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TACKLING NATO'S CHALLENGES

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PASCUAL: My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm one of the vice presidents of Brookings. I'm the Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program here. And it's a pleasure to welcome you to this event on Tackling NATO's Challenges.

The massive transformation of NATO as a defense Alliance has forced us to ask the question of whether the process that NATO has gone through to transform itself and to adapt itself is enough. And how that question is addressed is really going to affect the relevance and the viability of the institution and perhaps the very future of the Alliance, and these are some of the questions that we want to begin to get at in this discussion today. But in the real world, they're going to play themselves out as the next NATO summit takes place. The 60th anniversary takes place on April 3rd and 4th.

There certainly is no question that NATO needs to evolve, and indeed it has evolved. We can quickly think back to the end of the Cold War, the expansion of its membership from 15 to eventually 26; the development of a NATO-Russia council back in 1997 because of a recognition that a special relationship had to be developed with Russia in the context of NATO's enlargement; a relationship with Ukraine because it was clear that you can't expand and develop a relationship with Russia without also taking the needs of Ukraine into account; the crisis moments that took place this past summer in August with Russia's incursion into

Georgia; and then, of course, the emergence of a NATO-Georgia council which, in some ways, has been seen by many as a substitute for both Georgia and Ukraine as moving toward a membership action plan. But certainly there have been innovations in organization.

Certainly NATO's area of activity has expanded, and the first out-of-area actions took place in Bosnia and then in Kosovo and now, obviously, in Afghanistan, and even in Iraq NATO has been involved in training missions. NATO certainly looked at adapting itself militarily where it has placed an emphasis on being lighter and more mobile in thinking about how it changes itself from a ground force-oriented military structure to something which operates in a wider global environment.

And still we have to answer the question "why NATO?" and "is it effective -- can it be effective?" And part of the answer is going to depend on what's the threat. How do we understand what NATO is organizing itself against or toward or in prevention of? Is that a global set of threats, which are different from the threats that we've understood and thought of before as major international security threats -- things like climate change or nuclear proliferation or transnational terrorism? And if so, where does NATO fit into that equation, and how does it place itself as an organization?

If we can't define that threat, what certainly is likely to happen is that Russia is going to continue to perceive NATO's role and certainly any enlargement of NATO as a threat to Russia and so will have

an inherent tension that is built in to the Russia relationship. What we've also seen is that NATO has to have a better understanding of how it operates not just as a defense and military organization but in its relationship with civilian entities, and that's nowhere demonstrated better than in Afghanistan where you have NATO involved in -- virtually every country from NATO and a total of 480 countries involved -- but you have a UN mandate giving credibility and legitimacy to the mission there. And still we see NATO struggling, the US struggling, and, as we saw in President Obama's address on Afghanistan just last week, what he said was that the make-or-break of the new strategy will depend not on military forces but on civilian capacity, and if that's the case, does NATO build that into its capabilities, because certainly those capabilities are not there yet.

So, these are some of the kinds of questions that we want to take on in this discussion today, and we're looking forward to them. We have the benefit of engaging in this dialogue with four just terrific individuals.

The first is Dan Hamilton. Dan is a professor and director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins here across the street. He's also the executive director of the American Consortium on EU Studies, which is a cooperative network among institutions in Washington that serves as the European Union center of excellence in Washington. He has a distinguished career that he's had in the diplomatic world and in

the State Department, where he has, among other things, been Deputy Assistant Secretary, responsible for European affairs.

Dan, I know you were Senior Policy Advisor to the US Ambassador in the US Embassy in Germany. I assume that that was not really just the US Embassy in Germany; that was Dick Holbrook, which gives it a whole different stature, of course, in its significance and its possibilities.

Together with Dan then we'll have Justin Vaisse. Justin is a Senior Fellow here at the Brookings Institution. We're extraordinarily pleased to have him. Just before coming to Brookings, Justin was on the Policy Planning staff in France. He previously had been at Brookings and completed an extraordinary book on Islam and the political and religious challenges it presents in contemporary France, and Justin will be able to give us I think a unique perspective from a European standpoint and particularly from a French standpoint.

And then we'll have Jeremy Shapiro. Jeremy is the research director at the Center on the United States and Europe here at Brookings. He has been one of the leading figures we've had here at Brookings analyzing European and global security issues. He's also written extensively on homeland security issues, and he just comes back to us after having been away for about a month steeping himself on European security issues in Europe.

So, welcome back home, Jeremy.

And then we'll have Steve Pifer. Steve is a Visiting Fellow here at Brookings. He's made a tremendous mark already by some of the landmark work that he's done on Russia. He just recently put out an extraordinary paper on future strategy on Ukraine. In his diplomatic career, Steve had been Ambassador to Ukraine. He had been a senior director at the National Security Council and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

So, an excellent panel to guide us through this discussion, and let me, on that note, turn it over to Dan and let you kick off. Do you want to do it in there or up here?

MR. HAMILTON: I think we're speaking here if that's all right.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. I think we're just talking, so go for it.

MR. HAMILTON: I think my role is to provide a overall setting -- the questions that Carlos provided -- and my colleagues are going to address various aspects of that, so I won't try to get into every issue. But first let me thank Brookings and the colleagues here and many friends who are here today for the opportunity.

Much of what I say is based on a report that -- and there are other think tanks -- my Center and other think tanks produced recently called Alliance reborn. I brought some copies that are on the table, hard copied that you can get the electronic version on our websites, CSIS website, Atlantic Council website, NDU website. So, it should be right

there. And it was based on many consultation -- also the European colleagues, so I don't think it's just sort of a US product.

I think the NATO summit occurs in a broader setting, of course, to the President's trip to Europe. Basically, the whole flow of that trip -- if you look at where he's going and the kinds of issues he's going to have to deal with, with his European colleagues, this is really an open moment now to reposition the West in a new world rising, confronting a whole host of unorthodox challenges, not just ones that we are familiar with, and to really address this underlying issue, is this relationship between United States and Europe still relevant in this new world and if so how, and how do the institutions we have calculably readjust them to reform them and tailor them to the new kinds of challenges we face? That's the President's first trip as President, and I think if you look at a series of those events, that really is the overall sort of, I think, challenge and opportunity that we have. So, the question where NATO fits in, I think is it has to be put in a broader context, because the truly strategic issues right now are not just military in nature, and primarily of course they're economic. The economic crisis, I need to say, is really the strategic challenge we're facing right now, and he will tackle that with his European colleagues.

If you look at some of the other challenges we face, the challenge of habitable planet climate change, those kinds of issues, the whole issue of promoting development, all these types of things, and you

ask yourselves are the institutions we have across the Atlantic and the mechanisms that we have developed over the last number of years adequate to those strategic challenges, I think the answer has to be no, they have not adapted in the way they need to, and this is the opportunity now to do that. We state very directly that many of those challenges are best addressed either bilaterally across the Atlantic or in the US-EU channel, because many of these issues are not, you know, military political issues -- they're more economic or environmental -- and that the US-EU channel also needs a reform, and that will take a little bit more time. It's more complicated. But I think it's important to say that up front, that the other strategic mechanism of trans-Atlantic cooperation is also in dire need of a review and needs to be readjusted. It's not going to happen this week, but it should be on the agenda.

So, if you ask where NATO fits, then I think you've come to look again at a bit of history. They're celebrating 60 years of this Alliance. For 40 years, and celebrating NATO's greatest success, the peaceful end of the cold war, NATO never fired a shot. It was never engaged, frankly, in any hot fighting. Today it's involved in five simultaneous operations. It's never been busier, and yet it seems that it's harder for government leaders today to convey to publics and parliaments what NATO is really about. It's at a high operational tempo, and yet that operational reality has exposed strategic differences in strategic culture among allies, threat perceptions, capabilities, and resources.

So, it's become harder to convey what NATO's role is, as Carlos indicated, at a time when it's actually been busier than it ever has been. And I think this is the dilemma, that if NATO is to be sustained, we must have a clearer way to explain what its purpose and how it's now relevant to the kinds of challenges we face.

So, that's sort of the setting, and I think one has to look, since we are celebrating 60 years of this Alliance, to say what is NATO's purpose? Has it changed? I argue, and our colleagues argue, that actually the core purpose of NATO has not changed.

