged the Pakistani establishment and Pakistani army to do what it's done in Swat. It certainly has been useful in encouraging intelligence exchanges against al Qaeda, but at the end of the day the government of Pakistan did these things because it's in Pakistan's national interest, and in particular in the survival instincts of the Zardari government and its current relationship with the Pakistani army.

The focus here has been on threats to the government of Pakistan, not on the threats to U.S. or NATO interests in the region or the larger threat posed by Lashkar-e-Taiba in its posture toward India.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you very much, Bruce. A little more cheerful than we sometimes heard you speak about Pakistan, but no one's jumping with joy yet either.

And my guess, Steve -- you've written such great stuff on Pakistan over the years.

Anybody who hasn't yet read Steve's Brookings book on Pakistan, in addition to having perhaps the best cover in the history of Brookings plus has a fantastic set of contents, it is a history but also explanation of what drives Pakistan culturally, historically, militarily, and otherwise. Steve's been sounding the warning calls about some of the needs to pay attention to this relationship for a long time. He's been, I know, very concerned about recent developments. I'm wondering if you're feeling a little better or at least giving a mixed verdict or if you're still fundamentally quite concerned, Steve, about how you see the country going.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Mike. Let me congratulate you and Jason for the Index.

Can you hear me?

And I think I can summarize my views building on what you said.

A little bit louder? Yeah, okay.

I think I could summarize my views. I used to be short-term pessimistic and long-term pessimistic about Pakistan. Now I'm short-term optimistic and long-term pessimistic about Pakistan. I think that -- and that's the subject of my research project. I think that Pakistan is crippled by a series of bad decisions, not only those made in Pakistan but by decisions made in the United States and other countries in that it suffers from a really, really decayed, broken-down educational system; its economy is dysfunctional; sectarian violence that is within Islamic groups continues unabated; Islamist terrorism of various kinds is growing; and there's regional separatism on the march. That's all bad news. And whether those factors will bring Pakistan down in the future I don't know, but one of my next research projects is to try and answer that question the best we can.

The problem with polls and with data and with metrics is doesn't offer the answers to these kinds of questions, but it does tell you where you've been sort of like a rear-view mirror.

When I was a professor a thousand years ago, I used to tell our graduate students that the trouble with quantitative data is that it's like the drunk who loses his keys -- he only looks where the lamp posts are

shining light. That's because that's where the data is. So, if you only look where poll the data is in the other quantitative data, you may not find answers to your question.

To me, the most difficult questions -- answers to the most difficult questions aren't obtained by metrics, and I think the administration -- it was really the Kerry-Lugar Bill that (inaudible) was wrong in ordering the government to come with metrics. You know, if the Congress orders the administration to develop metrics, the administration will provide thousands and thousands of metrics, more than anybody would, and I haven't seen one list, and really there were more objectives than metrics. I'm very skeptical of the idea of using quantitative data to measure -- either to measure progress or whether we've the right data to indicate what's happening in a country such as Pakistan.

To me the most difficult issue is tapping into the attitudes and the beliefs of Pakistanian leaders themselves. And I've been told -- every time I speak on Pakistan, which as been quite frequent that isn't -- Professor Cohen, isn't it true that the Pakistani officer corps is more radical? And the answer is no, there is no data to prove that one way or the other. There's no evidence of any sort. What is happening, we're pretty sure, is that as Pakistan becomes more conservative, the officer corps becomes more conservative. But that doesn't mean that the officers who rise to the top are necessarily more conservative.

So, the widespread assumption here and in a lot of other countries the army and -- the officer corps is more conservative. Probably not true; at best, it's unprovable. And that's true, I think, of attitudes of Pakistani's youth. Nobody's ever examined the subject, yet the assumption is that the madrassas are churning out thousands and thousands of radical Pakistani kids who then go out to become suicide bombers. Some data, some studies show in fact that suicide bombers do not come from madrassas; they come from other directions. So, I think that there are more difficult questions out there than I think the data can provide answers to.

Having come up with a metric like this or a series of data is useful in that it tells you what you don't know. It may tell a little bit about whether Pakistanis feel more secure or not. But most of the polling has not broken down Pakistan by province or by educational background. In other words, it's practically useless. I've been involved in some of the polling -- studied some of the polls. And if you don't break if down by province or by educational or social background, it's virtually useless. In fact, I've done polling myself when I was a graduate student -- I hate to confess this -- and we simply made up most of the data. That's why when you drive around Chicago the freeways don't go where you want them to go. I can tell you why.

So, I think that this approach has its merits, often in terms of crude data showing you what might or might not be happening, but they have their risk, and I think if governments, as we did during Vietnam, take it too seriously and don't have people on the ground with regional expertise and liable to lead you astray.

One final point, really, is that they don't -- the polls don't tell you, or these metrics don't tell you whether Afghanistan is more important than Pakistan or Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan or whether they're the same -- of the same (inaudible). And they don't tell you whether Pakistan's future is going to be shaped by India, by the United States, by other countries. In other words, these are tough policy choices where the metrics play virtually no role in guiding.

