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THE IMPACT OF TOMORROW'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

ON U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

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Introduction and Moderator:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: Thank you. For those of you I haven't met yet, my name is Peter Singer. I direct the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings. I want to welcome you all to this session.

The 21st Century Defense Initiative was establish with the goals of wrestling with three issues, three layers of change facing the American defense system today. The first is the changing security environment -- new threats, new actors, new technologies. The second was the changing expectations that are being placed upon the defense system today, everything from counterinsurgency to homeland security. And then, finally, the changing structures and responses being developed in light of these changing environment and expectations.

Established in 2002, the U.S. Northern Command certainly exemplifies each of these key issues of change in providing command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts. In coordinating defense support of civil authorities, it must be prepared for all the various threats. It could reach America's homeland in the new 21st century environment. Indeed, in defending America, it's AOR includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico and surrounding waters out to 500 nautical miles.

We're therefore very honored to have with us here today General Victor Renuart, Commander of NORTHCOM and the North

American Aerospace Defense Command. He's going to provide us with an assessment of these future security challenges and his vision on how the organization that he leads will be responding in terms of its mission and structures. He brings to this amazing background on both the operational and strategic levels.

He entered the Air Force in 1971 following graduation from Indiana University, and his distinguished career includes over 3,800 flight hours and 60 combat missions. He commanded a NATO support group and two fighter wings during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He served as Commander of the 76th Fighter Squadron. During Operation Deny Flight, he served as Director of Plans for NATO's combined air operations center. During Operation Southern Watch, he commanded the joint task force Southwest Asia and the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force. And during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, he served as CENTCOM Director of Operations. And, finally, prior to assuming his current position, he was Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

And so with us again, it's our honor to have him because of this -- in light of his both operational experience but also the broad purview of working with coalition partners and strategic questions.

So, again, thank you for joining us and we look forward to your remarks.

GEN. RENUART: Thank you very much, Pete. I appreciate the very kind introduction, and it's really a treat for me to be here today. Brookings has such a central role in the strategic thinking in our country and a great and proud tradition. Your 21st Century Defense Initiative, as you mentioned, focuses on three areas that are part of our lifestyle at NORAD and NORTHCOM every day, and so the chance to come and talk with you about them for a little bit and then to field your questions, because I think that's a critical element of this dialog and interface -- is really an honor for me.

With NORTHCOM, you get, really, the personification, if you will, of each of those three areas that the 21st Century Defense Initiative embodies -- as you said, changes in warfare and what that does to impact our defense priorities and policies and how you shape and change military structures so that they can adapt to this changing environment. That really is a short story of the evolution of U.S. Northern Command since we were formed in 2002.

9/11 reminded us all that the first priority of the President and the Secretary of Defense certainly is homeland security and homeland defense, but on 9/11 we really had no unified effort, no command singularly responsible for the defense of our homeland. Certainly that has changed and I think changed for the better.

If you think back to where you were on 9/11 -- I certainly

know where I was -- as was mentioned I was the Director of Operations for Central Command and working for General Tom Franks down in Tampa -- and honestly I had moved to Tampa from having spent a year in Saudi Arabia in the summer of 9/11 thinking this was wonderful. I was going to go to South Florida. I was going to buy my sailboat and have a very enjoyable, two-year tour at the headquarters. Well, 9/11 put my boat in abeyance for a little while and turned into a lifestyle that was both professionally the most challenging that I've ever had and personally the most challenging I've ever had. However, it was maybe the most important job of my military career until I took this job.

We at CENTCOM began very quickly to shape the response to those attacks in New York and Washington and what would have been an attack save for some heroic efforts on the part of passengers of Flight 93, and we were focused very much on how to reach back out at this terrorist threat and affect them where they were and eventually to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and their supporters as well as the al Qaeda that were there.

But I was also very concerned about what was next. If they could do this once, could they do it again, and was our homeland ready for such an attack? Did we have a commander who focused on that? How imminent was that attack? Were we analyzing the intelligence better on 9/12 than we were on 9/10? And it was clear to me at that time that the

Department of Defense needed something to focus on this kind of an environment, this very different environment than we'd seen in the decades prior to 2001.

Well, certainly a lot has happened since then, and maybe one of the most important decisions that our country made was to establish the U.S. Northern Command in October of 2002 and give that job at that time to General Ed Eberhardt, who, along with Admiral Tim Keating -- my two predecessors -- was tasked to shaped this new command and allow it to exercise a very diverse set of capabilities to defend the homeland but also to operate in support of civil authorities when disaster strikes.

At the same time, and importantly for our headquarters, the Department of Homeland Security was established. Twenty-two different organizations were pulled together, put under a new secretary, put under a new flag, if you will, and told to become a functioning organization also focused on the security of our nation. The relationship between our two headquarters and our two staffs was -- it was critical that it be successful, but it struggled in the early days with the friction of new institutions trying to grow into their own shoes and at the same time fight for resources and define responsibilities in a way that maintained the authorities and the protections of our Constitution while allowing us to be better defended against that kind of threat. And, as I said, a lot has happened since then,

and I'd like to take just a few minutes to talk a little bit about both NORAD and NORTHCOM and how we've evolved since 9/11, and then I'm going to try to jump into the future a little bit, because as you know we see a transition in government occurring. We see transition in my own -- among my international partners a transition in government occurring in Canada and all of those combined to change the playing field a bit as we move forward from today, given the threats that we see both to the homeland as well as to particularly areas like space and cyber and others and I'll try to talk up to those here in a few minutes.

Let me start with the bottom line up front. The number one priority for our commands, and both commands -- both NORAD and NORTHCOM -- is to defend the homeland, homeland for NORAD being two countries, Canada and the U.S., who have a great, proud tradition of working together in a military-to-military environment but have a unique bi-national relationship that is unlike, really, any other in the world. Because they are two interrelated commands, it made sense at the time, and still does, to designate a single commander as a dual-hatted commander. As Commander NORAD, I'm responsible for the warning of threats to our two nations, and as I'll talk a little about later, as Commander NORTHCOM, I'm responsible, then, for the U.S. national response to those warnings and for the support of civil authorities by the Department of Defense when disaster strikes.

