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THE AIR FORCE'S ROLE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: Welcome; for those I haven't met yet, I'm Pete Singer, I direct the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings. And this program at Brookings explores the changing dynamics of security and warfare in the 21st century. And as I flew back last night for this event, I reflected on all the various changes facing the U.S. Air Force today and over the next five, ten, 20 years. And they're manifold; they're from the changing nature of threats that might range from rising states to failed states, from triple digit SAMS, to a teenager playing in an IED, to a computer hacker planting a computer virus.

The amazing changes in technology that we're experiencing right now, such as the growing use of unmanned systems, which with Moore's law are becoming more and more smart and more and more lethal.

You have a changing generation that's entering into service. You have the millennials joining, who are digital natives who have never known the world without computers; a generation that, to them, the Vietnam War is as distant as World War I was to the baby boomers. You have changing domains of security, in which those young airmen might be called upon to serve. They might be called upon to protect assets in space; they might be called upon to carry out a humanitarian disaster

response in Africa. And then finally we have a changing economic and budget environment, which is acting to both heighten those threats, as well as maybe constrain the responses that we can make.

And the key is that each of those changes, an individual would be historic in challenging just by itself, but they're happening all at once and growing, and that makes them all the more challenging.

Now, the one thing that we've learned that isn't changing is that the key to developing an appropriate and successful response still remains leadership, and because of that, we are delighted and honored today to host one such leader.

General Norton Schwartz is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. He needs no long introduction, so I'm not going to give one. So all I will note is that he brings to his overall job, as well as our discussion today on one of those key areas of change, irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and the responses that we're making within it. He brings a diverse array of experience to that, from 4,400 flight hours to study at places like U.S. Air Force Academy and MIT, to planning command roles and locales that range from Alaska to Iraq, to missions that have covered everything from transportation, to humanitarian, to air defense, to joint special operations. So with that, General Schwartz, thank you for joining us.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I should have brought my glasses; I could see way to the back end of the room. And I guess I sort of resemble the remark about being part of the slide rule generation. You know, way back when, you don't remember this probably, but I sure do, we were still using slide rules for a while.

I do appreciate the kind introduction, and it's a pleasure to join you today, an honor, in fact, to be here with this very distinguished crowd. And I think it's really an opportunity to talk about some topics I think that are of fairly substantial strategic importance, and to hear your ideas and your questions, as well.

The work down here is significant in that it promotes ongoing dialogue that sharpens all of our collective thinking. And truly I believe you would all agree that there's no corner on wisdom, and that it also hones our intellectual perspective on the challenges we'll face both today, those we do face today, and those we'll face as we go down the road. I'm pleased to be part of this discussion and to offer my perspective as your Air Force Chief.

I'm fascinated, by the way, by Pete Singer's latest work on high technology robots. So if anybody has UAV questions here, I'll probably bump them to you.

I man the air craft systems, and so on, and their effects in today's battle space, as well as tomorrows. But I'm inclined, I think today, maybe to take a little bit different approach to today's discussion and begin by sharing some thoughts with you all on irregular warfare, not that advanced ways and means that Doctor Singer detailed in his compelling work are unrelated to our irregular warfare, they're not, but I want to discuss some of the human and the intellectual dimensions of irregular warfare first in order to help to spill some enduring aspects that these innovative ways and means might address.

Some of you might be surprised to learn that the United States Air Force has a very accomplished insurgent in its ranks. And others might be curious to find out that this insurgent comes from a far away Muslim nation with an oil rich desert landscape and a very violent past of anti-colonial conflicts. His group coordinated attacks promoted violent ideologies and work to strain and fatigue his uniform foes, to inflict moral and physical punishment on the Western European forces who actively and often ruthlessly sought to find and annihilate him and his cohorts.

He spent years mastering his craft and would become a very dangerous and lethal adversary, demanding some radical solutions to the threat he presented as the insurgency he served spent years coordinating

foreign assistance in local resources to perfect their deadly arts, as well as their underground logistics.

Yes, it's true, the insurgent is in our ranks today working largely undetected by your or the public's consciousness. But I don't really want you to worry about this in the slightest, because we also have in our ranks an accomplished counterinsurgent.

He spent years learning and working to defeat this insurgency. He was remarkably familiar with the local culture, language, and with his foes on a personal level. I'd like just to repeat that, culture, language, and familiarity with his foes at a personal level. He knew how to think like his adversary and how to anticipate their needs and their moves. And ultimately his work contributed to the counterinsurgency's efforts, ability to defeat the insurgents in the field. It might make you feel a bit more assured to know how accomplished this counterinsurgent is, and as I indicated, works for the Air Force, and that he is actively today assisting us and our joint partners in training and developing a new generation of warriors able to contend with efforts of like minded insurgents.