I think there are three elements to it. One is to provide for the collective defense of its members. The core mission of NATO remains important. We can discuss against what, but the mission itself is there.

The second is to provide a preeminent forum for security consultations across the Atlantic and provide that trans-Atlantic link. Again, one reason is that the US-EU link doesn't, you know, function as well. There isn't another mechanism. It is our link. If we're going to use it, it is the important link that has to be sustained.

And third -- there is a third enduring role for NATO, which I think often is overlooked, and that is it wasn't really geared to a threat. It was -- if you think about the end of World War II and the tragedies of Europe and the 20th century, it was to provide a framework -- an umbrella, if you will -- a reassurance so that Europeans would start to focus their security energies on common challenges rather than on each other -- that

was Europe's tragedy in the last century -- and that NATO, by providing a US link and to try to redirect Europeans toward the common security issues, meant that the core problem of the European security, which was all these armies facing each other as much as Western Europe as Central and Eastern Europe, could maybe be ameliorated. I believe that role is still there and that it still remains relevant.

NATO provided the umbrella under which the European Union could be created and grow. It gave Europeans the reassurance that they could build this common project together. All three of those elements, though, today are being questioned. So, one needs to step back and say what is the strategic purpose of NATO and how should we go about it?

We have proposed that at the summit a wise person's group, an eminent person's group be formed this time to look at a new strategic concept for NATO, that they report by next December at the next ministerial meeting on their broader findings and strategic environment in NATO's role, that a drafting committee be made and composed then of officials from NATO and capitals to try to get consensus by the next NATO summit, which we anticipate will be in Portugal in the fall of 2010 -- ambassador's here, welcome him -- so, we have proposed that sort of framework. I think it's uncertain whether there is yet consensus. We will know in a few days on that type of idea, but a number of ministers that come forward with similar types of ideas in that. So, it means there's a

period now to look at the strategic concept for NATO -- where does NATO fit?

We argue that NATO above all needs a new balance. We spent 15 years now going out of area or out of business. The slogan that's driven much of NATO's energy is that the real threats are outside the core area of the Alliance. We have been successful at that, I would argue, although we're facing maybe a challenge in Afghanistan, which will be discussed. But we've come so far out of area that if you ask I think most normal people, the citizens in the NATO world on the street, what's NATO about, they say it's to protect us. Protecting us in the Hindu Cush requires a bit of time to explain I think, particularly in some parts of Europe, why that is the case, and if we cannot convince our own publics about why NATO is there protecting us, it's unlikely we're going to sustain support for a NATO that's expeditionary far out of area.

So, while the slogan used to be "out of area, out of business," we would argue today it's "in area or in trouble" and that we need to balance NATO's missions and that the balance becomes the key to thinking about a sustainable NATO in the future.

If you think about what that would be, we argue there is a fairly clear set of home missions that NATO could perform and a fairly defined clear set of away missions, and I'm just going to tick them off. We can discuss them in detail in the discussion period.

NATO is still important at home. By home, I mean the North Atlantic space, the core area of the Alliance. Collective defense is still the core mission of the Alliance. We have just had any number of new countries join this Alliance because they believed in the credibility of that commitment, so maintaining the credibility of that commitment remains essential to the credibility of the Alliance itself. And yet NATO has not been doing a number of things to reassure new allies that the broad common collective defense commitment is real. So, we argue and we again have a number of specific areas in which we argue the Alliance should be stepping back and looking at Article 5, the North Atlantic Treaty, the collective defense clause, and try to fill that again with life so that allies across the Alliance are reassured about what this Alliance is about.

The second element is something relatively new, and if you read the report, we don't start with NATO on this topic, we start elsewhere with the US-EU agenda again, but NATO has a supporting role here to play we believe, and that is a new sense of the security challenges we face. Many of the security challenges we face today are not the traditional military challenges in our space, if you will. They're cyber hackers; they're energy cartels; they are terrorists. And the commonality that binds these kinds of challenges is not that any of these entities are trying to take our territory, the traditional sort of military threat. They're trying to disrupt free societies. When the airplanes flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, economists at that time said this was not only an attack on

freedom; it was an attack through freedom using the very networks of free societies to disrupt those societies. This is a different kind of challenge. It's very real. It continues, and we must find a way across the Atlantic to deal with this as free societies. How do free societies organize themselves to protect society? This is not primarily a military role, it's not primarily a role for NATO, but in the report we have tried to tease out a number of areas in which NATO could play a supporting role. One Article 5 mission today in the Mediterranean is -- Operation Active Endeavor is in fact -- one could consider what we call a resilience operation, that is, protect lots of nasty things from coming into Europe, guarding the approaches -- air, land, and sea approaches to the North Atlantic space. That's just one area. Cyber defense, bio-defense, particularly against forces would be other areas one could look at.

The third co-mission, we argue, is to maintain this commitment to Europe that's whole, free, and at peace with itself. We are not there yet. If you look at the space between the EU and Russia or the space east of NATO, this is an unsettled space. We have learned from history that unsettled spaces in Europe are not good for US security and that the longer you ignore those, usually the higher price you pay later.

The Alliance has made certain commitments over the last year in terms of future aspirants and into that space itself. We believe we need to hold firm to those commitments. And yet think -- step back a moment and think about this space and what we need to do. When the

Berlin Wall came down 20 years ago and the iron curtain fell, the West approached the East with a broad set of tools and instruments. It didn't just say NATO in or out and define success of its policy as only NATO enlargement. The EU had a major role to play. We had lots of other instruments that we used. We have in the last number of years, I would argue, narrowed our options into this question of in or out of institutions, and yet the conditions are very different in these countries. They are, on the whole, weaker than previous candidates. They are themselves divided. If you look at Ukraine, public opinion is very divided on entering NATO. Russia is opposed. And we have not yet helped them create the conditions by which integration at some time in the future will be almost a foregone conclusion. So, we argue the focus should be on conditions rather than institutions. NATO has a role to play here, but, again, it's a broader strategy.

The way missions just briefly. Crisis response and ability to project force to crises that might threaten our security is a critical task for the Alliance. We see it today. We saw it in the Balkans, but we see it now very, very far away of course in Afghanistan. The Alliance must have that capability. That's the only trans-Atlantic mechanism we have. The EU is not going to do that. The US and the EU couldn't do that. This is NATO's role, and it should have the capabilities to be able to project -- to deal with those contingencies. If those contingencies happen, also as we've seen in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, the fighting stops, you can't move

immediately to civilian operations. There is a need for NATO (inaudible) NATO to have capabilities in the area of stability operations. It means transferring to civilian authority as quickly as possible, but there is this period and there is a need for civilian and military working together, and NATO must think harder about how it can play a productive role there.

The last area we say is that all of this -- you can stretch NATO so far, but if you stretch it too far it'll break, and NATO can't do all these things by itself. So, it must work better and more effectively with partners. The partners we have in mind, again, European Union. It is simply an oddity that you have both of these major institutions not working together as they could, especially at a time where our resources are stretched and we have so many other crises, and yet it's being blocked and we could discuss the reasons for that.

NATO and the UN -- they signed an agreement last fall, and yet NATO was so toxic in the eyes of the UN they didn't publicize it. There's an agreement, and so what is the future of NATO-UN operations? I think, as a number of people have said in the past and in forums such as this, you can imagine lots of operations in which the UN is involved but not NATO or the EU. It's hard to imagine these days many, you know, international operations in which NATO and the UN -- the EU is involved but not the UN. The UN has to play a role here, but the mechanisms are very rudimentary and almost dysfunctional in terms of the relationship.

What about the African Union? The idea is not to project NATO into Africa but to allow the Africans to work, as they have said, on the kinds of issues that they need to deal with according to their institutions. The EU again plays a major role here but the NATO-EU relationship could be important to that. So, if you can work better with partners, you start to identify and prioritize roles for NATO. Sometimes NATO -- in the cold war, I should say, NATO was our instrument. It was the leading actor. Today that's not necessarily the case. In some areas, it is the leading role. It plays the leading role. Collective defense and maybe crisis response if a military response is provided.

But in most other areas it's playing now a supporting role, and if it's going to be a credible supporting player, it has to be able to work better with other players, and we tried to distinguish and prioritize then these types of roles for NATO so that the highest priorities where you want to invest your resources start to come to the top. The other ones then you work on with many other players.

