THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S "ANGRY YOUTH": WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009

PARTICIPANTS:

Welcome:
CARLOS PASCUAL
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy

Keynote Address:
KAI-FU LEE
Vice President, Google Inc.
President, Google Greater China

Moderators:
CHENG LI
Senior Fellow and Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL
Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Panelists:
EVAN OSNOS  
Staff Writer, *The New Yorker*

STANLEY ROSEN  
Professor of Political Science, The University of Southern California

TERESA WRIGHT  
Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long Beach

XU WU  
Assistant Professor of Media and Public Relations, Arizona State University

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PASCUAL: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us today. My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm one of the Vice Presidents and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program here at Brookings, and I very much want to welcome you to this event that's jointly sponsored by the John L. Thornton China Center and Brookings Institution and its Foreign Policy Program that is focused on Understanding China's "Angry Youth": What Does the Future Hold?

In the foreign policy community, a great deal of attention has been paid to the U.S.-China economic relationship, its military contacts,
climate change cooperation, just to name a few of these issues. Today our speakers will focus on a less-talked-about issue in China: its youth, their expectations, their influence. But it is a topic that has implications for the U.S.-China relationship in the years to come.

We cannot remove this issue from the geopolitical and economic realities affecting China and the rest of the world. China's engagement with the global community has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. It has put China in a position of political power that it never would have achieved otherwise. It has created opportunities for personal freedom and expression that never otherwise would have been there, and yet at the same time these ties between China and the global economic community have resulted in 20 million lost jobs as a result of the collapse of global demand. And those political and economic factors have to reverberate internally back within China and affect the views and the prospect of China's youth.

There's also a debate within the Chinese state whether to proceed aggressively internationally to take advantage of this moment when much of the international community is going through difficult circumstances, and we see that, for example, reflecting in China's very aggressive and open behavior in its relationships, for example, with Russia and Brazil in financing energy development or providing financing
to those countries in return for pledges of future deliveries of oil. And yet at the same time we may see a China that becomes more statist at home because of fears of what could happen if it can not control the economics and politics internally.

And so let us turn back to these issues of the Chinese youth. These "angry youth," as they are referred to in Chinese, are often anti-American and hyper-nationalistic. The question arises: will these young people take political views that have potential impacts on the U.S.-China relationship? Will those views affect them as they take up positions of leadership in the government or in the business community?

Over several weeks, we will mark the 90th anniversary of the May 4th movement, an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal movement that was instigated by Chinese students that was a major turning point in modern Chinese political history. And of course we will also mark the 20th anniversary of the June 4th incident, which was the culmination of weeks of protests by pro-democracy Chinese students in Tiananmen Square.

We also can't fail to remember the power that youth have had in global politics. In 1968, it was the power of youth demonstrations here in the United States and in France that had a fundamental impact on the character of the governments in those two countries.
The Generation X here in the United States has certainly had a huge impact on the attitude and the dynamics that arose in the 1980s and the way that it created a sense that the United States can be free to operate in a market that was very much unrestricted of international and even in some cases domestic regulations.

And in Generation Y today we see a youth movement that is intensely engaged with the politics of the country and played a fundamental role in the election of the first African-American as President of the United States.

So, how much do these issues affect the politics of China? How much can we expect to extend these trends back to China, and how much will the youth affect how statist China is, how China deals with migration issues, how it deals with its health care questions, how it deals with the openness of a political system, how it deals with its neighbors.

These important anniversaries that I mentioned earlier provide an interesting backdrop to our discussion. What is the difference today between the democracy activists of a generation ago and today's angry youth? What has shaped their views of China and the world, and how they will shape China's future political trajectory? These are the kinds of questions that we want to engage you with, and we look forward to a very active and fruitful debate.
I would now like to turn to Dr. Cheng Li, Senior Fellow and Research Director at the John L. Thornton China Center. Dr. Li’s work on generational change and leadership transformation and the emergence of the middle class in China has been at the absolute forefront of his field. So many times I have been to China, and I have been talking to groups of business and political leaders and international participants, and they have told me: when Cheng Li writes something on generational and political change in China, we read it because we know that there is something to be learned. We are very lucky to have him as a colleague here at the Brookings Institution, Dr. Li.

DR. LI: Thank you, Carlos for that very generous comment and also really thoughtful opening remarks.

I’m privileged to serve as a moderator for the keynote session of the conference. Before introducing the keynote speaker, I want to join my colleague Carlos in welcoming you all to what promises to be a fruitful, intellectual discussion on China’s youth, their anger, and our anxiety. We have assembled a truly distinguished group of speakers who will present their insights and research on these relatively new and profoundly challenging phenomena, both with China and to the outside world.
Now, our speakers will help address some of the most important questions on the subject. What gave rise to the frustration of China's angry youth? What are the possible mutual misperceptions between China's young people and the Western media? What implications does their existence have for the country's political trajectory? How will the growing influence of China's angry youth impact China's foreign policy in years to come?

Now, the brilliant science fiction novelist H. G. Wells once said -- I quote -- "History is a race between education and catastrophe." This is particularly true for the 21st century work in which we confront many potential catastrophes. This is the time when education, vision, and international understanding are greatly needed.

I'm honored to introduce to you a widely respected educator, a visionary leader, and an honorary promoter of future understanding between Chinese and Americans, Dr. Kai-Fu Lee. Born in Taipei, Taiwan, Kai-Fu immigrated to the United States in 1973 at the age of 12. He later attended Columbia University with the plan to study politics and law, with a dream of becoming a senator some day. One of his classmates who attended Columbia in the same year indeed became a senator and is now President of the United States.
During his undergraduate years, Kai-Fu realized that he was more interested in computer science than political science, so he went on to earn a Ph.D. in computer science from Carnegie Mellon University. The Chinese-American community might have lost its first Chinese-American senator, but the world has gained a brilliant IT scientist.

Dr. Lee is an expert in the fields of artificial intelligence, speech recognition, and multi-media. Dr. Lee was the founder of China-based Microsoft Research Asia and is the founding president of Google Greater China, a position he has held since 2005.

Kai-Fu Lee is a household name in China, especially among college students, not only because his email count is constantly bombarded with hundreds of resumes, but mainly because Kai-Fu has spent 20 percent of his time during the past few years, arguably more than any public figure in China, communicating with China's young people. He generously offers advice on their studies, careers, and life choices and patiently listens to their aspirations, anger, and frustrations.

Kai-Fu has written three best-selling in the past four years, and all of them aim to help understand, educate, or mentor China's young people. Kai-Fu's hundreds of public speeches or lectures on Chinese campuses brought China's college students, the countries best and brightest and the countries confused and frustrated, greater visibility.
Kai-Fu, we are so honored to have you to speak to us this afternoon, not as the president of Google China but as an educator, a thinker, and a caring friend of young people in China and elsewhere.

Ladies and gentlemen, with my personal gratitude and admiration, I would like to ask you to join me in welcoming Dr. Kai-Fu Lee.

DR. LEE: I've been warned that the questions later may not be so kind.

But as Dr. Li said, I'm here really to talk more about my knowledge and experience with the youth in China. It is completely unrelated to my day job. I really enjoyed the 20 percent of time I spent with the Chinese students, because in them I see a huge amount of potential. I see an amazing amount of dedication, incredible curiosity, and huge potential for the future. At the same time, they're growing up in a very challenging environment with parents who have high expectations, an education system that's not yet the world's best, and also with a society that emphasizes wealth above all else. So, it is in that environment they grow up in which they will either realize the potential to be their best or succumb to the various temptations that exist in the society. So, I'm trying to do my best to help them, and I will continue to do that.

So, in talking to many of them, I'm understanding the youths in a little more depth, and today the topic is angry youth. I almost think
that the name is a little bit negative and a little bit unfair to the many people I talk to and work with. They are anything but angry. But let me just focus on the topic of today.

So, when we talk about angry youth, I think we’re talking about post-80’s, people born after 1980, that they had access to the internet, and that they often use it to vent their frustrations and that frustration often comes from either their patriotism or their desire to seek which is righteous, fair, true, and transparent. They care about social issues. They’re concerned, and they feel they need to be outspoken to have their voices heard, and they often use the internet to gain knowledge and to have their voice heard. And I think that by and large is the way I perceive what the term “angry youth” means. And as you can hear from my speech, it’s not a very negative term. I think it’s very understandable that growing up in a challenging environment, the internet comes about as an amazing vehicle for their voices to be heard and it’s completely understandable they would use it.

If we were to do a taxonomy of what kinds of angry youths there are, I have to describe this using a Chinese pun. So, angry is “fen” as in fen nu. People actually use three different kinds of fen to describe the taxonomy of the Chinese angry youth. The normal kind is angry -- fen. And I think what that means is a group of people who are critical,
skeptical, sometimes unhappy and they want to point out problems of things that they observe and they use the anonymity of the internet to let the silent majority have a chance to speak up. I think that's what's usually meant to be fenqing, fen nu de fen.

I think there's also a group of people who's fen dou de fen. That means aspiring, industrious; and peoples often use that word instead of angry to describe a similar kind of people or subset of such angry youths. And I think this kind of fenqing, the aspiring youth, are people who are objective, realistic, fair. They have a strong sense of social responsibility. They don't just point out the problems, but they want to solve the problems -- they want to point out solutions. And I think they have a clear understanding of what patriotism means, that it is not nationalism, that they love their country but it's not at the expense of other countries, and I think this is a group of constructive people I think who are going to hopefully become the pillar of society in the future.

It would be incomplete for me to say there's not a third class of angry youth, and that fen is translated as “excrement”. That's also fenqing, and I think the definition of that kind of fenqing is people who are generally gullible. They have a lack of knowledge; they don't apply enough logic and common sense to problems. They are easily provoked. They're impetuous, and they're hot-headed, and they sometimes don't just
speak up but they actually take action, and I think they sometimes have trouble separating patriotism from nationalism, and they sometimes not only want China to win, they may want some other countries to lose, and a lot of responsible Chinese journalists and authors have called these excrement youths scoundrels hiding under the pretence of patriotism. And I think this is the kind of angry youth that needs to be avoided.

Unfortunately, when we talk about angry youth, sometimes people think of the excrement youth, but really I don't think that's the majority, and I certainly don't think those are the ones showing true leadership.

But let me now, for some of you who are not less familiar with what the fenqing have done over the past five years, let me give you a couple of examples. One example is a certain number of youths stood up against plagiarism in academics. They created a website to let other youth chime in and say hey, that's plagiarism, they didn't create that work, this professor isn't worth the promotion. And that, I think, has been positive in trying to wake people up about corruption in academia.

Another example is during last year's earthquake these angry youths, if you will, they jumped in and created a platform. They actually came to Google and said can we help create a database of all those cities in need and tell other people what kind of resources can be
supplied. We're all Chinese people and these are actually overseas Chinese and domestic Chinese who didn't sleep days and nights and used the internet to help create a connection between the places in need and between the people who want to donate.

At the same time, another group of people decided to look at earthquake donations. They created a roster of all the rich people in China intending to honor those who donated a lot of money consistent with their aggregate wealth and also to bring out those shameful ones who didn't donate enough. So that I think at the same time provided a positive factor and a somewhat negative factor. I mean, I'm just listing the incident and you can be the judge of what positive and negative and social implications there are.

Another example was maybe about two or three years ago a certain multinational company, the general manager had a fit one day at his secretary and treated her with disrespect in very demeaning ways, and that secretary, in her anger, wrote a very well-written resignation letter pointing all the ways in which her boss should not have treated her, and she disseminated that resignation letter on the internet, which caused an outrage of all the people who stood up for this particular young, angry secretary and demanded that this multinational fire the general manager, which indeed happened. That's the fourth example.
A fifth example is called a death blog.  This happened recently.  There was a woman who decided to take her own life, and before she leaped out of the 20th-story building, she posted a blog article in which she talked about how her husband betrayed her and was an unfitting husband and had an affair with all the other bad things that he did.  And in blogs in China, you can post comments to blogs, just like in the U.S., so her friends proceeded to investigate who, which lady her husband had an affair with and where he lives, where she lives, where his parents live, where her parents live, and then various angry people went to their residences and proceeded to harass them in ways that are probably not very appropriate.  So, this is another example of almost vigilante behavior.

And the last one I will give is during -- before the Olympics last year there was a rumor spreading on the internet that some board member of Carrefour donated money for Tibet independence, and I'm not stating that as good or bad, nor am I stating whether it's true or false, but that rumor spread all over the internet, creating a lot of anger and boycotting of Carrefour, a very popular Walmart-like market in China, so much so that Carrefour had to shut down for a number of days.

So, those are some of the examples that hopefully give you a spectrum of the kinds of things that happen, that people, through the
internet, vent their frustration, access information, try to drag out and bring justice for those whom justice is needed or believed to be needed.

So those are the phenomenon, and what causes this kind of phenomenon? Let me now briefly talk about some of the factors that I can see.

First, I think there are the society factors. Clearly, China's past 200 years of history has a lot of humiliation and that causes the Chinese people to have a strong sense of pride and a strong desire for respect and that you can look no further than books and movies to see that the popular books in China, such as *China Can Say No*; popular movies going from the recent *Najing Najing* to the older movies having to do with martial arts like "Huo Yuanjia", these are all examples which really reminded people about the old times of humiliation and the importance of patriotism. And I think the intent is very reasonable and honorable that this is a country you should be proud of, but I think sometimes when there's lack of world view, that can also cause extreme behavior. Also I think there's a desire to bring about greater transparency so people would -- some of the angry youths would view themselves as self-appointed reporters who would bring -- report various things that may not be read in the press.
And then, lastly, I think there sometimes -- I think the whole all of China is very much shaped by the market economy. When Deng Xiaoping said: “let some people get rich first”, which is an absolutely right and brilliant thing to have done, it had great, positive effects for the country and the people, but at the same time it also unavoidably caused a desire for success and fame for people to, on the one hand, be willing to work really hard, want to get money, make that their one goal in life; but on the other hand there’s too much focus on wealth and that there’s a desire for instant gratification and there is a certain degree of idol worshipping. Especially as the Chinese internet billionaires began to emerge, more people want to become like them, and that creates a certain kind of instant gratification behavior. And that also creates a certain kind of haves and have-nots by the people who have got rich, so there are some people who want to be rich and there are some people who are unhappy, envious, perhaps even angry that they -- why am I not rich, how am I not as good as others. So, this kind of market economy by and large a great thing but also brings about certain types of social phenomenon and feelings.

