

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

PRESIDENTIAL COMMAND:
POWER, LEADERSHIP AND THE MAKING
OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM RICHARD NIXON TO GEORGE W. BUSH

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PASCUAL: My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies here at The Brookings Institution, and it's a pleasure to welcome you to this event where we want to pay tribute and take a look at and analyze what is the scholarly, which is a public policy work book by Peter Rodman called *Presidential Command*.

To do this today, we have the benefit of two extraordinary individuals who will I will introduce in a minute -- Secretary Larry Eagleburger and Ambassador Eric Edelman, both of whom have been tremendous leaders in our government over an extended part of their careers, two individuals who have been career foreign service operatives and have distinguished themselves in the policy work.

Well, on the one hand we are looking at Peter's book and the message that he had in that book about the success and failures of presidents and what makes them succeed. I think it's also an opportunity to pay tribute to a unique individual, Peter Rodman, and to his family as well, and we have the benefit of having with us today his wife, their niece, his daughter Theodora, and I've had the benefit of meeting a good part of that family at one particular event, and it's just a terrific group of people, extraordinarily engaging. And one can imagine in part how Peter Rodman

developed his incredible sense of humor and wit that we all I think have come to appreciate the most.

I want to say a couple of things that are actually quotes from a few distinguished individuals who delivered statements at a memorial service for Peter several months ago, but they are some extraordinary statements, and they remind us of what an incredible individual Peter Rodman was.

First is by Henry Kissinger, and in his statement Henry Kissinger said, "The highest task of a public servant is to take his or her society from where it is to where it has never been." That's supposed to be a positive thing, Secretary Eagleburger. I know that you're going to say that, you know, there are some people who do that in the wrong direction, but Henry Kissinger was saying that in a positive way, and saying it in a positive way about Peter Rodman. "This implies the courage to face complexity, the character to act when the outcome is still ambiguous. For Peter, the issue of courage did not arise because he perceived new alternatives to pursuing his duty. In other words, there was no question about courage because, in fact, facing complexity was simply what had to be done.

"Peter transcended the passions of a turbulent time. He did so by his integrity, his special kind of innocence which caused even his

intellectual adversaries to feel that they learned from him even when they could not bring themselves to share his conclusions."

And another close colleague and the president of this institution, Strobe Talbott, also delivered a statement at this memorial service, and Strobe would be with us if it were not a tragedy -- for a tragedy in his own life where his wife, Brooke Shearer, passed away about 10 days ago. And in that service Strobe said, "In government, at the White House, State, and the Pentagon, Peter never politicized his office. He recruited the best professionals he could find to work with him. Whether in his service to five presidents or his active participation in the great debates of our time from outside government, he advocated his beliefs in a way that set him apart from and above the kind of ad hominem attacks and partisanship that we have so often -- that have so often debased political discourse in this country.

"When he came to Brookings, Peter quickly established himself in one respect above all others. For an accomplished veteran of the political and etiological wars of the city, his conduct was marked by exceptional stability, courtesy, and generosity. And indeed, he was an exceptionally generous and gracious colleague."

This book *Presidential Command* is, as I said, about how modern presidents succeed and fail. Peter engages in the issues of

leadership and how presidents set tones. He explores the question of scope and the breadth of what a presidency entails today and what it means to succeed. And he deals with the complexity of being able to succeed in some areas and what that means for the overall perceptions of the presidency when, in fact, other areas are not so successful -- and how, and what the nature of managing the challenge of (inaudible) in today's global world.

And he also deals with the question of bureaucracy and how to work with it, how not to become entangled with it, and how not to allow it to be an obstruction, and yet the dangers that exist when you ignore it completely.

The punch line is fairly straightforward in the book. He says that the best model for the management of a White House is that by George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st president of the United States. He says that it was the most collegial and smoothest run. He said it was a cabinet of heavyweights, and among those heavyweights, of course, was Brent Scowcroft, a small and respectful and gracious man, who was known as "the impresario and enforcer," and, of course, teaches us something about how it is possible to succeed and have a gracious character in Washington at the same time.

And, of course, two of those characters who were

heavyweights during that administration are with us today.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I've lost a lot of weight since.

MR. PASCUAL: One of them is Secretary Larry Eagleburger, and in addition to being a heavyweight of his time, he was irreverent then - - he's still irreverent now -- and he will continue to be irreverent to this discussion which is why we invited him because he keeps us entertained. But he's also smart in his comments.

Secretary Eagleburger rose to be Secretary of State having been a career foreign service officer. I should know this, but I don't think anybody else has ever done that, have they?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: No.

MR. PASCUAL: A unique mark in his career. And he has been an ambassador, and he has been a civil servant, foreign service officer in the sense that someone who had expertise, who engaged in policy, who understood what it meant to try to move issues through the bureaucracy and to get things done.

And with Secretary Eagleburger is Ambassador Eric Edelman. And I've had the benefit of working with Eric for many years and being friends with Eric for many years. In his last position, he was Under Secretary of Defense for policy. He served in that position for two very

different people, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Gates. He has been ambassador in both Turkey and Finland. He has been a principal foreign policy advisor for both Dick Cheney and Strobe Talbott, and so in that sense Eric Edelman knows something about diversity in leadership as well and, in fact, has a tremendous lecture on leadership that I had a chance to read but not hear him deliver. And I hope he will develop it further.

So these are the individuals who will start us off in this discussion. I will ask them both a few questions afterwards, and then open it up to you.

But, Secretary Eagleburger, please.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Well, you've said almost everything I could say about Peter. One of the most remarkable, in my view always young -- maybe he wasn't so young as he got older -- but he was still young as far as I'm concerned, and he had a -- well, this book shows it. It's beautifully written, and it's very clear that he has learned a lot as he went through the whole process of working with Henry. He is one of the few people I can say worked *with* Henry. Most of the rest of us worked for Henry, but Peter, I think, was as much the junior partner, maybe, but nevertheless a partner with Henry on very many things.

And I can't -- the interesting part of all of this is I can't remember any particular event. He had a remarkable sense of humor, but

the only event I can remember had very little to do with him. I was in the -- he and I were with Henry and some others in Paris for negotiating with Lee Duk To and trying to get the hell out of Vietnam. And all of the Vietnamese were on one side of the table and all of us Americans on the other. Henry was in the center, Peter was at one end, and I was at the other, and there were some other people in between.

And one of them on that side was a fellow named Stearman. And Henry and Lee Duk To got into an argument over a fact, and that went on for about five minutes with each side arguing about the fact, and finally Stearman said, "No, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Lee Duk To is correct. If you'll look on page 38 of your briefing book, you will see that his statement is the correct one."

There was this dead silence, and I remember looking at Peter, and he was having a terrible time to keep from laughing. And finally, from the depths of his cavernous chest, "Dick Stearman, pick up your chair and move it to the other side of the table."

(Laughter)

As I say, the only thing I could relate to Peter in that one is that he and I were both horrified and amused, and I figured that Henry was going to end up killing Stearman, but he didn't. He was much nicer than I expected.

Anyway, this book is remarkable, and Peter was remarkable, and he is one of the few people that I know and you, today, reinforced it, that I think Henry looked upon as close to being a son as any person. And as I think you told us, he, every day in the hospital Henry called him, and now you don't get that out of Henry for most people. And I think that shows how much Henry valued him and valued all of those years working with him.

And I believe that it's after -- now, you don't want me to say anything about the book, particularly, at this stage, do you, other than say that it's an excellent book. I think he is right. I was trying to -- of all of the administrations I have lived through or at least partly lived through and Bush 41 -- I guess that's the right number -- in my judgment was -- and that's not a partisan comment -- but in my judgment he did as well by performing along the lines of what Peter thought was a sensible way to proceed if you were president. I think he was far better at it than anybody else that I saw, although Nixon came close.

