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PARTICIPANTS:

**Introduction**

THOMAS A. DINE  
Former President, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

**Moderator**

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**Featured Speakers**

THE HONORABLE SAM BROWNBACK (R-KAN.)  
United States Senate

THE HONORABLE ADAM SMITH (D-WASH.)  
United States House of Representatives

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. DINE: (In progress.) -- approach to it and as we begin soon the second decade of the 21st century. And thanks to Brookings, the Brookings Institution, for hosting us. I'm a long-time alumnus, and I'm happy to be back. When I was here, there was no such nice room as this, which dates me.

But Kristin Lord tells me that Brookings addressed the public diplomacy issue about 50 years ago. So there's a history here. Whether it's a continuum is something else, but, of course, 50 years ago was the great debate over Smith Mundt legislation.

This subject has been addressed over the last several years in a variety reports inside the U.S. Government, around the U.S. Government, far away from the U.S. Government, and so it's been shaken down, looked at, turned upside down and around many times.

If there's one common focus, however, it is we are in trouble in the global Muslim community, in particular in the Arab-speaking populations. And we'd better make policy changes, make adjustments in implementation of policy, redo the structure of American public diplomacy, including the use of strategic communications -- a new favorite phrase of so many of the report writers.

Interestingly, while each report demands better results from the U.S.G., very few of these reports recommend increasing budgetary funds to dramatically increase our impact. And having been a veteran for eight years in the Broadcasting Board of Governors -- I was President of

Radio Free Europe -- Radio Liberty -- during that time. I know how hard it is to get funds, but funds are still essential and at the core.

I ask our panelists and our audience today to acknowledge the ends of public diplomacy and their means, such as policies; explanation of policies in pronouncements; dialogues about policy; educational exchanges, radio, television, Internet broadcasting; intellectual and journalistic independence; cultural diplomacy; science diplomacy; and engaging the business sector.

I believe also we need to distinguish public diplomacy from strategic communications. As I indicated earlier, I'm a little itchy about such a coined expression. That is, the process of selecting, framing, and sharing information and images to create a favorable climate in which to advance America's interests and objectives. In short, we need a strategy to our public diplomacy.

All three of our distinguished panelists have been and are making suggestions to alter the status quo. One of our panelists obviously is not here yet. He has to vote in the House of Representatives several times, and we look forward to his getting here. But we all know that votes bog members down.

Public diplomacy is broken. Let's fix it.

Sam Brownback, born and bred in Kansas, has been serviced-oriented from high school through college and law school, state government, the U.S. House, and the U.S. Senate since 1997.

He is both a Kansas Senator, promoting the interests of his state, and a national Senator engaged in domestic and international issues that affect all of us.

When Adam Smith gets here, he'll have been introduced. Adam Smith is completing his sixth term as the U.S. Representative of Washington State's 9<sup>th</sup> District. Taking a keen interest in national security issues, he serves on both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, chairing that Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.

Kristin Lord, a Ph.D and author and former Associate Dean of George Washington's Elliott School of International Affairs, is a Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program here at the Brookings Institution.

She directs the Science and Technology Task Force of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. She is finishing up a congressionally mandated study on public diplomacy for the U.S. Department of State.

So, Kristin, I want to ask you to say a few words, answer a few thoughts, if you will, and then we'll turn to you, Senator Brownback.

MS. LORD: Great. Thank you very much, John. And for those of you standing in the back, I'd like to invite you up. There are actually several seats up here, and we'd be delighted if you came and joined us.

I'd like to thank Tom, who introduced us today, and also Senator Brownback and Congressman Smith for joining us. As Tom just said, I'm working on a study on public diplomacy, and one of the delights

of working on this particular subject is actually how much bipartisan consensus there is on the need for reform, they need to do things differently, to raise the prominence of public diplomacy and strategic communications.

And I would say there's even about 80 percent consensus on how to address those problems. I found it a remarkably constructive debate, so I'm really grateful to both you Senator Brownback and also Congressman Smith for not just participating in this debate here, but also for helping to have this bipartisan dialogue here in Washington, and to all of you in the room who contribute to that.

I know many of you spend your days working on this issue.

I wanted to start, Senator Brownback, by talking about the legislation that you're going to be putting forward today. The people in -- we've had the chance to review it. The people in this room will not have had the chance to review it. Could you tell us just a little bit about what -- the key points in what this legislation is going to include? And also why you felt that it was so important to put this legislation forward?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: I'd be happy to. And thank you for -- anybody have an interest in anything other than the financial markets today. Thank you for -- because all our calls in our office are on another topic. By the way, they're running about 99 to one against it, too, just to give you some feel for what the public thinks about some of these ideas.

And I want to recognize, too, if I could, Josh Carter. Josh, hold your hand up, if you don't mind. He's been working with me on a lot

of this, and a number of you in the audience I've met with on these different proposals.

Kristin said it accurately. Virtually across the board, people do not believe that our strategic communication apparatus is working.

We brought in different individuals to talk about how they might change it, but across the board, everybody's saying this isn't working. And then you just have to look across the world and see our lack of standing in some key places, as was pointed out initially, and you can say this is not working at all.

And so, we need to do something. We need to do something different, and we need to do something that can work in this environment that we're in.

We -- I'm going to be putting in a piece of legislation today. Obviously, we don't anticipate it passing this Congress unless we're in a whole lot longer this year than what I'm anticipating right now.

But we want to put it in a something to start a dialogue and a discussion with the Congress and with the country of how we can move forward on strategic communications. So, after we get it in, we'd sure like for the rest of you to let us know or get a hold of Josh, and he'll post his Internet site so you can rush in and crowd it up, if you'd like.

But just to let us know how you think this ought to take place, because I think next Congress, we're going to dig into this. And the summation of it is basically that we had a strategic communications entity during the Cold War and it was effective. We do not now. And we need to reconstruct something that can be of a strategic communications entity,

that will be pulling together the various pieces of strategic communications on a global basis and have that individual that heads the entity with access to the President so that the President is the person that's in charge of this ad is directing and moving this forward on a coordinated, global strategic basis.

We cannot win the War on Terrorism as a military battle exclusively. Obviously, at points in time, you need to use the military, and we have. But, at the end of the day, we've got to win the war of ideas.

And unfortunate, it seems like in too much of the case of the War on Terrorism our opponent appears to be marketing their ideas, in many cases, better than we are. As a marketing giant, with a country with Madison Avenue, and that is a beautiful and brilliant at communicating ideas and stories, as a country, we don't seem to have grabbed back and used it collectively to communicate our ideas in winning this war of ideas in the War on Terrorism.

And that's something we have to do. We've got to do that. We've got to be able to do it effectively. So, we're talking about pulling that together, getting that strategic communications, getting it focused, and answering underneath and to the President so that there's one person to be able to respond to that, and moving that -- and moving this topic forward within the next Congress and seeing if we can get this piece done.

