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EUROPE'S ROLE IN NATION BUILDING

FROM THE BALKANS TO THE CONGO

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BENJAMIN: Good afternoon, and welcome to the Brookings Institution. I'm Daniel Benjamin and I'm the Director of the Center on the United States and Europe, and I'm delighted to welcome you to this event on Europe's role in nation building with Ambassador James Dobbins.

There has probably never been a time in the United States when there was a greater recognition of the need to improve our skills and those of the international community at nation building. It's not only because Colin Powell's Pottery Barn rules have become so well known -- you break it, you own it -- but also because there are simply a lot of nations as we've seen over the last 15 or 20 years that simply cannot be left in the deplorable state in which we find them because they are such a threat to peace in their regions and because of the suffering of their people.

Given that background, I'm particularly delighted to welcome Ambassador Jim Dobbins here today to speak on this subject. There may be no one who knows more and knows it in a deep and grounded and non-abstract way about this subject than Jim Dobbins. And if I were simply to introduce him on any one of the myriad of other subjects on which he is an expert, I would probably begin by saying that he is the closest thing that the United States has ever developed in the way of a

true Whitehall Mandarin, that is to say, he's the kind of deeply experienced, profoundly capable civil servant without whom a government cannot function.

When I met Jim he was the Senior Director for Latin American Affairs at the NSC and it was I think only by happenstance that I found out at some point that he never had anything to do with Latin American before when he was at the NSC, but it was a sign of his competence that he had been thrown at that continent, and I think the continent was better for it. He has also been Ambassador to the European Community, Assistant Secretary for Europe, and a number of other senior positions. Mostly importantly for our purposes however he was U.S. Special Envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, and I think in a book I wrote once we described him as Washington's Mister Fix-It.

We call on him so often here that we tend to think as Jim as a Brookings scholar, but the fact is that he is director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. He has led RAND in putting out a series of books on nation building, Jim writes books in the time it takes the rest of us to write articles, and this has been a truly invaluable series of works. He will talk today about Europe's role in nation building, but other volumes in this series which examine I believe 22 different nation-building operations. Other volumes examine U.S. efforts and U.N. efforts.

There really is very little more one can say about Jim except that this will probably be the definitive talk that you will hear on nation building for a long time to come, until he comes out with the volume that summarizes all of those other volumes put together. In any case, it's a great pleasure for us to have him here and it's clearly a testament to his reputation in the community that this hall is filled on a hot July afternoon. So without further ado, I'll turn the lectern to him.

MR. DOBBINS: Thank you, Dan, and thank you for extending honorary membership in the Brookings community once again. I do feel very much at home here.

The book that I'm going to talk about today is the third in a series of case studies that we at RAND have done. I've done these with a number of colleagues which explains why we're able to turn these out fairly rapidly; Keith Crane, one of my principle collaborators, is here as well.

The title of this one is "Europe's Role in Nation Building from the Balkans to the Congo." The study, and in my talk today I'll talk a bit about the methodology, the case studies that we examined in the book, how these cases compared to cases in the earlier volumes, and then some broad conclusions that can be drawn from that.

The two earlier case studies were "America's Role in Nation Building" which came out in 2003. This attracted some notice when it

came out just before the Iraq war because it concluded that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq. The second, "The U.N.'s Role in Nation Building," came out in 2005 and that attracted some notice because it concluded rather counter-intuitively for most Americans that the U.N. was actually doing a better job at this function than the United States was.

There are a couple of other volumes which are not case studies but which draw on the same material. One is called "The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building" which is a how-to manual which came out last year. The original working title of it was "Nation Building for Dummies" but some people suggested that Don Rumsfeld would take that personally so we went to a slightly more anodyne title. Then another volume which is coming out in a couple of months just in time for the transition is called "After the War: Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush," and that volume looks at how presidential personality, interagency structures, and decision-making processes affects the outcomes, that is, how presidents and their administrations face these challenges, how they organize themselves for them, how they made decisions, and how that process and personality affected the outcomes.

What do we mean by nation building? This is a term that's entered American parlance, the Europeans tend to call it state building, the U.N. calls it peace building, the current administration calls it stabilization and reconstruction. What we mean by the term is the use of

armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to forestall a return to hostilities and promote a transition to democracy. So all of the cases that we look at have a military component. That doesn't mean we're saying you always have to have a military component, we're simply saying those are the only cases we studied. That's the universe that these studies are designed to address.

Not all military interventions are nation building interventions, but since 1989 if you look at the military interventions that have taken place, nearly all of them fit this paradigm. Whatever the reason that led to the intervention in the first place, they all end up fitting this paradigm which is very much a post-Cold War phenomenon.

There has been a major growth in these kinds of missions since 1989. For instance, during the Cold War the United States intervened in a new country on an average of something like once every 10 years where you had Granada, Panama, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic. In the Clinton Administration, that went from once every 10 years to once every 2 years, so you had Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, in just a little more than 8 years. The current President Bush came into office saying he wasn't going to do this anymore, and he invaded three new countries in his first 3 years in office. He went into Afghanistan, Iraq, and we went back into Haiti in 2004. The point here is that there's been an acceleration in these kinds of missions.

This is also evident in the U.N.'s record which has accelerated even more quickly. During the Cold War the U.N. mounted a new peacekeeping operation an average of once every 4 years. Since 1989 it mounts a new operation on the average of once every 6 months. These operations are cumulative. In the 1990s they were lasting 6 to 8 years, more recently they're lasting 8 to 10 years. So if you're doing one every 2 years like the United States, pretty soon you're doing four or five at once as the U.S. was in 2004 when it had troops in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If you're the U.N. and you're mounting one every 6 months, pretty soon you're up to about 20 which is where the U.N. is at the moment.

This phenomenon was largely a domain for the U.N. on the one hand or U.S.-led coalitions including NATO on the other. But more recently a third alternative if you will has emerged which is European-led efforts including European Union-led efforts. It's still a rather tentative phenomenon, but it's one that we're studying and so that's what this study is designed to look at.

The first volume that I talked about, the U.S. experience in nation building, looked at Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The second volume which looked at U.N.-led cases which is defined is cases in which they were blue-helmeted, the U.S. Secretary General was in charge, and for the most part the United

States was not heavily engaged. The ones we looked at were the Congo back in the 1960s, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor.