Last May, NORAD celebrated its 50th anniversary, and in fact it is the longest standing bi-national agreement that we have, and, as I said, we have a tremendous relationship with our Canadian partners. This relationship continues to grow, and in fact two years ago we renegotiated the NORAD terms of reference and added the mission maritime warning to that role, or to that mission set, and that has some unique characteristics and requirements that I'll mention here in a little bit.

But let me talk about those three missions in, I guess, a more traditional order. First, aerospace warning, which has really grown. That mission has grown out of the cold war days. We were concerned about the Russian long-range bombers, and we needed to have some air defense force that could not only detect them but then interdict them before they could drop their nuclear weapons on either Canada or the U.S.

Prior to 9/11 NORAD focused, really, totally outside of our borders. We looked to external threats. Since that day, however, we now have a very close partnership with Transport Canada and the FAA in the United States, and we equally are focused on threats inside the borders of our country.

You may know on 9/11 there was an opportunity to interdict that last aircraft, Flight 93, as leaders in our government believe that there was an increasing number of aircraft. We've seen the results of one.

There was concern that that final aircraft was going to target Congress or somewhere important here in the D.C. area. We actually launched our NORAD alert fighters to try to run that aircraft down and, if necessary, intercept it and shoot it down if it were required. The pilots of those aircraft actually were not certain that they didn't have a relative on that airplane, so this mission of air sovereignty within our country has some unique aspects to it that we didn't quite understand at the time that that occurred.

Today, however, we have an active air defense force that looks both outside and is prepared to respond inside our borders, and we've coordinated that mission authority with both the U.S. and Canada so that both nations can feel comfortable that if it is required -- if it is required -- we have a credible military capability that could keep us from being struck by one of those same kinds of threats today. That requires an interagency level of confidence building that has become the hallmark of our commands -- and I'll talk a little bit about that coalition village that we've created here in just a bit.

The second of NORAD's missions is air space control, and that is the insurance of air sovereignty for our two countries, and again in the cold war days that was to find those Russian bombers. We still have that capability today, and, as you know, the Russians are flying their long-range aviation out, not so much that -- in terms of a threat to the U.S. but

being -- for us to be aware of any approaching aircraft to our air space that is not identified, not on an international flight plan, and whose intentions are unknown. This NORAD capability of aerospace superiority or sovereignty is something that we take advantage of on a routine basis. If necessary, NORAD does have the authorities, then, to bring decisive action and bring to bear military assets should they be required, and that is done with the authority of the leaders of both the United States and Canada.

Our third and newest mission, as I mentioned earlier, is that of maritime warning. It was added to our mission set in May 2006, and as with aerospace warning our goal is to detect threats to North America from the sea. We do that using existing sensors, and that really is a way to translate ships' radars and advanced information system reportings of commercial vessels as they transit the ocean and they intend to make port calls, and we try to build a common picture of vessels in the maritime domain as they move around the world so that if we have a threat that begins to develop, if intelligence points us towards someone who would try to use a ship at sea or a container aboard a ship as a threat to us, we can identify where that vessel is and interdict that, board it, search it, ensure that we've validated that there either is or is not a threat before the vessel continues. And to do that we work very closely with the Coast Guard, with our United States Navy and Air Force, air forces of both the U.S. and

Canada. But what do you do with that warning once a valid threat becomes a national mission, and I'll talk a little bit about that as we talk about the NORTHCOM role.

So, that's -- those are the three central missions of NORAD. They've been established for some period of time in most cases, maritime being certainly new. But they have allowed us to form a bond between two countries that has been the hallmark of our military relationship for quite some time.

Let me shift a little bit to our U.S. national mission, that of the U.S. Northern Command. As I mentioned earlier, the President created Northern Command at the recommendation of the Secretary after 9/11, because the Secretary thought it was time to have unity of command for all military aspects of homeland defense, as well as some good structure to provide defense support to civil authorities when disaster strikes.

NORTHCOM operates in a changing and uncertain environment. In fact, I was saying earlier that I had not a good appreciation or understanding of the complexity of the roles of NORAD and NORTHCOM's relationship and the missions associated with U.S. Northern Command until I took command there in Colorado Springs. It's a mission that has a very diverse set of partners.

I'll talk a little bit, in a few minutes, about my coalition village when I was at Central Command. Some of you may know, we built a

coalition village there prior to operations in Afghanistan that had nearly 70 nations, and it was an incredible picture to see the flags of each of those countries out there to support our Operation Enduring Freedom planning and execution. Today my coalition village has, I would call it, about 120 flags and they're not flags necessarily of nations, but they are partnerships with states, partnerships with federal agencies, partnerships with the services for sure, and certainly our three international partners that we work with on a day-to-day basis. But I'll come back to that in just a bit.

Our domains are all-encompassing -- land, sea, and air, as Pete mentioned, but space and cyberspace also are part of our domain, and while I'll talk a little bit about cyber later on, that cyber threat is very real and we are all dependent upon the network that brings us information for our livelihood every day. Interruptions to that, as we saw in the country of Estonia, can be devastating to a nation.

We also support our civil authorities upon the direction of the Secretary, and when Mother Nature does bad things to America and to its civilian population, the country expects that the Department of Defense, as well as the other agencies of our government, will be there to help them, and so recently, for example, the wild fires in California brought Department of Defense assistance with modular airborne firefighting aircraft that could put suppressant on the ground to help contain fires

while the ground firefighters could go in and put those out. They included support -- military support for the federal agencies that were responsible for security in and around the Democratic and Republican National Convention. We had a small joint task force that had emergency ordnance disposal or bomb detection dogs or those kinds of capabilities available should they be required because of a threat to one of those events.

Even smaller events like the collapse of the I-35 bridge in Minnesota about a year-plus ago allowed us to put DoD capability in the person of U.S. Navy salvage divers in on the ground to support the local sheriff, who was the on-scene commander, to recover the remains of those eight individuals who lost their lives in that bridge collapse and were unaccounted for. That capability doesn't exist anywhere in the world, and we owe that to our own communities to make that available should that be requested.