I would just say it's -- you know, in the final point that was mentioned earlier about budgetary environment. This is something I think is going to be -- need to be done within current dollar constraints.

And I know that isn't going to be well received to a number of people, and there are going to be great cases to be made that we should expand the dollar amount.

The fact of the matter is we're looking at a deficit of a large number next year, and I would think probably either administration coming in is going to look at this and say it's important; it's important to get coordinated. I don't know that it's going to have the oomph to be able to get more dollars into it; and so that we need to think in ways that we can coordinate and pull these dollars -- of the current dollars that we have within this.

I think that's just a political reality as different as some may want it, as different as I may want it in some cases. I just think that's the fiscal environment that we're looking at and that we need to work within that constraint.

Listen I've talked longer than I intended to, but I'd be happy to respond to your questions or I hope we can have some dialogue with the audience as well.

MS. LORD: We will. We'll leave plenty of time for questions for the audience. So I know that some of you are already formulating your questions. That's good. Please hold them just a bit, and we will turn to them.

Senator, you propose a new National Center for Strategic Communications, and, as you know, those functions of coordinating and leading the U.S. Government's effort in public diplomacy and strategic



communications are currently situated in the State Department and led by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

That's something that President Bush has put into place, has tried to bolster the authority of that agency. Why have you decided that the State Department cannot do the job that you -- and needs to have a new agency in place in order to lead this effort?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Well, I think because the President has tried to bolster it, and hasn't gotten the job done. We still are having a deficiency of being able to have that strategic communications, plus anybody who's been around this town for any period of time, you know, knows you get these competitions between agencies and then it starts pulling and fraying.

And so what we're trying to do is put that in one spot and then have an overall coordinating entity of the various Secretaries. But still, this individual answers to the President of the United States.

It's not a cabinet-level position, but does answer there to try to get coordination in an entity, strategic, and not then having to carry -- carry this within one particular branch of government; that has many missions.

The State Department has many missions and gets a number of them done very well. This one hasn't -- hadn't worked well.

MS. LORD: Senator, I've seen several --

MR. DINE: As a veteran of Washington policy making for a long time, my observation is that we do miss USIA, and there are alumni in this room right now of that period.

But the only time in my observation that USIA really did well is when the director himself -- I don't think there was a woman -- not only reported into the President, but was a good friend.

The most recent experience was Charles Wick and Ronald Reagan. And it -- Wick really drove back into creative areas. I remember during the LBJ years, he had his friends there, too. These were distinguished people, but they could pick up the telephone and call. And it's this agency that you envision that's going to have that kind of leadership, which I think is absolutely essential.

It doesn't make any difference about cabinet, sub-cabinet. We all know personality.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: I would hope it would. And here, I'm not talking about reconstituting USIA. But I'm saying that that function that it served so well during the Cold War that you put in a new entity and a structure that has access to the President and direct access to the President.

You know, the President still has to appoint whoever they think is the right person for the job. Hopefully, it will be somebody that can pick up the phone and call, and also that can be persuasive to the President that these are things that we've got to do if we're going to win this war of ideas. There are other venues that we fight the War on Terrorism, but in the war of ideas, here's how we can win it.

MR. DINE: When you say, we'll put these things in it, does that include international broadcasting?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: We've got that in the draft bill.

MR. DINE: So it's inside?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Yes.

MS. LORD: And that would be a real departure, by the way, in your legislation. I mean, for many, many years, we've had a concept that we need to have independent broadcasting, a firewall between policy, leadership, and content in order to ensure that the audience -- the philosophy is that the audience who was listening to that content will find it more credible, and, therefore, more persuasive because they know there is an editorial firewall.

You in this legislation would actually propose I believe eliminating that firewall. Could you talk a little bit about why you made that choice? And that would be one of the clearest breaks from the past in this legislation.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Well, it's that we've got to get out there on our ideas. You know, we've got to fight the war of ideas. And that our opponent is out in a war of ideas, and is putting these forward aggressively and effectively, and we have to put this out.

That's why I would like its answer to the President and that -- have that direction from the director for this entity; and that we've got to get a stronger communication line up and down here in the entity to be able to communicate that; that at times, we've been very effective in the past in that battle of ideas.

But it involves recognizing that you are in a war of ideas, and you're out there competing with your ideas and putting them forward cleanly and clearly; and that we're not telling people so much about the

country of the United States, but we're talking more about the battle of the ideas that we are talking about -- on democracy and human rights, religious freedom, and these sort of concepts that we think is important as a nation and for any nation, as important for an individual, any individual, no matter where they're located.

MS. LORD: How do publics view information when they know that there's a direct line to the government policymakers? Do you think they find it as credible, as persuasive as a broadcasting service that's perceived to be more independent, that's projecting the news in an independent and objective fashion?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: I don't know if I'm qualified to answer that. I just know I compete in the arena of ideas on a daily basis in what I do.

I have a group of constituents that I represent. But I find if I don't battle for my ideas, I lose, that we just -- we're not engaged, and so then we lose. And it just doesn't seem like we are effectively engaged now, and so you lose.

And that's what -- I don't know if you can measure, well, somebody says if it's not independent, I'm not going to listen to it. You know what? During the Cold War era, they listened.

I've had officials I've worked with in other countries saying, you know, these were -- they listened to the broadcasts and the ideas being put forward. I think it's the strength of the ideas that's the critical component of it -- strength and clarity.

MS. LORD: I wonder if this is something we could ask. We have on our panel today Tom Dine, who was the head of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and I think we'd be remiss actually if we didn't ask Tom to comment on this point.

MR. DINE: With all due respect, you can imagine what's going to come now.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: It's always the set up shot.

MR. DINE: Yeah, really. Well, I'm trying to be diplomatic.

During the Cold War, the example of Voice of America, America's voice, government run; independent and Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty; BBC, independent from the Foreign Ministry in London, although taking money directly, but still, the emphasis was on journalism.

And that's why I put it in my opening remarks -- journalism using our standards in the West, independent, not propaganda. There's no doubt we are in a battle of ideas.

And there are various ways of, from my perspective, of going at it, including using independent-minded journalists reporting the news of the day in local languages.

Now, for instance, during the Cold War, therefore, this combination of French international, BBC, Deutsche Velde, VOA, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty as a combination, and there's been some Hoover Institution studies on this, as a combination really had impact, really had impact on getting that listening audience, because they were seen as information from the outside in, and you could trust it.

And I think Kristin's point is, can you trust government information. Well, you can and you can't, it just depends.

Now in terms of today's battle of ideas, Alhurra, which is part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and we fund it, but it's as independent as you can make it, Arab speaking, Alhurra in Iraq has a larger audience than Al Jazeera. And, hey, I'm all for that.