Let me stop at that point.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, thank you, Steve, and you set up Jeremy very nicely by mentioning the word "Afghanistan" a few times.

And let me say by way of introduction for my good friend and colleague, Jeremy Shapiro, that he has increasingly become one of the country's experts on Afghanistan. He was part of General McChrystal's strategic assessment team this summer. He's been to the country I think four or five times at this point, studied it from the point of view of NATO, which is sort of his traditional portfolio, but also as a military analyst and as a student of counterinsurgency.

I've been lucky enough, along with Jason, to write some studies with him on how we use this kind of information in these kinds of wars to assess progress, and so I look forward very much, now that he's got a year of the Afghanistan Index under his belt as well, to hearing his thoughts about Afghanistan looks at the moment when metrics are being elevated even more prominently, because as you know the administration has recently been delivering metrics to the Congress to help figure out how we assess progress there, and they've taken at least one of our ideas to heart, and they've dumped something like 46 metrics on the Congress, so figure you drown them in enough data they won't be able to sense of it. That's one cynical interpretation of what they've done. The other interpretation is they're avoiding an excess of precision in claiming they know which three or four things really tell the direction of the world.

Maybe Jeremy can answer which of these two interpretations is more accurate.

In any event, I look forward, as do everyone else here, to your comments.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Mike. I'm not going to touch that one.

And I want to -- it's nice to follow up Steve and Bruce. It's a rare opportunity for me to sound uplifting. And I think what I wanted to do instead of sort of focusing on the overall picture in Afghanistan is to use it

and use what we've learned over the last year or so as a little bit of a case study in the utility and limits of metrics, sort of expanding on Steve's point about why you shouldn't listen to us too much.

I think the big sort of metrics story clearly, when you look at the papers these days in Afghanistan, is the U.S. and coalition military casualties. This was highlighted of course last week by the deaths of eight soldiers in one incident, and it's obviously a very important indicator of progress, particularly of course because of its effects on the home fronts in the U.S. and Europe, and the increases in military casualties are very large.

There were 360 coalition casualties through September of this year, which is roughly a 50 percent increase in the same period last year, and it's more than the 294 that were up for all of last year. But part of what we try to do in the Index is to assess the strategy on its own terms, to try to figure out what the strategy is actually trying to accomplish and measure that. And if we look at the McChrystal report, which helpfully I helped write so (inaudible), it says that military casualties will go up in the short term as more troops come in to Afghanistan and as they implement the strategy of protecting the population. What McChrystal did to realize this was to introduce new tactics to reduce civilian casualties caused by what they term pro-government forces, which is essentially the coalition and Afghan army forces, especially to reduce civilian casualties caused by

air strikes. In essence, what this was intended to do was to take more risk with coalition military lives to protect Afghan civilian lives, so they are now slower to call in air strikes when troops are in contact, and that's been a big cause of the increase in coalition military casualties.

There is enormous focus on this issue from General McChrystal and from the ISAF Command general where they say now that the most dangerous place in Afghanistan is standing in front of General McChrystal trying to explain a civilian casualty incident.

There are some early indications in our numbers that these efforts have been very effective in reducing civilian casualties, indeed more effective than I would have thought possible, particularly in the context of an increasing number of troops over the last year. There were -- according to the U.N., there'd been 1,388 civilian casualties through August of this year versus 1,482 at this point last year, and this hides of course that the decreasing trend started after January or February of this year. And every month since then has seen fewer civilian casualties than the year before.

Probably more importantly than this, the cause of civilian casualties has become overwhelmingly from insurgent-started violence. Last year, l39 percent of civilian casualties were caused by pro-government forces principally by air strikes as I said. This year it's just 21 percent a decrease of -- and that percentage is decreasing throughout

the year. August is always the deadliest month in Afghanistan, but only 7 percent of the civilian casualties in August were caused by pro-government forces.

This in terms of ISAF strategy represents the green chutes of fairly major counterinsurgency success. It means that the coalition is becoming the protector of the population; the insurgents are becoming the killers of the population, principally through IEDs and suicide bombings, which have become far less discriminate. And it accounts in part for the inability of the insurgents to profit from the decreasing popularity of the government. The insurgent support within the populations remains very mired at a 5 to 10 percent level.

It's also important in the U.S. and European context -- Secretary Gates was reportedly very worried about the prospects that a larger U.S. footprint in Afghanistan would increase civilian casualties and fuel anger against the coalition, and words have been assuaged to some extent by -- apparently by McChrystal's focus and assumedly reassured by these numbers. They mean that the Afghan operation is now arguably the most precise counter insurgent campaign in the history. The vast majority of the desks right now are military.

To give you some perspective on this, ISAF -- that 7 percent figure means that ISAF caused 22 civilian deaths in August 2009. They suffered 76 casualties among their own forces.

