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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PIFER: Good morning. My name is Steven Pifer. I'm a Visiting Fellow here at the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to today's Sakip Sabanci lecture.

For those of us in the Center on the United States and Europe, a key focus of research has been Turkey, U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkey's relations with Europe, and the broader role that Turkey plays in the Euro-Atlantic community, the broader Middle East, and Central Asia, and the Sakip Sabanci lecture has been one of our premier public events each year. We're very grateful to Sabanci University for their continuing support for both the research and this lecture series.

And I'm delighted that today we're joined by Guler Sabanci. She's with us. She chairs Sabanci Holding, and she also chairs the Board of Trustees at Sabanci University; and she's also brought a distinguished group here with her from Turkey. We're pleased to welcome them as well.

We're also delighted to have Lord Christopher Patten with us. He will deliver today's lecture, and Strobe Talbott will introduce him more formally in just a moment.

And, finally, I would like to welcome the audience that is joining us at the Sabanci University in Istanbul by video teleconference. Professor Sayari, I hope you can hear us.

PROF. SAYARI: Yes, we can hear you. Greetings from Istanbul, Sabanci University campus.

MR. PIFER: Well, good evening, we're glad that the technology is working.

Now, let me invite Ms. Sabanci up for a few comments, please.

MS. SABANCI: Thank you, Steve.

Yes, good morning, and good afternoon in Istanbul. It is a great pleasure to be here, to be back here in Brookings. It's our fifth Sakip Sabanci lecture. We are very pleased that we are here today again with our president-elect of our university, Nihat Berker, with Professor Ahmet Aykac. I see a lot of friends. Strobe Talbott is here, Kemal Dervis is here. And thank you for all being here, and also in Istanbul in the campus it is nice to be connected with you also.

As we all know, and I don't know -- for those of you who don't know maybe, but my uncle, late uncle, Mr. Sakip Sabanci, who was a well-known figure in my country, and he was mostly known for his love for his country, and in his love for Turkey he always believed strongly that

Turkey deserved a more important role in the international world, in the international politics. That's why our objective with this Sakip Sabanci lecture series that we're doing with Brookings Institute is to establish, really, a prominent platform for exploring Turkey's increasingly important role in the world. Also of course, we would -- our objective with these lectures is to give an opportunity for our students to hear from the experts the recent developments in both regional and international politics and to help them to better understand the complexities and the complex world that we're living in.

The former lectures were given -- for those of you who have followed would remember we had started with former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; and the second year we had the former president of World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz; and then we had Richard Holbrooke; and last year we had Nicholas Burns, former U.S. Secretary of State and ambassador. And today I am so pleased and so proud that this year's lecture will be given by Lord Chris Patten, a good friend I can say, the chancellor of the University of Oxford. And I'm also very, very proud that he had accepted to be the international board member of Sabanci University, which we are delighted to have him with us. Of course, as you all, I am also looking forward of hearing his thoughts about ways of

building strong partnership among the U.S., Europe, and Turkey despite the many challenges that we're going through.

Before starting the lecture, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my good friends, Strobe Talbott, Dan Benjamin, and Steve, and all the team that is in Brookings who have helped and contributed to realize this conference; and of course in Turkey with Tosun Terzioglu, Professor Aykac, all the Sabanci University team who have supported and contributed for realizing this conference. And thank you all again for being and sharing this lecture with us. Thank you very much.

MR. PIFER: Thank you very much. I'd like to turn the podium now over to Strobe Talbott, president of Brookings, who will introduce today's lecture.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Steve.

And thank you, Guler Hanim, once again for giving us the opportunity to put more energy and more content into this partnership between the Brookings Institution and Sabanci University. It is a great honor that you have bestowed upon us by giving us a chance to be part of this annual lectureship, which serves as a living memorial to your uncle about whom you just said a few words, and all of us who know about him, his achievements, and his legacy know that Sakip Sabanci was not just a great Turkish patriot but also a citizen of the world. He was a visionary

entrepreneur, a champion of reform, and a generous philanthropist and educator.

The lectureship, which is now in its fifth year, as you've already heard, underscores the Brookings Institution's commitment to Turkey's importance to the United States, Europe, and the world. We've had here at the Brookings Institution a program dedicated to Turkey for coming up on six years. It has been ably led by Omer Taspinar, and it is quite appropriate I think that the Turkey program should be housed within the Center on the United States and Europe here at Brookings. It is a matter of particular pride to us that two leaders of that center, Phil Gordon and Dan Benjamin, have been nominated to serve at high levels of the United States government.

The Center on the United States and Europe here at Brookings also has the benefit of two distinguished U.S. diplomats who are deeply experienced in the region, Steve Pifer and Mark Paris, who have contributed in many ways to the work of the Turkey Program. That work consists, among other things, of both public and very private discussions, including some in recent months that have, I think, reflected and caught the spirit of the U.S.' interest in positive developments in the region, such as recent statements that have come out of Ankara and

Yerevan announcing that Turkey and Armenia have agreed to a roadmap toward normalization.