And that's quantifiable evidence that something is working. Together, VOA and Radio Free Europe broadcast to Afghanistan, and basically we're running neck and neck with BBC, but we're overwhelming - - and, therefore, having a larger audience than local radio, local television.

So it depends. China is a different story. Russia is a very different story, where they're trying to block everything, so we're trying to go through Internet.

So I think we need to clarify what this -- I'm all for a return to some kind of agency, but I'm not in favor at this point of including broadcasting because I think it will be seen as too close to government and not enough authenticity of what's really taking place. It's a very tricky line, but that firewall is critical.

Look, living in Prague and getting phone calls from ambassadors almost once a week -- why in the hell did you criticize a minister in your local broadcasts, which I then had to research and find out what was said.

So some minister in Bishkek Kyrgyzstan that criticized on our Kyrgyz service. And I had to tell the ambassador, well, that's the news. And that's the way it goes.

And he didn't like it. But, you know, we -- a very big audience in Kyrgyzstan. So all this are fundamentals and have to be debated. And they haven't been debated in a long time.

MS. LORD: And I wonder, Senator, also I could back you up to your point about the State Department and ask you to talk a bit more about your diagnosis of why you feel the State Department hasn't been able to lead the government's mission in strategic communication, public diplomacy the way that you would like.

There are lots of different explanations for this. One is resources you mentioned; that they've been given a huge task but very few resources to do it, especially compared to the Defense Department. Others in Washington have told me behind closed doors that they don't think that the State Department has the necessary range of skills.

But depending on your diagnosis of the problem, there are different solutions. One is to create a new agency, as you're proposing, but others are to bolster those capabilities, to bring in those new sets of skills, and to give the State Department more resources to do the job.

So I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about why the -- why did you make the diagnosis you made, and then also a little bit more about why choose this solution and not other solutions.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: You know at the root of it I go back to the basic premise that the problem -- that we haven't been able to get on top of the battle of ideas in the War on Terrorism.

The President has tried through the current apparatus to accomplish that, put somebody that he thought was very close to the

President and a high level on top of it as an emissary. It didn't work. And so you're saying well, then, why would you run at that again, if that one hasn't worked.

And your timeframes are not lengthy. I mean, these are the sort of battles in Washington that can take some period of time when you're trying a reorganization. And if the President -- he's run at this. He's tried to get it done. It didn't work. And we have had an effective model in the past that has worked in a similar time period where you had a battle of ideas. And we're not talking about just reconstituting that situation.

But I think it's just, you know, been there, done that. And that there are competing interests within the various branches of government, and I've certainly grown full well knowledgeable of all those, that you can get caught between those.

And a lot of times when you get caught between different views of dealing with a topic within various agencies or Secretaries, what ends up happening is nothing or it just kind of dithers along, and it doesn't deal with what you need, and then you just -- you need to get out of it.

MS. LORD: Well, Senator, I'm going to ask you one more question. Then I think that given the fact that Congressman Smith is still voting apparently, at least for now, I'm going to turn it back to our chair. He may have other questions for us, but then I think we'll turn it over to the audience.

One of the other things that is in your proposed legislation is a recommendation that this new organization, the National Center for Strategic Communication, really reach out more to the private sector and



give them grants and try to mobilize the private sector. And, of course, this is something that's been recommended by many, many reports.

But I'm wondering if you could talk a bit about first of all what kinds of activities you imagine that the Center would support and also I'm assuming that this Center would oversee covert information operations as well as overt information operations given where it would sit in the government.

How happy a combination is that likely to be in practice, to have the same organization giving grants to overt American private groups, and also supporting covert information operations?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Well, the overt is the one that I think, what we put in here, and that I think can be very effective, particularly given the new mediums (sic.) that are being used, and the development and the rapid pace with which those change as different mediums.

The covert, all we're talking about in here is with having the various agencies be able to discuss but not fund and direct that out of this entity. But this is more at the discussion level of where we called the various heads of the agencies together, because I don't think you can -- I don't think it would be wise to coordinate putting those in within one entity.

I think you really run into some of the problems that Tom was talking about if you try to do that.

MS. LORD: And could you talk a little bit more about the range of activities you're hoping those grants would fund and support in the private sector?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Particularly broadcast entities, but also I think we need to have the flexibility to go into the new medium waves that lots of different entities are using on a very effective basis and pretty cost-effective basis, too, whether it's going in through Internet or any number of other different means that I think we need to get on the -- get more on the cutting edge of that --

MS. LORD: Mm-hmm.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: -- and supply those, too.

MR. DINE: I'd like to hear what our -- there are so many experts I recognized out there, so why don't we open it up?

SENATOR BROWNBACK: I'd like to hear your comments and thoughts, too. You can put them in the form of a question, if you'd like, or you can just give us some comments.

MS. LORD: Would you kindly introduce yourself and your affiliation when you stand up?

MR. PULMAN: Sure.

MS. LORD: Thank you.

MR. PULMAN: My name is Mitchell Pulman . I'm a contractor on State Department Public Diplomacy Programs. I've been involved in a number of programs over the years.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Speak up just a little bit if you could, sir.

MR. PULMAN: Oh, okay. I'm a contractor on State Department Public Diplomacy Programs. My name is Mitchell Pulman, and in recent years, I've been mostly involved in media productions --

television, radio. I've also been involved in student exchanges at the International Visitors' Program.

And I just wanted to say I understand what you're saying about budgetary constraints. But realistically, I think a lot of policymakers aren't -- are a little detached, don't really understand the extent to which budgetary problems have created problems for public diplomacy programs.

The same problems that affect society at large -- increased airfares, skyrocketing gas costs -- does affect public diplomacy programs, as well as, you know, salaries, how much people get paid --

SENATOR BROWNBACK: You can add the weakness of the dollar.

MR. PULMAN: That, too. Absolutely. One program I'm involved with, the Television Co-Ops Co-Productions, we wouldn't be able to film in your home state this year because crews are restricted to the East Coast because of the cost of flying west. And the number programs is, I think it's about one-third this year --

SENATOR BROWNBACK: I mean, you could just station those crews in the Midwest. It's cheaper.

MR. PULMAN: They fly into, like, New York and D.C. But they're doing about one third as many productions this year as the last, and last year was about half as many as a couple years ago.

And, you know, these -- this isn't a lot of money we're talking about. I mean, compared to, you know, what we spend in Iraq, it's pocket change.

And I think really, you know, public -- the fact is public diplomacy costs money, and if we're really going to be serious about this, we don't need to talk about huge increases in funding, but we definitely need to look at some increase, at least just to stay even with what we've been doing.

And one of my concerns about creating a new agency or new department is that brings a lot of new expenses -- a new building, high salaried people at the top. And I can't help but wonder if a lot of that - - if we have funds for that sort of thing, if it wouldn't, in fact, be better spent on just supporting the programs we already have in place, where they are now.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: The problem with the last points you made is that there's just pretty strong opinion -- it seems to be backed up by public opinion in the region -- that we're not being effective how we are currently.