Many of you might now be wondering who these two people are, an experienced insurgent and an able counterinsurgent who are both in the nation's Air Force. And it might even surprise you to learn, and I'm not blowing smoke here this morning, it's true, this is the real deal. But

would it surprise you a bit more to learn that these two figures are, in fact, the same person?

His name is Remy Mauduit and he is the editor of the Air and Space Power Journal, French version, at the Air Force Research Institute, and also Chair of the U.S. Marine University Guy P. Wyser-Pratt French Institute. And some of you may have heard him speak, as he lectures regularly at the area university, the Joint Special Operations University, the Marine Corps War College, and the presentations for Navy Seals, among others, who are in coin counterinsurgency training. Mauduit spent five years in an insurgency, guerilla and terrorism leadership positions with the FLN during the French Algerian War from 1954 to 1959. He was a member of a small portion of Algerian Nationalists Society that was educated and reform-minded, resolved with other democratic FLN leaders to use violent guerilla methods in an effort to convince the French to grant them autonomous rule in an independent and democratic Algerian Republic closely aligned with France.

He lived the daily existence of an insurgent working to arm, supply, indoctrinate, and coordinate fighters and operations against the French, and this was a tough existence, to be sure.

After five years of this difficult life, however, things got much worse for Mauduit. An extremist element of the FLN took over, seeking

not a free republican Algeria, but an extremist dictatorship, with a monopoly on power completely separate from France.

These extremists took over violently, putting the ranks of the FLN and its moderate democratic elements through torture and executions. Mauduit was arrested and viciously tortured for 17 days before he managed to escape, and soon defected to the French side, later earning a commission upon his graduation from the Surshell Officer School. When he served in Algeria for two years in Special Operations as a French counterinsurgency commando, where he took the fight to the same extremists who had tortured him and killed so many of his FLN compatriots; I think his remarkable story serves to provide us with many relevant lessons on insurgency in general and the irregular adversaries that we face today.

As Mauduit points out, drawing lessons from the conduct of operations in the Algerian insurgency provides such a mile in terms of geography and topography, social make-up, open borders, and a technologically advanced army fighting militarily inferior forces with terrorism and guerrilla tactics.

And I think his experience provides us some excellent, enduring lessons on the value of air power in irregular conflict.

Are we paying attention today to those lessons? Together with lessons learned from our experiences in the current fight, but the overwhelming theme of this remarkable – the relevance of air power that Mauduit spoke of in irregular warfare, and more specifically, the counterinsurgency effort, and the French experience I think serves as a lens through which we can view some of these important lessons as Mauduit is helping us and our joint brothers and sisters to better understand how to effectively and efficiently succeed in coin missions.

Think of the experience in Algeria. In 1958, a new French commander of forces in Algeria stepped onto the scene, General Murray Shaw. He was an accomplished airman who understood the speed and flexibility afforded by France's air power advantage. But he also understood the need for closely integrated joint operations that leveraged the inherent strengths of the ground and air forces in combined roles.

He abandoned the old static system of spreading forces evenly throughout the theater and employed a new system that one might call the third approach, where Mauduit describes the Shaw plan, utilizing primarily air gathered intelligence, and without warning the elite units and the Air Force move at tremendous speed into enemy territory.

Within a few minutes, units land in the heart of insurgent territory. The elite forces engage immediately the insurgents, while fighters,

bombers, armed helicopters patrol the battle space and strife and bomb any insurgents leaving the area, or in today's lingo, leakers. The command and control post is always, always shared by Army and Air Force commanders, employing the local sector troops to finish the job and then to keep the area clean.

It was devastating to the FLN, in terms of lives and moral, Mauduit said, and I think it sounds a bit familiar, don't you? Except for the level of technology, the techniques are not all that different from what we find successful today. But Mauduit goes on to describe the results within a broader context of the enduring lessons and how the Shaw plan became effective. And he helps us think about air power as a useful part of the counterinsurgency campaign.

He will tell you, quite frankly, that air power used in close coordination with ground forces, based on time senses of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance was very effective; it was then, and it is now.

As he tells it, it was hell on earth. Believe me, I was at the receiving end during two excessively long and horrifying months. Close working relationships between the Air Force and the Army were the sign of quannon conditions for the success of this plan. Joint planning, command

and control were the names of the game, he said, and based on our recent experience, I could not agree more.