I might add that even though quite a few of our colleagues here at Brookings are passing through what is really a revolving door at the opening of the building out here as they leave Brookings to go into national public service, as you just heard from Guler Hanim, that door works in both directions, and we're very lucky indeed to have now arriving at Brookings a world class international public servant, my old and dear friend Kemal Dervish, who has joined us to be the leader of our program on the global economy and development.

Among Kemal's other activities as he moves into the new phase of his career after stepping down as the administrator at the United Nations Development Program, he is, as Guler Hanim mentioned, also an advisor of Sabanci University, which is yet another connection between this institution and the one that I'm glad to see is still on the screen. We always say quietly to ourselves "Insha'Allah" whenever we turn on the technology for these events, but it seems to be working fine, and I hope I haven't just jinxed it. I'm particularly glad that Kemal could be with us for the program today.

Because it is a very timely program indeed, among other things what we now have is an opportunity to pick up on the interaction

four weeks ago between President Barack Obama and a hundred or so Turkish students at the Cultural Center in Istanbul, and just as so many Americans and people around the world had a chance to watch and listen to the give and take on television between President Obama and that wonderful group of students that was assembled there, we are now connected in real time to an equally superb group, rather more numerous group it looks like, in Istanbul at Sabanci University.

Today's event is timely for another reason as well. As the United States and the world struggle with the economy, so does Turkey. As one of the most rapidly growing countries in the world, Turkey ironically has been especially vulnerable to the financial tsunami whose epicenter, of course, was on Wall Street. That paradox, which is putting it rather gently, is an important and complicating element in our discussion. We could not have a better speaker and guest of honor to lead us in that discussion.

Chris Patten's career is well known to all of you -- a member of the British Parliament from 1979 until 1992, the last and politically courageous and very effective British governor of Hong Kong, European Commissioner for External Relations, Chancellor of Oxford, and author of several superb books. His latest book is called *What Next*? That title poses a big question about the problems facing the world and the

solutions we must develop together. Many of those problems, including those associated with the global recession, are ones that are more likely to be soluble if the United States collaborates vigorously and constructively and with as much common ground and common interest as possible with Turkey; and that means with Turkey in its capacity not just as an American ally, not just as a member of the G-20, but also as a full member of the European Union, an institution that Chris Patten has done so much to strengthen not least in his advocacy of Turkish succession.

Chris, you have the floor and our gratitude for being here.

LORD PATTEN: Madam Sabanci, Strobe, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, can I say what a great honor it is to be invited to deliver a lecture that bears the name of such a distinguished benefactor, of such a distinguished foundation, and of such a distinguished university.

He came, he saw, he conquered, even enjoying a standing ovation from the European Press Corps in London. President Obama's first official trip to Europe in March was a huge success, a source of pleasure for all America-philes. This did not perhaps come as a surprise. After all, Barack Obama was overwhelmingly the choice of the admittedly non-voting European public for the White House. He follows a president whose departure is not widely lamented in either old or new Europe. Moreover, not to downplay his triumph, he does not face stiff competition

in terms of charisma or authority when stood alongside his European peers. He speaks as the newly elected leader of what is still the world's only superpower. Which of his partners speaks for Europe and were any of them to do so, what would they have to say, and would their colleagues agree with them?

Now, here I confess to a typical European presumption. By "Europe" I mean the European Union even though not every country in continental Europe is a member of the E.U. But most countries are already members or would like to be so in the future. The President's last port of call was Turkey, the fate of whose application for membership will help to define Europe's future as well as that country's own destiny. The largest non-members are the part-aspirant Ukraine, whose fluctuating western border tells much of the story of Europe over two centuries, and Russia, which is only partly European culturally, politically, and geographically.

I hope that my compression is defensible. When, therefore, I suggest that the President conquered Europe, what exactly was it that he conquered? What is Europe today? The European Union is a process, a process which has enabled European nation states to cope with their past and to accommodate themselves to a world in which individually they are no longer great powers. The Union is both reactive and visionary --

reactive because it came into existence to entomb ethnic nationalism, which had hatched the Holocaust and triggered two world wars; visionary because it offered at its most radical the notion of a super-state rising from the ashes of the nation-states left behind by empire and at its most practical the still pretty revolutionary notion of nation-states sharing sovereignty in defined areas and accepting binding dispute settlement machinery to make that pooling sovereignty work.

The creature that has emerged bears the strong imprint of the second -- to some people lesser -- vision, though there is still occasional flashes of the first, the sight of a flag, or the sound of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy."