And so these kinds of things, as well as the support to Hurricane Gustav, Hurricane Hannah, Hurricane Ike, Hurricane Fannie this year, all characterize the kinds of support to civil authorities that Northern Command in coordination with federal agencies, in support of state governments, and in cooperation with the National Guard is available to provide.

You might have seen some pictures of patient evacuation

pre-landfall prior to Hurricane Gustav. What a great coalition effort of Guard and active aircraft, medical personnel, but also an international presence. The governor of Canada sent a C-17. In fact, the next to last aircraft out of New Orleans before the hurricane struck was a Canadian C-17 lifting the last of our critical care patients out of New Orleans. So, we've created this relationship based on our NORAD relationship with Canada, that NORTHCOM can begin to cooperate with our Canadian friends when disaster strikes as well.

Today, our nation's adversaries are unpredictable. They're diverse. They learn from unfolding events. They benefit from technologies and materials that are readily available because of the global economy, and they're not always military, as we know with the potential terrorist threats that there are around the world. And they don't follow our conventional laws of war, and so we have to be prepared for a broad variety of threats that can pop up or pop down not unlike the Whack-a-mole games that you see at a fair. Each day we have to have a set of number one priorities, and we have to be able to respond to any of those as they develop.

Globalization is creating opportunities for sure in industry. In fact, if you look across our businesses around the world, almost none of them are not partners with business entities from other nations. They are tied together, and that may not ever change. But globalization also

creates opportunities to accelerate the spread of disease, and so we plan for a pandemic event that could occur. Globalization may create access -- increased access for the precursors or ingredients of a weapon of mass destruction, and so we have to be prepared for an event that could occur and have a capability to respond, and I'll talk a little bit more about that later on.

It's imperative that everyone in NORTHCOM understand that our homeland defense is our number one priority -- our number one priority -- and that there are very real threats to that homeland but that we also don't necessarily control or command the resources necessary to meet those threats. We have to collaborate with a variety of federal partners in order to be effective with any of those. And so our mission is to anticipate those threats, and in fact we changed our mission statement shortly after I took command to add that word in to it, to "anticipate" and conduct homeland defense and civil support operations to defend and protect and secure the American homeland in all domains. That's a big mission statement. Some would say well, you're not resourced enough. Well, I think we are adequately resourced. In fact, we are doing very well in our resourcing. But we also owe the American public to not put a bill out there that is unreasonable, and so we've begun to shape a relationship with our federal partners and with the other military services that can move forces in and out of the NORTHCOM domain, if you will, to respond to

threats as we see them. If you anticipate, then you understand how to ask for the correct capability. And so we put a lot of effort into thinking about what might happen tomorrow or the next day or the next day so that we can be prepared if it does occur. And that includes, by that way, cooperation with all of the intelligence agencies on the terrorist threat to our nation, and we are active participants in the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI's joint terrorism task force, and a number of other intelligence agencies that allow us to keep abreast of those things that might be happening with the terrorist organization in the FATA region in Pakistan so that we can cooperate with our partners in law enforcement to ensure that that doesn't find its way into our nation.

Every day our command center monitors between 35 and 45 events around the United States that might require federal support -- might require federal support. Whether it's a train derailment of a chemical car or the movement of sensitive equipment around our country or it is a fire or an earthquake or a hurricane or a tornado, we maintain a close connectivity with the operation centers of the Department of Homeland Security and its supporting agencies, with law enforcement agencies around the country, and certainly with those of our international partners so that we can monitor the pulse of our nation, so that we can understand if there is a demand signal being generated and that we are in a position to respond hopefully before the request comes. And I think we can look at

the examples of the recent hurricanes as a measure of success that we were prepared before the hurricanes came, that we had support of the national government pre-landfall to provide assistance, and that we did that in a very aggressive fashion.

While we're not always asked for support, we always want to be ready. We always want to be in a position, and so monitoring that information on a routine basis is part of our daily battle rhythm. Understanding where events may occur allows us to be better prepared to respond. We call it leaning forward in the saddle. You know, that's kind of a cowboy thing out in Colorado, but we found that it is a great way to be in a position to succeed. It's key to us, because we don't want to be seen as pushing to be there too soon. We don't want to be seen as coming too late. And we certainly don't want to stay longer than is necessary to get the job done. But every day the armed forces of the United States has the capacity to assist its citizens and its communities. We must be ready to do that. We always must be ready to do that.

Recently we consolidated our operations centers into our single headquarters command and control facility, and it allows us now to go from warning to consequence management in a seamless command and control environment. It's a great step forward for us. It's something that we've been working on for quite some time at NORAD and NORTHCOM, and in that operations center we have components not just

from each of the DoD armed services but from some 45 other federal agencies who are integrated into our operations and planning team. They work in a collaborative fashion. We have a significant investment by those federal agencies and high-quality leaders who can come to us and bring not only their expertise in their history with that organization but their insights about the decision making for their federal agencies. And we can have, then, an active dialog with their leadership any time that may be needed.

We also have a NORTHCOM officer and a staff positioned in each of the ten FEMA regions. We call it a defense coordinating officer. That is a senior army colonel. Most have been brigade commanders. Most of them have combat experience. All of them understand how to collaborate with coalition partners. And so they work hand-in-hand with the FEMA region director to conduct detailed planning, gap analysis, and then initial command and control of DoD forces that may be used in the region. This hurricane season kept us pretty busy because of the nature of the multiple states being impacted in a short period of time. We had multiple defense coordinating officers backing each other up from different regions around the country.

Our area of responsibility has unique significance. It's different from the overseas commands, because it includes our homeland. It has unique constitutional limitations. We monitor every day the

activities that we are undertaking to ensure that they do not cross the boundaries of constitutional limitations of use of the military in the homeland. Trust me. I have 16 lawyers that stand around every day looking for nothing better than for us to push off into outside of the bounds of one of those limitations. But that troop of lawyers is extremely capable to ensure that we stay within the bounds of our constitution while leaning forward to help the citizens of our nation. As I mentioned, operating the homeland is unique. Political, economic, legal, and cultural challenges are very different than when you operate in an overseas command.