Now, you can say just it's strictly a resource issue. There's others that would look at this and say, there's another set of factors, several set of factors in play.

So that if your answer it is, well, let's just put more money with where we are. I don't know if you're going to get a lot of traction for that on either side of the aisle. Maybe you will.

MR. DINE: And I would like to add something. I agree with what the Senator just said. What you haven't said is this is -- this program is effective. This program is effective. This program is not effective. And it's time for a thorough evaluation, a cost-effective evaluation of what

constitutes \$1.5 billion of the American taxpayers' money, particularly now.

I mean, for 46 years I've been in this city or in and out of this city, and it's always been a tight budgetary situation. But it's real now. It is very real unless you've been gone to the moon for the last two months.

And so, the next president is kind of have a tough job because everybody -- Interior, Agriculture, Defense -- everybody is going to come in and beg. And there are going to have to be some tough, tough, tough decisions.

I think -- I just believe in -- maybe this is nature, but I believe if you really, really cut into this, you can find ways of doing it better and cheaper.

MS. LORD: Since this is supposed to be a dialogue with lots of perspectives, I'm going to add mine, because I have a slightly different view than the two gentlemen here. I actually agree with a lot of what they've said. The problem is not just money. You can do a lot with a little in public diplomacy and with creativity and a very careful assessment of what works and what doesn't.

I also think it's true that it's unlikely that any new program is going to get massive new resources given the financial constraints the next Congress and the next President is going to face.

But I also think still, that one and a half billion dollars is not a very large investment in a tool that could be used much more effectively. We could have a much more well-rounded set of policy instruments at the next President's disposal, and that this is one that merits a bit more

investment, even as we cut some areas that aren't working and assess what would be a better investment for those resources.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Yes, sir.

MR STRADLER: Thank you. Paul Stradler. I'm a Senior Fellow in Public Diplomacy at the American Foreign Policy Council and a veteran of USIA.

Just a couple of comments. One, I think the reason why it needs to be out of the State Department is that public diplomacy and diplomacy are different things. They need to be in creative tension with each other.

But diplomacy is interacting with other state governments and multilateral organizations. Dealing with foreign publics also occurs overseas, but it's a different activity, and it obviously relates to diplomacy, but they're distinctive things.

And kind of an institutional part of that is it's very difficult for an Under Secretary, even if a good friend of the President and able to call up the President, to speak to Congress, to speak to OMB about their particular needs as distinct from the State Department.

And an Under Secretary reporting through the Secretary of State, arguing for public diplomacy, also has to talk about retirement and building security and treaty obligations and all those kinds of things.

So, it -- you can never get a clear argument for public diplomacy in tension and underneath a Secretary of State whose job it must be to focus on traditional diplomacy.

A Secretary of State who does not do that should be cashiered , obviously, so, they're different things and the fact that they're called public diplomacy sometimes confuses us that they must be kind of the same thing. But cheesecake and cheese are different things. And public diplomacy occurs overseas, but it's different.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: That's a good point.

MR. STRADLER: A comment on the firewall. Somehow it's grown the idea that broadcasting need special protection, but all other forms of interaction and public diplomacy activity don't. So, radio broadcasting is seen as needing a firewall.

To be effective, you need a kind of professional integrity and a certain degree of credibility in all these activities. So, to think that broadcasting as a unique medium needs special protections and none of these other things need anything I think is a strange spectrum.

They all need obviously credibility. If they're government-funded, there is a government interest that needs to be straightforward and upfront about it.

And the listeners also will be able to make some distinctions. Yes, it's government-funded, but the National Endowment for Democracy is largely government-funded, but it has credibility in what it does. And so do all these other activities in addition to radio broadcasting.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: Well, I might add to that. You know, I think a lot of it's, too, the quality of what's put forward. I mean, how many of you here think CNN has a slight tilt or a bias in their presentation?

How many of you here think Fox News has a slight tilt or a bias to their -- I kind of tend to think that they both do, but I watch them both. But I know that. I know there's a tilt. Now I favor the one tilt more than I favor the other tilt. But I want to hear what the other guy is saying, too, on it.

But it's the quality. It's good quality programming. It hits hot topics on it. I think, you know, people can judge and do judge on that. I think it's got to be high quality, and then I just really wanted to engage in the war of ideas. I want us to be fighting for our ideas out there and broadcasting every day, and just -- and really pushing it.

We're doing a human trafficking bill now in front of the Congress, trying to get the reauthorization. This is an issue that I've carried with Paul Wellstone when he was in the U.S. Senate.

And I want us out there fighting for that idea. This is a human rights -- this is a human dignity topic, and we ought to be out there fighting for it. But I want us to be out there engaged and every day.

MR. DINE: Yes, ma'am.

MS. DANIELS: Hi, my name is Samira Daniels . I've been interested in this topic for a long time. I think that if there was sort of a point which -- a point at which there has been a divide from the kind of public -- foreign diplomacy on the distinction that that gentleman just made that, you know, there were academicians at one point that used to be able to speak fluent Farsi RC and Punjabi and Lardoons and would go abroad and, you know, there was much more a kind of an active, lively dialog



going on among different Muslims and Christians and so forth. But it's taken a turn, you know, in the sense because of war and because of other natural resource issues and so forth. There are more sort of dysfunctional relations that have developed over a period of 14, 15 years, and I think that if that can be addressed, we can address a lot of other issues on an ideological level.

MALE SPEAKER: But I don't think you address the war of ideas that the Senator has clearly stated. Yes, the interstate relations have fallen apart. You've got failed states, this kind of state, that kind of state, and then groups that are creating all kinds of violence and disruption. But I don't know what the conclusion of your commentary is.

QUESTIONER: Well the point is that, you know, the focus has been the terrorists. You know, we're battling the ideology of the terrorists, but in fact it's also the discussions among the intellectuals of a particular country that I think always came to the fore, but that is not what's happening now. It's, you know, that we're battling Osama bin Laden, but I don't think that it's necessarily Osama bin Laden that we are - we should be addressing, that is to counter his influence. I think there are other equally important influences that need to be addressed in most countries.

SENATOR BROWNBACK: If I could, I'm -- we've got votes on the seven I'm going to have to slip away for, but Kristin, thank you very

much, and Tom for your years and years, and I want to thank everybody here. I think you need to continue with the dialog -- I presume you will. And the Congressman will be coming shortly.

We are going to put this bill in this afternoon. We do invite people to comment and help us. This is not set in stone by any means, and it's meant to try to hopefully be a spot where people can start discussing and pushing on it. We're going to work as much as we can on a bipartisan fashion to do this, and I think we'll be able to get something bipartisan pulled together on it. But we do invite -- particularly the intellectual capital that's in this room -- to let us know what you think and get into the weeds with it because we need to do that. And the more we can do it the earlier I think the better off we are for likely being able to get something on through.