The second factor that particularly affects the post-'80s or balinghou youths in China is that it's really the time when the cultural revolution effects are over, the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's market...
economy, and also single child -- one child per family. So, that means already a very education-centric culture in China is now placing all of their hope, right -- I as a parent went through the cultural revolution, never had a real life, I want to live vicariously through my child, so I want him or her to have everything, to have the best of everything -- my life's existence is to let my child have everything. And that certainly creates a good environment in which the children can learn, can have a lot of resources, but it also causes the kids sometimes to be spoiled. Parents will give them whatever they want. They may not have as much respect for the elders. Some of those things may be a little more lacking.

A friend of mine says the children born after 1980 are really a different species than the people before. He said people before 1980 -- the kids were raises like pigs; after 1980, the kids are raised like pandas. So, they are really pampered and they are given everything they want. And that can lead to, you know, many good things. You know, they study hard, their parents have high expectations. But also they may be a bit self-centric as a result of being spoiled. And they may be a little bit fragile. Some have referred to this generation as the “strawberry generation”, you know, something that looks beautiful from the outside but is really quite mushy on the inside. It's a term that was actually imported from Taiwan, but I think there are similarities in this respect for the youths.
And then having one child and no siblings can cause a little more difficulty developing social skills. So, I think these are the family factors that affect the angry youths.

And then I want to talk about the education factors. So, the positive part is that there are lots of schools. The schools are getting much better. This is in fact the first time this generation, post-'80s, the first time really so many people can get a decent modern education, and that's a wonderful thing, that you can't be angry unless you know what to be angry about. You can't be angry about something unless you're educated and can reason, and that's what education has brought to them. But this education system is still somewhat of a rogue learning, and it's not enough critical thinking taught, and the problem of that is in the traditional Chinese learning, something is either right or wrong, good or bad, there's only one answer to the problem, so some people would say okay, Japan bad, therefore, let's do something, let's have a million people sign a petition to increase their war reparation even though that's, you know, over 70 years ago. So, that kind of thing unfortunately causes people to feel there's just one way to think about a problem. And also rogue learning causes people potentially to be more gullible.

So we talked about Carrefour rumors, which probably isn't even true, and that caused such a huge hit on the company.
Also related to education, colleges were expanded very rapidly, and in 1998 there were only about one million freshmen per year, and in 2008, nearly 10 years later, there are now six million entrant freshmen, and that causes, actually, the top schools to be extremely competitive and extremely good and rapidly becoming much, much better schools.

You even see Nobel Laureates returning to various schools teaching and so on. That's all wonderful. But, unfortunately, that's about two to three percent of all the schools. 2000 colleges in China and maybe the top 10 or 20 are actually quite good and improving rapidly, but the rest -- you can imagine how you get damaged faculty. You have six times more students. How are you going to grow six times the faculty in a mere decade? And that results in poor teachers, unqualified teachers, poor education; and it causes students a lot of questions and doubts, uncertainty about the quality of education they're getting and that's why -- and also it creates more college graduates than perhaps a society needs.

I think China needs to have more vocational schools, but instead I think a lot of these colleges don't train enough professional strength and they train some thinking but not enough, and that causes some of the graduates to perhaps turn into not the best of the angry youths.
So, these are the various societal factors, family factors, and educational factors. Let me now talk about the internet, I think without which there wouldn't be this generation of aspiring to excrement youths.

So, what did the internet do? I think the internet's the most amazing thing, the most positive thing that's happened to China. It creates access to an incredible amount of information, foreign sources of information, Chinese content has grown rapidly, people are able to share information, real-time information, make friends, social networking is very popular, every college student when they meet each other they trade their QQ number -- not even their name, their QQ number, which is the equivalent to a MSN Messenger. Each person has a number, so they get to know each other on MSN, they learn to live vicariously, and I think this internet brings about not only this wonderful amount of information, but it also causes a few challenges, right: addiction to internet games -- I won't go into that here, but that's a big challenge -- people wanting to make friends on the internet rather than real life, which can lead to certain personality shifts. Also, the internet is a combination of anonymity, that people don't know who you are so that you can vent more. In real life you might be a shy person; on the internet you might be a very outspoken. It's a place where people can vent frustrations. It's also a place where people in a monolithic value of who can be the most famous and rich,
okay, so maybe someone can't be rich and famous in real life; maybe there's a chance to do that on the internet through a game, through being the most outspoken, through leading one of his vigilante efforts. Those are all opportunities that internet brings about.

Some numbers to give you the power of the internet. On a typical news article that you find on the Chinese news website, often you will find 10,000 comments. You never find that on the U.S. news website. People will jump in to express their feelings, okay. Blogs in China -- there are 162 million blogs in China. That's out of 300 million internet users. More than one person out of two has a blog. Some blogs are extremely popular. The most popular blogger in China, Xu Jinglei -- she has 250 million visits to her blog, and each of her postings would be read by perhaps 200,000 people and commented on by perhaps 10,000 people. So, you can imagine the degree to which people use the internet to talk about things, to either worshipping, to comment, to talk to each other. And Twitter -- very popular -- Twitter and its copycats. A lot of news I actually first see on Twitter before I would see on blogs before I would see on news. So, Twitter and blogs boundary are fuzzy. Blog and news boundary are also fuzzy. So, I think this is an enormous platform for information sharing that the internet brings about. So, those are the observations that I would make.
So, lastly I would just comment that when we talk about angry youth, I really don't want to think about this as a very negative term, because I think if we think deeply about what angry youth is about, this is people who are young people who have access to information, who have a sense of social responsibility, who have their sense of right and wrong – they are not always right - but they have a sense of right and wrong. They're doing things because of their sense of right and wrong, and they're willing to speak up, and I think this is the kinds of things that have caused, for example, the May 4th movement in China. This is the kind of things that have caused the post-war Japan to have become very successful and popular.

Of course there's also danger if this positive energy goes the wrong way towards what we called excrement youth earlier, so I think if we can play a role whether we're Chinese, Americans, Chinese-Americans -- if we can all play a role to guide these well-intentioned, positive youths to help guide them to improve their critical thinking skills to increase their world view to teach them how to become constructive and not destructive and to teach them about true values and meaning of life, then I think there is a very good chance that this generation of angry youth will become, actually, aspiring youths, making China a better place and
improving the relationship between China, America, and the rest of the world. Thank you.

DR. LI: Well, by the way, the most popular blog is Xu Jinglei’s, and she is an actress, yes, and I haven't seen any of her films. Certainly very popular.

Now, before opening -- first of all, thank you so much for that really excellent presentation with all the vivid stories and examples.

Now, before opening for all to the Q&A, I would like to start with two quick questions. Now, I know that it is well known that you live by the motto I read in Chinese last night: to have the courage to change things that can be changed, to have the humility to accept what cannot be changed, and to have the wisdom to distinguish the difference between two -- I know there’s probably already an English one --

DR. LEE: Serenity Prayer.

DR. LI: Yeah, I translated in Chinese. Now, I want to more explicitly, directly ask for your wisdom on the following question, which is: what can policymakers in Washington do or what they cannot do in order to change the hostile attitudes towards the United States?

DR. LEE: Okay, by and large, I don't think I would characterize the overall youths' feeling about the U.S. as hostile. I think overall, America is actually revered, respected, and the American dream
has become the Chinese dream. Now, to be sure, there are certain acts by certain Americans that at times would be viewed by various groups of Chinese as negative and at those times the angry youths sometimes get amplified. So, I think the best thing that the American government can do is to continue to express its views but to do so without attacking -- without -- not in an attacking way but in a constructive way and also not feeling like every country has to become just like America. I think China can progress, the Chinese people can progress on perhaps a different path, and I think having that openness to see the different paths and expressing it in a constructive way is the best advice I can give.

DR. LI: Thanks. Now, my second question actually has very much to do with your late father, who is really a prominent political scientist, taught at Taiwan Chengchi University. He wrote six or seven books, all biographies, about the top leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping. Now, I know that you are very familiar with the biographies, the life experiences, profiles of these top leaders. Now my question is do you foresee the possibility being 15 to 20 years there will be emerging Chinese leaders who will put an anti-American platform at the centerpiece of China's foreign policy. If yes, why so; if not, why not? Like, what happened, in Iran or some other countries.
DR. LEE: Right. Well, unfortunately, I didn't learn much political science from my father, and the ones that -- the political science I learned in Columbia has been long forgotten, so I'm not an expert to make those projections. But what I can tell you is some of these youths are beginning to become government officials, and I actually, in my work, are encountering them, and I would largely characterize the young government officials as open-minded, reasonable, constructive, having good world view. That doesn't mean they agree with everything that people here believe in or that they believe, you know, what the American government believes in, but I think the kind of -- if we are to put them into three classes we had before, I think they would be pretty close to the aspiring youth. So, I think I would be an optimist, although I don't think I would dare make a projection one way or the other.

DR. LI: Okay, thanks.

Okay, now the floor is open, and please introduce yourself and your affiliation.

QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Seth, and I'm just a citizen, I'm not really associated with any think tank, although I worked for Yahoo for a little bit, so don't hold that against me. There is a book that's been written which I think is called Unhappy China. In many ways I think some of the ideas in the book are actually ideas about U.S. government officials
have actually advocated, maybe having China reduce the value of their currency. How much do you think that America has been used as sort of a football in Chinese politics in terms of either, you know, a sort of we should copy what the Americans do or we shouldn't copy what the Americans do. Are we -- I mean, I think in some sense maybe you could argue that France is somewhat of a football in American politics over the last eight years. Is something similar happening in China with the United States, or do you think that this book is sort of a representative of a trend or a kind of thinking or do you think this is --

DR. LEE: Sorry, when you say "a football," do you mean a scapegoat as the negative force?

QUESTIONER: Yeah, so, I mean it's sort of like, you know, how much is the Chinese politics being based increasingly on comparing and contrasting with the United States? I think over the last few years, I -- well, I think that we've done that somewhat with France, particularly after the Iraq war, and even now I think maybe a little bit more on the Republican side than the Democratic side, but almost everything that they have proposed is in comparison to France.

DR. LEE: Okay, yeah, okay. All right, again, a politics question of which I'm not an expert, but I would say, based on my observations in China, I think the Chinese government, people, media are
rather internally focused. I think there's a lot of pride on China's emergence, and I think there's -- I think most of the focus is on how to help China have a very successful emergence and rise. I don't think there's any effort to make any one country the enemy. Now, I think -- on the other hand, I do think when you go to these -- the most negative of angry youths' sentiment -- I would guess they're more focused on Japan than any other country. Occasionally you see America being listed as having done something bad, and I think something bad is certainly not, you know, monetary policy for things like that. I think it's about -- I think is about interfering with other sovereign nations' domestic affairs. That's the single thing that America has attacked by the medicines of China.

DR. LEE: Yeah, Dennis.

MR. WILDER: Let me give you a break. Dennis Wilder with the Brookings Institution. Let me give you a break from political questions for a moment and ask you about the future of the internet in China. It's grown so rapidly to 300 million. I wonder, is there a maximum size to the internet, and, if so, where do you think it sort of ends up and what groups end up being part of the internet and, more importantly, who gets left out of this new internet culture of China?

DR. LEE: Okay, I think the size of the internet is limited by the number of phones in China. Even though 300 million is a large
number, there are more than 600 million people who have phones, and this year is an amazing year in China with the successful deployment of 3G by the three telecom companies. I've been using 3G on my phone and PC. I've been to five cities. It works perfectly. So, that's where I think a big infrastructure play by a government that believes in having equal access everywhere I think is showing, interestingly, better wireless access than probably in the U.S., okay, and I think there is -- once I think the users go up, the availability goes up, and I think there's going to be an opportunity to perhaps reduce the access costs. And I think now with three telecom companies competing is inevitable they will compete on price. So, the accessibility of 3G mobile internet I predict to become ubiquitous and low cost in the fairly near term. That would make the 6 or 700 people easily access to mobile internet, and that's roughly half of China, and that's really compelling.

DR. LI: Yes, Jennifer.

QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. Lee, this is Jennifer Lee from China Press. I have two problems. One is I think many people are concerned whether China blocks the internet. Young people may find it difficult to access internet and get a different kind of opinion or information. The second is many -- as I know, many American people, thier concern about China has increased – concerned about their anti-
American sentiments or anti-France sentiments during specific periods of time, and concerned that Chinese people maybe under the propaganda, so-called propaganda of the Chinese government or Chinese media. So, how could the Chinese young people – how they can get the different kinds informations, and what should be the standard for them to evaluate information. I mean, should they believe their government or not or they believe the western media or not or maybe they have their own standards. Thank you.

DR. LEE: Okay, I usually don't talk to the young people about politics, so I don't really know the answer to those questions. Sorry.

DR. LI: Okay, yes.

QUESTIONER: Hi, Pattie Kim from the Congressional Executive Commission on China. And so my question is with the economic downturn I've been reading that a lot of college graduates are unemployed these days in China, and so I can imagine their ambition and their angers turning into sort of negative energy, and so I was wondering if you could talk about if there's any long-term implications of this. Thank you.

