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THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PASCUAL: My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm one of the Vice Presidents at Brookings and the Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program here, and it's a real pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this discussion today to give us an opportunity to both learn from and question our colleagues from outside of the United States.

We've given this session the title The U.S. Presidential Election: Observations from the Outside Looking In, and we're going to start here from the outside looking in from Australia, and the outside looking in from France, and the outside looking In from Japan. But if there are others here from other countries, we're going to welcome the outside looking in from your perspectives as well.

Let me just say a couple of opening things and then turn after that to one of my colleagues, Michael Fullilove here at the table. Many of you may have recently seen a program that was broadcast on CNN -- it was a CNN-Gorge Washington University where they had five former secretaries of state -- and so at the table were Colin Powell and Secretary Albright, and Jim Baker, and Henry Kissinger, and Warren Christopher. And Christiana Amanpour began the discussion with Colin Powell and said you run into the president at the inaugural ball, and he says to you, "Hey, Colin, you know, what do I need to worry about the next day?"

And the expectation of the audience was what's he going to say? Is he going to say Afghanistan? Is he going to say China? And he said, "Leadership." And he said, "The only way that you can succeed is if you rebuilt credibility in American leadership. And the only way that you can restore credibility in American leadership is if we listen and if we create partnership, because we are in a world that we cannot actually sustain this alone. We are in a world which requires us to work in conjunction with others and where partnership now means leadership."

And it was quite a shock, actually, for the audience, and what was even more shocking was the other four secretaries of state said, "You know? We agree with Colin." And so we're coming back to the session here to not only get a perspective from our colleagues about what it looks like, what these elections look like from the outside looking in, but also to begin to explore this question of leadership and American leadership and what it means for the future, because the ability of the United States to lead is going to be fundamentally tied to our ability to work with other partners and understanding, understanding what those partners are looking for from the United States both in the context of the direct bilateral relationships that we might have, the regional priorities that they set, or in other cases it may be the global priorities that we set; and this is all going to happen at a time when we had more problems on the global stage than we've probably ever seen in recent history.

We see it in part because of the financial crisis, and we see the linkages between the financial crisis and politics, we see the impacts that this has on the institutions of governance, and we see the impact that it has to even be able to deal with some of the short-term crises that we might face, whether they be Iraq or Iran, Afghanistan or the Middle East Peace Process. And just simply the daunting reality that on Day One, on January 20th of next year, the 44th President of the United States is going to walk into his office, and that in-box is going to be filled up to here, and everybody's going to say, you got to pick priorities, and everybody is going to look at each other and is going to say, Wow, what do I take off?

And so again, the only way I think we're going to be able to deal with this is through this concept of partnership and leadership.

In order to get at this topic, we've got three outstanding colleagues here from the Brookings Institution. We're going to start with Michael Fullilove, and Michael is from the Lowy Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy and has been with us for the past few months and has been an observer and a commentator on American politics for quite some time.

He joins us from the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. He's been a former advisor to Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating. Many of you may often read him in The Financial Times of the IHT. I said to him quite jealously the other day, "How in the world do you get yourself published so often?" But he has been quite a

tremendous commentator in international politics.

After that will be Justin Vaisse, and Justin is on a return trip to the Brookings Institution. He previously served here before as a Fellow on an exchange program that we have with France. He's now here as a Senior Fellow at Brookings. He is an expert on Islam and Europe. He wrote an outstanding book on Islam in France before. He has just written a book, a tremendous book on neo-conservatism in the United States, and so we'll bring his perspectives of working as an advisor in the French Foreign Ministry, but someone who has been a student of American politics.

And then we'll have Keiko Iizuka, who is the deputy political editor for the Yomiuri Shimbun. And Keiko's been the chief correspondent in the prime minister's office. She's been one of the leading authors for a newspaper on U.S./Japan relations and Japan/China relationships. She's written quite a lot and studied quite a lot the issues of North Korea and nuclear security, and so will help us be able to get a handle on what some of those issues are, specifically in the U.S.\Japan alliance and what it's going to take to be able to build confidence.

So with that introduction let me stop and turn to Michael.

MR. FULLILOVE: Well, thank you, Carlos. Thank you for the introduction, thank you for the plug from our opinion routing, The Answer. My answer to Carlos is a question about how you get published,

of course, is shameless self-promotion.

Carlos, the world, I think, is watching this election. The contest is being followed as closely outside America as it is within America. I think all of it -- speeches, vice presidential peaks, debates -- is being dissected in blogs and op-ed columns in every language. We all know more about Wasilla and Wilmington than we ever suspected we might.

Now, why does the world care so much? Partly it is as Carlos mentioned, the scale of the challenges facing the next president. Bloody conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, a cooling economy, newly confident competitors, financial collapse, a warming planet. A lot is at stake. But more than that I think it's because the idea of America -- democratic, optimistic and meritocratic -- continues to fascinate.

And I'm an optimist about these. And it seems to me that the nominations of both John McCain and Barak Obama play directly into this theme: They demonstrate the remarkable openness and flexibility of the American political system and its receptivity to talent.

McCain is a war hero and a maverick who is accordingly hated by many Republicans on Capital Hill and K Street.

Obama is an African-American, a gifted newcomer who bested the Democratic dynasty that dominated democratic politics for nearly two decades; and African-American who has so far defied the predictions of

the armies of pundits who say that Americans would never vote for a black man.

So each of these men in a way embody the finest aspects of this country, and I think that's part of the attraction for the world in watching these elections.

I would like to touch on three things in my comments. First of all, what do Australians think about the election? Secondly, do your kind of leadership pallets, what kind of leadership do Australians expect from the next president? And finally, I want to turn it and ask what kind of leadership the next president should expect from the rest of the world.

First of all on what Australians and the rest of the world thinks. I can tell you -- let me make a confession to you. The last eight years have been pretty tough for an Australian Americaphile like me as President Bush sloughed off natural allies, as he squandered his international influence, as he initiated the Iraq war, as he ratcheted up anti-Americanism around the world.

Australia has a claim to being the most reliable of all United States allies -- with respect to my colleagues on the panel -- the only country to fight beside the United States in every major conflict of the 20th and 21st centuries. And yet when the Lowy Institute did a poll in 2004 and we asked Australians to rank threats to Australia's national security, you will be amazed to hear that the same percentage of Australians scored

U.S. foreign policy as a threat to Australia's national security as scored Islamic fundamentalism. It was a startling equivalence that scored us a hit on *The New York Times* front page for all the wrong reasons, I'm afraid to say. That's the bad news.

I think the good news is that the instant the next president is inaugurated, the country's soft power account will start to look much healthier. If it's McCain, I think his personal story, his character, and his principled opposition to the darker trappings of Bush foreign policy -- Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, water boarding and all the rest -- will stand him in good stead.

