THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AFTER THE BUSH YEARS

Washington, D.C.

Monday, October 20, 2008

Introduction and Moderator:

IVO H. DAALDER
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy

Panelists:

AMITAI ETZIONI
Professor of International Affairs,
George Washington University

JAMES TRAUB
Contributing Writer, *The New York Times Magazine*

TAMARA COFMAN WITTES
Director, Middle East Democracy and Development Project

* * * * *

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DAALDER: Good afternoon, everybody. Thanks -- to those still coming in, if you can take your seats or a seat as opposed to your seat since there's no assigned seating. There's some seats up front here, too. Thanks all for coming out on such a gorgeous fall afternoon in Washington. First let us mention that Frank -- Francis Fukuyama, who was supposed to be here, unfortunately fell ill and is -- went home instead. So we wish him all the best. We told him to take some tea and honey, and hopefully that will do the trick. But it's our loss for him not to be here. That doesn't mean, however, that we won't have a good discussion this morning about a topic that is still generating a lot of interest, even after eight years of trying to do our best not to promote democracy anywhere -- oh, sorry.

First question I have is a serious one. Who knows what the Bush Doctrine is? It's not a trick question. Yale historian, John Lewis Gaddis, writing in the *American Interest* I guess one issue ago, suggested that it is not the doctrine of preemption that Governor Palin might have missed, misunderstood, when Charlie Gibson asked about this in an interview a couple of weeks ago, but that it was in fact this statement in Bush's second inaugural that "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every

nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." Gaddis suggests that future historians may well refer to this statement as the Bush Doctrine in the same way that people remember the Truman Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine, unlike say the non-remembered Nixon Doctrine and Carter Doctrine or Reagan Doctrine. But that this statement might well for future historians be as significant as the scripter of what American foreign policy is or could be about as the Truman and Monroe Doctrines were. Unfortunately for Gaddis -- and his arguments -- sorry, the argument that Gaddis had for why this was so was and would be so if the emphasis was on the second part of the statement rather than the first part, on the "ending tyranny" part of the statement as opposed to the statement that argued that it should be "U.S. policy to support the growth" and in fact "to promote the growth of democratic institutions and movements around the world." He makes a distinction in his article between democracy promotion and the ending of tyranny, suggesting that the ending of tyranny is what may well be remembered as the Bush Doctrine rather than the promotion of democracy. Unfortunately, Gaddis, who actually suggested the "ending tyranny" language to the Bush speechwriters prior to the second inaugural the last four years have been more about an exercise in failed democracy promotion rather than a successful attempt to end tyranny. And the question is is whether we're

going to see in the next -- whether that record of the last four years is going to be the record or the likelihood about policy in the future. And that in deed is the question before us. Will in the next four years, in the next eight years, in the next twenty years, in the next fifty years, will the United States have a policy of promoting democracy? Will it have a policy of ending tyranny? Or will it have a policy of trying to do both? Here to discuss this issue with us tonight -- this afternoon -- is a distinguished panel of scholars and commentators and thinkers who have recently all written exceedingly bright and good books about this very topic in one way or the other. To my left, immediate left, is Jim Traub, a contributing writer to the *New York Times Magazine* and the author of the just published *The Freedom Agenda: Why America Must Spread Democracy.* After Jim has introduced --

MR. TRAUB: You didn't read the parentheses that comes after that, you know, *Why America Must Spread* -- no, *(Just Not the Way George Bush Did).*

MR. DAALDER: *(Just Not The Way* -- well, I just wanted to keep some -- keep you --

MR. TRAUB: You can't read the first part without the second part.

MR. DAALDER: All right. I'm sorry. I don't have the first part down that well. So he's going to talk about not the way that George Bush did it. Amitai Etzioni from George Washington University where he teaches international affairs is the author of *Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* that was also published this year. And last, but certainly not least, are Steve Caulic here at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, Tamara Wittes who is the author of *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy.*

Jim will start off. Then we'll turn it over to Amitai, and finally to Tamara. And then we'll have a little discussion here, and then we'll open it up.

By the way, there are some seats here up front so you don't have to stand the whole time. There's at least five seats here if you want to come down.

Jim, thanks very much for being here and look forward to your comments.

MR. TRAUB: Well, thank you, Ivo, and I'm not only delighted, I'm amazed at the number of people who actually care about this enough to come out. I'm amazed and delighted. I think one answer to the John Lewis Gaddis view is contained in the movie "*W*." Now I don't know how many of you had a chance to see this movie yet, but it is the

story of a profoundly ignorant and delusional President who thinks he can bring democracy to the Middle East, and about his aides who cynically support this fantasy either because they want to take over the Middle East or because they want to get him reelected. Now, of course, we know nothing could be further from the facts, but the unfortunate thing is that some people actually believe this. And it strikes me in thinking about where we should go in the future and what it is we should hope for this doctrine that we're in a very bad place. I think that George Bush has had the effect of undermining all of the doctrines in whose name he has conducted foreign policy for the last eight years, which is okay in the case of preemption. It's not so okay I think in the case of democracy promotion. But it is clearly true -- and I discovered this just in talking about this thing when I go around the country -- is that everybody's immediate reaction is that's bad. Why would we want to be doing that? And I'm sure part of the reason is this horrible word "promotion," which obviously we need to change for "support," and "nurture," some nice word, whereas "promotion" means put something in a place where it isn't right now. And it also has this kind of attention-K-mart-shoppers quality to it, which is kind of vulgar. But it's not just that. It is this sense, I think, that people don't believe anymore in the idea that America can be a force for good. They don't believe anymore in the idea of a value-driven foreign policy. I think there

is a real danger of a kind of foreign policy of retrenchment or at the very least I would say the renaissance of realism. And you hear a lot of this now in lots of different forms. Now I think that -- when I say President Obama, I realize I'm jumping the gun, but it just seems like a plausible hypothesis -- certainly either one of these guys, but certainly Obama would not want to fall into that. But I guess the question is why should he not? That is, given that all that we know of these past eight years, given the fact that it's not that easy to come up with noble examples where the United States has been able to make a decisive difference, though there are such examples, it's just that it is a process which is so inherently difficult that the batting average is always going to look kind of low. I think given also that the specific connection that the administration insisted on drawing, which is democracy as the cure for terrorism, is not only just a terrible piece of intellectual shorthand, it's just too obviously often untrue. And so given all of those reversals, given this atmosphere, you have to ask the question why should we do it? What is the language in which we explain it? What is the pressing need for it? Now, I think you need to go back a little bit before this administration and recognize it is a thing which the United States has done for a long time. And in the book I point out it's kind of more or less (French). We've been doing it since the Colonial experience in the Philippines. But, of course, that just says that we do it,

not that we do it well, or that it is in fact doable. But certainly if you go back as far as the Clinton Administration, there was a recognition that globalization meant first, that the chief challenges we faced were not principally adversarial states, but stateless forces and non-state actors, whether terrorism, narcotics, disease, kind of financial failures which of course we see now. And second that the way to deal with these forces was an order -- was to strengthen state capacity to deal with those things. That is that failed states, failing states, weak states, are a profound danger to us because it is within such places that these forces most fester in the sense that a person in East Africa with a failed public health system, who gets some terrible disease, gets onto a plane, comes here, and now it's our problem. And obviously, 9/11 enormously increases that sense because what gets on the plane causes the death of 3000 people. So I think even prior to this Bush effort, there was already the sense that the world had changed in such a way that what happens inside states matters to us as much as the external behavior of states. And that's this sort of rebuke to realism; 9/11 of course raises those stakes enormously. And in fact, if I were to say what the Bush Doctrine was, I also would have been stumped like Sarah Palin -- I mean I would have had an answer. But it would have been wrong. According to Charlie Gibson, it would have been like the one that John Lewis Gaddis gave, but I think probably I would say