This study looks at six cases where some European capital was either the dominant or very important decision maker and so it looks at Albania in 1997, this was an Italian-led multinational operation, Sierra Leone which was a U.N. operation that the U.K. stepped in and rescued as it looked like it was about to founder, Macedonia which was a European Union-led operation, Côte d'Ivoire which was an operation in which the French and the U.N. shared responsibilities, the Democratic Republic of the Congo which is the same country but a different operation than the one we studied in the other volume which looked back the 1960s, this looked at the current operation, and in particular at the two EU-led mini interventions that book place in the midst of a broader U.N. intervention, and then finally Bosnia since 2004 when the EU took over from NATO.

Finally, for reasons that nothing to do with the theme of the book but simply didn't fit anywhere else, we did include a case on the Australian-led operation in the Solomon Islands. We aren't going to do a whole book on Australia and we did want to include their role in nation building because it's not a negligible one in regional terms.

This chart is an effort to demonstrate the input, the costs of the 22 or so cases that we've looked at. One axis is the military strength as a proportion of the population, that is on a per capita basis how many foreign troops were involved. And the other axis is how much money was involved again on a per capita basis. The blue dots are American-led missions, the white dots are U.N.-led missions, and the red dots are European-led missions. Among other things, you can derive from this that the American-led missions tend to be in the upper right-hand corner of the chart, that is the corner in which larger amounts of manpower and money are being committed, and the U.N. and EU missions tend to have smaller amounts of manpower and money committed to them.

The first case we looked at was Albania in 1997. I have to admit that this operation was so successful that when I started to do this book and somebody suggested we include it, I didn't even know it had existed. It simply took place without a great deal of notice largely because it was completed quickly and was almost uniformly successful within the framework of its mission. Albania collapsed in 1997 as the result of a pyramid or Ponzi scheme within which the government was implicated, the government collapsed, the country descended into chaos, large numbers of refugees began to leave the country going mostly to Italy, the nearest place of refuge. The Italians were determined to do something about it and they cast around for some institutional arrangement which would

allow them to address this approaching chaos. The U.N. at that point was largely discredited. You have Somalia, you had Rwanda, you had Srebrenica and the failure of UNPROFOR, and so they weren't disposed to look to the U.N. NATO was tied down in Bosnia and the U.S. wasn't prepared to take on another role. The European Union had developed no capability for this kind of action. There was some desultory discussion of whether the Western European Union should be used. But in the end the Italians bit the bullet and got a Security Council mandate and organized the mission on their own. The Italians went in, established security, held elections, and left shortly thereafter and the country has continued to progress since then. Economic growth resumed, security was established, elections were held. The Italians did introduce a couple of interesting innovations. First of all, this was a police-dominated mission. There was a military component but the dominant component of the mission was military. Secondly, they actually established a council of troop-contributing countries who jointly decided on a policy for the intervention, an innovation the United States has never adopted, but one that worked rather well in this case.

The next case we looked at was Macedonia in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo. It looked like Macedonia was going to be the next Balkan country to descend into civil war. There were outbreaks of violence between the ethnic Slav and Albanian communities. The U.S.

was loathe to take on responsibility for another major peacemaking, peace-enforcement mission both because it was heavily involved in both Bosnia and Kosovo, also this broke out just as the Bush Administration came into office and they were distinctly uninterested in taking on more responsibilities in the Balkans. Therefore, the administration looked to the European Union to take the lead in resolving this conflict. The European Union which had developed mechanisms since 1997 to address these kinds of things demonstrated the capacity to do so. Solana, the high representative who had just come into office a few weeks earlier, and the office was a completely new one, took responsibility for managing Western and international interactions with Macedonia. Lots of other organizations and nations were involved. The United States nominated a special envoy who went with Solana everywhere he went. The OSCE, NATO, the U.N., everybody had roles to play. But the European Union was definitely in the lead and the U.S. in counter distinction to the role it had played in the early 1990s when it undercut European diplomacy pretty consistently throughout the Bosnia crisis played a helpful and supportive role while letting the EU take the lead. The EU eventually deployed for the first time a military force under an EU flag as part of this operation. It was a rather small force, I think 300 at the most, so it wasn't a major operation, but it was the first time that the EU had deployed and employed military force as a component of its ESDP security and defense policy.

The next case we looked at was the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There has been a long-running U.N. operation there, the largest operation the U.N. was running for most of this period, but there were two EU interventions in which the EU under an EU flag deployed forces into the Congo to perform discrete missions. In 2004 they deployed a force of I think if I remember correctly about 5,000 into an area called Bunya which was a particularly disorderly area where a lot of violence was going on in order to calm that particular situation down. The French dominated the operation. It had an EU flag, but the EU at that point didn't have command-and-control arrangements very fully developed so the EU content of it was more symbolic than real, but it was an EU mission and it was successful within the limited framework that was set forth.

Two years later the EU deployed a second mission. This was a similarly sized mission. It lasted about the same length, about 6 months. Its purpose was to support security during the Congolese elections. The Germans had the command. It was a more truly EU mission in the sense that EU command-and-control arrangements had been more fully developed and the EU as an institution was more heavily involved in organizing and sustaining the mission. It too was successful within that limited framework.

The EU's assumption of responsibility in Bosnia too place somewhat more gradually. The EU of course had always been involved

from Dayton on, but in the 1990s it was clearly an American-dominated mission through NATO, through the Dayton diplomacy, but this gradually began to change in the current decade. In 2002 the high representative who responds to a larger body which includes both the United States and Russia also became at the same time the EU representative and so he was dual-hatted which was a recognition that the EU was stepping into a leadership role. In 2003 the European Union took over the police mission from the U.N. and so the international police that were deployed in Bosnia after 2003 were EU police and not U.N. police. Then in 2004 the EU took over the peacekeeping mission from NATO. I think that this transition has been smooth, the security situation in Bosnia has remained tranquil, and there have not been any particular challenges in the security field.

The EU's main challenge has been in the political field in trying to move Bosnia toward a position in which it can realistically govern itself and eventually become a member of the European Community. This requires persuading the Bosnia political leadership to alter aspects of the Dayton Accords in order to fashion a more workable constitution, one that doesn't require an international high representative who can impose legislation when the legislature deadlocks as it does rather frequently. The EU's leadership here has been I would say somewhat erratic. Ashdown was the most exigent of all the high representatives over the last 13 years or so, and then his successor Schwarz-Schilling was the last

exigent, least active of that whole period. Then his successor, a guy named Lajčák, became something closer to the Ashdown model. So you had wild variations in terms of the role that the high representative who was the EU representative was playing during this period and there's been relatively little, which is to say virtually no, progress on the political front. So I don't think this can be called an unqualified success, but Bosnia is still peaceful and the security role that we're particularly focus on in this study has been adequately handled.