MODERATOR: Thank you for your initiative, and thank you for presenting it as an idea. If we don't get -- if you don't get fifty critiques out of this audience, then it's been a failed afternoon. So, because there'll be a diversity of opinion. But at least we got the ball rolling, and I think that's more important than the legislation itself.

MS. LORD: Senator, thank you for coming. I know people here will recognize that doing an event with Senators and Congressmen is like the triple axel of Washington events, trying to get you both here. So thank you very much and we wish you luck with your -- (APPLAUSE)

MODERATOR: There must be some more comments and questions. Yes ma'am, over here.

QUESTIONER: I'm Hillary Riggs Ross , a contractor supporting the Joint Staff.

MODERATOR: I didn't hear. What staff?

QUESTIONER: The Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

MODERATOR: Okay.

QUESTIONER: We've heard a lot about talking to people, ideas --

MODERATOR: This is well timed. Congressman Smith, you've been -- why don't we hold off. You've been introduced already. I've described you as avidly involved in national security issues, member of the Armed Services Committee of the House, Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, and Subcommittee Chair on Terrorism, Counterterrorism. And we've already had somewhat of a discussion on public diplomacy is broke, is broken, how are we going to fix it, and you've got an idea or two. So we'd like to hear from you now, and then there are plenty of fertile minds here, the place is loaded with experts.

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Yes. I do run the risk of not knowing what Senator Brownback said just --

MODERATOR: He's introducing legislation --

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Repeating everything he said -- I know what his legislation is. I think it's a very good idea. I'll try to be brief because I do, you know, want to hear your comments and questions, and you've probably heard a great deal about the subject already.

And the bottom line is when we're looking at a national security strategy, there should be three components to it. Certainly defense, which we've very familiar with; development, which is something that I also think is very, very important -- I'm sorry, there should be four components to it -- defense, development, we are working on the Foreign Affairs Committee now to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act to deal with issues in that area. We had a meeting of a small working group this morning to talk about that. Diplomacy is another key piece within the State Department, which we need to do. And I guess tucked within diplomacy is the idea of message -- strategic communications. And it is something that we actually did fairly effectively along the way during the Cold War. We realized we were locked in an ideological struggle. And we did the battle against communism, constantly trying to get our message out about why capitalism was better, but also being clever about it and figuring out different ways to build relationships to advance our message. And the problem that we have right now since 9/11, we have done a lot of reworking of our basic institutions on the defense intel side, arguably too much, but you know we've created a National Director of Intelligence,

we've created the National Counterterrorism Center, the Homeland Security Department. There's been a lot of work done to try to get the interagency piece right, to make sure that we were communicating with each other, that there was no stove piping, learned the lessons of 9/11. And I think much of that has I think been successful. What we haven't done on the strategic communications side is that same sort of focus on post-9/11 strategic communications needs to change. There's a lot of people working on it. How should we change it? What makes the most sense in terms of how we rearrange this? You know, the best we've done is an undersecretary position within the State Department that has largely been unfocused. What exactly they're doing, very few people know. We have the Defense Department that obviously on a day-in and day-out basis is engaged in strategic communications. I'm the Chair of the Terrorism Subcommittee, have jurisdiction over our Special Operations Command, and I'm very focused on counterterrorism fight that way. In Iraq and Afghanistan our Special Ops guys and our broader military are engaged in strategic communications in a variety of different ways -- that's a tough word to say by the way; I'm just going to say "message" from now on instead of strategic communications -- and, you know, they're doing a piece of it, but they're not coordinated. So what we've tried to do in the Defense Authorization bill -- I'll look at my staff and see at this point, we've either succeeded or not. I think we succeeded, but

it's a big secret until 3:00 when we all get together and talk about what's in the Defense Authorization bill.

So we were able to get language in there that requires the President to come up with a comprehensive interagency approach to strategic communications. To pull all of these pieces together in much the same way that we've pulled together straightforward counterterrorism, get all of the different players involved in a coordinated fashion, and start sending out a message. Now as I understand it, Senator Brownback has a similar idea. His idea -- I'm paraphrasing -- is to, you know, basically create what we did in the NCTC for strategic communications, to create a new Center that pulled those pieces together. You know, there's different ideas out there. You know, one of my biases at this point is that we've arguably created too many new agencies. In fact I'm just back from a trip to Israel and Jordan -- and I've heard this in other parts of the world that I've been to -- there's a lot of concern, particularly within the intelligence community, that some of their best operatives are now being pulled back to staff all of these new centers and -- well, for various positions that have been created. I was trying to figure out what to refer to the National Director of Intelligence as. So we don't have people out in the field anymore, so I think it's quite possible that we can simply pick from within the existing agencies and assign responsibilities, most logically I believe in

the State Department under a more comprehensive USIA model and do this. But the bottom line is we need to pull that together comprehensively.

And the other key part of what we talk about in my piece is to get us off of the idea that we're simply trying to sell America; that basically we're trying to convince people that, you know, improve America's image abroad. That is a piece of what we are doing. But we are a lot more focused now on winning the ideological struggle within the Muslim world against al-Qaeda, and simply broadly going out and saying America's a great place. Capitalism is great. You can laugh at this point, given the week that we're in. (LAUGHTER) No, I'm just kidding. But we all have our struggles. But the point is that sort of broad message doesn't really fit what we're dealing with. And, you know, when you think back on the Cold War, a lot went on but at the end of the day, we won basically. The way I've always summed it up is, you know, here's your grocery store, here's our grocery store, we win and we did eventually because we had a much, much better system. It doesn't really work that way in the Muslim world because they are not as capitalist focused as we are, not as inquisitive of a different culture, and understanding that culture is a huge part of how we deliver an effective message. Because I am absolutely convinced that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population, well above 90 percent, completely rejects Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and their very convoluted but incredibly detailed and specific ideology that they've developed. But

they are not willing to simply say, you know, we want to be the United States of America. They don't. Personally, I don't blame them. We all have our different cultures, but how do we better communicate why despite that, al-Qaeda's the wrong way to go? And there's a whole bunch of different pieces involved in doing that, and we need to better coordinate them in an interagency way.

And the final point I'll make is one of the other things that we have in our bill, and I want to give credit to Matt Thornberry, who is the ranking member on the Terrorism Subcommittee who's been working on these message issues a great deal. And it was his idea to try to get a somewhat independent board, a center if you will, that is separate from the government to advise us on strategic communications, poll people from different parts of the world and different backgrounds in order to study and look at what the government is doing, to exercise some independent oversight, which I think is something that could help us as well.

