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FM3-07 STABILITY OPERATIONS:
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE 21ST CENTURY

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. DAVIDSON: Well, welcome to Brookings and the launch of FM3-07, the Stability Operations Manual. I'd like to thank everybody for coming. This is a great turnout. Also I would like to thank Brookings, the 21st Century Defense Initiative, and Peter Singer and Michael O'Hanlon for all the support that they've given on this event, and Heather Messera as well, especially; and the University of Michigan Press for agreeing to publish this Army manual so that it could be available to the general public; and also, finally, to the Combined Arms Center and under the leadership of General Caldwell.

My name's Janine Davidson. I'm a Senior Fellow here at Brookings, and I'd like to just sort of set the stage here for the panelists to discuss the manual. First of all, where did it come from? What is it all about?

The American military has a really long history in conducting these sorts of operations. It goes all the way back to the 19th century, but it wasn't really until, well, about 2004 when there was a Defense Science Board study that said, you know, we've been doing these things for a long time, and they're really expensive, they take a long time, and we're not very good at them, and people die. And we need to get better at them. And so this is sort of the, one of the many different efforts to do that.

What makes this unique is that it's a whole of government effort. The manual was written by the Army, but it was really written in a whole of government way with lots and lots of different actors, as General Caldwell will discuss.

I would like to point out a couple of things before we turn it over to the panelists, what this manual is not: It's not grand strategy; it's a doctrine, it's about how to do things not why we do it, not where we do it, not when we do it. That's up to the politicians. That's important to understand.

It's also not policy and it's also not rigid. I think what you'll learn here today is that this manual is a really, really big step in understanding where we've been and where we're going, and how to conduct these operations. But it's not the final answer. There are a lot of questions, and I'm sure this audience is going to have a lot of questions for the panelists.

So with that I'd like to introduce the panelists. On my right first is General Caldwell. He's the Commander of the Combined Arms Center where they do all the doctrine and the heavy thinking for the Army. He's in charge of all the schools for the Army.

And after that will be Carlos Pascual, who's the Director of Foreign Policy Studies here at Brookings. He also was the former Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department,

so he knows this topic very well, but from the civilian side.

And finally, Secretary of Defense -- Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy. She's a new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Michele Flournoy has just completed the president's study for Afghanistan and Pakistan, so there's some applicability here today on that.

Without further ado, I would like to turn it over to General Caldwell.

LT. GENERAL WILLIAM B. CALDWELL: Well, Janine, thanks for that introduction. I appreciate that, and I appreciate you agreeing to moderate this today and host it here for us.

I also want to share today this is a big day for the Army, obviously, because there has been an ongoing collaborative effort to get this Field Manual brought to conclusion, and we did it this past fall, and we're really excited about where it will take us into the future.

It's always great, too, to see you, Michele. Thank you for being here. I know this isn't quite like being in the White House with the president rolling out the Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy, but I do appreciate you joining us here today.

And to you, Carlos, too. Thank you to you and the entire Brookings team for hosting this event for us to do this.

And I also want to point out that today, you know, this isn't the

end; this is, rather, an ongoing dialogue that will continue, and as we sat there and listened this morning to the president's announcement on the new comprehensive regional strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, there's obviously, like Janine said, tremendous implications as we move forward here into the future.

Let me say it's an honor to be here today. It's a privilege to address everyone here, and as so many of our agency/interagency partners, the partners, our friends, the nongovernmental organizations, the private organizations, leaders from academia and the private sector, congressional staffers, and even members of the media, they were all a part of helping us get to where we were in publishing this manual.

Let me also take this opportunity, if I could, to invite any of you all who have not been out to Fort Leavenworth, which is the truly intellectual center for Army. We'd love to host you out there. If you haven't come, give us a call and we'd be glad to have you come out there and spend some time with us. It's a tremendous organization the United States Army has out there where we do, do the writing, the thinking, and the educating for our Army.

Today marks a special day, as we said. As our Army moves into this 21st century and learns how to operate in this very uncertain complex and dynamic environment, what this book has done, this has been

a journey for us, a journey that will guide us into the future, a journal that would take us beyond the conflicts of today to meet the challenges of tomorrow. And this journey will mark our generation as agents of change, change for a better, safer, more stable world.

It's a journey that began over a year ago. I'd been in command for only a few months when my staff came to me and asked me about the beginnings of this new manual we were going to write called Stability Operations, and I thought: Just what we need. Another Army doctrinal manual. And they said, well, it's not going to be done the same way we've done before; that, in fact, this one here we're going to be far more inclusive than we've ever been, and we're going to take a much more collaborative, coordinated, and cooperative approach in being the facilitators of building a piece of doctrine for the United States Army unlike we've ever done before.

What started off to be a product for us, a product that we were going to produce, has really become a process. It's a process that didn't end with the publication of the manual, but rather it's just the beginning of many more things that we'll continue to do out of those relationships that have been formed during this time period.

Traditionally, when we write army doctrine, it's done in-house. The Army has a very deliberate set procedure, as many of you might

imagine, as we can only do in the United States military, but we really broke the mold in doing this one. If you look back and you look at how we wrote the counterinsurgency manual, it really was the first deviation from the way army manuals are written, done in 2006 in a much more open and collaborative manner, many academia and others being brought into the process. We took the lessons learned from that, applied them to this, and expanded even further going into the international community, reaching out across many, many different nations in addition to all the normal folks we talked about at the very beginning.

But this manual, the Stability Operations Doctrine, is even more unique. It focuses on the skills and capabilities not typically resident in our military forces. These soft-power skills, rebuilding and reforming of institutions, of governments, revitalizing fragile economies, restoring social well-being, will be critical to the future where operating among the people of the world will be the norm. In fact, we call that mastering the human dimension of conflict, because this will truly be the only sure path to success.

These soft-power skills are drawn from the contributions of many different sources: the other departments and agencies of our government, the developmental community, the humanitarian community, our allies and friends, and even the private sector. To write about these

skills and to do so in a way that would support our ability to work together in harmony required a very unique team of experts to pull this together.

When I came to Washington, D.C., in October of 2007 when we initiated this, I really thought I was coming to meet lots of members of the Joint Community. Instead, what I found was the exact opposite. The people who were at the core of writing this up were gathered at the U.S. Institute for Peace to help us chart the way with a time line and agenda that were about as aggressive as it gets in this business, and in less than one year from the beginning we were able to publish this manual.

The team included people that are in fact in this room with us today, people like Janine Davidson, who at the time was the Director for the Consortium for Complex Operations, crucial to helping us bring together representatives from the other agencies.

Elaine Bitterman, a career minister from USAID, who brought a lifetime of developmental experience to the effort, and Beth Cole from the Institute for Peace, and Ambassador Jim Bishop, Vice President for Interaction. All of them helped us leverage the wealth of experience in nongovernmental and governmental communities to ensure that this manual capture adequately the way that we thought the U.S. Government would operate in the future.

The team literally included only one army officer. That was it.

That was all that was required was just to have one army officer, and that was Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard. He authored it for us. As Janine notes so eloquently, if you look at the forward that she had written, Steve brought to the table an ability to know what he didn't know. We recognized walking into this that there was more we didn't know than we did know, and that we would really count on people like Janine Davidson and Beth Cole, Ambassador Jim Bishop to help guide and direct us and lead us along the way, and introduce us to those people who needed to be a part of this process if this manual was, in fact, going to be something that could be utilized by the United States military and our partners and friends and allies as a guideline in the future.

Together they began to close the gaps to assemble the single document that would capture the experience of the entire community of practice; but truly, what began as an effort to develop a manual, like I said, became far more than that, and today we view this as a process, a process of developing relationships, of knowledge-sharing, and a process that has also resulted in some very long-lasting friendships among many of us.

This process helped to blaze a pathway to the future, to embark on a debate on how we'll develop the next generation of leaders, not just military leaders but leaders from agencies, organizations, and countries capable of foraging these effective teams; leaders who can unite

diverse groups of people to work together towards a shared goal; creative and adaptive comfortable with operating in this complex environment that we find ourselves in, in the 21st century. This is the essence of what we call "the comprehensive approach," evolving leadership beyond traditional modes of command and control to embrace what we call and like to refer to as this "new C-3 of the 21st century," that of coordination, collaboration, and cooperation.

The comprehensive approach allow us to move beyond that unity of command to forge a unity of effort and a unity of purpose among the many of the diverse actors in this community. The comprehensive approach represents the greatest challenge our leaders will face in the next generation. Our leaders must understand that military force, although necessary, will never be sufficient; that military force, in fact, will win every battle engagement of which we are engaged in, but we alone will never be able to win the peace. By forging the comprehensive approach to operations, we in fact get at the very core of leader development for our military, and at Fort Leavenworth we are pressing forward with initiatives to achieve this energy so critical to the future success of our Armed Forces as we work together as a community of nations.

This book is just an example of what we can accomplish when we all work together in a collaborative, coordinated, and cooperative

manner. When we get our minds set on doing something, we can in fact bring it much closer to one common goal. And our educational programs at the Command and General Staff College out of Fort Leavenworth, we expanded our classes to include greater representation from international military students. We're now well over 100 and moving towards about 150.

And the School of Advanced Military Studies, our truly premier leader development program in the United States Army, we have already begun to push in there interagency graduates now who's gone already out to the field just this past summer to keep critical jobs at the Central Command Headquarters and deployed forward into Afghanistan. Our faculty now in fact includes some permanent members of the interagency and our allies. And our course work now has begun to more routinely include interaction with international and nongovernmental organizations.