But -- and this is not -- I'm not saying that this is a comment on his ability as president, but in terms of running the staff was best, and the way he did in making the decisions he made, he was clearly above and beyond. And the one thing again that I will never forget is during the

Kuwait mix-up when we went in and asked Mr. Saddam Hussein to leave, in the preparation for that, the president was on the telephone day after day talking to every world leader that made any difference and a lot of them who didn't, and I found it absolutely amazing what he was able to do in terms of talking to other world leaders -- the Syrians and others -- talking them into coming along with us in this effort to get rid of Saddam's presence in Kuwait.

And if -- there were any number of arguments why it was not sensible for the president to move to remove Saddam from power at that time, but, if none other, it was to have done so at that point would have been to violate all of the agreements that the president had made with all of them, the understanding that the president had made with the various people that he talked into coming along with us in removing Saddam from Kuwait. So the arguments that were made later some of the benighted people who -- well, never mind, other than to say that they're screaming and yelling about how the president should have gone after Saddam at that time were only made once it was fairly clear that he could have done so. But if he had done so would have been taking the advice of certain people who became vice presidents later on that I think would have been - it would have been very unwise to have tried to do it.

But anyway, I'm going to let it go until you ask some

meaningful questions, if you're up to it. And
actually --

MR. PASCUAL: Clearly, I'm not.

Eric, please?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Well, thank you, Carlos, and let
me just say what a privilege and pleasure it is to be on the same stage
with Secretary Eagleburger, with whom I had the privilege of working
when I was much younger, had a little bit more hair, and was more junior
in the foreign service,

MR. PASCUAL: That's the only thing I've kept is my hair.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Carlos mentioned that I have
now had the privilege of working with two people, Secretary Eagleburger
and my most immediate past boss in government, Bob Gates, who, as
career officers in their respective services, uniquely came to Commandos
Organizations, and it's always put me in mind a little bit of the comment
that Tom Lehrer, the musician, mathematician and satirist made about 40
years. He said, "When Mozart was my age," he'd been dead for two
years." He said, "It's people like that who make you realize how little
you've accomplished in life." So, Larry --

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: He's the one who wrote a,
"Be Prepared," that's the Boy Scouts' (inaudible) song?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Right.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: (Inaudible)

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: But Secretary Eagleburger was always my beau ideal of an under secretary, and I'm delighted to be here with him.

And I'm very grateful to Carlos and Strobe Talbott and Brookings for hosting this event because I think Peter's really excellent book has not received as much attention as it ought to have, in part, I think, because -- I think, it is my speculation that when The Washington Post Book World went out of business, they stopped doing a book review at The Post, and Peter's book suffered from being published the same month as we had the presidential transition going on here in the United States. So I think there's a wonderful opportunity to get to talk a little bit about both the book and about Peter.

And let me make a few comments about Peter, personally, before I talk about the book, because as I read the book, I heard Peter's voice speaking to me just as when he and I would touch base at the end of the day at the Pentagon, connected by our Hamburg-secure video devices, and discuss the events of the day, but also discuss national security decision-making and his aspiration to write this book. And I think Peter was in many ways uniquely qualified to write this kind of book

because, like Larry Eagleburger, he served at high levels of state, defense, and the White House. And, frankly, not that many range of people have had that experience.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: When did he start writing, do you remember?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: I think about the spring of 2007, right after he left government.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Really?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: But he'd been thinking about it for, I know, many years before that. But my first encounter with Peter was actually not in person; it was in print, and I think the episode says a lot about Peter. He had written a scathing review in The American Spectator of William Shawcross' book about Secretary Kissinger, and the book was called Side Show; Peter's review was called Side Swipe. And it led to a rather extraordinary exchange in the pages of The Spectator between Peter and William Shawcross, which Shawcross later appended as an appendix to subsequent editions of Side Show when it came out.

And years later Peter and William found themselves on the same side of the debate over the Iraq War and jointly penned an article for The American Spectator. And I know just before he died, Peter and William were considering whether or not to do a joint op-ed on Iran and

other subjects on which they shared a common opinion.

But I think the episode really speaks volumes about Peter's uncommon ability to debate issues in a depersonalized manner, almost an a-partisan manner, and in a way that allowed him reach across the political divides and engage people with whom he didn't agree, and I think something that Strobe's comments cited by Carlos earlier attest to.

I first got to know Peter when I was a junior foreign service officer and serving as a special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz, or as what Larry Eagleburger in those days referred to as "the kitty corps." Peter was working with Stephen Bosworth. Ambassador Bosworth is a member of the Policy Planning Council and subsequently became Steve's successor as Director of Policy Planning at State. And he and I worked together in the aftermath of the failed May 17, 1983 agreement between Israel and Lebanon that George Shultz brokered.

And I think Larry will probably remember the memo for Secretary Shultz that Peter wrote when the agreement lay in ruins, when the U.S. forces had withdrawn from Lebanon, and a long period of Syrian domination lay ahead for that country. Peter wrote a memo saying that our involvement in Lebanon should be punctuated, he said, not with a period, with a semicolon, because we would undoubtedly need to revisit this issue once again. And he believed that because as he argues and

writes in Presidential Command, he believed that Lebanon was Ronald Reagan's biggest foreign policy failure.

Now, as State would have it some 20 years later when we were reunited as colleagues at the Pentagon, we had to deal with this issue. I should add inter alia that Peter, being my subordinate, was a little bit awkward. Peter had been a mentor; he had been someone I looked up to, a role model, and we found ourselves in the awkward situation of his being my subordinate. A less gracious person would have made that more difficult, but Peter's natural grace made it a very easy relationship, and in, you know, time as I hoped and as I suspected, Peter would become my indispensable colleague and ally in any number of interagency fights.

But he and I agreed that as two veterans of the Reagan administration misadventure in Lebanon, we had a moral charge to do all in our power to preserve that country's hard-won independence in the aftermath of the Peter revolution in 2005. And so it was no surprise that in November 2006 Peter found himself as the first senior defense official in more than 20 years to fly into Beirut aboard a C-17 transport aircraft carrying the first rush of assistance, military assistance granted to the Lebanese Armed Forces under Section 1206 of the National Defense Act which was pursuant to a strategy that Peter had articulated. And when he

departed government, I picked up that baton and made four trips to Lebanon over 2007-2008 to follow up.

I think this whole episode -- I apologize to the flight excursion into it -- but I think it tells you a couple of things about Peter: First, his incredible capacity for taking the long view of any situation; and second, the moral seriousness with which he approached all issues despite his very clear realist pedigree and predisposition.

Peter had a wicked sense of humor about the interagency process, which Larry mentioned and which was on display in the book, and he and I frequently would talk about the interagency process and the political environment in Washington, and joke about two New Yorker cartoons that we had both noticed. One came out in the early '80s at the beginning of the Reagan administration which showed Attila the Hun with a group of his barbarians pillaging a village, and against a backdrop of pillage and maidens being carried off. One refugee from this turns to the other and says, "Well, you can say what you want about him, but at least he has a coherent foreign policy."

(Laughter)

The other New Yorker cartoon was of more recent vintage and shows a deceased government bureaucrat waiting outside the Pearly Gates, but being denied entry by St. Peter. And the bureaucrat says,

"Don't you think that this represents the criminalization of policy differences?"

(Laughter)

No matter how many times Peter and I talked about these cartoons, he always managed to bring a smile to his face. And I think they spoke to two of Peter's long-term underlying concern about the nation's process for national security policymaking which he describes in the book:

One is the need for an active, engaged, and continuous presidential leadership and vision, both in the articulation and the execution of policy. Peter's book roots itself firmly in Richard Neustadt's classic study, *Presidential Power*, and he offered what Peter says himself is a, quote "unapologetic support for presidential authority." And he described, I think very well, in his book the increasing difficulty of exercising that authority as the family of national security agencies has grown, the institutions have become increasingly bureaucratized, and the political environment has become increasingly poisonous.

