# THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

## CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

and the

## SLAVIC RESEARCH CENTER AT HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY

## THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: BEYOND NORTHEAST ASIA

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#### **INTRODUCTION:**

**Richard C. Bush III** Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

**Akihiro Iwashita** Director, Slavic Research Center

**Carlos Pascual** Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy

Kenji Shinoda Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Japan

#### PANEL 1: CHINA AND RUSSIA

Akihiro Iwashita (Moderator)

**Yoshifumi Nakai** Professor, Gakushuin University

**Richard C. Bush III** Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

Shinji Hyodo Senior Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studies

**Steven Pifer** Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

#### PANEL 2: EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Richard C. Bush III (Moderator)

**Tadayuki Hayashi** Vice President, Hokkaido University

**Justin Vaisse** Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

Keiko Sakai Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Michael E. O'Hanlon Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy

#### LUNCH AND KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

#### Kent Calder

Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University

#### PANEL 3: CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA

**Shinichiro Tabata (Moderator)** Professor, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

**Tomohiko Uyama** Professor, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

Johannes F. Linn Executive Director, Wolfensohn Center for Development

**Osamu Yoshida** Professor, Hiroshima University

**Stephen P. Cohen** Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy

#### <u>PROCEEDINGS</u>

MR. BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, if I could have your attention. My name is Richard Bush, I'm the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. It's my great pleasure to convene this symposium on the U.S.-Japan Alliance Beyond Northeast Asia. It's my pleasure to welcome you. I have three other duties: One is to express how pleased we are to be collaborating in this session with the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University and the Japan Foundation.

Second, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of my former colleague and friend, Professor Akihiro Iwashita from Hokkaido University. This symposium was his idea, and he's done a tremendous amount of work along with his staff and my staff.

And then the third thing is to get out of the way, because we have some other important people to provide introductory remarks. First, Professor Iwashita and my Vice President Carlos Pascual, and then Minister Shinoda Kenji from the Japanese Embassy, so I will get out of the way.

Aki?

MR. IWASHITA: Thank you, Richard, for your hospitality. I have a lot of good memories from my ten months stay here at Brookings Institution as Visiting Fellow at CNAPS last year, and I am very happy and excited to be back.

Particularly, I found out two things during my stay in Washington. First, major league baseball. I lived in Rockville, Maryland, during my stay. I saw the baseball mania in Japan while I was in Washington, watched baseball every day, evening at home. Naturally, I was fascinated by this Baltimore Orioles, and its broad stadium Camden. Last year's May and June after the seminar at Brookings rather, sometimes even skipping the seminar itself, I went to Camden Yard by MARC to watch the Os game.

After having coming back to Japan, the thing I missed the most was not Washington, not Brookings, but the Camden Yards, as our Ambassador Ryozo Kato said that before. Factually, we could not watch the Os games in Japan. The Japanese media paid only attention to Ichiro, Matsui, and Matsuzaka. Nobody had ever heard of the Orioles; however, this year the situation has changed. I'm not a fan of Uehara, Koji Uehara, but thanks to him, now, the Japan's media rushed to cover the Orioles game. Sometimes I enjoy the Orioles game this season on TV wearing my Brian Roberts black tee shirt from Orioles.

The second things I found out is the life here at Brookings. I'm a researcher in foreign relations having set my career from Russian studies had widened toward China, Central Asia, and now reaching the entire of Eurasia. I often joined non-Northeast Asian seminars at the Brookings and went to other think-tank's seminar on Russia, South Asia, and the Middle East, Central Asia, like that. For example, Georgetown University, and Carnegie, SAIS, Wilson Center, CSIS, and others. Of course, thanks to the helpful guidance of Richard, other Japanese citizens, and CNAPS fellow, I also became familiar with Washington's Northeast Asian foreign policy circles, basicly covering China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

Then I discovered some interesting phenomenon. I was often the only Japanese participant at non-Northeast Asian events. Most Japanese researchers here in D.C. have little interest in non-Northeast Asian events such as on Central Asia, Russia and India, which sometimes closely relates with Northeast Asian politics and economy. As time went on, I recognized these phenomenon are not only true for Japanese but also the Americans. I rarely saw U.S. experts on Northeast Asia join Central Asian conference at SAIS. I did not see U.S. experts on South Asia join a Russian seminar at the Georgetown. It seems also true within Brookings; the Brookings organizes many seminars every day, a big conference every day, and has many talented experts on each region. However, even at Brookings, few experts on Korea join the seminar on Central Europe. A researcher on Russia has little concern about Japan. I have rarely seen a Brookings seminar fellow join together in a session during my stay at the Brookings last year.