So, this is what the metrics tell us. This is what -- this is assessing the strategy on its terms. The deeper question, I suppose, is will it work? Does is really matter? Will it generate support for the Coalition mission and for the Afghan government? Civilian as an issue clearly resonates very strongly here and in Europe. It's not clear that Afghans actually see this as a key issue. The violence that these numbers represent is actually fairly well, especially by the rather depressing standards set in Afghanistan the last 30 years. For the sake of comparison, Ciudad Juarez, the Mexican border town next to El Paso, has had 1,700 murders this year, in a population of 1.3 million people, versus the 1,388 killed by violence in Afghanistan this year in a population of 32 million.

The civilian casualties (inaudible) certainly been highlighted by the Afghan government, but in part I think that's because it serves to demonstrate their independence from the coalition and gives them leverage with the coalition. Local officials, in my experience, tend actually not to be too concerned with this to a degree, which is quite surprising to me. Indeed, the -- they tend to be focused on casualties but on control of the population, so according to the *Washington Post*, when McChrystal went to apologize to Afghan local officials for the Kunduz incident that occurred the beginning of September when some 30 to 50 civilians were killed, he was actually quite shocked by the reactions of the local officials.

They weren't angry about the civilian casualties. They were angry that there hadn't been more attacks like this. One of them said if we do three more operations like was done the other night, stability will come to Kunduz, one official told McChrystal, if people do not want to live in peace in harmony, that's not our fault. Another Afghan official, a governor of a province, called this policy "stickocracy." What he meant was that control means that you are a provider of security and that you'll do what is necessary to establish control, and the very attention that the coalition pays to civilian casualties actually creates the impression among many Afghans that they in fact are not interested in establishing control and not interested in being the provider of security.

So, arguably, this is a tension with a polity that emphasizes minimizing civilian casualties above all, but since that policy is working in terms of reducing deaths from coalition operations as well as, frankly, could be expected or better than could be expected, I guess we'll have to see how this tension works out. But that's just a sort of case study of the limits of metrics.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Jeremy and everyone.

Let's go straight to questions. As you can see, the overriding theme of our work here is we want to provide grist for debate, so please have at us and have at it.

Yes, sir, let's start right here, and wait for the microphone. Please identify yourself if you could.

MR. HARRIOTT: Judd Harriett, documentary film producer. There's a metric on page 31 and 30 that fascinates me. On 31, it shows that 82 percent of the Pakistanis regard al Qaeda as a critical threat. On the previous page, it shows that 59 percent of the Pakistanis share some or most of al Qaeda's attitudes towards the U.S. Now, my question is does this mean that the Pakistanis don't want al Qaeda in their house but as long as they screw with the Americans they're not bad fellows?

MR. O'HANLON: Bruce, you want to take that?

MR. RIEDEL: Yes. You of course know one needs to be wary of falling data. How you present the question often leads to the answer that you get. But if you look at the polling data over the last two or three years, what has not changed is views about the United States and views about the righteousness of jihadism against the United States. What has changed is the perception that jihadism is now a threat to the interests of Pakistanis. So, in short, you got it exactly right. If you want to bring down the World Trade Center, okay; if you want to attack the crusaders in Afghanistan, okay; don't blow up the Marriott Hotel, don't kill our own leaders. But I would suggest to you this is also part of a pattern we've seen in other countries in the Islamic world where the first part of the blowback is almost all about don't do it here at home. What we've

seen in places like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt -- Egypt actually much earlier, back in the 1990s -- is that there's a wave-like effect. People initially say don't do it citizens of my country, but it's okay to do it to American soldiers. Over time, they begin to also say well, don't do it to American tourists in the souk, because we really like their dollars. But people do have a learning curve here and the blowback from terrorism shouldn't be measured in one poll; it should be measured over a significant period of time.

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, sir. Let me take two in the front row together and then we'll have responses.

MR. GOYAL: Thank you, Raghubir Goyal from *India Globe* and *Asia Today*. My question is that a lot of assessment has been going on now in the White House, including today and this week more and also the Pentagon, and of course here at the Brookings many, many have taken place. Now, the problems in the area have been going on for the last 20-plus years and now [since] 9/11, nine years. Many think tanks are saying that more military to Afghanistan may not solve the problem, but maybe much more pressure in Pakistan. My question is how much pressure can you put more in Pakistan than what they're in now, and what do you think will be the outcome of this problem?

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, sir, please. Actually, we'll take two more and then we'll --

MR BUTT: Yeah. My name is Kami Butt. I write for the Pakistani *Spectator*. My question to Mr. Cohen is that normally in the media we see that like everything that goes on against American and NATO troops in Afghanistan is the work of Mullah Omar -- Mullah Omar -- how many -- the reason of (inaudible) he has in Qatar, if he is in Pakistan probably he is sleeping in different houses like Saddam Hussein, so my question to you is this - is that our disappointment that somehow we are unable to court Pashtun population of Afghanistan, and because of that disappointment we tend to blame everything to Pakistan or to -- because it's accommodating Mullah Omar. I do not know if Pakistan is accommodating Mullah Omar.