The next case we looked at Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone had a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the year 2000 which was nearing collapse. It was under pressure. Insurgents were defying U.N. troops, capturing and holding U.N. troops hostage and killing them. The U.N. was incapable of establishing security or even securing its own forces. In the wake of earlier setbacks in places as I've mentioned like Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, this looked like another failed U.N. mission. The U.K. which was the former colonial power stepped in and deployed a small but capable and resolute force which was prepared to use violence proactively in order to cow the insurgents, rescue hostages, and restore security. After a relatively brief intervention they were able to turn the mission back over to the U.N. The U.N. in the interim had also made some important changes. The Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized that this mission was faltering. He and the U.N. altered the mandate and the force

structure to make both more robust. The mission was turned around, and also importantly U.N. peacekeeping was turned around. In the aftermath of this mission, U.N. mandates and U.N. forces have been more robust, more willing to use force in more than just self-defense and balance more successful.

The French played a somewhat similar role in the Côte d'Ivoire which descended into civil war in 2002 with a certain difference. First of all, it was the French who were there first and the U.N. who showed up later so the French had forces in Côte d'Ivoire, they reinforced them as soon as the civil war broke out, and they're there still. The mission is an interesting and somewhat unsatisfactory blend of postcolonial neocolonialism if you will of the familiar late-20th century variety and post-Cold War peace enforcement or peacekeeping of the more recent vintage and it hasn't blended very well. The French are not regarded by the two sides as entirely impartial, they have their own interests, they have economic investments, they have a large number of citizens. They didn't put their forces under the U.N., they've supported the U.N. and the U.N. have supported the French, but it's not an entirely satisfactory marriage and it's one that's gone on in some ways too long. That is, whereas the British came in, established security and left, the French has been there throughout this period. But the main reason that this has not been entirely successful is that it's the least resourced, the

most poorly resourced, of the operations that we've studied in this volume and so it's not only a question of the ambiguity of what the U.N. and French respective roles were, but the fact that there simply aren't enough troops and enough money given the size of the country in comparison to some of these other missions.

The Solomons mission is interesting for several reasons. First, it's the only mission I know of which has no U.N. mandate, no U.N. involvement, no American involvement, and no European involvement. It is a multinational mission under Australian leadership, but it doesn't have any of those things. It's there at the invitation of the Solomons government. The Australians have some excuse for not getting a mandate. They said it would be too time-consuming. The fact is that the mission started a couple of weeks after the invasion of Iraq which Australia participated in I suspect that they were just (inaudible) U.N. for not having blessed that mission and were prepared to show they could do without it, thank you. But in any case, that hasn't been a particular disadvantage so far. Another interesting aspect of this is it's a police-led mission. That is, the commander is a policeman, he has soldiers and he has police under him, but the dominant element of the mission is police. A third interesting aspect of the mission is that the Australian Parliament has committed funds for 10 years. This has a 10-year budget, a 10-year time span. There is no talk about exit strategies and departure deadlines.

They've assumed that this is going to take 10 years. Another interesting thing is that the Australian officials and the police who are there are not acting under some international authority, they are actually sworn in to the Solomons government and become officials in the Solomons government. So when an Australian policeman is making an arrest he's doing it under Solomons law as a policeman sworn into the Solomons police force.

The next part of this presentation is an effort to compare the 22 cases that we've done. We compare both inputs and outputs or outcomes is probably a better word. The inputs are things like how much manpower we supply, how much money we supply, how much time or manpower or money are applied, so three main inputs. Then the outcomes are things like was security established, was representative government established, how many refugees went home, what level of economic growth was achieved, and to compare across these cases.

Comparing across these cases is somewhat artificial in the sense that with one or two exceptions there was some American role in all of the cases because after all we pay a quarter of the U.N.'s budget, there was some U.N. role in almost all the American cases except Germany and Japan back in the 1940s, and the Europeans participate in almost all these operations. What we're looking at here is not the level of participation, what we're looking at here is how did the fact that the mission was commanded from New York or commanded from Washington

or commanded from Brussels affect the differences? What can you say about how the leadership of these operations affects inputs and outputs?

This looks at the peak military presence. How many international forces were present? As you see, the U.S.-led operations are for the most part much, much larger than either the U.N.- or EU-led operations. In fact, the smallest U.S.-led operation was as big as the biggest U.N.-led operation. That's one.

This looks at the same figures on a per capita basis which is a more important measure of what impact that military presence is likely to have on the population. How big is it in comparison to the population? Here again you can see that the U.S., the blue, are by and large more heavily manned even on a relative basis than the U.N. or EU operations. The two exceptions where the U.N. had very high levels of military manpower to population are tiny societies, East Timor and Eastern Slavonia and not really representative for that reason.

This looks at the number of civilian police that were committed to the operation. The United States pioneered the use of civilian police in peace operations in the 1990s. We were the first to deploy not just advisers but policemen with badges, guns, and arrest authority as part of a peacekeeping force in Haiti in 1994, and the U.N. adopted that model increasingly, whereas in the current administration we dropped it. We put in nearly a thousand police in Haiti, we put in 2,000

police in Bosnia, when I say we it was broad U.S. leadership, they were actually U.N. police in Bosnia, and nearly five thousand police in Kosovo, and then there were no police in Afghanistan or Iraq, no civilian police. There are advisers and of course there are military police, but the administration simply didn't follow this model. But the U.N. did adopt the model and the U.N. practice now is to assign one policeman for every 10 soldiers. So if they have 10,000 men in a peacekeeping force, they expect to have 1,000 policemen as part of that peacekeeping force, and those are their current numbers. They currently have 90,000 troops and 9,000 police deployed in their peacekeeping forces, and by and large the Europeans have adopted the same model. This chart shows how many policemen you add as a proportion of your military force, and as it indicates, in some of the smaller operations like Namibia and El Salvador, the ratio was very high.

This chart indicates the duration of operations. In the early 1990s the general view was you went in, you established security, you held elections and you got out as soon as possible. That was the paradigm that both the U.S. and the U.N. embraced. That's been shown to be too short in many cases. For instance, we did that in Haiti, we went in in 1994, stayed 2 years, held elections, left, and we had to go back in 2004. So these operations have tended to last longer in recent years and

the chart shows how times have tended in increase. Of course, some of these operations are still going.

This is the level of combat deaths. These are combat deaths suffered by the intervening force. That's of course also an outcome, not a desirable outcome, in fact there's an inverse relationship between the number of casualties and the likely success of the operation. Again, the U.S. has suffered higher casualties as a rule, and of course the Iraq and Afghanistan casualties both go off this chart. The U.N. has lower levels of casualties although not negligible, and the European casualties are lower still with the exception of the Côte d'Ivoire where nearly all of the casualties have been French rather than U.N.