DR. LEE: Right. Yeah, I believe if you watch the economic crisis worldwide, it's interesting that China is very different from
the U.S.  See, in the U.S. the degree of the crisis is much stronger, and most companies are dealing with it by having significant layoffs and still hiring campus hires.  But the Chinese companies I think still largely carry a bit of historic HR -- human resource -- practice of not doing layoffs, and they -- when they have to curb costs they tend not to hire, which exacerbates the new college graduate employment problem.  So, what you observe is in fact a significant problem.  I think there the government is trying to make a lot of new ways to increase the opportunities -- for example, encouraging the students to go into starting their own companies, service-oriented companies, in the villages, and the government provides funding or loan, which I think is applied to services rather than innovation -- can be a very positive force that could actually help China.  I think there's also attempts to increase the graduate students so that they could go into graduate studies rather than become just unemployed, which I think can only prolong but not solve the problem. So, I think the government's creating policies that will help address this, and I think it is in fact a big issue, but I don't foresee it becoming a big disaster.

DR. LI:  We'll take two more questions, and -- yeah, maybe these two gentlemen.  Yes.
QUESTIONER: My name is Donald Barnes. I'm a visiting professor at Guangxi University in Nanning. I've been there for six years. During the time that we were there, we saw throughout China large new universities being built, large new campuses, and the Wall Street Journal today has an article about the cost of that and how those loans to those universities are now having to be repaid. I'd like to have you follow up on a comment you made earlier about the question of whether or not all the people who are going to college in China today really should be there and if so -- if not, then how do they work through that problem?

DR. LI: Okay, one more --

DR. LEE: Yeah, okay, answer them together?

DR. LI: Together, yes.

DR. LEE: Okay.

QUESTIONER: Great. Hi, my name is Luke Ortega. I'm sort of a free agent. I was curious if you'd talk a little bit more about the relationship between the angry youth and Western news media outlets, particularly kind of in the aftermath of the coverage of the Lhasa riots last year by CNN and BBC, if you think there's any long-term implications with regards to that. Thank you.

DR. LEE: Okay, how do I relay the questions. To answer the professor's question, I was in Nanning recently actually. It's a
wonderful place. I think in general the -- I think universities have been overbuilt. China does not need 2000 four-year universities. I think there should be a much larger number of vocational schools, and I think there needs to be a higher caliber of teachers and less desire to spend too much money on beautiful campuses and buildings. So, those are -- that's an area where I can be a little more outspoken, and I've actually written articles about that. So, if you read Chinese, you can find my writing. I have -- I've written a letter to the Ministry of Education pointing out the issues there, and I think this year in the recent congress, China's national congress, they're calling for open advice on how to improve the education system. So, I think there's an opportunity for some of these things to happen, and I think it was very -- I mean, even though I think it was -- if the universities are over-expanded and not enough on vocational side, I do think it was well intentioned and is actually responding. It was about 10 years ago -- there was -- the parents really wanted their kids to go to four-year colleges, and it was really trying to be responsive to the people's needs, but I think, unfortunately, they didn't consider no country can manufacture six times the faculty of colleges in ten years. So, well intentioned but didn't quite work out, but I think maybe now there can be an opportunity to turn some of them into vocational schools and I think have a better ration than exist today.
The other question -- yes, the CNN coverage generated a fair amount of outrage about the supposed unfairness of the coverage in Tibet. Again, I'm not an expert, so I won't make judgment on what's right or wrong, but I would say that definitely caused a significant negative sentiment on the internet. I would say most of that negative sentiment was directed at CNN, not directed at America in general and certainly not directed at American people.

DR. LI: So, we have another four panelists with us -- four distinguished speakers, and -- but I want to end this in a keynote by thanking you for giving us a more optimistic view. It's interesting to see that -- we talk about angry youth, we worry about various aspects associated with that phenomenon, but the person that much involved seem to be very optimistic. You're a very happy man about China's future, about Chinese leadership, about Chinese economy. I hope you're right. Thank you very much.

DR. LEE: Thank you. Thank you very much.

DR. LI: Shall we take a five-minute break, then come back for the second panel.

Dr. Lieberthal, please.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Really delighted to have the chance to follow that excellent presentation by Lee Kai-Fu. I find myself in
agreement with his basic point that it's a little uncomfortable to characterize China's youth as angry, here in fact complicated, and in fact as I was kind of reflecting a little bit on the framing of this panel today it kind of struck me that there's some irony here.

You know, up until 150 years ago or so, everyone looked, in China, to the older generation for wisdom and guidance and authority and confidence in the future; and then in the last 150 years for reasons everyone understands, people -- each generation looked at China's youths to save the country, right? The older generation was hopeless. The youth were the ones that were going to define the future. Very interesting, because each group of -- each youth cohort of course then became the next older generation that was hopeless, so there was some problem with the methodology. But every -- if you look at the writings of people who went to China over this period, you find persistently that authors pin their hopes on the youths, seeing them as dynamic, idealistic, talented, serious worth for the future.

Now, we run into a situation that, first of all, is characterized by the youths growing up in a country that is undergoing the most rapid change I believe any major country has ever undergone, and the changes are comprehensive. You know, from the perspective of someone growing up in China now, families have changed. Where most urban
youths grow up in a family of one person, you know, they're the only child, and in the rural areas I think the average is closer to two. But many Chinese children now, since the birth control campaign has been on for long enough, grew up without aunts and uncles. I mean, it's just -- think back, for those of you who have worked with China for more than 20 or 30 years. Imagine China back then without aunts and uncles and cousins and, you know, it's just inconceivable. So, the social fabric has changed in the most fundamental fashion.

Place of abode has also changed in fundamental fashion. The rate of urbanization in China over the last -- since the early '90s has been historically unprecedented. In many cases, the rural youths are being left behind while their parents go into the cities, so they're being raised by grandparents, but then they, too, quickly go into the cities. So, we're having a kind of change in environment in which you grow up that is also extraordinarily rapidly changing the framework for youths, and then as Lee Kai-Fu stressed, access to education, the vast expanse in the educational system, especially in higher education since 1998, and then again access to information, which we went through in the last hour -- absolutely extraordinary. China has fully experienced the information revolution that has transformed the United States and other places. And then simply changes in expectations about standard of living and
expectations for the future for very large numbers of Chinese younger people. They are no longer concerned with the scramble for existence. They're concerned with the scramble for wealth and prestige and opportunity to travel abroad or to be in the elite in their own country.

Now, the irony is while all this is happening for China's youths, it's happening because for the first time in many generations -- I'm being somewhat over-simplistic but let me just highlight this -- for the first time in many generations, the older generation has been enormously successful. They have put China on a path where it is rapidly becoming a country that makes a huge difference not only for its own people but on global issues, a country whose regional and global impact is now the talk of everyone and the concern of everyone as we look to the future. So, what happens to the youth in this enormously dynamic mixture? I suspect we should expect to see very sharp differences not only between generations every 20 years or so but even between cohorts every 10 years or so because the changes are of such a magnitude and such a speed that their impact is significant under -- across very compressed time frames.

You'd also expect to find very -- a very complicated mix of views on such things as basic values, personal aspirations, ideas about the country -- in other words, on nontrivial issues.
Today's panel is wonderful in that it brings together four individuals who have done very serious work on understanding attitudes among China's youths in detail, not the broad either nationalistic rantings on some websites and that kind of thing, which we are all aware of, but what's beneath the surface. Each has taken a somewhat different approach in his or her exploration of this broad topic, and so each one's comments will reveal additional elements in the complex tapestry of China's younger generation -- I should say generations plural, even though we're talking about 20 years.

I'm going to ask each speaker, since there are four speakers, to limit themselves to 15 minutes. I will be dictatorial in imposing that limit, and so I really ask that you stick with this. I think -- I'm particularly anxious that you stick with the limit not because I want to constrain what you have to say but, rather, because I want to maximize time for Q&A, because we're going to hear a lot in the substantive presentations, and the Q&A is really a time to get it -- to work together, right? -- to push for bottom line assessments and how things integrate, and that's where you really take over and drive the discussion.

You all have sheets out there that give not only the list of speakers but a very good biographical sketch of each, so I am not going to take time to do that. I'd rather we'll ask the speakers to speak in the
order in which they are on your handouts. Let me just therefore do a one-line introduction of each right now, and this will be the order in which they stand up and speak.

Evan Osnos is a staff writer for the New Yorker, based in Beijing. Very long career working with China, understanding China. A prize-winning reporter and so forth.

Stanley Rosen I have known I think for under 50 years but I'm not sure at this point but is Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California. Has done fascinating work on culture and all kinds of things over many years.

Terri Wright, who I'm meeting for the first time actually and a pleasure to do so, is Professor of Political Science at California State University at Long Beach.

And Xu is Professor of Media -- I think it's the Walter Cronkite Center, right? -- of Media and Public Relations at Arizona State University.

So, on that order, they will each come up. You will hear from me again only if they get close to 15 minutes and I have to enforce discipline, and then at the end we'll hopefully have nearly an hour for Q&A.

Evan, please.

MR. OSNOS: Thank you very much.
We've had already a terrific introduction to the subject of the angry youth and who they are and where they come from, so I'm going to give you a slightly different perspective today and give you a case study. We can call this “Travails Among the Angry Youth”, I suppose.

And, actually, you know, I started first hearing about the angry youth four years when I moved back to China after some time away, and I said well, this is -- as a journalist -- I said well, we need to get to the bottom of this. So, I called up, as I always do, a Chinese journalist friend, who's my first phone call, and I said so how am I going to find these elusive, angry youth? And she said well, I'm angry youth. So, that was my first introduction to the fact that perhaps I had a definitional problem to begin with.

Actually, though, what I'm going to tell you about today is a story that begins last spring surrounding the protest in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, and I think a lot of the people in this room know some of the details so I'm not going to spend much time on it, but in March of last year there was a social uprising in Lhasa. There was a response by the Chinese government, which then prompted criticism from abroad about the tactics that were used. When the Olympic torch then shortly thereafter started traveling around the world, it became in its own way a sort of referendum on the Chinese leadership, and the torch was protested
in Paris and San Francisco and other places. Students overseas, Chinese students overseas and also within China, rose up in response and they protested at Carrefour. There were thousands of people protesting at Carrefour, boycotting Carrefour, because of what they said was that France had pro-Tibetan sympathies and so on.

In the middle of this, April 15th, there was a video that popped up on the Chinese internet. It was called “China, Stand Up”. It’s about six minutes long. It was a sort of patch work of news clippings and video and orchestral music, a kind of stirring presentation, and the video basically sketched out the image of, as it described, a new cold war, a nation under siege, China hemmed in by the world’s great powers, unable to claim its rightful place as a great nation. The video was a sensation on the Chinese internet. Within a couple of days, it was number 4 on Sina, another website. It ranked only a couple places behind the number one video, which was an anchor on TV yawning or something. So, some things are universal I think. But it really was a phenomenon. There were -- people were clicking on it twice every second at one point.

So I said I need to figure out who made this video and find out what they’re about and what they’re really trying to say. Once again, I called up a Chinese journalist friend, and sure enough he led me eventually to a guy named Tang Jie, who is a 27-year-old Ph.D. student at
Fudan University. He studies political philosophy and specifically Western political philosophy and more specifically phenomenology, and I'm not going to pretend to know that I understand what it is that he's studying. But it's an unbelievably obscure and specific branch of Western political philosophy, and he knows his subject well. He's a great admirer of Leo Strauss, the political philosopher. He's a -- he sort of puts himself, surprisingly, in league with American neo-conservatives like Harvey Mansfield, Paul Wolfowitz. He has found in that tradition something that resonates with him, and that's that the glory of the past, the reverence for the classics, is a way of providing a moral framework for China today. So, he spends as much time talking about, you know, Leo Strauss as he does talking about contemporary American politics and contemporary Chinese politics. In his room, he has books by Harvey Mansfield, Thomas Friedman, Lao Tzu, *Who Moved My Cheese*. He's got the full spectrum of human thought.

So, obviously this defied some of my own stereotypes. I basically had gone into this expecting to find a bully or a nut or somebody at least holed up in their parents' basement. But he was none of the above. I mean, this was a guy who was in many ways as fluent about Western media as I could hope for, or as I could have possibly imagined in China. And, most of all, he was a mensch. He was a guy -- the first
thing he did when I got there was try to pay for my cab fare. I mean, he was wearing an Oxford blue shirt, he was wearing khakis. He looked like he would have been comfortable on an American campus.

So, what was behind it? I mean, was this just a case of him expressing something that he didn't believe in? Absolutely not. There's a few specific things that he was trying to get across. Foremost, the reason he composed a video of this kind was that he felt betrayed. He felt betrayed by the West, and specifically the Western media, so a guy like this – Tang Jie has basically been raised in a small town outside of Hangzhou. The reason he's no longer in a small town outside of Hangzhou is because he had the internet and because it allowed him to have access to all this Western information. He routinely reads the New York Times, the BBC, Die Spiegel -- he's speaks German, English. He has high expectations for the Western media. The only reason he agreed to see me was because he knows about the New Yorker and he understands what it is that I was trying to do. So, when the events in Tibet happened and he started reading what he thought were one-sided reports that didn't give China a fair shake and as far as he was concerned didn't reflect the real history of Tibet, that's why he felt betrayed, and so he used the same instruments that had got him addicted to the Western information, to Western media, to then strike back.
The other piece of this, which is not quite so cheerful, is that he is part of what I've come to think of as the currency wars syndrome, which is that he has read this book, which is very popular in China, called the Currency Wars. It's a sort of middle-brow patchwork of conspiracy theories and a discussion of global finance. The takeaway from it is that China has been a victim in some ways of the global financial system or that certainly that it's been constrained and that the United States has made efforts to try to keep China from being what it can be. So, that then becomes one of the pieces of background that shapes his understanding.

The third piece of this is recent political and economic events. He looked around over the last few years and he said wait a second, a Chinese oil company, CNOOC, tried to buy into an American oil company, UNOCAL, and it was rejected. He said that doesn't make any sense to me and it certainly seems inconsistent with the pattern of Chinese companies or at least American companies coming into China and making a big impact.