When President Giscard D'Estaing presented the work of his European convention, which had been set the task of drawing the legal treaty-based threads that bound the E.U. together into a constitution for the 21st century, he argued that this was akin to the work of the founding fathers of the United States in Philadelphia. This claim was confusing braggadocio.

In Philadelphia, sub-national entities agreed to form themselves into a nation state, albeit one whose institutional manifestations spent many years learning to co-hear.

In Brussels, proud and in many cases ancient nation states were agreeing which of their powers they were prepared to share with others and the terms on which they were ready to do this. They were not winding themselves up like bankrupt companies.

The American Constitution begins with the words, "We the people." The E.U. Treaty, which still awaits ratification, begins with the words, "His majesty, the King of the Belgians" and goes on to list, in alphabetical order, the heads of state in all the other E.U. countries. We the people of Europe are not the source of legitimacy and accountability. We the people of such and such a country validate the E.U. and provide its authority.

There is, as has been widely noted, no European *demos*, no European electorate. There is a European Parliament, which has power but not much authority. Europeans are not greatly interested in the politics of one another's countries. Their televisions, on the other hand, keep them well informed about football across the continent. The beautiful game pulls them together much more than the political parties of the left, right, and center could ever do. Moreover, the exclusion of most of the political issues that most concern them from Europe's collective agenda ensures that the questions that dominate European debate are invariably of secondary importance to voters. Member states will not give up to

Brussels their tax-raising powers or their responsibility for health, education, pensions, or labor markets; and no government is going to cede to others the right to determine whether its young men and women should take up arms, risking life and limb. So, Europe is not the creation of a Federalist's dreams on the one hand or of a Euro-phobe's nightmares on the other. Its alleged pretensions to super-statehood are what St. Thomas More called terrors for children.

In Europe, national sovereignty is transformed. It is not thrown away or usurped. None of this belittles the real and extraordinary achievements of Europe, far surpassing any previous efforts anywhere that sustain regional cooperation. The E.U. has drawn together a collection of different national economies into a transnational single market. The IMF reported in April 2007 that this market's GDP was significantly bigger than that of the United States -- 15.8 trillion pounds versus 11.6 trillion pounds.

Europe invests more in America than America does in Europe. This single market is represented internationally by a single trade negotiator, albeit one with a mandate agreed by national capitals. In trade policy, the E.U. is the biggest global hitter alongside the U.S., not a claim that could be made in the foreign and security fields. Twelve of the member states operate with a single currency and monetary policy. The

E.U. has a harmonized environmental policy. The single market is not complete, not fully covering yet energy policy or services. But the scale of the advance has been sufficient to make the European Commission, for example, one of the most significant global actors in competition policy.

It's easy to see why the E.U. is regarded as an economic giant on the world stage. It aspires, of course, to be much more. But in foreign and security policy, rhetoric has too often been stranded way ahead of the political will to turn heavy aspiration into facts on the ground.

The end of the Cold War impelled Europe along the road in the hunt for a political role that would match its economic one. No longer would a commercial Charles Atlas allow sand to be kicked in his political face. There were several reasons for this. With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, Western Europe lost its geo-strategic centrality and the importance it enjoyed merely by surviving and prospering under America's nuclear umbrella.

Perhaps Europeans recalled the glory days when their flags had fluttered over palm and pine. They certainly remembered that America's role in Europe's reconstruction had aimed at the creation of a democratic partner capable of assisting the U.S. in bearing the burdens of global leadership. In addition, the Russian empire's dismemberment raised questions of stability on Europe's own continent. It had, in the

recent past, taken in Spain, Portugal, and Greece to consolidate their democratic escape from military dictatorship and fascism. Now it had to look to its responsibilities in the East.

On top of that, in Yugoslavia the collapse of the state before the ferocious recrudescence of ethnic nationalism brought back to Europe those demons that we believe had been exorcised almost 50 years before. Over 220,000 people died. Concentration camps were established. Families were burned from their homes. Ethnic cleansing destroyed communities. War crimes stalked Europe, not just Rwanda. And all this within a short drive of the beaches where Europeans had only recently baked themselves in the Dalmatian sun.

And what did Europe do? We had meetings. We drafted communiqués replete with strong nouns and weak verbs, and we bragged that the hour of Europe had at last arrived. But Europe would not decide what it wanted. Did it want to stop Yugoslavia from falling apart, to expedite the process, or to look the other way? What America declined to do mattered far more than what Europe could agree to do. Surely, nothing has done more to push Europe into the ambition to play a role in foreign and security policy than the bloody humiliations of the Balkans.

There was a hum-drum prosaic point to consider as well. While two European countries had nuclear weapons and were also

permanent members of the U.N. Security Council because they had counted among the Second World War's victors, no European country on its own could shape the world's affairs. Even if, despite the bruising lesson of Suez, some were prepared to deny that. They would surely concede that they mattered more around the world, could pack a bigger punch when they spoke or acted together. So, how did they actually wish to behave as a partner of their friend and protector, the U.S.?