The bottom line is we are not fighting comprehensively enough. We have a fairly straightforward outlook to my way of thinking in the global war on terror, as we've chosen to call it, and that is there's X number of bad guys out there who want to take us out, and we've got to get them first. And there's no question that that's part of it. Absolutely no question; and those who deny that I think are every little bit as wrong as



those who think that's all we have to do. But the one thing that we know for sure at this point is it's not just that one group, you know, you'll remember the jokes, and there have been a variety of different ones, about you know the worst job in the world is to be al-Qaeda's number four guy because we've killed like 5000 of them. You know, you cannot simply kill or capture them all. You have to make sure that more are not created. And relying solely on the defense piece gets us on a treadmill that keeps picking up speed, and we're not going to be able to keep up. We have to win the broader ideological war, and to do that we have to use these other components of national security policy. Development, diplomacy, and strategic communications, and we're trying to work on that in a comprehensive fashion on my Subcommittee and in Congress.

So a lot more can be said about this obviously, but I want to, you know, take some questions and I appreciate the opportunity.

MODERATOR: Thank you very, very much. Kristin, I would suggest that you and I not comment, and let's hear from the audience since we commented extensively -- somewhat extensively -- you know, with Senator Brownback. So comment on Congressman Smith's comments or anything else. Yes, hello, way in the back. Please identify yourself.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Matt Armstrong. I'm most well known as a blogger mountain runner. I'm heartened and Representative,

Congressman, we've actually talked on the phone a couple of months ago where you were first introducing this legislation, and I've seen a draft of the Brownback bill and a couple of comments on that. I'm heartened to hear that you're seeming to take a different position on, and I want to hear that. One of the things that I heard the Senator talking about was really who we are more and how we're trying to promote that, versus the issue in the ideological struggle is who they are and the conflict within the Muslim community, if we want to be specific in this one particular ideological engagement and you're not taking that same position that the Senator is. It's not who we are, it's who they are and how we can disengage them from the support phase. The other --

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Right, I think campaigning works is the bottom line, and I think that certainly has to be part of our strategic communications.

QUESTIONER: -- and the other is both of you have taken extreme issue with how public diplomacy has been executed in the last seven years based primarily on the lack of leadership at both the sec-state level and the undersecretary level until most recently, until the current undersecretary who by most accounts understands it's mostly an ideological struggle, and not just let's promote and share our values with the world. And yet we're still going through and let's revamp this whole thing, but it sounds like you're taking into consideration it's a personality

issue and we need to have the right people in place, smart people in place, which then takes me to really the final point and that's the issue of the resources. On the DOD side we talk about that they have a lot of resources, and part of that resource availability is that they have training. They have the flexibility to put their people through training. They can think about what they're going to do, and then they can go implement those policies. And on the State side, we don't see that training float in any way, shape, or form. We have those structured processes. People can't get X, Y, or Z done because it's outside of their lane, much more so than DOD where DOD has become a learning organization. I'm wondering if you can speak to how you think State might be changing into "a learning organization," which is strange to discuss, and the fact that both diplomacy and public diplomacy have really merged and we can't have a Department of State without a Department of Non-State because you're always talking to the publics.

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: And I think that's a fair summary of where we need to go, and you know one of the greatest allies that has emerged on this is Secretary Gates at DOD who has repeatedly made the point that, you know, he's overstretched, being pulled in a whole bunch of different things that the State Department ought to be doing. So he's taken a very cooperative approach that I think is different from his predecessor that actually is inclusive of State, recognizing that he can't do

his job effectively if he's being required to do the State Department's job. And that's a good start. Now as, you know, we had a great hearing before the Armed Services Committee with both Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice, and Secretary Rice pointed out we're going to need a little bit of your money, a little bit of somebody's money. She didn't quite put it that way, but the point is, you know, I think we now recognize the need, now we're going to have to shift the resources to some extent so that the State Department can do that. And in shifting those resources, I really think one of the most important points on this and on the development piece -- even on the broader counterterrorism piece for that matter and the defense element -- is to consolidate some of the agencies that are out there so that we don't have so many people doing the same thing and not in coordination. And this is something that I, you know, learned as a state legislator. Whenever you have a problem like this, everyone sort of gets together, recognizes the problem, and says we're going to create an agency that's going to coordinate it. And then instead of have seven agencies that are doing the same thing, you have eight agencies that are doing the same thing. And I think we fell into that a little bit on some of the counterterrorism stuff, so consolidation is going to have to be a piece of this.

And the other final thing I will say is in order to elevate this strategic communications piece in importance, they're going to have to

have a little more authority. One of the best ideas that we could think of is to make them part of the National Security Council, to give them a seat at that table. You know, we believe that's an important piece of it, that elevates their importance, their proximity to the west wing in their involvement, and I think that can help us.

MODERATOR: A lot of what I just heard you say was about structure. What about policies? What about -- what is it we are messaging and how to be most effective in doing that?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Well, in the first place I think we've all got good ideas on that, and I'll give you some of mine. You know, I think -- I'll give you one more, one more structure point, and then I will give you a specific. I think we need to be aware of the basics of what we're doing, and my background on this is running campaigns. And running campaigns you develop a message and you deliver that message to the people you're trying to persuade. And that sounds simple, but it is really important, okay? What is the message? And I think what is the message comes a lot from who you're trying to deliver it to. That's why I make the point about, you know, the message that worked to defeat communism will not work to defeat this ideological foe. So you really need to understand the culture and understand the people. And one of the biggest pieces that I've discovered is where do people get their information? That's what would -- I really focused on in the two difficult

campaigns that I ran in my life when I was more or less trying to figure out, okay, I know what my message is, but how do I get at these people. You know, when I ran my first campaign, it was going door to door. It was a state senate campaign, television wasn't a factor, and I was enamored of that when I ran my second campaign for Congress. And it sort of led me down a blind alley briefly. I won't tell the long version of the story, but the short version of the story, I was reminded that where I grew up -- and I think television is king. That's where people get their information, and I can knock on every door I want to running for Congress and send out all kinds of mail, wasn't going to matter if I wasn't on television. That's where people get their information. Well fast forward that out to the people who are being recruited or trying to be radicalized into the al-Qaeda movement. Where do they get their information? You know, one of the things that we've come up with -- they've come up with in SOCOM is video games and comic books. You know, there are all these, you know, comic book and video themes -- video game themes -- that are part, you know, that al-Qaeda has come up with that are, you know, fighting against the West, you know, glorious suicide bombing and all of this. So we've come up with counter messages within those areas that are in comic book themes or are in the medium that people will listen to. We've really got to be smart about that. So that's as far as what the specifics of it are, you know. I think the key is understand the culture, understand who you're trying to

persuade, where they get their information, and what is persuadable. And it doesn't make any sense to go to Madison Avenue for that information. I'm a huge fan of the TV show "Mad Men" you know and I get what they're doing there and they were doing -- those guys don't understand the Muslim world. So go out into that world and get people who do, and work with them to understand those important messaging points that I outlined which are the specifics of what I would do.