Let me leave it at that, and, as I said, the colleagues are going to get into some of these issues in more detail.

MR. PASCUAL: Dan, thanks. So, that gives us a good framework on the proposal, the timing of the strategic concepts, some of the critical issues.

Justin, if you want to pick up particularly on the European perspective of what might -- what the expectations are out of the summit,

and then you want to speak personally from your perspective of how France sees these issues.

MR. VAISSE: Yeah, but maybe I'll start with one of the items of the summit later this week, which is the full return of France into NATO's integrated structure and of course what the implications are for the Alliance, and I'll start with a few facts and with one obvious fact, which is that France never left the Atlantic Alliance, and it never actually even left NATO, meaning that it was always committed to common defense, as defined by Article 5, and it never stopped sitting at the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, where all major political decisions at NATO are taken.

But, as you know, in 1966, after failing to gain greater leverage for Europeans inside NATO, Charles de Gaulle decided, as he put it, to change the modalities of French participation in the Alliance while reaffirming his solidarity with the allies. At that time, the context was entirely different where several thousand American, Canadian soldiers on more than 20 NATO bases on French soil (inaudible) more of French forces were subordinated to NATO command and, more specifically, to go to then get information on NATO nuclear devices that were circulating on French territory. So, he decided to terminate the integration of French troops. He left the integrated command and the various committees and shape was relocated from Paris to Brussels.

The reason the debate has been so fierce in the past month in France with heated rhetoric against Sarkozy's decision is that this move

is considered -- the (inaudible) move is considered to be a founding act for an autonomous French foreign policy combining independence and solidarity sort of keystone of historic and mythic, I would say, proportions, which eventually came to be accepted by all political forces, hence, the heated debate.

Of course the fall of the Berlin Wall changed the landscape dramatically, and when it became clear that NATO would survive with different missions and objectives, President Mitterand in a secret initiative in 1990 and '91, and then President Chirac, in a public and much more ambitious attempt in 1996 and '97 both thought that negotiations to fully reintegrate NATO in exchange for a greater Europeanization of the Alliance. Neither attempt worked. But still in the 1990s there was a sort of creeping reintegration whether in a military committee or in other major committees to the point that France before the summit and the reintegration is now part of 36 out of 38 of these committees and that more than 120 officers have been inserted, as it is said in NATO (inaudible). So, in other words, France was in the past few years a quasi-integrated country, the fourth largest contributor to NATO in terms of budget and troops.

In a sense, that situation was satisfying to everyone -- the Gaullists, who considered it as a sign of French independence, and also to advocates of radical collaboration with NATO as well as a part of French

armed forces interested in keeping up with the allies and maintaining interoperability.

So of course the question, as many opponents to Sarkozy put it, was the following: If it ain't broken, why fix it? There were three reasons that can explain Sarkozy's decision. The first is -- the first idea is to fully participate in order to get and influence on decisions, that is, fully commensurate with French efforts.

The second one is comparable to what Mitterand and Chirac had pursued -- is to increase the role of Europeans inside NATO. According to press reports, France would get two major commands, one in Norfolk -- the allied command transformation and the joint command in Lisbon, which, by the way, oversees the NATO response force -- and maybe a few other positions that we don't know of yet. And so in the end, France would send a bit more than 800 extra officers into the structure.

The third objective, the third rationale, is to send a strong -- and probably the most important one -- is to send a strong signal to allies that European security policy -- known by its acronym, ESDP -- which France has been actively promoting for the decade, is not a competitor to NATO but should be seen as a compliment to it.

So, what will be the consequences, the implications for NATO in general? Well, the first thing is that France will have a slightly greater influence inside NATO, which may slightly reinforce its weight on issues that are currently debated and that Dan mentioned. For example,

the nature of the Alliance and of course the question of the strategic concept, which Paris sees as a military organization centered on Europe and on security challenges to Europe and security, including out-of-area challenges.

Another example of such dates is enlargement, which Paris sees as necessitating a very cautious approach as Article 5 remains the cornerstone of the Alliance and should not be extended lightly.

I see two other implications, two other specific developments for NATO. The first one is a push for streamlining of NATO, an objective that is pursued in particular by the UK and by France, which Paris would be in a better position to promote. Current NATO structures are bloated and way too bureaucratic and they need to be reformed.

Second positive development and probably the most important one would be a relaxing of the sort of theological debates about which institution, the EU or NATO, should come first. Sarkozy's move by sacrificing the sacred cow for French policy decreases suspicions and makes it easier to be pragmatic and use the institution or the arrangements between institutions, which has the best added value in one specific situation.

From the French perspective, it's now up to the allies, including the UK and other countries, to abandon their own sacred cows about ESDP and join Barack Obama in a press release dated March 21st in, I quote, "welcoming the further strengthening of European defense

capabilities" or to join General James Jones in stating just last week that a strong and independent Europe is good for a strong and independent alliance. If any European defense is still hampered by a lack of funding and capabilities by EU member states, it is currently making very serious progress as exemplified by its recent autonomous mission in Chad or the current mission off the coast of Somalia to fight piracy.

French full reintegration into NATO creates more congenial environment for a stronger commitment to both ESDP and NATO, and in the spirit, EU-NATO relations, as I mentioned, and also as I mentioned, E.U.-U.S. relations should be explored on nonsecurity issues. Given the enormous scope of the challenges we have to tackle together, Europeans and Americans, I think this is a very welcome development.

MR. PASCUAL: Justin, thank you, and let's maybe pick up on that and put it in that context of Afghanistan. I remember several years ago discussions with the French permanent representative to NATO, and this was in the wake of the acrimony and the tension after the invasion in Iraq, and he basically said: What you Americans want to do is run a dinner party, i.e. run a military operation, and you want us, the French and the others, to be the bottle washers.

And, obviously, what you're saying here is that we've gone beyond that era and there's a difference in the capacity to talk. There is a greater degree of congeniality, but then, you know, here we come to

Afghanistan and whether you sustain it in that context or whether it's going to hit another bump in the process.

Jeremy?

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah, I guess maybe the experience in Afghanistan has been that it's a more congenial discussion, but it turns out that the Europeans are not that good at washing bottles either. And so I think that that's sort of the problem, it's been -- it's been created on the ground.

I don't want to discuss the whole, the AFPAK strategy that came out last week. I think you've probably seen a tremendous amount of discussion about that, but I do want to sort of think about the implications of that strategy for NATO and for Europe, and this, you know, in part relates to the NATO Summit which is where -- which is, you know, why we're here and where all this is leading. But I think, actually, the main issue is not really the NATO Summit which will go well for the reasons that summits always go well, so nobody has an interest in it going badly.

And the U.S. has laid out some of the things that it wants from the European allies in Afghanistan, and I think those things will largely be delivered, at least, certainly, in rhetorical form at the Summit. They want -- of course, thinking about what these things are, they're not -- they're not small. The first thing they want very much is solidarity. Solidarity on the mission. That means a recognition that the mission in Afghanistan is about international security, about European security, and

that were in it together, that we devised the strategy together, and that we intend to fight it to the end together.

They want a few -- a bit of a surge of European troops for the election that's coming up in August through October, apparently, about four or five battalions. They want a lot more resources for training of Afghan national security forces, about a dozen of the so-called HAMLET , which are the embedded security training team. And they want help with the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, which will provide a financial basis for a large Afghan army going forward, and, in general the increase in reconstruction aid a lot of which will be determined at this Hague Summit which is coming up right before the NATO Summit.

And I think the ground is well set for securing agreement on all of these things. You'll notice there's not a request for a lot of -- for a surge of European troops in any great way besides the election, a little bump for the elections, and I think that's purposeful. I'll get into that a little bit later.

The new strategy process that the Obama administration just went through and the strategy that was revealed in some ways -- I don't think this was the intent of it -- but in some ways it answers a lot of the European complaints that have been had over the years about Afghanistan. They had a general complaint that the European countries were not allowed into the process of strategy formulation, but I think we heard this week the fact that this process that just took place over the last

few months was a very open process, and the Europeans were a part of that process at every step.