There was a conceptual problem here, an issue that divided the member states. Should Europe focus primarily on building a European pillar for the trans-Atlantic arch or on constructing the arch itself? As with many metaphors, the symbols often take over the argument and confound objective analysis, but there was certainly a difference of opinion with Britain and France on different sides of the architectural argument and Germany somewhere in the middle.

Since the 1940s, Britain had seen itself primarily as an American confidant who happened also laterally to be a member of the E.U. British prime ministers sought to play the ever faithful Jeeves in the White House, a discrete clearing of the throat pursuant to a courtly word to the wise. Is there anything these days more demeaning than London's periodic attempts to squeeze the phrase "special relationship" out of American administrations?

Often the result of all this is bad for Britain and unhelpful for America, as was the case when Mr. Blair played the Old Testament's Ruth to your last President in Iraq, "Entreat me not to leave thee or to return from following after thee, for wither thou goest I will go and where thou lodgest I will lodge," thus Mr. Blair.

In France, your oldest ally, attitudes have been a little more confusing, bedeviled by an exceptionalism that mirrors that same American quality that we love in Europe to hate. Harold McMillan said of General de Gaulle, "He speaks of Europe but he means France." France certainly associates the worst of globalization with the U.S., even while enthusiastically swallowing your McDonald's, and I've never quite been able to fathom whether French criticism of American is because you've done so much for Europe or because you haven't done more.

I dwell on the two countries that I know best and love most for a simple reason. This is not a very communitarian point, yet there is no European policy to speak of where France and Britain and Germany, too, are not at the heart of the action. I don't seek to be rude about the others or to belittle them, but count out the big three and nothing much gets done, and Britain has to recognize that because of our history of semi-detached engagement, sometimes all that matters is for France and Germany to arrive at the table. The nature of any European partnership

with the U.S. is imbued with the lessons that you taught some of us after the Second World War. There has to be an international rule book to which all are subject, supported by international institutions that help to give it legitimacy. We want to work with you as partners to deal with common problems that no one state can tackle successfully on its own. It was the sense that that view of the world had been cast away with derision by the Bush administration that caused such wailing and gnashing of teeth in Europe. Now we sense that normal service has been resumed with a charm, dash, and eloquence that captivate us.

With President Bush we knew what we were against; but do we now know exactly what we are for or, rather, what we are prepared to do to sustain a view of the world that we regard as fundamentally European? There are a few problems. When we define Europe's multilateralism is there a danger that, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, "There's no there there"?

For a start, what happens when international rules -- the international rule of law is defied? When is Europe happy to concede the use of force? After 9/11, Europe drafted and agreed with commendable speed a global strategy paper. One reason why we were able to agree to it so quickly is that this was a question that we ducked. When Robert Kagan compared Europe with Venus and America with Mars, there was

rather more truth to the observation than was comfortable for Europeans. The reasons for our Venutian tendencies are clear. We tried Mars to destruction in the last century. We're addicted, of course, to endless meetings, because we know they're better than shooting at one another. Diplomacy is not the wimp's way out. As W. H. Auden noted of diplomats, "And on the issue of their charm depended a land laid waste and all its young men slain."

Naturally, many Europeans are prepared to fight, to put their lives on the line for a good international cause. We have contributed substantially to conflict prevention and to peacekeeping from the Balkans to the Middle East to Africa to Afghanistan. But if public spending is a mark of a nation state's priorities, then the amount that many member states spend on their defense forces does not suggest that the ability to deploy military capability ranks as high as European rhetoric would suggest it should. We're unlikely in Europe to become much more than a super civilian power unless we spend more on defense, harmonize defense procurement, and lose our nervousness about using the force that we actually have. European defense budgets shrink. Germany spends, for example, only 1.5 percent of GDP on its military, and two-thirds of this budget goes on personnel, including 130,000 civilian employees. My grandfather's and my father's generations wanted the

Germans to spend less on their armed forces. Today we want them to spend more. Without doubt, this is a preferable situation, but it does have consequences, as we can see in Afghanistan.

It also inevitably raises questions about the role of NATO, questions that seem to me to be posed as well by the debate about Georgia and NATO enlargement that was triggered by Russia's squalid military action in South Ossetia. Some seem to talk about NATO enlargement as though we're discussing membership of a tennis club. It's a military alliance the commitments to which are serious matters of life and death. What is NATO's function today? Where is the front line? Is NATO simply a relic of the successful past defeat of Soviet Communism on which we're nervous to call time for fear of creating a security void? For me, that's certainly part of the argument.

Getting rid of NATO seems an unnecessary leap in the dark. Without it, I suspect that Europe's contribution to military solutions would be much weaker. The E.U. would certainly be hard-pressed to undertake those occasional exercises in which its superpower ally does not wish to take part itself. In those instances, the Europeans would not be able to tap into the assets that the U.S. makes available to NATO as the organization's main military power. Europe without NATO would be tantamount to embracing unnecessarily a great deal of risk.