But I think we also have to be realistic and say it is absolutely clear that Obama's election would shift international perceptions of America further, especially in the regions where threats coalesce. There is no other presidential candidate in history who could reminisce as Obama does when he describes is childhood years in Indonesia about the feel of packed mud on the bare feet "as I wander through paddy fields." This is a kind of American story that the world has never seen.

Now, Australia is as gripped by Obama-lovin' as everyone else. In our poll that we released a couple of weeks ago, 73 percent of Australians favored Obama, 16 percent favored McCain, which is a remarkable ratio.

How to explain it? I think it is mainly fatigue with the current

administration and its way of doing things. A concern that Washington has departed from the post-World War II practice of projecting its influence through other countries and through institutions, not only by itself. I think there is a hunger for intellectual curiosity in the White House after eight years of an impatient president who Bob Woodward tells us, informs briefers, "Speed it up, this isn't my first rodeo."

I argue in a paper that we're releasing today, Hope and Glory: The Presidential Election and U.S. Foreign Policy" available at all good bookstores or indeed a table outside the door. That McCain would be more unilateral than Obama, more prone to using force, more focused on interstate competition, more confrontational towards America's adversaries. And I think, at base, many Australians wonder if that's what we all need at this particular point in the world's history.

So that's what Australians think.

Secondly, what do Australians want? I think there are a number of specific issues on which Australian policymakers are looking to Washington and one general issue. Let me mention, just touch on a couple of specific ones. I think Canberra is asking what kind of relationship the next president will want with old allies like Australia. Under the public perception in Washington is that Obama is more alliance-friendly. But I think in relation to the Asia-Pacific it's McCain who is more alliance-focused. It's a complicated question and may be one we can

return to in the Q&A.

Secondly, I think we are looking for a president who understands that America is strongest when it is open to the world, not only on foreign policy but also on economics. And so I have to say that some of Obama's trade rhetoric is a concern for Canberra. Of course, the operative question on free trade is not which candidate is purer but who can more effectively turn down the protectionist impulses of the next Congress, and I think on that issue the judgment is not yet in.

Thirdly, I think Australia is looking for the kind of Asia policy that the next president will run. There are lots of commonalities, I think, between Obama and McCain on this. I think, for example, both would maintain the strategic presence in Asia which certainly Australia and Japan is very keen on. But I think there are lots of differences, and I'll mention two of them:

On China, I think both Obama and McCain hold to what we could call the Spider Man Doctrine, that with China's great power comes great responsibility. I think both of them advocate a strategy that combines engagement with balancing. But I also think that Obama is closer to the engagement end of the spectrum which is where most Australians see it.

Secondly, I think Australians are intrigued to meet a presidential candidate in Senator Obama with a rich understanding of Indonesia. Australian governments have tried over the many years to get Washington

to pay proper attention to Indonesia, which is after all the world's largest Muslim country, a thriving democracy, as well as being our nearest neighbor to the north. So to have somebody like Obama, if he's elected, who spent some of his formative years in Indonesia, presents us with a real opportunity.

So there are lots of specific issues like that, but I think to come back to the question that you put, Carlos, I think more than any of those specific kind of Australia's specific issues, Australians are looking to the grand strategy that the next president will run. And here I think it's about lessons that the next president takes from the Card One.

During George Bush's second term, U.S. foreign policy has undergone a difficult shift from the unilateralism of the first term to the more multilateral approach of the second term, from a more ideological program to one that relies on pragmatism, from an overreliance on force to a more balanced array of approaches. And I think all of us believe it would be very unfortunate if America if America were to unlearn those lessons in the transition to a new president.

I don't think on the available evidence that there's much risk of that happening under a President Obama, but I think many Australians ask, what about in the case of a President McCain, who would not, after all, be a lame duck but a newly-elected hawk. The hope is that McCain is aware of the Bush Administration's sins, and he would not repeat them;

that he's aware of the limits of American power. A pessimist would observe that McCain's response to the Georgia crisis was more bellicose than that of either Senator Obama or indeed President Bush.

Carlos, my final point is this: You asked what kind of leadership the world expects of America, and that's a good question. But I want to turn it around and ask this: What kind of leadership can America expect from the rest of the world? The question that I think Americans should be asking is: Will the rest of the world step up and share the risks and costs of leadership with the United States?

There is some ground for pessimism, I'm afraid, on this front, because after years of complaining about the unilateralism of Bush's first term, much of the world has ignored the multilateralism of his second term. Some capitals used, welcomed the opportunity provided by President Bush's international unpopularity to shirk their own responsibilities.

So I'm looking at the election of a new president as a new slate for the United States, but also a new slate for the rest of us. If we want Washington to regard its alliances as valuable, then we have to be valuable allies.

If we want Washington to use multilateral means, then we have to make sure that multilateralism works, and that doesn't mean opposing America all the time. The alternative to stepping up and sharing the costs

of leadership is to step aside and to leave all the hard tasks to Washington, but I fear that would only encourage the American unilateralists who got us into this mess to begin with.

MR. PASCUAL: Michael, that's terrific, and I guess if nothing else as a result of the financial crisis, there's been a new interpretation of the rest of the world stepping up; if nothing else, buying our bonds and keeping us afloat. So, you know, it's happened in certain ways but even from a policy perspective as well.

Keiko, Justin, I apologize. I had said Justin, you're going to go next, but Keiko, over to you.

MS. IIZUKA: Thank you. It's a great honor for me to be here to represent some of the views of the Asia-Pacific Region, and I think since Michael and I both are from Asia-Pacific, some parts are in resonance.

And I think I will start with this --

MR. PASCUAL: Keiko, a couple of people are indicating they're having a heard time hearing you.

MS. IIZUKA: Oh, okay.

MR. PASCUAL: Maybe if sound people in the back there can hear me as well, if they can turn up the sound a little bit on Keiko.

MS. IIZUKA: Can you hear me? Okay, great.

I think I will start with the introduction of this interesting poll, and it is the Pew Research Center survey that was released last June on how

much people around the world are interested in this U.S. presidential election, and first the American people.

Of course, the rate was very, very high. Eighty percent of people answered yes, they were following the campaign very closely. And then even the French -- Justin is one of them -- 40 percent said they were following closely.

And then in Australia where Michael is from, it was 52 percent. And looking at my people, the Japanese, I probably announced that it was 83 percent resulting in, when in the first place beating the American people. So now you all know that Japanese are really interested in this election, and it seems that among the Japanese populace, Mr. Obama is quite popular like in most other countries in the world.

According to the latest poll which was just released yesterday, the survey was just jointly done conducted by newspapers from eight countries, including my paper Yomiuri Shimbun, and such paper as The Guardian from the U.K., the support rate for Mr. Obama in Japan is 61 percent while the support for Mr. McCain is 13 percent. And in France it was 68 versus 5, and in Britain 64 versus 15. And the survey also shows that there is overall expectations that the change of the U.S. administration will restore American reputation and influence abroad.