Although it was very painful as a career foreign service officer to read Peter's unsparing analysis of the state department's consistent failure to provide presidents with strategic advice, guidance, or innovation, I think he is, unfortunately right on target. And I think Peter is merciless and self-critical in analyzing and assessing cabinet members

who served more as spokespeople for their respective institutions than as instruments for the realizing the president's agenda inside the executive branch.

I think about halfway through the book Peter captures his conservative philosophy in describing the different approaches to policymaking in the Nixon, Ford, and the Carter administrations. Peter describes the, quote, "balance system," that President Carter had developed suspended between a dovish secretary of state side, and a more hawkish national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. And Peter writes, quote: "It made perfect sense on an organization chart, but it masks a fundamental flaw, the philosophical schizophrenia of the president of his world view and of his resulting policies."

"Nixon and Kissinger," Peter writes, "on the other hand, were united in a tragic conservative view of history, quote, 'in which conflicts are not always reconcilable, and enemies must often be resisted.' It is a consistent view of how the world works and how human nature is designed. It sees the whole world relating disparate events to each other, which is one of the meanings of taking a strategic view. Whether one agrees with this philosophy or not, having a philosophy ensure a consistency."

Carter, Peter points out, was, quote, "an engineer by training,

not a geopolitician, and, as such, he can be said to be part of the American pragmatic tradition which considered issues case by case leaning sometimes towards one view and sometimes towards the other view on the merits. Lawyers come out of a similar tradition."

And Peter concludes that, "A senior Carter aid has commented to me that Carter had no consistent philosophy in foreign policy except that what had gone on in his predecessor's administration was bad."

Peter's concern for consistence and coherence, I think, infuses the entire book, and although he explicitly says this is no a book meant to contribute to that genre of books that chew over Professor Edwin Corwin's oft-noted observation that the Constitution is an invitation to struggle between the executive and legislative branches over control of foreign policy, he nonetheless upholds the case for the institutional prerogatives of the presidency as opposed to the Congress.

And I will share here that the very last communication I had from Peter was an e-mail in very high (inaudible) about the results of the Baker Hamilton Commission on the War Powers Act, which he assured me was a snare that the administration shouldn't fall for.

I replied that I thought that he shouldn't worry that Bush 43 administration would never yield anything in its defense of the presidential

prerogative.

Peter's well-wrought studies of each administration I think offer many insights about civil-military relations, leadership at the department of state and defense, and a decision-making style for presidents, as Carlos acknowledged. And I think Peter is scrupulously spare and dispassionate here. He writes about the Clinton presidency, of which he was quite critical in a very austere way, and he talks about the lessons that the administration learned over time, and lauds President Clinton for gaining in confidence and empowering capable individuals like Bob Rubin, Strobe Talbott, Dick Holbrooke, and George Mitchell to resolve internal policy differences, and integrate all elements of national power on the president's behalf.

Peter also provides, I think, the very best analysis and critique of the Bush 43 administration's decision-making process that I've seen in print, including the tenure and departure of his and my very controversial boss, Don Rumsfeld. And although he doesn't refer to the burgeoning scholarship on emotional intelligence and leadership style, I think Peter's work and his conclusions are very consistent with the body of literature that has emerged, and I'm sure he'd agree with Princeton University's Fred Greenstein, who studied presidential difference, concludes that, quote, "Emotional intelligence may be the most significant

factor of success or failure in the White House," and he says, "Beware of the presidential contender who lacks emotional intelligence. In its absence, all else may turn to ashes."

I hope in this period of presidential transition folks in the new administration will find time to consult Peter's thoughtful and well-wrought book. His insistence on the necessity of preserving the president's ability to have real choice among alternatives, the danger of policymaking by consensus, the importance of monitoring and assessing policy constantly, and keeping discussions of the principles and deputies at the strategic levels are all cautionary notes that would serve any administration well. I think it makes a tremendous companion piece, by the way, and it's a shameless plug for Brookings for the excellent book that Jim Steinberg and Kurt Campbell has done, *Dangerous Transitions*.

But I would like to conclude my remarks this morning with a finding from the archives that I think has some bearing on a vision-policymaking-state-department dysfunction and today's proceedings. It was found by two very distinguished scholars of foreign relations in the Acheson Papers of Yale University and passed on to me, and when I shared it with Peter, he roared with laughter. And he and I agreed that it was as much a description of the interagency process we knew as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which it was meant to describe.

It is a letter in 1970 from a mid-level foreign service officer serving at the U.S. Missions in NATO congratulating Secretary Acheson for winning the Pulitzer Prize for his memoirs, Present at the Creation. The author tells Acheson, quote: "I always admired your vision in inventing NATO, but eight months here have led me to have some second thoughts. Like sex, NATO is a good thing to be knowledgeable about and to experience on occasion, but it can become quite wearing."

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Quite what?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: "It can become quite wearing."

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Oh.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: "The work at times is interesting thought it doesn't match Washington. Beyond that, I've been constantly amazed at how stupid and bullheaded the department has become since I left." It is signed, "Lawrence S. Eagleburger."

(Laughter)

Thanks very much for your time and attention, and I hope you all read Peter's book.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Are you serious?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: I have been in --

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Did he say that?

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: No, I didn't make that up. It's in

Box 9 -- I've got a footnote in here -- it's in Box 9 of the Acheson manuscripts at Yale University Library, if you want to look at it.

MR. PASCUAL: Congratulations, Secretary.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: You know, I was lucky enough when Johnson brought Acheson back to consult on trans-NATO when de Gaulle was being de Gaulle. And I went -- I was Acheson's staff for that period of time, and I got to know him. He was a wonderful man.

He also wanted to assassinate de Gaulle that shows that he was slightly out of date, but --

MR. PASCUAL: Well, let the record show that that was not an executive order.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: But that's so important.

MR. PASCUAL: A fascinating success. And let it go -- actually, I'll resist the temptation to go -- to start off with The New Yorker cartoons and the Attila the Hun and the word consistency, and the concern or the points that Eric made about Richard Nixon's foreign policy. But there are certain analogies there that's easy to draw -- but anyway, we'll go back to the question of transition.

At the end of the time of Bush 41, there was certainly one major world change in events the crash of the Soviet Union. There were other crises that were developing on a smaller scale, one obviously

Somalia that became much bigger in the eyes of the world. Another one, Secretary Eagleburger, that you probably know better than anybody else is what was happening in former Yugoslavia.

And then we look at the transitions that occurred from Bush 43 now to President Obama, very different kinds of circumstances, but again one major world-changing event, the global economic crisis that is going to fundamentally change the way that we conduct economic and political affairs across the world. And then two other conflicts that certainly are not minor, one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan.

And perhaps this is one of the most difficult periods in the Congress, this foreign policy, because your teams aren't well established, you're moving from one leadership team to another leadership team. One group is trying to figure out how to pass information to another. There are potentially different etiological perspectives, and I guess one of the things that I wanted to come back to the two of you in looking at this question of transition, are there things that you would draw from, from the experience that you had back in '92-'93, and then looking at this current transition? Were lessons that you think are particularly important that either come out of your personal experience about transitional process and what the president needs to do in order to be able to effectively manage and provide leadership in this kind of interim period as new teams are actually

developed at this point?

Secretary Eagleburger, do you want to take that?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Well, first of all, I think it's almost inevitable that when you move from an administration, let's assume being in office for two terms -- excuse me, one second -- and is replaced by what I will describe as amateur -- and I don't mean it in a pejorative sense, but coming in new and with or without a definite plan on what it wants to change, and that would apply in this present administration, or let's move it back to when we left -- when we left and Clinton came in.

Let me give you an example of the almost inevitable thing that will happen. As you probably recall, President Bush had sent some troops in to feed in Somalia, nothing more than feeding, giving food to the people who were starving. And he had called President-Elect Clinton ahead of time and said, "I want to do this." He didn't ever ask for an okay, but he in effect was doing that, namely saying, "I'm going to do it whether you like it or not." But I think if President Clinton has suggested, Bush would not have gone ahead, but Clinton did not object.