I mentioned my coalition village and those flags of 120 different partners. Those include 49 states and, as some of you know, there are -- each state, as all of you I'm sure know, each state is sovereign and unique. All of the states have unique challenges and certainly strong views on how the federal government could or should support them in a disaster. So, each of them requires a separate approach. We have longstanding relationships with the governors and the adjutants-general and the emergency managers in each of those states. I visit them on a routine basis. We spend time ensuring that as they plan, we plan in collaboration with them. We've created a capability interface with the State Joint Force Headquarters of the National Guard so that we share in the planning and the readiness evaluation and the understanding of their problems, and I point to the great support mentioned by Governor

Schwarzenegger to the California wildfires just in the last few months as an example. But in addition to those states, we've got the territories of the District of Columbia -- or the District of Columbia, I should say, and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. We also have 60 federal agencies, and I talked about that a moment ago, but these 60 federal agencies have invested liaison cells in our headquarters so that not only are they aware of what we do and how we think, but we understand how they operate and we collaborate in our planning. Each of those is a coalition partner that has unique skill sets, unique challenges, unique budgetary constraints, and with whom which we cannot succeed, and so we've got to find a way to collaborate every day. Certainly each of our military services, to include the Coast Guard, acts as a sovereign entity and a partner that we play with every day, as well as the National Guard Bureau, a unique organization that has helped to shape the capability of the National Guard for the future and one with which we interact on a routine basis multiple times a day. And I'm pleased to say that our partnership with the National Guard Bureau is better than it has ever been in our history. It's a pretty broad array of characters, each with its own capabilities and challenges, and we have to make sure that all of us are tied into this national response framework that is the underpinning of work in the homeland. Within that framework, which was published January of this year, we are one of a part of multi-layered local state, federal, and

private sector entities who are responsible in some way to be engaged when a domestic incident occurs.

We have taken the lexicon -- or taken the terminology of command and control out of our lexicon in NORAD and NORTHCOM. Certainly we exercise command and control of assigned forces, so my air defense force, my missile defense capabilities, my consequence management forces -- those all are commanded and controlled by NORTHCOM. But to get the mission accomplished, that's not the force that's going to do that in its entirety, and in fact it's only a very small part of this. So, we have to collaborate and communicate and coordinate and integrate with those 60 different agencies that I mentioned with those 50 states and territories that might be affected, with the multiple services and with the National Guard Bureau, and none of us own or command any of each other, if you will. So, we've got to create a means of collaboration that is very different than the traditional unified command structure that many of us are familiar with.

Our national defense strategy says that we as a nation must not only strengthen our military capabilities but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power to develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply the tools as needed. This really defines a different kind of jointness in our world in NORAD, in NORTHCOM.

Secretary Gates mentioned this to a degree a couple of

months ago in a speech when he talked about the investment that the nation has to make in soft power. Soft power is our power in the homeland. We have to be able to build collaborative efforts with our federal partners, with our international partners to be successful.

Now, I mentioned I'm going to look into the future just a little bit for you. As you know, in just a week and a half we will hold a national election. We will have a new administration. Certainly we will have a new commander-in-chief and a new Secretary of Defense. And so what will the -- how do we see that the future that is facing this new administration? The chairman has done a lot of great work to help think about those transition issues that are important to us, and I want to spend a moment or two, and we've collaborated heavily with the chairman but I want to spend a moment of two talking to you about some of those that are a little bit unique to the NORTHCOM area of interest.

One is the Arctic. As you know, there is a lot of discussion about the effects of warming in the Arctic. I can tell you only -- not being an expert, I can only tell you that the fact is there is more navigable water in areas of the Arctic than we've seen ever in the past. I can tell you that there is more transient of those navigable waters than we've seen in the past. In fact, in the last year, we've had seven cruise ships up there cruising in the area of Northern Alaska in the Northwest Passage. And so with more presence comes more need to have a clear and focused

strategy for how do nations operate in that region. There's ongoing discussion in the administration, and I hope it will continue to define what are our strategic interests? How do we partner with nations in the area? How do we see the emergence of resource markets in that region? Should there be a military strategy or not? Do we merely have presence? And then in my NORAD hat, how do I put the NORAD air sovereignty space surveillance missile defense umbrella over that in a way that supports the U.S. position as well as the positions of the Canadian government as they struggle with the same difficulty of defining where they want to move in the Arctic in the years beyond 2008.

So, our Arctic policy is one today that emphasizes environmental protection and sustainable development in human health, and those are all valid, but as we see the likelihood of more presence in that region, should we consider a change in the way we address the security of that region and how do we do it collaboratively with the other nations who are there? Certainly the U.S. has a strong interest in that region and is working collaboratively with the other nation partners, and it's something we would hope to continue to have a dialog in, in the coming days.

Within the Department of Defense, we also have to decide how do we -- if we have a responsibility there, how do we divide that responsibility, and the Unified Command Plan process for 2010 will give

us the opportunity to look at which combat commanders have the best capability to operate in that region.

A little closer to home, one of our concerns is the potential for a chemical, biological, radiological, or high-yield explosive event, and as some of you may know, we were assigned forces this year for the first time, and today we have -- I'm please to say we have a Consequence Management Response Force that is formed, trained, and equipped and ready to respond to an event like a weapon of mass destruction attack and is assigned to NORTHCOM for the first time in history.

Now, some would say that this has significant implications with respect to the policy of posse comitatus. This force is not a legal -- a law enforcement force. This force is not designed to use military to suppress in any way. It is a force designed to respond to the needs of a community if one of these events occurs. And so we have worked hard over the last six months to train this force. It is assigned to U.S. Army North and to U.S. Northern Command and has a capability on a very short notice to respond anywhere in the country in the event of a weapon of mass destruction attack.

I'm pleased we'll grow two more of those forces over the coming years. They're about 4500 to 5000 in total, and they are very, very capable at managing the consequences in a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. We don't know when those will occur. I believe the

threat is real. We certainly hope the likelihood is not very high. But we owe the nation the capability to respond should one of those threats come to reality.

