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AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

DR. COHEN: Our apologies for the late start, but one of the panelists has gone AWOL, but I'm sure she'll be here. She'll be here shortly. I think we can begin and Ambassador Schaffer will arrive in due course and, if not, no.

Let me welcome you to the launch of a book that has been in the making for 17 years, probably the most prolonged birth of a book, at least around here, in many, many years. My co-authors and I participated in a retrospective study of the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis. We then wrote a book on the 1990 crisis which we called a compound crisis -- I'll explain that later -- and then we collaborated on a study of the Kargil Crisis of 1999 and finishing the set off on a study of the 2001-2002 crisis.

We owe much to a number of people, especially to our patient wives as we traveled around, meeting with each other, interviewing and so forth. We think that we have written a comprehensive guide to these crises and said something important on five areas, at least five areas: the nature of crisis, India-Pakistan relations, American involvement in these crises, the role of nuclear weapons, the prospect for the present détente or peace process or -- to give it its sterile, formal title -- composite dialogue and perhaps other issues as well.

Let me say a few words about these specific topics and then

introduce a stellar panel of experts, each of whom has studied or been involved in one or more of these crises. Each brings to this book launch a rich experience in the policy world.

What is a crisis? Turns out, the academic literature is replete with discussions of crisis management -- there are at least five or ten very fine books on the subject -- but very little is said about what an international crisis is. There's a definition which goes to the effect that a crisis is a period where there's a sense of impending action, particularly military action, or change, but it turns out it's very hard to measure a crisis because crises have large, substantive components.

This is especially true when different parties have different judgments about the presence and nature of a crisis. We found this to be true in the case of all four crises.

In some cases, the United States was the least engaged power, especially the 1987 crisis. I was in the government at that point, and there was no crisis as far as we were concerned. In fact, we reassured both countries that there was not a crisis. Turns out, later in a sense, it could have been a major crisis.

In other cases, it appeared that the U.S. was more alarmist than the two countries. Further, as time passes, people look back and say, that was a crisis, and this was the case in 1990-1991 when Seymour Hersh

wrote his article after the 1990 crisis and the alleged movement of nuclear assets. So 1990 became a crisis after the fact.

It can be argued that India-Pakistan relations were one long crisis with peaks coming during their three wars and the skirmish at Kargil and the three other crises discussed in this book. This raises deeper questions about normalization between two states with different political systems, different state identities and territorial disagreements, most notably about Kashmir which is also an identity issue.

The relations between India and Pakistan are not as pathological or as intractable as that between Israel and its neighbors. Right now, in Annapolis, they're going to settle that problem presumably by lunchtime so they can catch their planes going back. But there are many points of comparison and, in the book, we do point out a few similarities between the two.

American involvement in these crises varied greatly. In 1987, the U.S. reassured both sides that there was not crisis. In 1990, we overcompensated and were more worried about developments than the two weak governments in India and Pakistan. In 1999, Kargil, we probably got it just right, and the same was true, I think, in 2001-2002. In these two crises, the U.S. was being used by both sides to pressure the other. So America has become, willy-nilly, a go-between in the region in a

new way, involuntarily and without conscious planning.

Nuclear weapons played a different role in each crisis. In 1987, the crisis certainly accelerated both states' weapons programs. In 1990, there were no nukes, but they could have been assembled and deployed if the crisis had escalated. Again, this is a technical issue. We're not quite sure of the facts of the matter, but they probably could have pushed toward a simple crude device in both countries.

In 1999, there were nuclear weapons because the two countries had tested in 1998, and it is clear that escalation was inhibited by their presence. The same is true of 2001-2002. If there's a lesson, it is that in most cases the existence of nuclear weapons might lead to restraint -- underline might -- but again this lesson might not hold in all cases.

To summarize my perspective of this, and I think my co-authors shared this view, it is that nuclear weapons may prevent war, but they don't create a peace or détente. We're not optimistic that the present dialogue is going anywhere very fast.

This makes the relationship vulnerable to any terrorist group or attack that wants to provoke a new crisis. Without going into the details, Siachen, Sir Creek, trade, cultural exchanges and other issues are still stalled between India and Pakistan. There is no will, at the same time, on both sides to bring about a conclusion to any of these issues. Both sides,

at one time or another, seem to believe that time is on their side.

We have some ideas about all of these themes, but this is the time to turn to the panel for their comments and ideas.

Peter Rodman has the unique distinction of serving under five presidents in important positions, and recently joined the Brookings Institutions as a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program. Peter saw the 1987 crisis from the perspective of the White House and the 2001-2002 crisis from the vantage point of the Department of Defense.