There was a complaint that there was no clear justification for the strategy, no statement, really, of why we were there, what we were trying to achieve, and how we would get out. But I think, actually, you have a fairly clear statement of that last weekend from the president.

There was a complaint that the strategy was too -- the strategy that we didn't have -- we too military in its focus. But as Carlos mentioned, we saw in the president's speech last week and in the new strategy a real move to comprehensive, what's called a comprehensive approach, which is definitely a buzzword of the day. And that's an emphasis on a civilian surge to go along with the increase in troops that's this Hague conference that they've called. And you should understand that the reason to call a Hague conference just a few days before the -NATO Summit is to signal that Afghanistan is recognized as not just a military mission and not just an Alliance mission, but one that has a big tent, takes in all the global partners, and takes in a lot of civilian organizations. And so the Hague conference is actually a nod in that direction.

So in that sense, the new strategy and, more importantly, the new process of strategy formulation has been very welcomed to the Europeans, or should be. But there is also a very real challenge to the European allies in the new strategy, and I think actually the president

made it very explicit on Friday, strikingly explicit, frankly, for a presidential speech, so I'm going to read the quote that I think was the key one:

"What's at stake now is not just our own security. It is the very idea that free nations can come together on behalf of our common security. That was the founding cause of NATO six decades ago."

The U.S. decision not to ask for European troops was not simply about the probability that they would be difficult to get and that that might create problems at the NATO Summit. There was also a great deal of resistance within the American government, particularly within the American military, to asking for more European troops. There was a great deal of frustration on the ground in Afghanistan with the performance of Europeans and the performance of NATO.

Some of this dates to the problems that were had as far back as Kosovo, but it's certainly been exacerbated in Afghanistan. There is a perception of poor performance of many of the key allies, of severe political restrictions, troops constantly coming back to their capital for essentially tactical decisions, and an extremely unwieldy command structure in Afghanistan. There are a lot -- a lot of generals in Afghanistan. I'm not quite clear why we need so many.

This is not primarily about resources. Europe, in fact, I think has seen a sort of quiet surge in its Afghanistan efforts in the last two or three years. The number of troops there has grown over 50 percent in the

last two years, and there's been a big growth in financial assistance as well.

It is, however, widely seen as insufficient on a couple of levels which aren't purely about resources. First, they very often haven't for rather bureaucratic reasons fulfilled their spending promises.

Second, Europeans agree with the statement that was very strongly -- the scene was very strong in the strategy review that Afghanistan is a regional problem, particularly involving Pakistan. But, in fact, very, very few European countries -- I think really the British are the only one -- have any involvement in Pakistan, have really made any effort to recognize this as a regional problem. The E.U. has not engaged in Pakistan, and there's a general unwillingness to allow the NATO mandate to take in Pakistan just like the acknowledgement that this is a regional problem.

The third problem is the comprehensive strategy itself. It's interesting, the comprehensive strategy, although it sort of dates back into the counterinsurgency literature going back many decades, is something that was an idea that European governments were much more quick -- we much quicker to latch onto, European governments and European militaries, and much quicker to latch onto than the Americans. But they have, in fact, implemented it much less well, and the U.S. capability for implementing it particularly in Afghanistan now greatly exceeds the Europeans.

The Europeans have been, I think, very good on the theory of comprehensive approach, but not so good on the practice. They have been very bad at integrating the civilian and military tools, I think in part because there is such a firm division. And we've heard it in many of the presentations between what they -- between a civilian and a military mission, but in fact the very premise of the comprehensive approach is that there can be no such division.

So the European police mission has also, I think, badly underperformed. It's authorized for 400. I don't believe they've ever managed to deploy more than 180 police trainees of the 400 authorized, which is why we've seen it insufficient. The U.S. estimates that we need -- just to give you some sense of what the need is -- over 1500 more police trainers. The French have been trying to supplement this with resort to the European gendarme force but in fact have been encountering a lot of resistance within Europe to doing that.

The results of all this -- and I think you start to see it in the strategy if you believe in more on the ground is a creeping Americanization of this war. Authority will clearly follow resources. There is going to be, I think, as American troops become more and more predominant in Afghanistan, a tremendous insistence from the Americans on unity of command, that there be no more calling back to capital to get things done, and I think following the sort of model that they used in Iraq, I think the general view among the Americans is that European troops can

conceivably be useful but if they have these restrictions, then they're not and we'd rather not have them at all.

We see that in the regional plan South where most of the new American troops will be going, there's been an American general appointed to be the deputy commander there, and we see many more American officers going into that command. Kai Eide's new deputy is also an American, Peter Galbraith, who is a close intimate of Richard Holbrook, and they've been both quite critical of Kai Eide. I wouldn't, if I was Kai Eide, be thrilled to have him as my deputy, which isn't a shot at Peter Galbraith.

The Dutch and the Canadians who have been, I think, two of the most effective European forces in Afghanistan are scheduled to leave over the next couple of years, so we're seeing a sort of slowly, almost natural Americanization of the effort there. And, you know, I think we could have a discussion as to whether this is good for Afghanistan or not. I go back and forth on that. I think either way, though, it's bad for NATO, and the real issue is whether NATO can be useful as a sort of standing interoperable alliance, which has always been its major claim, to utility,.

NATO militaries, because they are -- because they stand together, because they train together, because they have standards of procurement, they operate very, very well together, and you can see this in a lot of their training. But the political constraints mean that, in fact, on

a difficult mission in Afghanistan they haven't worked together as well as their training would allow them to.

So I think the issue is not, as I said, so much the Summit, the issue is next year. And it may not be a turning point for Afghanistan next year, but I think it will almost certainly be a turning point for NATO, It's all well and good to devise these strategic concepts, but from an American perspective I think NATO has to be useful. The reason that NATO has been used so much in the past several years is that NATO has been useful. It's demonstrated its capacity to be useful.

I think Afghanistan is questioning that, so a year from now or at the next NATO Summit whenever that is, if the Europeans have not fulfilled their promises, if they're not pushing for more European involvement in Afghanistan, if they're sniping at the strategy continues despite the fact that the process was quite open, then they will be left behind in Afghanistan. That may not be something they regret, but I think it will damage the idea that NATO is a useful instrument of global security.

MR. PASCUAL: Jeremy, thanks. And then since that isn't sufficient complexity, there's obviously the set of relationships that has emerged with Russia, and then, of course, with the other aspiring European countries, Ukraine and Georgia and others that are seeking membership prestige, you know. I think --

MR. PIFER: For sure. Well, I think that to the extent that time allows at the NATO Summit, there will be a discussion among NATO

leaders about the question of the Alliance's relationship both with Russia on the one hand, but also with other post-Soviet states, particularly Ukraine and Georgia.

And I'll start with Russia where you have a situation which was that the NATO-Russia Council, which was the main mechanism for Alliance interaction with Russia, was suspended after the conflict between Russia and Georgia last August. I think in retrospect that was probably a mistake. It would have right and appropriate to suspend NATO-Russian military cooperation, but by suspending the channel we suspended the channel that was designed to talk about crisis situations in Europe. I mean this was one of the original reasons for establishing the channel.

Now, NATO foreign ministers earlier this month in Brussels agreed to reset the relationship with Russia. They decided that they would resume the NATO-Russia Council, and the idea is that regular meetings to begin with and then building up to a NATO-Russian ministerial at some point, probably in the first half of this year.

That'll be sort of the basis for the discussion when NATO leaders gather in four days. They will give their own blessing to the idea of restudying relations and trying to build a more positive, more robust relationship between the Alliance and Russia.

But there's probably also going to be a bit of discussion about, you know, should the Alliance also think of Russia as a possible threat. This discussion came out a little bit at the NATO foreign ministers

meeting where there were some concerns on the part of some new members that if you look at the more assertive Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet states for the last couple of years, if you look at the conflict with Georgia, if you look at the gas war in January with Ukraine, should NATO begin thinking about Russia may not always be a partner but there actually may be some security concerns here in a time where the Alliance, as a matter of policy over the last 15 years has not spent a lot of time thinking about Russia as a threat or thinking about contingencies to deal with Russia in that context.

So that will be a discussion that takes place I think behind closed doors. You will undoubtedly have language that comes out looking forward to a more positive relationship between NATO and Russia, and then the challenge building on that will be, how do you, in fact, give NATO-Russia more substance?