However, if you pay attention more specifically to policymakers and intellectuals in Japan, you will find that mood is a bit different; it's not

that upbeat. There are a certain level of concerns and mixed with some expectations. I will point that mainly three reasons for that starting from the perspective rather general circumstance to more specific aspects.

The first, the rise of China, of course. No matter which candidate wins there is overall anxiety that Japan, as a country, will go into eclipse both in terms of political and economic influence. There are many researches on data regarding on this topic, so I won't to go into detail in the interest of time.

And, second, there are general understandings -- I think Michael explained a little bit about this -- general understandings regarding the basic natures and characteristics of each -- Democratic party and Republican party -- that are represented. Looking back in the history, Japan has generally felt more comfortable with the Republican party. For many of us in Japan, the Republican party's general image is tough on security and firm in its anticommunist attitude, and perhaps in terms of economic policy, the Republican party seems to put more emphasis on free trade while the Democratic party tends to project an image of protectionist.

This is not without grounds. Japan has a memory of going through a very, very severe series of trade disputes with the Clinton administration during the mid-1990s. President Clinton claimed to decrease Japan's huge trade surplus. So there were strong protests

among Japanese leaders during this period.

So those images still linger in the minds of many leaders and policymakers in Japan. And, certainly, this is the most specific to this election in 2008, there will be more concern if Mr. Obama is elected as president. This is so to say a mixture of both first and second factors that I just explained.

As a Japanese citizen, well, to be very frank, I feel so much relieved to hear when Mr. McCain makes his speech everywhere stressing the importance of conventional bilateral alliance-force policy.

On the other hand, Mr. Obama, well, it seems to me, shows the attitude to think more transnationally with a view to strengthen the strategic power of China and utilizing multilateral frameworks such as six-party talks in dealing with North Korean nuclear issues.

The notion of alliance seems to be somewhat submerged in other multilateral arrangements, so these create feelings of apprehensiveness on the side of Japan. And in relation to this, one more concern is related to the toughness of security, particularly with regard to Mr. Obama's nuclear security policy in long term. The Democratic party's platform that was released this August states a world without nuclear weapons. It clearly says that America will seek a world with no nuclear weapons and take concrete actions to move in this direction.

Well, of course, this says that we will maintain a strong and

reliable deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, but there is a very high concern among the Japanese.

Needless to say,. this is an excellent ideal policy as an ultimate goal. Japan, of course, supports the goal of nuclear (inaudible) world, but the concern is how soon and under which circumstance? Those questions cause a little bit of uneasiness among some policymakers and intellectuals.

In East Asia there are still remnants of Cold War here and there. North Korea is our neighbor, and we are not 100 percent sure about how much the Chinese military buildup will go on in the future. So, as a result, there might arise a very fundamental question: Would the nuclear umbrella that is the essence of Japan/U.S. alliance function in the future?

And, of course, so these are the three concerns that I wanted to explain, and, of course, many considered people in the Obama count explain and try to reassure Japanese that there is no need to worry.

For example, the former Navy Secretary Joe Bouncin and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye posted an article in June to Asahi Shimbun, a rival newspaper of mine, reiterating that. The U.S./Japan alliance is the cornerstone of American policy in the Asia-Pacific Region. That is, of course, the key phrase which has been repeated a number of times since the end of Cold War, but still the feeling of uncertain would not go away.

And while there are concerns, however, there are also expectations that Japan and U.S. relationship will enter after the election. The new stage, the alliance will function as a foothold to promote and tackle by the global agenda, such as global warming, nonproliferation, and the current financial crisis.

So there's a growing observation on the side of Japanese that the power of the U.S. perhaps keeps declining, gradually, in both dimensions of economy and security, so that the idea is that Japan should stand more equally as an ally to help out the U.S. in achieving these global agenda.

And I would like to -- well, I have to point out one thing -- that on the side of Japanese, a lot of effort must be made in order to maintain and reinforce this kind of quality of alliance. What has been widely reported, Japan has just elected in September it's sad prime minister in one year. And there's a high possibility that the ruling liberal democracy party will lose power to the opposition party in the next lower house election as early as the end of this November. This continuing political confusion, obviously, undermines the credibility and reliability of Japan as an implement in power to support the alliance.

And just to explain how deep this concern is, if the opposition party takes office, it will be certain to cause more unpredictability in maintaining the alliance because the leader of the opposition, Ichiro

Ozawa, advocates policies to put more importance on the UN authority rather than the cooperation with the U.S. with regard to the participation of Japanese troops in international peacekeeping activities.

While this is somehow related to the U.S. leadership issue, and added to this the DPJs has just released on October 10th it's preliminary manifesto for the upcoming election which clearly states that it will seek the revision of the Japan/U.S. status of forces agreement, or so-called SOFA, which is one of the basic agreements, they both got a stable bilateral alliance, it also ends to revise arrangement, really, with regard to the host nation support. The Japanese government currently pays the cost of more than $2 billion annually in support of 40,000 U.S. troops stationed throughout Japan. The DPJ will try to decrease the amount of budget that Japan takes over.

In summary, there are a mixture of concerns and hopeful anticipations towards this election, so we are Japanese. We Japanese are very busy paying attention to both U.S. and our election.

Thank you

MR. PASCUAL: Keiko, thank you. It's quite fascinating to hear your perspective right after Michael as well, and just the contrast between on the one hand an expectation for engagement, greater involvement, restrictions on the use of force, or greater balance between force and soft diplomacy and other aspects of power.

Vís-a-vís your perspective from Japan, I'm looking at trust and a concern that arises as a result of diminishing American, both financial power and security power, so really quite a different perspective between the two.

Justin?

MR. VAISSE: Thanks. Thanks for your introduction and congrats again for Michael for putting out a base which is a really good, I would say, introduction to this election.

I'd like to speak about Europe, in general, not only France. And, of course, that presents me with the problem of generalization: that is to say, trying to differentiate the attitudes of different European countries. For example, the Eastern European countries and the Western European countries.

The problem of generalization is also one of distinguishing discrimination between social and political groups inside each country. And last but not least, between the reactions or the expectations of elites versus that of public opinion in general, but still keeping in mind all these differences and the way they present a challenge for the analysis, I guess the two relevant elements to -- comment on here are, first, a very high degree of interest and concern about this election in Europe; and, second, a clear preference which is world wide, which is particularly clear in Europe for Barak Obama versus John McCain.

So first, I'm using a somewhat different metric than Keiko. I'm using the Gallup poll that was released two days ago on Tuesday which say that 65 percent of Europeans say who wins in November makes a difference to their country versus only 31 percent in the rest of the world. So it's about double. And only 25 to 30 percent of Europeans don't have a opinion as to whom they prefer between Obama and McCain versus 60 percent of the world in general. So I guess we can fairly say there's an unusual and exceptionally high degree of interest and concern.

The second element is the clear preference which Keiko mentioned for Barak Obama versus John McCain, which is, depending on how you ask the question, is it in terms of image or would you prefer to see Obama/McCain president, or do you have confidence in Obama/McCain. Depending on how you ask the question, answers go from 60 to 90 percent in favor of Barak Obama in Europe.