Ambassador Teresita Schaffer was the senior most American official dealing with South Asia full-time for a number of years and has served as American ambassador in Sri Lanka as well as other important assignments including Dean of the Foreign Service Institute.

Tezi, were you in office during any of the crises?

AMB. SCHAFFER: In 1990.

DR. COHEN: The 1990 crisis, so she saw the 1990 crisis from the vantage point of the State Department. Ambassador Schaffer is now with CSIS where she heads up their South Asia program.

Dr. Ashley Tellis not only is an accomplished academic writer and scholar on security affairs, he was a senior analyst at Rand before he went out to the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi as a special assistant to Ambassador Robert Blackwill where he oversaw the 2001-2001 crisis from

that vantage point. Now, Dr. Tellis is next door with us at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

So, let me call on Peter Rodman first, and then we'll go down the list.

We have at least one important participant in one of the crises, Ambassador Raminder Jassal, who was the Ministry of Defense spokesman during the Kargil crisis, and we'll ask him to add a few remarks after our comments.

Peter.

MR. RODMAN: Steve, thank you.

I'm very honored that Steve invited me to join this panel this morning. I'm inclined to think that the main contribution I have made in my life to U.S. policy in South Asia is that I helped recruit Steve to the Policy Planning staff of the State Department in the 1980s. So there was one period in which the U.S. Government was able to get the full benefit of Steve's unique expertise directly and on a full-time basis, and I consider that a contribution because all of us have the highest regard for Steve as preeminent among American scholars in this field.

If I can make any contribution beyond that, what I thought I would do this morning is say a little bit about the 2001-2002 crisis, with which I did have some involvement in the Pentagon, and put it in the context of

what I believe the present administration's approach to India and Pakistan has been.

When President Bush came into office, he had the idea of getting out of the sanctions bind. What he inherited was a policy of sanctions against both India and Pakistan, resulting particularly from the nuclear weapons, the explosion of nuclear weapons in 1998. But it was clear with the passage of a few years time that this policy was getting us no leverage. It was costing us leverage with both sides, not gaining us leverage, and therefore we had the idea, even before 9/11, that with both India and Pakistan maybe it was time to free ourselves of these sanctions and to engage with both, or with each in its own right.

India has always talked of not wanting to be part of a hyphenated policy. It shouldn't be an India-Pakistan policy. India is a major country in its own right. From our perspective, Pakistan too, we have interests with Pakistan in its own right. That seemed a very important insight.

Now, 9/11 came along and, of course, transformed our relationship with Pakistan. But with India, I believe this President came into office with the idea that India again is a major country in its own right and, in Asia, an important global player and a country with which it was in our interest to engage now that the Cold War was over.

The Cold War had introduced many distortions in our relationship

with India, and those were now behind us. The new strategic environment seemed to this President an opportunity for a new strategic relationship with India. So, again, after 9/11, that was a test of this, the possibility of an unhyphenated policy.

Both countries seemed to us and still seem to us strategically important for different reasons. Our relations with each have their different strategic imperatives.

Now, it's very hard to deepen engagement with two countries who are themselves rivals. You always run the risk as you deepen your engagement with one side that you will annoy the other more than you will get the benefit of whatever you're doing, but the United States has a global foreign policy. There are many parts of the world where we have relations with friends who are themselves rivals, in a regional context, whether it's Arabs and Israelis, or Greece and Turkey, or China and Taiwan. This is what we do for a living.

I'm happy to say that as I think over the last several years, we have pulled it off, at least so far, that our relations with India are deeper than ever, including in the defense field. Our relations with Pakistan have been very close in the War on Terror as everyone knows and notices. Perhaps in the question period, people can talk about the current crisis.

But, in any case, our relationship, in this trilateral relationship so far,

the United States I think has managed to have better relations with each than it had in the past and to do this without antagonizing the other.

Now, this is the context of the 2001-2002 crisis. The stakes we had acquired in relations with both countries, a sufficient strategic stake to make it an imperative that we engage ourselves to head off this crisis. As you know, in history, not every India-Pakistan crisis has drawn us in as a would-be mediator, but I think in 2001-2002, as I said, our strategic stakes with both had become very high and, of course, the additional urgency introduced by the nuclear dimension that made it seem an imperative for us to do everything we could to head off an escalation of that crisis.

But another point to make is that this was an unusual example of, well, I won't say unusual. I'll just say it's a noteworthy example of cooperation within our government, between the State Department and the Defense Department. I accompanied Colin Powell on one of his visits to the region -- it's referred to in the book -- in May of 2002 as a Defense Department representative just to show the flag and participate in Colin Powell's effort at mediation. Then a month later, Secretary Rumsfeld went over.