Bush's statement in the second inaugural that the success of liberty in our land, the survival of liberty -- I'm sorry, our land depends upon the success of liberty in other lands. Now I would never put it that starkly myself. But nevertheless, I do think that the underlying 9/11 perception is right and sits upon this larger conception that globalization makes this incumbent upon us. And so I think if it is true that this thing is not just a kind of humanitarian effort that we make because we believe in democracy and want other people to enjoy its fruits, but that in fact it is important to our national security. The question going forward is going to be how are we going to talk about it not only in terms of language, but in terms of action? And one thing that occurs to me is that there's a convergence between the way Obama talks about this issue and the recent Stabilizations Operations Manual that the U.S. Army turned out. That is the premise of the Stabilization Ops Manual is that fixing failed states, fixing weak states, is as central to military doctrine as being able to carry out hostilities effectively. The way Obama tends to approach this whole democracy promotion issue is without particularly using the words "democracy" or "promotion." He, too, says -- I think he used the figure "sixty" -- there are sixty weak states in danger of failure throughout the world, and they pose a profound danger to us. And so the business of nation building, he would say, is going to be central to his time in office. A few quick thoughts about

that: One is that you may have noticed in the Vice Presidential debate when Joe Biden was asked what's the one program that you're going to have to cut back because of the economic bailout? He said foreign aid. Now, of course, that's easy because foreign aid is money for people who don't vote, so it's always popular to say you're going to cut that. But it is central to Obama's sense that nation building is a national security issue that one has to also be willing to spend money on it. And it seems to me it is, in fact, a fundamental difference between Obama and Bush and the Bush Administration. Those guys believed in democracy promotion, but not nation building. And if that's the case, you are left with basically two choices: either the Bradley fighting vehicle on the one side or rhetorical exclamations on the other side. And that's one reason it seems to me why this process failed. What they leave out is the need for the kind of slow, persistent, frustrating, state-building activity, which has to be part of that. And so my guess is that we're going to be hearing a lot or maybe more about state building than we are about democracy promotion. But I would just say as a last point, I think it's a mistake to stop using the word "democracy" as a lot of people are inclined to do because it's an American brand, it's seen as like Coca-Cola, that nobody wants this thing anymore. And the answer is people still do. People in the Middle East still say they want democracy. They believe in democracy. It's the best possible

system. And as we think for example about Pakistan, which is going to be one of the great challenges, maybe the single biggest challenge this administration is going to face in foreign policy. There is no solution there except for making the democracy of Pakistan deeper and more extensive. And so that's a case where the state-building agenda and the democracy-promotion agenda are going to be one in the same. So let me stop there and we'll continue.

MR. DAALDER: Great, thanks. Amitai.

MR. ETZIONI: Thank you, Ivo. It's the second time in a week that I benefit from your guidance, so I hope before this is over you can say your story about the concert of democracies. I think now it's an important part of the story, and I want to thank you for your book, including subtitle *Not the Way Bush Did It.* I think you should have done it four years ago, eight years ago.

Here's my problem: Assuming your friend the pharmacist takes you for a tour of the pharmacy, and you say my God, there are a bunch of bottles, which are labeled medications, which are full of vitamins. And there's a bunch of bottles labeled medication and they're full of cyanide, and you say to them how can you put the same label on both bottles? And they say you are right. And you leave, and he leaves the labels the way they were before. From my viewpoint, democracy building,

nurturing, promotion, is a non-lethal means -- through education grants, maybe foreign aid, -- is as American as apple pie, you can debate it as Chinese, but otherwise I don't know many people who would disagree. And spending whatever Ned, Schmed, in bed, they're all kind of good people who do that and God Bless them, and more power to them. That's not it to talk about. These are the vitamins. What's the problem, then we send the Marines and missiles and CIA and Special Forces to promote democracy. That is discussion. And when you call both the same label, I'm sorry you can confuse vitamins with toxins. And I know immediately after I finish, they'll go right back and talk about democracy promotion or whatever the phrase is without distinguishing what are we talking about? I don't know how I can make it more explicit. It makes a huge difference. If you invade a country and bomb it to liberate it and kill 100,000 people and cause civil warfare among the various tribes and then leave and don't build democracy, all you do is send them four brides and movies and invite them for dinner and promote democracy with non-lethal means. So I just take it for granted, I'm sorry, my time is limited. There is nothing to talk about when you talk about non-lethal promotion, and I want to talk about other problem. And here we come to aggression, which is a serious question in most ways, and I think deserves another moment of deliberation. Our democracy is the only reliable progress for peace. You

show in your book that it doesn't work for the Philippines, it doesn't work other places, but that is a serious thesis because if you -- if only democracies can be good partners in peace, then yes, I can see a reason I would want to topple a regime like North Korea if I feel the only way I can get it to give up nuclear weapon, to stop supporting terrorism, to become a reliable partner in peace, I will have to democratize it because otherwise I will not be able to work with it. I think that is wrong. That for me is the crux of the matter. You can have reliable partners in peace without them being first democratized. Let me be very specific here, and given the limits of time -- I have written a book on that -- I just run through the headlines. I started by looking at the Muslim world. If you're opposed to the Muslim world, here's the criteria: Are you for or against liberal democracy? Are you signing up on our abuse of human rights and our democracy? We can argue how many Muslims of the world we supported. Clearly there are some, most of them in Europe, but you will find the different polls will give you different numbers. If you ask them are you against terrorism? Are you against invading other countries? Are you against nuclear weapons? You find the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the largest countries -- in Indonesia, in Bangladesh, in North Africa, in Mali, among the Palestinians -- rejecting the use of force. So, you see here how much difference it makes, what litmus test you make, to who can

be a partner for the first round. Of course we don't want to stop building peace, but as a first round, let's just stop killing each other and then that will open the doors to the rest. So I'm taking the hypothesis of democracy drives security and turn it 180 degrees -- security allows you to turn to democracy. The two great successes, which everybody talks about in terms of democracy building, are Japan and Germany. What people forget to mention -- and I know something about this, I spent some childhood there, I even have an accent left -- first the war was over, first all firing ceased, then we build democracy. Now that was long time ago. My poster child is Libya. Libya did two little things. They stopped supporting terrorism and they gave up on the weapons of mass destruction. I want to be clear. Not invite us to inspect so you can cheat and hide. We took the whole thing in cargo planes and ships and took it out. They get an A plus. In all seriousness from me, Qaddafi is much more for peace than many of the other people who got to know the price of peace. But by doing the out most urgent is our first security priority give up on terrorism and give up on weapons of mass destruction. And you're not invading other countries, and not committing genocide is another part of my minimal requirements. How does it do on democratization? Very poorly. Does it mean we should keep them on the list of countries we sanction who refuse to do this? No. I think a country, which is beginning to make this jump, we

should kiss them on both cheeks and now send them four brides and dinners and movies and work with them on the next step. Look what happened with North Korea. For seven years we said we need a regime change. Now let me digress here for a moment. I was a guest of the reformers in Iran. Put yourself in the shoes of the Mullahs for a second and say I come to you -- say I want to talk to you about your nuclear weapons and such, but first of all I want to talk to you about regime change. You know what it's like, like you come to Bush and say first of all I want you to give the keys of the White House to Gore, second I want you to come pay for gay rights and abortion, and then I'll talk to you. It's not a good conversation starter. And so then we came to North Korea and said you're the axis of evil. We need to undue you before we can talk about issues. It didn't work very well. So in the last months of his term when he's concerned about his legacy he suddenly said to North Korea, you know what? If you give up your nuclear weapons, we support your regime. We'll give you food, we'll give you energy, we'll give you foreign aid, we'll throw the doors open, we'll remove you from -- and I don't know if it's going to work. But at least it's a conversation worth conducting, hopefully it will unfold. We have not gotten to that part with Iran yet. We have many signs that Robert Slavin many others report that it is exactly what Iran is looking for. Again, put yourself in their shoes for a moment.