And then my question about American perception, like Jason just said, that Pakistan is one of the very few Muslim countries that are Obama-proof. And I think the reason -- I would ask this question to Bruce, that how can we expect some good (inaudible) – from those Muslims or those Pakistanis when we are supporting a guy who is internationally known as "Mr. Ten Percent." And if you know -- if you have -- I'm sure that you have read the book of Husain Haqqani, current Pakistani ambassador in Washington. He is the one who fed Washington that problem in India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal -- are created by ISI, designed by Pakistani Army, and implemented by ISI. Then no wonder that he is known as a political prostitute among Pakistani-American Community. If

we have this kind of person in Washington who has done so much harm to Pakistan, and then we are supporting "Mr. Ten Percent." I knew President Obama was dallying with Nawaz Sharif. Then we wanted fax and the army to go off and those troublemakers. But beyond that, we don't support the leader who has some goods (inaudible) among Pakistani people, like in (inaudible) and Washeef , yet still supporting "Mr. Ten Percent" whose whole objective is take (inaudible) Pakistani dollars and deposit it into his personal account. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: And just behind -- well, actually, okay. Well, first -- in the second row, and then we'll come back here. So, we'll have four questions for four panelists. Please.

SPEAKER: Yes. My question is -- first, my name is (inaudible) from the Voice of America, Afghanistan Service. Many Afghans -- they always complain that still ISA is involved in dealing with Taliban in Afghanistan. Just today there was some press report that some people call Afghan Taliban actually are the free army of Pakistan. They always -- there -- because Pakistan will never abandon Afghanistan's interest because they have a long-term interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, this is one thing that I would like to say, that when there is not pressure on ISA in particular to stop interfering in Afghanistan.

The second thing is the perceptions of Pashtun are not reflected in this Index. Pashtun populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan -

- they have different perceptions regarding their situations in Swat, in Waziristan and at the radius , and this should be considered in the Index. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, and then we'll wrap up here for this round. Right in the front.

SPEAKER: Thank you, Michael. Yeah, I'm (inaudible). I've done some writing on South Asia. We talked of Swat as the first operation, but perhaps the metrics where you can the most information on reconstruction and displacement is Bajaur, and it's an isolated area, and I wonder whether you have looked at that.

The second thing was about 10,000 military casualties. I don't think that 10,000 hospital beds under Pakistan army control, so are these going to civilian hospitals? That may be on the way of measuring the casualties sustained.

The third -- and I'll just finish up -- was -- well, I lost it. Well, I guess, how many violently dead in Tokyo?

MR. O'HANLON: Okay, why don't we just run down the line and take which ever question you'd like, please.

MR. COHEN: Yeah, I'll deal with the first and possibly the third question. I think it's wrong to assume that states and their leaders are the same as mules and donkeys, and the carrot and stick approach strikes me as self-defeating. If you want to have influence, you've got to

persuade the leadership of a country, whether you like it or not, that it's in their interest and their country's interest to pursue a particular policy. So, I think in that case we have a lot to enforce in the case of Pakistan. I think Pakistan is at another crossroads. It's one intersection after another but aware they've got to make a decision about their future. And if they want to be in the kind of country that people hate and distress and characterize as the source of terrorism, they could do that. It'd be very easy -- plus, they have nuclear weapons. I think if they want to be a country that can accommodate their neighbors, live peacefully, have something that resembles a democracy at home, they could probably do that also. Do, I think that's the kind of argument we should be making with Pakistan easily, which we are I think in this administration in particular, and provide whatever means we can to provide to them so they can carry this out. So, the notion of carrot and stick sanctions strikes me as the wrong way to approach the leaders of another country.

In the case of Mullah Omar and so far, I think it's remarkable that -- and what we're doing about Pakistani support for the Taliban. I think the McChrystal report is astonishing. It was the most explicit, detailed analysis of what Pakistan is doing with Taliban that I've ever seen, and since that was cleared all the way up the chain of command, I would assume that the Pakistanis are in deep conversation with American leaders, especially military leaders about whether they're going to get X-

number -- x-amount of equipment unless they don't stop supporting people like the Talibans. I think there's probably an argument being made here that it's in your interest not to support these people and that it's not in your interest not to support these people and that it's not in your interest to see the Taliban as a projection of Pakistani power into Central Asia. I think that's false to your politics on Pakistan.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible)

MR. O'HANLON: Sorry, I've got to be a tough guy on this. Jeremy, please.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah, thank you. I would say on the issue that Steve was just talking about, we had a lot of debates and the McChrystal assessment of a lot of different issues, and we tended not agree on most things. The issue of the Pakistani assistance was not an issue that we disagreed on.