At our combat training centers we're doing the exact same thing; we have recognized the critical importance of getting towards this, and we start to integrate our interagency partners out there to the point where we eventually wanted to be to where those who were going to go forward to work in provincial reconstruction teams or in other key elements in Afghanistan and Iraq will, in fact, go through the missions rehearsal exercises with those military forces getting ready to deploy forward.

And then just two weeks ago we completed our first iteration

of a one-week course for the interagency planners in an initiative launched in conjunction with the State

Department's Office of Political Military Affairs, again just one more step in moving towards a comprehensive approach in understanding that it's going to be a collective effort by all of us as we work towards some ultimate success down range in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Before I pass the microphone to Carlos, I would leave you with one more thought here. We, the United States military and everybody in this room, bear the responsibility of developing these creative and adaptive leaders that are going to be at the heart and sole of this entire comprehensive approach, leaders with that innate ability to contend with the emerging drivers of conflict and instability in the face of rapid cultural, social, and technological change; leaders who can integrate the tools of statecraft with our military forces, our international partners, our humanitarian organizations, and even the private sector; leaders who can forge a unity of effort among the very rich and diverse group of actors to shape a better future, a better tomorrow.

It's been said there is no greater responsibility than bearing the mantle of leadership. Our generation, the people that are in this room today, bear the great responsibility of developing those leaders for tomorrow, and we believe as you look at this book and go through it that this

book is in fact the first step in moving forward in both teaching and training and educating the future leaders of America.

And with that, I'll pass it off to Carlos.

CARLOS PASCUAL: General, thank you. And, Janine, thank you very much, and, Michele, a pleasure to be here with you as well. Thank you for joining us in this discussion.

This manual, I think, makes an absolutely critical contribution to our understanding of peace, and, as General Caldwell has just underscored, he said that this requires building the capacity of a state to function; it requires and necessitates skills that are outside of the military; it requires new forms of civilian military engagement, and that's the challenge that the Army is trying to face up to today and which is so critical to our foreign policy and our national security strategies.

I have a prediction, and that prediction is that the military is going to find this field manual inherently frustrating. It's going to find it frustrating because most of the elements in it, in order to be able to achieve stability operations, justice to rule of law in security, social service -- delivery of social service, effective governance, developing an economy, developing infrastructure are outside the military's control.

It's going to be frustrating because there are major gaps in civilian capacity. We really haven't faced up yet to the fact that success in

these military -- in military missions also requires a fundamental civilian capability, and that we have to staff for that and actually build those capabilities.

And it's going to be frustrating because as we move toward that part of building capacity of local counterparts to function, it's going to depend on their political will, their political capabilities, and it's going to take that outside of the hands of the U.S. Government and outside of the military.

That said, this document is a foundation for planning, and I think it's important to go back to the quote from President Eisenhower that Janine has in her part of the introduction where he says that: Planning is everything. The plan is nothing. And the intent here is to be able to use this as a manual that can help drive change. And I do think it is a powerful tool. And if this manual had been used and applied to Iraq, for example, and when it began to ask the questions in 2002 and 2003 -- and who was going to address all of the kinds of essential tasks that are identified in this manual? -- we either would not have undertaken the mission, or we would have delayed it, or we would have changed it radically. But this manual would have told us that that mission was going to fail was defined in 2003 and as was staffed in 2003.

And for Afghanistan it would have told us that we needed to maintain and sustain a much longer presence because there is no way that

all of these things that have to be achieved in order to get effective stability, they could not simply have been accomplished in a speedy fashion in 2002 in the time period that was allowed before there was as beginning of a significant shift of troops to Iraq.

So this is a powerful tool. It can actually have an impact.

Let me cover four specific sets of things in the time remaining that I have. The first is on the political and policy context; the second is on civilian capacity; the third are on some specific technical and cultural challenges; and the fourth may be just highlighting how some of this might play out or the implications it might have for Afghanistan.

So let me start on the political and policy context. The context for this manual is that there needs to be a medium-term strategy in any given country in order to achieve a political solution. Without that political solution, there is no viable long-term solution for peace in a particular country. This was established well in the Brahimi Report when the United Nations tackled this issue in 2001. It's been reaffirmed in every major study of peacekeeping and peace-building that you have to have a political foundation for peace.

So without that political strategy, what stability operations essentially do is that they are part of a holding pattern; they're not necessarily achieving stability in and of themselves. What stability

operations can do and what they should do is provide us for that transitional process to make peace sustainable.

Second point. This manual assumes very much of a U.S.-centric approach in U.S.-dominated environments for promoting peace and peace-building. Most cases that we're going to face in the international community are not going to be in that kind of category and, indeed, we should not precedent the kind of training and capabilities that we develop on the assumption of a U.S. intervention because a likelihood, one would hope, in the future is that they will certainly be less necessary.

And so if we look at the typical kinds of cases that we would be addressing instability operations in the future, they will be places like Somalia, or Sudan, or Congo, or Lebanon, or Haiti, or Burundi. And so we have to ask ourselves the question: Would the U.S. join in effort in such countries? Do we have the capability to coordinate with other international efforts? Do we have the political will to be able to do that, and if we don't contribute, will others, in fact, be willing to continue to make efforts in these particular areas?

If there's one particular area that I think that the manual needs to go further and needs to be strengthened, it is particularly to look at this question of U.S. coordination with the rest of the international community because most of the cases that we're going to face should not be U.S.

centric, they should be put into a broader international context.

In this international context, unfortunately, the United States is often seen as a laggard, and that may surprise many of us because we try to push this issue forward quite aggressively. But the majority of U.S. efforts have actually been done in the context of U.S.-specific missions, Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. If you look at most of the international peacekeeping missions in the world, the United States is a funder but not a contributor.

If you look at most stabilization and reconstruction in peace-building efforts and the funding that's been put behind it, the European Union contributes about \$250 euros annually in capability and has a program that goes from 2007 to 2013 that's about \$2 billion euros.

Canada has \$100 million Canadian fund plus significant operational funding for these activities. The U.K. also has a significant interagency fund for operations. The United States has no fund for stabilization and reconstruction, and this year finally received \$75 million allocation for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as well as building up some other capabilities. But we are far behind other major partners in the international community. It's important for us to keep that in mind.

Then it's also important to recognize that if there's going to be

success, that there has to be a demand for these capabilities, the all of government kinds of capabilities that are outlined in the manual. What it stresses is that -- what the manual stresses is that there is no individual agency that can actually produce success; there needs to be a coordinated approach. It lays out the requirements for an integrated management system across the government. But that only functions and works if there is actually a demand for it.

And as the president and the national security advisor, and the secretary of defense and the secretary of state call for that kind of organization in addressing these stability operations in specific countries, and if that doesn't happen, what will end up occurring is that there will always be a tension between those that are manning the intergovernmental -- or all of government functions and, in particular the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the regional bureaus who have traditionally had those responsibilities.

And what you will also potentially see is a tension that emerges not only with the regional bureaus but with technical bureaus that have responsibility, for example, for peacekeeping activities. And so there really needs to be a demand from the top to be able to have this kind of integration to work.

Let me say a couple of things about capacity. There are three

kinds of capacity I would suggest that are important on the civilian side, and, roughly, I would say that one is the ability to have an effective integrating and planning team that puts together the overall operational plan.

A second are individuals who are able to be deployed to the field who become the foundation for local planning oversight and implementation of programs.

And third are the, in effect, the foot soldiers on the civilian side: those who are actually delivering the assistance. And it's important to keep all those three distinctions in mind.

So if we ask that question and say, well, where do we have the civilian capabilities right now? There's an Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization that's been created on the planning side, and it's been significantly improving its capabilities, but keep in mind, that's an office of about 80 people.

There are small offices in other agencies of the U.S. government, and there has just been funding that's been created for a civilian response corps of about 250 people across multiple -- eight different agencies -- that will have responsibility or a function particularly for addressing that middle core, individuals who can be deployed out to field missions. So let's bring that back then to some of the functions that are described in the manual itself.

It calls for an integrated management system that has the capacity to bring together the interagency, and to do that, it generally is going to require a senior individual that has oversight of that integrated management system for any given country. Right now there is no core of senior individuals that are trained for this that the U.S. Government has to be able to turn to, so it's done on an ad hoc basis.

On the planning side, significant capabilities have been built up. There have been planning documents that have been developed, but if you look at the point of can plans be exercised, is there capacity for significant training, here on the civilian side there's a huge gap because the numbers of the people are so stretched that they're trying, in fact, to figure out how to get the job done so that they don't have the capability of actually engaging the extent of training programs that the military is wanting, and in fact you could take out the entire civilian capacity in doing the training, and not actually having people do the actual jobs that you are hoping for them to do.

If we look at operations, here there is a major gap. At one point there was a proposal for the creation of a civilian reserve, and that civilian reserve would be something comparable to what the military has, both a military reserve and a civil affairs reserve. And that this could be drawn on for deployment and implementation of programs, for example in

the area of police and the rule of law, and delivery of some basic services.

That is totally frozen and no funding has been made available for that.

And so, in effect, those who are implementing the programs are on the model that we essentially have always had, drawing on nongovernmental organizations and contractors, both of which have significant capabilities. But the deployment lagged in getting them overseas and actually implementing programs has usually been much more significant, although in some cases less for NGOs.