And it does seem that there are a number of various poor cooperation where Alliance and Russian interest would coincide. Afghanistan is one in the sense that the Alliance will find access through Russia to move troops and material to Afghanistan very important. That's a local area of cooperation.

Feeder missile defense has been on the agenda for a number of years. It hasn't made much progress lately because of concerns on the Russian part about U.S. plans to deploy a more strategic missile defense system into Poland and the Czech Republic. But if there

is an easier dialogue between Washington and Moscow on that Central European deployment, it may allow a more fruitful conversation in the NATO-Russia channels on the question of feeder missile defense.

And there are other areas that the Alliance ought to look at. For example, in the last six to seven months, you've had NATO and Russian warships operating off the coast of Somalia, and it would seem that counterpiracy would be a logical area for NATO-Russia cooperation.

Now, I think also in the NATO-Russia channel, you're going to have some discussion of some difficult issues. The Russians have said they want to talk about what happened with Georgia last year. Also this question of a European security conference that has been deposed by Russian President Medvedev, there hasn't been a lot of substance or a lot of specifics to that proposal, but certainly it involved issues that are central to NATO. So that also might be a topic for discussion in those channels.

And then, as I said, at some point probably before the middle of the year, you would have NATO-Russia ministerial meeting which would be, then, an opportunity to define with more clarity the particulars for new NATO-Russia cooperation.

Now, over the longer term, it seems to me that what will be important for the NATO-Russia relationship is to find a way to, can NATO begin to affect Moscow's perception of the Alliance, which still is very much largely in Cold War terms, I would argue ignoring major changes

that NATO's made in terms of both its force structure and in terms of its missions.

I mean if you look at the major missions that NATO today pursues: coalition operations in Afghanistan, Balkan peacekeeping, active endeavor to interdict flows of weapons of mass destruction (inaudible), all of those missions actually are in the Russian interest. So the question is, can you begin to bring the Russians in? In fact, NATO can be a security partner; it's not the NATO of 20 or 25 years ago. Now, that's going to require a lot of work, a lot of cooperation, and it will take a lot of time.

On the question of Ukraine and Georgia, the big issue last year was whether or not Kiev and Tblisi would receive membership action plans as the next step in the development of their relationships with NATO. Well, at this point NAFTA and membership action plans seem to be off the table. In part, that was due to a concern on the part of a number of European allies that going forward the membership action plan would be simply too provocative to Moscow.

But it also reflected circumstances internal within both Georgia and Ukraine. In the case of Ukraine, you've had this political feud going on now between the president and the prime minister for almost a year, which has really made coherent policymaking almost impossible in some cases.

And in the case of Georgia, I think what you have is a, you know, some questioning of the judgment and, well, recognizing that

certainly the Georgians were provoked in the run-up to August, but still some -- a lack of understanding of the judgment that led to the Georgian decision to send the Georgian military into South Ossetia on August 7.

So what NATO foreign ministers had decided, and they decided this in December, is the way to move forward in terms of NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia relations is not a membership action plan but an annual national program and then use of the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Council.

Now, one of the secrets here, the open secrets here, is it's not hard to take the substance of a membership action plan and call that an annual national program, and my sense is that the Ukrainians have figured that out. And, interestingly, what it appears is that the reaction in Russia is not to the substance of NATO-Ukraine or NATO-Georgia cooperation; it's to the idea of membership is in the title. So there may be an opportunity for Ukraine and Georgia to move forward in their relations with NATO without the heat, without some of the tension that we saw generated by the entire debate last year about membership action plans.

Now, nevertheless, it's going to be difficult for NATO to find a balance between on the one hand we setting its relationship with Russia and continuing to develop relations with Ukraine and Georgia. That's going to be an area -- well, the entire question of how NATO interacts with states in the post-Soviet area will be one of friction between the Alliance and Moscow because there's a basic contradiction here which is, on the

one hand NATO has a open-door policy. It says it wants to encourage the integration, the development of relations of countries with NATO.

It goes on to say that countries that are European that share the values of the Alliance, that want to become members that can make a contribution to NATO can join. And that includes countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. And you go back to a year ago, the last NATO Summit in Bucharest where NATO leaders boldly stated that Ukraine and Georgia will be members of NATO.

Now, that's fairly inconsistent with what the Russians have articulated with this notion of a sphere of privileged interest in the post-Soviet states that seem to include a red line saying that NATO and Ukraine would not advance into the post-Soviet area. And we saw last year just how hard Moscow pushed back again, including threats to target nuclear missiles on Ukraine.

Now, we don't have to have a resolution to this issue right now, and it may be possible to find a balance without too much difficulty in the short terms. One thing that I think it will be important for NATO to do is not let Russia define us as an either/or choice. We don't want to accept the notion from Moscow that NATO can either have good relations with Russia or it can develop its relationships with Ukraine and Georgia, I think. That's a false choice, and the Alliance should push back if Russia tries to couch via choice in that language.

But as NATO goes forward in the next year with the development of the strategic concept, it would seem that on logical question for the Alliance to begin to think about is how over the longer term it is going to maintain this balance between on the one hand developing relations with countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, including keeping open the door that would allow at some point should those countries decide that they want to do so and meet the qualifications to allow membership, or at the same time also restudying and building a more positive and robust relationship with Russia.

MR. PASCUAL: Steve, excellent. Thank you.

Dan, let me come back to you, and Steve and Jeremy have really outlined some very tough questions that are going to have to be addressed on cooperation with Russia, what that means for the Ukraine and Georgia in particular, and then, obviously, the complexity of the Afghan mission.

Just in terms of dynamics at the Summit, are we going to see any of this come to the fore, or is there going to -- is this going to be papered over? Are we going to just simply see fort of movement with a general sense of agreement, or is there going to be a real discussion or debate on these issues?

PROFESSOR HAMILTON: Well, I think it has to go back to the entire trip. You'll see that I think Afghanistan, for instance, you'll see as the theme through various of these meetings, and I think, as Jeremy

said, the Afghanistan conference itself starts things off in a way by providing a new setting for how to think about the issue.

The Iranians, you know, are coming, and this is a different dynamic here. It's a message that the regional powers all have a stake in what happens to Afghanistan, and they've, you know, by showing up at least accept some part of that premise.

So there's a new setting here in which some of these issues, I think, will be addressed. But I don't think at the NATO Summit, you know, as you said, the issues will flare up in that way. The U.S. has laid forth its, put forth balanced strategy that it believes should be advanced. It was based on intense consultation with Europeans; it has stepped back from this sort of the possible conflict of, you know, are you going to contribute troops or not? By saying it's a broad-based strategy, where can you contribute, according to each national debate?

I think there is expectation that their contributions need to be made, and I think that's maybe a bit of where, you know, the emphasis will be, how did we do after a week of those debates?

But, you know, the NATO peace is one. The president goes to Prague, there's a USEU Summit as well in which some of these elements will come back again. The European Commission has lots of funds, frankly, in terms of development of aid and things that's poured billions of euros into Pakistan, for instance. No one know where they've gone, but it's poured lots of money into Pakistan over many years.

So there's a big economic component to this: the role of police training, security force training, fighting the drug trade -- there's lots of other elements here. I think they'll try to manage all of that. Jeremy's point is that a year from now we'll have to see as how well that was done.

I think the issues that Steve mentioned on enlargement and on the wider space, again I don't -- I think has been an agreement not to make this a big confrontational issue. In fact I think the new administration isn't pursuing the same sort of, you know, type of agenda that the Bush administration was pursuing by making this a question, as I said, are you in or out of a particular institution? The question is, is this wider Europe, this unsettled space, becoming more of less stable, and what are the U.S. and its allies doing to contribute to that stability working with the countries in the region so that they can create the condition by which sometime in the future the question of integration has almost been a natural question.

We're nowhere near that right now, and to the economic crisis, if you look at Ukraine, for instance, is really their real strategic issue at the moment; it's not are you in or out of NATO? So I think the real question is: What are we prepared to do, and are we prepared to work together across the Atlantic to deal with these kinds of issues for countries like Ukraine.

The E.U. is about to put forward an Eastern partnership motivated by Polish and Swedish interest. The question, I think, is where is the beef in that partnership, if one wants to really look at the details.