An invisible but real line dividing the different area studies is much stronger than I expected. A lack of interaction among them seems to seriously damage the foreign policymaking process, I believe. Imagine the consequences of a so-called strategic thinkers' discourse on such worst-case scenario as World War IV, and the united evils, et cetera, against the United States. This sort of discourse which lack deep expertise on each area made a sporadic evil into a united demon against the United States, such as the former President's thinking which linked Afghanistan with Iraq, and this area and this area. To calm down the old strategic thinking and reshape the rational foreign policy under the new presidency, the time has come to raise a ground work for a more sound, more reliable area centered expertise beyond the border and sectionalism on current area studies.

In this sense, today's event is remarkable, not for Japanese only, but for the American, the United States. We must seek together a new methodology for reshaping foreign policies throughout the world. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Richard and my Brookings colleagues for understanding my idea and for endeavoring to invite today's Brookings all-star team beyond the dividing line that separates different area of expertise. I believe today is a great day for us.

Of course, today's direct aim is selling Japan or letting Washington audience know Japan's expertise on area studies; beyond Northeast Asian circles, I write it in handout – maybe you have my handout? Also getting Japan right in Northeast Asian policymaking circles and showing Japan's true potential as an ally are important tasks. Of course, recently the alliance is stretching for cooperation on Iraq, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean and beyond Northeast Asia. However, we have yet to coordinate our regional expertise together; that is, we have yet to truly understand each other.

Today is the first step to enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance for this orientation. Our Slavic Research Center has brought together a good team here, I believe. Some names belong to the other institution; however, Professor Sakai, our Iraq specialist, was a non-resident professor of our Slavic Research Center last year, and Professor Nakai Yoshifumi, expert on China, and Professor Yoshida, Hiroshima University expert on India, belong to a huge ongoing comparative studies project on Eurasian great powers, targeting Russia, China, and India. Maybe you recognize this brown pamphlet on the desk? Check it, please.

And Mr. Hyodo is often invited to our delegation as a Russian – conference on Russia. So, two years ago when our center jointly organized symposium on Russia with Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, he was there. In this sense, we are also the virtual team on Slavic Research Center. I'm convinced that all of you here will enjoy our presentation, and will be inspired by the intensive discussion today. Thank you for joining us.

And I pass the mike to Carlos, please.

MR. PASCUAL: Professor Iwashita, thank you for your encouraging and inspiring words and your vision in leading this conference and these ideas.

My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm one of the vice presidents of the Brookings Institution. I'm the Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program here, and it's a pleasure to be able to introduce this session as well.

I want to thank in particular the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University for organizing the Japanese delegation, and in particular to Vice President Hayashi for bringing together such a distinguished team and for the entire team for traveling such a long way. So thank you very much, and a big hand to all of them for their willingness to participate.

(Applause)

I want to thank the Japan Foundation for their support for this conference as well as a number of other activities. I want to make a special note and an acknowledgment of Minister Shinoda, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Japan here, who of himself is a tremendous scholar on issues related to Russia, on Europe, on global issues, and very much could be a part of the panel, and next time we'll have to book you further in advance to get you here for a long period of time, because he's a person of tremendous expertise, and it's a great opportunity for us to be able to engage with him on a regular basis. And then, of course, to my colleagues at the Brookings Institution, in particular Richard Bush, for his leadership of the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies and all of the colleagues that are participating on these panels, thank you for giving your time to be able to do so.

As Professor Iwashita has underscored in a globalized world it is absolutely critical and essential that the United States and Japan engage in the events of this globalized world in order to maintain the relevance and the centrality of the relationship. And in a sense, that's what this conference is about. If we start to look at how the U.S.-Japan relationship has already started to develop in the course of the Obama administration, I think that's a trend that we can see a foundation for, and I think a challenge that we face is how do we continue to build on it?

When Secretary Clinton was in Tokyo, one of the things that she said was working together, the United States and Japan, working together to deal with the multitude of issues that affect not only Asia but the entire world is a high priority for the Obama administration. In other words, we have to look beyond the immediate relationship. If we look at the discussions that she had with Prime Minister Aso, and then when Prime Minister Aso came in his meetings with President Obama, obviously they talked about Asia, obviously they talked about the United States and Japan, obviously they talked about North Korea.