The strategy calls for the deployment of what are called advance civilian teams that from the beginning of operations, military operations can imbed with the military, and that's very much going to depend on having the civilians available. The civilian response corps that I mentioned earlier, these 250 people will facilitate that, but there is a huge gap there.

On the international side, we also have to recognize that coordination is broken. The U.N. recently created a peace-building commission that is intended to be able to achieve better coordination in stability operations. That still is finding its feet and, in fact, the office that supports it, the Peace-building Support Office, was headed by an individual, Jane Hallud, tremendously talented who is, we hope, going to become the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security. So that's going to remove a

capacity from the international side.

And NATO and the E.U., one of the things that we have to recognize as well is that there's been a huge problem there, and two entities that you would expect to coordinate have not for a series of political reasons that are related to Turkey and Cypress. So as a result of this, NATO right now has no formal mechanism for coordination between its military function and those who are carrying out civilian activities.

Let me say a couple of things on the technical and cultural side, then, that derive from this. General Caldwell pointed out the importance of having a capacity to operate at a decentralized level and a provincial level, and the function in the role of the PRTs have played provincially, construction teams have played in this capacity. Here what we have seen, traditionally, is that PRTs have been a mechanism to operate at a provincial level that has been largely military oriented with some civilians imbedded, and in initial deployments where the security situation is fairly unstable, that has at times been quite successful in being able to get civilians out to the field, but it is not a model for doing development to really change any environment on the ground.

As one brigade commander in Afghanistan told me, he said, you know, "We do development by opportunity. We see a well that needs to be fixed and we fix it, but this is not a strategic approach." And so in order

to be able to get this to function what is going to be absolutely critical is to be able to raise the number of civilians that are available for those PRTs, to be able to coordinate with local officials, develop local strategies, bring in behind them nongovernmental organizations and contractors. The intent is absolutely the right one to be able to develop those capabilities. The capacity to do it still is missing.

The second issue is the coordination between militaries and civilian, and who has the lead in different circumstances. And this is often a tricky situation because it's not -- you don't usually get a completely even security situation across the country, and so you have to make judgments on where the military's in the lead and where civilians are in the lead. And in order to be able to do that you actually have to have civilians on the ground. And right now we don't have sufficient civilians on the ground in provincial areas to be able to manage those tradeoffs in a as sophisticated a way as would be ideal.

Another area where I think there is a gap is a gap between the understanding on part of the military and the part of civilians on what the military would generally call security sector reform. Civilians would call it the rule of law. But here's the problem: The military will generally focus -- Emanuel underscores those -- that they would generally focus on reform and development of military capabilities. Civilians will generally focus on

the rule of law side, on laws and the courts.

There's a piece of this that nobody usually wants to touch: It's usually the police and penitentiaries. Increasingly, the military has been drawn in on providing support for the development of police forces, not their expertise. We have no national police force in the United States and no ready source of capacity to be able to do this. Other countries have national police forces and can help in it, but if we'd look internationally, the number of available police reserves is absolutely minuscule, and you could use them, probably, in just two provinces of Afghanistan, much less in other parts of the world.

And so this area of police is a huge, huge gap, and it's important for the following reasons, because building up police capacity in any given country is going to take time. I think it's probably going to take years because it's not just a question of training individuals, it's actually reforming entire police forces so that the individuals who are trained are not simply in a corrupt environment which is going to undo that training.

So to make this work, it usually requires, over the interim period, the deployment of international police to fill that particular gap. We don't have that capability.

Final point that I'll make on the technical cultural side is an issue regarding in-states. And I think that the strategy rightly points out, or

the doctrine rightly points out the importance of having a clear understanding of what in-states are that we're trying to achieve. There's a huge difference between the military and civilian world and how those in-states are usually seen. In part it's because of the functions and roles that we've played in the past.

When the military has traditionally thought about an in-state, it usually is regarding the destruction of something, and it's fairly clear and straightforward how you actually achieve it. When you're starting to talk about how do you create a viable government and are trying to figure out what are the different elements of that, there is no simple formula to create that in-state. And so in the course of implementation, there's going to necessarily be an extensive dialogue between civilians and the military in order to be able to get that to function.

I have used up more than my time, and I haven't said anything about Afghanistan, so I'm not going to say anything about Afghanistan right now, and I'll save that for the questions and answers.

Michèle?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here, and I want to thank Brookings and Carlos for hosting the event, and Janine and General Caldwell for organizing this and giving us a wonderful excuse to talk about an important topic. It's also great to see so many

friends in the audience.

I'm very pleased to be here both to celebrate the publication of the Army's Stability Operations Manual, but also to try to help illuminate some of the critical issues that it explores. I also wanted to say that I was honored to, before I came into government, be asked to write the foreword along with Sean Brimley, who's hiding in the back there, for the manual. To me, this manual along with its predecessor, the COIN (Counterinsurgency) Field Manual, goes a long way towards answering one of the most important questions to come out of these long years of war: How does this end?

You will recall that General David Petraeus -- this is his now famous question that he posed during the invasion of Iraq, and it's something that we are finally starting to answer. On Iraq we've seen the emergence of a bipartisan consensus around a way forward. On Afghanistan the administration just today released the results of a strategic review, and I'll comment on that briefly later in my remarks.

But we've learned a lot. We've learned through hard experience that the answer, as the manual states, involves using all of the elements of our national power to help develop a nation's internal capacity for security, for governance, and for development.

Now, it sounds like a very simple answer, but as you all know,

the devil is in the details, and there's absolutely nothing simple about stability operations. In fact, the strategic and operational tactical challenges associated with these kinds of operations are the most complex that we face. And that's why I believe that 3-07, as it's affectionately called in the Army, is such an important document, and it's why I'm very pleased to be -- to know that this edition is not only available within the Department of Defense but is available to the general public and to our international partners as well to enhance that dialogue.

But what I wanted to do in my brief remarks today before turning to Afghanistan is to place stability operations within a broader strategic context. Our ongoing experience in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly constitute case studies for why we need effective stability operations doctrine and capabilities. But it's also vital that we look to the future and consider how the decisions we make today can help ensure that we develop a military that can meet the challenges of tomorrow, and, indeed, whole of government capabilities that can meet the challenges of tomorrow.

If you peer into the future of security environment, some of the most difficult challenges we face, I believe, will result from the consequences of state weakness rather than displays of state strengths. Put another way I think the U.S. military is likely, just as likely to be asked to prevent war rather than to make it, to build another nation's capacity rather

than to destroy it.

Now, this isn't the typical way we think about use of force or the deployment of our nation's military, so why do I think that stability operations will increase in importance? Well, it seems to me that the international system is going through some pretty profound changes, and if you think about the inheritance, the daunting inheritance, we face: a long global struggle against violent extremism; proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; shifting balance of power with new powers like China and India rising; and others beginning to decline; the potential for more nationalistic and autocratic governments to emerge; the increasing competition for energy resources and strategic minerals, and the potential for resource conflict; continued globalization -- which is usually a good news story, but uneven integration -- and, of course, certain accelerants in the system like global climate change which will only increase over time the pressures on the weakest states in the system; and our current economic crisis which will likely accelerate some of these trends and exacerbate some of the challenges that we face.

The core strategic challenge for the United States in the midst of all this is to maintain some kind of balance and resilience in the international system as it undergoes these profound changes. These changes will impact what the military likes to call the operational

environment; that is, what they expect to see and experience if and when they are called to deploy to defend American interests. And I believe that operational environment will feature at least three core challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; increasingly hybrid forms of warfare; and frequent threats, as I said, associated with state weakness or failure.

First, the global commons. As new powers rise, we are likely to spend more time and effort focused on maintaining stability in the global commons -- air, sea space, cyberspace domains that really comprise the connective tissue of the international system. I believe that over time many of the challenges we face will involve maintaining you know, U.S. access to and stability in those global commons, and the recent state of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is just one example. Frequency of cyber attacks that we and other countries are experiencing is another.

Second, because of America's continued dominance in conventional forms of warfare where we are beyond compare, as a result of that future conflicts, I think, are more likely to take on a hybrid character. Future adversaries are more likely to use asymmetric means to counter advantages that they may include everything from insurgent attacks to very high-end sophisticated anti-access and area denial strategies.

Third, as I said, U.S. forces are likely to be engaged in operations to prevent or respond to problems associated with state

weakness, as much as with state strength. And here this is really where this new doctrine and the kind of capabilities it suggests are most relevant. I strongly believe that we need to be prepared for these operations because we may encounter something of a paradox. As other powers rise and many states reap the benefits in a globalizing world, it's likely to add pressure on other states.

And in this sense, globalization has a dark side. This process might actually accelerate the decline of states that by virtue of either poor leadership, economics, demographics, geography are simply unable to adapt to the new era and meet the basic needs of their population. Weak and failing states will pose two kinds of acute challenges to U.S. and allied interests. In some cases they will often become catalysts for the growth of radicalism and extremism, as we've seen in Somalia and Yemen, and, of course, Afghanistan before 9/11. Others will be at risk and involve critical assets and resources that are absolutely critical to our interests, Nigeria being another example given its strategic resources.

So there's not only a strong historical case to improve our capacity for stability operations, and not only our current operations requiring a better response in support of those who are deployed today, but the future environment will also demand that we institutionalize and better resource capabilities for stability operations. This is going to be an area that

I can assure you that the upcoming quadrennial defense review that the Department of Defense will conduct, it'll be a main focus area for that review.