But, you know, what's the U.S. then? How will the U.S. interact with that type of new initiative? And, you know, what -- all the tools that we have at our disposal to advance the stability throughout wider Europe I think will be the real issue. I don't see it flaring up, though, in that sense.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. Justin and Jeremy talked about this creeping Americanization of the mission, and indeed one of the things that was intended was France's, let's say, nominal reintegration in ways that you already pointed out to some extent may have already existed. But part of the intent of that, as you said, was to reaffirm that there is no contradiction between ESDP and NATO's mission that there can be greater congeniality and harmonization here of interest.

Is that -- are we going to see that, that greater congeniality as we see this greater Americanization of the mission? Or do you think that Jeremy's overstating it?

MR. VAISSE: Well, I would say two things. The first one is that the sort of structural situation which produces this quitting Americanization is obviously a very, I think an obvious asymmetry of interest for Afghanistan, and sorry for the Taliban that it basically means that Europeans don't -- some of your statement -- don't see Afghanistan as crucial or I would say even existential as Americans do. And do their engagement is commensurate, or their commitment, rather, is commensurate with that importance that they attach to Afghanistan compared with the new administration, which from the start I'd say that it

was the important point, it was sort of redefining the war against terrorists around Afghanistan. And that was the main battleground.

And so apart from certain countries that are directly faced with the consequences of what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'm thinking of the U.K., many other countries don't put the same -- don't see the same importance. That explains a lot of what thing is going on right now.

Now, the second point is, as far as NATO-E.U. relations are concerned, especially for that police mission that Germany described and which, contrary to other police missions that the U.S. then has been leading, and which have been successes, this one is not -- has not been doing very well, and one of the reasons and one of the problems -- it's first of all the program's capabilities, obviously, the numbers are not there, the resources are not there. But then also it's a question of operations between NATO and the E,U. and especially the fact police, policemen cannot be escorted by NATO, the reason being the lack of institutional cooperation or official link between NATO and the E.U. because (inaudible) it's here a problem that I don't want to go into.

SPEAKER: But, obviously, it is to be hoped that due to that new environment it would be easier to develop these NATO-E.U. ties, even though I wouldn't bet too much on it, right. I mean it's here a problem as a Turkish-Cyprus issue which precludes any kind of formal discussion between the two. And so here when my question, you know,

something which is fundamentally potentially can threaten the Alliance, if failure in Afghanistan cold potentially threaten the Alliance, you can't actually get the E.U. and NATO to have a discussion on down the street in the same city.

MR. VAISSE: Right. You know, having been to Phil Gordon's confirmation hearing last week and having seen him being grilled on Turkey-Cyprus, I thought I would not touch on the subject. I fear of being grilled to the same point. But, obviously, this is a problem both for Kosovo and, more importantly, for Afghanistan.

MR. PASCUAL: Jeremy, to sort of bring this situation back to an American context, I mean look at (inaudible) Justin's situation. The scenario he lays out, European countries don't think Afghanistan matters that much, he agrees with your scenario, they're going to be increasingly less involved, if we don't have a way of really working out the NATO-E.U. relationship, and everybody wants to hide from the Turkey-Cyprus problem.

So how does this play out back home? I mean does it basically end up being that you essentially get people in the United States saying, why bother?

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah. I think you've already sort of, in Afghanistan at least on the ground, you've already -- you've already reached that point. I mean it's an interesting statement to say that there's an asymmetry of interest between Europe and the United States on

Afghanistan. I mean I think it's right, but I was sort of pausing and thinking about -- I mean I think it's as descriptive -- the descriptive statement's right, but that's the way that the Europeans think of it, that they don't feel as if they have a strong interest. And I think it's actually worth sort of probing and saying, well, why is it that they feel that way?

In fact, it is -- what's going on in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a great threat to Europe. It's actually a greater threat to Europe than it is to the United States. It's not just the U.K., it's Germany, there have been plots in Denmark, there have been plots in Spain. They have all emanated from this region. The Germans -- the European governments, by and large, including the German government are on record as saying European security begins in the Hindu Cush. This is something that they've really meant, but I would say that in part the asymmetry of interest comes from the different ways that they view their global security mission from the capacity that the Europeans have to rely on the United States, to rely on this creeping Americanization if the European part doesn't work.

Look, I don't blame them for this. If I had that option, I'd probably take it, too. But I think what the premise of NATO is, that we are in these things together. The logic of that, of the letting the Americans do it, is that we're not. And I think there's growing fatigue definitely within the U.S. military and within a lot of the defense establishment with this attitude.

Of course, you know, it's been going on for a long time. We've been living with it for a long time, but in Afghanistan this was really the test, the first time that the Alliance, as a standing alliance, was put to this sort of test.

So if the war becomes largely American, if the asymmetry of interest means that the Europeans are, you know, cheering on the sidelines, that probably won't be a disaster for Afghanistan, and it certainly won't be the end of NATO. But I think as we move forward the Americans who have largely begun to think of NATO, as someone put it, a toolbox. We'll start to see it as a less useful tool, and it will sort of go into the garage and atrophy a bit.

MR. PASCUAL: I should stop coming to these sessions, they get depressing. Steve, Obama-Medvedev, is that the real summit? Between NATO and Russia?

MR. PIFER: Well, I'm not sure it's the real summit between NATO and Russia, but I do think that you're going to have a couple things -- well, one thing for sure coming out of the meeting. Both sides are making noises like they want to get back into a strategic arms reductions.

So my (inaudible) is that one thing we'll see on a Wednesday is, you know, some kind of comment, some principles, maybe for moving strategic arms reduction forward because it's a fairly urgent question. If they don't take action on December 5, the strategic arms reduction treaty expires, and although we'll still have the 2002 Moscow treaty in force, that

treaty does not provide much in the way of limitation and provides nothing in the way of verification or monitoring.

I think also Washington would like to make it not just an arms control meeting but also begin to identify other areas on the U.S.-Russia agenda, Afghanistan, Iran, perhaps European security where you could have a more positive dialogue.

Now, the impact I think that this has with NATO-Russia, NATO-Ukraine, NATO-Georgia, to the extent that you can improve the U.S.-Russia relationship which by the end of 2008 was at its lowest point since 1991, but if you can begin to improve that relationship, it creates a different context in which you deal with issues like NATO-Ukraine. And if you go back to 2002, Ukraine publicly announced that it wanted to join NATO in 2002, as I think you recall since you were in Kiev at the time. It didn't generate the tensions between Russia and NATO, Russia-United States in part because it was seen as less serious with Kuchma but also because in 2002 there was still a more positive U.S.-Russia context and a more positive NATO-Russia context.

To the extent that we can improve the bilateral dialogue between Washington and Moscow, it creates a different situation and may be an easier situation to manage some of the differences over questions like NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia.

MR. PASCUAL: Thanks. Let me open it up to the audience to those who might have questions that they want to ask.

Yes, sir?

MR. NOVIK: My name Dmitri Novik. I have two basic questions, but before I --

MR. PASCUAL: Take your time, Dmitri. Please, go ahead. Go ahead, but keep it to one question.

MR. NOVIK: Okay, yes. But before, I need to say that I have experience, 57 years living in Soviet Union. I traveled extensively in Ukraine, Georgia, of course, in Russia. So my question is based on my experience knowing culture or history of this region.

So my first question is this: Why you consider Ukraine and Georgia as same, twins. It's different country, and the (inaudible) of connection not with Ukraine, and Georgia is different. Is the first question.

And the second question is --

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, I'll let you go to the second one if you're quick.

MR. NOVIK: And my question is, it will be from history because I don't know. I think that the greatest mistake in NATO relations was rejection by United States, by President Bush. He was in just the fight of NATO Agreement to help United States by NATO countries in Afghanistan (indistinguishable). It was greatest mistake.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you, Dmitri.

MR. NOVIK: And my question is this: What was opinion of Turkey about this agreement, because we know NATO Agreement is

together. All country must be. Can you tell me what was Turkey opinion of this?

MR. PASCUAL: Good, thank you. Steve, do you want take the Ukraine and Georgia, two different states?