In Europe, I guess that we can still grumble, albeit more quietly, these days. But even a multilateralist administration still makes policy primarily on its own, which it then asks us to support. Look at Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's partly our own fault. We have to confront the consequences of wishing to strut our stuff on the world stage as a major player while not being prepared to pay the full price for that role. We can't grumble quite so justifiably about American leadership of a more or less unilateralist variety in security matters when we're not prepared to dig as deep into our pockets to pay for our military as Americans are. We need sometimes to see ourselves as many in the U.S. see us, Monday morning quarterbacks, the courage of whose convictions does not always stretch to paying for them.

If we wish to be an effective partner of a largely multilateralist American superpower, what should Europe do? What is Washington entitled to expect of us? First, managing our own economic recovery through and beyond these turbulent days must be a primary objective. Here much depends on the domestic management of individual member states, which will vary according to whether the economies concerned are debtors or exporting creditors. But there are three issues that we'll need to be aware of collectively. Europe's normally been on the right side of arguments over free trade with the lamentable exception of

agriculture. It's imperative that we avoid slithering into financial protectionism and economic nationalism within the Union or beyond. It would be a calamity to allow the disintegration of the single market, which has been Europe's most significant achievement. G-20 commitments to free trade have been belied, as the World Bank has shown, by significant backsliding. That must stop, and the E.U. should be in the vanguard of stopping it.

Europe's longer-term problem is two-fold. For me, the most significant remarks of President Obama on the margins of the G-20 concerned his determination to end the days during which the U.S. has had a voracious appetite for the goods and services that the rest of the world provides. If it is indeed the end of America's period as the world's spender and borrower of last resort, then we need to look elsewhere for the principal engines of world growth. The relationship between the surplus and deficit countries is going to change, and that will not be a welcome message in some parts of Europe. Nor do we (inaudible) to face up to the results of our demographic challenge, both the 20 percent decline in our population by mid-century and the aging and reduction of our workforce. If we are to raise our productivity and our underlying growth rate, we shall need to make labor market and welfare reforms that will rub up against our traditional attitudes to social solidarity. It's true that

we have an extraordinarily good quality of life, but as Tancredi says in Lampedusa's great novel, *The Leopard*, "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change."

We also need to invest more in research and development and in our badly under-funded universities. The danger is that without reform and change, we'll find ourselves with a falling population, a falling share of world output and trade, and a declining influence in value as the superpower's principal partner in the world.

Second, our principal role in foreign and security policy should continue to underpin stability on our continent and around the borders of the E.U. I spoke earlier about part of the motivation for increasing the membership of the E.U. Enlargement has been our most successful foreign policy promoting regime change peacefully and promoting reforms that have secured democracy, welfare capitalism, and the rule of law. Sometimes we've allowed the political attractions of enlargement to run ahead of the criteria that applicant countries should be able to meet. That was true of Romania and Bulgaria where corruption and organized crime, especially in Bulgaria, continue to pose problems. But overall, enlargement has been a huge success and its prospect has been at the heart of the political process that has brought stability to the

Balkans. It would be a huge error if we were to allow the momentum of this policy to slacken.

Croatia is already in negotiation for full membership. Macedonia's candidacy is accepted, though the opening of negotiations is held up by an argument about the country's name in which both Greece and Macedonia have behaved with what fast-minded observers would surely regard as extreme childishness.

The other countries of Southeast Europe are at various stages of pre-negotiation status encompassed in a process called bureaucratically stabilization and association. There are too important considerations here. The E.U. must remain firmly committed to the perspective of membership for these countries. If they come to believe that the existing member states are not serious about this, the will to reform will weaken.

Second, the E.U. must be tough but not unfair on the conditions for membership. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, must have a properly functioning national government. The high representative there should take tougher action against those politicians responsible for the present political paralysis, freezing their salaries, for instance, if necessary.

Serbia must demonstrate its unshakable commitment to the international rule of law and stop its overt encouragement of separatism in Kosovo north of Mitrovica.

Brussels should be able to convince Washington -- alas, the task seems to be getting more difficult -- that the heavy lifting in the Balkans can be left to the E.U. That will require rather more prolonged attention to what is going on in the region than some member states have been prepared to offer recently. It's a besetting sin in foreign policy to get bored with a subject and to move on before the job is properly done. There's a lot more to do in Southeast Europe.

My biggest concern about enlargement concerns Turkey, a country accepted by Brussels as part of Europe and therefore as a potential E.U. member for over 50 years. During that period, Turkey has successfully pursued reforms that have anchored its status as a modern, increasingly prosperous European democracy.