So how do I explain these two elements? I think that change first and identity second are really the most important factors to explain both that level, that exceptional level of interest and the overwhelming preference for Barak Obama.

Change, as you know, is really the paradigm of the selection here in the U.S. It's a message on which Obama has capitalized with great success. And I think it also explains his popularity in Europe.

You have to keep in mind that George W. Bush is now slightly

less popular than Satan in public opinion polls across the continent, and this is due to a number of factors, but foreign policy undoubtedly figures prominently among them. Even before 9/11, even before the Iraq War, it's Bush foreign policy which became a bone of contention with Europe, and let me give you two examples of a very first part of the first mandate of Bush -- and, of course, I subscribe to what Michael said, but the changing course of Bush foreign policy.

But what remains stuck in the minds of Europeans is the thickening of the mandate from 2001 to 2003. So first example, the rejection of the Kyoto protocol or of any reduction of Co2 emissions contrary to the promises that had been made during the containing of Governor Bush in 2000, and also the way he explained it -- and I quote from a press conference in March 2001 -- "Because first things first are the people who live in America." And so that really angered traditionally poor American parts of Europe, especially in Northern Europe, especially in the Scandinavian countries, and other regions. So even before 9/11, even before the Iraq War it was off to a bad start.

The second example is Guantanamo right after 9/11. I remember that the first persons to react very strongly against Guantanamo in December of 2001 and January of 2002 where the British Lords, who are not the most reflexively anti-Americans of all Europeans. And, of course, I don't need to go in the years after that. Since then it has

been awfully downward, especially with the Iraq War, and it's this image of the first mandates that remains stuck in the mind of Europeans, and that's what they want change from.

So I would say that -- I would first argue that the first for change after eight years of Bush largely accounts for the interest given to the campaign, and also the preference given to Barak Obama over McCain, who is seen for good and bad reasons, as a disciple of Bush.

But I think there is something deeper than Just policies agreement on specific international issues. I think one reason why Europeans are paying such close attention to this election is because they realize that America is inextricably linked to their own identity. So that's my second point: It's not only the change, it's also about identity, because for Europeans America is a mirror.

What I mean by that is that America is critical to what Europe is, how it seems itself, how it defines itself, and how, also, it is defined in the eyes of others. After all, America is the biggest part of what we call "the West," and whether the symbol of the West is George W. Bush or Barak Obama makes a big difference.

But, more importantly, it's more, for Europeans, a matter of self-definition. Remember, for example, February 15, 2003, there were millions, probably between five and ten million Europeans in the streets protesting against the Iraq War, and this has been cast rightly, I think, as a

defining moment for European identity in terms of not being American. But beyond, once again, what America does, it is also what America is that counts, and on various issues many Europeans define Europe -- its social model, its economic model especially after the recent financial crisis as the opposite of America, the sort of non-America, not necessarily in a sort of counterweight way, but certainly a different model from that of American.

So my point is that any U.S. election, but particularly this one, is seen through this lens of identity, and in this respect any generic Democrat is simply closer to the mainstream of European public opinion on social and economic issues than any generic Republican. That's why Democratic candidates in the recent elections are often -- not always, but often, very often favored.

At one level we could argue that the election of a Democrat somehow validates, if you'd like, the European model, or it's seen as such. Basically, Barak Obama represents the America most Europeans like compared with Bush and McCain, and especially Sarah Palin, who presents the total "otherness" for many, many Europeans and probably the most exotic figure you can get in a Western country.

So I conclude on two points:

First, of course, that's partly an illusion in the sense that Obama is closer to McCain than he is to Europeans on many issues ranging from

the death penalty to Iran or Afghanistan, for example. So, yes, if Obama is elected, there is a risk of (inaudible) expectation, disillusion, et cetera. But nonetheless, I think that in terms of goodwill and Obama administration would automatically generate more positive responses and create a climate which would be much more conducive, much more favorable to American interests.

The analogy I would use is that of Nicholas Sarkozy here. Nicolas Sarkozy had the great asset of not being Jacques Chirac, and a front business has been an enduring asset for him. Whatever he would do, even if he would just follow the same exact policy line as Chirac, or even if it would go further like talking with Syria, for example, or attacking the U.S. on the climate change and other issues.

No matter what he does he seemed very favorably because the memory of Chirac is so terrible that he's still seen as way more pro-American, including in his policies which is actually not always the case. And so this asset, I think would be very important for Obama versus McCain, and it would automatically buy (inaudible) generally 20th, 2009, a great deal of goodwill.

And I stop here.

MR. PASCUAL: Justin, thank you. The three of you have done a terrific job of laying out perspectives and expectations which take us all the way across the board of

-- and this might be something interesting to talk about, is whether in fact there are superhuman expectations, because on the one hand there are expectations of a president who can engage, who can understand the rebalancing of force and diplomacy, yet at the same time a president who maintains America strong and understands traditional alliances and doesn't sacrifice those aspects of traditional alliances; a president who will be different, certainly, as Justin said. You got a certain number of points on that. But at the same time, a president who can come back and revisit some of the transnational issues that perhaps actually caused so much of the skepticism to begin with, as Justin, as you said, on climate change and on human rights.

So it's going to be a tough task, I mean, in a sense managing these relationships because there's going to be a lot of expectations on every front. But we can explore those in greater details, and I'll bring some questions back to the group, but I want to turn to the audience first and see if we have some questions.

And, if I could, Zheng Hao, if you would be willing to begin with a question.

MR. Hao Zheng: Thank you, Carlos. Thank you, all the panelists.

It's very interesting to hear so many fresh --

MR. PASCUAL: If you can introduce yourself.

MR. Hao Zheng: Yes, my name is Hao Zheng from CNAPS and also from Hong Kong.

It's very interesting to hear so many fresh and comments and reviews from you, but it's also a pity we don't see any Chinese specialties sitting on the stage since China and the U.S. relations are of such importance today and may be more important tomorrow. But as a Chinese citizen I want to ask a question:

What kind of U.S./Asia/Pacific policies will be applies if the next administration --

MR. PASCUAL: We can't hear you. Can you step up a little --

MR. HOW JANG: Yes. What kind of U.S./Asia/Pacific policies will be applied in the next administration, especially on dealing with the regional problems like marine time polluting, especially from Australia, and those Korea issues and Afghanistan War issues. What kind of this policies will be used over the next administration?

I have a second question, is turned to, particularly, to Kyoto. I know that the majority of Japanese are watching this election very tightly, but probably it hurts that there is some very bad news to the Japanese car-making industries, especially when you heard that Obama and McCain citing the base if they are elected ask the next percent they will reduce the car imports from Japan and South Korea. So this is very bad news to damage U.S. and Japan trade relations.

So how do your governments to react on the base message? How -- I mean, what kind of preparation your government is prepared to face these challenges?

Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. I want to take two more questions, and I'll come back to the panel. Just right back there, one further back, yeah.

MR. KABUCI: My name is Masut Kabuci. I have an observation and question. The observation is a far as the insistence on the leadership, why is there such an insistence on leadership, especially at a time where we're witnessing that the prerequisites of national elements to lead are extremely rigid and strained? My belief is let's let go of this.

And to Justin, I'm a little perplexed as to Europeans' identity with the U.S. is concerned, which I assume you include French attitude and identity in it, given what we know of the French and their special sense of identity, which is independent of the U.S. and America?

Is there any room for an alternative interpretation of that?

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. And one other question. I want to take -- is there anyone back here? No. All right, we'll take, go over there to that side.

MR. MENDEZ: Josh Mendez. I'm just an investment analyst.

My question concerns the U.S. debt problem. The U.S. has

pretty much doubled its debt to $11 trillion under this current administration, and to what extent do you think that will have significance for its ability to protect itself in the world?

And the question particularly for the Japan correspondent, the fact that the U.S. is the largest debtor in the world now, and Japan is its largest creditor, what the significance on that relationship?

MR. PASCUAL: Let's come back to the panel and begin with a question of U.S./Asia regional relationships and policies. I'm not going to try to expect the panel to speak for American policy necessarily, but you might have perspectives on what some of the dynamics and complexities are going to be that American policy is going to have to play into. So I'll give you a little bit of greater room or scope here in coming back to the question.

But the issue of North Korea was raised. Obviously, it's been the major issue in international headlines, so this engages the entire region. There are history questions or trade questions that have come up.

Keiko, do you want to start on this issue, since some of those questions directly come back to Japan?

MS. IIZUKA: Yes. Thank you, that is a great question, and as I explained earlier, there is already a sense of uneasiness with regard to the next administration's trade policy and given this economic downturn of the whole entire world.

And, of course, Mr. Obama, was initially highly critical of North Atlantic -- sorry -- North American Free Trade Agreement matter. And so there was a sense within Japanese industry Japan is going through perhaps a difficult time in exporting automobiles.

But I think that Mr. Obama's attitude -- well, if Obama wins this election -- he doesn't seem to be a very, well, very strong-headed hardliner as a protectionist. I think he's drifting from somewhat very hardliner as a protectionist, but to a kind of -- he puts more emphasis on globalization and multilateralism. So, and looking at those aspects, I think Japanese industries are now very hard in lobbying already, doing some lobbying to not to make any -- well, very many difficult actions, to take actions toward automobiles.

But I don't know. This election, of course, the Michigan -- State of Michigan is a very difficult state, and Japanese auto industries, obviously, understand this situation, and the government is, in relation to this, is now trying to worth the industries.

MR. PASCUAL: Justin, let me come to you now. It was a specific question to you, and I'm going to also take a bit of liberty with the debt question, especially given President Sarkozy's very central role, obviously, with Gordon Brown in stepping up in the midst of the financial crisis and, very interestingly, bringing together the European leaders and coming to agreement on a financial package that was worth $2.3, $2.4

trillion in the course of a few days with a very aggressive set of measures that went far beyond what the United States has done -- in fact, actually setting a new platform that the United States is actually having to come back to.

And so it presents on the one hand an interesting perspective of European leadership, and so I think one question to bring back to you, and it gets also at a question that Michael posed to us: Are we going to see more European leadership on this kind of scale? And, in particular, in the context of the financial crisis, one of the questions has raised and what Keiko came back to, you know, is this risk of, on the other hand one side of the policy which shows that we're interconnected; the other side which potentially creates the risk of protectionism, especially as the financial crisis hits the real economy and you start to get -- whether it's the right policy or not, you start to get specific groups being affected and potentially seen in the United States and Europe and other places a call for protectionism even though that might not necessarily be the most effective policy to be able to promote growth in the long term.

So, just curious from a European perspective, the leadership issue, and then the reverse of that, the protectionism risk, how likely are those.

MR. VAISSE: Thanks. In response to the question on identity, I put it differently. If Europeans looked at who among the two candidates

knows Europe the best who's the most connected to Europe, who has stated the most clearly his intentions to mending fences and working with Europe and the allies, they would choose John McCain. John McCain has been going to Europe for the past 15 years, basically every year at the Verecunda Security Conference in Munich. He knows Europe much better than Obama. Obama doesn't have much connection with -- apart from Germany personal connections, I mean, with Europe. McCain has.

So in terms of proximity, I would say McCain would be the normal European candidate. The reason I was introducing not only policy conferences but also identity is that there is no -- so beyond Europe, there is no other country that counts as much in terms of defining who Europe is that offers such a mirror. But that mirror can be either -- it can be either a countermodel, that is, we're defining Europe as the non-America in terms of, like, social model, the economic model, et cetera; or it can be, on the contrary, a model for others.

And so my point was to say that Obama -- and it's something that we've seen here in this election in the U.S., among certain consequences, Obama because he's been pretty vague on some issues because he offers that sort of flexible image. Europeans have been able to project the America they love, the America they dream of, on Obama, and the fact that he is Black, has also played a role in the sense that it's the, let's say, the positive side of America. And, once again, it's the

America the Europeans like.

And so in terms of validating not only just substantive policy programs but validating who you are and what is your approach to the world, et cetera, there's no doubt that this identity of anonymous played in favor of Obama much more than John McCain, even more so, I would say, than the generic Democrat and the generic Republican than Red America and Blue America, if you'd like.

On the crisis and Sarkozy, more European leadership, well, the European leadership of the past few months have been linked very closely with the fact that France was holding the rotating presidency of the U, theoretically, this should not count at all. That is to say, theoretically, the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council should not really matter whether it's a small country or big country. But when you have issues like Russia/Georgia, or the financial crisis, yes, it does matter because the larger countries and that that are also in the Euro Zone are of identify more weight, more gravitas than small ones.

So until the end of December -- the French presidency is from July to December -- there will still be a European leadership, especially because we are entering -- I mean we've entered with a lame duck Bush presidency -- we've entered a period, I would say, of sort of eclipse of American leadership that started when Bush became a lame duck -- and I'll let you put a date on that -- and will go on during the transition between

November and January, and then will go on probably for a couple of -- on most issues on a couple of months because of the time that will be needed to put the teams in place.

And so is Europe equipped to sort of provide leadership in this critical juncture? Until December probably; after that probably not, and the reason is that Europe has woes of its own. And, of course, the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish, which probably only postpones the adoption of the treaty, but has been a subtle blow to effectiveness and to the possibility for Europe to be effective and a leader.

And so the events of the past few weeks have demonstrated the need for a streamlined and reinforced leadership that the Treaty of Lisbon does not fully provide but at least is a very good step in that direction. And so in the short-term alliance, it would be yes; and then from January through -- starting in January, probably there would be less of European leadership.