Mauduit's experience taught him that air power was, at most, an important weapon against the insurgency, but one with effects, both hard and soft. From the advantages of rapid air mobility, to information superiority from aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts, to rapid kinetic strike and close air support capability that air power provides.

Mauduit and the FLN learned the hard way of the impact these efforts and effects have on an insurgency when used within an integrated command and control system. Mauduit sums it up in one word which he used, and it was paralysis. And I think that's pretty close to what we're thinking about today. I'm not exaggerating here, paralysis perhaps is a bit of exaggeration, but those were his words.

And the question is, how can we better leverage the technologies that Pete Singer so aptly describes in his latest book in innovative ways that integrate all aspects of the joint team, in an effort to suffocate the insurgent operations in the most efficient and effective way possible. I like the word suffocate better than paralysis. It is truly amazing that the unmanned systems of today can deliver real time information around the clock to both users on the ground and those half a world away.

In 1959, who would have believed that this such a thing were to become a reality in less than a lifetime? And what sort of integrated technologies will be the norm in 50 years? And what must we do to leverage them in a timely manner?

But while the ways and means will change with the exponential growth of technologies which surround us from the slide rule to the computer, there are foundational principals, I believe, that will never change.

This form of integrated application of hard and soft power takes on – varies from context to context, and the mission of counterinsurgency is certain not one for the military instrument of national power alone, but rather part of a larger coordinated effort with coalition and interagency partners across the national instruments of power.

Our ongoing challenge includes discovering how best to inculcate these lessons institutionally, in your Air Force, so we don't have relearn these lessons with each succeeding generation. And your Air Force is dedicated to establishing an appropriate institutional architecture, perhaps a wing, at least, culture and career paths to facilitate a sharp edge in irregular warfare that improves as time goes on. That is why we are grateful to have insurgents among us like Remy Mauduit. And we are paying attention to the lessons of the past.

And I'm grateful, as well, for all of you who are here today who play, in their own ways, both those of us in government, those of us in the Defense intelligencia, and in industry. All of us play important roles in this process of improvement, and in thinking about how we can get better at each aspect of this vitally important aspect of our national security. I look forward to hearing from you now, as we go along in this enduring dialogue about how best to apply a lasting element of America's asymmetric military power.

I'm grateful for you allowing me to come in and make a few remarks today. I'd be happy to take any and all questions that you may have, and I promise you I'll do my best not to dance. Thanks very much.

MR. SINGER: General, thank you again for joining us. It was a fantastic speech. I'd like to kick off the question with an issue that I've been exploring in terms of the relationship between technology and irregular warfare. And as you pointed out, a key to this aspect of suffocating the adversary is our ability not just to gather information, but to gather real time information, and distribute it not just to the war fighter on the ground, but all the way up and down the chain, back to the command center.

Now, how do we ensure that this real time information, which also now allows us to make real time decisions, empowers the strategic

corporal on the ground and doesn't lead to micro managing of them by those from afar?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: I think the key thing here is to have leaders who understand that our youngsters, those on the ground, are superbly trained, and with the right information, will almost invariably do the right thing. And the truth of the matter is, ladies and gentlemen, the way it is today is that the best shooters in our Armed Forces will not do this work without the kinds of constant stare that are available from unmanned systems, for example, that we're currently employing in the fight. It's not that they're not courageous, they are, and if necessary, they would go do their work without this view of the target, for example. But they have learned, and we have learned, why would we have the country's very best shooters go through a window or through a door or around the corner and be surprised? It makes no sense. And so what we're focusing on is to provide the kind of tactical situation awareness that allows our folks both to be successful and be discriminating at the same time.

And I think my counterparts, and this is certainly true at the COCOM level and at the Joint Task Force level, have little interest in sort of tinkering with the tactics.

There is interest certainly in the targeting, for example. But once you clear that hurdle, we turn it over to the folks that know how to do

this well, with an abundance of information that gives us much higher confidence that they'll act with precision and they'll be successful. Thank you.

MR. SINGER: Let's take some questions. Right here in the front first. And if you could stand up and wait for the mic to come to you and identify yourself.

MR. CLARK: Good morning, Sir. Colon Clark with – Are you talking about creating a coin wing?

GENERAL SCWARTZ: It's possible; thanks, Colon. We will have a meeting in June, where the Air Force leadership is going to decide what the institutional architecture will be for the commitment we think is necessary in this mission space. And it will probably also include what kind of instruments and tools are needed. So we will size that commitment, we will define the organization and the tool sets that will be applied.