But Bush made it very clear that he was going in to feed and get out. There was no intention of staying, and, in fact, President Bush said, "I hope we will be able to have accomplished all the feeding and be

out before you are inaugurated." Well, it didn't work that way and, in fact, we were still in Somalia when President Clinton came into office.

And you will I think recall, the president was advised from several people who had been involved in the Somalia thing earlier decided to stay on and, hopefully, put some stability back into a country that had none, and where -- whatever the name of the leader was I can't remember now -- who was doing nothing more than killing people every chance he got. And we had very clearly -- in fact, I went up to the U.N. to talk to Boutros Boutros-Ghali to say to him that were going to go in and feed, and then we were getting out, he was not to have any assumption that we were there to stay.

Well, the Clinton people -- and I honestly think that this is something that so-called experts persuaded President Clinton of when there was no reason that he should have any good [inaudible] for it at this point yet. And we got into some very serious trouble, as we recall, and "Black Hawk Down" and so forth.

And then the administration, new administration, ran as fast as it could to get out. And I think a lot bad signals were sent. But my point is a different one: It is I am convinced that if they had had any experience whether we'd dumped this problem in their laps, they would not have made the mistakes that Admiral Howell convinced them to stay

on.

And it was largely one man who convinced the president, as far as I know at least, who was one man who convinced the president to stay, and at some cost to it at an early stage in his administration -- which, by the way, is another thing, and this administration now is going through the same thing, namely, the other thing that any new administration ought to be thinking about very hard, I think, is that when you come into office, on the foreign policy side you better be damn careful not to get yourself into difficulties early on. And that's so easy to do with a slight misinterpretation or what's going on, which is what happened to President Clinton in this particular case.

But my point is, when you are doing these transitions, on domestic policy I think that's pretty much a given that you will -- the incoming president will know as much about the -- almost as much at least and maybe more about the issues than the outgoing one. But when it comes to foreign policy, unless the candidate who becomes president is very knowledgeable about foreign policy issues, it's the time when he can most easily get himself into some really difficult time.

And one of the examples that I often use in terms of trying to talk about President Barack Obama -- or whatever his name is, I (inaudible) -- the present president that he needs to watch out for is something that

JFK -- that JFK made a serious mistake was when he went to Paris to meet with Khrushchev I think it was, wasn't it?

MR. PASCUAL: Yes, Khrushchev.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: And gave away having left the Soviet leader with a clear impression that he was a dilettante, that he didn't know anything about foreign affairs, and that he would likely be easily -- easily horn-swoggled, and that is, people still say and I think probably correctly, was one of the major reasons Cuban Missile Crisis, but Khrushchev misjudged Kennedy because of that first impression, which, by the way, something else that I notice in Peter's book, he talks about a fair amount, towards the end when he talks about personality and how that affects impressions in world leaders and so forth.

But my point again, is in foreign affairs it seems to me, and we've seen it too many times, where it is very easy for the incoming president to make mistakes, and it ought to be incumbent on the outgoing president to do everything he can to make sure that he doesn't put the new president in the position to make those mistakes.

But I think, for example, right now there are going to be some questions about, after the first 100 days, there were some issue of whether the president's apologies and so forth would give the wrong impression to world leaders, the same sort of question in terms of: Be

careful what you do until you've been in office long enough to have a better sense of it.

I don't know if that makes as much of an answer, but I will tell you I think that it is that transition period when it is most likely that you will make a mistake, and it is most likely that you will give an impression to your opponent of what kind of a character you have, and it may be totally wrong because you will be coming in without much knowledge of what's been going on and can make some serious mistakes.

MR. PASCUAL: So I guess maybe a couple of things to take from that would clarity of the mission that one is engaged in and to specify that as clearly as possible; and the issue of purposefulness and resolve and how you convey that, particularly if you're trying to distinguish yourself from a predecessor. In some ways, I think both of those are issues that, whether or not you think that they've been demonstrated now or not, have certainly been talked about but --

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I want to argue with that first one.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: The clarity of mission, not that it isn't important, not that it shouldn't be done, but you may, in the case that I mentioned about Somalia, I think it was very clear that the

people coming into office as we were going out had a totally different estimate of the situation in Somalia. And we could tell them what we thought about it, but the people that were advising the president thought it was a quite different situation. But it wasn't such a -- they weren't clear about their mission, and -- it was clear they were about their mission but it was the wrong mission.

MR. PASCUAL: Right.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: So you've got that question of learning what's going on before you make your judgment, sometimes.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Carlos, if I could jump in on (inaudible) for a second. Part of the strength of Peter's book, I think, is that it refocuses attention on how much our system of national security decision-making is president-centric. And it's, in comparison as Peter draws a comparison to the United Kingdom, when we have a change of prime ministers, as we may have in the U.K. over the next year, the new prime minister comes in, the old prime minister leaves, but the permanent bureaucracy is still there, and there is a continuity that does not exist in our system.

I remember my first ambassador in the foreign service, Sam Lewis, describing what it was like being an NSC staffer at the end of the Johnson administration on January 20th, watching the, you know, trucks

pulling out with all of the files that were taking off to the Johnson Library, and the new people coming in and having absolutely nothing on which to rely. And so the danger, I think, of the transition process is that presidents -- and this is I think just an expansion of Larry's point -- presidents are not likely to be particularly well-staffed, and no matter how smart they are and no matter how much they think they know, there is going to be a staffing process that's got to support them as they make these decisions, reach these judgments and assessments of what's going on.

That process has become much more difficult over the period of history that Peter describes, and I mentioned Jim Steinberg and Kurt Campbell's book. I don't -- people here may have read it -- I'll give you my summary version in five second of their book. It's what I used to refer to as the three stages of transition. I've seen this in every one since 1981.

The first stage is both sides say: We want to have the smoothest transition ever. The income guy says, "We're going to hit the ground running."

The outgoing guys say, "We're not going to drop the baton, we're going to hand it off cleanly."

Then human beings get involved in this process, and it gets more complicated, and the second stage is the outgoing guys saying,

"Look, we want to describe to you the policies we've developed and the reasons for them, because we've learned through hard experience that these policies are, you know, work, and it's not partisan. We're not trying to, you know --"

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Try that on Holbrooke sometime.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Right. And the incoming guys say, you know, "You may think this is your prize pig, but we think it's a pig," and off it goes into the trash.

By then you get to the third stage, which we're deep into now, which is the incoming team saying, "God, this is so much more screwed up than we thought. It's going to take us four years, or maybe eight years or 12 years to dig out of the disaster that our predecessors created for us."

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: And (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: And the outgoing guys are saying, "God, we can't believe this. This was the team that, you know, was supposedly flawless in the campaign, and now they can't even -- you know, can't even organize a decent NSC meeting."

So this is an inevitable process to some degree because it's, you know, inhabited by flawed human beings. But I agree with Larry, it's a period where a president can make serious missteps where he ought to

be seeking to staff up his administration carefully and quickly, and where I would make a plea for two things, which is that they not use the confirmation process and the vetting process to settle political scores and to create points. The president needs the team that he chooses to put into place.

As someone who's been subject to a long Senate hold during a confirmation myself for nine months about something that had nothing to do with me, it is very deleterious to rational, reasonable policymaking. People ought to abstain from it, and people ought to remember that the transition process lasts well, I would say now, unfortunately, into the early fall of any administration, just because of the difficulty of vetting, clearing, and confirming valuable people.

I think we, frankly, should have fewer Senate-confirmable positions in the Washington-based executive branch.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I hope you didn't expect that (inaudible).