They've been declared as the axis of evil. Our Vice President at least until recently twice a week talks about military options against Iran. Why wouldn't they seek the protective services of a nuclear weapon? We have American bases surrounding them from all sides. They asked for a non-aggression treaty and when it was put in a draft the Europeans prepared, the State Department took out that part of it. So I think at least before we start bombing and such, we should test that suggestion that we will let your own people change the regime -- by the way, they're much better at this -- if you give up on supporting Hezbollah and terrorism and give up on nuclear weapons. Now the same idea with Russia -- for the last eight years we've been on sixty different occasions blasted the Russians in public and privately for not promoting democracy, for retracting and going back to the old evil days, to nil effect. Putin is not going to give up on his base of power because they sent him some diplomats to complain about the regime. Now they had a very important business discussion, and that is there are about 10,000 small tactical nuclear weapons floating around. And in 90 percent of the material, commission of nuclear weapons can be made against the United States. They are now better guarded, but not well guarded. I need to just give you a little detail here so you get what I'm talking about. The Russian Army doesn't have terribly high standards for becoming a member of their troops. If you fail the Russian Army, you get

assigned to a Special Forces in charge of protecting fissile material. Most of them are high on drugs or alcohol or both. For $45 the terrorists from Chechnya bribed the border guards and got their weapons and terrorists into the school. There are two so complex from Chechnya that explosive belts and bribed their way into a Russian airplane and blew them up. So I don't sleep easily when they have all that stuff going on. So I hope the next President, on his second day maybe, after he deals with the economic crisis, will tell Russia you know what? We really care about what's known as a cooperative threat reduction initiative. That's very important to us. What can I give you in return? Me preaching you democracy doesn't get me very far, so how about let's start with what's our number one security concern for any expert is the combination of terrorism and nuclear weapons, that we really care about that. So these are several examples to show that if you are concerned about security, democracy will have to follow and not lead. One more step, if you look inside countries -- so far I've talked about international relations -- again, security leads rather than follow democratization. I already talked about Japan and Germany. Now I used to live in New York City twenty years ago when violent crime was very high. Some of you may remember the same for Los Angles. In those days you were told never to go into a park, I mean, that was crazy. At home -- you'd better be home by the time it

gets dark. And if you needed to walk on the street, you walk where the lights are in the middle. People were afraid of crime. People in Harlem were sleeping in their bath tubs to avoid stray bullets between fighting gangs. In those days the Los Angeles Police Chief said shoot first and ask questions later, he was hailed when he said hang them from the lamp post. People say finally we have finally a leader. Anybody who said it today would be out of the job by afternoon. What is the story here? The story here is when security is directly threatened, democracy is endangered. And when security is basic, democracies thrive. The day after September 11 about 70 percent of Americans said forget about the Constitution, give me safety. Today they say it's too much surveillance, too much police, too much police state. You can measure -- I mean we measured month by month by month. As people returned to flying -- because after 9/11 you could measure anxiety by how many people avoided flying -- as people returned to flying our commitment to rights and democracy increased. People, you know, are no different. They have this odd idea, you know, that they want their children to be able to play outside, to be able to go to school, the right to go to work, and even maybe to political meetings without being shot, without being bombed. So before they want free speech and all the other things they deserve. They want security first. So any way you slice it, it's not democracy drives

security, it's security, basic security -- I want to add here one more phrase. Why do I keep saying basic security? Because like all good things, if you go to extremes, if you say you want to be in a place where nobody gets ever shot, you know, then you really end up in a police state. So, you know, you're not looking here for perfection, but if you look at a situation where people's basic needs can be attended to without their fear of being shot. And finally another request. I have some colleagues whose job is to democratize the world, and they have a lot of those little flags and to go around on the map and just stick them. You know, democracy here and so on -- Ukraine and Georgia and so on. And when they have more flags than countries then they define democracy done. Pat Moynihan introduced that phrase where he talked about defining deviance done. So what happened was the police weren't doing so well, I talked to you about the rising statistics in crime, so the police took hard looks at crime and defined them as no longer criminal and their performance improved immensely overnight. And he referred to it as defining done deviance. Some of my colleagues do the same thing for democracy. So real democracy is really quite a big deal -- free press, competing parties, civil society, you can't always get it in two weeks, you know, especially in a place like Afghanistan. So instead the same dead elections. If you do that, you fake democracy because Syria and Soviet Union and China all

have elections. So I think if you're going to have a serious discussion, we need to understand that a democracy is a very delicate plant. It has to be long cultivated, the cone has to be carefully prepared. Read Traub's book and you'll see all the things that I couldn't tell you about.

MR. DAALDER: Thank you, Amitai. It's certainly the Middle East. Vitamins, cyanide, as long as they're not mixed. Tamara?

MS. WITTES: Right. Okay. Thanks, Ivo, and thanks to Jim and Amitai for coming over today. I think this is already a very rich discussion, and I'm looking forward to the broader conversation. I want to make just three points about the place of democracy in U.S. foreign policy, and about how democracy has been done these last few years and I think can be done better, particularly as it relates to the Middle East, which is of course my area of specialty. But a broader point first, which is -- it seems to me to make little sense to argue as some folks do that American values should not be a part of U.S. foreign policy. It seems to me that values are always an element of successful U.S. foreign policy for two basic reasons. The first is simply definitional. It's our national values that define the interests that we seek to pursue and protect in the world, the interests that our foreign policy is designed to advance. But more concretely and more practically, successful policy always demands the support of the American public. And U.S. engagements abroad can rarely be sustained for very

long without U.S. public support. And that inevitably requires that politicians and policymakers address the public sense of national values and national priorities. And it's interesting to me in listening to these two guys who preceded me on the panel today because it seems to me what we're ultimately talking about is priorities, is where democracy promotion should fall among our foreign policy priorities, not whether it should be there at all. And I think the reason that that's ultimately what we're talking about is that, you know, as Jim pointed out, national debate is swirling again as it does in every election cycle around the question of what America's proper role in the world should be. And it seems to me that those who argue for greater disengagement for a more minimalist foreign policy, the trend that Jim was worried about, almost always lose this domestic argument because of our political culture, because of our political values. Our political culture is one of universalism. That's how we define our citizenship. That's how we define our national identity, in terms that are not restricted by ethnicity or language, but in terms of values that our founding fathers declared were universal values. And I think that's clearly reflected ultimately in the choices Americans make about their foreign policy priorities. And that's just been reinforced over time, I think, because our national self concept derives from our national experience. And in the last century, that is an experience in which our

interests have driven us to engage and not to withdraw. So democracy promotion it seems to me is just part of this broader dynamic of values in U.S. foreign policy. It's thoroughly embedded in the history of U.S. engagement abroad. Just about anytime an American President was about to embark on a major international engagement, the notion of democracy would be invoked sometimes as just a rhetorical cover, but sometimes as a more meaningful component of justifying that engagement. And, you know, we can and I think often do make arguments about whether American Presidents when they're talking about democracy promotion are being sincere or whether it's just a cover for the pursuit of economic interests or strategic interests. Nonetheless, democracy promotion has consistently, I think, played a major role in U.S. foreign policy, and I don't see any reason to suggest that that will change. So I really think what we're talking about is where it ranks on our national priority list.