MODERATOR: Well, that was, you know, a wonderful description, and I'm going to take the influence of this chair and call -- Did he leave? The head of the Broadcasting Board of Governors was here, and I was going to call on him to comment on what you just said.

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: He knew where you were headed. (LAUGHTER)

MODERATOR: Well, thank -- oh there you are, Jeff. Come up, Ben. Get the mike. Comment on what the Congressman just said. Now to tell you the bias involved here. Jeff Trimble and I were colleagues at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for many years. And he comes out of the world of journalism; I come out of the world of foreign policy and politics. And we were a good one-two punch at RFE/RL in Prague --

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: And I will defend myself when we -- he insisted that I give specifics. My biggest specific is let's get the people who know what they're doing in charge --

MODERATOR: But I'm interested in your comments on targeting particularly.

MR. TRIMBLE: Yeah, absolutely crucial whether it's in strategic communications, even over to the covert side, or whether it's in what we do at Broadcasting Board of Governors through a journalistic mission. We have to know who we're trying to reach. And that varies from market to market. It varies from place to place. It varies from medium to medium. I'll give you an example. We just got research in from Pakistan that showed that Voice of America doubled its audiences in Pakistan in the last year to I think about 12 million people a week. That's terrific, and one of the things that gratified us was to see that that listenership and viewership was pretty much split between radio and television and there wasn't very much overlap. Because it turns out the people in the countryside you're reaching through radio, medium-wave and short-wave in the case of Pakistan, and people who are watching television are the urban populations, watching it on satellite TV. So we're shaping distinct products for each of those markets, targeting them very specifically down to the medium. And when it works right is in the case of Pakistan with the VOA, it can work out really well.

So, yeah, definitely, you need to target your audiences in a very sophisticated way. And that's much easier to do. It's much more complicated than it was back during the Cold War when you really had



short-wave and that was pretty much the whole show. So you had to throw it out there, and you're also as you indicate, Congressman, you're in highly competitive media environments where people have a huge amount of choices for information that they get. And increasingly they're turning back in a digital way to the traditionally most trusted source of news and information, and that's word of mouth. People you know who tell you things, and you believe it because they told you. Except now instead of telling you on the street corner in your village, they're telling you through SMS and sending you a link to an e-mail and saying look at this. And an RFE/RL analyst, Dan Chimage, if you're not familiar with his work, has done terrific work on exactly how al-Qaeda has done this. And we've studied that very closely, again through the lenses of our journalistic mission in U.S. international broadcasting, and not through the influencing mission of the strategic communications side, but extraordinarily important and very difficult to do, crucial though in the contemporary environment. Is that responsive, Tom?

MODERATOR: Thanks. Great. Now, is there somebody from public diplomacy at State who wants to comment on targeting?

MS. LORD: Congressman, I wonder if while we're talking about broadcasting you could comment on this a bit. Before you arrived, Senator Brownback was talking about his new bill, which would bring broadcasting directly under the control of the new proposed National

Center for Strategic Communication. I mean that's obviously a different model than we followed in the past where broadcasting has been more independent, has had a fire wall between broadcasting and policymakers. Do you favor bringing broadcasting closer to policymaking or maintaining the fire wall that we've had for so many decades now?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: I haven't decided is the short and honest answer. It's something I need to get some arguments on on both sides, but my bias as you can tell from my remarks is towards greater consolidation so that we're on the same page and know what we're doing. That would be my initial bias, but I could certainly be persuaded otherwise.

MODERATOR: Dr. Schneider from Syracuse University.

QUESTIONER: It's Mike Schneider from Syracuse University. We've heard a lot about messages and targeting focused -- it sounds awfully one way, and I wonder if our panelist would comment on all the rest that public diplomacy has done; the exchange program, educational activities, the public dimension of public diplomacy, and also the advisory role of public diplomacy. In other words, if we had different policies, would we have better public diplomacy?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: There's two pieces to your question, and number one, the exchange programs and that aspect of it, absolutely critical. You know, everywhere I go in the world they talk about how important that is to building a relationship. Pakistan's the best

example. You know, there is this gap from when the Pressler Amendment passed and we cut them off and we stopped doing the exchange program -- '88, '90, somewhere in there up until 9/11. And in dealing with the Pakistani military, anybody who came of age in that 11-year gap and didn't come to the U.S. is a lot more difficult for us to deal with than those who did.

The second piece of it is yes, what are our policies? We had a very good hearing in my Terrorism Subcommittee last week with three people who came in and talked about that very issue. And there is no question that our policies impact this debate. And I think it is a huge mistake to say, you know, it's just a crazy ideology, they hate us for our freedom, or you know it's just because they're poor. No, it is in response to policies, and we know what they are. The frustrations over what's going on in Kashmir, you know, drives a lot of it; the frustrations over Israel and Palestine -- now where we bogged down a little bit was when we took a step back and said, okay, well what should we do? You know, what are our policies in the Muslim world? How could we change them in a positive way because the truth is we're kind of damned if we do and damned if we don't. Where we get involved, our presence is viewed as intrusive. Where we don't get involved, we're ignoring the problem. So we seem to have a deep-seated, underlying mistrust problem that needs to be addressed before any action that we can do. Now the one thing, the one

thing, that clearly works even in the toughest neighborhoods is helping people out in a disaster. And it seems to me that even if you're helping them out outside of a disaster, that that's helping as well. I mean if you showed that the West is going to use its power to specifically help people in the Muslim world, whether it's in a crisis or elsewhere, it works. And that gets you out of the well, should we back Mubarak or shouldn't we? You know, what should we have done about Iraq? I mean those questions are always going -- no matter what you do, you're going to be in trouble. But after the tsunami, after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, showing up and helping, you know, lifted our, you know, favorability ratings in those parts of the world immeasurably. And then you can sort of extrapolate out and say, well we don't have to wait for an earthquake or a tsunami -- you know, I cited the three cups of tea Greg Mortenson I think it is who builds schools in the poorest parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and is a very popular guy because of it. And he builds schools for girls as well as boys. I mean he's walking into some cultural problems there and doing it because he's helping. So that's the one thing that we can do. We can get into the back and forth on Israel and Palestine; I think we kid ourselves if we think there's some policy we can adopt that would appease these concerns because it seems to be very complicated.

MODERATOR: Yes, sir? Up here.