We have a commitment from the department, as I said, for two more of those forces. We'll continue to build those over the next two years so that by 2011 -- fiscal year 2011 -- we will have three capable, trained consequence management response forces ready to deploy should they be needed to support national policy.

Let me turn to our international partners for just a moment. We have a wonderful relationship both with Canada and Mexico. Let me spend a minute about with Mexico and then I'll talk a bit about Canada.

The next administration will be certainly looking at how to strengthen the partnerships that we have with Mexico, and my view is that the strength of our homeland defense is also a function of how well we integrate with our partners to the north and to the south. We continue to grow a stronger military-to-military relationship with our friends in Mexico. We certainly respect Mexico's sovereign concerns and its interest in a good neighbor relationship, and we work to expand that in any opportunity we can. The current Building Partnership Capacity Initiative with Mexico for improved emergency preparedness capabilities along our border must continue. The Merida Initiative, which was a great first step in our growing support to Mexico as they fight their fight against narco-terrorism, has put

a good start of money -- $400-plus million -- approved in the '08 supplemental to assist with the counternarcotics effort in Mexico, but also it allows for their military to grow in some capacity to assist the government in this difficult fight. We should continue that support for Merida, and we work very aggressively and closely with the Department of State and with the Department of Defense so that we keep that on the forefront of our future investment.

I've encouraged Congress also to enact those authorities outlined in Section 1206 of the 2009 NDAA. These are focused on building partnership capacity of our friendly military forces, and they will allow for greater capabilities for Sedena and Somar, the two principal military arms of the Mexican armed forces, to assist its government in its counterterrorism, counternarcotics efforts. The current Mexican administration is keenly focused on this challenge, and our military-to-military ties with the Army and the Navy support that in every way possible.

We have a Mexican officer on our staff from the Mexican navy, and we are growing so that we will have a Mexican army officer and hopefully Mexican air force officer visiting -- I mean, joining us soon.

Mexico has supported the U.S. and, as you may know, the Mexican army, navy, and air force helped us during the Katrina response. In fact, it was the first Mexican military unit to operate on our soil since

1846. It's not just mil-to-mil that we are engaged with, however. We hosted a number of members of the Mexican parliament, the Mexican assistant secretary, the Mexican deputy attorney general -- all to show the importance of the inter-agency approach that we use at NORTHCOM everyday. It's clear that they learned a lot from that. They're eager to learn more. They want to keep this relationship close. And the mutual benefit and mutual respect we've created are going to allow us to make that even better.

We've also got to continue the support we NORTHCOM -- of our military -- of our law enforcement, I'm sorry, agencies on the U.S. side of the border. We have a joint task force in South Texas that is focused on military support to our law enforcement agencies, and they work every day to assist the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Patrol, and a variety of other law enforcement agencies in the challenge against drugs, illegal drugs trafficked into our country, and money laundering and weapons movement that may be going out of our country to Mexico. This is an important effort for the Department of Defense, but it is a supporting effort, and so we are providing logistics. We're operating sensors. We are providing support to those law enforcement officers, making their job just a bit easier as they conduct this tough mission.

I mentioned Canada. We certainly can't neglect our northern border, and, as you know, Canada has been a longstanding partner. They

have a special event coming soon. In 2010, they will host the Vancouver Winter Games, and that will have a huge impact on certainly the Canadian national identity. But, as you also know, the Vancouver-Seattle area is almost joined together in terms of its economic relationships, its movement of workers back and forth across the border. It is a seamless process there that certainly will be impacted by those games. We're working very closely with the government of Canada, with Canada Command, who is our NORTHCOM counterpart, to prepare for any support that the U.S. might be asked to provide in the buildup to the winter games. Certainly in NORAD we'll have a role of air sovereignty for both nations as these events occur.

Canada has gone through an unprecedented period of growth in its military in terms of modernization of equipment, of increase in size, in its forces, and certainly its contributions to our operations overseas. But, importantly, they continue to remain absolutely committed to the NORAD relationship and to the expansion and cooperation between Canada Command and U.S. Northern Command. They are a great partner, and they are committed to be our partner for as far into the future as I can see.

Finally, I'd just like to speak a minute about cyber. Cyber defense is a big deal. Multiple agencies have been given a role in this. Money has been applied to it, but we are still in the early stages of

understanding not only the threat but how you counter that, not just for the military, not just for that dot-mil environment, but for the dot-com and the dot-gov and all those other networks out there that we rely on to operate every day. It's a huge challenge for us. It's one that we need to continue to work aggressively on. It is not a single-service or single-agency solution out there. We all have to work collaboratively. And today I know our Department of Defense is working hard on this. Department of Homeland Security has established a portion of the agency there to deal with this. They are building and growing that capacity, but it's one that we have to continue to stay focused on. We only have to look at Estonia to see an example of the effect of a cyber attack, what effect a cyber attack may have on even a small state, like that one.

Well, I've spent a good bit of time talking about our commands. I've talked a little bit about what the future may be like. NORTHCOM, as I mentioned, was a creation of the 9/11 security structure. We're concerned and engaged with both the defense and the civil support in our homeland. But as a new administration moves forward, it will have to decide if that national security structure is correct. There's been a lot written about a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency. There's been a lot written about single or multiple homeland defense and national security agencies. Those will be issues that a new administration will have to take on. The Department of Defense is working actively to try to frame

some of the challenges for us so that a new administration, whoever it might be, will have an ability to understand these 21st century challenges in a way that they can be effective in the early days of the administration.

Finally, I'd just say that we believe very strongly that in order to move in a direction we have to have a vision that makes sense, and we worked over the last year to publish our vision 20/20, and one of the key principles of that is contained in just a small phrase, and it says we must always -- we must constantly challenge the way it is in favor of the way it ought to be, and we look at this every day as we try to anticipate the kind of threats that might develop, the kinds of challenges we may have to face, and the kinds of capability we'll need to respond. We think we're being innovative. We think we're being forward leaning. We think we're looking at this in a way that is right for the nation, and we'll continue to stay committed to that on into the future.