Now we're looking at some of the positive outcomes. One criteria for success is did you establish security and did it last, in particular did it last after you left if you've left, so this chart tries to answer that question. What it's measuring did the place go back to civil war or didn't it, and the answers are as indicated in the chart. For the U.S. at the time we did the study, Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo were peaceful, so was Haiti largely because when we did the study the U.N. had gone back in in 2004 and was still there. That answer would have been no if we'd done the study in 2003, for instance. And Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq were not yet secure. The U.N. of the eight cases we've studied rather surprisingly, seven of them were peaceful. The Belgian Congo was rated

not peaceful when we did the study, the U.N. study was done a couple of years ago, but it had stayed peaceful for 30 years after the U.N. left. The U.N. went in in 1961, stayed until 1963, and left behind a country that was not well governed but was not in civil for several decades after the U.N. left, so not a bad record. The EU's record at the time we did the study was three are secure and two are not yet secure.

Another good measure of success is how many of the refugees returned. Many of these operations are in fact conducted principally to get refugees to return. If you think of the U.S. interventions in Haiti or the NATO intervention in Kosovo, one of the main drivers of those interventions was unwanted refugees and if large numbers of refugees are returning, that's a good measure of the degree of security that's been established. So this is a useful indicator of success in other aspects of the mission. As you see, most of these missions, not all, have had positive effects and some of them have been highly positive. In counter-distinction, Iraq actually had a huge increase in refugees after the intervention so clearly from that standpoint it was not yet a success. But most of the other ones had very rapid refugee return figures, and interestingly in this category the U.N. interventions were the most uniformly successful.

This chart shows how quickly elections were held. It's not particularly a good thing to hold elections early. Often it's necessary, but

best practices suggest that giving a certain amount of time to allow civil society to develop, political parties to develop, ethnic tensions to subside, is helpful. Also best practices suggest it's better to hold local elections first and national elections later, this almost never happens as this chart shows, and there are various reasons for that, but it's simply useful to be able to look at how quickly elections were held in each of these places.

Another measure of success in democratization is now how quickly did you hold elections but whether or not the place is still being governed by a representative government that took office as a result of what the international community considered free and fair elections. For those ratings we went to Freedom House which rates every country in the world on kind of a 1 to 10 scale with 1 being the highest and 10 being the lowest on the scale, 9 I think being the lowest on the scale, and use their ratings rather than try to come up with our own. This tells you how the countries rate. So in terms of the U.S. you've got Germany and Japan which are free, Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan which are partly free, this was done after the Haitian election that took place in 2005. Kosovo is rated not free by Freedom House because it wasn't independent. It's now independent and presumably they will change that rating to free or partly free. And then Iraq and Afghanistan, where Afghanistan rates as partly free and Iraq as not.

The U.N. ratings are interesting. You wouldn't think given the countries that the U.N. has intervened in that they would score very high in this, but in fact they only have one of the eight cases as not free by Freedom House and all the others are either free or partly free, so they actually have the best score. The EU score is only reasonably good with only Côte d'Ivoire rated when we did the study as not free.

These figures look at how much assistance was provided again on a per capita basis, and we can see here that on average the U.S. levels of assistance were higher than those that the U.N. or the EU was able to mobilize. This doesn't mean the United States is more generous because in fact most of this money is not American. For instance, if you look at the Kosovo line which is the best, 80 percent of that was actually not American, it was European for the most part, so this is not a measure of generosity, this is a measure of competence in marshalling international resources. It's not surprising that the U.S. is more successful in marshalling resources for places where its troops are at risk than the U.N. It is a little surprising that it's much more successful than the EU which has much larger aid budgets than the U.S. does. I think what this says about the EU's capabilities is that the U.S. is much more successful at integrating its development and its security communities, its economic, political, and security resources, to focus them on whatever its current

priority is, whereas the EU is less successful at reorienting its development priorities when it puts its troops at risk.

This is another outcome. This is annual growth in the first 5 years after the intervention, and not surprisingly this is the category, and it's the only category, of outcomes at which the U.S. scores the highest, and this is clearly largely reflective of the higher amounts of input in terms of assistance that the U.S. is able to marshal.

The last few charts are just an attempt to show how the U.S. and the Europeans rate in comparison with the rest of the world in terms of manning international interventions, peace operations of one sort or another. How much are we doing as compared to everyone else in the world? You have four lines in the chart. You have the American line which is the bottom one and white, you have the EU line which is the red line which is next to the bottom for most of the chart, then you have the rest of the world which is everyone else in the world, and then you have the green one is the total of this. These are number of troops deployed in U.N.-mandated operations. These are not blue-helmeted operations. These are any operation as a U.N. mandate, and as a practical matter, every operation since 1989 has had a U.N. mandate. This includes Iraq which now has a U.N. mandate, it includes Afghanistan, it includes every operation that any country is involved in. I've used dotted lines to show the effect of Iraq among other things because some countries might argue

or some people might argue that Iraq is not truly a U.N.-mandated peace operation so you can either use the dotted line or not, but it clearly skews the proportion here.

This shows the percentage of our active-duty forces deployed in these kinds of operations. So what percentage of U.S. and European forces are deployed in any kind of operation that has a U.N. mandate? If you don't count Iraq, the U.S. total has never gone above 2 percent. All the stuff in the 1990s about how we were exhausting our forces and depressing reenlistment rates and damaging readiness because we had at one point maybe 10,000 troops in the Balkans, this demonstrates that we never had more than 2 percent of our active-duty force structure deployed in these kinds of operations, and the Europeans have never had much more than 2 percent. Iraq skews this for the U.S. and it goes up to almost 12 percent.

This shows something different. This is the number of troops in U.N.-led operations, in blue-helmeted peacekeeping operations. As you can see from this chart, around 1995 the U.S. and Europe essentially withdraw from peacekeeping operations and have not returned. The U.S. went down to virtually zero and the U.N. went down to close to zero, maybe one- to two-thousand, whereas the rest of the world picked up the residual, so the rest of the world is manning 98 percent or so of U.N. peacekeeping. This is the same chart showing what proportion of

the total the U.S. and the U.N. are deploying in U.N. peacekeeping operations. As you can see, the U.S. is down at the bottom. I think at the moment there are some nearly 100,000 men or 90,000 men deployed on U.N. peacekeeping operations of whom 11 are Americans. So that's the comparison that we did.