So what are the implications of all this for American strategy in general? First, I want to echo what Janine said: This manual is not a strategy. One of the things that critics tend to misunderstand is the difference between preparing for the full range of contingencies which is what the Department of Defense does versus deciding on whether, when, how to use force, which is something altogether different and really the purview of the president as commander in chief. It's the difference between developing options and deciding -- making decisions.

That said, the challenge is better preparing for stability operations really raises some important strategic issues. We've been spending some time thinking about issues of grand strategy as the new administration gets off the ground, particularly in recent weeks as we undertake a number of policy reviews. And as we try to formulate a new national security strategy in a pretty troubled time, I take solace from the fact that we as a nation have encountered and overcome challenges of this magnitude in the past.

Sometimes we forget how incredible the challenges were in the wake, for example, of World War II. Europe and large parts of Asia, land

ruins, the global economy had stagnated -- sounds familiar? -- the specter of another ideological challenge was rising, proliferation of nuclear technologies was beginning. It took years for American strategists to grapple with these challenges and determine the best way forward.

But towards the ends of the '40s, the bipartisan strategy began to emerge, and the core of the strategy was a very powerful idea, and that is that our interests, American interests, are deeply intertwined with the health and the stability of the international system as a whole. And while we all tend to think of containment as the bumper sticker for that era, equally important was the idea, the more fundamental goals of creating and sustaining a healthy international system.

So I would argue that we can apply the same like logic today. Today America's interests require a healthy international system that is resilient in the face of profound economic and security challenges; that it accommodates and integrates new powers as they rise that safeguards open commerce and trade. However much the environment has changed, the essence of our interest has remained the same. So America has a large role in helping to maintain stability in important areas, and the challenges associated with stability operations really strike at the core of this enduring set of interests and this enduring mission.

I believe that the story of how our military has grappled with

these challenges provides a very powerful set of valuable insights with this.

So while this manual is first and foremost a document that provides guidance to the Army on how to better prepare for difficult challenges, it also helps to inform policymakers and the American public about why it is so important that we provide improved interagency capacity and planning and guidance to compliment the military's capabilities as they support and defend American interests in stability operations.

The 21st century challenges that we face will require not only the best our military can offer but truly whole of government approaches, as Carlos mentioned. And I would argue whole of the international community approaches. And it will require investment. We have to put our money where our mouth is, and that means investing in the civilian capacities that are needed to be successful in these operations and in meeting these critical tests.

So let me just close with a brief word on the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy that was just rolled out by the president earlier today, and I'm going to focus, specifically, on the Afghanistan dimensions of this strategy, even though the strategy is, of itself, really looks at this in a very integrated way.

In Afghanistan, this administration is committed to refocusing our operations to achieve a very clear and core goal, and that is destructing,

dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and ensuring that Afghanistan does not return to being a safe haven for terrorists. Achieving this goal is absolutely vital to American interests and to preventing future attacks on the American people on our homeland and on our allies.

For several years, our commanders on the ground have not been given all of the resources that they need to defeat the insurgency and address the conditions that have enabled it to fester. Afghanistan for awhile was an economy of forced mission, as the strategic focus shifted to Iraq. Now it is time for a new strategy and renews commitment. The U.S., along with its Afghan partners and the international allies, will fully resource an integrated current insurgency strategy designed to do three core things:

First, reverse Taliban gains and secure the population in the most troubled areas of the country, particularly the South and the East.

Second, provide the Afghan national security forces, army and police, with the training and mentoring they need to expand rapidly and to ultimately take the lead in providing for the security of their country.

Third, providing the secure environment in which governance and development programs can take root and grow and lead to a much more self-reliant Afghanistan.

One of the most critical elements of the strategy is building the

capacity of the Afghanistan national security forces, and President Obama has already ordered more than 17,000 additional troops to the country and just yesterday announced the deployment of 4,000 more troops focused on the training of the ANSF. We expect that our allies will also increase their commitments as well, particularly as we head into the NATO Summit.

The focus of our military forces on the ground will be both protecting the population and security the environment, and training, mentoring ANSF so that they can eventually take the lead for security. But beyond the strengthened military mission, strengthening civilian assistance and better integrating the civilian and military efforts will be critical to success. And here, as you know, just underscore Carlos' message about: We cannot realize the potential of this strategy without real investment in civilian capacity, not only within the U.S. government. We need to ask our allies to provide their best civilian experts. We need to go beyond government resources to engage the private sector as well.

Defeating the insurgency will also require breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency by a more effective counternarcotics effort; supporting an Afghan-led effort towards reconciliation that would bring insurgent foot soldiers and mid-level leaders to the side of the government and stop the support for the Taliban and for al-Qaeda; and combating corruption at all levels of government to strengthen the

legitimacy of the Afghan institutions in the eyes of the Afghan people.

The review that we've just conducted offers not only a refocused strategy based on core American interests and objectives but also a commitment to provide coalition commanders and civilians on the ground with the resources they need to execute it. The strategy requires mobilizing not only domestic support here at home but also greater international support for our efforts. And you'll see the administration fanning out across the globe in the coming weeks to engage allies and partners to get as much of that support as possible.

This is not just America's war. Defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist allies is a goal and a responsibility of the international community. It's something we must all do together.

I want to end where I started with General Petraeus' question of how does this end. This is a question that should haunt policymakers, and it does. It certainly keeps me up at night, because in this country civilians are the ones who ask those in uniform and their families to risk and to sacrifice.

So I see General Petraeus' question as more of a challenge to do right by those who we ask to serve, both uniformed and civilian. We as leaders have an obligation to provide a better response and a better toolbox than we have in the past, and I believe that this Stability Operations Manual

takes us a long way down that road towards doing just that.

So let me congratulate the writing team and thanks for having me.

(Applause)

JANINE DAVIDSON: We'd like to open it up for questions now if you want to just raise your hand, and I'll go ahead and call on you. Right here in the front. The microphones are coming around. Please state your affiliation and your name.

COLIN CLARK: Colin Clark, military dot com. Michele, how important is, given strengthening the civilian infrastructure, creating something like an expeditionary AID, as we used to have?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think that really investing in the civilian capabilities and capacities of the U.S. government and the international community at large is very important. It's hard to think of an operation or a mission that does not require not only secured military capabilities but also very significant civilian expertise of a large -- of many, many times.

So I think this is an area where our approach and our funding really hasn't caught up with the realities that we find ourselves in every single day. So I think it's a very important part of the way forward.

CARLOS PASCUAL: If I could just add to that a second, because this, in dimension to this, sometimes the word "expeditionary" creates the wrong impression, and it sounds like it's an invading force. And the purpose, in fact, is the opposite.

The reason that you need a much greater civilian capability is that to be effective on the ground you need to work with local counterparts. And one of the things that's underscored in the manual is that you only succeed if there is local ownership. That local ownership depends on working with local counterparts building up their capability so you're going to understand what their problems are. If you're going to develop realistic strategies if you're going to support them during implementation, if you're going to bring in the right supporting contractual support, you need to be there to understand this.

And so if you don't have that presence, the ability to actually develop effective programs is compromised, the ability to actually deliver them is compromised, the ability to oversee them and ensure that there isn't corruption is compromised, the ability to make adjustments is compromised. So this has to be seen from a very different perspective.

This is not -- the purpose of an extensive U.S. civilian presence is not for the purpose of imposing an American will and American model. The irony is the opposite: It's actually for strengthening a local

capacity and a local vision, and if you don't have that local presence, then what ends up happening is that your vision and your guidance comes from Washington, and you end up getting more of an external model that ends up being imposed in that local environment.

JANINE DAVIDSON: Right here in the front?

LARRY O'SHAUNESSY: Larry O'Shaunessy with CNN, a question for Under Secretary Flournoy.

What do we get for our money that we're sending to Pakistan, especially if their intelligent services are going to be somewhat in cahoots with the Taliban, and is the money being well spent?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think what we need to work towards in Pakistan is a strategic self-shift in their calculus that recognizes the tremendous threat that the extremists within their own borders poses to not only us but to the people in the state of Pakistan. And I think part of doing that is first of all providing assistance at a level that is meaningful, but also ensuring that they understand that our ability to provide that assistance depends on seeing changes in past behaviors that have not been helpful to the international community, and it has not done everything that needs to be done in terms of combating the terrorist threat and combating insurgency.

JANINE DAVIDSON: All the way in the back?

COURTNEY KUBY: Hi, Courtney Kuby from NBC. If I could just follow up on that question from Larry, you said, Ms. Flournoy, to provide assistance at a level that's meaningful, I mean, what does that mean? Can you just expand on what that means?

And then I also wanted to ask you, you went back several times in your comments to, how does this end? There's a military (inaudible) saying that this Afghan strategy is really lowering expectations that the U.S. and the coalition can win in Afghanistan. What do you say to that criticism? Thanks.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: Well, on the question of assistance to Pakistan, the president this morning calls on Congress to support legislation that Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar has introduced, or reintroduced, that would provide \$1.5 billion per year over five years of assistance for Pakistan focused on really helping them develop from the bottom up to economic and governance institutions and capacities.

In addition, there is military assistance that will be proposed to increase their capacity to conduct counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism operations. So this is a part of the strategy that will be implemented over time. I'm sorry, the second part of your question?

SPEAKER: You mentioned several times about how does this end, and specific to Afghanistan, some of the criticism from military

analysts about this strategy review today is that it lowers expectations and talk about how the U.S. can't win.