Second point. It seems to me President Bush had the right idea to try and promote democracy in the Middle East and the exception in American policy there. Not so much as Amitai suggested because -- not so much because democracy in the Middle East would be an antidote to terrorism; the empirical evidence I think is thin to support that hypothesis. But in my view because there were deep and there are deep underlying

social and economic changes in this region that are making democracy more and more important to regional stability. And regional stability in the Middle East has long been a prerequisite for the pursuit of core American interests in the region. But Bush went about democracy promotion in the Middle East in a way that didn't move the ball forward very much, and in fact in a number of places, may well have set us back. It seems to me there were three cardinal mistakes in the Bush approach. One of the biggest, really strategic mistakes that the Bush Administration made in implementing its freedom agenda for the Middle East was pushing hardest for democratic change in those places that were least well prepared to manage it, the conflict-ridden, weak governments in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq post-invasion. And the Bush Administration largely defined democratic change in these places, compounding its error according to the phenomenon of elections. When you have ongoing conflict between different communities in a state, when the central government doesn't have a monopoly on force, can't protect the basic security of its citizens, when citizens, therefore, don't trust the government to be a neutral arbiter between them, in an environment like that whether it's in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world, people are going to support local communal organizations that can provide that basic security, that are looking out for their interests. And when you hold

elections, open elections, in that environment, then those armed community-based organizations will get a lot of public support, and they will compound the support they gain with their weapons from the community with electoral legitimacy. And that's what happened in Lebanon with Hezbollah, which strengthened its position in the Lebanese Parliament. That's clearly what happened in the West Bank in Gaza. And that's what happened with the Shi'a militias victorious in Iraq's Parliamentary elections, the consequences of which we're dealing with still today. And here is where I think Amitai's argument about prioritizing security over democracy is clearly correct. In these sorts of cases, there are certainly places in the world where people's concern for security overwhelms their interest in a functioning, pluralistic democracy. Where, in fact, their insecurity is so profound that they cannot feel safe in a pluralistic democracy that includes elements like these militant elements in the three cases I've been discussing. And the Bush Administration clearly undermined, I think, ultimately stability as well as the cause of democracy in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories by neglecting conflict resolution, by neglecting that security imperative, and putting all its eggs in the basket of elections. But I think that the argument about prioritizing security over democracy has limits. It is limited to that set of cases. There are many more places in the world where we might think of promoting

democracy that are not weak states. In fact, they're states where the government is quite strong, perhaps too strong. Many of these places are strategic partners of the United States, places like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. And this gets to a very difficult problem, which I'll talk about some more in a minute, which is the problem of how to resolve the conflicts we perceive between advancing democracy in those countries and other forms of strategic cooperation with those countries. But I think it's important to note that we're not talking here about the tradeoffs that Amitai is highlighting between democracy and security. The security cooperation that we engage in, for example, with Egypt, is not anything much that enhances the security of Egyptian citizens. It might enhance our security somewhat. It definitely enhances the security of the Egyptian government vis-à-vis its domestic opposition, but if you're looking at the perspective of the local populous, which is something Amitai to his credit focuses on intensely in his book, I'm not sure that's the tradeoff we're looking at in a place like Egypt, and I'm not sure that that's a kind of tradeoff we would want to make in a place like Egypt.

Second problem with the Bush approach. Even where it did focus attention, it didn't do a very good job of matching its diplomacy to its rhetoric, or its diplomacy to its democracy-assistance funding, the money that was being spent to promote democracy in the Middle East. Now I

think there's a good reason for this, which is that democracy is a long-term prospect, okay? It's an evolutionary process or sometimes very discontinuous, going in fits and starts, backsliding and then moving forward, and our political system, and our foreign policy bureaucracy more particularly, are oriented toward short-term outcomes. So a key challenge is just figuring out how to translate our long-term interest in advancing freedom, advancing liberty, advancing political openness, into short-term indicators that our government officials can then put up against our other short-term imperatives. So if I'm an ambassador at post out in a friendly country, but an autocratic country, and I have a trade mission coming from Washington that wants to sell planes, and I also have this sort of ongoing cable traffic from the State Department saying you have to promote human rights, how am I going to rank the imperative of that arriving trade mission and the imperative of talking to my counterparts about human rights? I can always talk to them about human rights next week, but the trade mission is coming this week. The members of Congress are asking for outcomes this week. My assistant secretary is testifying this week, and that's how democracy promotion continually sort of slips down the priority list. So figuring out how to overcome that natural tendency I think will be a key challenge for the next administration, if in deed it wants to get serious

about democracy promotion in the region. And as I said, I think it should for reasons that I'm happy to go into later, but I won't dwell on now.

The third problem that faced the Bush Administration, and the one that I think is really the hardest to solve, it's one that the Bush Administration never actually faced up to very well in the Middle East. But it's one that bedevils all U.S. administrations who seriously try to advance freedom around the world, particularly with our autocratic allies. And that is that there are sometimes real conflicts of interest between pushing democracy and achieving other strategic goals, and difficult choices that the U.S. has to make about where to press for democracy and at what price. Often times administrations like to fudge this question, and this gets us into a lot of trouble. It seems to me that we are often accused of hypocrisy and double standards for the choices that we make, when we admit we're making them and we don't admit that we're making them. So we might as well be a little more honest with ourselves and then honest with the rest of the world about where and why we are promoting democracy and where and why we are not. There are, though, times when we are afraid that we are facing conflicts of interest that don't really exist. And I think you see this in the Middle East as well. Often times, democracy and human rights advocates, asking for tougher U.S. government policy toward Egypt, for example, are told well we can't push

the Egyptians right now because we need their cooperation on a peace process, and if we push them too hard on democracy, they'll stop working with us on the peace process. There's a tradeoff between these two things. I think we've seen actually from the evidence of the last few years that that sort of conflict is less real than imagined. It's something that we tend to preempt ourselves by worrying about it. If you look at 2004 and 2005, when the Bush Administration was trying to speak quite vocally about democracy and human rights in Egypt when Egypt was facing presidential elections and parliamentary elections, at the same time we were trying to help Israel withdraw from the Gaza Strip and negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militant factions. The Egyptians did not lessen their cooperation on those peace-process related issues, one wit, despite all the criticism they were getting on domestic governance from Washington. If anything, they accelerated their cooperation, and the reason is quite obvious because the Arab-Israeli peace process is as much in Egypt's interests as it is in our own. Sometimes being a super power, we assume that we need to cajole our allies into coming along with us, when the reason they're there with us is because of shared interests. And so recognizing where those interests are shared and relying on those a little bit to mediate tension over democracy and human rights I think is something we could do a better job of.

But this brings me to a third point, which is that there really are times and places where democratic progress is quite important to furthering other American strategic interests. And so the question then is how we make that case to our target countries who are often, as I said, our autocratic allies? In Pakistan over the last eight years we have had a wonderful case study and a wonderful experiment in the alternative where the Bush Administration was willing to support, strongly support, military dictatorship in Pakistan in the name of prioritizing counterterrorism and security, giving it explicitly a higher priority than democracy in Pakistan. I'm not sure that it netted us much in terms of additional counterterrorism cooperation from the Pakistanis, and ultimately I think the Bush Administration also came to the conclusion that the democracy deficit in Pakistan was getting in the way of the Pakistani government's ability to cooperate with us on counterterrorism activities. And so there's been a subtle shift in policy, which I imagine if Obama does succeed on November 4th as Jim suggested, I imagine you will see a greater shift in that direction. It's something that the candidate has spoken about explicitly of seeking to use democracy promotion in Pakistan and the strengthening of democracy there as a way of building greater public support for the common goal of Pakistani security and counter-radicalization efforts in Pakistan. I would argue that, in fact, in the Middle

East here and now, we are facing a situation where our strategic interests on core issues in the region, security issues, and our interests in democracy promotion are reinforcing one another. That the instability created by some of the Bush Administration's mistakes over the last eight years are not inevitable to democracy promotion in the Middle East, but that in fact we have a strong case to make to our autocratic allies in the region. That we and they have a common interest in countering radicalization in the region through efforts of conflict resolution -- meaning the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iraqi stabilization, and efforts at liberalizing reform at home. And that we both need that agenda to move forward in order to build a foundation for long-term cooperative relations between ourselves and our Arab allies.

I'm going to stop it there and just emphasize again the point that I don't think there's any disagreement among us about the notion that democracy promotion is empirically and inherently an element of U.S. foreign policy. It's a question of where it falls. Thanks.