And I think a wing size unit, at least to get started, is not, you know, is not unlikely. I'm not pre-determining the outcome of this discussion, but as you're aware, the Air Force, along with SOCOM, has a modest capability of train-and-assist personnel in the special operations community. I think it's a fair question about whether we should scale that up in order to meet the demands of this current fight.

I just got back from a trip to Afghanistan, and the train and assist activity in particular for the Afghan Army Air Corps is quite remarkable. I commend to you, if you have a chance to travel, to visit with Brigadier General Dewy Everhart, who is running our train and assist operation for the Afghan Army Air Corps. Incidentally, the Commander of the Afghan Army Air Corps is a former Russian – a very sharp fellow.

MR. SINGER: Let's use our global reach and get someone in the far distant, way back there in the corner, so that we're being equal here.

MR. GARD: Robert Gard, retired Army. Speaking of Afghanistan, one reads in the press over and over again President Karzai's concern with civilian casualties, some of which, of course, are caused by our air strikes. Can you address that and give us some idea of the trade-off between going after a high valued target and inflicting civilian casualties?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: It's complicated because the adversary is well aware of our sensitivity to civilian casualties. And they also are well aware of the dynamic that it creates on the ground, and so they complicate targeting deliberately by placing their high value targets, as you identified, in locations and amongst civilian populations which makes our targeting more difficult.

You need to appreciate, I believe general card if I recall correctly, sir, and it's good to see you again, that the targeting effort that's underway under David McKiernan's stewardship, is probably the most precise in anything we've ever undertaken. He understands very well the necessity for being discriminating and the application, not just of air power or aerial deliver fires, but fires generally. And so one of the things, for example, that the unmanned aerial systems have provided is an ability to really definitively, positively ID targets, beyond a reasonable doubt.

And the truth of the matter is, sir, that on deliberately planned targets, we very rarely have either civilian casualties or so called collateral damage. The real challenge is in spontaneous targeting, troops in contact, for example. When a call comes through -- "troops in contact need help now" -- that is the more challenging situation, when Americans or coalition troops are under fire and at risk.

David McKiernan has imposed fairly stringent criteria on spontaneous targeting in order, again, to manage this situation as best he can. So fundamentally, what this really is about is having weapons that you can use discreetly, that are precise, as well as scalable in terms of blast and so on, the effects, if you will, it is vital that the target be positively identified as a hostile, and if possible, and this is one of the benefits of constant surveillance, of knowing what else is within the blast radius, or

the effect radius. And again, I guess I would emphasize that this applies to fires of all variety, and in particular, in direct fire. So it's on everybody's mind, not just President Karzai, and I would suggest that we collectively, the whole team in Afghanistan, the joint team, have worked very diligently to make sure that, again, we are as discriminating as possible, and that the most challenging scenario we face is, again, the spontaneous situation where we have troops in contact.

MR. SINGER: I wanted to ask a follow up question to that, which is, you used the historic parallel of Algeria, and I think how that shows how – what happens tactically within irregular warfare often may not be as important as the narrative that comes out of it.

And the prevailing narrative, as this question illustrates, is more so the civilian casualty collateral damage narrative than the Charlie Dunlap law fare, the enemy is hiding out, mixing within civilian populaces, utilizing ambulances, schools, hospitals, et cetera. How do we do a better job of winning, not just the tactical part, but the narrative part of it, as well?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: That's why the military instrument is not the only element that's at work here. I mean in the end, those of you – all of you know that the military instrument tends to be certainly more precise than it's ever been, but it's still reasonably blunt. And so we need to better integrate the various tools that we have at our disposal to

truly understand the target, however big or small it may be, a village, a community, a building, what have you, and that requires, I would argue, you know, very, very good integration between the intelligence side and the op side, it involves having sources on the ground that are supportive and can offer ground truth, it means using the technology in a way that demonstrates the care that we're applying to these efforts.

Nothing like full motion video to demonstrate what was done and what was accomplished. And maybe some voice overlay that describes, you know, how hard the kids are trying to do it right. Some of this is working people's perceptions, and that hasn't been our strong suit, and is certainly an area where we can do better.

MR. SINGER: All right. We've gone short and long, let's go medium right there.