Second of all, he looked at the case -- this was last spring, don't forget -- of Chinese investments in the United States, particularly in American financial services and American financial securities, and he said we just bought a huge chunk of the Blackstone group and we've lost a lot of our money. How did we get induced to do that? What game are we
playing essentially, and what are the rules? And does this make sense for China?

He’d come up with these ideas, not independently -- he was part of, as we talked about today, a sort of broader community of like-minded people who communicate on the Web, and more locally he was friends with about five or six guys who shared his thinking, all of whom had been graduate students at Fudan. All of them had studied political philosophy or political science. They had good jobs. These were the guys who have won from the system. They were bankers, journalists, junior faculty members at Fudan. These were people who have benefited from the status quo. So, they have a certain perspective on China's overall system. They're not interested in seeing it subverted.

On the other hand, these guys are not just patsies. These are not people who basically say well, everything about the Chinese system is good. In fact, their target is very specific. Their target is injustice and humiliation and indignity. So, whenever they feel that they're being treated unfairly, that's who they go after, and it's just as often the case that they go after people in the West, as I'll tell you in a minute, as they go after sources in China. So, how accurate or inaccurate, for instance, are their perceptions of the West, because I think that's
important to understanding what it is that they're trying to say. What do they know about us and what are they really trying to get across?

Well, one thing that they're mistaken about is that they imagine that Western media has a kind of strategic or political intention, that we're all organized in a way that allows us to cooperate and that whenever we choose to write about something or not write about something -- if we write about Tibetan protests that this is a way of expressing some sort submerged or, you know, veiled political ambition, veiled political goal. I tried, by explaining to them that true dysfunction of an American newsroom, a place with which I'm deeply acquainted. It wasn't persuasive. He still believed basically that what he reads in the New York Times, what he reads in the Guardian are the views of the government. So, that's important in understanding how they perceive Western media.

Number two, they also have an inflated sense of their importance in the American imagination. I mean, he believes basically that your average American is sitting around talking about how we can contain China so as to preserve America's place in the world. And this is not malicious. I mean -- and, in fact, he has -- it's just a little bit out of whack. It's too much. He doesn't actually -- what I tried to explain was that actually Americans do care about China and we care about China's
position in the world, but your average American is not sitting around figuring out how we can prevent them from achieving great power status.

However, he had some very astute observations as well, and things that I very much credit him for. On the plus side, he has a very accurate understanding of the strange role that Tibet plays in the American conversation. As he often said to me, why are you talking about Tibet? Why does it matter to Americans? And I said the truth is there's not really a rational explanation for it. I mean, Tibet has a sort of mystical spiritual significance to some Americans, and so therefore it takes on -- for them, it takes on a spiritual significance. For other people, it's a political issue. It's about China adhering to its constitution and, as they would put it, permitting religious freedom that is guaranteed under Chinese law. But in that sense, he was interested -- and I thought he was right -- that it played an unusually large role in the America -- in SINO-U.S. relations last spring.

So, how many Tang Jies are there, and how many of the other kinds of fenqing? Well, I think it's fair to say that we know that there are not a lot of Straussians out there on Chinese campuses. He is not the norm. On the other hand, the non-Straussians, the guys who are out there who are fierce, in some cases uneducated, who are the sort of gullible types that Kai-Fu Lee was talking about -- they're not the ones who
are able to craft the sophisticated and nuanced message that achieved this kind of wide distribution. There's a reason why Tang Jie was successful, and it's because he understands the high-low messaging that he's trying to accomplish. He knows what he wants to say. He also knows what he's read and what's going to make it successful on the Chinese internet and he's able to speak both languages, which is very sophisticated.

But broadly speaking, the ideas that he's getting across are not all that out of keeping with broad Chinese views at the moment. If you look at, for instance, data by Pew Research Center last year, you saw that 9 out of 10 Chinese generally agreed with the direction that the government was taking. By contrast, 2 out of 10 Americans agreed with the direction that our country was taking at the time.

But what we don't have a firmer grip on -- and this is an important piece of the puzzle -- is how many people believe in the kind of vitriolic style of nationalism that he espouses and that he represents and how many are sort of passive observers? How many people that clicked on his website looked at it and didn't really agree with the spirit of it and how many people said this is the kind of communication I want to be a part of?
What impact does Tang Jie have?  This is a big question. Last spring it was significant.  If you looked around in the months leading up to the Olympics, the Chinese government found itself off balance. They had been trying for months to reduce the anxiety abroad associated with Chinese rise in the world.  In fact, the Chinese government was not comfortable with the phrase "peaceful rise" much less "peaceful development."  Then you have this populist narrative of guys like Tang Jie saying well, in fact, we're going to be very assertive about where we are in the world today.

I'm going to end on another note, which is that after the Olympics Tongjia and his friends had a new and very different kind of issue, which is that they started to look at corruption and the misuse of public funds, and the same energy that they had put in to denouncing the West's criticism of the Olympics and of Tibet they then put into denouncing corruption.  So, Tang Jie started inundating me with email, and he's a friend so now we see each other fairly often, but he started inundating me with email about local officials in Chengdu around the site of the earthquake misusing public money, putting it into their own gated communities.  He showed photos of tents being erected in fancy suburban residential complexes.  And then he showed me the -- all of the bitter criticism of that kind of behavior from people like him, and he said
you see, it's not just about you guys, it's actually about injustice. And his point was credible.

So, I think for that reason when we think about the angry youth, we have to think about, as our title today suggests, they're angry and it makes us anxious. But I can tell you that we're not the only ones anxious. The reality is that in Beijing if you're the Chinese leadership, this makes you even more anxious, because what you recognize is the Chinese history has been written by the activism of young people, and as fast as this kind of activism attached itself to the American criticism or Western criticism of the Olympics, it can shift and move to something else, because Tang Jie and people like him -- they don't place their loyalty ultimately in the Communist Party, they place their loyalty in the glory of the Chinese people and the Glory of Chinese history. So, for that reason, it's a fickle target and they can shift our allegiances when they choose. So, for that reason, he faces as much pressure perhaps from Beijing as he certainly would ever face from people broad. Thanks very much.

DR. ROSEN: Yeah, I think my comments will resonate very closely with what all of the previous speakers have talked about. I recently did a paper on whether the many anniversaries of the significant events -- the anniversaries that fall in 2009 -- will have a likely effect on mobilizing segments of the youth population in any kind of accu-regime
protest, and I wanted to discuss my simple conclusion to that but to get there in a kind of round-about way to by discussing Chinese youth more generally.

Starting with the question, since it's been raised in a sense -- Lee Kai-Fu and others -- we have all these images of Chinese youth, can they be reconciled. Up until mid-2008, for example, it was common to find youth under attack in the Chinese media characterized primarily as the "me generation," criticized and I'm being -- I'm quoting here -- "being reliant and rebellious, cynical and pragmatic, self-centered and equality obsessed." Also in the Chinese media they talked about -- again I'm quoting -- "China's first generation of couch potatoes, addicts of online games, patrons of fast food chains, and loyal audiences for Hollywood movies." Then all of a sudden, we have the Sichuan earthquake May 12th, 2008. And the Chinese media changed completely. The same media outlets that had published these earlier assessments and written off these youth suddenly reversed themselves and began to extol their virtues while noting, not just in passing, that all this altruistic behavior -- it was not surprising, because "they had learned the virtues of great compassion, benevolence, and gallantness" -- I'm quoting again -- "from imbibing traditional Chinese culture." "After all," as the media said, "they have fully enjoyed the achievements of China's 30 years of reform in
opening up.” So, in effect, when they were bad it's because they were going against the Party state; when they were good, it's because they were grown up -- have grown up in the party state. So, the media was shifting quite a bit, and it's hard to reconcile these different images. Also, these are compassionate youth now, but they also have the angry youth. And the fact reflecting the continuing influence of the recent past, some of the Chinese critics have referred to these internet savvy nationalists as, quote, "online redline red guards infected by a populace virus." So, all of these images flying around. So, you have these competing, contradictory influences shaping the attitudes and values of the young Chinese today, particular in wealthy coastal areas. They become very internationalistic in their outlook, strongly affected by global trends. At the same time, they're very pragmatic and materialistic, largely concerned with living the good life and making money. So, you see in both of these the internationalist and the materialistic -- the influence of the West is very strong. But then you have the third competing influence, most often called nationalism, in its more extreme form. That represents a broader impulse, and to me it encompasses not only the defense of China against perceived enemies from abroad but also the kind of love of country and self-sacrifice in support of those most in need that you saw in the volunteerism that followed the earthquake. And I think China's youth
have shown they are capable of exhibiting all of these tendencies at
different times, depending on circumstances, or even at the same time. I
would give just one example. I was interviewing people in China about
some of these different images, and some interviewees noted even those
youth who felt they had to show patriotism by honoring that short-lived
attempt to boycott Carrefour, the French superstore that was talked about
with Lee Kai-Fu -- they made sure that before the boycott began on May
1st that they used all their discount coupons they had for Carrefour and
went there and got everything they needed. Then they could go ahead
and have the boycott. So you see, the internationalist, the materialistic,
and the patriotic or nationalist all combined in the same case.

Now, public opinion surveys, which I look at extensively in
China -- they certainly reveal the importance of money, the importance of
material things in the lives of Chinese youth, but at the same time to me,
having looked at -- as Ken Lieberthal said -- I've been doing this for, what,
50 or 60 years, I don't know -- but they suggested a young generation
desperate to believe in something very willing to make sacrifices if they
are persuaded that the cause is just. So, when an opportunity like the
Sichuan earthquake comes up, it gives an occasion to demonstrate this
idealism, an idealism I would say that is not new. It was there in the
Maoist period when I was doing my research on the culture revolution,
interviewing Red Guards. It was there at that time. It was there in
Tiananmen Square when I talked to demonstrators. Now these are very
different generations of youth, very different belief systems. But the
idealism is there. In the late 1980s when I was traveling around China,
internationalism was far stronger than patriotism, and some of my
conservative friends, who I used to talk to a lot back in those days -- he
labeled student attitudes in those days of the late '80s as what he called
reverse racism. He used the words "reverse racism."

As the students often dismissed much of Chinese culture,
much of government policy, and adapted a very naïve to me pro-Western
outlook ranging from almost total belief in the Western media -- reports
from BBC, Voice of America, fascination with Western philosophers, like
Sartre, Nietra, and Freud; and I traveled all over China back in those days
talking to university students, so it was quite striking to me.

It seemed clear that, in an ironic sense, the more the
Chinese government had limited information about the West entering into
China, the more students who knew their government was lying about
what they were doing assumed they were also lying about the West.
This is the same Wang Xiaodong, by the way, who's one of the authors of
the book, China's Not Happy, and led the attack on the film "Lust, Caution"
because of the issue of patriotism.
Now, to get at something that Evan and others have talked about, for use today, the unabashed, uncritical internationalism of the late 1980s has been replaced by what a professor at Wisconsin, has called the new interpretive framework that acknowledges the pursuit of national interest as the ultimate goal of international relations. With this kind of a recession context, national interest, any information that is emanating from Western media sources is used skeptically by well-educated, well-informed young Chinese who assume that this kind of reporting must be done because it's furthering pro-Western agenda. Just as we're pursuing national interests, all Western countries are also pursuing national interests. Anything that comes in from the West has to be assumed -- whether it's human rights issues or anything else has to be assumed to be somehow furthering Western interests -- American interests.

Now, it's also common in the Chinese media to refer to age groups, as Lee Kai-Fu again talked about in generational terms, and most of those I want to talk about in the time I have left are the so-called post-'80s generation, the balingho, the people born from 1980 to 1989. That's about 200 million Chinese. They have been discussed endlessly in the Chinese media. I left a handout of four pages outside. I doubt that many people picked it up, but I have a lot of survey data about that outside, and the first two pages of the handout -- you can pick it up later if
you don't have it now -- the first two pages of the handout look at what the post-'60s and post-'70s generation, those born from '60 and '69, and '70 to '79, have to say about the post-'80s youth and how they see themselves and what the differences are. It's very clear these earlier generations see the post-'80s generation as far more superficial, self-centered, materialistic than the post-'80s generation sees itself.

And this is common in many other surveys, as well.

On page three of the handout which, again, you may not have, has a cartoon where the post-'80s youth and the post-'90s youth -- and this gets to something that Ken talked about, how these generations are changing so rapidly -- are basically attacking each other, based on blogs. If you look at the blogs between the post-'80s and the post-'90s group.

Now either this is a validation of the familiar Chinese expression “Each generation is worse than the last,” or more likely, it seems quite common that each generation is very eager to push its reluctant predecessors off the center stage.

So in this context of intergenerational criticism, I think, it's not surprising that previous generations of youth -- whether the 1950s generation of docile tools of the Communist Party, the Maoist Red Guards of the mid-'60s, 1989 demonstrators in Tiananmen Square -- none of
these generations have much support from current youth, who see them as foolish in many ways, if not worse.

Now, I think I’ve used up, by my count, about nine minutes. So in the time I have left, I want to talk about some survey data that relate to issues of political participation, attitudes towards Western culture, and the Western political system in comparison to China’s political system. Because I think the results are surprising, and it gets to my conclusion. It also suggests -- as Professor Lieberthal mentioned -- the complexity of youth attitudes and behavior.

The last page of my handout, which is somewhere outside, reports on an internal survey, or restricted-circulation survey, conducted among -- a recent survey among history students at 33 Chinese universities by the Academy of Social Sciences. It’s not surprising it was not published in the open press. It’s only in their internal journal.

There are 21 question asked. On that table I have outside, I’ve given the results of three of the questions.

One was on belief systems, which found that about 73 percent chose “individual struggle” as their belief system. Another 10 percent said they didn’t know their belief system. And about 17 percent said “struggle to achieve communism.” This is not particularly surprising.
In addition, more than 94 percent acknowledged they had been influenced by Western culture, even though more than 82 percent agree that Western video products propagate Western political ideas and a Western lifestyle. But fewer than 12 percent expressed a willingness to negate such products.