When was the Powell trip? Was it May?

DR. TELLIS: It was May.

MR. RODMAN: Then Deputy Secretary Armitage went over, I think,

in June.

Then Secretary Rumsfeld, who was on a trip to Europe for a NATO Defense Ministers meeting, was given the job of going to the region as well, and I remember a handoff. Armitage was coming out, and we met in some place in Europe. I think it was Estonia. Armitage talked to Rumsfeld about what he had done and compared notes and just passed the baton to Rumsfeld who did his bit to convey messages to both sides.

The Defense Department was certainly not in the lead here, but we thought that given the intimacy of defense relations that we now had with both countries, that hearing from him the same message that they were hearing from other parts of the U.S. Government was its own contribution. Secretary Rumsfeld talked about some specifics and confidence-building measures and, in a very gingerly way, he also talked about the nuclear risks.

Now, we understood that both sides were very sensitive and remain very sensitive to what they might see as patronizing advice from us about their nuclear weapons. Both of them tend to say, hey, you think we're too immature to handle these things and don't belittle us. But what Secretary Rumsfeld talked about, I believe in both capitals, was to say, hey, look at our own experience in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the scholarship about the Cuban Missile Crisis many years later revealed how little the U.S. and

the Soviet Union really understood about each other's motives. The contemporary scholarly assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis is really there was a greater danger of miscalculation than anyone realized.

So he made the point in, I think, a less patronizing way to say, hey, look, all countries that have nuclear weapons run this kind of risk, and it was his way of gently suggesting to both sides that they should never be overconfident about what they think will happen in terms of escalation and the risks.

One last point I'd make, and again I'd vouch for the account in the book. That's really my bottom line here. I consider it very accurate and completely congruent with my own recollection.

There's one little item in there which I think is worth noting, and that's the role of the travel advisories. This is one of the surprising things. It's a miscalculation perhaps that had a benign effect.

The United States Government, as you know and maybe Teresita would know better, issued a travel advisory about businesses and the risks of Americans traveling in the region. I believe it was done for routine reasons. I mean I think this is something that the State Department and embassies keep an eye on, their assessment of the risks, and they do this as a matter of the safety of personnel and the potential safety of Americans. It's usually not done, in my understanding, as a policy act.

But in this case, and the ambassador can talk about that, I think the Indian Government reacted very sharply because they saw an economic effect and thought this was an economic weapon being used against them which they thought was very unfair. It may well have been one of the things which contributed to the de-escalation of the crisis because it was an example of unanticipated costs that the countries were bearing as a result of this crisis, but my understanding is that the U.S. Government was probably surprised at the political effect that this measure had.

I don't know if there's a lesson there for future crisis management, but I can vouch for, I think, certainly the U.S. Government not anticipating that this would have policy significance. At least that is my recollection.

Again, I consider the account in this book to be right on and an excellent work of scholarship, and so I congratulate all of the authors.

Thank you.

AMB. SCHAFFER: First of all, I've already apologized to Steve, but let me apologize to the rest of you for coming in late. This has been a bit of a Murphy's Law morning in that department, but I am very glad to be here.

I'm particularly glad that Steve asked me to comment on this book. I know it's been a labor of love for Steve. It is one of a long series, which may not be over yet, of books on India-Pakistan crises that he co-authors

with Cheema and Chari and which have been very useful in that they incorporate different perspectives. The different perspectives are, in a sense, less labeled in this book than they are in the single crisis books, but they are nonetheless present.

At a time when all of us South Asia watchers are beating our gums daily and more about Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is a useful reminder that the old standby India-Pakistan issue is still with us, that it is an old standby, but that it changes through time and sometimes in significant ways.

As Steve already mentioned, I saw one of these crises as a serving official working specifically on South Asia, Brasstacks. I was overseas and since it was not a crisis, capital C, from Washington's perspective, it meant that I was in a different universe. The last two crises that he describes, the Kargil Crisis and the mobilization of 2001-2002, I was in Washington but in the think tank world and therefore watching from the side.

Broadly speaking, the book captures my memories and, as I said, is a good reminder that crises look different from different places. The one perspective that was really quite different from where I sat than it was from what emerges from the book, and indeed from the accounts seen from Islamabad and Delhi, is 1990, the nuclear dimension. I know it is true that

in the minds of Indian and Pakistani officials who worked that crisis and scholars who observed it, this was not a nuclear crisis. I can assure you that in the minds of U.S. officials who were working on it, it was a potentially nuclear crisis.