In terms of the sort of relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think there's an Afghan dimension to the drone attacks, which maybe often gets underestimated. In addition to trying to limit the capacity of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan, those drone attacks are very important for Afghan public opinion. The Afghan perception, rightly or wrongly, is that this is a war that stems from Pakistan, and one of the things that tends to confuse them about this war is if the war stems from Pakistan, why is it taking place in Afghanistan. They say when you ask

Afghans well, what should our policy be, should we be bombing more in -- should we be fighting more in Afghanistan, they say no, you should be fighting more in Pakistan, we should be bombing more in Pakistan. Strikes me as a fairly blood-thirsty policy, but it's pretty unanimous. And so the drone attacks are an important way, although I think they have a lot of -- I certainly agree that they have a lot of the negatives that have been alluded to -- an important way of actually demonstrating to the Afghan population that in fact the coalition recognizes that.

I think the other comment that went to me is about -- the question about Tokyo I guess -- is that what it was, Tokyo? Yeah. This is -- you know, I think this comes down to a question of societal standards and violence. We don't have the same -- we have much higher levels of violence in Washington, D.C, than we have -- than they have in Tokyo, but we manage to accept it, and I think -- what we haven't done very well in Afghanistan or as a -- in terms of the U.S. military really anywhere -- is sort of try to understand what this violence means in the context of a given society. It means something very different in Tokyo, in Washington, and in Kabul, and Kandahar.

SPEAKER: Let me pile on to a couple of things here. First of all, the question of pressure on Pakistan over the Afghan Taliban. The McChrystal report, as we have it, is a remarkable document. I've never seen a leaked document that was redacted. We have the document

here, which the Pentagon went back to the (inaudible) and said we want to take out these things; therefore, we want to leave in these things. And leaving in the stuff about the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban could not have been an oversight. They must have known what that was going to mean. and I think that's a very good example, as Steve suggested, of putting pressure on the government of Pakistan.

Publicity works. That gets to the question about Pakistani casualties. I don't know where the Pakistani -- what hospitals they're in. What I know is this -- over the last week, we suddenly got a number from the government of Pakistan as to how many army casualties it suffered in the war against the Taliban. It was really quite precise. I don't have the exact number. It was like 5,392 killed, 10,000 such-and-such wounded. This did not look to be a number that was made up out of whole cloth. Someone came up with a great deal of precision. A lot more data like that would be very helpful to persuading people on the outside what it is that Pakistan is actually doing. So, I applaud the notion of putting it out there, and what I would urge them to do is put a lot more of that kind of data out there. Over what period? Over how long? Where did they go? What hospitals? How many were killed and wounded in various places? This is indicative of something else we've seen in the last few months. The ISI, like most intelligence organizations is usually not terribly friendly to the media. They don't like to talk to the media. All of a sudden, this summer,

the ISI has become very friendly with the media. Look at David Ignatius' piece in the *Washington Post* yesterday. That was a remarkable effort on their part to reach out and try and deal with some of the criticisms of it. I thought David was a little bit soft in how he portrayed the responses, but that's his business being a correspondent.

Now, opening up to the media doesn't mean you've changed your policies. But it does suggest that you recognize you have a problem, and that's the first step. Recognition that you have some kind of a problem is a good thing to have happen. Now we'd like to see a lot more activity, a lot more data, and not just because we want it for the Pakistan Index. We all want to see it to see more transparency in Pakistani policy.

The question of support for different individuals in the Pakistani government. I think this administration wisely at the beginning of its term decided it wasn't going to pick favorites in Pakistani politics. First of all, the history of the United States picking favorites in foreign governments' politics is one of universal disaster. We should never pick foreign leaders. We almost always pick the wrong guy. And in any case, it's not up to us. The United States government, contrary to all the conspiracy theories you will read in the Pakistani press, is not going to decide who the next president of Pakistan is. Some group of Pakistanis, probably unfortunately not the majority of Pakistanis, will decide that -- not the United States government.

SPEAKER: Sure, I just had a couple of quick points, (inaudible), to add to you question about the posture and perception in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I don't dispute that at all that there's certainly going to be a discrepancy between their perceptions and some of the Punjabis or Tajiks or Uzbeks or whoever else in another country. But, again, we're beholding here to open source data, and it's just a matter of not having seen or come across such polling data that broke it down, audited by ethnicity or, as Steve referred to, educational background; and either one of those would certainly be welcome and very open when people contact us with a better source. We're usually pretty quick to include it as part of the Index project. So, if you know of any or if anyone does, we'd certainly be happy to consider it.

And the other -- with regard to Bajaur displacement, and actually it is a pretty interesting -- that district in the most recent Ocho Weekly Update Report oh Pakistan, we had a very interesting chart that we depict in the index that shows overall population displacement over this last 8- or 10-month period given the added insecurity, and it estimated that for Bajaur about 90 percent of that population of that district has at least at one point been displaced. So certainly -- the highest of any of the specific districts that we're looking at. And it's certainly a key indicator that that is experienced from -- certainly heightened insecurity, and we're trying to get a better grasp without going forward to try to track these over time

to see sort of which say the arrows are pointing on a given week-to-week basis.