What did all this mean? We've looked at four EU-led interventions, Macedonia, the Congo twice, and Bosnia. A fifth the U.N. has just launched that's not covered in the book is in Chad. It's just getting underway. It's also true that the EU has done a number of nonmilitary interventions in the security sphere which have been on balance quite helpful, but the only ones we studied were ones that had a military component.

So far the EU-led military operations have been small, mostly short-lived and rather tentative. They're mostly about demonstrating a capability and exercising a capability rather than having a profound and lasting effect. In Europe and in operations that take place on the periphery of Europe, the EU has been very successful in marshalling nonmilitary assets which are often more important than its military assets in effecting the overall outcome and this is particularly true where the EU can offer the promise of EU membership as a component of its influence. When it's operating at a distance from Europe where it can't offer EU membership as an incentive, then its capacity to deploy other

nonmilitary assets in support of its overall effort has been disappointing and less effective than the United States, and that is somewhat surprising given the potential the EU has for mobilizing those kinds of resources. As I said, I think it has to do with several factors. One is that the development and security communities in the EU are not as integrated as in the U.S. They have different philosophies, they have different priorities, they've used to cooperating. As second is that the commission which has the money and the council which controls the forces are divided and always in some tension. A third is that there's a lack of solidarity. If U.K. troops go to Sierra Leone, that doesn't mean the French reorganize their aid budget to put more money in Sierra Leone, so to the extent that these missions are seen essentially as national in character, they don't generate European-wide resource reallocation.

Nevertheless, the U.S. has demonstrated the capacity to deploy and employ military force at a distance and sometimes in quite difficult circumstances. The circumstances in the Congo where they deployed were quite demanding, and in our judgment, ESDP is ready to go beyond the trial stage and take on larger missions. However, an important qualification is the following, that if the objective if simply to bolster a U.N.-led mission, the most cost-effective way of doing that is to commit forces to the U.N.-led mission, not deploy a parallel EU- or American-led mission in support of that force. The U.N.'s record despite

some well-known and signal failures has improved impressively, and in the case studies we do as I've indicated, of the four criteria for success, the U.N. scores higher than either the EU or the U.S. in three. There are a number of reasons for that including the fact that their cases were for the most part somewhat easier in that they had permissive entry and some degree of acquiescence in the parties which was not always the case with U.S.-led missions. Nevertheless, the U.N.'s success rate is high enough to lead one to conclude that if the EU wants to deploy forces in order to promote European influence and develop a capacity that they may need in some other cases where the U.N. or NATO aren't available, that's a perfectly legitimate rationale and they've made progress in this regard. But if this is simply a way of bolstering U.N. peacekeeping, then the best of doing that is actually to commit national forces to the U.N. peacekeeping missions, and in that comparison of the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases is illustrative. In Sierra Leone the U.N. deployed a nationally led mission separate from the U.N., whereas in Liberia the Swedes and the Irish provided the same capability, that is, a heavily armed, highly trained, highly mobile strategic reserve that the U.N. could use and that model also proved equally satisfactory.

So that's the study and I'd be happy to take questions.

MR. BENJAMIN: A lot of data here.

MR. DOBBINS: Yes. Maybe too much.

MR. BENJAMIN: My head was spinning a bit, but I had a few questions off the top. The obvious one is clearly why don't we just hand it all over to the Italians. But assuming that's not going to happen, looking at the figures you had about the military deployment versus police deployment, the characteristic of U.S. versus EU deployments, is it a natural conclusion from that that by and large in these kinds of operations the lighter, more police-oriented types of missions are likely to be more successful? It seems that it's almost circular, that you're going to have a lighter deployment in those cases where the security environment is more permissive, less problematic, and therefore you had a better chance of a good outcome. And it would certainly also seem to lead to the conclusion that we're heading toward a two-tier West, if not exactly a two-tier alliance.

MR. DOBBINS: I think that police offer an important component in almost any nation-building mission. They have capabilities and expertise that soldiers by and large don't have and have to spend a long time developing. At the moment, for instance, the United States is deploying law-enforcement experts with every brigade to provide headquarters-level advice on how to break up criminal networks and do other kinds of things. We're doing this through contractors and it's kind of a messy process and it took us 5 years to do it, but we're finally doing it. Whereas the EU and the U.N. have a more regularized system in which they assume from the beginning that 10 percent of the deployment is

going to be police and they have structures for mobilizing and deploying police. By and large they don't depend on contractors. They take people out of their national police departments which we don't really have an analog which is part of the problem.

It's true that if you allow the environment to become so violent that civilians have a hard time moving around except in military convoys you limit their effectiveness, but the environments in Afghanistan and even Iraq didn't start violently and the early deployment of a police contingent as part of the initial force in both cases might well have attenuated the levels of violence that eventually emerged or at a minimum would have more speedily developed indigenous capabilities to meet those levels of violence when they emerged. So I do think that there's a rationale for doing this.

I think there's also a rationale for not depending on military police who don't by and large have the same kinds of expertise and thus creating a better way of mobilizing our own assets. But it's not just the case of our assets. In Kosovo and Bosnia we used U.N. police but the U.S. was in the overall driver's seat and used U.N. police. And in Haiti we organized a nationally led international coalition of police that was headed by the former head of the New York Police Department and he pulled together 1,000 policemen mostly from Latin America and Haiti and New York where we had Haitian-speaking American police. So I think this

should return to the American repertoire and I think it serves a useful purpose even in less-permissive environments, but clearly the objective of sound planning for these kinds of operations is planning the kinds of deployments and operations which will deter and preempt the emergence of large violent insurgencies rather than having to deal with them.

MR. BENJAMIN: Just to the issue of what we should be doing in our future nation-building deployments, would it be your recommendation that given the absence of a national police force that we have within the military a track that is capable of doing this or do we need to have a speed dial for calling up international police forces some of which may actually resist our call because they don't necessarily agree with the intervention? How should this be organized so that we get it better next time?