QUESTIONER: Patrick Moore from the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy. Congressman Smith, you mentioned that the three prongs of foreign policy: defense, development, and diplomacy, those three are obviously not implemented, you know, just by, you know, DOD, AID, and DOS. Could you speak to the role that the DOD and the military has played in addressing the, you know, information aspect of the GWOT, and to what extent that they should?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: That's something that crosses over into the development discussion as well. You know, our military budget is huge, and our military has been deployed very, very broadly throughout the world since 9/11. They were before, but even more broadly. And that has crossed them over into many of these spaces. I mean, most famously in Iraq where, you know, they went on a military mission, we didn't have anybody to do the mission building -- I'll spare you the partisan rip on that -- and just say that, you know, so basically the military woke up and they had to do all of that. You know, a great conversation I had back in 2004 with General Corelli who was there with the 1st Cav, you know, explaining how, you know, you could sort of lay a map out and wherever there wasn't any electricity, that's where the most insurgent incidents were happening. And we got into a discussion of how to do it, back and forth, and he finally said well, gosh I'm not a city planner, and it's like well, you are now. (LAUGHTER) You know, you have been

dragged into that role. They've also been dragged into the role that you mentioned on messaging and strategic communications and strategy. I mentioned the comic books that they're generating and the different ideas they come up with in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere. I've been to the Southern Philippines when we were doing a counter-insurgency message down there, and then also on the development piece. You know, we have specific, you know, sources of funds that are available to the DOD to do basic development help, and it's part of the counter-insurgency effort. How do we get in good with the tribal leader? Well, they want a school built. Okay, here's the money, we can build it. They want a road built. We can -- in a small way, anyway, do that, and so that is the DOD creeping into the Department of State's responsibilities on, you know, on development, on diplomacy and all of that.

Going forward I think certainly we need a broader interagency role. I think State should probably be taking the lead on that. And the one thing that I don't want to do is I don't want to get away from the value the DOD brings on those issues. They have learned a lot, and they have succeeded a lot, particularly within the Special Operations Command, on you know basic development issues, on messaging issues. They are well trained, and they know what they're doing. I think there's sometimes a perception that, you know, well the military's there to shoot people, blow things up, and you know defeat an enemy. Our military

today, because of their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and because of the way we train people at SOCOM, has a vast array of talents and abilities that should be used, but they should be used in cooperation. They shouldn't be used with DOD being the front agency, being the one to do this in my view. And that's something that the next administration's going to have to figure out how to sort out within this interagency piece.

MODERATOR: Time is moving along. We have time for two more questions, and then I'm going to ask Kristin to make her comments, if you will, and then we'll bring this to a close. Oh, the lady I cut off, sorry.

QUESTIONER: That's okay. I'm Hillary Riggs Ross, a contractor supporter the Joint Staff. And you've kind of come around to the question that I was going to ask, which was we've had a lot of discussion about the importance of words, you know, getting our message out, doing all of this, but in many cases the United States has taken actions that completely contradict what our message is supposed to be. And how do you resolve that when you have something, you know, we might have military operations that are seen as being completely against the things that we're saying. I mean, of course, there can also be actions that are positive as in a school building and disaster relief and all of that, but how would you go about resolving that tension between the two?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Well, certainly, I mean you can look at a bunch of historical things that we've done. Now I will say, you know, being someone who's been a legislator awhile now, 18 years, and all the votes that come with that, you know, if you've lived, if you've made decisions of consequence, you are by definition inconsistent and a hypocrite. Okay? It's unavoidable. If I meet the person who has avoided it, you know, I will follow them for the rest of my life. And, you know, we get sucked into that. That's why I reference the issues of well, what should we do in Israel? What should we do in Afghanistan or Iraq? Should we be involved? Should we not be involved? How? Where? You know, there's always going to be, you know, people who will come back at us on that. Now that's not to say that overarching issues like Abu Ghraib, our interrogation policies, and those things aren't important, they are. There are many people who were in Iraq at the time of Abu Ghraib who say that that, you know, and the bombing of the Mosque that set off the sectarian -- those two events, you know, contributed to our troubles there more than anything else that happened. So I understand the importance of that, and I do think we need to be more careful in calculating that and thinking about the consequences of our actions. But nor should we kid ourselves that there's some perfect set of actions that makes us look consistent, that everyone's going to be with us. And that's where, frankly, messaging is important, where you have to sort of, you know, emphasize



the message that you want to get out there. That battle is always going to there. You know, you're never going to have a time when you commit an action and everybody universally says great, that's exactly what we wanted, all right? You know, I was joking actually on the way over here. We were talking about the financial bailout. What do we do? Do we not do it? And I said, you know, the only thing I know is every member of Congress who votes for it is going to be accused of being a shill for the President, of abdicating their responsibility, and giving a blank check to the Treasurer. Every member of Congress who votes against it is going to be accused of putting politics ahead of the best of the nation. It's simply cowardly hiding behind partisan arguments instead of doing what we need to do in order to save the economy. Okay. That's going to happen, so what you have to be prepared for -- and it's awful and I hate it -- you've got to get in there and swing. All right? From day one, you've got to get your side of that story out, and you've got to explain what you're doing, and that's why, you know, what we're talking here in this strategic communications piece is so important. Spend is a fact of life right now. Do the best actions certainly, and then always know that even if you do the right thing, you've got to get out there and make the case.

MODERATOR: Yes, Julie?

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Juliana Pilon and I teach at the Institute of World Politics. Thank you very much. It was a pleasure to

listen to you, and it's wonderful. I've been beaming throughout this whole event. It's so wonderful. This strategic communication is hardly being addressed and I'm pleased that you and Senator Brownback have -- agree on so many issues.

The ultimate question continues to be the structure -- the message, of course, is always an issue, and if you don't have the right message, it doesn't matter what structure you have. That said both the Department of Defense and the State Department in many respects have missions that are fundamentally different from strategic communication. Quite aside from, as mentioned before, the competition among agencies is always an issue, and one agency doesn't want another one to be in charge and so forth, that a problem with putting -- having the National Security Council be the umbrella is that it's been tried before and it doesn't work in part because the National Security Council doesn't have money. And, so that's not a small matter. But I think it's worth noting that Jim Glassman, who recently became confirmed as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, has taken upon himself with success more than anything else to engage the interagency process. That said, his very title -- Public Diplomacy, he's in charge of public diplomacy and public affairs actually not in that order -- indicates that the State Department again, the status quo, may not be the ideal umbrella. So perhaps you will take a closer look at Senator Brownback's recommendation and perhaps it will -- after a

discussion and additional input -- it might evolve into a more effective body.

But thank you very much. I just have to say again, and thank you also for your input, Tom. It's just a joy to hear you all. Thank you.

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: Thank you. These are excellent comments. I appreciate the information. It's very helpful.

MODERATOR: And Kristin, that leaves --

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: I have to fly --

MODERATOR: Don't you want to hear her brilliance?

CONGRESSMAN SMITH: I want to hear her brilliance.

MS. LORD: I just want -- I'm just going to thank you for coming very much, Congressman. And for all of you who came today, I'd like to thank you. One of the things in the Smith-Thornberry amendment is a call for a study of whether the U.S. government should be supporting a new organization to help tap the potential of the private sector, help to research an analysis that can help inform a strategic analysis in public diplomacy. That's something that a forthcoming report of mine will cover. I hope it's of service.

Thank you again for coming and for you, Congressman, for helping to make this a really top issue on the Hill.

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/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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