I know Brookings is devoted to innovative policy solutions. We think we are an innovative policy solution. It came about after 9/11. We always will get better. We can't rest on where we've been. We always have to move toward where we ought to be, and I appreciate the opportunity to share a little bit of that with you today and look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

MR. SINGER: Can you hear me now? All right, great.

Well, General, again, thank you for a real definitive down-

briefing on both the mission and some of the opportunities, some of the challenges. What I'd like to do is I'll open up with a question and then turn to the audience here.

One thing I found interesting is you talked about the difference between your expectations and understandings that you had, for example, when you were working for SECDEF when you moved into the role and there was much different things there, particularly as it relates to NORAD. Now that you're within the structure, leading the structure, what do you see as the biggest misconceptions about NORTHCOM, and in particular we could maybe break it down in terms of public understanding versus policymaker understanding. What are the things that people aren't getting that they really do need to get?

GEN. RENUART: Well, I think probably the -- from the public's perspective, I think that there are assumptions by all of our citizens that there are many, many different agencies focused on homeland security and homeland defense. I think that they would be surprised to see that the effort is much more unified than some expect. One of the challenges that I saw going to NORTHCOM was -- I'll call them the gaps of Katrina. The gaps of Katrina were -- in my view, were characterized by a lack of integrated planning among all the participants, some institutional friction that lived -- or that existed among departments. There was perceived competition for resources. And what I found was

organizations that really wanted to do the right thing but didn't quite know how to effect it. So, we began very early on to craft the relationships between the senior leaders of the appropriate agencies and create a personal relationship built on trust that allowed us to then take our institutions a step or two further than maybe they were prepared to go. And so today the lessons of Katrina, the lack of prior planning, the lack of integration, the lack of confidence among the participants I think has been greatly overcome.

I mentioned the routine activity that we have with the Department of Homeland Security. We participate in daily conferences, video conferences, with their operations center. I talk to the senior leaders within the department and within FEMA on a daily or weekly basis and sometimes multiple times in a day, depending on what events are unfolding. That didn't exist in that same way. That wasn't part of the institutional culture of the organization -- not because anybody was bad, but because the institutions hadn't grown in their own mission to the point where they were comfortable doing that. Everybody was struggling, trying to solve their own internal problems. I think we're beyond that today.

I think the other thing that amazed me when I arrived is that it's very difficult to say that one particular problem is your number one problem. I mentioned air sovereignty. I mentioned space surveillance. I mentioned missile defense. I mentioned hurricanes and fires and

earthquakes and all of those things, and on any given day one or two of them or three of them will all be there in the national field of view, there in the media, there affecting our citizens. And so we don't have the luxury to say well, today our highest priority is air sovereignty, because today you can have an earthquake occur and the nation will ask us to respond in that regard. So, it's that complexity every day that I was most surprised with. And I don't think our citizens in the United States quite realized that. Most that come to visit with us are very surprised at the broad range of areas we deal with every day and the implications. The bridge collapse in Minnesota is a great example. You wouldn't normally say that's a national disaster, but it took national forces in order to bring that to conclusion. And that's what we have to be in a position to do for our community.

MR. SINGER: And is your sense there's an overlap between what the public is maybe seeing or not seeing there in terms of the policymakers? Like, when you deal with Congress or OSD, and not asking to name names but are there the similar kinds of misconceptions?

GEN. RENUART: Well, I think -- I think in many ways the American public were captured by the image of Katrina, and that left an impression that there were big disconnects, and certainly members of Congress were concerned about that. And so we set on very early to ease those concerns and demonstrate the fact that we have learned from those gaps. So, I think the difference between when I took command a

year and a half ago and where we are today is significant, because there is a higher level of confidence based on demonstrated performance, and you can talk about how well you do things, but until you do them, most people don't quite believe, and so we had to change the culture in our command that would anticipate -- made a huge difference -- and then we had to deliver on that promise, and so far we've continued to do that to a level that we are seeing both policymakers and private citizens express confidence that we have come a long way since that time of Katrina.

MR. SINGER: Fantastic.

Now, what I'd like is wait for the microphone to come to you, and when you introduce yourself stand up and let us know your question. So, right here in the front.

MR. McMICHAEL: Hi, General. Bill McMichael, *Military Times* newspapers. General Chilton has said that the responsibility for cyber defense of the United States lies with the strategic command in terms of the mil and smil realms and that the remainder lies with the Department of Homeland Security. How does NORTHCOM interrelate with STRATCOM in that regard and DHS, and how do you deconflict those sorts of -- those sorts of things? How do you all coordinate that?

GEN. RENUART: That's a great question, and I guess, like many of you, we are a consumer of both the dot-mil and the dot-gov, dot-edu, dot.com environments. The organizations that we deal with every

day most frequently do not live in the dot-mil domain, and so, yes, General Chilton is exactly correct. U.S. Strategic Command has the responsibility for the protection of the dot-mil domain. Department of Homeland Security does have the responsibility for those dot-gov organizations and some others. And we work in both. And so we become a demand signal, if you will, for them, and we work very closely with both General Chilton's team and Assistant Secretary -- Deputy Secretary Schneider in the Department of Homeland Security as they are shaping their capacity to provide defense support of operations in those other domains. But we become a user of their capabilities, and so just like we have to define the requirements to the Department of the Air Force for the next generation tanker, for example, we have to define our requirements for security to both Strategic Command and to DHS and work with them on the integration and execution of the plan to provide that security. But we are no different, really, from one of the other military unified commands in that we rely on STRATCOM to provide us that expertise and support. The services will provide them the individuals trained, and then if it's not working for us, I mean, we owe them the feedback to say, you know, we need to adjust. The unique piece with us is we also have to do the same with the Department of Homeland Security, and I am excited about the opportunities there, because they are really working hard on this. It's something that continues to have a funding requirement that the nation will

have to deal with, but I think in terms of the relationships between the two commands, we're pretty comfortable with that, and we continue to be aggressive in defining the requirements so that it's captured in whatever the product will be that provides added security, added defense.

MR. McMICHAEL: If that's the case, it sounds as though there's some redundant capability there. Why is there that need to even share -- why is there that overlap? Why not just leave those responsibilities with DHS and STRATCOM?