MR. DOBBINS: In the case Afghanistan I think that we wouldn't have had any resistance and had we asked the U.N. to deploy a civilian police effort their answer would be we'll deploy them anywhere you put peacekeepers and then we would have said maybe we do need peacekeepers somewhere other than Kabul, but even if we just put them in Kabul, we had 5,000 soldiers in Kabul, if we put 500 civilian police in Kabul, we'd be a lot further along today in training of Afghan police than we were. So even if we just limited it to Kabul only, because you're not going to put police where you don't have soldiers, that's not a reasonable

proposition. As to how we do them, yes, in Iraq we might have had a difficulty generating police from a number of other countries and by the time it got so violent that would of course have been the case. The Army is in fact looking at creating specialties, subspecialties within the Army that can provide at least staff-level advice about law-enforcement type activities, and they do have military police and they do use them perforce. I would think that the best way of improving our current capability of mobilizing civilian police would simply be to pass legislation which would authorize the federal government to bring state and local law enforcement into federal employment for limited terms with guarantees that they could return to their local force with no loss of seniority, promotion rights, benefits, et cetera, and with some compensation for the local force because there is an interesting and a willingness and a certain sense of adventure on the part of state and local police and they usually do have the right kinds of training and qualifications, and in some cases they have language, there's a large pool of foreign-language speakers in the United States, and so you can often generate people who both have police experience and language experience for these kinds of missions. At the moment they have to resign from their police force, take a contract with DynCorp, and then they have no guarantee that they can go back to their police force and even if they do they've lost their seniority, et cetera. So I think something like that would facilitate mobilizing these resources.

MR. BENJAMIN: Something like a national police guard?

MR. DOBBINS: Yes. They don't have to be a standing force, simply a method of allowing people to undertake this kind of service and then return to their normal employment.

MR. BENJAMIN: Is there anyone in Congress interested in a plan like this?

MR. DOBBINS: There is some element of it in the State Department's, what is it called, the Ready Reserve Corps. They have several levels of readiness in the SCRS, the new office in the State Department, has something. It has limited numbers and it doesn't include legislation which guarantees these people the right to return to their old jobs which I think would be helpful.

MR. BENJAMIN: My last question as a long-time veteran of these kinds of issues, is it your sense that such an effort with an administration backing it would get anywhere or that in the environment we're in everyone would say maybe we just shouldn't be doing anymore nation building?

MR. DOBBINS: There is the danger that the reaction to Iraq like the reaction to Vietnam will be no more Iraqs and that as a consequence we'll lose a lot of the expertise that we've painfully acquired through 6 years of trial and error. The administration to its credit has recognized that the occupation was badly handled and they've introduced

a number of innovations including a new office in the State Department, a directive in the Defense Department, that makes stability operations a core mission of the military which Bill Clinton would have been impeached for trying to do if he'd done it, and issued a presidential directive and asked for more money for the State Department and they're building this reserve corps, so they're doing a number of things. But if the administration's reaction to Iraq is we have to do better next time, there are a lot of other people who probably think we shouldn't do it again next time. So the real question is can the American people retain two different lessons at the same time, yes, don't invade large hostile Middle East countries on the basis of questionable intelligence with narrow coalitions, but on the other hand, if Iraq were a war of choice and the choice is a poor one, Afghanistan really wasn't and both of them stuck us with a very similar mission and so even if you're more discriminating in the future you're still going to get stuck with this mission occasionally.

MR. BENJAMIN: It's not clear to me that they've really thrown their weight behind supporting the State Department effort. As you know, here at Brookings we have some veterans of that initiative and it's never been very well funded, but time will tell whether a new administration can learn both of those lessons.

Why don't we now open it up to the floor where I'm sure the questions will be more acute. How about over there to get some geographic diversity from the start?

MS. STEWART: Katherine Stewart. I have a question. You said that we looked and saw that the EU had better success rates in the Balkans and in Africa especially based on peace afterwards and you sort of gave the explanation that it was because they could offer EU membership, but I don't find that compelling especially in the case of Italy and Albania. No one has ever talked about Albania entering the EU. So I wondered if you had any other explanation, geographic proximity, a common historical background, or what. Sort of a second question would be do you think in the future we'll see less individually country-led interventions instead of Italy or France wanting to go in somewhere and just sort of bringing the whole EU in, is it going to be that the EU wants to go as a whole sort of a collective thing?

MR. DOBBINS: Albania is on track to become a member of the EU, but I think it's probably true in 1997 that nobody was in a position to promise it. I think the success of the Albania operation had largely to do with the fact that the civil conflict in Albania wasn't an ethnic conflict, that the underlying causes were essentially political and economic but not ethnic or sectarian and that made it a lot easier to resolve, and once

security was resolved, Albania saw progress toward modernization which continued.

But in the cases of Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the promises of NATO and EU membership have certainly been major factors, maybe the most important factors, that and 60,000 troops, and in one case 50,000 in another, but the combination has both led to the pacification and then led to the troop numbers being able to come down very rapidly.

In terms of European interventions I think there will be less nationally led interventions and I think that nations will see the EU as a way of essentially leveraging their own participation and bringing others in, and I think the Chad operation which was largely a French derivation is an example of that.

MR. BENJAMIN: And also because I think countries' experiences have been more validly postcolonial in the 21st century than they were even at the very end of the 20th century so it seems to me that that will also factor in. Next question? A question from the EU?

MR. HERMAN: Hans Herman. Concluding from the impressive amount of data you gave us, what would you say is the main difference between European and U.S.-led missions in terms of integration of military and nonmilitary units? What lessons can we draw from this for nation building?

MR. DOBBINS: I think the EU was very successful in integrating military and nonmilitary means on its own periphery where it has the various modalities in place. It has economic funds, it has structures, it has personnel committed to modernizing those societies and integrating them, and the military component is a small additional component in a few cases where it's necessary. But at a greater distance it doesn't have those mechanisms, it simply has traditional economic development mechanisms and it has an economic development community that isn't attuned to security priorities and resists having its priorities adjusted as a result of decisions made in the security sphere, and so I think this is a problem. It's a problem that the alterations in the EU constitution would largely address if that succeeds, so it's not a problem that's irremediable, but it is definitely a problem for EU operations in say a place like the Congo.

QUESTIONER: (inaudible)

MR. DOBBINS: I think the broad lessons is that they're very important but that security is the preeminent requirement. If you provide security you'll get economic growth even if you provide no assistance at all, whereas if you apply the assistance without security you won't either get peace or prosperity. So in effect, security is a prerequisite for other aspects of reform but societies that are emerging from conflict are very promising areas for economic assistance. Dollar for dollar or euro for euro

you'll get growth in a postconflict society than you will if you put the same amount of money in a more stable society and that society will be able to accept more assistance as a higher proportion of its GDP can usefully be spent on assistance. So they're rather attractive objects of assistance, and I think the World Bank is beginning to look at how it can play a more constructive role in postconflict environments. It's been hesitant to involve itself in those kinds of missions and I think the EU Commission and the national aid agencies need to do the same.

MR. BENJAMIN: I hear an idea about a new tier of emerging markets being needed. Perhaps there's a hedge fund in the making.

