The Policy Irrelevance of the Economics of Education: Is "Normative as Positive" Just Useless, or is it Worse?

> Comments by Ben Olken Harvard University

> > May 2008

### Overview

- This is a very thought-provoking paper that makes three basic claims
  - 1. We implicitly justify the policy relevance of most empirical work on education in developing countries with the "Normative as Positive" (*NAP*) Model of government behavior.
    - This model states that governments maximize social welfare.
  - 2. This is a silly (or at least incomplete) model of government behavior.
    - Models that actually think about government actors and their objective functions (political economy models) better describe government behavior.
  - 3. Believing in the *NAP* model of the world can lead you to ask the wrong questions and make incorrect policy recommendations.
    - The policy justification behind the 'randomization agenda' is the NAP model, so therefore it is answering the wrong questions and making incorrect policy recommendations.

### What is the "*NAP*" model?

- Simplest version:
  - Production function for government services is F (P), where P is some policy choice
  - Individual utility as function of consumption and government services, u<sub>i</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>, F (P))
  - Denote government beliefs about production function F by  $\widehat{F}$
  - Social welfare function  $SW^{G}(u_{i}(x_{i}, F(P)))$
  - NAP: Government chooses P to maximize  $SW^G$  given  $\widehat{F}$ .
- Implication:
  - Policy failures come about because government has wrong beliefs about production function *F*
  - Evidence (effect of textbooks, school feeding, class size, remedial tutoring, etc) helps improve welfare by moving *F* closer to *F*, which results in better policy.
- Paper argues: NAP false, and therefore evidence about F doesn't necessarily improve policy.

### Is NAP the issue?

- In fact, we don't need to reject NAP to come to the same conundrum.
- NAP actually incorporates a fairly wide range of political economy models, since the equilibrium of many political economy models can be written as the solution to maximizing a social welfare function with some set of welfare weights.
  - Median voter models (Downs 1957)
  - Models of interest groups and collective action problems (Olson 1965, Stigler 1971)
  - etc.
- ► The real problem is that the social welfare function governments maximize may not be the social welfare function "we" want to maximize (equal welfare weights, Rawlsian maxmin criteria, etc), so SW<sup>G</sup> ≠ SW<sup>\*</sup>.
  - ► In which case, while understanding F better improves SW<sup>G</sup>, it doesn't necessarily improve SW\*.

#### So where does this leave us?

- ▶ So suppose that government maximizes SW<sup>G</sup>, or whatever
- What is the role of evidence?
- Specifically, under what circumstances does evidence about F improve SW\*?
- Theoretically, it's not guaranteed to do so, but I'd argue it does more often than not.

# The Role of Evidence

In the domestic political arena

- Politicians may not actually care about maximizing social welfare per se, but they often do care about getting re-elected
  - Often evidence about *F* can help them.
    - In Indonesia, in 2004 President promised to reduce poverty by 8 percentage points within five years and has launched a cash transfer program. Government needs evidence on better ways to target transfers.
    - In the US, improving school achievement is often a campaign promise.
- Informing disputes between political groups
  - Governments need to justify impact of programs to parliamentary opposition.
  - Rigorous impact evaluation can keep good programs alive and help reallocate funds away from bad ones.

## The Role of Evidence

Informing outside advice

- Economists are often asked to give technical advice.
- What should external donors who presumably care about SW\* – push for?
  - For example, the debate about whether to charge for government services
- ▶ Knowing *F* helps us give answers that increase *SW*<sup>\*</sup>.
- Understanding the political economy of reform is critical to implementing reform – but even if we know that, we still need to know what to push for.

## The Role of Evidence

As a rhetorical device

- Randomized evidence can dramatically enhance diffusion of good ideas because they are easy to understand (just compare treatment and control) and methodologically hard to dispute.
  - Progresa
  - Worms

#### The Role of Randomization

- Randomization is a methodology, not an 'agenda'.
- View of the 'randomization agenda' presented in the paper at least vis-a-vis education – is that it seeks to understand the education production function – what is the marginal benefit of class size, textbooks, para-teachers, etc. i.e., F.
- Paper argues that the right research agenda is the 'accountability agenda' – research to learn how to improve the system given that government is not a monolith.

#### The Role of Randomization

- But a wide variety randomized experiments in education address exactly these types of accountability problems.
  - Better monitoring of teachers (Duflo and Hanna 2008)
  - Performance pay for teachers (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2007)
  - Performance pay for students (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton forthcoming)
  - Changing the political structure of local school committees (Pradhan et al. underway)
  - Providing information to villages (Banerjee et al. underway)
  - Increasing demand for education (Progresa)
- So even if understanding F isn't what is needed, it is not clear that randomization can't help.