MR. COURTNEY: Bill Courtney with CSE. The Air Force seems to have a number of special strengths in the cyber security domain. How do you see the role of the Air Force in the new institutional arrangement – to bear in the joint cyber security fight?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: We'll be a force provider. As you're aware, a review is concluding within the White House on cyber matters generally, probably the results of that will be available to us in the

next couple weeks. And our place is, in part, to serve those missions we see as essential to Air Force business.

For example, this is in the cyber world. I mean we have to defend our networks. So information assurance clearly is a big part of the role that we play in defending our networks, and more broadly, coalition air capability in any campaign, because we do command and control via our networks.

Secondly, there are potential offensive applications of cyber that also are essential to the way we do business. Traditionally, for example, we take down integrated air defenses via kinetic means. But if it were possible to interrupt radar systems or surface to air missile systems via cyber, that would be another very powerful tool in the tool kit allowing us to accomplish air missions assigned by the Joint Force Commander. We will develop that – have – capability and we'll certainly mature both of those aspects, offense and defense, as we go forward, and we will provide that via a new numbered Air Force, 24th Air Force, to whatever architecture is ultimately approved for national cyber responsibilities. And again, I think that will all be a little clearer to us within a matter of weeks.

MR. SINGER: Right there.

MR. HECKMAN: Good morning, Chief. Gary Heckman, Raytheon Company. Some observed that the interagency, notably the

State Department, are hesitant to do irregular warfare because it's warfare. Large segments of the Defense Department are hesitant to do irregular warfare because it's not really warfare. We've got some cultural issues there. What's your impression on early steps that need to be made to move these camps closer together so we can achieve some enduring unified effort?

GENERAL SCWARTZ: It is an example of how we need to improve capacity. Gary, this is really an issue of capacity, in my view. I believe Secretary Clinton, and I think Secretary Rice before her, had that view, that there is a need to increase in the United States government, not just at state, civilian capacity to contribute in this irregular warfare sort of dimension, whether that's agriculture, or whether that's treasury, or whether that's state, or other elements of the government. Now, one of the advantages that DOD has, it's inescapable, is that we have depth, and we have scale, and so it's not surprising -- and we also have organization and people that say yes, sir or yes, ma'am. So it's not surprising that when, in a pinch, you know, we need to get something done, that sometimes the spotlight comes towards DOD.

That's not to suggest that people in the other agencies of government aren't ass-kicking good, too. It's a matter of capacity, and that's sort of what's unfolding right now with regard to getting the civilian

surge established for Afghanistan. DOD will probably help with some of that.

And I think what we will end up doing is going to our reserves and relying on our reserves for some of those unique civilian skill sets that farmers in Nebraska and Kansas and so on might be able to bring to bear in order to improve the situation that General Karr talked about, you know, on the ground, and make our effort more holistic. I know for a fact, Gary, that Secretary Clinton is determined to improve state capacity to do this kind of work. She's got an initiative on a civilian reserve corps for state. My hunch is that over time, that sort of initiative will proliferate into the other departments of the government, where there's a recognition now that Washington work isn't all that needs to be done.

MR. SINGER: Right there.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: I'll get you, sir, I promise.

MR. KILEY: Greg Kiley, consultant. The question is about the –

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Not always.

MR. KILEY: The question is about the general defense review. There's been a lot of talk around town about the major decisions that have been made, whether it be F22, C17, joint cargo aircraft, irregular warfare wings, without proper strategic underpinnings, and I was

wondering if you could just comment on that. Do you feel like there is a proper strategic underpinning with the major choices being made?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: We have a national defense strategy. You know, the interesting thing is, I wonder if this question about strategy would have occurred had we not had a transition in the defense team. The truth of the matter is, the new defense team needs to articulate its strategy, both, you know, national defense strategy, and of course, it cascades down, and so on. That is an instantaneous activity on the part of the new defense team that will occur, you know, in the coming months. I think it's an over simplification to suggest that, you know, what's really underlying that comment is that, you know, first of all, some people disagree with the choices that were made. So the argument is, they weren't well thought through and they weren't sort of strategically based. Okay, take that for what it's worth.

I think that these were thought through. And you may disagree with the fundamental thrust, fair enough, I take your point, you may disagree with the fundamental thrust, but the Secretary of Defense has got an eye on what he thinks is needed.

And the truth of the matter is, ladies and gentlemen, that the – we have to contain the infinite appetite, we have to make choices. Are they painful? Of course, they are, but there is more – there are fewer

resources than available to do all the things that are necessary, and so we have to par our ties, and I believe that's what he has attempted to do. Now, do I, you know, are we going to sit still in the studies that are coming up of QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review, the nuclear posture review, the space review and so on, are we going to not argue our case or for what we think the joint team needs from its Air Force, just to accept sort of where things are? Of course not. We will argue, you know, strenuously, we will make the best possible case we can. And again, you know, the Secretary of Defense gets along with – obviously, the President gets to decide.