MR. CASEY: Tim Casey, CDI. What role do you see the rising economies of India and China playing in nation building?

MR. DOBBINS: China actually has become a more important troop contributor. I think they are now like the tenth or eleventh largest and a few years ago they weren't participating at all. Japan has begun participating, but China has moved well in advance of Japan. I suspect there are several factors that are leading the Chinese to do this. The first is simply to demonstrate that they're a good citizen and that they're ready to assume responsibilities of a major power. Secondly, they are obviously to some degree projecting Chinese influence, and China has a number of interests in Africa particularly resource-related interests and

most of these missions do take place in Africa, and so I think that's a component. And they probably also recognize that this is very good practice, that these missions can teach them a lot about how to integrate with other militaries, how to conduct operations in demanding and distance environments, and that therefore there's a considerable benefit in terms of professionalizing their military in committing themselves to such missions. I don't think this is something the United States should view with a great deal of alarm. On the other hand, to the extent Americans got alarmed and it led them to also participate in U.S. peacekeeping, that wouldn't bother me.

MR. BENJAMIN: In the back, sir?

QUESTIONER: John -- Seton Hall University. You mentioned security as a substrate through which further reforms can be conducted. I'm just curious to know, you're familiar with Hernando de Soto's proposal that a formal legal structure and property laws should be established for economic growth to take place. Do you have any comments with that perspective?

MR. DOBBINS: I think clearly that putting in place structures which allow a resumption of normal economic activity are a very important early step in the nation-building process. Actually, adjusting property laws, registering property, is a more difficult process and it's not something you're going to do in the first months. It clearly I think has a major benefit

but I'm not sure it's something that is likely to be feasible in those early months when your capacity to introduce change and implement things is limited. In order to do something like that you need an effective functioning bureaucracy. You don't normally have an effective functioning bureaucracy and building one has to be one of your first priorities. I'm looking at my colleague Mr. Crane here. Have I said anything I shouldn't have? That was the right answer. Thank you.

MR. BENJAMIN: Jim, I have a question for you, a methodological one. When you have to confront all those reviewers at RAND who are armed with their social science Ph.D.s and they say to you are you really comparing 22 apples here or are you comparing 4 apples, 3 oranges, a watermelon, and a chicken, what do you say? The Congo deployments for example were in the midst of a lot of killing. In Iraq we've had troops on the ground throughout. It's a very different kind of thing. How do you respond?

MR. DOBBINS: I'd get a different reviewer. The book has lots of caveats in terms of acknowledging that there are differences. On the other hand, I think the fact that it's difficult to assemble data and it's difficult to compare them isn't a reason not to do it, it's simply a reason to recognize the limitations. But to say you can't compare the European and American roles because they're just different, so you're not going to do it, that doesn't strike me as a very useful or very scientific way of

approaching it. I think there are valid comparisons and valid conclusions that can be drawn and there are others that cannot. In terms of the Congo, you've had a U.N. operation with intermittent EU reinforcements and clearly any long-term conclusions about the validity of the Congo operation largely must credit the U.N. rather than the Europeans. The Europeans can only be credited with the impact of their brief interventions and then perhaps whatever lingering impact that may have had. The British definitely turned around the failing operation. It was failing before they got there, it succeeded after they left, and so I think you can fairly say that they had a pivotal and decisive role while also acknowledging that the U.N. did most of the work. The fact is that Congo although there are still levels of violence is much more peaceful than it was before the U.N. got there and it's had three elections that were universally accepted as free and fair as you could reasonably expect and the EU's presence during that period had a good deal to do with it.

More importantly, if you look more broadly at the number of conflicts that are going on in the world and the number of people getting killed in them, the numbers have been going down fairly steadily and it's reasonable to conclude that the large proliferation of peacekeeping missions that I talked about have contributed to that. In the United States and Europe there's a nostalgia for the Cold War. Yes, it was kind of scary but it was basically stable and peaceful. Well, it wasn't. The United

States and the Soviet Union were funding dozens of proxy wars around the world in places like Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Angola, there were killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people every single year for decades and most of those wars have been wrapped up and they haven't resumed. If you look at the statistics of the number of conflicts between the early 1990s and the beginning of this current decade you find the numbers are cut in about half, the numbers of people getting killed in them went down even further, and rather remarkably, the numbers continue to go down from the beginning of this decade to now and despite the number of people killed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Darfur, the fact is that more people were saved in the Congo than were killed in all those other conflicts because the Congo is bigger than all those other places put together and more people were getting killed, so these activities do yield measurable results.

MR. BENJAMIN: You're underlining the general narrative that things are always falling apart.

MR. DOBBINS: Yes.

MR. BENJAMIN: So don't tell anyone. We'll be out of business.

MR. NIELSEN: Adam Nielsen. You mentioned that ESDP is ready to go beyond the trial stage and then mentioned that European operations should be done under the U.N. or under U.N. administrative

direction. Is that right? Can you explain that relationship a bit more or where you see ESDP going if they should be under the auspices of the U.N.?

MR. DOBBINS: What I said was that if the objective is simply to bolster a U.N. operation then the most cost-effective way and that is just to assign troops rather than have two different councils, the Security Council and the European Council, two different chains of command controlling the troops that are in the same operating zone, that's more expensive and it introduces a number of other complications that could be avoided. There are cases where the U.N. isn't interested or won't go or where more higher-quality, more expensive troops are necessary. The average EU soldier costs $150,000 a year even if he's not doing anything. The average U.N. soldier is about $50,000 a year. So all things being equal, if you can man the thing with 70 or 80 percent Third World soldiers and 10 to 20 percent First World soldiers, it's a lot cheaper than manning with 100 percent First World soldiers and most peacekeeping operations where you have permissive entry and some degree of acquiescence by the parties are susceptible to that level of engagement, but there will be exceptions. There will be exceptions either because the EU chooses to emphasize its role, project its influence, or because higher-quality, more mobile, better-equipped troops are required

and in either of those circumstances the EU now has a capacity which it didn't have 5 years ago.