Lastly, on protectionism, yes, there are noises, but I don't think it will be -- I mean I'm not expecting major pushes towards protectionism. It will be more in the sense of whether the proposal that Sarkozy has put forward recently on the sovereign wealth funds on protecting European major corporations between strategic ones from old-style takeovers in some of the critical sectors.

And I'll stop at that.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, good.

Keiko, I'm going to come back to you in one second and let you talk about begin our biggest creditor. Well, go ahead, you're ready to go.

MS. IIZUKA: Please may I, yes, yes. Answering the gentleman's question, Japan as the biggest creditor, Japan has tried to show some leadership within the region of Asia. Japan has just proposed to establish a joint financial regulatory body to help stabilize the Asian financial crisis among Japan, China, and South Korea. So in relation to, just to try to help the U.S., Japan is trying to show some leadership within Asia that would, Japan hopes, result in helping out the U.S. That's what I wanted to add.

MR. PASCUAL: All cash is welcome right now.

Michael, from a perspective Down Under, also help us understand the East and, in particular, the leadership question that was raised. You posed the duo dilemma of it, both leadership in the United States, a changed style of leadership, but the leadership and willingness of the rest of the world.

So the question was put: Why does leadership matter at a time like this? I'll let you dabble in both.

DR. FULLILOVE: I think -- I mean I think leadership has got a bum rap. I think the word "leadership" has got a bum rap, and now many people are identifying American leadership with American unilateralism,

and that is not what it means.

America has taken some blows in the last years, but it still remains the only -- Washington remains the only capital in the world that runs a truly global foreign policy. This is still the only country in the world that can project military power almost anywhere in the world. None of the great problems facing all of us as human beings can be solved without the Americans. So that's why I think there is hunger for leadership.

There's not a hunger for go-it-along leadership, but there's a hunger for leadership. There are a couple of quotes that I thought were interesting from Obama on this point. He characterized President Bush's approach to coalition-building as we wound up the United Kingdom in Togo and then we do what we please. I assume he left Australia out for politeness reasons rather than forgetfulness. But I think that kind of model of leadership is not what the world wants.

In terms of leadership that the rest of us can provide, I think one of the advantages of President Bush's departure from office is that the focus will come onto some of the other great powers in the world, and I think some of the other great powers will be held to some similar standards to those to which America is help.

For example, China. Jang How mentioned China and I might come back in a second to talk about China and the East, but China is now a great power. China has an enormous stake in the international order

and in the maintenance of the international order. And yet it seems to me that China often, for a great power, runs a foreign policy that is really more appropriate for a developing country.

I think China's performance in the Security Council of the United Nations and its behavior on some issues like Darfur and Iran, I think it pursues its narrowly-drawn interests in a way that if the United States were to do it would be criticized by newspaper editorialists all around the world as amoral belligerence. And this is to engage in particular criticism of China. Nobody is pure. All of us have double standards, but I think America's double standards have been held up to a much harsher light because of the unpopularity of the current leadership and the current administration. And perhaps when we have a new administration, we can expect higher standards of leadership from more countries.

Just a couple of other comments on Jang How's question about Asia. I think -- and China in particular -- I think China's rise is transforming the diplomatic geometry in Asia, if you like. And also on Asia, strategic triangles are being created as countries that were traditional allies or friends or partners of the United States, like Thailand or Indonesia or even Australia, moving to accommodate China's rise -- and this is a natural -- this is a natural development -- I'll give you just one quick example if I can:

The U.S/China/Australia strategic triangle. For many years we had a very congenial strategic triangle in Australia where our leading

trading partner was Japan, which itself was an ally of our strategic ally of the United States. That makes for a very easy triangle to manage when your leading trading partner is allied to your leading strategic partner.

Last year China overtook Japan as our leading trading partner. We are doing wonderful business with China; we are working with them on all sorts of issues. But this makes for a much more complicated strategic triangle for Australian policymakers to manage. And in that sense, that's why I am more enthusiastic about Obama's willingness to engage China. I think that China has to be held to high standards.

Both McCain and Obama I think try to do that, but I think McCain's distrust of democracies -- of nondemocracies I should say -- his concern with the regional balance of distribution of power, if you like, and the regional balance of power would push him more towards the balancing end of the relationship with China, whereas I think we have to engage China, we have to talk with China, seriously, about where we think their policies are deficient, but we also have to work with them to solve the global problems that threaten us all.

MR. PASCUAL: Very good. Let me come back to the floor.

MR. LIU : My name is Shih-chung Liu from CNAPS Brookings and also from Taiwan.

It's interesting to see this perception gap between the majority of people from various countries favors Obama vis-à-vis the fact that maybe

most of them can understand how difficult a challenge that he's going to face if he's elected, and also what kind of mess he's going to inherit.

Carlos talked about leadership and also I would like to make some comments on Obama's approach if he's elected, Obama's approach toward China. My question is, let's assuming, because of this budget, because of the economic crisis, because of this fiscal problems, the next president of the United States is, in theory, saying that he might me, especially when it comes to the case of Obama, to largely to his lack of foreign policy experience compared with Senator McCain, he might face a question that he's afraid of leadership especially when he comes to foreign policies.

And not to mention countries like Iran and Iraq and maybe North Korea, even China, when President Obama try to engage you with China, this country might take advantage of you, this kind of a presumably fragile leaderships. And I was just wondering, is this a big concern to these countries that are represented, especially to Australia, and to what extent do you perceive the leadership? I mean it's not about what they say during the campaign that worries you; it's about whether you believe he can do a better job when he face such a tremendous difficulties if he is elected.

Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. Two other questions. I'll take them over

there.

MS. LUNBERG: Hi. I'm Kristin Lunberg from the State Department, and this question is for Michael.

I was hoping you could expand a bit on your comment on Indonesia and the importance of Obama's connection to Indonesia in the minds of Australians. Can you explain what they hope he will do differently?

MR. PASCUAL: Okay, and one more. Gary?

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report.

I want to see if you could speak to something we haven't talked about today, which either candidate will face and your countries will face. It really goes to, I think, Michael's point about leadership not just from the U.S. but from elsewhere around the globe. And that is the subject matter that we've sort of been dancing around for the last couple of years, and that's whether the post-World War II global governance, if you will, organizations are up to the task of the 21st century. And I mean everything from the UN to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, et cetera.

So I'd be interested in getting the thinking of the panel on, speaking for, the countries and the regions that you represent. What is the depth and the nature of the interest in retooling these post-World War

II institutions around global governance?

MR. PASCUAL: Okay. Michael, I'm going to start with you, if you don't mind on the first question on leadership capacity. And then if you want to also go into the Indonesia question.

DR. FULLILOVE: Um-hmm. Look, I think there are risks with an Obama presidency. One is something we talked about, the high expectations, the fact that -- I mean such as the dizzyingly high level of anticipation, I think, about an Obama presidency that it's hard not to think that whatever foreign policy he enacts whether it's on climate change or China or Aid, that he won't disappoint great swats of public opinion.