The membership ambitions of Turkey have been supported by America with an occasional, indeed pretty regular, lack of sensitivity. The high point in crassness occurred during the buildup to the invasion of Iraq when America's then Deputy Secretary of Defense and a previous giver of this lecture, part of an administration that championed Turkey's E.U. ambitions, flew to Ankara to scold Turkish generals for not overriding

the Parliament's clear refusal to allow Turkey to be used as an American base for the war. It cannot surely have passed him by, but encouraging soldiers to overrule democratically elected politicians was not one of Europe's so-called Copenhagen political criteria for membership. But we in Europe have behaved from time to time with almost equal insensitivity. The BBC's Europe editor, Mark Mardell, commented a couple of years ago, somewhat exaggerating the point, that the reforms demanded of Turkey were analogous to a pre-accession U.K. being told to apologize for its behavior to India, change the way it policed Northern Ireland, and hand back Gibraltar.

The question of Turkish membership of the E.U. is difficult partly because we in Europe have increased the complexity ourselves. For example, we allowed a divided Cyprus to become a member of the E.U. on the understanding that the Greek Cypriots would negotiate an agreement to end division with their Turkish neighbors under U.N. auspices. Once in the E.U., the Greek Cypriot government in effect resiled from the deal, even preventing an E.U. commissioner from coming to the island to explain its advantages. It is to me unthinkable that an issue of the importance of Turkish membership can be put in bulk by behavior like this.

My imposition has always been clear, and I don't want to argue it at length here. Turkish membership of the E.U. would be hugely beneficial economically and politically to Europe. Turkey's economic potential with a young and dynamic workforce could help power Europe's economy. Politically, Turkish membership would give Europe far greater clout not only in its neighborhood but outside the region. I believe that the issue is a defining one for Europe's future. If we were to reject Turkey at the end of negotiations in which every test had been met, we could write off being taken seriously as a significant global force.

Turkey can make the process easier or more difficult. Major decisions to be taken in the next few months on reforms, on Cyprus, and on Armenia will set the tone for several years ahead. Turkey clearly has to choose what kind of country it wants to be -- to move forward or go back. I hope it will choose to continue along the road to becoming a more successful, more daring country building on the successes of recent years. Turkey is a first-division country, which should play in the first division, too.

The E.U. and some of its members may seem from the Turkish perspective to be hypocritical, prejudiced, confused, and inured. Turkey should avoid behaving in a similar way. I hope that Turkey will give its friends in Europe the arguments to help them win the battle for

support in Europe. Continuing with reform will help out flank opponents, and that would also be good for Turkey. I don't imagine that Turkey underestimates the role that its E.U. process played in the boom of the 2000s with seven years of growth. The idea that Turkey was moving towards E.U.-style rules and regulations gave a sense of security to investors, and foreign investment flooded in. Turkey's neighbors are interested in a European modernizing country. Investors from the Gulf are looking for the same safe environment for business that they could count on in E.U. capitols.

On Cypress, Turkey has done well to seize the chances for a settlement as they have emerged over the last five years. The best outcome would be a full settlement resulting from the current talks. If that fails, Turkey and the E.U. should avoid allowing the E.U. convergence process to be blocked by the issue and should search for a way forward under the additional protocol to the Ankara agreement forcing the opening of ports and airports and the normalization of relations with Greek Cypriots, challenging as that may be.

Last month's normalization agreement with Armenia was a huge hugely important step forward. Keeping the Armenian border closed does nothing to persuade Armenia to compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh,

a point which E.U. member states should make persuasively to the Azerbaijan government.

I'm sure that Turkey recognizes that it has to convince voters in Europe's democracies that it's playing to the E.U. rules and is a desirable friend, partner, and member of the union. It's more convincing when Turkey behaves like an E.U. member looking out rather than as an outsider rattling the gates to get in. This is an argument that we can win, outflanking populist politicians in Europe who use the issue of Turkish membership as a surrogate or whipping boy for their own domestic problems with immigration, economic dissatisfaction, and cultural frictions. The question is too important for us to allow the negotiations for membership to run into a wall or to grind slowly to a halt in the sand.

My other two geo-strategic priorities, which I'll deal with briefly in developing our partnership with the U.S., are both matters where Turkey, too, has an important role to play. Europe's greatest foreign policy failure in the last 10 years has been our inability to put together a common and coherent position on Russia. European member states have cut bilateral deals with Russia on energy, and Moscow has used them to advance its political agenda. Gazprom has been the principal agent in attempting to secure a Russian sphere of influence around her borders and to increase European dependence on a not-very-reliable monopoly

provider, especially of gas. There are signs that the E.U. may be waking up to the danger, not least of dependence on a source that is both politicized and uncertain.

Any serious policy to reduce European dependence on Russia requires the creation of an internal European energy market with linked-up energy networks and the breaking down of energy monopolies. The European Commission has put forward perfectly sensible proposals to this end, but they've proved to be excessively strong meat for some members, especially the proposals on unbundling.