Over 50 percent identify themselves with American cultural concepts, and only 17 percent did not identify with them.

Even in terms of a question like “liberalism,” 61 percent identified with liberalism, and found it to be a concept of universal moral significance, despite the fact that they knew that liberalism is part of Western political though and base of democratic systems associated with Western capitalism.

Thirty-six percent endorse the concept of separation of powers. And only -- a smaller percentage, below 50 percent, did not endorse that at all.

One more survey -- I don’t have lot of time, but I have a lot of friends who do surveys in China, many of which do not get published for obvious reasons. But I just got one, a long survey, in the mail that a friend of mine who does survey research sent me, the initial results of his survey at five of the most elite universities in Beijing. And he is
somebody who trains political workers, so he was quite surprised at the results.

It supported the basic characteristics of the American political system far more than the Chinese political model. For example, around 75 percent of the sample either greatly liked or comparatively liked Western political model of separation of powers. Only about 4.2 percent comparatively disliked it. Not a single student of the 505 in the sample, said they completely disliked separation of powers.

It was very clear to him, in the survey -- and this gets to some of the questions that Evan was talking about, as well -- that the students see this model from the United States as necessary, or at least particularly helpful, in fighting official corruption, because they see the CCP as simply unable to do it because of the monopoly of power. He also discusses the limitations on the Patriotic Education Campaign.

In terms of political participation, I could talk about the Communist Party, motivations for joining, but I'm going to skip that.

I'll give one survey on participation, because I think it's very revealing.

The Beijing Municipal Communist Youth League does an annual survey which covers a wide variety of questions. And in 2005/2006, they found around 75 percent of youth expressed a
willingness to participate in politics. Now, in previous years, that number of participating in politics, or willingness, was not as high as 50 percent. So they were very excited about that.

But when you look at their data more closely and start disaggregating the findings, you find that only 10 percent actually were enthusiastic about that kind of participation. And even more telling was what “participation” actually meant, when you defined it. When they were asked what form their participation had taken, 72-1/2 percent said they had not actually participated at all, despite the fact that their attitude was they wanted to, they didn’t do it. The behavior was very different.

Eleven percent said, “When I participate in politics, it means I express my opinion to family members or friends.” About 6 percent said, “I participate in politics by expressing opinions in internet discussions.” And only about half a percent said they would ever contact a party or youth league organization to express an opinion.

So those kinds of surveys show very clearly to me that the Party State apparatus has really retreated very far in the daily lives of most youths.

Okay, my last point, and my last minute -- so, my conclusion is, despite all the multiple anniversaries of significant events in 2009, it appears unlikely that Chinese youth are going to pose any immediate
threat to the regime because they’re pursuing a pragmatic, success-oriented approach. This post-'80s generation has ensured that their public lives are placed in service to their private ambitions. So participation in politics, in effect, is private participation, through friends, family, anonymous internet activities. Pursuing party membership is merely a necessary investment to increase their chances of getting a good job, leading a comfortable life.

There are very few indications that this generation will take any overt political risks, particularly if the leadership remains unified.

Now, that’s 15 minutes. If I had five more minutes, I would qualify pretty much everything I’ve said and give you a different argument, including what Evan concluded at the end -- how things could become dangerous for the leadership. But I don’t have time to do that.

(Applause)

Dr. WRIGHT: Hi, everyone. I want to thank you all for coming, and thank Dr. Li again for inviting me to attend this event.

My talk today, I want to step back a little bit and think about how the topic that we’re looking at today -- Chinese youth, their anger and our anxiety -- but also the case of China more broadly, how they help us to critically examine some of the assumptions that we have with regard to
China’s development and, more broadly, some of the assumptions that we have about the relationship between capitalism and democracy.

There is a very common assumption, both among American policy-makers and academics, that capitalist economic development will inevitably lead to strain between a society and the authoritarian regime over which it rules. And if I had more time I could go back and give you all sorts of quotes from Western leaders that basically make this argument, that if we just kind of allow capitalism to continue to grow and prosper in China, and if we encourage free trade with China, then it will only be a matter of time before the Chinese people start to call for, and eventually succeed in pressing for liberal democratic change.

So I think the case of China, and especially the case of Chinese university students, provides us with a very useful case study with which to critically examine this very common assumption.

And, in fact, if you look at Chinese university students in the 1980s or, say, the late 1970s to the late 1980s, it would seem that this assumption may have been well founded. During this time, Chinese students, Chinese university students, did seem to have increasingly attenuated relations with the ruling Communist Party regime and, in fact, we saw some very notable cases of collective contentious action on the
part of university students and, in some cases, outright confrontation between university students and the ruling authorities.

So during this period -- what I would call the “early post-Mao period,” the late ’70s to the late 1980s -- it did indeed appear as if China’s university students may be taking on this role as a democratic vanguard.

But, since the early 1990s, we’ve seen a very different kind of role, and the very different kinds of political attitudes and behaviors among Chinese university students.

First of all, we have seen a greater desire to be part of the Chinese Communist Party, a greater interest in joining the Communist Party. And when we have seen cases of contentiousness on the part of university students in China, rather than rising up in the streets and criticizing Chinese Communist Party policies, you see more cases where Chinese university students seem to be supporting the Communist Party. And some people in the West might even see Chinese university students as sort of apologists for the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

So, of course, this development since the early 1990s has been disappointing to many in the West. And I think this is particularly the source of our anxiety when we look at Chinese youths today. It’s not happening the way we thought it would. This isn’t the way we expected
things to develop in China, especially as capitalist economic growth and reform has continued to progress over the last 20 years or so.

So what I want to do today is try to offer some explanations of why we've seen this change between the early post-Mao period and the late post-Mao period -- or you could say the pre-'89 university student population and the post-'89 student population. But at the same time, kind of harking back to many of the points made by earlier speakers, I also want to emphasize that it is not really right, it's not really appropriate, to over-exaggerate the differences between these two kind of generations of students. And, in fact, we have to kind of reassess the degree to which Chinese university students from the late '70s to the late '80s really were a liberal democratic vanguard. And by the same token, we have to really think carefully about whether or not Chinese university students since the early '90s have really become the sort of apologists for the Chinese Communist Party.

All right. So, first, just a very brief overview of the differences in political attitudes and behavior between Chinese university students in the early post-Mao period -- say, '89 and before -- and the late post-Mao period.

As I mentioned before, from the late '70s to the late 1980s, you see declining interest in Communist Party membership among
university students in China, decreased interest in joining the party. At the same time, we have some very notable instances of collective political contention really directed at the regime.

One of the most prominent of these was in the fall land winter of 1986 and 1987. And in this case, these student-led demonstrations were sparked by desires to enable the population to nominate their own candidates for the local People’s Congress. And these demonstrations began in Anhui Province at the University of Science and Technology, but they quickly kind of were echoed on other university campuses across the country.

Now, along with this kind of more democratic demand for more participation in local elections, students also complained about very mundane issues, like their poor living conditions, including very specific things like the low quality of their cafeteria food. But they also complained about the sort of gap between their sort of perceived “elite” status in society, and their relatively low salaries upon graduation. And this was a disjunction that was all the more unsettling to them, given the fact that as China’s economy had started to liberalize during this period, a lot of people were getting very wealthy outside of the public sector, a lot of people who didn’t have a university education.
But at the same time, I think it’s very important to emphasize that even during the student-led demonstrations of 1986 and 1987, students did not challenge the legitimacy of the Communist Party-led regime, and they never called for multi-party elections, or mass political enfranchisement. There weren’t clear liberal democratic demands.

And we see the same thing when we turn to the student-led protests of 1989 which, of course, are the most prominent student protests that appeared in, really, the entire post-Mao period.

You see a lot of commonalities in the demands raised during the demonstrations of 1989. You see sort of liberal democratic calls for freedom of speech and freedom of association. One of the things that the students did was try to form their own autonomous student unions, free from Communist Party control during this time.

At the same time, students even in 1989, emphasized that their demands were their constitutional rights. So they didn’t frame them as kind of being opposed to Communist Part rule, but rather calling on the party to kind of live up to its own constitution.

At the same time, students in ’89 also were very critical of political corruption. In fact, that was probably one of the major grievances raised during 1989. And, of course, they also had the more
mundane grievances as well, about their poor living conditions -- again, cafeteria food and whatnot.

Now, finally, you did hear a lot of talk about patriotism during 1989. The students again and again emphasized that their demands and their intentions were, in fact, patriotic. And they explained their patriotism as that their love of their country made them call for reform of the political system and the economic system in order to make the country better.

All right. Now, if we turn to the post-1989 university student population we see a very different picture if we kind of take a more superficial look.

First of all, you see increased interest in joining the Communist Party. And this has been documented by Dr. Rosen and others. And at the same time, when we have seen student-led protests, or protests in which students were kind of prominent participants, rather than protesting sort of against the Communist Party, you see these protests intended to kind of defend China, or defend the Communist Party against what are perceived as slights against China, or slights against the political system in China.

So -- Evan Osnos already talked about what happened last spring with regard to the Tibetan protests, so I won’t go into that. But
that’s one example of the kind of protests that I’m talking about. You could also go back to 1998, when American military forces bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. This also led to similar kinds of collective actions in protest of the West and, particularly, in this case, the United States. We also saw this in 2005, when the publication of Japanese textbooks were perceived to kind of trivialize Japanese aggression in China during World War II.

So, overall, you kind of see this fairly clear difference between the political attitudes and behavior of university students pre- and post-’89.

So now I’ll try to suggest some reasons why I think we’ve seen this shift.

In the early post-Mao era, late 1970s to the late 1980s, students -- university students -- were a very small and very elite social stratum. Through the ’80s, and actually through the present, access to universities was determined by a student’s score on a national examination. And only about 4 percent -- this is the early post-Mao period -- only about 4 percent of those students who took the national university entrance exam actually ended up being admitted to a university.

And the upshot of this is that from the late ’70s to the late ’80s, only 1/10 of 1 percent of the Chinese citizenry was a university
student. So we’re talking a tiny, tiny percentage of the population. And only about 1 percent of the entire population was a university graduate. So as a result, Chinese university students in the early post-Mao period, the late ’70s to the late ‘80s, comprised a very elite social stratum.

Secondly, during the early post-Mao period, university graduates were virtually assured a decent job upon graduation. And that’s because during this period, the Communist Party, by and large, continued to assign job assignments to all university graduates upon their graduation. Now, meanwhile, as the economy liberalized, and as private businesses were established, university students -- again, who were this tiny, tiny, elite within the citizenry -- also had increased opportunities to find good jobs outside of the public sector.

Third factor, from the late ‘70s to the late 1980s, there were clear splits within the top leadership of the Communist Party, and these splits revolved around the pace and extent of both economic and political reform.

And the consequence of this is that from the late ‘70s to the late ‘80s, there were very clearly discernible policy swings that at some points gave students hope that greater political liberalization would result - - but then, almost inevitably, would lead to a dashing of those hopes. So there was a more kind of back-and-forth, in terms of policy.
In addition to this, there were clear supporters of at least somewhat greater political liberalization within the top ranks of the Communist Party. So I'm thinking about Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, et cetera. And the existence of these relatively pro-political liberalization elites within the top ranks of the Party provided students with similar ideological proclivities, with perceived supporters and protectors within the Party.

And then, finally, in the early post-Mao period, the late '70s to the late 1980s, economic reform was relatively new, it was relatively exciting, and it was relatively uncertain -- in large part because there were these splits within the top leaders of the Communist Party. And as was mentioned earlier, the memory of the Cultural Revolution was also quite fresh. And I think because of that, the real fear of divisions within the Party, and the sort of chaos that might result from that. So the overall consequence of all of these factors was, during this period, a greater potential for collective action directed against he party state, and also greater interest in the West as a potential model.

But at the same time -- just to emphasize again -- even when university students in the early post-Mao period called for "democracy," they were not calling for multi-party elections, they were not calling for mass political enfranchisement, and they were not calling for an end to
Chinese Communist Party rule. Instead, they were calling for greater freedom of speech and association, and an end to official corruption.

Okay, what have we seen since the early 1990s? We've seen a very different contextual picture.

First of all, higher education has largely been marketized. And, again, there's already been some discussion of this, and you can refer to some very good articles written by Dr. Rosen if you want more details.

The central government has cut a lot of its funding toward higher education, and the upshot of that has been that most universities now charge tuition. And for a lot of potential university applicants, the tuition is now so high that a university education is just prohibited, in terms of the expense.

So the result of that is that since the early 1990s, university students in China increasingly have come from financially privileged families who have benefitted from China's market reforms. And, importantly, many of these privileged families have made their money by capitalizing on their connections with the ruling Chinese Communist Party. So the bigger consequence of that is that college students since the early '90s are now more part of an economic elite stratum than a kind of social elite stratum. And college students increasingly have come from
families that have enjoyed positive or beneficial ties with the Communist Party.

Second change since the early 1990s is what I would call the “massification of higher education.” And this, again, has already been discussed to a degree.

Central authorities have expanded dramatically the number of college admittees, and secondary education has become far less exclusive than it as in the early post-Mao period. So, as I mentioned before, in the early post-Mao period, only about 4 percent of those who took the national entrance exam were actually admitted to college, as of 2003, this proportion was 60 percent. So a massive jump in just the ability to gain college entry. And, as Dr. Lee mentioned earlier, this has led to a six-fold increase in the number of university students in China.

Now, you combine this with the fact that beginning in 1997, the Party discontinued its allocation of jobs to university graduates. So you have more students coming in, more students getting that university education, but they’re no longer guaranteed a job after they graduate.

What this means is that today there are lots of opportunities to get rich, but it’s much harder to get a desirable job. University students and graduates today have to fend for themselves. And it’s in this context, where we see what Dr. Rosen was just talking about -- close
ties to the Communist Party are now seen as useful in an instrumental sense. They’re seen as useful in terms of getting a good job, and thereby attaining material comfort and high social status.