I think the risk of disappointing expectations applies to American, too, because I think a lot of Americans looking at the reception that Senator Obama received in Berlin, looking at these polls which shows that he's favored by four-to-one around the world, are probably -- may well be disappointed if his popularity in other countries does not translate into countries stepping up in the way that we've discussed. So that's one risk.

The other risk is the one you mentioned, that America's adversaries will mistake Obama's reasonableness for weakness. And that is a risk, I think. And that's why European diplomats complained in June that his pledge to negotiate with Tehran without preconditions, and especially without requiring suspension of uranium enrichment reduced the West's leverage on Iran over Tehran. And that's why I think Obama

has walked back that pledge by saying that the negotiations would only take place at a time and place of his choosing and after the appropriate groundwork had been done and so on.

So, yes, I think it's a risk. I also think that you have a phenomenon in your respond policy sometimes where -- it might be Jimmy Carter as one example -- where a president comes to office being very reasonable and very open, and when that's thrown back in his face, then almost to compensate for that and to show that -- and that put JFK and the Bay of Pigs as another example -- to show that he's strong and he can't be mucked around with he can overreact.

So these are all risks. But as against that, I think Obama has shown a remarkable amount of discipline and strength. He has showed a lot of strength and fortitude by going up against Senator Clinton, and on his foreign policy topics -- on his foreign policy stances if you agree with him or disagree with him, he's stuck to his guns. And that's the kind of strength, actually, that the very unromantic international system sometimes requires.

But, yes, is it true that all these problems of the world are all susceptible to rational discussion? Absolutely not. Leverage and pressure is required, and probably Senator Clinton would say that Obama knows a bit about leverage and pressure.

In terms of Indonesia, I would just say that I think Australian

governments of both colors have been disappointed that Americans are not more interested in Indonesia, given its size, given the very unusual historical circumstances of Indonesia, given the different kind of Islam that's practiced there. You know, a lot of us were disappointed by the reaction of the international financial authorities to the Asian crisis a decade ago, and the sort of the weights that were put on some Southeast Asian economies which proved to be quite detrimental.

You know, when we're thinking about whether democracies can work in the Islamic world, I often wonder you know, why don't we look more to Indonesia which is a rollicking and tidy, difficult but hugely successful democracy in my opinion -- or at least it's undergoing a very successful transition. So I don't think there's a particular policy issue that we're interested in; it's just that I think that it's time that Indonesia gets the attention it deserves.

I might say, just as a caveat, that some policymakers in Canberra should be careful what they wish for because Australia is very accustomed to being the United States' very close friend in that part of the world, but having a particular relationship with presidents of the United States. And it will take some adjustment on the part of some policymakers if we have a president who has much bigger personal connections to Indonesia than to Australia. I think those adjustments are worth making, I should say, but they'll have to be made.

MR. PASCUAL: Justin, if it were President Obama, is the capacity experience issue a big question for Europeans?

MR. VAISSE: Yes, especially because of these expectations that are really high, and also because there's a sense that he will certainly be tested as by (inaudible) say but that's a sort of more general view that I've gathered in different places in Europe.

I'd like to go to your question of the global institutions, even if Carlos, of course, would better placed, and I have even worked on these issues for the past two months and published a report on that.

On the financial ones, of course, that is very new, that is, it's back to (inaudible) of weeks, but, yes, they would be -- there seems to be readiness to adapt the financial institutions that were set up after World War II to the current situation, especially to avert a crisis like the one we saw, and basically increase regulation.

And that's the whole, I would say not tug of war, but I would say the whole discussion between George Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy last weekend in Camp David where at the end of the day Sarkozy managed to get a positive answer from Bush for that November 15 meeting on the global financial architecture. It's labeled as a new Breton Woods, but, of course, the analogy is just to show the scope like when you say "New Marshall Plan," it's never a Marshall Plan, it's just to show the idea.

This said, I'm not sure that either Sarkozy's idea coincides with

that of all of the other European leaders first; and second, that his ideas and European ideas would coincide either with that of Bush, and that's been shown that, no, it was not the case, and but even with that of Barack Obama, if Obama is elected.

So, yes, I think there's readiness to change and to make the world more in the European image as far as financial institutions are concerned, but I'm not sure it's feasible even with the current crisis.

And as far as political institutions are concerned, there has been a readiness on the part of France and the U.K. I'm mentioning these two because of their own security council to change things and to increase the number of countries, and also to move from the G-8 to probably a G-13 that was one of the sort of major idea that Sarkozy had been putting on the table during his campaign last -- in the first part of 2007.

Of course, to the extent that it implies a sort of downsizing of European participation in these institutions, the question is whether to what extent with the follow on these ideas of trying to retool or redesign these institutions because, of course, they will be a conflict of interest. But at least there is, I think, more readiness than there was, for example, during the Millennium Summit a couple of years ago for the UN.

MR. PASCUAL: Keiko, I'll give you an opportunity to make a pitch for Japan's membership in the UN Security Council.

MS. IIZUKA: Yes, and I have just a very, very quick comment.

Yes, for me I think it seems that Mr. McCain represents the post-World War Era. He, himself, represents, I think. He is the icon of post-World War Era, and Mr. Obama is more flexible in retooling the post-World War institutions. And in terms of our relation to United Nations Security Council reform, I think that Japan is, now even more strongly, will keep competing to get a seat, and I think Japan will team, make a team with Brazil and India and, of course, with Germany to expand the seats.

And in terms of G-8 that Justin has just mentioned, I think that I remember that Mr. Obama has just previously mentioned that, expanding the membership as well. So the question is, how do we -- how do we face this emerging powers, China and India and some other populous countries, into this international framework? So Japan is quite hopeful of extending the membership of the United Nations Security Council.

MR. PASCUAL: I'll give you an advance advertisement for an Event on November 20th. We will be launching an action plan that deal exactly with this question of global governance and the institutions that we use to deal with questions of governance in a transnational world.

And one of the big issues that arises and that comes out of the study that we did over a period of a year and a half that involved travels throughout the world, consultations with all of the major powers and others who aren't major powers, is, you know, this recognition that in the transnational environment that we live today, there is a movement of

capital and technology and labor and ideas across borders.

And on one hand it's been a source of tremendous power and growth, and it's lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in places like China and India. But it's become an existential threat to our institutions of global governance that were actually founded on the basis of what's failing sovereignty that grew on the assumption that borders are sacrosanct, and you controlled what was within your borders, and you didn't actually transcend the borders of another.

And so now we're in a world where, wow, you can't control what's in your border, and to find, to actually have some impact on what is happening within your border, you have to pay attention to what's happening inside of somebody else's borders. And so this is actually presented a real challenge to our global governance institutions because we have to think about sovereignty differently.