And I think that each of the services feels that our obligation in the end is to provide the best Army, the best Navy, the best Marine Corps, and the best Air Force that we possibly can given the resources that are allocated to us. Okay. There's this gentleman here, he's been waiting.

SPEAKER: My name is – I represent myself. So, first of all, I need to say that your intellectual lecture is so impressive, it's more than civilian people speak, it's unbelievable, wonderful speech. But –

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: If my wife was here, she might disagree with you.

SPEAKER: Yeah, maybe. My opinion is that the decisive weapon in any – is to be smarter than your – the only decisive weapon, and from this point of view, I'd like to ask this question for you. In Afghanistan/Pakistan – the basic problem, the main problem is, they felt safe – in Pakistan, but they need to – in Afghanistan to make – so the basic problem for them, to close the borders, and the main problem for us, as I understand, first of all, to prevent – to succeed for them to cross the border. And they need – they have hunger to go through border, and we are not – so it's what we – so from this point of view, I ask this question, why don't use the mouse trap tactic?

If someone is hunger, try to use it. It's what means to be smarter than your other --

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Sir, interesting that, you know, the American way of war actually – my impression over time is that sometimes, you know, we have compensated for maybe not being smarter than our adversaries with mass, with capacity, you know. We won whether we were smart or not. But we're now in an era where, you know, things are much more complicated. And I certainly agree that we have to be as skilled and as wise, as well as capable, more capable than our adversaries.

The issue of borders is a tough one. Look, you know, we can't do very well in the southwestern United States, the border problem is a hard one, it is a very hard one. And the truth is that smuggling has been a phenomenon since the beginning of man, I think. I think it is unrealistic to imagine that we could successfully seal the Pakistani/Afghan border, right. So there is a package deal here. There are a combination of strategies I think that are required, certainly, presence in the border areas, surveillance in the border areas, partnering with our Pakistani partners to disallow the sanctuaries from which the insurgents come, that's perhaps the most important aspect of this, and it is why you're very right, that this is a regional problem, and I think this is something which we clearly better understand now, and as you indicated, it is Afghanistan/Pakistan, it's not just Afghanistan.

So your point on trying to make it more costly and more difficult to infiltrate into Afghanistan is certainly valid. And the additional true presence, in part, is intended to help address that issue. Thank you.

MR. SINGER: Let's get someone in the way back again there, back right corner.

SPEAKER: Good morning, sir. My name is – and I'm from the Center for Defense Information. And my question is about – you

mentioned earlier about the nuclear posture review; I was just wondering, what are your opinions or views about moving the NNSA to the DOD?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Obviously, that's a discussion in which the Air Force has very little equity. My personal view is, and at least my best military advice would be that there is some merit in keeping the nuclear enterprise in our country not wholly concentrated within the Department of Defense, that there is a history, a legacy of civilian oversight and participation and involvement in the nuclear enterprise going back to the very first days.

And I think it might be – there might be unintended consequences of having that portion of the nuclear enterprise that currently resides in the Department of Energy migrate in its entirety to DOD.

I don't see immediately the obvious advantage of that initiative. There might be some who see financial reasons to do that, but I think on the – it isn't clear to me that there's a distinct policy upside. Okay.

MR. SINGER: Right there.

MR. TREMBLE: Steven Tremble with Flight International. Can you address whether the U.S. Air Force needs a different kind of

aircraft for the irregular warfare role, and specifically the – class like Super Tucano or AT6?

GENERAL SWARTZ: Yeah, it's possible, and this is part of the discussion. Do we need a light strike aircraft which with to do – building partner capacity, as well as perhaps, you know, organic kinds of IW support missions? In my mind, sort of the perfect situation might be, and this is really consistent with Secretary Gates' thinking, you know, what we want is to have forces that are versatile, what we want is to minimize those things which are sort of single purpose.

Now, a minute man – with a nuclear warhead will always be essentially single purpose. But when you get into the general purpose forces, it seems to me that the way ahead is to have assets that can easily work both low end and higher end kinds of requirements.