MR. DAALDER: Thanks, Tamara. In fact, that last point just strikes me and raises a fundamental question because there is a lot of agreement among the three of you. I think there is an agreement that security is a fundamental basis for democratization; that without security, you can't have democratization; that, in fact, the whole notion, Jim, that

you talked about about enlarging the spectrum from democracy to state or nation/nation or state building underscores the reality that you need to build security, which is what a state provides, after all, that's what states are about, they're about providing security for the people who live there. And it raises the question because there's an assumption here underlying I think all three of your presentations, and in deed American policy on this issue, that the issue is finding where the priority is. The issue is to find the right situation in which you can promote that, but once you've done that, we can actually promote democracy. This is something we can do; that there is something -- there is a strategy that allows you to move from a non-democracy liberal state of affairs to a democratic state of affairs. That somewhere there is a path that gets you from A to B. And that there is an active strategy that the United States and countries like it can pursue to get you from A to B. And elaborate on that. Why is that so? Let me -- just to add, I think the recent history -- and if the recent history, which Jim, you've looked at more than anyone else -- it's not just Iraq or Afghanistan, but in deed it's the recent history of the 1990s. Go to a place like Bosnia where there were regional elections just last month -- or this month -- reaffirming the ethnic divisions that, in fact, underscore -- were the result -- were the basis of the war that tore that country apart until twelve years ago when we had a successful peace operation. And you start to wonder

about the degree to which we have, in fact, the capacity to actively promote democracy. So Jim, start off, but others I'm sure --

MR. TRAUB: Well first I think you're exaggerating our agreement. I was worried Amitai and I were going to agree, and thank God we don't. At the most basic level -- I mean I think you put a very important challenge in front of us, which is, is this a subject? And your point is no, it's not a subject because either we're talking about regime change in which case we have an argument, or we're not talking about regime change in which case we're talking about something trivial. Now in that case I shouldn't have written my book. So obviously I think there's something that's highly non-trivial, and I think what Tamara talked about were many of the highly non-trivial difficult questions, which in fact are entailed by this question of democracy promotion, which is what should we be doing in Egypt? What should we be doing in Pakistan where, in fact, we face what appears to be a contradiction between the demands of security -- in this case in the war on terror -- as opposed to the demands of democracy? And should we be making those decisions because we think democracy is a morally good thing or because, as Tamara said, because we actually think that democracy is not only morally and cyclically good, but actually ultimately leads to greater security? Now those are really fundamental questions, and they involve actual mechanisms, really

important mechanisms, which are neither merely nice things, merely Fulbrights, nor are they the business end of a Bradley fighting vehicle. So those are big questions. I think also -- Amitai talked about the question of Georgia and Russia. Well, that's a different form that democracy promotion takes, which is to say, should we say we have a lot of fish to fry with Russia and it just doesn't matter that much that one is an autocracy Russia and the other is a democracy Georgia? Or should we say no, it is part of our policy, it matters to us to be favoring democracies, and if so, why does it matter to us? So it seems to me it's an extremely consequential set of questions, so I just wanted to put that to the side, probably because I didn't want to answer Ivo's question which is really hard to answer, which is you're a doctor -- to go back to the analogy -- you're a doctor. Do you actually have any cures for this disease? And I think -- I sort them into two things. There's kind of high-democracy promotion and low-democracy promotion. Low-democracy promotion is state building. That's all the slow, steady things that you do in order to slowly accelerate the process, which otherwise is a long, organic vegetable process of state development. So there's that. But then there are actually quite consequential moments when you can do something at the level of diplomacy. So in the Reagan Administration when we finally withdrew our support from dictators in Chili, South Korea, and the

Philippines, it made a really consequential difference because American diplomacy is really powerful. Now when we tried the same thing in Egypt, it didn't work very well because there it seems to me that the resistance, the intransigents of the thing we're dealing with which is 3000 years of Egyptian history, is really, really deep. In Pakistan can we make a difference? I don't know. It's really important that we try. I think we can, but it's going to be way harder than we think.

MR. DAALDER: Amitai.

MR. ETZIONI: I don't mind differences. I grew up in Israel. I can live with --

MR. TRAUB: Why would you -- what's the point of talking otherwise?

MR. ETZIONI: But there isn't. I'm sorry to disappoint you, by the way in your book you point out very well the idea that to build democracy in order to be secure didn't work very well when you pointed out the democratic Philippines did cultivate terrorists. So you're quite helpful to me and I appreciate it. And by the way, since everybody --

MR. TRAUB: I can argue with myself on this one.

MR. ETZIONI: Please, be my guest. And since people are mentioning books, I should say I spelled it out in a book which is called oddly *Security First*. Now, seriously though, I did not mean to say that

peaceful promotion of democracy is trivial. I think the argument about it is trivial because I don't know anybody as serious who is opposed to promoting democracy with peaceful means. We can talk about the ranking, and I'll come back to it in a second, but the debate I think is focused by the way we should use force because that's what regime change means to most of the people.

Ivo, to answer your question, do we have what it takes? It's really very similar to making soup out of nails. You see you add some meat and some potatoes and some onions and some carrots, and pretty soon you have a fairly decent soup. Now a democracy starts as nails. It's hard and in order for it to work, it requires very long and very high investment even when the conditions are favorable. And I invite people to go back to the study of what happened in Germany and in Japan -- first of all, it took eight to ten years, not three weeks, and second the investment was much, much higher than anything we are dedicating now, and the conditions were particularly favorable. So the notion that you can take -- you mentioned Bosnia. You may mention Haiti and Cambodia and there's a long, long list of countries in which we tried. So it's -- I'm all in favor with peaceful means. The realization is very taxing, very difficult. But I want to talk about Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I think they are important cases to focus on, and here I think we face a different issue. And that is if you are

in the democracy building business, there comes a sequence within it. So far I talked about relationship, what comes first security or democracy? Now I want to say if you are going to assemble democracy, where do you have to start? You cannot start with elections in countries in which all liberal forces were destroyed, and all you have is the government and its Secret Service and a few extremists in the underground. If you open that up, not only is damage done to your foreign policy, the democracy is going to last about 5 minutes. That is what correctly has been called “one person, one vote, one time.” And so we don’t do any favor to a country by forcing ineffective radicals into office. So what you do? You have to start creating conditions under which the liberal forces can find their legs. In order to have a democracy, you have to have competitive political parties. In order to have democracy, you have to have access to a free media. So you start playing cards in these countries to open up their press a little, to allow reform groups to meet, and somewhere in that process comes then elections. But if you leave as elections, you’re going to get a situation which is doubly damaging us, our foreign policy interests, and to the ultimate result you want a democracy which is just not normally democracy, but one which deserves an elevated name.

MS. WITTES: Okay, can I add two points onto that quickly? Number one. Amitai mentioned investment, and I think he’s absolutely

right. If you look at successful cases, you will see that it required a huge investment not only of money, but of time and commitment. And, you know, it's quite right to wonder, as Ivo did in his opening remarks, whether the American public really has the stomach for that right now. So even if we are to conclude that it's in our interests to promote democracy in this place or that, there is a case to be made to the American people, and it requires leadership on the part of the next President in order to make that case and win that investment. But I don't think there's any question that in order to be successful, it requires a significant investment. Another comparison, if you look at the amount of money spent by the U.S. government in the few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall under the Freedom Support Act. That was a tremendous investment by U.S. taxpayers in consolidating democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. An investment that for the most part I think has paid off really well. But if you compare that to the amount of money that has been set aside for democracy promotion in the Middle East over the first five years of the freedom agenda, it's a factor of about 18:1 Freedom Support Act versus Middle East democracy funding. So we have a long way to go. On process, though, I think this is a really important point to tackle. First of all, I don't know that there is an ideal process or path that we could follow. There are certainly lots of tools in the toolbox, and you

have to apply them differently in different situations. But to address this frontally, it seems to me that the United States often has not much choice about things like whether we care about elections or whether we don't care about elections, whether we pay attention to what's going on inside these countries. Most of the still-authoritarian countries around the world have some kind of elections already, however rigged they may be, and Egypt is certainly an example. They have Parliamentary elections every five years, and they have a multi-party system in that Parliament. So the question is not whether the United States is going to say have elections or don't have elections. The question is what's the context within which those elections take place? And what's the United States focusing on when those elections take place? And I think this gets us to something very important, which is that we need to be a lot more focused -- and this is something I go into at length in my book, -- since we're all flogging our books -- *Freedom's Unsteady March*, I talk about the primacy of political rights and the need for the United States to pay a lot more attention to the context of political liberty within which these manufactured elections are taking place, which means -- you know, the question is less whether there is one or more candidates on the ballot, but what are the rules that say who can get on the ballot? And how open are those rules? Okay? What are the rules governing what journalists can say in the newspaper? It's

great to do media training. We should be training journalists on what their role is in a free society. But if we are not also talking to their governments about giving them space to implement those lessons, then our money is wasted. So I think we really can focus in on the issue of political rights as a way of getting at these enabling conditions. But the notion that there's some ideal sequence of events that we can, you know, say point A, point B, point C, in every situation, I think we have to get away from that.