There are other ways of creating a more market-friendly energy sector that would enable Europe to deal more effectively with Russia, which, needless to say, objects to any change. The other aim for European energy policy should be faster progress on what Eurocrats call the southern energy corridor, securing Caspian energy supplies for European consumers. The fall in the energy price has taken some of the sting out of Russia's aggressive and very political use of energy, but unless we act, I'm sure that the Gazprom tanks will be driving once again onto European lawns. We'd have a better relationship with Russia if we were able to constrain its ability to bully its neighbors.

Finally, more complicated is the role we should as Europeans be playing in our Mediterranean neighborhood. We spend

much time talking to one another and to our Mediterranean partners about Palestine and Israel. Cui bono? We have a big checkbook, which may be useful if there is ever a deal, but since we played no useful role to speak of when the U.S. was not involved in the Bush years in the search for peace, I can't for the life of me see what useful we could play now that you're back on the case. It's sad, but there it is. We even seem reluctant to make in public the rather obvious point that there'll be no agreement without the involvement of Hamas presumably in the first place through its support, a point apparently understood by Secretary Clinton for a government of national unity. I'm afraid that for some years Europe's policy on the Middle East was simply to have another meeting of the Quartet, the "Quartet sans trois", as Amr Moussa called it.

Elsewhere in the region, we should surely be using the Barcelona process now morphed into something pretty well identical called the union of the Mediterranean, the pursuit of freedom agenda that President Bush was right to identify, whatever the hapless way in which it was pursued. The U.S. and Europe talked democracy but connived at the Arabic exception, worried that elections in Arab and Muslim states would replace autocrats with men in beards. But the longer we accept that the Muslim world is not fertile ground for civil society, pluralism, and democracy, the more certain it is that the men in beards will become more

extreme and eventually win elections by even larger majorities. Europe's partnership with Mediterranean countries is posited on a shared commitment to good governance and human rights. We should start to act on this.

There's an old saying that you have to be careful in life lest you get what you hoped and asked for. That has happened to Europe. We have the American President of our dreams. We can no longer define ourselves in contradistinction to President Bush. As I've said, he was so convenient for Europeans, a solution, in a way, to the puzzle of what we wanted to be on the world stage. We could say with conviction we know where we are. We're not with him. But the time has passed when we could say wearily that if only there was a multilateralist in the White House we would be able to rally to the task of offering constructive burden sharing in coping with the world's problems.

There is such a political leader now in Washington, and while he cannot walk on water, he can clearly throw bridges across it. So, how far will we Europeans be able to advance across the planks, and what will be the result if we remain clamorous but nervous and divided on our side of the water? Perhaps next time he comes to call, President Obama will need to step on one or two European toes, which may of

course inhibit the rush by Europe's leaders to be photographed standing next to him.

Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Lord Patten, thank you very much for a fascinating lecture delivered with British insight and also humor. We have about 15 minutes for questions. We'll start with a question here from the audience and then go to Istanbul.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Adil Biyra from the U.S.-Azeri network. I have a question about the Turkey-Armenia border, which you have mentioned, and the need to explain to Azerbaijan about the need to, you know, open the border. Don't you think it would be better to explain to Armenia to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories which came first, and of course the border was closed in retaliation for this? Thank you very much.

LORD PATTEN: It was about 10 years ago, 9 years ago, that I first connected intellectually with the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. It was about the same time that I connected intellectually with the issue of Transnistria, and I'm, sadly, at one of the long line of diplomats or quasi-diplomats who can't point to any success for that -- mild efforts on those problems.

Look, I don't think that there is any reason at all for thinking that closing the border is going to make the Armenians more amenable to a settlement. I think, of course, we'd all like to see a settlement between the two countries. I first spoke about it in Azerbaijan to the earlier President Aliyev I think in 1999 or 2000, and it's high time for progress. I wonder how active and positive Moscow has been in seeking solutions to these (inaudible) conflicts in its own backyard and perhaps sometimes Moscow has seen spheres of influence as being easier to maintain if the countries covered are weakened by disputes between themselves.

MR. PIFER: Okay, let's go now to our colleagues in Istanbul. Professor Sayari, over to you.

PROF. SAYARI: Thank you, Steve. We heard a wonderful lecture, and I'm sure it gave us a lot of ideas for questions, and we have a large audience, so we're going to see who would like to ask some questions.

Yes, somebody here. If you could identify yourself please.

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible). I'm a political science Ph.D. student at Sabanci University. Mr. Patten, thank you very much for this thought-provoking speech. My question will be about the U.K.'s position within the European Union. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had stated that the Atlantic is narrower than the English Channel,

and I was wondering to what extent that you think this statement is still valid today. Thank you.