MR. PASCUAL: Before opening it up, though, let's just stay with this, an element of esteem, the relationship between the leadership and the bureaucracy. And, as you say, I mean the president has been elected to be a leader, to make decisions, to give guidance, to set a tone, yet the reality is that presidential decisions are not actions, and they have

to translate into something.

And, increasingly, the kind of actions that might have been associated in a foreign policy world was either a policy decision that should result in, let's say, an arms control agreement, or a military action where there is a very defined sort of hierarchical system where a command actually leads their specific action, it's much more ambiguous in today's world. And, you know, Iraq and Afghanistan are probably as good a demonstration of that as you get because this whole process of trying to figure out how do you make -- how to you work with a country to help it function again and help, in fact, actually build that state and make it viable? It is much more complicated; it is not just a military issue, it's not just an issue that you can decide on by decree, but in fact it actually takes a capacity of bureaucracy to implement, and it takes the actions of the whole country as well to be able to implement.

So a much more complicated environment that we're operating in right now. And I guess, you know, both of you have been closely associated with executive power. You've also been in the midst of bureaucracies and seen how those bureaucracies function and related to the leaders. And I would be interested in your reflections now in a situation where the new president as come in. He is trying to set a tone and make decisions about issues like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan that are

extraordinarily complex, that are going to depend on the bureaucracy to step in and to be able to translate into action. What advice do you have for this president to be able to, in fact, actually succeed in that kind of an environment?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Be careful.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: I think that -- well, let me just speak for the bureaucracy. Well, I'll talk about both state and defense. I mean the National Security Council as a bureaucracy is actually the one that's most easy for the president to control and is why presidents frequently end up after an election campaign talking about how they're going to restore cabinet government -- Peter talks a little bit about this in his book -- and end up relying on their own personal staff because it's actually one that they can reach out and control most easily.

I mentioned in my opening remarks the pain I experienced reading Peter's all-too-accurate description of the department of state. The department of state -- and I don't want to speak for Secretary Eagleburger but speak for myself -- as a group is one of the most talented groups I've ever been associated with in terms of the quality, of the intellect and the capacity of the individual, yet we, as an institution are almost always less than the sum of our parts.

And I think that it requires a particularly strong leadership by

a secretary of state combined with empowering the foreign service that gets the best out of them. And I would say I think Peter -- I think this fairly reflects Peter's view -- I'd be interested in Larry's view -- that Peter, I think if you read the book, would say that Henry and George Shultz were the two secretaries of state who got the most out of the department of state and got it to play the role that it probably ought to play by providing clear strategic guidance and leadership, but empanelling career foreign service officers like Larry Eagleburger to occupy senior leadership positions in the building and to make the building produce useful advice for the president.

In the department of defense, it's frankly a lot more complicated because it is a bigger, more complex organization with huge budgetary resources and enormous programs that develop a lot of inertia. And we're going to have a very interesting, you know, kind of test bed for all this in terms of Bob Gates' tenure, or his second tenure as secretary of defense in the Obama administration. He's already established himself in the department, but he's going to have real challenges now moving away from, you know, the relatively simpler policy challenge of trying to get the Iraq War right and Afghanistan right, and the incomparably more difficult challenge dealing with cancellation of multiyear/multibillion-dollar defense programs and orchestrating a defense budget and program that is consistent with a national strategy.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Well, let's take a look at the situation now, for example. I, personally -- and I may be way off -- but I personally am very worried about the administration looking at Afghanistan as they are, in essence, because I think we should be well on the way to getting ourselves into another Vietnam if we're not careful, and it was back again. And I'm not arguing that we should be going into this Afghan situation with the intent to win a war. I'm not -- I think that it's clear that's not salable to the American people right now.

But then the question becomes, is it wise to stick your toe in there and maybe you find out that the water is a good bit hotter than you expected. So -- and again my point here is I think there is a real need -- this administration came in opposed to Iraq, understood, and then at least to some degree to confuse me, at least, then turns around and says, well, we need to win a war in Afghanistan and then puts troops into Afghanistan, but again with the clear understanding that it will be a limited deployment, and limited deployment has been what has gotten us into these situations time after time.

And my argument is not half so much that if you're going to do it, you have to do it to win -- although that would be my argument -- but rather if you aren't prepared to go in there to win it, then don't do it at all, or at least in the case of Afghanistan be very careful about what you're

going to do and think it through more carefully than I think we have.

My point's a different one; it's not that I'm knocking them on Afghanistan as such, but I am -- I would be very, very surprised if the military that are going to be advising the president and Bob Gates on this one are not -- well, we know for a fact that Petraeus has a different view of what should be done in Afghanistan. That's now becoming clear. But my point again is here is a new administration. It is an administration that comes in with certain philosophical conditions: antagonistic towards Iraq, and antagonistic in general, and is supported by those who are antagonistic to military excursion, and yet is now involved in trying to plan one.

And my point again is that somewhere along the lines they need to take a deep breath and start talking to the military in a or serious way than I think up to this case they have, because, if nothing, I suspect that at least Petraeus is going to tell them: If you do what you're thinking of doing now, you better be careful because we may be in another Vietnam.

So then my point again is, when you come in as a novice -- and I don't know any other word to use for it -- and though you will have some members of your team who are not novices but they will have been out of office for eight years -- more than that -- they would have been --

yeah, they've been out of office for at least eight years, so they will now be trying to catch up, and it gets back to my point that when you first come into office, you had better be on the foreign policy issues and much less concerned on the domestic issues. But on the foreign policy issues you can get yourself in to so much trouble in the early stages that it then becomes difficult to dig your way out of.

But I would hope in this particular case I'm talking about right now which is Afghanistan, that they would spend a good bit more time thinking that one through before they act.

MR. PASCUAL: Well, I think this begins to illustrate the complexity of the role of presidents to guide us in the direction that presidents can give the way on and the constraints in being able to execute that guidance. And I think Afghanistan is probably a particularly good example of some of those complexities because, in fact, first of all it's no longer seen as Afghanistan, just as "the issue." And I think one of the questions that goes back to your point about learning that I would certainly give a positive score is, in fact, looking at it as a much broader issue as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region, and how those issues interact with one another. I think that's become a critical factor in being able to get a realistic sense of what needs to be done.

I think in this question of realism of defining the mission, one

of the central things that has been a factor in Afghanistan is this counterterrorism -- or is it counterinsurgency? Because the two, in fact, have different implications for the kind of presence that we need on the ground, and the administration has come back and said we've looked at this and we've decided that we're going to need the counterinsurgency strategy, not a counterterrorism strategy if we're going to succeed, which means a stronger and a greater on-the-ground military presence building up an Afghanistan military and police capacity, but also real radically increasing the civilian capacity on the ground.

And the question -- and I think this, then, comes back to the issue of bureaucracies and how bureaucracies relate to it -- do you have the capacity to, in fact, actually do that when you turn back to a bureaucracy? And I think that's where the wake-up call is going to end up coming back for this administration because we, in fact, haven't created, I think, the bureaucratic structures that are consistent with the nature of the world that is actually changed. And that's something that I think is going to be a bigger, longer-term challenge for this administration as it goes forward, that if, in fact, this president wants to be able to executive presidential command, the nature of that government behind the president is going to have to change in its capacities as well.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: There is one other point I

wanted to make, too, which is another fatal flaw amongst presidents is uncertainty, which is -- Jimmy Carter is the classic case, and a classic case within that case is obviously the neutron bomb where this particular bomb wouldn't ruin any buildings but it would eviscerate the people who happened to be in them, and so forth. And he was off and on, on that one, got the Germans, for example, all cranked up to finally be willing to accept the deployment of this thing -- Helmut Schmidt -- and then within a week or two of when it was supposed to be deployed, he changed his minds. And the consequences for Helmut Schmidt, who had worked very hard to convince the German's policy politick that this was a good thing to commit to be deployed in Germany now had to retreat and in a hurry. And it badly damaged the relationship between Helmut Schmidt and President Carter from then on out.