And the overall result of this among the college educated population in China has been a reduced desire to challenge the political establishment, and a heightened desire to join it.

Another factor laid on top of this is that since the early 1990s, the top Communist Party leaders have been more or less unified in their opposition to further political reform, and their support for continued economic reform. So -- it’s time to stop. Okay. I'll do one more minute? Okay.

So what that means is that there are no backers within the ranks of the Communist Party’s top ranks for greater political reform.

Now at the same time -- just to end very quickly in one minute -- I do want to emphasize there continue to be clear continuities between the early post-Mao era and the late post-Mao era, in terms of the political attitudes and behavior of university students.

First of all, a common theme is criticism of corruption within the Chinese Communist Party. So that means that university students today are not the apologists for the CCP that many believe them to be.
At the same time, what you see across both periods is a lack of a clear desire for systemic political transformation. So what that means is that the early post-Mao period university students were also not quite so clearly the liberal democrats that we often make them out to be.

All right. I’ll leave you there.

(Applause)

DR. WU: Thank you, Director Li Cheng, and also thank you, Brookings, for organizing this event. And thank you for coming.

I just found out, the great thing to be a last presenter is all of your major key points have been covered by other presenters. So I have to scramble with some other points.

Today we talk about “angry youth.” Although this is a very important topic, actually we can -- 90 years ago, 50 years ago, 20 years ago, we can cover the same topic, even with the same sub-headline.

But what makes this particular generation, or this group of “angry youth” unique and important? I think there are two aspects of this.

One is the stature of China, which is dramatically different from the previous China.

The second major point is the technology. Here we talk about internet. Which means they are not only angry, but also they are well educated, well informed, and well connected and even technologically
savvy, to present their case. So they are not only kind of venting their anger, some of them even organize and even kind of execute in a fashion that has never been the case in the past.

So what are those kinds of angry youths? Who are they, and why are they angry, or what are they angry at?

Let’s think about, look at this one number. China right now, just latest survey report, has 300 million kind of on-line population. Okay, that is kind of a frequently reported kind of number.

But there is another number which is, I think, more telling of this particular group. More than 75 percent of these 300 million on-line population are between the age of 18 and 35 -- okay? More than 75 percent of these 300 million people, between the age of 18 and 35.

This number is not only disproportionately larger than the distribution of this age group in China’s kind of general population, but also disproportionately larger than any on-line countries in the world -- which makes this group more energetic, young and well-educated, and also they have a lot of energy, a lot of hormones to kind of spend on-line.

So, yes, that is quite kind of a -- and also let’s think about this age group -- 35 years of age, younger than 35 -- which means when they were born, China already started this tremendous growth, or this
opening to the outside world. 1979 is the year when Deng Xiaoping decided, okay, we open up to the outside world, and reform.

So most of these 300 million, 75 percent of this 300 million, they grow up in the historical kind of period of time when China has experienced this fascinating kind of growth. So over the course of their entire lifetime, China has been growing, growing, growing. Okay? It’s a rising kind of case.

So they identify -- they are so proud. Which is quite different from the kind of, their -- not to mention their parents, but even to those groups demonstrated in 1989, okay, just kind of maybe 10 years older than them, their experience is dramatically different. Because during their entire lifetime they experience the most kind of encouraging kind of growth, not only in China’s history but, actually, in human history, in terms of within this 30-years period of time, not only in the kind of growth has been kind of unprecedented, but every seven years people’s income doubles.

So there is nothing to complain about. Every seven years, over the past 30 years, people’s income double, double, double. So this really gives this group of people tremendous pride, which is quite different from the previous kind of “angry youth.”
The problem here is there is a gigantic perception gap between these angry -- this new kind of very proud young people, their expectation about themselves, or their self-identification about themselves, and the difference between their self-identification with the Western media, or whatever the West's perception about China. Because it's really hard for a foreign country or foreign culture to really understand China, not to mention to change, or dramatically change your perception about a Far East kind of a different culture or different kind of civilization.

So this lingering effect of the old China, the Communist China, which is really contrast with this younger generations, their self-identification.

In social psychology, we have the theory of this looking-glass self theory, which is you identify yourself as if you want to be the -- okay, the sentence is, "I am what I think you think I am."

I am what I think you think I am. So you pretty much kind of identify yourself based on people's perception about you. So you have this very high pride, and high expectation about other people's perception about you, but their perception is not kind of consistent, or anyhow, compatible with your self-identification.
So this really causes a lot of this frustration and also anger. So that really this is the triggering point of this social psychology, why this is so kind of widespread, rather than just a small group of people.

And also there is another kind of factor, which is not the case in the past, which is the internet. Okay. The internet is not only a kind of a media, people to communicate with each other, but also it has a tremendous power of organizing people, and even kind of attacking people -- okay? We talk about it during the 1999 and even 2000, that there is a cyber-warfare between the Chinese hacker groups and American hacker groups, and even there are several other foreign countries joined together to fight, to kind of sabotage, to deface a lot of these websites, and really cause a lot of the tremendous kind of damage, which is quite different from the pervious, kind of nationalist, kind of whatever, this “angry youth.” Okay, normally, they demonstrate, there’s nothing else, okay? You don’t cover it, it doesn’t exit. But right now, they can deface, they can sabotage, they can even kind of interfere with your kind of communications. So that causes a lot of trouble.

What are the characteristics? So, actually, I wrote a book about these Chinese cyber-nationalists. I trace back this kind of movement all the way back to 1994, when the internet first entered China. Because after that -- this is really kind of watershed event -- after that,
although there is a continuation of this nationalistic sentiment, but the way people organize, or the way people to operationalize their kind of opinion is quite different from the past.

So what are the major characteristics of this new ideology or new movement?

There are several of them. The first is this Chinese cyber-nationalism, or this Chinese kind of "angry youth," is a non-governmental sponsored, a grassroots movement. It's a non-government sponsored grassroots movement. This is a very kind of important point, because a lot of the foreign media, whenever they cover Chinese kind of events, or whatever kind of political events, by nature they assume there is a kind of a Chinese government manipulation, and try to control it, even kind of stimulate some of the anger and try to take advantage of it.

Yes, there is a certain point of it, the Chinese government because there is a kind of concurrence. When the Chinese government agenda concurrent with these kind of Chinese nationalist agenda, okay, the government may kind of be a little bit kind of low key and kind of let them to kind of play out. But there are certain kinds of incidents, a lot of kind of agendas they may not kind of consistent with each other, so cause a lot of kind of trouble. Even the Chinese government may need to very kind of careful and even kind of fearful of this very troubling kind of events.
I’ll give several kinds of examples, in terms of this conflicting kind of agenda. For example, during the 2002 or 2003, the Chinese government wanted to play a low-key approach to Japan. Especially, they want to keep a better or friendly kind of relationship with a lot of Japanese, companies or investment. So they don’t want to really play up the Diaoyu Island and other kind of disputed kind of areas or territory -- the disputes.

But these Chinese cyber-nationalists, nonetheless, they want to promote this issue. For example, they raise money on-line, and they kind of rented a small boat, and they voyaged to the Diaoyu Island, they declared sovereignty over the island, and cause a lot of kind of this trouble -- not only to this particular group, because they were kind of arrested by the Japanese coast guard, but also kind of caused a lot of trouble for the Chinese government. Because this is really push the Chinese government into a corner, in terms of, okay, you have to declare your nationalist kind of credential, because even the Chinese Communist Party cannot risk the danger of this legitimacy problem, which really kind of go against the government’s agenda.

The next kind of characteristic of the movement is it’s modern. Here, I talk about “modern,” because as compared to the past nationalist kind of event, this group of people is more liberal, progressive,
in terms of -- other presenters have talked about their kind of reading habits, their kind of philosophy, their kind of understanding about the outside world. Which means they are more well-informed, well-educated about not only themselves, but also about the whole world.

So their decision-making -- if you look at, for example, there are several demonstrations by these very kind of, very active nationalist groups on-line, each of their decisions actually is based on a democratic kind of voting system -- okay? Whenever they want to attack a kind of foreign website, okay, the people kind of choose the leader, and then they use this kind of voting process to really get to that kind of final decision-making, which is quite different from whatever other previous kind of those nationalistic movements.

And another factor, another characteristic of this Chinese cyber-nationalism is it's not just from the Chinese mainland to outside, which is not a one-side kind of communication channel. It's a two-way communication channel. It's both inside-out and outside-in -- which is quite different from in the past. For example, after 1989, the Tiananmen kind of movement, the people, Chinese people, studying or living outside China, most of them actually don’t like the Chinese government during that time, so a lot of this, there is a conflicting kind of agenda between the
students, or Chinese people, living outside China, and with the people living inside China.

But that is not the case for this nationalism kind of a feeling over the past 10 or kind of even 20 years, because especially you should remember last year, when they did the torch relay-- which I called this “tortured” torch relay, really, a lot of the anger, you can find the anger not from inside China, because a lot of coverage about the disruption of these torch relays were kind of blocked by the Chinese initially. So actually the first anger, you can find it actually from the Chinese youngsters, these angry youth outside China, they’re living, studying, outside China. So there’s no total control from the Chinese government, in terms of manipulating their anger, or their kind of direction of whatever, their kind of activity.

So we see a lot of this kind of channeling back and forth, which is quite a kind of a new phenomenon.

And another characteristic of this Chinese cyber-nationalism is it’s not proactive, it’s more reactive, or defensive. That is something we can maybe take comfort for, because this is not something that is aggressive or tries to proactively promoting Chinese agenda. It’s more like a case by case basis. For example, there are several kind of incidents in the past when Chinese, these kind of hacker groups, frustrated or kind
of angered toward America’s policy, especially during 1998, when there was the embassy bombing, and the 2001, when there was a spy plane collision between China and the U.S. During that period of time you will see this heightened anger, or this kind of outburst of this nationalism feeling. But after, especially after 9/11, September 11th, and when the American, whenever their policy shifts to another area, you will see there is decreasing kind of hostility or anti-Americanism among Chinese youngsters.

So there’s not a kind of target of particular one nation, or one kind of policy, as if this is kind of one-issue focus. It’s that. It’s more like case sensitive. It’s more reactive rather than proactive.

So that makes it more flexible, but on the other hand makes it more uncontrollable, or even unpredictable, in the future. We never know what will happen that will trigger this dormant but very powerful kind of sentiment, which is across a large group of people. Try to imagine that.

The reason why I call it a “grassroots movement,” there are several kind of incidents. For example, in 2005, when the Chinese online citizens, they don’t like the Chinese government’s policy towards Japan, especially during this Japan’s bid for the permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council during that period of time, there is on-
line several websites, they kind of organized this on-line petition against Japan’s bid for this U.N. Security Council permanent membership. Over the course of a half year, over 40 million people signed that petition -- although there are some redundancies, some people kind of used a fake name to kind of post whatever kind of sign their kind of petition, but still this is a large number -- 40 million signatures.

So it’s a massive number, not only to Chinese government, but also to any kind of government or any kind of political parties involved.

So, in conclusion, we all know that nationalism is a double-edged sword. But for this case, for the Chinese cyber-nationalism, it’s not only a double-edged sword, but also there is no handle.

(Laughter)

Nobody knows when that will hit you, or how damaging it is, that it will hurt you. Even for the Chinese Communist Party itself, it has to find a way to accommodate to this kind of threatening but also it’s a pending danger.

But a good point, a good thing we can maybe look into the future, be a little bit kind of optimistic is: this nationalism feeling is not a lasting kind of event. It’s just like a younger -- young people try to identify itself, so it more happens when a nation enters the international community.
So although China is the largest and also the oldest civilization, but it's relatively young when we talk about this international integration. So that happens when China really entered the outside world, just like a youngster first time enters the real world. It may find a lot of things that are kind of contrasting, or that's kind of inconsistent with his or her kind of self-identification. But after a while, when he matures, when he really kind of develops this understanding and also this interaction with the outside world, I think that will literally and gradually kind of quiet down. And that will become kind of a future, when China becomes a real kind of responsible stakeholder, because China is mature enough to really deal with the outside world. I mean, after maybe 20 years, we may not talk about this same angry youth. And that's our kind of best hope.

Okay. Thank you.

(Applause)

DR. LIEBERTHAL: First of all, thank you very much for four very good, wide-ranging presentations that really raised a tremendous array of issues.

I'm anxious to open this up to everyone. While people are getting wired up, let me pop a question or two, just in case anyone on the
panel wants to pick it up. And these are a couple questions designed to kind of get our arms around the whole corpus of what we’re talking about.

And I basically have three quick questions.

One is, how much of what all of you have said applies to young workers and peasants, and school leavers? You know, not people in chu zhong, or gao zhong, but after they’re out and are in the labor force? Or is this more reflective of a more intellectual group?

Secondly, when do you young people in China become politically conscious? Do we have a sense of when they begin to develop political ideas? I know when I was in high school politics did not beat, you know, sports and sex. And so I wonder about in China now.

And thirdly -- and perhaps most importantly -- everyone that we’ve heard today has stressed the revolution in connectivity among young people -- right? They’re ability to reach out through digital networks and just know what everyone else is doing, access information, and that kind of thing.

Do you get a sense that a social ethics has developed among China’s youth? I mean, you know, traditionally, China had very strong social ethics. Under Mao it had very strong social ethics, but different social ethics, but still very strong.
And my sense is one of things that really collapsed under the reforms was agreed-upon social ethics. And I’m wondering whether you sense that this is now coming together in some way again, or do we have people who can be mobilized through internet appeals and that kind of thing, but really not much society-wide agreement among the younger cohorts on such things as -- I don’t know -- equality, civil liberties, the role of violence, collectivism versus individualism -- you know, the things that constitute social sensibility?

Let me ask with those -- all three are designed to kind of get an overall picture of this. Do you have brief responses to any of those three? I’d be happy to recognize anyone who -- Evan, if you didn’t step forward I was going to apply what you call “military voluntarism” to this. Evan doesn’t step forward, but everyone else steps back and Evan is chosen.