LORD PATTEN: It's a smart remark, and it has very often been true. When the founding fathers of the E.U. -- Jean Monnet and so on -- came to Washington at the end of the Second World War, they got a much better reception for their ideas of a European common market of pursuing political integration through economic integration. They got a much better reception in Washington than they got in London. One of them called Britain's attitude to the emerging common market and eventually the European Union as the price of victory and (inaudible) country and was, I think, rather deluded -- it was several years after the Second World War -- in thinking that we could establish a niche for ourselves or a geographical place for ourselves somewhere between Europe and the United States at the head of a great empire turned commonwealth and we would be European but not of Europe and that we would be America's subbleton in the world. A lot of our delusions were shattered at Suez, and a lot of them have fallen to pieces since. There's always the danger when you've been a great power that if you don't understand that that status has slipped away you can cease even to become a great country. I don't think we've done that, but there have sometimes been dangers of doing that.

To be serious, I don't think there is any option for Britain but to pursue its national interest as part of the European Union, but because we tend to be rather practical-minded people and you're unlikely to hear Brits ever using the sort of "Ode to Joy" language about the European Union that comes so easily to other Europeans even while they defend their national interests just as vigorously or even more vigorously than British politicians do.

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible). I'm from PFC Energy. You talked about the -- that the division of European -- the E.U., foreign policy -- and this is especially true when it comes to China, and it seems like, you know, Britain, France, Germany -- they all pursue different policies with China, and because of this union there's talk of just the G-2 with the U.S. and China to solve the world's problems. How does the E.U. feel about being sidelined from this discussion, and how can European policy change to have a more productive engagement with China? Thank you.

LORD PATTEN: I think actually that we have had a pretty productive engagement with China, though I suspect Europe disappointments China in one respect. I always used to feel when I was Commissioner that the Chinese ambassador in Brussels and the Chinese foreign ministry had a much clearer grasp about Europe and what we

should be trying to do in Europe than we sometimes had ourselves. If you look at the commercial agreements, the regulatory agreements, the economic agreements, the trade agreements between Europe and China, they suggest a very strong and healthy relationship. But it's true that the bigger countries will very often find themselves competing for larger shares of the Chinese market and offer Chinese investments in a way which destroys some of the coherence and credibility of a European policy. We got into a particularly embarrassing mess a few years ago. The question of the Chinese arms embargo with states going in all sorts of different directions. I think overall, our relationship with China is a very good one, but it is true, as I said in my speech, that if we fail to increase our underlying growth rate, and if we become a group of states with a falling share of world trade and a falling share of world output as well as a falling population, then more and more people are going to see the G-2 as being the really significant relationship. That won't even happen this year I'm sure over climate change and global warming.

MR. PIFER: Okay, I think we have time for one more question. We'll look to the question to come from Istanbul.

PROF. SAYARI: Okay, we're going to see if one of our students is interested.

Yes.

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible). I am from Sabanci University. My question is what kind of a Europe do you see 10 years from now? I mean, do you see it becoming stronger, or weaker, more unified, or more fragmented? Thank you.

LORD PATTEN: You're going to think I'm a Gaullist, which I guess in many respects I am and we all are. I think you will see still a Europe which is an extraordinary agreement between sovereign and the states who understand implicitly if not always explicitly that their sovereignty is -- which is anyway a pretty slippery (inaudible) concept -- that their sovereignty is limited by their size and that it's greater when they're able to act together rather than independently.

I hope you'll see a Europe which has built on the real achievements that have been made economically with a single market with trade policy, and I hope you'll see a Europe which has not thrown away those advantages. I hope you'll see a Europe which has stuck to its commitments on environmental policy which has built an energy policy for the whole of the Union and which is allowing perhaps competition policy to apply to defense contractors in order to encourage greater harmonization of procurement. I hope you'll see a Europe which is able to deploy more effectively force around the world when it's needed and doesn't have to lease air transport from Ukraine or hunt for another helicopter or two in

order to make a peacekeeping engagement work. I hope you will see a Europe which is much better at getting from A to B. We're fantastically good in Europe at getting from A to Z, but A to B is, in my experience, invariable much trickier. And if we could only focus on really practical jobs that remain to be completed, as in the Balkans, rather than swap visions -- visions to a penny -- people are very often locked up for having them as well -- so, a little practical delivery is the real issue for Europe, a Europe in which the French will still -- I speak as an Englishman – alas, be French, and the British will still be British and the Germans still German, and I hope also that in 10 years' time Turkey is actually a member of the European Union or on the brink of becoming a member of the European Union. I think that would be a stronger European Union, a stronger Turkey, and a stronger commitment to multilateralism.

MR. PIFER: Well, unfortunately, our time is at an end. I would like to bid our friends in Istanbul good evening, and I'd like to ask the audience here to join me in thanking Lord Patten for a truly fascinating lecture. That was really very good.

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