SPEAKER: I think that's based on a misunderstanding. I don't think we're lowered our sights or lowered expectations. What we've done is refocused, refocused on why are we there, and we're rearticulated our core objectives and our core interests and a more defined strategy for how do we actually turn the tide and begin to make progress, and how do we build Afghan capacity to move toward a more self-reliant state.

JOHANNA MENDELSON-FOREMAN: Thank you. Johanna Mendelson Foreman, from Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thank you all for excellent presentations. I wanted to touch on a point, General, that you raised about using the military as a tool of prevention in the future and how this manual would support it. Prevention usually means sustained presence or it means partnerships with the international community often who have foot soldiers, men and women on the ground, and I wonder if you in thinking about this have really gotten to more specifics about this I think very important and innovative component of the manual. Thank you.

GENERAL CALDWELL: I think one of the key things when looking at the manual, most people who are thinking about it in terms of we've conducted some sort of military operations and then you'd go into

stability operations, when in fact over a year ago General Casey, the Chief of the Army, directed us to move the importance of stability operations up to and equal with offensive and defensive. In other words, he said we've got an incredible destructive capability in the United States military in the Army, but we need to have a constructive piece too that is equally as awesome and it complements just as well what we can do destructively. So about a year ago we published our Operations Manual which recognized that and codified that into the way we looked and approached things, and in doing that, that then led to this next manual, because there are times when in fact we want to be preventative, we recognize that the U.S. government may in fact use the military in a preventive role to preclude any kind of military force really having to be employed in any kind of numbers but, rather, we have the unique capabilities and assets that we can work in harmony with the U.S. government, international partners and friends, nongovernmental organizations, private organizations, that can go in and operate in areas in support of our U.S. national government policies that don't have to be as a part of some military operation. In fact, you would hope the constructive piece could be used that way. But then of course we'd then also have the capabilities as we're seeing right now today in Afghanistan and Iraq where in fact we do want to raise the importance of stability operations up.

If you have discussions with commanders that are on the

ground out there today, they'll in fact tell you that truly probably 70 to 80 percent of what they do on the ground is not the destructive piece that you normally think of in terms of how you use the military, but in fact it's the exact opposite, they're spending their time, effort and their energies helping to provide a more safe and secure environment for the people so that the rule of law and justice can take place and in fact we can find people able to live in a much more peaceful environment.

JANINE DAVIDSON: I think also in the context of writing the manual, this is one of those terminology issues also that came up. We had people from the development community, the diplomacy community, the defense community, the so-called three D's. So what some would call conflict prevention others would say that's diplomacy, others would say that's development, and what I think we're trying to get toward in the manual in sort of the how-to part is what does it mean we say the military is an enabler to those sorts of long-term relationship-building strategies that you would have either bilaterally or in a regional sense, so military-to-military engagement and those sorts of things. But if the military is preventing out some area by itself, then that's not the point, it's the whole-of-government approach, and I think the manual again is not perfect but it's getting closer to that and again the process being almost important as the actual product if not more so, those discussions that are now happening across those

communities is really, really important.

MR. PASCUAL: And the other thing that's critical in this is you have to recognize that anything that's done on the military side on prevention presumes an invitation so you're not going in and imposing yourself, so that either the host country has to say we need help on dealing with a specific kind of problem or there is some form of an international mandate that calls for that to happen, and this is still an area that needs to be elaborated and developed further because simply translating prevention into activity can at times be considered preemption which as we all know is in some circumstances going to be a source of conflict rather than diminishing conflict. So it is an extraordinarily sensitive issue that has to be dealt with.

GENERAL CALDWELL: Great clarification. That's exactly right.

PETER SINGER: Pete Singer with Brookings. Thank you to the panel for really great presentations. A thread that connected all of them was again this question of civilian capacity and I wanted to pull on that thread a little bit more. Carlos, you raised the problem of the civilian response, the Corps really only has 250 right now and we haven't funded the Civilian Reserve Corps element to it. Where do you see this headed particularly given that the President when he was running made a promise

to expand that to 25,000? Then on the Department of the Army side of this, I hope your Army staff will forgive me, but I wanted to ask, this civilian capacity, is that also something that could be built within the Department of the Army as well in that we have a history of using Department of the Army civilians in deployments going back 1898 and also during Vietnam? Is that also an area where we shouldn't just be looking to NGOs and other agencies, but also maybe within the structure of the Department of the Army itself? Thank you.

CARLOS PASCUAL: I think one of the things you've from all of us as Peter suggests is there needs to be a significant capacity on the civilian side because what in the end one is talking about is helping states and the private sector within those states and nongovernmental sectors within those states have the capacity to be able to address the needs of the citizens of the country in some dependable way and they have to be able to do that and that is a process of building up a capability that is not a military function. The military function is usually to break things down. So if you ask the question where are those capabilities in our own society, those capabilities are on the civilian side of government. Our military doesn't do the build-up side of what happens internally within the United States and I think it's important for us to think comparably in other places.

I think it's also important for us to recognize that the principle

of civilian control of the military is something which is sacrosanct here in the United States and if the face that we have internationally is that the military becomes the front line of our diplomacy and of our development, that's going to have significant consequences as well. So the military part of our overall government capacity is important and it's critical and it plays a particularly central role on the defense side, in transitional security environments it may be called upon, is called upon to reach to the point of undertaking certain kinds of civilian and humanitarian activities, but we also I think have to understand the limits of that and if we keep pushing it further, in effect what we would be calling upon is for the military to develop skills and capabilities that are in effect in competition with the civilian parts of government which would be detrimental and I don't think the military wants to do.

So what it forces us to do then is to ask the question if we're serious about this then are we going to invest in the civilian parts of government to be able to do it, and it's going to require investments at a number of different levels. One is just sheer numbers of the capacity that you have in the Foreign Service of the U.S. government, the State Department and USAID in particular. USAID is down to about 1,000 Foreign Service officers. I served in USAID during my career and when I joined in 1983 there were about 3,500 Foreign Service officers, before that

there were probably six times that many during the era of Vietnam, probably not a good base for comparison. But the basic point is those numbers have come down radically.

The State Department and Foreign Service is somewhere on the order of about 6,500 people. If you look at that in its deployments around the world, it's already spread thin, so one might even talk about the necessity of doubling the size of the Foreign Service to actually create the base requirement that's necessary to undertake our activity overseas. If you can build up that base, then it creates greater capacity to be able to draw on individuals with skills into specific missions and functions. That then sets the context for when say a Civilian Response Corps, a group of people who can be the first deployers to an environment makes sense, it makes sense if they can create that initial presence and then you can bring in others that establish a more normal operating environment. You need both to be able to do that.

It makes sense if you can then draw behind it those who are actually implementing programs and activities such as through a civilian reserve that is much more extensive on police and police trainers and rule-of-law experts, or you can draw in more extensively NGOs and contractors, but then here let's also recognize the limitations that currently exist. In most of the contracts are contractual arrangements between the

U.S. government and those contractors and NGOs, it's almost precluded to actually put in seed capital to allow them to train and be ready for deployments. It's seen as a contingency fund which generally has been rejected by the U.S. Congress. So it requires a change in the way that we handle those contracting operations as well.

It's possible to do this. We know the pieces that need to be fixed. We know the general amounts that are required in order to be able to do it. And one thing that I would just flag as a particular danger is that if we decide that it's too hard to do this through the civilian parts of government because it's easier to get an appropriation to the military, we're seeing a dangerous precedent because, one, we're in effect creating competition between the military and the civilian parts of government for exactly the same skill areas, and secondly, we create the threat of establishing a military face of government of functions that are fundamentally civilian in nature and which undermines the basic principle that we've had here in the United States which is the civilian control of the military.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: If I could just point a finer point on this issue. You've put it in concrete terms. The strategy that we've outlined for Afghanistan requires a substantial investment, at least a down payment, on the kind of civilian capacity that we've been talking about today. The first test will be as the administration submits a supplemental require for 2009

that will include a substantial request for resources on the civilian side for expertise that's absolutely critical to succeed in Afghanistan. This will be an important opportunity and an important challenge to help Congress do the right thing and help start to invest in these capabilities because there is an immediately critical need for a mission that involves that vital U.S. interests. So I'm hoping that this will begin to get off the ground as we go forward.

GENERAL CALDWELL: I think you'll see in the manual we continually talk about the need for a comprehensive approach. Again the military has an incredible destructive capability and that's the core mission of what we exist for and we should not lose that, and whenever we can increase the civilian capacity to work in a comprehensive manner with respect -- the military really is not interested in taking on any of the civilian functions and capabilities but, rather, augment them as required so that they can be much more effective and efficient in what they're trying to achieve. So the short answer to your question is I think you'd find most of us wanting to see an increase in the civilian capability and capacity so that they can in fact be in greater numbers out there so that we can operate and work in a comprehensive manner because that's what it's going to take. Again the military is necessary but it's not sufficient.

SPEAKER: This is for General Caldwell as well as the other panelists. You've talked about developing new kinds of leaders who can

operate effectively in these changing environments. The first question is within the military how can you change the personnel system to reward and promote and educate these sets of people? Then for the other panelists, how do you extend that to interagency to develop the national security personnel and educational system?