MR. DAALDER: I found the agreement, which is that we shouldn't concentrate on elections. We should concentrate on the basis that allows elections to succeed. Although I don't know whether competing political parties and access to free media are the key because I'm not sure what that makes the United States which has neither, which is why we're all paying so much money to have other people advertise.

Let me open it up to a very patient crowd over here, and the first person who caught my eye was Diana Negroponte.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Thank you very much. Diana Negroponte of Brookings, but also a trustee of Freedom House. I want to challenge Jim Traub's analysis of the trivial. When an organization with both private American money and federal grants seeks to act as a facilitator in Kyrgyzstan to gather civil society together to train them in non-violence, which invests in the printing press, and then which

communicates the case of a young woman who was arrested crossing the border with her computer which has software which is seen as threatening, that closes down the program. We end or have to end our programs and withdraw not American citizens, but Bulgarians and Romanians. Is that really trivial?

MR. TRAUB: Is that really --

MS. NEGROPONTE: Trivial. It's your use of the word "trivial" and perhaps -- I want you to help --

MR. TRAUB: Well, I think you must have misunderstood me.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Very good. Thank you.

MR. TRAUB: Oh, no, I think I meant the opposite. No, no. What I was saying was that I was objecting to Amitai's argument that there were these two choices, either a thing that was so obviously everyone agreed with that it wasn't worth talking about, or regime change. My point when I used the word trivial was that there are extremely tough, at the margin political decisions, whether you call them decisions about priorities or something else, that go into this whole question of whether you want to have democracy promotion or not. I wasn't at all saying that I think that the efforts made by American NGOs, for example, are trivial. I mean, if I

thought that, then why would I be believing in this stuff and writing this book?

MR. DAALDER: I think that's right. Sir, right over here. Further down, about three -- there you go, oh, Larry, sorry!

QUESTIONER: Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution and NED. So I'll direct this question to Tamara, but I'd be interested in hearing everyone's response. So you said the Bush Administration put priorities on the wrong places in the Middle East, the more intense or vulnerable conflict zones. So presumably the further you move away from the heart of Israel, Palestine, and Iraq, and so on, the less risky it would be and the more perspicuous. Go out a little further to Egypt or go out even further to where you were in the recent elections in Morocco and ask this question. In the places that would be somewhat more perspicuous or maybe a little bit less risky, what is the incentive of any of these regimes to go beyond the purely superficial and cyclical forms of tactical liberalization that they've been engaged in? And if they judge the risks as too great and their love of power as too enormous, what can the United States do to change their calculation of incentives? Because I think the logic of what you've been writing about is we can pour all of the money we want into political reform programs and, you know, if there's not the political will to take real reform steps, it's probably not going to have much impact. And

we can pour a lot more money into civil society programs and that will help on the demand side and have some impact. But if you don't change the calculus at the top, you know, gradual reform is probably not going to happen.

MS. WITTES: Well, thank you. That's a fantastic question, and I would have expected no less from you. And I think Morocco is a fascinating case to look at in trying to address this question. You know, it's a place that the Bush Administration often cites as a success story because it has engaged in some gradual liberalizing reforms, revising the social code to give women greater equality, opening up the political party system so that it's very easy actually to register to become a party in Morocco and to compete for Parliament. They have a Islamist party there that sits in Parliament and doesn't face the same degree of repression or exclusion that Islamist parties face in other countries like Egypt or Jordan. So you can look at Morocco and say, you know, well, just keep going down the path. And the Moroccan regime at this point has judged that it's not ready to go further down that path. It risks its own power and privileges. It risks in its view extremism, empowering extremists. And so how do you make this case? I think there are two key elements to the case. The first is look at what happened in Morocco's elections last year where in a widely anticipated election, the rules of which were freer and

fairer than any prior election in Moroccan history, produced a voter turnout of around 20 percent, and that shocked everyone. Why did Moroccans, given this tremendous opportunity about which many had been agitating for years, not go to the polls and make their voices heard? Because they had concluded that the Parliament they were voting for had no capacity to address their problems, the power to address the economy, to address national security, to address the budget devoted to education, to address corruption, that power all still rested in the Royal Court, which maintained control over key ministries and key agencies. And the Parliament actually had very little to do. And over a few cycles, electoral cycles, where people tried this system and didn't see it producing results, they gave up. And we know this because it wasn't simply a question of people not showing up to the polls. A significant proportion of the ballots cast in the election were spoiled. People scrawled messages on them, saying all parties are corrupt. You know, this system is worthless. So it was a clear message from the Moroccan people that this kind of limited reform also isn't going to bring you stability or necessarily security. Today in Morocco there are riots. There have been labor riots and food riots in Morocco over the last couple of months almost daily. And so the regime knows that the limited reform it has done is insufficient to address people's concerns. I think you see that in Morocco and you see it across the region.

The other part of the case, though -- and I'll try to do this briefly -- is the case that our government has to make to its counterparts, to Arab leaders. Why should you care about this reform? We're facing a region today where we have a coalition of revisionist forces that are bent on reducing our role and contradicting our interests in Israel-Palestine, and Iraq, around the region, and this is a coalition of revisionists including Iran, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and on and off, Syria. They're still figuring out where they sit. And facing off against this coalition is the United States, Israel, and for the first time, just about every major Arab state is on the same side as Israel in this regional divide. Now it's a regional divide -- the threat that's being posed by these revisionists is not just about stirring up violence in Iraq or in the Gaza Strip. It is also about stirring up discontent within Arab countries against their leaders. And the critique that Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, the critique they're making of the reigning powers in the region today, is not just about our foreign policy. It's also about our Arab allies' domestic governance and the fact that they don't listen to the plight of their own people. So if we're going to beat back this revisionist threat in the Middle East in order to protect our own interests there, we can't just focus on conflict management and conflict resolution. We also have to focus on addressing these domestic

grievances that are giving Hassan Nasrallah the material to work with, and I think that means pressing political reform.

MR. DAALDER: Jim?

MR. TRAUB: Yeah. I don't actually have a very convincing answer to Larry's question because the fact is you cannot show an authoritarian leader a path of reform, which leads to his retaining his authority in a new reformed state. Now we quite rightly recognize that the path you're beckoning to him to take is one that leads to his extinction. And so then the question is, as Larry said, what levers do you have to make him do a thing which he quite likely recognizes is not in his interests? Now I think there is sometimes an answer to that, in part because of some of the points that Tamara raised and part because of America's own diplomatic power. So then the question becomes can you do things that will open up small amounts of space? Can you help drive in a little wedge which will then stay there? I think that this issue arises very much in the question of Islamist parties that I don't want to go into at length, which Tamara's touched on a little bit, but it's one thing that almost all of these leaders -- some of them are more reasonable than others, like Moroccans. Jordan's a little less so, Egyptians yet less so. They won't allow the Muslim brotherhood to really operate. I think it's in our interests not to embrace them -- they don't want to be embraced. We aren't going

to embrace them, but to accept their legitimacy and to allow them to operate in their societies because the way they function right now is in fact one of the few ways of creating space in what is otherwise a really sealed off policy. There are other things we can do, but I admit they're relatively modest.