MS. COLLINS: Cheryl Collins. Along the same lines in talking about how countries (inaudible) and this is not to equate the African Union or other organizations or regional organizations (inaudible) do you think that the A.U. is getting to the point where you could include it in a study like this and if so how would you rate it? And then what other -- roles for regional organizations (inaudible)

MR. DOBBINS: I think the AU and also (inaudible) have conducted a number of operations and you undoubtedly could do a book like this. If anybody has funding and would like for us to do one let me know, but I'm a little skeptical about how useful that is. It's the option of last resort in many cases. From an American standpoint and from a European standpoint, the main disadvantage of using the A.U. or some other African organization is that you have to pay 100 percent of its cost rather than just 50 percent. Whereas if you use the U.N., for the U.S. the cost is 25 percent and Europe's cost is 25 percent and everybody else in the world has to pay the rest rather they like it or not, even if they voted against the operation they have to pay, and they do for the most. But if it's an A.U. operation say in Darfur, they don't pay a penny. They don't have budgets, they don't have the capacity, to deploy and project force and sustain it, so that's paid for entirely by the U.S. and Europe. So you're

paying 100 percent of the cost instead of 50 percent of the cost and you're getting a less-capable force as a result. It's not the best of bargains.

There are places where the local country like Sudan says it will only take African troops. They're doing that for all the wrong reasons. They're not doing it because they're the most effective, they're doing it because they're the least effective. They're doing it because they will be the least exigent, they will be under the least pressure to comply and cooperate, so that's not a big incentive to invest a lot in those capabilities. But that said, there are lots of conflicts where the U.N. is busy, the U.S. isn't interested and where regional forces have been used sometimes with a fair degree of success.

MR. BENJAMIN: We have time for one or two more questions.

MR. ELLSWORTH: Gabriel Ellsworth with the Heritage Foundation. I was just wondering, there's been a lot of speculation about whether a major issue in transatlantic relations in the next administration will be the next president needing to make calls for more European support for the work in Afghanistan. Is there anything in your findings that the next president could draw on to try and make those appeals to Europe or how can he make those appeals more persuasive than they've been from this administration?

MR. DOBBINS: I think it is likely that the next administration will look to Europe to increase its support and it's also likely that faced with the choice of doing more in Afghanistan and Iraq that the Europeans will choose Afghanistan, and there is certainly scope for more and I think it's quite likely that if the U.S. is able to withdraw some of its forces from Iraq they're likely to go to Afghanistan and that will be a further goad to the Europeans to increase their own commitments.

I'm not sure the study has too much that directly relates because I don't think it's likely that the EU would want or that the U.S. would be particularly interested in having an EU force, that is, a separate command structure, you have a NATO command structure and an American command structure, so to have a third in effect command structure in Afghanistan, I don't think that would be very attractive. If the Europeans said we'll give you 50,000 troops if you accept another command structure, we'd probably do it, but I don't see that being very likely.

On the other hand, there's lots more the EU can do in other fields. They have for instance undertaken to provide a large number of international police, and so far although they promised to do it they haven't actually done it in any numbers. So an expanded EU police mission would definitely be an area that the U.S. would welcome and the EU could

potentially respond positively. And of course, the EU has a large aid budget and they could allocate more of it for Afghanistan.

MR. BENJAMIN: (inaudible) Ireland.

QUESTIONER: (inaudible) the Brookings Institution. With the strengthening of EU planning capacities make a difference in the nation-building missions and are you favorable to it?

MR. DOBBINS: Strengthening in their?

QUESTIONER: Planning capacities in Brussels.

MR. DOBBINS: I'd say that our study would indicate that their planning capacity has been adequate to the level of missions that they've conducted. In other words, the missions have been professionally conducted. There have not been significant problems in the planning for the missions.

The process has evolved somewhat. It's relied heavily on national planning capabilities, but there has been a gradual increase in the capacity of the central institutions that play a role. And to the extent they have larger missions and to the extent those missions were truly multinational, they simply an EU flag on a nationally dominated mission, that kind of capacity could be helpful. There is continued debate as to whether they should rely on NATO for those capabilities. NATO is grossly overstaffed in terms of its planning capability and so the question is whether you need to duplicate that with a large overstaffed EU capability

as well is a legitimate question. There's nothing in our study which would indicate a deficiency in that regard.

MR. BENJAMIN: I wonder if your watch is slow or mine is fast. Let's take one more question and then we'll wrap it up.

MR. CHEN: Chow Chen, freelance correspondent. In the EU you have use of the word cost-effective. I think this cost-effectiveness may be due to they went to (inaudible) and also in this U.S.-led operations. In Germany and Japan we done lots of preparations and in Japan we do quite extensive language training. So I think in this so-called nation building, in addition to armed forces I think to educate to be familiar with the land and also the preparation, these two things are very important.

MR. DOBBINS: I think that's right. It's true that all of the European operations were conducted in societies that were previously European colonies and so in that sense there was some degree of familiarity with the societies in question, and it's certainly true that the U.S. operations in both Germany and Japan after the Second World War, there was substantial planning in preparation for those missions. The missions didn't always go exactly as planned, but the fact that there was extensive planning and extensive resourcing that was made available was undoubtedly a factor in their success, and certainly more thorough planning and area familiarization is a factor. But when I said that the

missions were cost-effective I was talking primarily about the U.N. missions which are generally less expensive and yet have a reasonably high success rate.

MR. BENJAMIN: Jim, just in closing, you have now four volumes in the nation-building experience?

MR. DOBBINS: Yes. One or two more coming.

MR. BENJAMIN: One or two more coming, although those are pretty much finished if I may assume correctly.

MR. DOBBINS: The volume after the war which looks at the process and presidential personality is finished and it's now being edited. Then the next volume in the series will be an history of the occupation of Iraq.

MR. BENJAMIN: After that is there more in this vein to be mined?

MR. DOBBINS: Depending on funding.

MR. BENJAMIN: Depending on the funders.

MR. DOBBINS: Yes.

MR. BENJAMIN: Some things in Washington are eternal. Jim Dobbins, thank you very much.

MR. DOBBINS: Actually to answer your question seriously, all of our studies so far have looked at this from the standpoint of the interveners, how much money did they use, how much manpower did they

use, what strategy did they have, what programs did they put in place, and how did they work. I think that it will be interesting to reverse it and look at it from the standpoint of the indigenous people and see what qualities made missions easier, what qualities made missions harder, what conditions are likely to be more conducive to success, what conditions are less likely to be conducive to success. In other words, use the same method of trying to measure, calibrate, and compare, but do it more with a look at indigenous circumstances rather than inputs and outputs and come to some conclusions.

MR. BENJAMIN: That gets us back to our two oranges, an apple, and a watermelon question. Jim, thank you very much for an extremely illuminating and informative talk. And here at Brookings we're wishing you at least 12 or 15 more volumes.

MR. DOBBINS: Thank you.

MR. BENJAMIN: So we look forward to the next one.

MR. DOBBINS: Thank you, and thank you for having me.

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