But -- and he did it a number of times. He did it in his decisions on what to use in the way of force when they were going to go in and get the refugees -- the -- not the refugees, those who had been in prison from the embassy in Teheran, and they were going to go in and seize them, and he changed the instructions and the force levels that were to be deployed, I know for a fact three times, because a friend of mine who was in the agency at the time and was running the thing said that that had happened.

So again, my point here is this is where a president can be terribly damaging is on the question of being uncertain and changing his position so many times. The only other thing that could be worse would be somebody that was too determined to do whatever it was that he wanted to do and ended u with 500,000 troops in Vietnam, for an example. I mean you can cut it either way, but it is nevertheless, and if that isn't a personality problem to some degree at least, I don't know what it is. But you have in Lyndon Johnson someone who got to -- who was committed to the Vietnamese issue and then marched on with it in part because all of these wise men around him -- Dean Acheson and everybody else -- were saying go ahead, stay with it in Vietnam.

But Lyndon stayed in Vietnam when he probably should have been awakened to the fact somewhat earlier that he ought to be getting out, and that's one kind of personality quirk, I guess I would say, and then the reverse of that is the Jimmy Carter example which, where he wandered all over the lot on any number of very serious decisions that he had to make.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, I'm going to turn to the audience, and I'm going to take two questions at a time. We'll start back over there, and then come up to the front.

MR. MILLIKIN: Al Millikin, AM Media, and it seems that

Jimmy Carter has been too easily dismissed as wavering and uncertain in a pragmatic engineer that fails to recognize this human rights concerns and his religious and moral convictions that resulted in actions and reactions that seemed evident to me to be too often weak or lacking in too many American presidents, particularly recently.

And other countries under Carter did seem to not to genuinely respond to his good will and not just power and pragmatism, which seemed, I think many countries seemed to just be viewed as objects to be used and abused and discarded or, you know, waiting till a crisis or a special interest of the United States caused concern.

MR. PASCUAL: So, some more comments on the fact that Jimmy Carter did have a conviction, and we'll get as commentary on that.

Diana, make a point?

MS. NEGROPONTE: Diana Negroponte from the Brookings Institution. I'd like to ask the panel on this issue of consistency which Peter Rodman raises in his book. We have consistency in the nomination, nominations of a director of FBI. I don't think this is questioned, but how would you establish the same consistency of a director of national intelligence and for the director of the CIA? Or does one wish that consistency that Peter looked for?

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, so a question -- a comment, the

point on Jimmy Carter, human rights, there were convictions there, and let's recognize the importance of those convictions, if you wanted a comment on that and how they apply to today's foreign policy.

But then this question on intelligence where that you can, Secretary Eagleburger, you make the point that the starting point in any administration has to be to understand the realities, and part of understanding realities, presumably, have to be in how you rely on your intelligence services and the intelligence community, and how you look at them, and can you actually get consistency on how they operate?

Do you want to pick up on that?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I'm not sure I know how to answer. That's my problem, but on Jimmy Carter and his consistency, I believe (inaudible). And it's not that he waffled all over the place on everything; it's just that he waffled on some very serious issues, and he waffled because he wasn't convinced one way or the other, I think. And that's fine, and you want to have a president that thinks things through, only at some point you have to come to some decisions.

On the issue -- and you may be able to handle this second question between than I can -- I'm not sure. I guess the only way I can answer, because I'm not sure you can get consistency now. Until we as a nation can get ourselves sorted out, and this depends on the Congress as

much as anything, and what it is we want in an intelligence agency, I'm not sure you can ask for consistency. And, certainly, with what we've gone through in trying to establish leadership in the last two years, it seems to me that the consequence has been that we have tried to find somebody who stuck with the charges at the time about what the agency was doing wrong and so forth.

Panetta goes in I think fairly clearly to establish, with the president's approval, establish that the president does love the agency. And in case he wasn't able to prove it right away, Nancy Pelosi came along and gave it a real opportunity. So I think that's what, to me, it was -- Panetta comes in because, 1) he's effective -- and he really is, he's a very effective fellow; 2) it demonstrates that the president has confidence in the agency which, because of things that have been said and because of the thrust with this waterboarding and all of that stuff, clearly the agency I think, or people in the agency, was not at all certain about what they were supposed to be doing. And I think appointing him was as much as anything to try to send the message to the agency people that the president was behind them and supported them.

Now, that's, it seems to me, because of what's going on in the agency at the time, in and around the agency at the time, requires one kind of -- if the president makes a decision on one kind of a leader

because of a specific kind of problem. And next year or two years from now, it may be a quite different problem. So I can't come at you with a sensible answer until we have finally gotten ourselves to decide exactly what it is we want in the way of a Central Intelligence Agency. And I don't know how you can do that when you've got 16 different agencies now piled in on this issue.

So I don't know that I think you can do it. And you couldn't do it with the FBI for awhile when they were under attack. So I think myself -- I don't know what my distinguished colleague to my left -- you are to my left, aren't you? I don't know what he thinks --

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Only geographically at this point, Larry.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I don't think you can do it.

MR. PASCUAL: Eric, do you want to --

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Well, on the Jimmy Carter point, I agree with Secretary Eagleburger largely. I mean it's not that President Carter didn't accomplish anything in foreign policy. I think he may have managed the Panama Canal issue about as well as reasonably could have been managed. But I think on the really crucial issues I agree with Larry, and I think, you know, at the end of the day one has to draw a bill of account for every administration by whether we were better or worse off at

the end of their term. And I think we were probably worse off at the end of Carter's term than when it started.

On the intelligence community, I agree with Larry. I think the United States of America has always had somewhat uncomfortable relationships with the notion of intelligence. Henry Simpson famously said, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail."

For a different project I've been working on recently I've been rereading what I regard as one of the greatest, if not the greatest foreign service memoir of all time, Robert Murphy's *Diplomat Among Warriors*, and in Murphy's memoir, he described trying to work when he was given responsibility for French North Africa during World War II in the run-up to the U.S./Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, actually being engaged in a certain amount of what we would now call espionage and having his foreign service colleague saying, "We don't do that kind of thing," you now.

So I think we've always had a very uncomfortable relationship with intelligence. We now find ourselves in the midst of a conflict with certain elements of radical Islam I think that put us in a place where we are going to be involved in this conflict for some time to come, and it's going to be a very heavily intelligence-driven war that we're going to be engaged in. So I think, per force, we are going to have to rely very

heavily on our colleagues in the intelligence community, and I think that requires, you know, we need to talk about intelligence here with a kind of capital "I" kind of intelligence, which is things that the intelligence community produces. And then in lower case "i" intelligence, which is the sort of quality of mind that the policymaker brings, you know, brings to the table.

And we need to bear in mind the intelligence community is composed of two parts, both parts -- the clandestine service who are on the front line collecting intelligence, and I think any president would be very wise not to do anything that undermines the confidence of the clandestine service or complicates their life in what is already a difficult task to which most of us are not suited.

Then there is the analytic side of the house, and there I think it's more complicated, and there we get into a lot of the controversies that bedeviled the last administration about the so-called politicization of intelligence. And I have watched over a 30-year career the conflict between the lower case and upper case intelligence go on forever. There are some people in the intelligence community who believe that somebody, when they went over to Langley, you know, frocked them as a high priest, and that only they are capable of making, you know, a judgment about intelligence matters.

You know, I think I was a fairly careful consumer of intelligence in my various senior level positions, and while I had a lot of respect for the analyst community, I believe that they also bring to the table their own biases, just as we do. They're as bureaucracy, they develop habits, they develop biases, and what's incumbent on policymakers is to not just accept the products of the community as a given but to accept it as an input into which they bring their own, lower case, intelligence.

How we get the kind of stability you're looking for, Diana, I'm afraid I'm completely at a loss (inaudible).

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I want to tell you a little story, if I can.