So the perfect solution – well, a thought is that if we had a primary trainer that is for basic pilot training that could be easily reconfigured into a light strike platform, and then you would have a cadre' of instructors organic to those machines who not only did primary training for our Air Force and others that go through our courses, but could sort of make that transition quickly to a building partner capacity role in the same airplane, same crew, perhaps folks who we have arranged to have language skills and so on as part of their repertoire, that that is a very

attractive way to approach this problem, in other words, something that isn't necessarily single purpose or dedicated to building partner capacity alone, but would have other valuable contributions to the Air Force mission more generally. So that's a long way I guess of saying that there is a legitimate need to talk about the light strike role and the building partner capacity role, and we certainly intend to have that discussion in the coming months.

MR. ETTENSON: Hi Chief, Gordie Ettenson, Booze Allen.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Gordie, how are you?

MR. ETTENSON: Good, thanks. Question, over the last several years we've learned quite a bit, or perhaps relearned quite a bit about counterinsurgency focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. But the irregular warfare problem set is a much broader, murkier challenge. And arguable, those two battle spaces are title ten battle spaces that allow us great flexibility.

The Secretary mentioned a couple of weeks ago in his last presentation that, by way of example, he expects that the future operating environment that's envisioned would see 100 or more special operations, multi disciplinary interagency teams. If we're looking at the global persistent challenge requiring global persistent presence for many years to come, what would you – could you amplify some of your thoughts on

what the greater challenges to the corporate Air Force might be in order to prepare for that?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: I think it's human capital, Gordie, you know. I really believe this is less technical than it is having people who are bright, adaptable, have language skills – how many people in this room have – speak languages other than English? Less than half. So that's the pool we draw from who understand cultures.

Part of their, at least in the Armed Forces, the Air Force, that have a specialty in certain locales, I think, you know, that's the kind of thing which isn't mainstream at the moment that we have to expand. And again, that's – so not all of this is a discussion about, you know, what's the organization and what's the tool. I think a vital piece of this, and probably the most challenging of all, we can just declare organization, and if we really want to, we can find the money for a platform, but building the kind of people who can do this, who are comfortable in austere settings, families that are prepared to have their loved ones deployed for extended periods over a matter of years, I mean it's entirely possible, Gordie, that the United States Air Force in some ways will have to be more like the foreign service when this is all said and done, and much less the garrison force that you and I grew up in. I really think that's the key aspect.

And again, recruiting the kinds of folks that have that inclination, rewarding them and so on, is really the key institutional challenge for the Air Force. The Army, to a lesser extent, the Navy, are, you know, further ahead in this I think and will catch up.

MR. SINGER: I want to follow up on that human capital question. When I was chatting with my friends in the Air Force who are serving in CENTCOM, they talked about the key need as they saw it was the fact that we were gathering so much data, but not being able to turn it into useable information, that it wasn't building partner capacity was the key challenge, or it wasn't putting steel on target, it was simply put that we had a lot of data falling on the floor, we didn't have enough analysts in terms of that. How will the changes that you're potentially exploring right now deal with that problem of analysis, not just partnership capacity or targeting?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: I think the reality is that we're not going to get any bigger, Pete, you know, we're going to go to 332,000 active duty or so, we can't afford to get bigger. And so to use your point, sir, we're going to have to do this smarter. And so the analysis is going to have to be done by machine to a greater extent than it currently is.

Now, you know, that I don't think is Buck Rogers, I don't think that's that far fetched. We are going to have to do much better in

terms of attaining this analytical capacity so that there's, you know, fewer reams left on the floor, but it has to be automated.

And I think the coin of the realm here will be, you know, to have intelligent systems that will allow us to do that. If we don't, I do not see – we are putting more than 4,000 people, some new, some collected from missions that we're reducing, into the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance area, and that's not all UAS operators, this is back end stuff; 4,000, that's not trivial. But that trend line can't continue; there simply is not enough head space. And so I think that, you know, a major area of endeavor has to be, again, to apply intelligent systems in a way that allows us to digest that material, to identify intelligence, and distribute that in a much more automated fashion, that's the only way ahead, in my view. Can't fix that with people.

MR. SINGER: I have a suggested name for that program, you can call it SkyNet, it'll work out great.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Okay.

MR. SINGER: Let's get two more here, right there in the middle.

MR. BRADLEY: Tom Bradley from the Air Force Historical Foundation. I'd like to ask your assessment of today's airmen as compared to your understanding of their great grandfathers and great

grandmothers who won World War II; tell me about their character and abilities today. And second, and related, I'd like to hear you talk about the trend lines and the effective fighting morale of the Force the last several years and what you're doing to improve it.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Tom, again –

MR. BRADLEY: Effective fighting morale of the Force --

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Okay.