GENERAL CALDWELL: I can tell you from just a small perspective. We the United States military and our civilian counterparts have to learn how to educate and train together throughout our entire careers. This can't be episodic. It's got to be a continual thing. A year and a half ago when I arrived at Fort Leavenworth and looked at our premiere educational facility out there, the Command and General Staff College, there was nobody from the interagency. Today we have seven, this summer we'll have 23. Each time we do that though it's a challenge for the interagency because they don't have the buffer that people are allowed to go to schools whereas we in the military actually have a certain number of people that we always have in our structure that are intended to be in a school system of education and training. They don't have that. So were able to get 23 people coming out this summer from the interagency, and they're coming from the Department of State, from the FBI, from USAID, from Justice, they complement, and that's so critical so they in fact then spend a year on education inculcating and explaining their culture and how

they operate, understanding their lexicon and we understand theirs, and that needs to just be the microcosm or something that's going to be much bigger in the future. It doesn't help to do it at the 20-year point of everybody's careers. It needs to take place like we're doing it now, and we need to work in our training environment so that in fact if we are going to go some place in the world and operate together, we've done that in peacetime. We always say train as you will fight in the Army. It's a time-honored tradition, you train as you will fight. We need to train as we're going to operate and we operate in a comprehensive manner, and we have for many, many years. You can go back through history, we've always done it, and yet for some reason we tend to neglect that and forget it after the fact, and we can't do that this time. The intent of this manual is to codify in the Army doctrine how critically important that is so that in the years ahead as we look to 2015, 2025, when we see all the threats and the challenges that Michele was laying out that will be out there, they will only be able to dealt with if it's done in a comprehensive manner. The military is going to be unable to achieve some sort of peace and stability by itself. It has to be the U.S. government working with our partners, our friends, our allies, the international community, the private organizations, the nongovernmental organizations, with a collective effort.

JANINE DAVIDSON: If I could add to that, I think also some

of the things we've talked about before are career incentives for military officers who take on those sorts of exchange roles, your back-fill roles, and making sure that that is seen as something that is career enhancing as opposed to something that is a detriment to one's career. And I think it's the same on the civilian side. I think Carlos maybe you could talk a little bit more to the career incentives for FSOs working with the military or going to some of these school programs and whether or not they need to be adapted in order to create those sorts of incentives.

CARLOS PASCUAL: I think General Caldwell started out on exactly the right note which is the numbers, and I hate to keep coming back to that, but if you don't have the numbers you can't do any of this because you can't have the training programs, you can't have the cross-agency experiences that are necessary to build up capabilities, everybody is basically just trying to figure out how they do what they need to do on their plate tomorrow and you don't make the progress that's necessary.

If you do get the increases in the numbers, I think we've learned a number of things from military experience particularly the experience that we've seen under Goldwater-Nichols and promoting the idea of jointness, and Michele has written about in a publication that she was closely involved with called "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." Both of us were involved with a project called the National Security Reform Project

which addresses some of these issues in detail. But the things that we've learned is that having cross-agency experiences make sense because it helps you understand how different bureaucratic structures function, how they make decisions, what are their priorities, and it allows you to educate others about experiences in your host agency. It becomes a cross-exchange experience.

The other critical thing on the civilian side of government particularly with the State Department and traditional diplomats is training and management, and in particular, management by objectives and how you organize both your time and resources in order to produce specific results because that's traditionally not been a way that State Department officers have actually been trained.

The third thing that I would just underscore and this is inherent in the comment that General Caldwell just made about the importance of training and train the way you will fight, that means not just the traditional form of training that we think about on the civilian side of government of what you do in the classroom, it actually means exercising the principles and engaging in simulations and being able to test the ideas and figure out through those simulations what works and what doesn't work. We really don't have very much in the civilian parts of government, a minuscule amount do we actually in fact actually engage in that type of training. This

is going to be absolutely essential to be able to work through the different kinds of principles and concepts that are in the training manual. It's going to be necessary to work through the cultural types of issues. It's going to be necessary even to work through vocabulary questions. So unless we're able to undertake those kinds of training activities that are real exercises which will require numbers of individuals who can be dedicated to be able to do it, it will be very hard to actually translate this to people in a way that they understand in a practical, on-the-ground basis.

CHRIS MEUT: My name is Chris Meut. I'm from Army Defense Exports in Cooperation. My question is related to security force assistance. Under Secretary Flournoy, you mentioned the 4,000 troops who will be going to do the advising mission in Afghanistan. As I understand it, those will be a brigade from the 82nd Airborne and that's the model that's been followed in Iraq because in large part, outside of the Special Forces, we don't have a capacity to do advising as an institution capacity of the military. Do you envision that being something that will change in the future? What are your thoughts about the development of a permanent advisory capacity not just to do stage 3 and stage 4 interventions but also in phase zero, security cooperation and theater security cooperation and things like that? How do you envision that going in the future?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: It's a very important question

because I think mission of building the capacity of other security forces around the world, of resourcing that mission, that question is going to be with us for some time. I think this is one of many related issues that we're going to look at in the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, because we haven't been well structured to fully resource this mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan so we've struggled in a sort of ad hoc way to really figure how to do that. I think what we're proposing in Afghanistan will actually go much farther down the road to resourcing both the advising and assisting teams but also resourcing the partnering of units that do day-to-day operations together and have the opportunity to really have an impact on the professionalism of our Afghan partners. But in terms of longer-term solutions, this is an area where I don't think we've figured out the answer yet and we really need to take a look at alternatives and options in the context of the QDR.

CARLOS PASCUAL: If I could actually just jump in on that too to drive home another point on the premise of what we just started out with here. Four-thousand people going for purposes of training the Afghan National Army and the police. That would be two-thirds of the entire Foreign Service of the United States that would be deployed for that purpose. So if for the police and the military we think that we need those kinds of numbers and we need to be able to partner them in a consistent program of training,

what makes us think that it's not necessary to have comparable skills and capabilities in training all those who are functioning and working in the central government or at the provincial level? And particularly at the provincial level where if you're actually going to achieve service delivery and cut into this web of drugs and corruption, that's the place where you actually really deliver the results, and that's where the capabilities are extraordinarily weak on the part of the Afghanistan government and it's going to take a significant deployment of resources to be able to do it. And what we're talking right now in terms of deployments at a provincial level whether it's the U.S. government or others, we're maybe talking tens, maybe talking hundreds, and that underscores what the difficulty is going to be.

The President has made a commitment to seek additional civilian resources, we've made a commitment to seek them from other governments. We have to realize that there's a real capacity gap there and that issue more than any requires I think massive attention because, and the White Paper on Afghanistan says it itself, if we can't deal with the civilian capacity, there is no success to the strategy and there I think the success of this effort is either going to be made or we're going to lose it.

GENERAL CALDWELL: I would just add in fact in this room is one of the brigades that is getting ready to deploy here very shortly in the next few months to be an advise and assist brigade. We have modular

brigades in the United States Army and we have taken and designated a new formation where we can take a modular brigade, put it through a specialized training program and then we're deploying them, and you'll start seeing in the next few months the deployment of up to eight of these over the next year, and there may be more required to do this as they continue to do the assessment of the strategy that's being laid out, but there are at least eight now in the pipeline and we in fact are going to deploy them as advise and assist brigades. Their mission is to not go over and conduct destructive type operations but, rather, to advise and assist in the development of the police and military forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the brigade commanders and his planner are here today in this session. They're listening. This is an important thing. They understand the mindset that they have to have established in each of the soldiers. There has been some modifications for the force structure, minimal, but their whole training program is entirely different than what they would have gone through had we just deployed them as a combat brigade. They're not a combat brigade. They're an advise and assist brigade.

JOHN BARRY: John Barry, "Newsweek." Let me cheat and ask two questions if I may. First about NGOs. It's clear that the military or at least the Army it needs NGOs. Is it clear that the NGOs realize they need the Army? Historically there's been a good deal of suspicion among the

NGO community about too close a collaboration with the military for reasons that are both good and bad. Do you see this as being a problem?

My second question relates to the rest of the military. This is Army doctrine. Are the other services on board for this? It's not joint doctrine and that's a very different thing in military parlance. I don't think I heard any reference to anybody from the Marine Corps, for instance, being involved in the making of this, although the Marines do play a significant on-the-ground role and one can think of combat service support functions within both the Air Force and the Navy that would be helpful for these kinds of stability operations.

JANINE DAVIDSON: On the NGO point, I think the overarching answer to your question is it depends. We had a very serious 2-year long-term project with the U.S. Institute of Peace where we brought in interaction and their sort of consortium of NGOs, those NGOs that work on especially humanitarian and disaster sorts of things, and that wanted to come up with some sort of rules of the road for operating with the military on the ground, and there are a lot of them and there are an increasing number of them. The product of that is available on the U.S. Institute of Peace website. It's the NGO Civil Military Guidelines. It's getting written into doctrine and I think we referenced it in the manual.

That said, there is still a debate inside the NGO community

over things like humanitarian space and if we work with the military do we sacrifice the humanitarian space, and that dialogue has shifted a lot over time as a lot of NGOs have been targeted with or without operating with the military. So I think this is a period of sort of flux in terms of which direction it will go, but I would say we've definitely had a lot more cooperation across the board and part of the writing team was an NGO team. Some of the words in the book, some big sections of the book, were written entirely by that interaction consortium with Jim Bishop in the lead. I'll let you address the Marine Corps part.

GENERAL CALDWELL: That's a great point because Janine was one of those who helped bring the international community and NGOs together to have dialogue with us. We alone could not have done that a year and a half ago. We couldn't have brought everybody to the table. But Janine through her past job that she had along with Beth and a few others, they were able to bring a lot of them together. What we have found is, again I mentioned this idea of C-2. In the military we think of command and control, and what we have really come to appreciate and understand is that this is going to be C-3. It's going to be the collaboration, the coordination and the cooperation amongst all of us trying to achieve an ultimate goal of helping provide a safe and secure environment for those people wherever we've been asked to go help provide assistance or have a presence.