MR. ETZIONI: Well, first Larry, I think we haven't talked about the darker side of democracy not building, and that is when we help train Secret Services and police and interrogation techniques, give surveillance tools and such, whether in Latin America or the Middle East. So a very good place to start for us to stop that and that would go a surprisingly long way to get their attention. I mean the regimes which need encouragement to change. Second -- and I'll make it very brief -- I agree with what's already been said, that there are situations where we can influence at the margin, but where Tamara's secret is concerned in influencing the democratization of Afghanistan and there you are. And then we decided election is to come first, again, we can go on. But the thing which really deserves our attention is when you put Iran and Hamas as the revisionist forces. We had on this stage not long ago the former second in command of Jordan who had written a book, *The Arab Center*, and he talks about revisionist forces. But I think and seriously, I just hope you didn't mean that to put in the same box those who want to impose a

religious tyranny on anyplace they can get their way. And again, I've been to Iran. And there's no mistake what they want and that is to undue democracy. They believe -- and if you know any fundamentalists of any religion, people have strong beliefs, and I respect them for that. Actually that's one of the things we could have more of on the reform side, some strong beliefs. But what they want is, you know, have women and put them back and all those things which they believe God told them to do, to put together with the people who want gradual reform I think simply and analytically mistaken and will not get us to the Promised Land. So I think --

MS. WITTES: Who are you saying did that, blurred that distinction?

MR. ETZIONI: Well, I think the tunnel vision is a cover of different forces. When I think about revisionists, I think about people who want me to buy something.

MS. WITTES: Oh, no, I mean it in an international relations sense; people who don't like the current balance of power and want to change it in their favor. And that's what these actors are doing.

MR. ETZIONI: It's very problematic to put them all in the same box. There is true that the Mullahs who want to have a religious tyranny, and they are a liberal force in Jordan such as --

MS. WITTES: But I'm not talking about the Muslim brotherhood in Jordan.

MR. ETZIONI: But I do.

MS. WITTES: Okay.

MR. ETZIONI: And so I think we should -- don't think we should treat them all as if they all one kind.

MR. TRAUB: Are you saying that we should treat all Islamists parties as being fundamentalist in the same way, and therefore not to be worthy of engaging them?

MR. ETZIONI: Not at all. I think those issues that you mention there is no problem in distinguishing between the more moderate part of the Muslim brotherhood who you mentioned and other such groups, and Hamas for instance.

MR. TRAUB: Yeah.

MR. DAALDER: We'll go in the back all the way over there. Yeah, the tall gentleman. There you go.

QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Jonathan Geyer with the National Democratic Institute. Another aspect of the Bush Doctrine has been the tacit approval of torture in a lot of shady places. Yet in this discussion, we sort of ignored what's happening in these stable countries such as

Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, in regard to torture. Do you -- would you please comment?

MR. DAALDER: Amitai just commented on it. We shouldn't do it, it's a bad thing.

QUESTIONER: But what is the legacy for the next President in dealing with --

MR. TRAUB: Well, I think the other part of your question, you know, which is something that I, you know, would talk about if I had had, you know, just all the time in the world, is that clearly for the United States to go around the world preaching this wonderful thing called democracy, and then actually subjecting people to torture and the complete absence of constitutional rights and creating a place that is constitutionally nowhere at Guantanamo, you know, to call it disingenuous is much too gentle. So you have to earn the right to say something to somebody in a way that's going to cause it to be believed, and we haven't done that.

MS. WITTES: I think that's absolutely right that the Bush Administration has left the United States with a credibility deficit on this issue. That said if you go back to some of the polls that Jim was talking about earlier, there's no question that citizens in the Middle East and in other regions of the world know what democracy looks like. They can

distinguish between Russian-style democracy and French-style democracy. And they have no problem associating themselves with those, you know, with Western democracies. Some of them don't particularly like an American stamp on it, which has implications for how we do democracy promotion. But it seems to me ultimately for a future administration to overcome this credibility deficit the proof will be in the pudding. It will matter what we are doing on democracy and we'll be judged on that.

MR. DAALDER: The gentleman in the gray -- in the -- that's not gray, I'm sorry. Yes, the brown camel jacket.

QUESTIONER: Leonard Oberlander , Consulting International liaison. We've heard in the discussion weighing on both sides of social and socio-political issues, but it seems to me there's a very large factor missing from the discussion so far. And that factor is the influence of the very influential business, international and national business communities, on democracy. The business communities depend in democracies on honest courts and judges and on rule of law to be able to enforce contracts. This makes businesses feel comfortable. We've heard about people feeling comfortable. What are the views of the panelists on the influence of business and perhaps the lessons learned looking at Central and South America where there has been criticism that

the U.S. has not paid lately enough attention and how businesses have declined there, but we haven't heard the same arguments about democracy slipping. What lessons are learned from South America and what is the factor of big business in the international community on promoting democracy?

MR. TRAUB: I have to say it's news to me that large corporations believe that democracy is so deeply in their interests. I mean, the 1960s -- let's say the post-World War II -- no, I'm sorry, the post-World War I experience in Latin America -- would be that what most businesses wanted at that time was a compliant country where they could operate with impunity. And that continued right up through ITT in the 1960s and '70s and so forth. I think what generally businesses want is a stable business environment with, as you say, a rule of law and the enforcement of contracts. That's very important, but that can permit what Fareed Zakaria would have called a liberal, non-democratic or a liberal autocratic state, which for many people is fine. And in deed in the decades of Chili's Pinochet, private enterprise flourished and found it quite a comfortable place to work. So I don't know that I expect much in the way of democratic spearheading from the private sector.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. Whenever I listen to a discussion about democracy promotion, I

think of the observation that George Ball made back in the early '60s when he said, you know, the world will see us as no better than we are. And that leads me to the question that I want to get at. Tamara has said that the question isn't whether America ought to be in the democracy promotion business, but where we fit it as a priority, and I agree with that. I would also add to that and then how we do it, both in terms of execution but also tonality and style, et cetera. But here's the question that I sort of have on my mind and that is how do we assess -- how do we get our mojo back? How do we assess when we are rehabilitated enough, -- you know, not unlike the Catholic Church -- we are rehabilitated enough to get back in the democracy promotion business, however we get into and whatever priority we assign to it?

MR. ETZIONI: Vote early and vote often.

MR. TRAUB: That's not the Catholic Church, that's Tammany Hall.

MR. DAALDER: A new Pope's not enough. Jim, do you want to take the --

MR. TRAUB: Yeah. I mean, I think a point that maybe Tamara has touched on, which is actually kind of startling how much effect we can have even in places where they hate us. And so, you know, Egypt, interesting example, they hate us and yet we actually caused some

movement to happen. And I don't know how much of this is effectiveness, and how much of this is a decent respect for the opinion of mankind should make it seem abhorrent to us to be preaching a thing which we ourselves are not practicing. So it is as much perhaps to do with our feelings about ourselves as it is about the world's feelings of us. And, alas, I think it's probably true that it takes a much longer time to restore your reputation than it does to destroy it. The only hopeful thing I can say is as I said before; I don't think we have to wait until we have somehow cleansed ourselves of our past sins in order to be able to engage in this endeavor. I think we have to show a good will about it.

MS. WITTES: I would second everything that Jim just said, and I would simply add that it's very likely that events will demand some kind of policy from an administration on these sorts of issues in various places in fairly short order. I mean, you know, just looking at the region I know best, there are at least two and maybe more political leaders who might depart from the scene in the next couple of years, and a new U.S. President is going to have to have some attitude toward the succession of political leadership in those allied countries. So, you know, it's not that we can avoid the issue while we're sort of searching our own souls in deciding how pure we are. I think we're going to have to have some policies in the meantime.