And so as on the basis of this, one of the things that came out of the studies that we need to take a new approach to sovereignty, and we proposed an idea that we called "responsible sovereignty" and draws on work that was done at Brookings in the 1990s by Francis Deng and looks at not only how countries behave, internally, but how they behave in the international community, and how they take responsibility for their domestic actions, internationally.

It also builds on the idea that you have to build a new rule-based

set of laws on how you deal with individual problems like nuclear security, or economic and financial stability, or climate change. And so you start with a precept of a rule-based order in a specific sector and the institutions that are necessary for that, rather than asking the question, what are the institutions that you need, and then trying to figure out who those institutions fit different problems. So we have to reverse that process.

And as you do that, then you start to learn lessons about what are some of the cross-cutting things that we can learn about institutions, and where do we need those institutions to be built up in specific areas?

And what it leads us to is something which is a little bit messier, It's a little bit of a Rubik's Cube of the international policy, but on the other hand it's actually much more reflective of the world that we live in today because the kinds of problems that we have are very different than what you want the UN to do, for example, on peace and security issues where you want it to be the centerpiece, and the coordinator is very different from climate change where you maybe want it to be the platform for international negotiations, to yet a different role on issues related to poverty where you might want it to be a watchdog and a monitor.

And so we try to take these things into account and will roll out this action plan that gives some of these suggestions and ideas on how to approach these issues, and we can go into them in much greater detail on November 20th.

And since you said the word "power and responsibility and Spider Man" the title of the book that goes with this is Power and Responsibility: International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats," and it'll be out in January.

Okay, one or two last questions, and we'll come back to the panel for final words. Anything? All the way in the back.

MR. : I already have a microphone here. But I want to follow up on Michael's comment that some might perceive Obama's reasonableness for weakness, and should know a President Obama be elected, as citizens of three traditional U.S. allies, what role can your states play in cautioning those who might pursue foolhardy foreign policy adventures in the face of a perceived U.S. weakness?

MR. PASCUAL: And one final question. Over here?

MS. : Dr. Fullilove, you spoke about how the unpopularity of Bush turned away some allies from engaging in taking upon leadership in national issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and then my question is, if Obama brings in goodwill in Europe and particularly in France, the issue of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan and how the deaths of 10 French soldiers immediately turned over the public opinion in France, will the wave of goodwill be enough to encourage Europe to join us in these conflicts? Or will it simply be a wave of goodwill on the part of the backers be continued to be submerged in these conflicts by ourselves?

Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Great. All right, I'm going to come back to the panel and start actually in reverse order, so, Justin, I'm going to begin with you and then Keiko and Michael, I'll give you the final word. And you can address whatever aspects of those questions you want or anything else you want to say.

MR. VAISSE: Sure. On the question of goodwill and how it translates into reality, I would say it has two effects: one, well, let's say the main effect it has is to make easier for policymakers to take decisions that are not necessarily popular, in a sense that it's easier to explain, for example to the French Republic, that the full reintegration of French forces into the integrated military structure, or that doing more for Afghanistan, it's easier to explain these things under an Obama administration than the Bush Administration.

And so goodwill is not only the fact that leaders would listen better and be more ready to help a new U.S. president, especially if it's Obama, but it's also the fact that they, vis-à-vis the public opinion, they would have more room to make an unpopular decision.

And on Afghanistan, specifically, the German Marshall Fund poll, it turned out these results is that (inaudible) trends to stabilize Afghanistan, support was found among Americans and Europeans for providing security for economical construction projects to the level of 73;

and 79 persons assisting with the training of Afghan Police 76 and 68 percent; combating narcotics production 70 percent and 76; and by contrast -- and this is related only to the conduct of combat operations -- 76 percent of Americans also supported committing combat operations against the Taliban compared with only 43 percent of Europeans.

And so, yes, there is here -- there is as gap precisely on combat operations, although you should remember that starting in October 2001 there were British Special Forces and French Special Forces as well, and then in January/February 2002 for Tora Bora there were forces from both countries. And so Europeans have been there since the very beginning, actually. And even if it is sometimes difficult for public opinions, if it's between some countries like Germany, I don't expect this to, let's say, change seriously.

And the death of 10 soldiers which you mentioned in August in fighting with the Taliban grabbed a lot of attention, largely because of the sort of cover-up that was done on the conditions in which there was attacks by the Taliban, the lack of material, et cetera, more than, you know, we should withdraw immediately. There was some reaction to this effect, but not that much, so, no, I'm not too worried on that, and I think that's the goodwill effect, will make it easier for America to reach its goals, especially if there is an Obama administration.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you. Keiko?

MS. IIZUKA: Just very quickly I will like just to reiterate that Japan, as a very staunch ally in the Asia/Pacific Region, would like to share the burden of leadership in dealing with this global agenda, especially, I think Japan, I think, could play some role in climate change. I would like to go into specifics but Japan is really enthusiastic in helping out in vetting China and India interests. That's it.

MR. PASCUAL: Thanks. Michael?

DR. FULLILOVE: I would just make three quick points, Carlos.

First of all, in relation to David's question, I think absolutely it is the role of an ally, a central role to talk frankly to the United States and to disagree when the United States is going something stupid, and it's one of my great regrets as an Australian that the previous restraining government did not counsel caution in relation to the Iraq War, but, you know, ignored the Administration in some ways. And that was not to the great -- there wasn't a lot of damage done, I think, to Australia, but I think, right, damage has been done by that war to our ally, and we should have been more cognizant of that.

The second point I'd make is the flip side of the first point. You should speak up when you disagree, but when you agree with something you have to stand on. And if you look at a conflict like Afghanistan, Afghanistan is not Iraq. Everybody in the world pretty much agrees that it's the good fight, and yet not everybody in the world is prepared to fight it.

It's sanctioned by the United Nations, and yet there are a lot of countries that bang their chests about their commitment to the United Nations who could be doing more who are not.

So I think, in conclusion, that if the next president needs to draw on the lessons of the last five years, I think so does the rest of the world, especially if we're going to solve the sorts of problems without passports that Carlos mentioned. These are very tough questions, and the world needs American leadership, but the rest of the world's not going to get a free pass come January 20, 2009, either.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you, Michael.

First of all, you can see one of the real strengths of Brookings which is actually to have the ability of having colleagues who come from different parts of the world, different perspectives are able to share those, and gives us an opportunity to learn our discussions, and so we thank our three panelists very much.

And we remind you outside, Hope or Glory: The Presidential Election and U.S. Foreign Policy, Michael's recent paper, you can pick it up out there.

Justin's new book which is coming out in the French version next week -- or Thursday, sorry, Justin -- *The History of Neo-Conservatism in the United States*.

And then November 20th, if you're interested in the global

governance question, join us back here from 9:00 to 11:00, and we'll have Madeleine Albright, Tom Pickering, Javier Solana, and Kemal Dervish as part of that discussion. It should be a very, very interesting discussion that we can continue. So thanks very much and a big hand for our panel.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public # 351998
in and for the
Commonwealth of Virginia
My Commission Expires:
November 30, 2008