MR. PASCUAL: Go ahead.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: When I was -- I was an SS1236 or something like that, and I was an SS08. Very few people were ever SS08s, but I was one. I was brought in as a six and demoted to eight, and my salary was raised, all before I came into the building. But anyway, one of my first jobs was intelligence analyst in INR, which is where they send every punk, new -- they used to send every punk foreign service officer that they didn't have any other place for. So I was sent down there as the Cuban political analyst.

And, lo and behold, while I'm there, what happens but the Bay of Pigs. And we were supposed to write up a little -- this was intelligence, now, mind you -- I hadn't the vaguest idea what an intelligence officer was supposed to do, but anyway you're supposed to write all these things up, and then it goes to the assistant secretary for INR -- it did, I don't now what happens now -- but anyway, so I looked at this, and I said, ah, this is kind of crazy. So in my analysis I said there's no way in the world that this can succeed. Too few people, so on and so on, which I think my 10-year-old son could have written.

But anyway, I wrote that up and I sent it forward, and within about an hour I was on the ropes. I tell you, "How could you write something like this when you know the president authorized this himself?" And blah, blah, blah, blah. And I was about ready to be read out of the foreign service, but then all of a sudden it didn't work. And Dick Goodwin comes over from the White House -- this is Kennedy's time -- comes over from the White House and some way or another he learns that I had written this piece that said it wasn't going to work, and so all of a sudden he thought I must be one of the major analytical figures in the whole department of state because I predicted it.

So I get yanked onto this meeting down in the department somewhere where amongst other things there's, as an SS08, I hear Carter

Achilles was then the counselor of the department, told by Goodwin, "Shut up and go sit down." I mean it was like that? Is this the way the White House deals with this case? Well, maybe I better leave. But anyway I learned a lot in that very first time, but the most important thing was what I learned is, if you're going to pay attention to what I'm doing as an analyst all of a sudden, this country is in deep, deep trouble. But, in fact, that was the way we did a great deal of -- at least the state department -- dealt with intelligence at the time. And I'm going to tell you it was my least moment of glory. But nevertheless --

MR. PASCUAL: All right, let me take two more questions on this side, please.

MR. COFFEY: John Coffey, retired state department. In Mr. Rodman's book, the relation between the national security advisor and the president is very important. How do each of you think the relationship between General Jones and this president is shaping up?

And second, Mr. Rodman actually favors a strong secretary of state, as the linchpin of an effective system. How do you think this secretary of state will fill that description?

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, and do you want to pass to right behind you?

SPEAKER: Through the -- through the --

MR. PASCUAL: State your name, please.

MR. WALLEN: Skye Wallen, Dennison University. My question has to do with our relationship with Europe and our European allies. How do you think Afghanistan -- what is the potential of our success or failure with our allies in Afghanistan? Iraq War, the international community said no to the United States, but now it seems like there's a willingness to reach out and -- the United States recognizes the importance of our acknowledgement of the international community, and I think that Europe is coming back to the idea that our relationship, the United States relationship is important as well.

So what is the potential of our relationship with Europe if we succeed in Afghanistan, and what could the consequences be if we do not?

MR. PASCUAL: I'm particularly interested in both of your perspectives on the relationships between the president and the international --

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Well, we'll come to that in just a minute. Let me do the last one first.

If we have -- if we have any confidence at all that our Western European allies will assist us in Afghanistan if anything above a boy scout platoon, we are whistling "Dixie." This is too many years of this has gone on with the Europeans less and less prepared to help, and when

the president -- when the president went to Europe -- it was just couple of weeks -- a few weeks ago and raised the Afghanistan issue, he got a flat turndown. And I think sooner or later maybe they will agree to do something, but not much. And as far as I'm concerned the argument about our having not paid enough attention to Europe maybe partly true, but it is also very much true that they haven't done much to help us for a long time.

So I'm not particularly enthusiastic about the hopes for anything that much better out of the European allies. I'm going to take my chances now on, since I'm never going to get it played again, I guess I can do this.

First of all, I can't -- I suspect you'll be a b to do better -- I can't really give you any sense of General Jones and his relationship with the secretary of state and so forth. I am -- well, I will say this: I suspect that the secretary of state is sufficiently tough that she's not going to let him step too far into what she would consider to be her territory. In other words, I don't think General Jones is going to be Henry Kissinger at his most developed as the national security advisor.

But at the same time I think he is going to have the propinquity, being close to somebody. If you're close to the president, that -- physically -- that is a tremendous advantage. And in this case he's the

guy that can go in in the morning and sit down with the president across the desk and say, "Now, this is what's going on in Afghanistan, and, Mr. President, I think maybe this is what you want to do here." He's got a way into the president that I don't care what else you say, it's an advantage.

Having said that, I do think that this secretary of state is a very tough cookie, and I suspect that within some limits she will be able to take care of herself, although what isn't clear yet -- and maybe it is to people who live around here, but it wouldn't be to me at least -- is how that -- how that relationship between her and the president is going to shake down given the fact that they were at swords' points here not too many months ago. And I can't believe that love and affection between the two of them is necessarily terribly high.

Now, that doesn't mean that they can't, like good adults, put all that behind them, but I would suspect that she will have a substantial impact on the president as is likely to be possible for this administration. I think she will be an effective secretary of state insofar as her relationship with the president is concerned. I don't know what other people may think, but if you analyzed her character at all, and you also remember that the president is himself not particularly an expert in foreign affairs, I think she will have a fair degree of independence, although again, when it comes to a choice between General Jones and her in terms of advice given to the

president, I think the fact that Jones is closer, physically, may have -- may mean that he will have a somewhat greater influence on the president than she would.

And, by the way, you cannot overdo this question of the physical presence close to the other person. It can work two ways again. In Al Hague's case it was part of what led to his demise, if you will, because he got on the nerves of not just the president but of the other senior advisors to the president at the time. It was because he was neutering at him too often, but it does make a difference, and particularly in a case like that with General Jones where I would assume he's had enough experience with high-level people that he has pretty feel for how far you can go and how far you can't go.

So I think that relationship is likely to work pretty well, although I also will tell you that you can never in the end be confident of anything until you've seen it at work for at least a six-month period.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Let me start on Afghanistan and our allies. Where I largely agree with Larry, I mean I think Secretary Gates gave an interview a day or so ago which I think that at best is extremely disappointing, that our allies who in many ways face the same challenge we do of constant plotting not only against our homeland but

their homelands from the areas along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border where al Qaida and a facility continue to plot attacks, that the governments in Europe have not seen fit to make the case to their own public that this is a challenge not just for the United States and the United Kingdom, but for them as well. And I don't think that in any way gainsays, you know, contribution of some allies who really have stood up and taken enormous casualties like the Canadians, the Danes, the Dutch, increasingly the French have played a role.

But for an alliance of 26, it's really a fairly pathetic showing. And I agree with Secretary Gates that it's largely a failure for the will on the part of European governments, and I suspect the discussion of why that is would be a longer conversation.

On the relationship among -- well, let me just say one other thing about that, which is I do think that there's a danger here for the administration in the long term. It does to some of the things Larry was talking about earlier in terms of our presence in Afghanistan and our role in Afghanistan. This is a mission which a couple of years ago was described as one that had been turned over to NATO and to the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. And as we take a growing role and a larger percentage of the troops, and the allies prove less capable of contributing, what that does to the political support here at

home for a continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan I think is going to be a problem for the administration to reckon with.

And I think I agree very much with what Larry said, that they need to be very careful about their rhetoric because it could come back to bite them later in the future.

On the relationships among principals and particularly the relationship between the national security advisor and the president, I, first of all would stipulate to the truth in advertising. I speak from absolutely no inside information. I left the Pentagon on January 16th and have no -- have not been present at any meetings, don't know exactly how it's going. I would say the challenge for General Jones, who is a former supreme allied commander from a Commandant in the Marine Corps, former senior military assistant to the secretary of defense, and he knows his way around this town, that the major challenge will be to develop a personal relationship with the president, which he did not have upon entering office.