MR. OSNOS: Here’s how you end up on point, I think, in the military.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: You bet. You bet.

MR. OSNOS: I want to talk for a second about the social ethics question. I do think that there is a general recognition these days of what is known in Chinese as a “crisis of faith.” Xinyang weiji is often what you hear about, which is basically that the sort of bonds that used to
tie people together, whether they were Confucian or socialist, have been broken down by the advance of the free market, and really the sort of everything’s-been-turned-upside-down over the last 30 years, as we’ve talked about today.

So I do, I hear about it from a lot of different people, that some of the most basic kinds of elements that they used to hold dear, like empathy for your neighbor, these kinds of questions have been, are very much in doubt. Parents are concerned their children don’t have the same values. An this is one of the reasons, I think, why you would hear a lot of kind of spiritual wandering among young Chinese these days—whether it’s towards Buddhism, or Christianity, or towards what are classified as cults - - these are really what people are looking for. They’re looking for some kind of spiritual leadership.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Thank you.

Stan?

DR. ROSEN: Yes, just quickly. I talked a little bit about that, but if you look at the surveys of these different generations, there’s no question that the earlier generations, those born from ‘60 to ‘70, ‘70 to ‘80, they see the ‘80s and ‘90s generation as really not having the kind of ethics you’re talking about.
And the ‘80s and ‘90s, talking to each other, are basically attacking each other for the same sins. Again, if you look at that cartoon outside -- I don’t know how many people have my handout -- but I have that cartoon where ‘80s youth and ‘90s youth are yelling at each other, basically, for watching the same extreme pornographic Japanese videos, or basically being stupid and not understanding world affairs or anything else.

So I certainly think there is a perception within China that these newer generations don’t have those same ethics.

There are a lot of books published by different generations or about different generations, and they see -- the earlier generations, “Oh, you just -- you did everything the Communist Party told you to do. So you didn’t really have any ethics, you just followed orders. You were a docile tool.” So I think the generations are very critical of each other.

And as you suggested, that maybe every five years now we’re going to start getting a new generation. But I think there is a problem there.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Thank you.

Any other comments?

Yes, Terri?
DR. WRIGHT: Yes, I'll make a few. One in response to the question about the wider applicability of, you know, some of these features to sort of the population that doesn't have a higher education, regular workers, peasants, et cetera.

I haven't seen any data -- I don't know if any of you have -- on, you know, nationalism and things like this. But one thing that we have a lot of information about is this pervasive anti-corruption sentiment, not just among university students or young people, but absolutely among “regular” kind of rank-and-file workers, both in the public sector and the private sector, and also among the peasantry.

And what you see kind of universally, I think, is what some scholars have identified as a “bifurcation of regime legitimacy” -- which means that most people look toward the kind of national government, the central leadership, the top leaders of the CCP as well-intentioned, well-meaning, but then they have this very different view of local political authorities, local business owners, et cetera, as being the source of corruption, et cetera. So I think that’s a commonality you see, really, across most socioeconomic sectors.

And then secondarily, with regard to this idea of a crisis of faith, I think that’s also something that kind of characterizes kind of wide swaths of the Chinese population, not just young people in China. So, for
example, if you look at kind of the skyrocketing popularity of the Falun Gong in the early 1990s, it wasn’t really young people that were the bulk of the membership of the Falun Gong, it was a lot of middle-aged and older people -- and a lot of people who didn’t have a higher education -- who were part of that.

And kind of along those lines, I just -- I was at a talk recently that was a commemoration of the 1989 protests. And we had a couple of speakers who were participants and sort of low-level leaders in 1989. And both of them have become Christians since 1989, and they very clearly stated that it was their kind of feeling of a loss of meaning, this kind of desolation, disillusionment, that made them open to Christianity later on.

So I think this is something that you see really across the population.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Thank you.

Xu, to do you have any comment?

DR. WU: Yes, a little bit of comments on this social ethics, and also the concerns about there is a young generation may not have this kind of Confucianism kind of value.

I think it’s not particular to China but also it happens to any country. The young generation try to rebel against their whatever, their
ancestors or their parents, and then somehow they find out they've become more like their parents when they kind of grow up. So it's kind of a cyclical kind of thing. My first point.

Another is, although there's a large group of people that want to try to re-identify themselves, but also there small kind of undercurrent which they want to go back to the past. And also there is a so-called “new Confucianism” kind of movement, especially among those youngsters. They read more, the kind of a classic the Chinese doctrine, and they try to respect, and even more respect, a lot of these philosophies.

And also, another, I know this, I really think that the Cultural Revolution has already destroyed a lot of its good kind of ethics. So we don’t know what is left. So we may have this discovery to do, not only for these youngsters, but also even for my parents or other older generation.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Great. Major issue for the future.

We'll open it up now.

Please, back here? Yes.

Please identify who you are. And I would appreciate keeping your questions brief, because there are a lot of hands that have gone up already, and we have 30 minutes.

Please, sir.
MR. CHEN: Yes, Chao Chen, freelance correspondent. I have an observation, and a question.

I think it's good that the youth have opportunity and are able to express their opinion, its give me the sense that those youth have confidence about themselves, and I think they think their future is in their hands. So I think this title, "angry youth," probably better more defined to "energetic and confident youth."

And my question is this: the Tibet issue is an important issue in China in this world. I would like the members of the panel to tell us your knowledge and your perception on Tibet issue.

Thank you.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: I'm going to ask just one person to respond to that, because this is not fundamentally focused on Tibet, and four responses will take most of our time.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Sir, there are a lot of important issues. This panel is focused on China's youth. Thank you. Excuse me.

Yes. Who wants to take.

DR. ROSEN: Well, the only thing I would say -- I've been to Tibet a number of times, most recently in 2007. The only thing I would say is what was kind of mentioned earlier, that in the United States you
have Orville Schell’s book on Virtual Tibet. There is this fascination with this mysterious kingdom. The Dalai Lama is extremely successful in going around the world. He’s won the Nobel Peace Prize.

I mean, the people in Xinjiang, when I’ve been in Xinjiang, complain, “Why is everybody always concerned about Tibet? We have problems here, too. But nobody cares about us.”

So there’s clearly a kind of disconnect, because it’s hard to find many people in China who don’t see Tibet as being a part of China. But when you go outside, you find, in Europe and the United States, people who are talking about Tibetan independence, Tibetan autonomy.

So there’s a real disconnect. And I can understand why people in China can’t fathom why people in the West care so much about Tibet. But if you read, going back to the ‘30s, James Hilton’s Lost Horizon, 1934, the Ronald Coleman film in 1937, the word “Shangri-la” comes from this mystical Tibetan kingdom.

And so when I show films like -- in my film class, Chinese film class -- “The Serf”, from 1963, that film could have been made today, exactly the same view of Tibet in China today, in terms of the PLA liberating Tibet, the slave society, and so on. The Chinese view is consistent.
One last point, because I don’t want to take too much time on this, either.

We had a high-level delegation to my university, USC, recently, with some of the top leaders who deal with Tibetan policy, including Tibetans. And it was quite fascinating to me -- with the small group that met with them -- because I said to them, “Well, it’s very clear from your point of view, the Dalai Lama, who left in 1959, has nothing to negotiate. Because he is still thinking of Tibet as of 1959, when he left. And your basic view is if the Dalai Lama wants to negotiate, the only thing he can negotiate is his own personal safety in going back to China, and probably living in Beijing. But he doesn’t represent -- from your point of view, he represents no one.”

And they said, “You have a very profound knowledge of Tibet.”

(Laughter)

But from the American point of view, or the Western point of view, for most people, they’re more influenced by Richard Gere than what anybody in China is saying about Tibet.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Thank you.

We’ll go to the back row here, and then we’ll jump around a bit.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Peter Gupser, retired president of an NGO, worked overseas.

My question is about the gender imbalance among youth in China. Because the one-child policy, the great favoritism for male children, there must be millions if not tens of millions of young men who will never get married and never have a family -- either today or in the next decade.

What impact does that have on the youth and the future of China?

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Other than frustration, I presume you mean.

(Laughter)

Who would like to take that?

DR. WRIGHT: Well, I mean, this isn’t much of an answer, it’s just kind of, you know, reinforcing what you just said and implied. I’ve always said the biggest thing to fear about China is not its economic rise, but the rise in the number of young men who aren’t going to have partners readily available.

So -- yeah, I think that’s a serious factor.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: You know, there are things you know from elsewhere, too. India has this problem. A lot of places have this
problem. And it predictably will lead to an ongoing rise in the sex-worker industry. It will lead to an ongoing rise in trafficking in women. It will lead to an ongoing rise in bride prices. But it will also end up with a lot of men who are unfulfilled in their family aspirations.

Oh, I'm sorry. Stan, did you want to --

DR. ROSEN: Yes, just quickly -- because I used to work, 10 or more years ago, I used to work a little bit in that area. It doesn't sound too good.

(Laughter)

DR. OSNOS: Which area are we talking about?

(Laughter)

DR. ROSEN: Well, the surveys. Because --

(Laughter)

DR. ROSEN: I also recommend the film Blind Mountain, by Li Yang, which is exactly about trafficking in women, which has two endings -- the international ending, and the ending in mainland China, where everything ends happily.

But what I found in some of the internal surveys was, one, that a lot of people who were arrested for trafficking in women did not see it as a crime, because they -- and the local officials in places where the women were trafficked to, often kidnapped, thought they were basically
solving the problems of bachelors who could not find wives -- especially people who had been disabled, or people who are not attractive for one reason or another. As their economies began to improve, for the first time, they could afford to pay for a wife. And they were paying quite substantial sums of money.

So it was a problem even to convince people involved in the pushing or the pulling effect of trafficking women that they’re actually doing something other than solving the problems of people who needed money or needed a spouse. That became very difficult. And that’s probably continuing.

But, again, that movie makes it very clear, where the whole village is going against the public security officials who try to rescue these women. And, after all, some of them have been drugged, and they’re sold for, let’s 7,00 yuan or more -- from the village’s point of view, “We paid good money for these people. What are you giving us in return?”

It’s a very difficult problem to solve.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Yes, ma’am.

QUESTIONER: My name is Isabella Chen. I graduated from the University of Maryland. And I have a question to Professor Rosen.
You use surveys to do your research. And I just have a question -- to what kind of extent do you think the samples in your research can represent the majority of Chinese people? Especially Chinese young people?

I want to take an example, such as 1989, Tiananmen event. I was too young at the time, but when I look at the documentary movies, I think I would disagree with them. But they, like Chai Ling and Wang Dan, they frequently use words like “people,” or “we.”

I just want to know, if I am a part of the “people,” who gives you the right to use the word “we?”

So today, when I see the Western scholars’ research, I always think, do they pay attention to the silent mass? Because many people are silent. But the people that go out to say some words against the government, their voice are high, and their voice are easier to be heard.

So I just want to know how you see the issue of the silent mass.

Thank you.

DR. ROSEN: Okay, I guess that’s me.

First, in terms of representative samples, the surveys I’m reporting about today were done by Chinese social scientists or the
Chinese government. I’m not reporting on my own surveys -- at the moment. And I try and be careful to look at samples.

But, to give you one case that I talked about -- the survey that was just sent to me by a friend of mind -- he took the most elite universities, pretty much -- well, Bei Da, Tsinghua, Ren Da, Beishi Da, and the fifth one was actually Beijing Aviation.

And it was interesting that when you get to Beijing Aviation, there were more conservative attitudes expressed there, compared to Bei Da and Tsinghua. But everybody knows that the students at these universities, particularly in Beijing University and Tsinghua University, are very critical of the government, especially in the classroom.

They’re entitled, they’re given an entitlement to be critical. Where, if you go to provincial universities, you don’t have that entitlement.

So he would be the first to acknowledge that his sample is not representative.

Now, I can spend a lot of time talking about Tiananmen Square. Obviously, that was a long time ago, and you don’t look old enough to have taken part in that.

But those -- yes -- there’s not enough time. We can talk afterwards, because I’ve met Chai Ling, and I know Wang Dan pretty well. He’s been to my apartment to watch Chinese films.
But I can talk about that. I'm not a big fan of Chai Ling at all. She's now suing Carma Hinton over that documentary, and it's really costing them a tremendous amount of money to contest that lawsuit.

So, I agree with you in quite a bit of what you're saying.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: There is a more fundamental point though, which is to say there are two kinds of reporting. One is kind of anecdotal, who speaks the loudest and most prominently gets reported. That's a real problem.

But the other is, serious social survey research. And there, you do do sampling frames, and there is a tremendous amount of knowledge that's been built up, globally, about how you do this well. And so -- and some of it is being done well in China. Some of it is not -- or some of it, it's too hard to tell.

But I think that there are, you know, defensible approaches to getting the way Chinese people -- you define the group you want to sample, and there are defensible ways of figuring out how to sample them accurately, and to know whether it is an accurate sample or not. I mean, there's just a huge literature on how to do this.

So this is not all -- you know, it's not all reporting what the most prominent speakers have to say. Fortunately, it's begun to get well beyond that in at least some of the work that's done in China.
Yes. Yes?

QUESTIONER: Dave Brown, from SAIS.

First of all, I’d like to comment that I was surprised that we went through five presentations without the word “religion” being mentioned. And so I thank the panel for the comments you made on that subject which would answer one of my questions.

The other one has to do with Charter ’08. Were any representative leaders of this youth movement involved in that? And what can be said, if anything, about young university students’ attitudes about the Charter ’08 declaration?

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Evan wants to take this?

MR. OSNOS: I mean, I can talk a little bit about Charter ’08. I haven’t done a huge amount of specific research on it.

But from what I’ve seen over the last couple of months, particularly, is that, you know, Liu Xiaobo, who is a prominent writer and dissident, who’s been now locked up for couple of months for his involvement in Charter ’08, he is actually probably more typical of the guys who began the project. So the classic dissidents who in some ways question the primacy of the Communist Party.