But one of the issues where they engaged a great deal of time on, were the issues and the collaboration that we might have on Afghanistan and Pakistan and climate change. These are increasingly parts of the relationships. If we look even here, anticipating the future, when Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki had a chance to speak here last November, one of the things that he was underscoring was that given that the United States and Japan are the world's two largest economies, we have a special global responsibility on economic and other matters, and hence the importance of the U.S.-Japan engagement in the context of the G-20 meeting that took place here in November, that took place in London in April. This isn't just a sidelight to those discussions: The U.S.-Japan relationship is central to how we're going to continue to manage the questions of competitiveness, stimulating our financial systems, stimulating the growth of our economy, and engaging in an effective partnership on thinking about new regulatory standards and transparency throughout the world.

In a sense, I think it's important for us to step back for a moment and think about the nature of the word that the United States and Japan face together. And for illustrative purpose, let's think about this for a minute in three different categories. A whole series of global crises or crises throughout the world that we face today, we know them well: Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, the Middle East peace process. We have a whole series of geopolitical challenges that we face: the rise of China and India, the relationship with Russia which at times has been, let's say, complicated and difficult, and a whole series of issues that we face throughout the African continent that have become even more acute as a result of the global recession.

And then a whole series of global and existential challenges that we face today, starting with the economic and financial crisis that we face in the world as well as issues related to climate change, nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, the spread of conflict across borders. This is the world that we face today, so how do we bring that back to the U.S.-Japan relationships and how do we understand it. Let me suggest five points that I think are important for us to think about. The first is the nature of globalization itself. It's the reality that we have today. In fact, what we've seen is that the ability to tap into global markets for capital and technology and labor have increased, have created unprecedented growth and wealth and have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in places like China and India. Yet at the same time the dark side of that globalization, the ability to manage it, or better said the inability to manage it effectively is part of what led to, for example, in the United States the housing crisis leading to a financial crisis to an economic crisis to a global recession.

Go on to issues like climate change and the very fact that we've had the miracle of industrialization and the prosperity that that's brought to the United States and Japan, in particular, and has brought goods to people, billions of people throughout the world has also created a pattern of energy use and fossil fuel use that has put such concentrations of carbon into the atmosphere that can, in fact, actually destroy life on the planet today as we see it.

And so what we face is this recognition that we have this phenomenon of globalization, and we have to have the ability to manage issues that go across borders and where no individual nation can actually solve these problems on its own.

Which brings me to my second point. What does leadership in the world mean today, then? In the context of all of these problems, the crises, the geopolitical issues, the existential issues, no one country can solve these alone; no one country can isolate themselves from these problems, so that is no long an option. And so what we face today is a challenge in leadership, is a challenge in partnership, a challenge in international partnership that will produce results. And this kind of partnership is not something which is based on some fanciful notions of idealism; it's actually become the new realism in international security policy because without it, and without making it effective, we can't succeed.

So the third point then: How do we make it effective? To make it effective we need better rules, we need a set of -- we need a foundation that creates the operational guidelines for how we're going to operate in this international environment. And hence what we see, for example, the discussions that we have on global economic issues and the implications for the ways that we change the management of the IMF, or the requirements that we have for increased capital to stimulate our global economy, or for the new mechanisms that we need to put in place for an international climate change agreement. What we're struggling for here is create the rules of the game in this globalized environment.

The fourth point that I think is important, is that in order to be able to succeed, we need effective institutions. And some of those institutions are going to be multilateral in nature. Some of them will be regional in nature. But we have to understand that we have to invest in these institutions and create their capacity in order to be able to respond to crises and be able to provide the foundation for effective responses on the ground.

Which brings us to my final and fifth point, which is we have to be serious about performance, and we have to monitor that performance because in the end, if we don't deliver results, we're not going to be effective.

So what I come back to is that if the U.S.-Japan alliance is going to be relevant and effective in the world that we face today -- and here I came back to Professor Iwashita's point -- if it's going to be effective in the world that we face today, it has to be relevant to that kind of world. We have to obviously think about the direct issues that we have in our relationship; we have to think about the issues in the United States and Japan themselves. But if we take that relationship and try to separate it from that wider global context, then we miss out on part of the potential, but we miss out on part of what the relevance of that alliance can actually be.