MR. O'HANLON: Bruce had previous commitments, so he's going to have to go. So, there's going to be one more question for Bruce, and then we'll another mega round after he's left. Who has a question for Bruce, if I could. We'll go here, and then, Gary, you're the first one in the next round.

SPEAKER: First of all, I think this is a very good exercise. My observation was there was one thing missing, which could be included. That's about the number of (inaudible), because these (inaudible) -- they have been part of Pakistan's educational system for a very long time. In the past, there were very few, but with the passage of time, especially during war against Soviet Union, the number of (inaudible) has risen. Now, these (inaudible) may not be producing militants outrightly, but they are producing a mindset where you will find a lot of hatred against those people who doesn't (inaudible) and that sort of things. So, that -- number of (inaudible), whether they are on (inaudible) or they are on decline, that should be a sort of very good aspect.

MR. O'HANLON: That's probably more for Jason, so I'm going to ask you to pass to Gary, and then we'll have -- hear one for Bruce. We'll finish up that way. He's got to literally go now.

And I forgot to introduce myself. I am Ali. I'm a Fulbright Scholar at American University.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Please.

GARY: I think -- I'll ask it quickly. What is or what are the most important metrics that we don't know, that we can't measure?

MR. RIEDEL: I think all of us would probably have some -- I have a really simple one. Location data. Where is the center of gravity of the enemy? Where are their headquarters? That kind of data is absolutely critical. When Eisenhower and Montgomery crossed the channel in June 1944, they tried to have the most data they could about the location of the enemy. We have weak data here. The drone attacks demonstrate the first real development of real hard data about enemy locations. But even there, it's almost all about al Qaeda. What's amazing to me is that eight years after this war has started, the amount of in-depth intelligence we have on the Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, is very weak. We can't even give you an authoritative answer to the question how important is Mullah Omar anymore? I think he's very important, but I don't think the data -- the data isn't there. We have not devoted either as a government nor as think tanks as much effort to studying the enemy we're actually fighting on the battlefield as we should have over the last eight years.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Bruce. As you're signing off, why don't we ask Jason to address the madrassas question and then we'll go to a final round; and, Steve, you may want to comment on that, too.

MR. CAMPBELL: Sure. Sure, with regard to madrassas, that's an excellent point and one that we do have in mind. Obviously, again, this is an ever-evolving study that is updated on a very regular basis, and that is an important component. One thing that I-- again, Mike and I come into this not as Pakistani experts but more from the sort of (inaudible) insurgency and trying to measure progress over the broad areas that need improvement for stability. So, that being said, trying to discern now you have -- from what I understand, the government official of madrassas -- you have some unofficial madrassas. I've come across some studies that have tried to look at the broad numbers, and that's something that we'll certainly continue to do going forward, and once we have enough of some of the data holes plugged in and are able to put together a concise charter or graph, it will certainly part of the -- added to the Index.

MR. O'HANLON: Steve, any --

MR. COHEN: Right. I agree that the government itself doesn't exactly know how many madrassas there are, so some people simply refuse to register. I think what's more important, though, is what's going on between the ears of the students in the madrassas, as well as in

the elite universities of Pakistan. What are the 19- and 20-year-old people think -- kids -- young men and women -- think about their future? Do they think that have a future in Pakistan? Do they think Pakistan has a future? What do they think is wrong with the country? What is right with the country? We have no data on that whatsoever.

MR. O'HANLON: So, we'll take three or four more questions and then conclude. Why don't we begin this time in the far back row, and there are two hands in the far back row, and then I'll move up a little bit.

MS. LAKSHMANAN: Thanks, Mike. It's Indira Lakshmanan from *Bloomberg News* and this question is actually for a piece I'm doing for the *International Herald Tribune*. I wanted to ask Jeremy about Afghanistan. Since you've had to the opportunity to advise General McChrystal and we didn't get in so much to the Afghan metrics, specifically the big thing hanging over this in one way is the election and the widespread allegations abroad and what is the United States going to do in the aftermath of this election? How is it going to deal with I guess presumably the Karzai government if he's reelected. So, I'd really like to hear that part of the metrics. What's your perception of what the good choices are available to the U.S. and the international community going forward in the civil part of U.S. involvement there. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: And then over here also in the back row please. Then we'll move up.

MR. KOBER: I'm Stanley Kober with the Cato Institute. The attack this past weekend -- several hundred -- two to three hundred Taliban congregated. Yet nobody came forward from the local community to warn our people, to warn the Afghans, who were also attacked in a separate base, some of them captured. Why do you think nobody came forward to warn either us or the Afghan forces?

MR. O'HANLON: Tough question. Over here on the side please, and then I'll come back to the middle.