MR. BRADLEY: -- the last several years.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: With regard to the kids, you know, you hear Jim Conway say this, you hear George Casey, you hear Gary Ruffhead, I mean the youngsters are remarkable, they are truly remarkable, if they are well led, if they are properly trained, and if we don't bullshit them, you know, because I think they sniff that stuff better than their grandparents did.

So, you know, the short answer to your question is that there's no lack of talent out there, and generally speaking, we're pretty good on the recruiting side. There's a little softness in one of the NCO dimensions on retention, it's not worrisome, it's not alarming, but it's something we need to pay attention to.

But again, this is a question that I think the key difference is less the character or the conviction of today's generation versus former.

But the bottom line was that, and when you and I were younger, the United States Air Force was two-thirds single and one-third married, and the truth is now, and this is represented in all the services, it's the exact opposite, we're two-thirds married and one-third single. And so when you're talking about keeping people in the skills that we need to do this work, and America does need good people to do this work, we're talking about families and spouses and so on and so forth, I think that's the key difference. And so, you know, are we catering to families? You bet we are, we're listening, and if we don't do that, you know, we're going to, you know, we're going to have long term problems in terms of keeping – attracting and keeping the kind of talent that we need.

Now, with regard to morale, I have not seen, when I've gone down range, any lack of morale. In garrison and so on, and certainly inside the beltway, maybe, you know, there's, from time to time, you know, morale is down, right, but again, certainly at the tactical level and at the operational level, you know.

I'll give you an example; I was in Arifjan two weeks ago, and I met with those young people who are running convoys into Iraq, and I asked them, I said, and we were in a hanger, and there was probably 250 people there, Air Force people that are doing this, does anybody here think that what they're doing is in lieu of anything, do you think what you're

doing is not worthy or somehow, you know, not a major contribution? Of course, no one believes that. They are fully invested in doing that mission. And I think, you know, one of the things we've tried to do is to say that while that may be a non-traditional Air Force mission, that's what the country needs right now, and that's what we're going to do, and we're going to do it well, and our obligation is to make sure the kids are properly trained for it, and they are, and they're performing spectacularly, and they believe in what they're doing, and Tom, when those kids grow up, a few of them grow up to be chief master sergeants, it's going to be a different Air Force because of that visceral experience, with their Army brother, side by side, mixed in the convoy, some in gun trucks, some in moving the transporters, no lack of morale there, trust me, okay.

MR. SINGER: One last question.

MS. MELENICK: Hi, General Schwartz, Marina Melenick with Defense Daily, nice to see you again.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Yes, ma'am.

MS. MELENICK: You just mentioned Secretary Gates' preference for platforms that are multi role and staying away from these niche' exquisite systems. Earlier this week, General Elder from STRATCOM talked about the B52's role in homeland security and surveillance and reconnaissance. As you comb through your

requirements for a next generation bomber, how do you envision that platform when taking into account all of this?

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Well, you know, it's complicated, and it was clear that the Secretary wasn't comfortable, we hadn't gotten into his comfort zone on how to define, you know, what attributes that next generation platform would have. Certainly, that's what we intend to do here in this upcoming cycle, because it depends on lots of things.

I mean what's the range, what's the pay load, is it low observable or very low observable, is it nuclear capable or non-nuclear capable, is it manned or is it unmanned? These are the key questions, and I think that he was not persuaded that we had this all solid, or solid enough to make a very substantial commitment this year.

There is no question in my mind that there is a need for a long range strike in the DOD portfolio. The question is, how do we define it, and that's what he has come back to us and said, look, I am not sure that you got this right yet again, you know, the size, the capacity, the sort of essential characteristics, persuade me, and we intend to do that. And, believe me, that's going to be a major effort on the part of our Air Force in this review cycle, yes, ma'am.

MR. SINGER: Well, General, we want to thank you again for joining us, and most particularly, compliment you on a fantastic speech,

but also an engagement on an array of questions on a lot of different areas. So it's been an honor for us, and I hope you all join me in a round of applause for the General.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: Let me just make a concluding comment, if I may. I know you guys have got to go. You know, when you have services sort of make presentations, there is a tendency to sort of focus on service stuff. But I do want to make a point that, you know, we are part of a larger tapestry of DOD capability. And what we want to do is, our basic strategy is to make the defense team successful, to do whatever is necessary to see that that's the case, and your Air Force is all in in that regard. Thanks.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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