MR. PIFER: Well, no, actually I did not mean to suggest that NATO or the United States looked at the Ukraine and Georgia as twin countries. I mean to some extent they were lumped together last year by NATO because they both, at the beginning of the year expressed a strong desire for membership action plans. But certainly when NATO or the us look at those countries, it seems two different countries with different circumstances and different relationships, different problems in their relationship with Russia.

So it's not the sense that we're looking at those countries as the same,

MR. PASCUAL: Dan, do you want to take the Article 5, and (inaudible) question?

PROFESSOR HAMILTON: Well, I would agree. I would agree, I think the, you know, on September 12th NATO allies basically is saying to the United States: We really consider this an Article 5. The administration's immediately reaction is: Let's not do that. But they did agree. We had AWACs planes flying over this building, probably, announced by European air women. But when the U.S. did go to

Afghanistan, the Europeans said, you know, let's do this together, and they were turned down, basically.

And I think a couple of years later, you know, a senior Defense Department official, include Paul Wolfowitz, as I recall it, said that was a mistake. They admitted it themselves. So that accounts a bit for this bifurcation that we've had in Afghanistan over the years, or the U.S. operations later and NATO operation that helps account for the confusion of what the strategy was all about, and the goals seemed to keep changing because we had these different operations. But I think it certainly complicated things tremendously.

I think, if I recall correctly, there was -- it was a united Alliance interest in making that a NATO mission, and that the United States decided, the Bush administration, decided not to. So as I recall, it included Turkey at the time. Turkey's opinion now might be a little different, but at the time I think that's what it was.

MR. PASCUAL: (Inaudible)

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah, I agree with Dan that it was a mistake not to do that, but I think it's important to understand the context because it sort of relates to the context that I'm talking about. There was a view in the Pentagon at the time that bringing in the Europeans, bringing in NATO to what they hoped would be a very smooth and very fast operation would add a huge amount of complexity, and that it simply wasn't worth it for the capability that they would get.

And I mean it's hard to dispute that looking at the past seven years in Afghanistan. It's hard to dispute that assertion.

Now, they would have gained some things. They would have gained legitimacy, and because the operation, I think, has been so long, and because, as Dan said, the dual operations have complicated it. I think they did make the wrong choice, but it was interesting that they were confronted with this choice. It was the result of their perceptions of the experience in Kosovo where the NATO decision processes had been so cumbersome, and the thing that they had learned is, don't fight a war with NATO.

And I think they've sort of in the 2001-2003 period, they realized, gee, NATO is very useful for a lot of things. It helps to create European commitment, it helps to create European contribution, it helps to confer legitimacy, and in the, basically in the 2003 to 2008, they learned again the lesson that they learned in Kosovo which is that it's a serious pain in the ass.

MR. PASCUAL: Well, there's also a perception that wars are over fast.

MR. PIFER: Yes.

MR. PASCUAL: Which is something which is -- required complete new understanding that these complex security operations on the ground, the group that is basically causing instability isn't going away. And so this isn't going to happen tomorrow, and therefore, you know,

having a wider group of countries involved in the process is certainly going to increase your ability to sustain it over a longer period.

MR. VAISSE: Can I say just a word, Carlos, on this idea of Americanization, because even though I agree with Jeremy's assessment that because of the reinforcement of the 17,000 troops announced by Obama, and then the 4,000 extra in the course of months, one should not forget, especially when you compare it with Iraq, for example, that European commitment and European contribution to the Afghanistan, not from the start, of course, but afterwards was significant, and that 45 persons of the fallen, of the victims, fatalities, has been non-American. And so it is pretty significant in terms of paying the price of blood. And so even though I agree that in the future the more we -- the more we de-Americanize in the past few years, this has really been a joint operation.

So I thought that our discussion was getting too much in the way of, you know, Americans doing everything and Europeans, and so I wanted to remind the audience how important the European contribution really was through ISAF.

MR. PASCUAL: And maybe we can come back in a minute to talk a little bit more about the nonmilitary contribution as well, but let's go back to the audience.

A question over here?

MR. SUBJAK : Hi, Peter Subjak from the Australian embassy. I just wonder if you could go back to a couple realities that were

mentioned here, especially Dan in terms of the fact that NATO, of course, by necessity has to have moved from geopolitical security threats to functional ones that could be anywhere around the world; and the second reality that during the regs you made for us , which is effectively that Europeans have not had much of a stomach for the fight in Afghanistan, and the corollary of that, of course, is that you have a lot of out-of-area partners now, including, for instance, Australia, Finland, Sweden, and Afghanistan.

And, certainly, there was some talk in the past about some sort of more formal relationship with militarily capable and politically like-minded partners. And I'm wondering whether there is any sense in NATO that there's need to revisit that. And I know the security providers for my idea died a slow death and, for lack of enthusiasm, the passion now part as well .

Speaking from Australia's point of view, I was in Brussels on posting when this idea was around, and, of course, having seen how NATO works, the consensus arrangements. I mean certainly myself as a professional diplomat didn't have any stomach for participating in a lot of long discussions and so on, and we obviously had some limits.

But there has been a problem in the past in terms of consultive mechanisms, not on the ground. Our military people work very, very well together in Afghanistan, of course, but there has been some disquiet expressed at HQ in relation to what sort of consultation we have

to shape things like comprehensive approach. And I wonder if -- and there is any idea of to revisit the discussion, and I'm thinking in terms of NATO's institutional dynamics.

I mean you have, for instance, Partnership of Peace, which is very much a moribund forum now, and those capable partners within the Partnership of Peace are participating on the ground, but the don't have a political forum, really, to work in.

By the same token you have people outside the Partnership for Peace such as Australia which makes a very effective contribution on the ground and doesn't necessarily have to be engaged at the political level. And I just -- both of your views on that.

MR. PASCUAL: Dan, does the new format of partnerships, is that something you consider --

PROFESSOR HAMILTON: Yes, just one point on the Partnership for Peace. There is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which is the political framework, so they do have -- the partners do have a political relationship to the Alliance. But I take your point about its being moribund, so that's the --

In terms of partners, I believe the administration is probably, despite some -- maybe some present or former colleagues here who might be up for playing the role at Brookings and that formulation. I think the movement seems to be within the Alliance toward figuring out, as I said, how NATO can connect better with others. I don't believe that

translates right into a global NATO. I don't see NATO, you know, dealing with the Spratly Islands. I mean I just don't see this, you know, the Asia-Pacific NATO emerging.

I do see countries like Australia and others working with NATO on common security challenges and the need to be at that right, that relationship type right. But I think it does more, needs moving more in the direction you were saying, which is if we agree the comprehensive approach here, which means not only better connecting our institutions but better connecting with civil military elements, means if a country like Australia said, We're here, we're going to work with you, NATO should be able to respond with a set of procedures and mechanisms that allows that to function. And I think that's the area of some pretty productive exploration that could happen over time.

And I think that's probably the next best step, and in very practical ways. And I think it has to get reflected, though, in the strategic concept debate so that the Alliance, per se, agrees that that's what it's going to do.

Chancellor Merkel, interestingly enough, the other day said, you know, NATO -- she used the term "revolutionary;" I don't know that I would term her comments "revolutionary," but she said, you know, this has to be a new way NATO works with other kinds of partners. I mean -- and before the Germans had been reluctant about some of this global-NATO talk, so you do see some movements where this idea of NATO has to

connect. You have to stretch its missions of the ways that I talked about, and then you have to connect it. And I think the connecting part now is much of the new -- new agenda.

MR. PASCUAL: Just let me bring this to you, though, I mean it goes back to the civil-military relationship, and if one makes the argument and it's a credible one, that success in missions are not just military but involves an integration of civilian and military capabilities and have a political dimension as well, that that, potentially, then expands the range of areas within which partnership could be useful or could be effective.

Yet, you know, I come back to this point of NATO's ability to engage with those partners that bring in the civilian and the political capabilities, the formal relationships and the dialogue with the European Union isn't there. As Dan was saying earlier, when there was a NATO-U.N. Agreement last year, it was kept under the radar screen because of opposition.

And so what it suggests in some ways is that there's a potential here for a wider set of partnerships, and if Germany is correct that in some cases it actually may be more efficient to have a concentration of some of the military forces to really make those partnerships and relationships work, there has to be a real meaningful understanding of what a civilian-military relationship can be, And can we get there?