The U.S. had issued the required certification for Pakistan's aid to continue in 1988 and 1989, but it had done so with great difficulty, and it had publicly said that it had done so with great difficulty. What that means, translating from bureau speak, was that while the U.S. Government, the President, President Clinton at that time -- sorry -- President Bush I at that time, was willing to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that our continued aid would materially reduce the risks of his doing so, this rested on some much more delicate judgments than had the previous certifications. Of course, the next certification didn't happen, the one in 1990.

When you combine that with the magnitude of the military movements taking place, certainly in the minds of U.S. officials, this was a classic situation where a miscalculation could lead to a situation that nobody wanted.

I think the thread running through American thinking about India-Pakistan and potential crises is: these are intelligent people. They are not crazy. They are not marching off to war. They live right next door to each

other. Miscalculation could happen very easily despite all best intentions which is why I would argue that the argument from our own experience is actually very compelling.

So, my memory of that is that the potential nuclear dimension was never far from our minds, and this certainly colored the way the U.S. was involved in it.

I'd like to talk very briefly about two issues that the book covers and one that it doesn't really aim to cover but that I think is important. The two that it covers are, first, outsider involvement. In general, I know that much of Steve's work has been an argument for more and more sophisticated third party diplomatic interest in helping India and Pakistan move from hostility to something better. What this book tells is the story of the very limited effectiveness of that outsider involvement, primarily U.S. in this case, and of shifting attitudes towards it.

Traditionally, Pakistan always wanted more international involvement; India didn't. By the time you get to the Kargil and mobilization crises, Pakistan is still kind of on auto pilot, looking for international involvement; India has decided this is a game it can play. I don't say that to be flippant, but I think that's a calculus of statesmanship that the Indian Government made at some point during that period.

As the book recounts well, I think the U.S. was quite effective in

crisis management. It did not really set forth for itself a goal of moving beyond crisis management and, not surprisingly, its diplomacy didn't actually do that. It hadn't set out to and it didn't.

I am much more skeptical about the possibility of a long-term and sustained Chinese role than the book is partly because the Chinese have always avoided, like the plague, getting caught in the middle of an extended bit of India-Pakistan diplomacy and partly because I think their objectives probably are not really congruent with those of others who might wish to be helpers in the task of moving beyond conflict.

The second theme that Steve covers is the theme of faulty intelligence, faulty judgment about each other's motives. I can't really add much to what is in the book except to say that this is something about which all countries need to be appropriately modest. You think you can see inside somebody else's brain. You probably can't, and you need to be cautious and conservative about how far you think you can go before something bad is going to happen. I think this is a kind of condition of existence in a turbulent world, but it has particular relevance to regions that are crisis-prone.

Now, is South Asia still crisis-prone? You have an interesting situation now where a ceasefire has held for four years. We are about six weeks shy of the fourth anniversary of the current version of the

composite dialogue. There has been a succession of ghastly incidents of precisely the sort that you might think would have triggered a new crisis and they didn't. They didn't because both governments, I think, were very determined that they didn't want them to.

That brings me to the final theme that I want to bring up, and it's one that the book didn't really set out to cover but that I think is nonetheless very important in understanding the story it tells, and that is how do India-Pakistan relations and crises fit into the domestic politics of both India and Pakistan. I could write a book on that. I promise I'm not going to do that out loud right this morning, but I think there are two observations that are important.

First, crises can happen under any kind of government. If you look at who was in power -- military, civilian and different parties -- you'll see that the four in this book meet that description. Peace progress, however, happens only under governments that feel strong.

I would offer you both the ceasefire and beginning of the composite dialogue; Musharraf in Pakistan was at the height of his powers. Vajpayee in India certainly thought he was at the height of his powers. The fact that he lost an election six months later was a classic miscalculation, but by any reasonable assessment of where he thought he was and where I would say most other people thought he was, he was in

good shape and therefore able to do something that he basically thought was right.

In Pakistan, peace progress has historically been harder to sustain under civilian governments although civilian governments, in some cases at least, have been more enthusiastic about starting down that road. I think you have examples both from Benazir Bhutto's time and from Nawaz Sharif's time in support of that last proposition.

The challenge, and it is a very fundamental challenge, is how do you get the outs on board. In Pakistan, when you had a civilian government, the key people who needed to be brought on board were the army. To that, I would now add that you would need to at least neutralize the predictable opposition of the religious constituencies, and that is plural.