MR. MARSHALL: Dana Marshall with Dewey & LeBoeuf. I have sort of one and a half questions. The first question is what does all of this -- these performance measures really imply in terms of how we ought to be allocating the 1-1/2 billion times 5 years that were just voted last week. The half question is I think about a year or so again, the IRI did a kind of interesting poll where they asked what single thing if the United States did that would help basically improve your image of the United States? Did you think about that kind of poll and do you have anything -- any update on that?

MR. O'HANLON: Here in the middle please. Yeah, on my right.

MR. SINGER: Vejay Singer from Dome Advisors. I have a quick question. There has been reports on the ground that the U.S.

Embassy is being made into a green zone in Islamabad. Is there any comment on that?

MR. O'HANLON: Okay, I think because everyone being a model of efficiency and conciseness we do have time if our panelists can keep all these questions in mind for one more, so we'll go -- yes, please, near the back.

SPEAKER: I'm (inaudible), (inaudible) society member from Pakistan, medical analyst. I have a lot of questions but I'm going to stick to one brief one. Part of it was questioned already. As we speak just now and the debate continues on (inaudible) Pakistan and Afghanistan strategies (inaudible) to ask that there is a (inaudible) in Pakistan that it's been very conditional (inaudible) to control (inaudible) foreign policy and so --

MR. O'HANLON: Hold the mike to your mouth, please.

SPEAKER: -- and it has been (inaudible) even in Parliament in the last few days since it's come up. So what I want to know is that I feel there's a (inaudible) in Pakistan, uncertainty, insecurity, fear, mistrust, interaction (inaudible) the U.S. on these areas. So, do you feel that (inaudible) is really going to pacify these areas of concern? And also how your Index (inaudible) get a copy so I have to look at it -- is going to be maybe used as a source of certification by the Secretary of State, which is

required, and do other such (inaudible) also compare it with (inaudible) conditionality?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. That's about seven and a half questions for three panelists, but they're good enough to handle them. So, in this case why don't we again start with Steve and then work down to Jason.

MR. COHEN: Well, let me deal with your last question and comment. I think that this administration takes seriously the question of opinion in Pakistan and other countries, and I think that they understand much better than the Bush administration. How do you do this? In the bush administration we were profoundly (inaudible) by Pakistanis for supporting what eventually became an incompetent military regime. So, we got -- we had -- both no confidence from the Pakistan government and popular dislike of the U.S. I think that they're bent on using this 1-1/2 billion times 5 aid package to not only improve the fate of Pakistanis but to improve our image in Pakistan. That's less important than the fact that simply improving Pakistan as a state and as a society. So -- and the President's speech in Cairo mentioned (inaudible) by several Pakistanis, a number of Pakistanis, is an important breakthrough in terms of American expression of its concern about the Islamic world. And I know that the White House is following up the (inaudible) speech with specific programs for a whole range of what they call Muslim majority countries. So, yes,

there's a problem in terms of public opinion. No, I don't think it's a short-term problem; it's a long-term phenomena but I think it's being addressed by this administration much better than the previous administration.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay, thanks for those hard questions.

In terms of the question of why did nobody warn the U.S. forces, I certainly don't know in this particular instant. We have a somewhat similar incident from last year in roughly the same region, and the story there is a fairly typical one, and I wouldn't be surprised to see this one corresponding to that story. The U.S. forces in that province in Nuristan sit astride southern routes into -- from Pakistan essentially, particularly opium-smuggling routes but basically they'll smuggle anything. And they very frequently, sometimes without even trying, disrupt those smuggling routes. That's (inaudible) part of their mandate. And so it's -- in that area they have tended to be very unpopular for reasons that they don't entirely understand, for reasons which actually have very little to do with the overall ideological battle of why we're in Afghanistan and the Taliban versus the government or anything like that. And they also tend to vary quite a bit from valley to valley as the U.S. forces become, to some degree by virtue of their position but also to some degree for reasons that they don't understand, instrumentalized in local feuds that have mostly to do with smuggling and other local issues. And so when the come on the wrong side of that as they often do, they end up being up very

disenfranchised from the population. So, you end up with examples in Nuristan in particular -- this is true to some degree (inaudible), particular in Nuristan where the U.S. will be able to walk without body armor through the bazaar of one village and the next valley over will be in constant combat. And so I'm guessing that this was the latter example.

SPEAKER: I think also this unit was about to be redeployed (inaudible), and it was really the old strategy, not the new strategy. Was that the (inaudible)?

MR. SHAPIRO: It's at least the implication of the new strategy, yeah. I don't know about this particular unit though.