And so if we want to think in bigger terms, if we want to ask the question if the United States and Japan have a stake in prosperity and security in the world for the next 50 years, how are we going to shape this alliance and this relationship in a way that actually helps us get to that point? And that's part of what we want to get at at this conference today, to be able to have a conversation that focuses on issues related to Russia and China, related to Central Asia, related to Europe. That takes on issues such as energy and climate change because these are the kinds of things that are fundamental to relevance in the global environment that we have today and to the prosperity and security of our countries.

It's a real pleasure to have a chance to add a few comments opening this session, and I want to turn it over to my friend and colleague, Minister Shinoda to add his words of welcome from the Japanese side. Thank you.

#### (Applause)

MR. SHINODA: Thank you very much, Carlos, and Richard, and Iwashita-sensei. I'm delighted to join you today because the topic of this symposium is most timely and important. For providing this opportunity, I wish to applaud two of the most distinguished institutions in our two countries: The Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University. And I once again would like to join you in thanking Dr. Richard Bush and Dr. Akihiro Iwashita for all that they have done.

Now that the Obama administration has passed the much publicized 100day milestone, I believe that we can look further down the road and discuss your theme: Japan-U.S. Alliance Beyond Northeast Asia. As Carlos mentioned, since January 20, the importance of our bilateral alliance has shined through. In February, two excellent visits achieved two firsts: Secretary Clinton chose Japan as her first foreign destination; and just one week later Prime Minister Aso became the first foreign leader to meet with President Obama at the White House. These very positive high-level talks have enabled us to take the next steps smoothly and seamlessly. We have advanced a very close consultation and policy coordination on such important issues as North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, climate change, and et cetera, et cetera.

Everyone here knows that our Japan-U.S. alliance has been all important to Asia and the world for more than half a century, and it continues to evolve. Needless to say, the core pillar of our alliance remains the same, our security arrangement which centers on the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. Yet in recent years as we face new global challenges the significance of our alliance has increased greatly. Today it is often called the "Japan-U.S. alliance in the world."

One of the most relevant and important regional areas in this regard is Eurasia. It is the vast expanse that reaches from East Asia to Europe and the Middle East. By cooperating closely, Japan and the United States can do much to advance stability, prosperity and democracy there. As we now think about how to move forward, let me make three personal suggestions.

The first point, our two countries together should always try to look at the Eurasian continent from the East. We need the European perspective, but we also need the Asian perspective. If one overshadows the other, our policy approach could be distorted, our effectiveness diminished. When we look at the players, increasingly strong China is stepping forward, and Russia which straddles Europe and Asia, shows a growing interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States enjoys a special vantage point as a trans-Pacific state and close ally of Japan, and as a trans-Atlantic state long linked with Europe. It is ideally suited to view Eurasia through Eastern eyes as well as Western eyes.

Second, I would like to point out the importance of the area centered on South Asia and Central Asia which we could call Central Eurasia. And I believe that a regional approach could be very useful for this particular area. Everyone is now focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and rightly so. The challenges are considerable, and they must be addressed. But I don't think we should limit our efforts just to the narrow territorial space of those countries. Rather, we should address the entire region and the area surrounding it such as India, Central Asian republics, and Iran, keeping in mind that the countries there are closely intertwined in terms of stability and prosperity. We would be better off if we take a comprehensive regional approach to Central Eurasia as a whole.

For example, Japan's initiative during the last several years called "Central Asia plus Japan dialogue" has been based on this concept. Japan and the United States, through close policy coordination can expand our partnership with our European friends

as well as a constructive collaboration with Russia and China. Our common goal is to bring stability, prosperity, and democracy to the whole Central Eurasian region.

Third is the division of labor type of partnership. As we coordinate policies and measures in the region, we should strive to enable each member country to participate where it is comparatively strong while making sure that the efforts are as complementary as possible. Such a division of labor rooted in a cooperative spirit will boost the effectiveness of our team effort.

As I have said, this symposium can help us find a common viewpoint where we can look at Eurasia together from the East. By doing so, we can further promote our joint efforts for stability, prosperity, and democracy in the region. So I am most enthusiastic about this symposium and the opportunities for cooperation. Let's have a great discussion, and thank you all very much.

(Applause)