GEN. RENUART: Well, I'm not sure I understand where you say there's redundancies. We're a user of the capability. But both of those organizations, if you will, are the operators that create the defensive capability for the different networks. There will be overlap in terms of the kinds of technologies that may be used certainly, and it makes sense for us to have some common protocols in that environment, but from us -- for example, when I deal in a disaster response, we live heavily on the HSIN network, which is Homeland Security's information network. On the other hand, many of the military forces that are provided to me live in the dot-mil/dot-smil environment, so I have to be able to collaborate with both, and in fact one of the challenges is to create collaborative tools that can walk across both domains but maintain the security of both at the same time, and that's some of the advances that we're working with. So, we establish that need. They then will begin to develop the products that will give us

that secure capability. Is that helpful? Okay.

MR. SINGER: Right in front.

SPEAKER: Reejay Milicon and Nuclear Energy Institute. First of all, I want to thank you for your longstanding service to the nation.

My question is a threat --a homeland security threat, especially an aviation-based threat, would have a very short lead time -- could have very short lead time for (inaudible) it's a crisis (inaudible) to make decisions. And what is the -- is that decision with the governor or is that the Executive Branch or who makes -- because it might be a situation -- there might not be the time for the coordination -- coordination and all that in a real sharp notice type of (inaudible).

GEN. RENUART: That's a great question and one I get often, and I -- you talk about some misperceptions out there and let me try to help with that a little bit.

First, every day -- every day -- there is a network of ground-based radar and other sensors that are out there to help us identify who is in our air traffic. And at this minute, right now, there are probably 7 to 8,000 aircraft operating in just U.S. national air space. We have to have a system that can categorize them, correlate their track. We look at intelligence to see if someone is trying to use an aircraft as a threat. And so the vigilance every day is significantly more active than it ever was before 9/11.

Second, we maintain an alert force at a number of locations around the country capable of responding to any one of those targets, and our goal is to do that within less than 20 minutes. Not always the case, but that's the goal we try.

Third -- and then can -- that -- those aircraft could characterize the type of airplane we see, how is it behaving, will the pilot respond to visual signals, and the like.

Third -- we -- for some selected areas, we have a capability to provide additional ground-based air defense for key protected areas. When you lay all that together, the warning time, if you will, of someone who is deviating from the established flight plan is -- it's not quite just the matter of seconds. You have some amount of time to assess what that aircraft might be doing, and then we have a decision matrix of certain characteristics that might lend us to a decision that it is someone that has hostile intent versus just a pilot who's lost. And I can tell you every day we identify an aircraft like that, and fortunately every day it has been a pilot who has been, you know, not aware that they were doing something inappropriate. But the good news for the country is we are out visually identifying and, you know, getting control of those aircraft on a routine basis.

Now, there is certainly a possibility of a very short notice event occurring. We have a command and control process that can get

decisions made in a very short period of time. If necessary, I have the authority to make a determination on those aircraft if I'm not able to reach one of the senior national leaders of our government. But we practice and exercise this on a weekly basis. On a daily basis we have aircraft that are not doing something they should. So, this is not something that will just pop up in a month that we haven't practiced. We do this almost every day, and we have specific exercises that test against the most demanding circumstances at least once a month. So, I actually am very comfortable, and I would want the American public to be very comfortable that we've come a long way since those days of 9/11 and that we are very focused on aircraft inside our air space -- the continental United States air space and in Canada -- that are not complying with the established rules whether they forget to talk on the radio or they change their transponder to a wrong code. All of that is immediately available to us. We have TSA and FAA that live in our operations center, so they can -- and an example -- about a month after I took the job, we had a foreign flag air cargo aircraft that stopped talking on the radio and was heading to a heavily built-up area, and within minutes we had -- we could trace the origin of the airplane, we knew what the cargo should have been aboard, we knew what the passenger manifest of that aircraft was, and then we launched air defense fighters to intercept it prior to it reaching, you know, a built-up area where it could have been a threat. And it turned out to be a simple mechanical

failure. But we were able to go to our Transportation Safety Administration, to our FAA, and begin to build information on that aircraft so that it's not just a blind decision but it's an informed decision on what the intention might be.

I'm sorry, a long answer to that question.

SPEAKER: Even if they turned off the transponders, your processors would still work.

GEN. RENUART: Absolutely.

SPEAKER: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SINGER: Let me ask a follow-up question to that, which is as we potentially shift to the 21st century air traffic control system integrating GPS versus using radar, how does -- what are the sort of challenges that that presents?

GEN. RENUART: That's a great question, because there is a strong desire to move away from fixed radar sites -- because they're expensive and the logistic support is significant -- to a GPS-based system. Well, that is a great capability for what I call compliant targets. But if you're noncompliant, it's less capable. So, we are working very aggressively with the FAA and other agencies to have an integrated approach. We'll take advantage of GPS, but we don't want to trade away all of the non-cooperative detection capabilities that would allow us to find that person who just turned his GPS off. And the FAA understands that

challenge and is working with us on this, but we've still got a little bit more work to do both in terms of technology and then integration to make sure. And in the meantime, we will keep that robust fixed radar capability until we've bridged the gap into the next generation.

MR. SINGER: Another question. Back there.

GEN. RENUART: You have one way in the back?

MR. SINGER: Right there, yeah. Holding their hand up, yeah.

SHARON: Hi, my name's Sharon. I'm with the Congress now. I was just curious. You mentioned in your talk a couple of things you encourage Congress to do, but what are the most important things, from your perspective, that the next Congress and administration will be up against security-wise and what will you be watching out for?

GEN. RENUART: Wow. I think -- and I'll really talk, really, just from my area of interest, because it would be unfair to speculate for other combatant commands on their behalf. For me, continuing the momentum that we have supporting our partners in Mexico is important for -- and Congress to support that, and I think there is good support out there. But that's an area that if we are able to assist Mexico in their fight against the narco-traffickers, that benefits us and is a real security plus.