In terms of the election, I think it's fair to say that the election result is a real disaster for U.S. policy, so what do the metrics tell us about it? Not very much. What good choices are left? There's clearly no good choices. The -- as a matter of fact, it's clearly, to some degree, the worst of all possible worlds. They went into the election in a way that was determined to challenge Hamid Karzai in a way that was determined to distance them from him. They succeeded in that, but they didn't succeed in dislodging him. So, all they have is a much worse relationship with the government, a much more -- a sense among the population that the government is yet more illegitimate, and of course the overall impression of the population in Afghanistan who never believed that this election would come out in any other way than the Americans wanted is that in fact

they have sustained Hamid Karzai. This is really the worse of all possible worlds.

What will they do? I think that the evidence for that seems quite clear, because I don't think there are many choices. The one official who really was advocating -- in the U.S. government or in the international community -- who was advocating taking a strong line against the election fraud was Peter (inaudible) who now finds himself without a job and doesn't seem to have been supported by even the patrons that put him into that position -- Richard Holbrooke in particular as far as I can tell. So, that seems to me to show a fairly clear direction. I don't really think there's much choice. There are no other options for the U.S. There is no capacity to challenge this result or to find anybody else who could take up this government.

MR. O'HANLON: I'm just going to say one word myself as I pass things of to Jason for the final word, and I agree with Jeremy, but I also think that right now we're having the Washington debate about future Afghanistan policy somewhat over simplified but still perhaps somewhat accurately described as a debate between two camps. The minimal (inaudible) counterterrorism concept and the McChrystal approach, and what I actually think is the more interesting debate since I think the counterterrorism approach has already been discredited by six years of trying that under Rumsfeld effectively is an approach in which you try to

leverage any additional American commitment to get the Afghans to do more and do better. That's not going to be an easy-to-describe option. It's not going to be a bargain where we all write down on a contract what we'll do and what they'll do. As Steve and Jeremy have been emphasizing, there are too many sovereign sensibilities and sensitivities for the Kabul government to be willing to have that kind of a contract. But I think we have to try to use this moment of leverage to get them to do as much as we possibly can, and that's where more of the American debate, in my judgment, should be going right now. Again, it's a nuanced, you know, indirect way of exercising influence. It's not simple or easy to describe as, you know, CT versus COIN -- counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency -- but I think it's a more meaningful set of choices and I hope we see more of that kind of a framing of the issue in the coming weeks. If I were advising Mr. Obama, I think that's -- you know, that's what he's going to try to think about how to do. Anymore additional American commitment for the war has to be, to the extent possible, used to leverage a greater Afghan commitment.

Jason's going to wrap up here. I was glad some of the questions emphasized economics, and there are a number of things he's doing in the Index that we'll continue to do here that try to give us the basis to document future progress -- everything from watching how many cell phones people province by province in Afghanistan if we can get that

data. And Steve's right to focus on breaking down trends province by province to trends in how people use the internet, believe it or not. Admittedly, not every 11-year-old school girl in South Waziristan is online. But nonetheless there actually are internet centers in (inaudible), and you can actually go onto a Google function and figure out what people are searching -- what's on (inaudible). It's almost an indirect form of polling and an indirect form of measuring how they feel about certain realities in their lives. We've talked about trying to gin up our own polling operation in some of these areas, which we haven't yet figured out how to do, but it's on our mind. Anyway, there are a lot of things -- and the Pakistanis are doing a nice job in a lot of their documents, which are available online for those of you who want to see the primary data yourselves. And I think it's a pretty honest to track what they know about what's going on in a number of these areas, and we'll of course continue to work with them on those points.

But, Jason, I apologize for keeping you, but would love to hear your final thoughts on any of the questions that are still on the agenda.

MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah, I just wanted to make a quick point on Stanley's question regarding (inaudible) in Nuristan Province, and in that situation we have made it publicly known that we are on our way out of that area. It is not longer a strategic priority. And I think that small

example is somewhat indicative of one of the bigger questions we have to deal with in the region, and that does why the ISI continue to have such close ties with certain elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda? Why is it difficult to get (inaudible) villages in certain areas of Afghanistan to put some trust in us? And it shows that, you know, it was no longer a worry for these people in Nuristan that, you know, we need to (inaudible) the Americans by lead -- it's the Americans are now leaving and how can we expect them to stick their necks on the line knowing that we are on our way out and they're going to be left with the residual Taliban forces there. And so I think we need to be cognizant of, you know, just going forward, and I don't want to over-extrapolate here, but in making announcements that you're leaving and sort of getting rid of the doubt in people's minds, you're going to have a very difficult time in trying to engender a trust among the local populations, and unfortunately I think this was -- is a (inaudible) like what happened in Nuristan is -- in some ways was predictable, because we -- you just can't expect to have local cooperation given that you're telling them you're going to leave them to the Taliban, you know, in the coming weeks.

MR. SHAPIRO: Let me just say -- this is Jeremy putting on his analyst hat -- we all do this. As we do the Indexes, we try to both present data and then interpret it. We try to sort of honestly create a file on our brains so that our policy judgments aren't influencing the data and

vice versa. Again, you all will keep us honest we hope, and ideas are welcome. Thank you very much for being here today. We appreciate it.

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