And the fact of the matter is, there are a number of people in the White House and on the National Security Council staff who do have preexisting close personal relationships with the president, including Denis McDonough and Mark Lippert on the National Security Council staff as well as Tom Donilon, the deputy national security advisor. And so I think that would be the major challenge for General Jones is to establish that

rapport and to become the president's senior counselor in the White House on matters of national security.

I do see two signs that I find a bit troubling. It seems to me it's been extraordinary quick for the knives to come out in any number of clearly inspired leaks in the press about the role he is playing, and I noted in The Washington Post story on the first hundred days of the administration when the account, the tick-tock account of the president's response to the Taeopodong-2 missile launched by North Korea during the Prague summit, that the description of the decision-making included the president sitting around his hotel suite with David Axelrod and Mark Lippert when he decided how to respond to that. And the national security adviser, who presumably was traveling on the trip, was nowhere to be found in the story.

Now, I don't know whether he was actually there or not, but it's a little worrisome to me that he would not have been a part of that decision that the president had to make on the sly before he went out and gave his speech (inaudible).

I believe that Secretary Clinton will be a very formidable secretary of state, but I think for her the key challenge will be to go back to something you said earlier, Carlos, to be able to secure the resources for the department of state to play the role that we expect it to play in a solely-

resourced counterinsurgency strategy, which is what Dick Holbrooke and my successor briefed the press was the administration's position after the Afghan policy review was complete. And so getting those resources to the Congress and deploying them effectively I believe will be one of her absolutely biggest challenges, and I'd be interested in Larry's view of this: I'm not quite sure how you make that work in a department where you have two deputies.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: You don't.

MR. PASCUAL: And let me just -- we're at the end of our time, so I'm going to ask the two of you to think about any final comments that you want to leave us with.

Larry, you might want to comment on this resource issue, and one other issue maybe in closing if you feel like addressing this and leaving us with any final thoughts here, is the question of breadth versus focus. There are huge issues in the world today that can and in fact are taking on the leadership of this country into many different directions -- in the economics area, Iraq, on Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea. There are big geopolitical issues like China, India, and Russia. There are these existential questions like nuclear security and climate change, and so the question or presidential command becomes a particularly challenging one as well because you don't simply command that.

It's a very complex world in which to deal with, and any final thoughts you can leave us on how do you manage effective amidst this kind of complexity I think would be of interest to people as well.

So let me give it back to the two of you, and actually, I'm going, Eric, to ask you to go first, and then, Secretary Eagleburger, we'll give you a final word.

AMBASSADOR EDELMAN: Well, I think it is an enormously complex challenge, set of challenges that the administration faces. I think Peter's point in his book, which I think is compelling is that the ability of a president to -- and his team -- to look at issues in relation to one another as opposed to one off, and to develop a strategic view is absolutely crucial.

It's crucial for two reasons: One, because you have to have a strategy if you're going to be effective, but it's also crucial because if you don't, you don't have a theory of the case to explain to the American people why it is you're doing things in different arenas. So I think this is going to be important.

The law requires the administration to develop its own national security strategy which is meant to frame a series of documents in the department of defense, quadrennial defense review, the national defense and national military strategy and I think that will be a place where the administration ought to put some intellectual effort because it's very

important for them to figure out what they, as the administration, think is the strategy of the United States and the way the various issues they are confronting are related.

And I think that because, very famously, Harry McMillan was once asked what drove him, what drove his agenda when he was prime minister after he left office in the mid-'60s. And he replied, "Events, dear boy, events." And this administration will, like all others, be driven by events most of which they won't or can't predict. And unless they have the theory of the case down, they'll be driven willy-nilly from one side to the other, as the Carter administration.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Well, first of all, to a degree I -- yes, it's a complicated world, and it's gotten more so. And part of the problem is we make it more complicated. Peter in his book refers to Reagan as partly successful, partly not, because he paid attention to maybe five things that were important to him and then didn't pay as much attention to some of the others.

That was not -- in an increasingly complicated world, that is not necessarily the wrong way to deal with the issues. If you can identify five or ten which you really have to -- and you're president and you have to stick with all the time -- and you've got confidence in some of your subordinates and can let them deal with some of the others, I don't say

that's the optimum, but I do say that it may be in an increasingly complicated world exactly what you're going to have to do. And you do have to then find some capable advisors that you can rely on. And if you find out that you can't rely on them, you'd better get rid of them pretty damn fast.

So I'm going to start by saying that while, yes, I think that George Bush -- George 41 -- I never remember the numbers, but I think that's the one -- that's the president that I saw most closely. I thought he was superb on foreign affairs. I think he lost on domestic issues, but he -- I thought he did beautifully and managed a complicated process with a good deal more sophistication than I would have expected when I first went to work for him.

But again, the book is absolutely critical in terms of trying to get around -- people getting their heads around the issue of how presidents ought to work, how they ought to deal with these issues. But in the end it's the presidents that have to read this book and get something out of it. And they don't necessarily have to agree with everything Peter has in there, but, boy, I'll tell you this gives a better roadmap than anything I've seen before or since, including *The President at the Creation*, and a number of other books that have come out.

But also I would say to you, ladies and gentlemen, I don't

know if you all saw this news this morning, but with North Korea having renounced the armistice so that we are now supposedly back at a condition of the war that I thought -- that was my war, it shows you how old I am -- and I thought maybe we'd won that one, but I'm not so sure now. That was is now back with us.

Now, we can assume that it's all a bunch of hogwash, but I don't happen to think it is, by the way. I just don't think you can count on those people having any sensible reactions to anything. So I wouldn't be surprised if their tops are blown off somewhere. But my point is a different one: It is that this world is just increasingly -- we've gone from the relative stability of the Cold War, believe it or not, where the only thing we had to worry about was whether the Soviet Union finally got a leader who got drunk one night and pushed the button, and was prevented from doing so by his six generals who would normally stand in the way, but where there was a relative stability in this world and between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Chinese to now a world in which there is no stability you could count on for more than 15 minutes, and as an example was this morning and what we learned has happened today. Whether it is or is not a significant event, we will find out at some point or another.

But it is this sort of issue that means that however the

president organizes himself and his staff using this the best he can, he's going to have to deal with problems that in my worst days in the state department I didn't have to deal with. And it is not going to be fun, and anything that can be done to help the president organize himself is terribly important to get it done, because I am -- we spent 15 years ignoring the nuclear weapons issue in the one way we should have paid attention to them, which was not trying to negotiate some sort of an agreement on reducing them but rather getting the nuclear powers to come together to say that -- and it maybe it couldn't have been done, but we never really tried it -- but that we should have come together, said to everyone who wanted to build the nuclear weapon, if you put your finger in the hard water -- well, it's not hard water, what do you call it?

MR. PASCUAL: Light water.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Light water, excuse me, whatever it is, we're going to cut it off. We should have done that 15 years ago, we didn't. And now we're going to reap the whirlwind, and that means that this president or the one that follows him is going to be faced, I'm convinced, with an exchange of nuclear weapons somewhere in this world between now and the end of his second term if he has one.

MR. PASCUAL: Well, I think certainly one of the things that

comes out of the book to me is that -- that Peter saw presidents who succeed as ones who encourage debates, who encourage honesty in that debate, and who encourage stability and are able to translate that, as the two of you has done, and as Peter has said, and keep consistency in politics. I think he would be extraordinarily pleased that we've been able to have this discussion around his book and extract some of the lessons that have come forth in this discussion that we've had today.

And I think he probably would have been looking at us for this last final thing -- Gosh, they did this because of something I wrote? What fools they really were.

Peter Rodman wrote a great book. *Presidential Command*, and Veronique, Theadora, it's been an honor to be able to do this on Peter's book. Thank you very much.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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