Second, we talked about technology. A number of our -- a number of the elements of our warning sensor network are beginning to

age, and so we have a number of initiatives in place. The Secretary and the Department are supportive of those, and I think it's important for -- and I think Congress is supportive of that as well, but we want to continue that support so that we can modernize those fixed radars that not only exist in our country but along the northern tier or Canada and Alaska that provide us external warning outside. We need to look at new technologies that allow us to take advantage of what I call passive detectors. You don't have to have a fixed radar site, but you can look at over-the-horizon technology, space-based technology, and others to integrate the picture for warning and defense. And, again, those are initiatives that are built in to our budget, and so I'm really not so much concerned that Congress add new things; it's that they continue the support that we've had for some of these initiatives already, and I think if we're able to do that and sustain that then we'll be in good shape.

MR. SINGER: We'll all go check our stock portfolios today and see if that's the case.

Another question right down in front.

MR. OSGOOD: General, I'm Carl Osgood. I write for *Executive Intelligence Review*. Just the fact that the military has a relationship with law enforcement is enough to make a lot of people nervous. So, there's two aspects of this -- of NORTHCOM's relationship with U.S. law enforcement that I'd like to ask you about. One is how does

NORTHCOM see its role in the event of a civil disturbance, let's say a repeat of the Los Angeles riots in 1992, that sort of event? And, secondly, could you talk a little bit about -- more about intelligence sharing between NORTHCOM and law enforcement. I mean domestic intelligence. I don't mean what NORTHCOM gets from outside the country. What goes on inside the country.

GEN. RENUART: Let me -- let me take the second first and I guess characterize it this way. We have -- there is a -- there are very specific provisions for intelligence oversight, and as they apply to NORTHCOM within the homeland, we have very, very precise guidelines on information that may come to us about U.S. persons, and we are not allowed to maintain any of that information. That has to be given to law enforcement agencies. And I say may come into our possession -- oftentimes, in fact most cases, this is as a result of -- as we look outside the country we may get some information on a potential U.S. person. That immediately goes to law enforcement, and we are not allowed to maintain any of that information. And we're very careful about that, because we have built a level of confidence in our country that we are supportive of our nation's policies and the Constitution, and we want to be -- we are oversensitive in terms of this. In fact, a couple of times after the fact, we found that we actually had some authority we didn't realize, but we didn't want to kind of bridge that gap. This is a concern that is a valid one in our

nation, and we are extremely sensitive to that. We do support law enforcement agencies, but not in the intelligence gathering in any way. We provide them -- for example, sensor operators that run cameras along the border, for example. That information goes directly to our law enforcement people. We certainly participate in the National Counterterrorism Center -- the Joint Terrorism Task Force -- because we are looking for external threats that be attempting to come to the United States, not focusing on internal threats, and we work very hard to build a good relationship with the various law enforcement agencies, and, frankly, early on they were concerned about this issue, because they felt that somehow DoD would be infringing upon their role in this area. And I'm pleased to say that our relationship with all of those law enforcement agencies is very, very good, because we have made a conscious effort not to get close to the legal constraints that are set up for use of DoD resources in this area.

Then I think the other piece I'd say is that the fact that those law enforcement agencies have invested in senior, experienced individuals to work in our headquarters signals to me that they do believe that relationship is a good one, and so I'm very comfortable there right now. And the American people ought not to be concerned that somehow we are being pulled into that area that you mentioned earlier where there is -- there might be concern. We've been very careful in that regard.

MR. SINGER: Okay, let's get one more question. Right there.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) Defense Analysis. General, I thank you very much for your (inaudible) remark and (inaudible) your (inaudible) Arctic policy, and you ask question how should you collaborate. My question is (inaudible) Arctic policy and Canada and Denmark. Russia also indicated interest in those region. My question is what is pro and con of engaging (inaudible) between U.S. and Canada which you are dual-hatted through NORAD in contrast (inaudible), including Denmark, because Denmark after all have one of the largest (inaudible) company, A.P. Muller . I'm interested in your views on this comment. Thank you.

GEN. RENUART: Well, I -- let me first say with respect to our relationship with Canada, our NORAD relationship allows us a great venue to have good discussion about what are the security implications of increased presence of anyone in the Arctic area. In the early days of NORAD we were really focused on Russian aircraft that flew over the Pole to threaten our countries. Today that's a routine air traffic route for most of the large airlines in the world. Today we see increased both research and commercial traffic in that region. Certainly the Arctic has at least the potential for some significant natural resource exploration, and this year we have ships from I believe seven different nations who have done a variety of exploration missions into the Arctic.

So, the question, then, is what are each nation's strategic interests and how do you collaborate with that? One of the important elements is to have an open dialog on these issues, and all of the combatant commanders have expressed their support to Congress for the U.N. Law of the Sea provisions in that agreement, and we hope that that will be ratified so that we can have an active seat at the table with each of the Arctic exploring nations. And I think that's a positive -- that will be a positive development for us.

In terms of the U.S. and Canada, we have some differences over definitions of things like inland waterways or national waters. Those things will be decided between the governments, and I think we have to make sure that we keep the military-to-military discussions focused on how do we best support the needs of our populations in that area, and right now that is in search and rescue and in maintenance of navigable waterways. A lot of that is done through the Coast Guard today. But certainly with our NORAD hat we do have an airborne presence up in that region as well.

With respect to the other nations, I'm not really an expert enough to be able to give you a real statement of fact or opinion. Certainly, Denmark -- Russia as you mentioned and others have an interest in that region. All have made some claims in international forums to some of that. Those are all in discussion, negotiation, litigation, and I

think our real role is to be prepared for whatever comes of that so that we provide an opportunity for safe and secure operations in that very difficult region.

MR. SINGER: Well thank you.

I have three things here to say. The first is to thank all of you for joining us and let you know about an upcoming event. It'll be on November 20th. We'll be hosting a special sneak preview of the new *24* movie for a discussion about the interface between what's shown on screen and what happens in reality.

The second is we want to thank you, today, for providing an absolutely fantastic presentation, an informative one that I think we all will walk away from knowing a lot more.

And then, third, I think we want to echo what the gentleman said, which is to thank you collectively for the service that you and your command is providing this nation.

So, please join me in a round of applause.

GEN. RENUART: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Great. Appreciate the opportunity.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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