MR. DAALDER: Let me add I think what matters more is not whether but how. And we have spent the last five years running around the world telling people how to do their business, while ignoring how we tell them to do our business at home. And if you do it differently, which is have a conversation, start it off as a conversation, that says how are we going to solve this small little problem like the succession in Egypt? It's really not for us to tell you how to do that, though we have some ideas that you may want to hear or may not want to hear, but that we can discuss. And by the way, we're not the only ones who should be discussing. There's a lot of other people who have a lot of experiences that are different from ours, but may well be relevant for what you're trying to do. That's a very different way than running around in the world and saying thou shalt do not as I say -- not as I do, but as I say -- which is how we've been doing business for the last five years. And I think if you do it that way, you can do it from day one. And then it helps to have a new Pope.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. (Name and affiliation inaudible.) Pakistan has been recently in the news often, of course, since 9/11 because of their support for terrorism, and they have kept it still (inaudible). So in the name of (inaudible) keep the U.S. dollars flowing and (inaudible) and they're keeping Osama bin Laden even there. So Osama bin Laden has been now in the news because this Senator Obama

has been talking about Pakistan has been misusing the U.S. aid. What advice do you think you have for the next administration or let's say the next President or let's say President Obama on how to deal with Pakistan or will you continue dealing with them like the way it has been for the last eight years?

MR. TRAUB: Well, I think we can't because, thank God, we no longer have General Musharraf to deal with. But I think if you talk to people who actually know this far, far better than I, like (name inaudible) and other Pakistan experts, they will say that there is -- it is just not possible to envision a long-term solution except for a government that finally -- a democratic government -- that extends itself into Fatah. Fatah has always been this useful rear base for the Pakistani military and for the intelligence services and a reserved pool of labor for fighting their own battles. There are no political parties that are permitted to organize in Fatah, and that's quite intentional. And so that means the Mullahs basically run the show politically. And it will be incredibly difficult and it will take a long time to actually extend the state into Fatah. But it seems to me that the only solution in Pakistan -- and it is going to be a mess -- is both to deepen what is now a very, very shallow, shaky, and corrupt democratic state and to geographically extend it into areas where it doesn't go at all. And the United States I think has a big role there, though

as I've said, it's going to be really hard for us to figure out how we can be most helpful.

MR. DAALDER: I mean the other issue is something that Amitai raised with regard to Secret Services and police, which is that the far wider problem in Pakistan at the moment is that our so-called allies in the war on terror are maybe on the other side, at least half of them, at times, particularly the ISI, but also with the new Pakistani military. And their view of what is important to Pakistan isn't our view of what is important to either Pakistan or ourselves. And unless we can figure out how to square that problem, how do you get the Pakistani state to see the world in a way that is not as distorted as it has been for the last fifty years, which is training the very terrorists that are now starting to fight among themselves, let alone fighting in India, we're not going to get anywhere. So there isn't -- there is a non-democracy element here. Of course, there's a non-democracy element in lots of these things, but in this one, you can't get to the extension of the state into Fatah. You can't certainly get into the extension of the democratic state into Fatah until the institutions of the security forces and the security institutions are willing to be part of a supporting structure of a democratic state, which of course they have never done in fifty years.

The last question here.

MR. GOLDSTONE: Thank you. Jack Goldstone of George Mason University. Ivo, you said there's agreement on the panel. Let's accept there is. We're not going to divide the world into democracies and non-democracies, that you're with us or you're against us. And we're going to push for things in the U.N. Charter. We're going to encourage regimes to pursue human rights, civil society, and that's the plan. So here's my question. That plan can take ten to twenty years to pay off. How do you get an administration in Washington to put real resources into something that's not going pay off in the immediate term, and what do you tell the people in Zimbabwe and Sudan who say we want help getting democracy now, and what are you going to do to help us?

MR. TRAUB: I think that is a question -- both a political question and a substantive question because the political question is if you can't show any kind of quick wins from this, people will say well what's the point? That's just the nature of politics. So there's some things you have to do. Now, what are those quick wins? I don't know. Is it pressuring Mubarak to get rid of Mansour? You know -- pardon me, to free Mansour? But I think on a political level, you have to do that. But I also think that that's why you distinguish between the high and the low. The low thing is this long steady process. The high thing is public moments of diplomatic action, which you know conduct human attention

and activity and they succeed and they fail. Elections have a way of doing this, but if not only elections. So there also have to be those I think moments up in lights as well.

MR. DAALDER: Amitai.

MR. ETZIONI: You know, I think this situation reminds me -- I'm exaggerating to make the point briefly -- the situation France and Britain was after World War II. They still thought the big superpowers who can fix things here and there if they just put their mind to it and increased the budget. We are depleted beyond belief. Our credibility's depleted. Our military's always stretched. Our economic is in a mess. The notion that if we just put our mind to it -- I mean, I'm saying you said it, but that we are the richest nation in the world and we just -- look, there's genocide in Sudan. From my viewpoint, stopping the genocide in Sudan takes priority over any democracy building anyplace. First of it, it saves lives. That's my religion. Congo. And so if you can't get our ass in gear to do that, then come on -- so I think we need to face the fact that we have very limited leverage left, there is an enormous list of things to be done. We haven't even mentioned climate change yet, and the nukes running around in Pakistan. And so, I think the question of setting priorities will be there as vengeance. And I'm afraid, to be honest about it, that promoting

democracy as you mentioned is not going to rank terribly high on the set of priorities, and I'm not sure it should.

MS. WITTES: Jack, I think that on the political point that's precisely why I said leadership is going to be important because you have to make that case to the American people. You're going to have to make it to Congress. And, you know, as Jim said, the low-level stuff you can do, and you can probably get some investment for, but maybe not at the levels that you'd like. If you want to increase the investment, you're going to have to increase your political visibility and invest more political capital in the issue. So you have to decide where and when you want to do that. On the substantive point, though, I think, you know if anybody knows that democracy is a long-term prospect, it's the activists on the ground in places like Zimbabwe and Egypt and China, and I don't think you have to worry about their impatience. I think what they want to know is, are we with them? And if we're with them, you know, they will work with us. And I think the other point here is that we've been talking about this as though the United States is going to be engaged in this all by itself. And one of the things that I think has been tragically lost over the last few years has been a sense of democracy promotion as a multi-national, multi-lateral effort. Again, as someone said, these values are embedded in the U.N. Charter. They're embedded in human rights documents that are widely

accepted around the world. There are new democracies like India that are interested in doing more of this work. Japan is now putting money into democracy assistance for the first time in the last few years. So this can be a more multi-lateral effort, and that kind of burden sharing, I think, can help us make the investments we need to do here at home.

MR. DAALDER: Let me make a final point and then conclude on the politics of this. It seems to me if you make this issue a top issue in American foreign policy, you're neither going to have the investment nor the success that you want. You want to embed it in the structure of how you think about how you deal with other countries. You want to have every foreign service officer make this an essential part of their job when they're out in the country. You would like businesses to be advocates for this kind of change, if only by having the rule of law becoming a central component in how they are in the countries that they are operating. Businesses in that sense are very important in our dealings with Russia in the 1990s. It wasn't very successful by the way, but it was important to try to help do that. But as you want to infuse in your entire way in which you deal with the rest of the world the notion that I think Jim started off with, that the more liberal and democratic the rest of the world is, the more secure we are, which is a central part of the American ethos. It's where we started back in 1776. It was the end of tyranny here could

not be sustained unless tyranny was ended in larger and larger places. We just shouldn't be invading countries to do it because that's not likely to get the result that we want. We should have this as a central part of how we think about our foreign policy. And then maybe the money will flow naturally. There's lots of things we've been spending money on and if the American people knew we were doing it and we had to actually defend it politically, it would be extraordinarily difficult, and yet we're doing it. So that's I think and I think that's part of the message of all of us. We may want to do the priority slightly differently, but we all believe that it is important that we succeed sooner rather than later.

With that I want to thank the panel, Jim, Amitai, and Tamara for an excellent set of remarks. Thank you all.

******

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public # 351998
in and for the
Commonwealth of Virginia
My Commission Expires:
November 30, 2008