The transparency and the openness too is very big, and what you will have seen if you've come to Fort Leavenworth in the last year, the number of NGOs that have come out there and engaged with our students who for many of them they saw them in Iraq or Afghanistan, but now they've also seen them in an educational environment and it's been absolutely invaluable. We've also invited them, and you'll find like the ICRC comes out and participates in every single mission rehearsal exercise of a unit going to Afghanistan and Iraq now and actually teaches classes on what they want to teach to our soldiers so they better understand what the ICRC does and what it won't do and so that when they get into theater they have a much greater appreciation for the importance of each of these organizations because again it's a comprehensive approach that we have to take in finding solutions to whenever we're going to make a decision to commit or deploy American forces. That's a real big piece.

But I would tell you on the manual itself there is not another manual that's ever been written that has been more coordinated across all the services, our partners, the interagency, than this one right here. It is truly a model for how to move forward. Carlos brought up a great point about now let's even incorporate more of our international partners next time and he's exactly right. We need to do that too. The days when we just write an Army manual with Army personnel for the use of the Army are

going because we will never operate that way, so why do we write a manual that way? So that's what really struck us. The COIN Manual was the first to break the mold, and in this one here like we said, it's Steve Leonard who's in the back there, one military officer full-time dedicated to write this where we normally may have a team of eight to twelve, and then everybody who helped write it was from the U.S. government, they were from complex operations, they were from USIP, truly interaction. They all were involved in helping write different portions and editing it and helping us getting it ready for publication. This really isn't an Army manual. This is just a manual that the U.S. Army helped facilitate in getting published that the international community at large could use when they have to do down range some place to operate.

SPEAKER: JOHN BARRY: Were the other services involved in this?

GENERAL CALDWELL: Absolutely. Yes, in fact, if you were to talk to General Maddis down at Joint Forces Command he will tell you he has read this thing from cover to cover, he has portions of it that are mandatory reading with his own command that he has shared with us, because he understands and appreciates the value of what the Army did in helping pull all these organizations together to put this piece into publication.

JANINE DAVIDSON: I think there's a little confusion also about the difference between joint doctrine and service doctrine, not to get nerdy on you, but the whole joint doctrine, the purple layer of doctrine, is geared at a different level. So this was never supposed to be a joint manual that is supposed to inform the joint forces commander's planning. It's more geared toward the people on the ground and that brings it down a notch, and that's just a terminology thing, joint doctrine, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps. So this is a service manual, but it's a whole government effort. That's one of the reasons that makes it unique which is also why it's probably confusing.

SPEAKER: I don't want to put too sharp a point on it, but it seems to me with the manual you have come up with a series of the tasks that need to be accomplished and from that some sense of what organizations would be responsible for those tasks from which I would think we can size the requirement, and I think Carlos has made the point that the capacity is just woefully not there not only in terms of what we could deploy if we scrape the bottom of the barrel, but we're really talking about a three- or fourfold increase if you're going to have for example State and USAID training on a day-to-day basis the way the Army trains when it's not deployed. So you're looking at hugely larger organizations and something like the Civilian Reserve Corps at 250 people, most GS-13s and 14s, is not

only inadequate, it's almost counterproductive. I'm wondering if there legislation for it coming? Is there a sense in Congress within the bureaucracy for those working with the President's budgets? I haven't heard of anybody talking about that kind of a quantum increase at State, USAID, nor have I heard about a wholesale change in terms of the training program, in fact even the recruitment programs that would allow you to believe that when you went through a Foreign Service officer's career at the end of the day you had someone who was perfect for a PRT. Is there anything going on? Are we missing something? Or are we just from your side getting a critique but nothing is actually transpiring in the way of macro change?

CARLOS PASCUAL: Let me just say a couple of things and Michele I'm sure you'll have other pieces to join here. First of all, if you compare where the United States is on these issues today versus 2004, it is a radical step forward. At that stage there was no sense that there needed to be a common office to actually unify these experiences. There was no such thing as even an essential task matrix, something that was a checklist of the critical things that needed to be achieved. There was nothing that provided any guidance on how planning would be undertaken. There was no capacity to achieve any form of interagency coordinated planning except on an ad hoc basis. There were no guidelines to be able to do it. There was nothing that was even written about how civilians would actually deploy with

the military. That part has changed and we have to recognize it and say that significant steps have been taken in that direction.

When these functions were first conceived of when I was asked to take on the Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, I was told that I could have 20 positions, but of those 20 positions that they were going to be provided on some form of detail arrangements totally ad hoc. We built it up to about 65 people. It was based on no funding for the office. It was totally on an ad hoc operation. That has been normalized as well and there's been a willingness to seek funding for those purposes.

The 250 people in the Civilian Response Corps isn't counterproductive. It is actually a real addition that is important. Because if you have groups of people who can train in groups of 30 and become available as first respondents that you can put in places like Sudan or in Haiti in critical moments where you need to build up capacity to manage a transitional situation and where they can actually leverage much wider international investment, it can make a significant contribution and we've already seen that kind of contribution take place in a number of countries. Sudan, Haiti and Lebanon are three where individuals deployed on a short-term basis and did make a difference.

But if we then look at it from a bigger context, do we need

more? Absolutely. Here the President's budget is encouraging. The President has indicated that he is going to seek a doubling of foreign assistance over a period of years, that there is going to be a significant increase in personnel. There still are not the steps that have been taken that go far enough to move toward the creation of a Civilian Reserve. That's a basic issue that's going to have to be addressed.

Engagement with the Congress is absolutely key. Senator Lugar and at that point Senator Biden were prescient in their sponsoring of legislation that lays out many of the foundations and authorizations that are necessary. The called for the creation of a Civilian Reserve. That legislation has never been passed. In fact, much of the critical language that is necessary is in fact already written. But there has been a significant part of the U.S. Congress that has resisted this and here comes a basic factor that we're just going to have to deal with. When you look at the U.S. budget and the deficits that we've been running and the requests that have been made by the previous administration and this one, usually when you go back and look at the overall allocations for the foreign affairs budget, when that comes back to the appropriate appropriations committees, they're saying the amounts that are being requested are \$3 billion to \$5 billion more than what we already have. You're telling us that you can't cut anything back and you want to add something. So in effect what we're

basically going to have to argue if we're going to move something like this forward is it's going to take the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense coming together and saying that investment in these capabilities are a national security priority for the United States and they have to go to the top of the list and that this is the level that we're going to have to put into it and

I raise this as a contrast for comparison. When President Bush in his last State of the Union address said we're going to increase the size of the U.S. military by 90,000. Any response to that? Any controversy? None whatsoever. Talk about increasing the size of the U.S. Foreign Service and civilian capabilities by 5,000 to 10,000? A massive pushback. It's seen as an extraneous investment in capabilities that are not necessary because we don't understand how they fit into our national security, and that's the change that we're going to have to make, that investment, one-ninth of what we just made in the expansion of the U.S. military, that that has to be made in civilian capacity.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think if I could just add that this points to the need for a much broader national conversation and dialogue on this issue. We have now 7 to 8 years of pretty searing experience and a pretty good sense of what's needed in these kinds of operations that knowledge of people who've gone deployment after deployment have and

take for granted, it's obvious, isn't always widely known here in Washington and out across the country. I think we need to have a national dialogue about what it takes to be successful in protecting and advancing our interests in these operations and I think the Congress needs to understand how vital some of these investments in these civilian capacities are.

I'd also encourage us to think beyond just what capacity can we build inside the U.S. government. I think this goes to the issue of national service and creating more opportunities for Americans who are very patriotic who want to serve, who want to make a difference in creating opportunities for them to serve. I'll give you my boss's favorite example. Secretary Gates you all know came from being President of Texas A&M and he routinely saw at the university, one of many land-grant universities that have agricultural teams that deploy all over the world all the time. How can we tap in to that as a resource in a place like Afghanistan? Could we go to the private sector, to universities, out to the American people and create opportunities and mechanisms and incentives for people who are real experts with really useful expertise to be a part of this and to give 6 months of their time, a year of their time, to help achieve a success that's really vital to this country?

MR. CASSALLS: My name is Dan Cassalls. I work for a small work called McKeller Corporation and we support the Under

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness which asked us to do a study on preparing DOD for the whole government and particularly training for whole government for reconstruction and stabilization. For fear of sort of inviting you to beat the horse of the lack of civilian capacity again, I want to pick up on actually General Caldwell's point that he made in his opening remarks that the military commanders and military personnel in general are required in Afghanistan and Iraq to work on an ad hoc basis. You have an illustrative example, I can't quite remember how you describe it, but they're on the ground and they're doing things for which they are not trained. They have the funds, quick response funds, the commander's funds in Iraq, lacking the civilian capacity until it comes along they're still going to be called on to perform.

And to come to the manual specifically, it's very clearly cross-walked to the task list which is still called the post-conflict reconstruction task list, but the five sectors. So in addition to the police and rule of law that you mentioned that's lacking, that capacity is lacking, commanders as I understand it and military personnel who are expected to and are in fact conducting governance, some security and in the other fields in the other sectors as well, economics, social welfare, et cetera.