But in reporting that we’ve read about it, that I’ve seen, what you do see is that there’s a younger sort of professional -- you can call
them the “blogging professional class,” these are people who have jobs, graphic artist, architects, and also are engaged in this on-line world, and they’ve chosen to take this on -- which is unusual. Because, after all, they’re the guys, they’re the people who have won in the system. And on the other hand, they see some kinship, ideologically, with this idea.

So, anecdotally, yes, we’ve seen that. But I haven’t run into the people, the people who I know from the sort of classic angry youth demographic are not writing to me saying, “Charter ‘08 is something that we’re supporting.”

DR. ROSEN: The only thing I would say, what’s surprising to me was the number of people that actually signed it.

MR. OSNOS: Mm-hmm.

DR. ROSEN: I mean, there were thousands -- in the end, thousands, yeah, about 3,000 people actually have signed it, which is quite striking.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Richard?

DR. RICHARD BUSH: Thank you. And thank you for the presentations.

In thinking about whether youth anger translates into intense political activism, I’d like to raise the factor of fear -- fear of the coercive power of the authoritarian party state. It seems that, you know, if
someone’s going to translate anger into activism, that will be mediated through an assessment of the dangers involved.

I would also hypothesize that the level of fear may decline the further away you get from the last big crackdown. So it’s not surprising that the 1990s were quiescent, and that this decade was quiescent.

I would look for the next decade as one where new generations of young people don’t learn the lessons of Tiananmen, and act on their ignorance.

I’d appreciate a comment.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Yes?

DR. WRIGHT: Well, one thing about fear is that even though university students have been quiescent over the last 20 years or so, other people in China haven’t. I mean, you had tens of thousands of mass disturbances mid-’90s, early-’90s, early 2000s. They’ve actually seemed to kind of peter out a little bit. Well, as far as I know, the government has stopped reporting on the exact numbers.

So I think we have to be careful in using fear as an explanation for a lack of political contentiousness on the part of university students, when you see that there are lots of other people who are able to overcome their fear and engage in contentious political action.
DR. LIEBERTHAL: Xu, did you?

DR. WU: Yes, I tend to agree with Teresa’s assessment. Because fear -- I remember there’s a documentary about Tiannamen, and actually the producer showed a picture from the documentary to some of the university students, they could not recognize that picture. So I don’t think because it’s quite successful for the government to control a lot of information, they really don’t have these resources for the fear, because they never see the photos, or pictures, or a lot of things.

So I don’t think, I really don’t think that is the driving factor of this very supportive kind of sentiment among the youngsters. I think they genuinely believe the country is on the right path, and they thing that the CCP is doing a good job in terms of maintaining this kind of development.

DR. ROSEN: Can I just have one, just very quickly, on that?

The real danger, to me, if you’re looking -- nobody’s answered Professor Lieberthal’s earlier question about workers, peasants, school-leavers, when they become politically active. So I’m going to leave that for the moment.

But the real danger is because you have these rising expectations. In 1995 there was a national survey— the methodological problems were there, but a national survey of over 10,000 people, saying
“Where do you think China stands, politically and militarily and economically?”

And by and large, the assessments were very low. But they also asked, “What about the next 30 years?” And there was a lot expectation China would be rising.

And when you do the surveys now every year, you have 68, 70 percent say that the government has done a very good job.

The danger is, if all of a sudden -- as everybody knows from Crane Brinton and all the other studies of revolution, revolutions, or big unrest, occurs when things are going well and all of a sudden there’s a drop, not when things are at the bottom. So that’s the real danger, I think, that if legitimacy is performance-based legitimacy, raising of the standard of living of the population -- which means getting job for university graduates -- and also making China rise and takes its voice in the world, those are the two sources of legitimacy. Ideology is not there anymore.

So if those get called into question in some way, then I think there is a real threat to the regime. And that could split the leadership, in terms of how to solve it. And elite cohesion is absolutely essential to continue the stability.
DR. LIEBERTHAL: You know, I agree with everything you’ve said, except I would add a layer, which is to say: I think that there is a kind of concern about China, about you know, Chinese, and the prestige of Chinese globally.

And so I think it just sounds a little too cut-and-dried to say kind of, you know, economic growth and, you know, the rise of China.

There is more of a broad sense of “Let’s not screw this up.”

DR. LIEBERTHAL: So even if there are ups and downs and that kind of thing, you know, “We’re kind of getting it right, finally. And let’s not screw it up.”

And I think that that allows for more cohesion, basic stability, if you will, or flexibility and resilience in the system than some of the terminology might convey -- although I very much agree with you if there’s a fundamental open split among the elite, hold onto your hats.

DR. WRIGHT: Yep.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Let’s see -- yes, sir. Over here. Yes, right over by the window there.

If you can pass down the microphone, please. Down there.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Toy Reid, with the Congressional Executive Commission on China.
I was encouraged, and found it also very insightful, the comment earlier that one of the panelists made about the sense that the angry youth, that the motivation behind the expression of anger comes from a sense of injustice -- whether real or perceived, depending on the case.

I found that sort of encouraging, because I think that some of the criticism that they’re reacting to, coming from other quarters, is also motivated by people who are acting because they think there is injustice going on.

Now, I think it’s also important to point out that, the Chinese youth, to some extent, growing up in the educational system that they have, are aware of certain aspects of problems like Tibet, things like, affirmative action for Tibetans, those sorts of policies -- the so-called liberation of the serfs or what have you -- and are less aware of the more repressive policies that have been implemented in Tibet for decades.

So I guess my question is -- and this is a big question -- what can be done, not just at the level of government exchange, but perhaps more importantly, at the level of educational and cultural exchange with the Chinese, to open an honest dialogue about addressing the problem of injustice -- as understood by Chinese, by Tibetans, by Americans and by others?
MR. ROSEN: Well, part of the problem, I would say, is that you’ve added Tibet to that mix. And once you put Tibet in there, that kind of skews it out of the normal, in a sense -- using “normal” not in a normal sense -- but “normal” Sino-American relations to discuss injustice.

I think that could be done. But once you bring Tibet in there, I think it’s going to get very difficult. I don’t know if the thrust of your comments are about Tibet, or the thrust of your comments are more generally about the case of injustice.

So I think certain issues will be very, very difficult to come to any kind of an agreement, in terms of issues of injustice. Because from the Chinese point of view, they have poured all this money -- the Chinese government point of view, and most of the Chinese population, they’ve poured all this money into Tibet, and these Tibetans are so ungrateful.

From the American point of view, “Well, you’ve taken away their religion, and you’re destroying their culture as they know it.” And it’s very hard to get past those two positions.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Li Cheng, did you want to jump in on this, or --

DR. LI: Well, as I listened to your excellent presentations, it seemed to me a lot of anger -- if this is an angry generation, or anger youth -- has to do with China’s current situation in China on the rise,
there’s a misunderstanding, the misperception, this legacy of, you know, hundred years’ humiliation.

But as China continues to rise, do we see the trend that this anger may change to arrogance?

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Teresa?

DS. WRIGHT: I had a response, partly to that one, but also to the previous question.

I think one thing that we have to be careful about when we call for more understanding, and more education, is to not have a sort of hubris that we need them to come and talk to us more, and to know more of the “reality of what’s going on,” so that they can have a more “true” sense of reality. And the assumption is, then they’ll think like we do. If they only had full access to all the information that’s out there, then of course they would have the same values that we do, the same goals that we do.

But I think we have something to learn from Chinese young people, as well. So it can’t just be this idea that we need to foster more exchanges and educational opportunities so that they can start to think more like us. I think we need to try to understand, kind of get inside their heads, as well -- and also respect the fact that perhaps they might have different goals than we would like to see.
DR. LIEBERTHAL: That's also one reason why I raised the issue of ethics at the beginning. Because justice -- several of you mentioned the sense of justice, but justice depends on ethics. Right? I mean, for your criteria for what is "just."

So what comes across here is there's a great concern with "justice," but there's not agreement on what is just.

DR. WRIGHT: Right.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Right?

DR. WU: Yes, regarding this arrogance, I think that is always a possibility, especially if you look deep into this, the combination of the so-called nationalism movement, some of them are very conservative, or very restrained. But also there is another group is built on this belief of Chinese culture is of superiority, or military of aggressiveness. This kind of sentiment.

I think that will, in times of trouble -- for example, if the current financial meltdown deepens or deteriorates in the next two or three years, and China can't stand up as maybe the only country that can survive or prosper. So that may lead to this time of sentiment.

I don't guard against, or rule out that possibility.

But I think the thing we can take comfort here is, the Chinese Communist Party right now pretty much has a balanced kind of control, or
this management of this Chinese cyber-nationalism, because on the one hand, they have this nationalism credential themselves -- okay? Although they call themselves “Chinese Communist Party,” but it’s more like “Chinese Capitalist Party,” or “Chinese Confucian Party.” You can replace the “Communist” part without really changing a lot of things.

But still, they have this very, I think, consistent or congruent agenda with this nationalist group -- although they disagree with the other for a lot of things. So I think they have the control for the government to really tone down, even if that arrogance become a major kind of a thing in the future.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: We have time for two quick questions.

And one will be here, and then one over here -- okay?

Sir?

QUESTIONER: Thanks. I’m Tim Tien, from George Mason University, School of Public Policy.

According to my observation, there are two kinds of angry youth in China. One is the liberal angry youth. If you say something negative about America or democracy, they will attack you emotionally. And they also give a very low rating to books like China is Not Happy.

The other kind of angry youth is very nationalistic. And you have talked a lot about them today.
So my question is, can any of you say something about the background of these two kinds of angry youth, and why their attitudes differ from each other?

Thank you.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Xu, and Evan, and then we’ll take the next question.

DR. WU: I think in terms of ideology for a group, or any political group, you will always find there’s kind of right, left or in the middle. A radical group or a very conservative group or very kind of so-called silent majority. I think that is the case, not only for this Chinese nationalism, it applies to all the ideology core kind of movements, or any kind of similar phenomenon.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Thank you.

Evan, did you want to add a little?

MR. OSNOS: Yes, just a quick word.

I actually find -- I mean, I follow these kinds of distinctions sort of closely. And, you know, in Chinese they call them “the elites” on one side, and the “fenqing” on the other side. I often find that this is a distinction that almost is just to keep them preoccupied. I mean, it helps lay out the terms. You know who you’re dealing with.
But the truth is that they are part of one more important coherent group, which is -- you can call it the “free expression wing,” which is that they basically believe that the internet is theirs, and it’s not to be taken away.

I’ve often thought the single most provocative act the Chinese government could do would be to shut down multi-player gaming. People would go into the streets overnight. I mean, that’s the single greatest source of enjoyment for people under 25 in China.

And just a very brief point. I do want to address Dr. Li’s point, it was a good point about the question of arrogance.

I actually think that we already see the problem of arrogance now. And what’s interesting about it is that it’s coincidental with the sense of vulnerability. And I’ve often thought of it as a sort of arrogant victimology, which is on the one hand, “We are aggrieved,” on the other hand, “We are great.” And you saw this last year with the Olympics. Because part of the, I think, the depth of feeling and the passion behind the response in China was that they were shocked to discover that there were people abroad who were not as amazed with their own progress as they were.

And they said, “I can’t believe that you looked at this marvelous place we’ve constructed and you want to talk about Tibet?”
And so there was a kind of interesting sort of distance between their vulnerability and their confidence.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Last question, and it really has to be brief, because it’s almost five o’clock.

It’s right down here, I think -- right? Yes.

QUESTIONER: Okay, just a quick question.

Can you comment on how the education system in China, especially the curriculum in regards towards, you know, teaching Taiwan, Tibet, Japan, how it buttresses this nationalism, and creates a sort of latent anger within Chinese, that it can be triggered when certain events happen.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Now there’s a short question for you.

(Laughter)

Does anyone have a quick response?

DR. WU: I think there’s -- from 1995, the Chinese government has initiated this patriotism campaign, which really changed a lot of the focus of the education, as to provide a certain kind of history, especially about the past 100 or 200 years, purposely neglecting or emphasizing certain point of past history. I think that is a contributing factor to this so-called “anger” or whatever, frustration, because they don’t have really a clear or complete picture about the whole history.
For example, there are several kinds of black spots over China’s past for 100 years, but also there are some very documented, well documented, extensively covered period of time, like the late Ching dynasty, or this kind of Opium War period of time, or the Japanese occupation period. So I think that really contributes to this victim sentiment.

Because the reason for people share this same kind of thinking, or the same kind of anger, because they share the same kind of reference system. They have the same knowledge base -- which is quite different from the real history.

So I think in the future, when this internet becomes more and more kind of penetrable, when people have a better balanced kind of material base, so that they can be -- so that the nationalism, or this anger may come down in the future.

DR. WRIGHT: I have one just super quick thing.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Okay.

DR. WRIGHT: I agree with all that, but at the same time I just want to emphasize again that I think it’s dangerous for us to just say, "Well, they’re just brainwashed, and that’s why they feel this way."
And I think, you know, the guy who did the You Tube video is a perfect example of this. He's not just brainwashed, he's somebody who knows a lot, can find any information that he wants on the internet.

So you have to kind of balance that against the reality of the educational system.

DR. LIEBERTHAL: Also, you can keep in mind what is the case in the United States, which we found, which is to say the more information that's available on the internet, and by all the cable channels on TV, the more people tend to go to only those areas that produce information that reinforce their prior convictions. So this is not necessarily an amalgomizing, homogenizing and temporizing kind of force. You have to look at how it's actually used.

I want to thank Dr. Li Cheng for putting this entire afternoon together, which has been wonderful -- and the Thornton Center at Brookings for sponsoring. And especially the panelists, for their wonderful presentations – Xu Wu, Terri Wright, Stanley Rosen, and Evan Osnos.

And I would appreciate your joining me in expressing our appreciation to all of them.

* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2012