MR. VAISSE: Yeah, the question being whether they can be developed inside -- inside NATO or have a development partnership with --

MR. PASCUAL: Right.

MR. VAISSE: -- with E.U. The thing is the E.U. is developing capacity capabilities in both directions, but, of course, more towards the civilian capabilities and precisely what Jeremy was describing earlier about the difficulty of precisely integrating. We know that the solution is ultimately political and has to do a lot with stabilization with construction and other issues. And so that's one of the areas in which the U.S. has been very active.

Now, without good putting the NATO-E.U. relationship on a better footing, there's not much perspective that these can be brought to bear in a situation like a (inaudible) something, thinking of the police mission, but all the missions as well. And before the institutional arrangements have been ironed out are including with the -- with the U.N. and the mess in terms of this not only too many generals, but there are also too many coordinators probably and meaning that there are too many institutions. And so that is probably a prerequisite.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. Let me take one final question. Gary, did you --

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you. Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. As I listened to Professor Hamilton open this

conversation and listening to those sort of three primary goals I guess one would say, or value proposition of NATO, what I've been struck by in this conversation -- and I'm not sure I've got it right, so let me just say it this way, is I wonder if what we're dealing with here isn't in a sort of global sense a question about mission creep. Is NATO getting out of, if you will, businesses or endeavors that it wasn't ever intended to be in because no one wants to sort of say, hang on, we need to -- you know, we really need to reexamine this thing from scratch.

And I'm reminded of the, you know, the slightly apocryphal story about the early part of the 19th century with all those gunpowder countries along the Delaware River, and, you know, most of them by mid-century had gone away. And the one that survived was DuPont because DuPont said, We're not in the gunpowder business, we're in the business of rearranging molecules.

And I'm wondering whether NATO needs to or has the capacity to do some version of reexamining what its role is and whether its value proposition should change as a result of that.

MR. PASCUAL: Why don't we take this to the general question to the panel, and let me start again this way and come back down, and you might want to answer that question specifically, or if you want to leave us with some other final thought, let's do that and, given the time, let's keep it quick for everybody.

Dan?

PROFESSOR HAMILTON: Well, since you refer to a sort of outline, I think -- I think you know it, really, this idea that NATO has not changed since, you know, its creation, and there was just a cold war instrument and only geared to a certain threat, and when the threat goes away, why is it there? Really, I think, misappreciates some of the dynamics of how the Alliance came to be.

Some of the elements I mentioned have to do with western cohesion in keeping the Europeans reassured about each other, not just about some external threat. There's an internal role for NATO that continued, and I believe it's still very important, frankly, especially as NATO enlarges. You see all the debates that are going on within Europe.

So I think there's more to it than that, and if you look at how NATO has adjusted, you know, the idea that Baltic states would be in NATO a few years ago was, you know, wild, or that the Balkan states. And this idea that we'd be in the Hindu Cush, you know, but NATO has adjusted to those. Obviously, sometimes that's a great tragedy, as in Bosnia where Germany said this is the first time we were in this kind of conflict.

Actually, let's recall that in the early 1990s we were in a similar issue where some allies weren't going to participate in a problem area and others were left on the ground, except it was the other way around; it was the United States that decided not to participate, and it was other European allies on the ground and our failure at that time to come

together and try to reinvent what this Alliance was about, you could argue that that time was the greatest failure of the West since World War II. And out failure of deterrence at that time led to all the tragedies that unfolded afterward.

So our point is that NATO has not tried to reinvent itself again for the last 10 years. It hasn't done this sort of soul-searching that it needs to. Lots of things have happened in the last 10 years, I mean amazing things, and yet we're still guided by a fairly outdated sort of set of prescriptions.

So I agree with you, yes. We need to do the soul-searching that I laid out, I think in a number areas, in which we should do that, and we should do it in a healthy way and take the time and do that.

My last point would be on -- just again assumes a sort of point here -- you know, I think really the U.S. approach -- I was trying to think how do you encapsulate that -- I think we're talking about Americanization of the war, but we're talking about a regionalization and internationalization of the effort in Afghanistan, and I think all of those elements are what the strategy now is about. The U.S. has decided that on the pure military aspect, simply the beating the Europeans over the head from our countries isn't working, so it'll have to be more consolidated.

But the second point, that the regional states have to be involved in this, it has to be, you know, a joint effort, and it's said to all

international partners this comprehensive approach is very important, everyone has to be engaged in Afghanistan because it links to so many other areas of instability that it's really quite critical. And I think maybe that's the way to think about this Americanization effort. There's this other piece that's been done on the military side in particular in which the U.S. is asking for lots of help in fact. In fact, it won't success unless those other elements are in place.

MR. VAISSE: Just in the interest of time I will defer to my colleagues here.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. Jeremy?

MR. SHAPIRO: You know, I think, you know, NATO is always soul-searching. I think, frankly, it was soul-searching during the Cold War. We sort of look upon that back as a time where NATO knew what it was about; it didn't feel that way at the time, and I think this is part of, I guess, the genius of NATO is that because it's always looking for what it is, it's always reasonably innovative. I think that NATO has been an extremely important organization, and it's been, as Dan was saying, a very flexible, particularly by the standards of organizations, a very flexible organization, a very useful organization. And I think that's the key. The soul-searching is about what they be, what they can do. That will never end, There will never be -- there will never be a decision, but it can help produce greater utility.

At the moment, we can look forward, and we can be certain that NATO will be useful for some things. It will be useful for these collective security issues that Dan was alluding to in Europe, and that's enough to sustain it. That's maybe as much as we should ask.

But the question that I think the Americans are now asking NATO, less the Europeans, is, are you going to be useful for these global stability missions? Their view in 2002, 2004 -- 2003, 2004, when this stuff was becoming very difficult, is we need somebody to do this. And they looked around, and NATO was the obvious choice, not because it was tailored for this, not because it was good for it, but because it existed, and it was better than anything else by far. And they've been putting it to the test.

And I think on that particular mission the marks of -- on that particular account, the marks are very mixed. I think it would be useful for NATO and useful for global security if NATO could step up to this type of mission because I don't really see a better alternative. But I think the story we're telling so far in Afghanistan is that it isn't quite, and that's a little bit -- a little bit (inaudible).

MR. PASCUAL: Steve?

MR. PIFER: No, I just add, briefly -- I mean it seems to be that when NATO began its search after the Cold War, what is the mission? You know, one of the primary recognitions was that NATO, if not unique was certainly preeminent in the ability to mobilize multilateral military

operations in a way that no other organization has ever been able to do. And I think that was a large part of the rationale. NATO was -- it was -- has -- its value-added was to go to take Dutch, Italian, German, and American troops and put them together with some confidence that they could actually operate in a cohesive fashion. And that's always been one of the real advantages of the Alliance.

And it does seem to be that to the extent that the source of security challenges that we look at in the future are going to be challenges that are less bilateral and more multilateral, having that capability is going to be important. The question is, can we sustain the political will to maintain it despite some of the tensions that we may see.

For example, if there are different levels of effort devoted to Afghanistan, because having that basic capability is going to be no longer to an interest.

MR. PASCUAL: I, just in closing, I want to say, and here Dan and I might disagree a little bit on the use of a vocabulary there, I guess. My guess is that n principle we probably don't agree -- disagree that much.

It struck me from the conversation -- and I'll go back to something I said at the beginning and you moved away form, Dan, is the word "threat." And the reason I've raised it is because, you know, we look at a change in global international environment, and the question that in the end we keep asking is: How is this institution, how is this organization

relevant to it? And some of the threats are very different from traditional security challenges, although they create security problems. And in many of these cases what is entailed is a military operation actually coordinating and operating in partnership with diplomatic and political and civilian and reconstruction entities.

And part of what we haven't done, I think, is actually better define what that changing nature of the world is and where NATO fits into that changing array. And then within that changing array, how you define a partnership which is not just a military partnership anymore, because this is a military organization, but it's not just a military partnership; it's actually a partnership between military functions and nonmilitary functions, and how do we build those into the capabilities of NATO to be able to sustain? And I think that that's going to be one of the big challenges over the course of the coming year or tow, is whether we can actually get greater clarity on how we talk about those issues and how we build those partnerships in a way that really transcends the traditional military sphere.

Thanks very much for joining us, and thank you to the panel.

(Applause)

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