So essentially my question is what sort of training, and the question that the OSDPR is asking is, what sort of training should we be

looking at now? Maybe you can tell us a little bit more about what's going on and what do those commanders have to know in those areas knowing that they are going to be filling that gap as Directive 3000-05 is still in effect and still says they have to until the civilian capacity comes along? We're not going to train them to be governance experts, we're not going to train them to be social development experts, but they're going to have to fill the gap. So if you can give us more specifics on what the training looks like at Leavenworth and what more capacity can we give them, our military, in these areas?

GENERAL CALDWELL: I'd say the first thing is instilling in our leaders a different mindset, and as we've talked about in the Army now, our job is to create adaptive and agile leaders. That's absolutely paramount. You educate for uncertainty, you train for certainty. So in our educational process we are out there educating them on how to prepare for uncertainty which means that we cannot possibly predict or think of every situation. We can give them a lot of different vignettes and scenarios to exercise in, but our job out there is to teach them to how think, not what to think, but how to think. So we have taken a real turn in our philosophy of education with these Majors who come there, about 1,400 years, and saying when you leave here you have to be far more agile and adaptive than you've ever been before. We're blessed in that when you look at the current

composition of our class of the Army officers who are there, well over 90 percent are combat veterans. Over 33 percent are multiple time combat veterans. We have a combat-seasoned force there like we've never seen in my Army career. So when I see these young men and women walk in out there, they already have been there, done it, experienced it and have an understanding. So the more that we can bring in international students to educate with them, the more we can bring in the interagency to educate with them, the more we can bring in the nongovernmental organizations and the private organizations to interact and do things with them out there during that year of education, the more capable they're going to be to handle that uncertainty that they're going to be faced with. Then we really stress too the importance of being creative in how you approach and think out of the box, look for new solutions, understand that the resources you have wherever you go, wherever you're placed, is what you're going to have to work with so now get creative and adapt to that situation to accomplish whatever you've been asked to achieve. Again we're done it through our exercise programs out there. We do a lot of exercises. We've done it through education. We've gone into much more small group facilitating discussions with the students. So we're working it real hard so that we can in fact do that. But a key component of that has been able to get more interagency engagement out there with and as part of our educational process.

The rest of the interagencies are ready to do it. They just truly are constrained. So General Casey authorized us to put military officers in as backfills into each of the agencies that agreed that they would send out to be educated with us. We don't charge them anything. There is no cost associated with it. They just to show up and they get a Master's Degree of Military Arts and Science and hang out with the U.S. military for a year. That's all we want them to come out and do and be a part of who we are as a comprehensive approach to learning and educating.

JANINE DAVIDSON: I think also that points to the evolution that's gone on in the training and education across the military. Part of your point I think also was they have to know how to do this stuff until all the civilians show up. I think it's a little more complex than that. I think, yes, that's true that they are increasingly filling in for what people would consider to be civilian tasks. However, if and when the civilians do come and if they continue to come in in increasing numbers and with increasing expertise, that means that the military doesn't just go back to training the way it used to train and educating the way it used to train, that means the military now educates for how best to enable those actors. How to really unlock the capacity and the expertise of the civilian actors means what they need from the military. I think that you'll see that the military educational physical system will have to continue to adapt and evolve in order to take that

changing role to the degree that it changes it. As Michele said, the military and the U.S. government in general is likely to be doing these things. This is the nature of the complex system that we're faced with internationally. That doesn't mean that once the civilians show up, the military is going to stay home. I think they're going to be out there together and so they're going to have to keep learning.

I received a note from way in the back that there's 5 minutes left and I was able to see it because I had Lasik last week. So I'm going to take about two or three questions together and then we'll get a wrap-up.

SIMEON: My name is Simeon and I have a question regarding Afghanistan. Are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams going to be enhanced based on what President Obama has said in an effort to improve the Afghan economy?

CARLOS PASCUAL: Could you repeat that? Are they going to be what?

JANINE DAVIDSON: Enhanced.

MR. SIMEON: Enhanced, yes. Just a follow-up. What is the alternative to opium for the Afghans? I was just listening to something this morning on NPR and it's one of the poorest countries in the world. They don't really have much in the way of alternative crops. And if you talk about dealing with the counter-narco-traffickers, providing them an alternative is

obviously the key. Can you discuss what the alternative would be and what the future role of the PRTs are going to be in Afghanistan?

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think one of the objectives of sending more civilians to Afghanistan is to enhance the capacity of the PRTs, but more broadly to really shift some of the emphasis to a more bottom-up approach to capacity building to work more at the district and provincial level, and as Carlos mentioned, how important it is to build capacity at that level. That's really the level at which most Afghans have any direct experience with their government so building capacity at that level is absolutely critical. That doesn't mean we stop working with the national ministries and working with national institutions, but I think we want to try to push more people outside of Kabul once the security situation allows and really enhance the PRTs and other mechanisms to get at the local level. Agricultural sector reform writ large will be critical, and part of making the counternarcotics strategy more effective will be working a lot harder on crop substitution. I'm not an agronomist but I know historically Afghanistan has grown a lot of wheat, it's traditionally had all kinds of fruit orchards. I've heard of some agronomists who've developed a form of alfalfa that is ideally suited for Afghanistan. So I think there are a lot of options to be explored. But it's going to take some assistance in enabling people to make that transition and real security so that they don't fall prey to

the very heavy-handed coercion and intimidation that goes on to try to keep them growing poppies.

MR. SIMEON: May I just ask a very quick follow-up?

JANINE DAVIDSON: Quickly, yes.

MR. SIMEON: The strategy being employed to secure the countryside, I've read it's going to be something similar to a clear, hold and build. Has any thought been given toward the status of the road-building projects? There has always been an issue of the outlying areas being disconnected from Kabul and within those outlying areas not connected very well via roads.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I think when you look particularly to agricultural-sector reform you have to take a systems perspective where you look not only at how do you help farmers grow legal and productive crops more effectively, but also how do they get those crops to market. How do they deal with the fully cycle that's required? How do they irrigate those crops? How do they get energy and so forth? So I think we are going to try to take a systems approach. Also we're not starting with a blank sheet here. There is a national development strategy. There are all kinds of plans that have been put together. We just haven't had the security conditions and the resources to bring it all together. And I do think that we're going to spend a lot of focus and effort bringing the U.N. effort, the various national

foreign donor efforts and Afghan indigenous efforts together toward a much more coherent and cohesive set of plans that we will work over many, many years. People tend to think just in terms of how long will troops be there. Afghanistan is a very long-term development project. The military intervention will not for the -- we'll be there in Afghanistan helping with economic and other kinds of development assistance for a very long time. That doesn't mean that the Afghans won't be prepared -- in a much smaller frame of time the Afghans will be prepared to take the lead on security and other parts of governance and so forth.

JANINE DAVIDSON: I think we're out of time. I'd like to give the panelists an opportunity to say anything if you have any final comments or thoughts.

MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: I just want to again applaud the work that General Caldwell and others have done. This is really hard. I think one of the things the U.S. military tends to do well is take stock of its own experience and try to capture lessons learned, best practices, institutionalize those, feed those into training and education and so forth. And I think that's a good example for all of us going forward, that we as a government, that as a nation, really need to take stock of what we've learned in the last several years and try to apply some of those lessons on how we're spending our resources and where we're putting our attention

going forward.

JANINE DAVIDSON: Carlos?

CARLOS PASCUAL: I think if there's one critical theme for all of us to keep remembering it is that success here is going to depend on viable political solutions within countries and local capacity to actually sustain it. The two of them are fundamental to any kind of sustainability. So what's being laid out here in this manual is a portion of how you get to those viable local solutions, how you achieve the capacity from the United States government and in reality between the United States government and the rest of the international community, how do you achieve the local presence to be able to work with counterparts to build up their capability so that they have the capacity to be able to govern their country, deliver services to their people and maintain resource for their people, and that that is fundamentally what it's about.

So we have to keep thinking about this not from a perspective of what is the U.S. government doing and what are we defining for that environment. If we look at it from that perspective, we will not succeed. If we look at it from the perspective of how do you build the capacity in a way that they can indeed sustain it, then we have a chance for success. It's harder. It takes more time. It takes more international engagement and cooperation to be able to do it. But that's the only way I think that we're

going to be able to see sustainable outcomes.

GENERAL CALDWELL: I would say as we put together this manual in going from conflict to peace, it really will take, and I think you've heard it today, a comprehensive approach. There is no easy solution and it is going to be hard. But if in fact everybody moves forward and understands that the military is very, very important but it's not going to be sufficient to achieve the final peace and we take a comprehensive view and everybody understands that and we resource it so that it can in fact be done, then I think we can find that the lessons we have learned over the last few years and the acknowledgement of what we're going to face in the next 10 to 25 years, it really is important that we put to heart what we outlined here in this manual as a collaborative effort that was put into writing this thing.

JANINE DAVIDSON: Finally I'd like to say thank you to everybody for coming and listening and also for the quick change in time and still coming out. I'd like to say thank you to General Caldwell and his team for the leadership they've had on this manual, and also to Michele for her forward that she wrote which was outstanding with Sean Brimley, and to the Brookings team, Carlos, Peter and Mike O'Hanlon and also Heather Messera for helping us launch this event. And finally the University of Michigan who without their sponsor of this particular edition we would not all be here right now.

As a final note, doctrine isn't strategy. It does inform strategy. It also informs policy. And to the extent that this book has generated this debate and this dialogue today, I think it's doing its job. If you're interested, we have them for sale where, Heather?

HEATHER MESSERA: They are in the Brookings Bookstore, right outside the door.

MS. DAVIDSON: Right outside the door. Thank you very much.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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