In India, it's more of a party thing and, of course, the reason isn't far to seek. India-Pakistan problems are just too delicious an opportunity to embarrass the people in power for any respectable opposition to pass up so that ultimately if you have a peace process that is moving ahead, you're negotiating both with the government and indirectly with the outs whomever they may be.

I would suggest to you that what we have now is a peace process that the governments in Pakistan and India want to keep alive. I don't think either one at the moment is strong enough to do very much with it.

There is some question in my mind as to how much the Indian Government wants to do with it in the sense that there doesn't seem to be a sense of urgency. I would also suggest to you that right at the moment the lack of urgency in the U.S. about a diplomatic initiative on India and Pakistan is entirely appropriate because in present regional circumstances there's very little useful that the U.S. could do.

So I commend the book to you. I would urge you to think about this domestic dimension as well, and I'm looking forward to hearing from Ashley.

DR. TELLIS: Well, let me start by complimenting Steve and his two co-authors on what is truly an excellent book. I read it over the Thanksgiving break, and I had read all the previous studies that had been done which fed into the book. This is really, in some sense, much better than the previous works because you have an opportunity to look at four crises in a synoptic fashion, and so you can actually tease out elements of comparison and salient themes that come through the book very, very clearly.

It's written in a wonderful fashion, and I think the organization is absolutely superb with respect to the variables the authors are trying to tease out of the four crises that they have investigated. So this is really a worthwhile effort, and I second both Peter's and Teresita's hope that this

will be the last book in the series and that we won't have a reason to write another one about a future crisis.

I want to make four points basically drawing from the book, in a sense, things that I would take away after reading a book of this kind.

The first point that struck me as I read the book cover to cover is that although we are dealing with four crises that take place at distinct points in time, all four in a sense describe what is a single strategic problem albeit from different perspectives.

What is that strategic problem? That strategic problem is in fact a constant strategic problem in South Asia and finds reflection in four different historical moments. That problem, to my mind, is that you have competition between two countries that have asymmetrical capabilities and asymmetrical objectives.

You have Pakistan which is a weaker state but is a revisionist state. I don't mean that pejoratively. I mean that just as a descriptor. It's dissatisfied with the status quo. It feels strongly about that dissatisfaction and so is compelled to use a variety of instruments, primarily subconventional conflict that shades into terrorism, in an effort to get India, the stronger state, to change its view to the problem.

You have India, on the other hand, which is nominally clearly the strongest state by any measures of national power but, oddly enough,

does not seem to have the military capacity to be able to win its wars against Pakistan quickly enough to deter Pakistan from seeking recourse to the subnational or subconventional conflicts in the first place. This has been the structural conundrum that one sees in South Asia, that one has seen in South Asia since at least 1971.

The perspectives, however, are different. So when you look at these capabilities from Delhi, when you look at them from Washington, when you look at them from Islamabad, they have different colorations. The book does a remarkable job of, in a sense, describing a Rashomon-like reality where things that seem to be one and the same actually look quite different depending on which capital you are in.

But the core of the problem that Steve and his co-authors describe and which struck me with great gravity after you read a book like this which puts the four crises together in a synoptic fashion, is that you're really dealing with one strategic problem that has found extension over time. To think of it in this form, I think is useful because it opens the door to asking the question that Steve ends the book with, which is: what are the prospects for change? Is the future likely to be different from the past?

To try and understand that, one again has to ask oneself whether the structural characteristics of these two competitors are changing in any fundamental way. If it is changing in fundamental ways, then I think there

is reason to believe that the future will be different. And so, that is something that I will come to at the end of this presentation, but the first point I would make is four crises, one common strategic problem yielding different perspectives from where one looks at the issue.

The second element that struck me even more strongly than when I read the individual studies before is that in all these crises what seems common is the ambiguity of Indian intentions. It is never quite clear in these crises whether India actually seeks to use force in a kinetic way to solve whatever the strategic problem at hand is, and so one is left with a somewhat uncomfortable feeling about whether one knows whether deterrence has succeeded or whether it has even been tested because there was no clear evidence that in each of these crises, India -- which invariably turns out to be the respondent to a provocation that is either launched by groups affiliated with Pakistan or Pakistan directly -- it's never quite clear whether the Indians are going to use force and whether there is a deliberate decision made to use force and whether that decision to use force is checkmated either by some objective realities like the strength of the other side, nuclear weapons that the other side has or an intention by a third power, or whether the Indian effort to use force is actually more subtle than people give them credit for. That is, whether the Indians never intended to actually use force kinetically, simply threaten the use of force

in order to force the issue to some kind of a political conclusion.

The records, of course, are not available for any of these crises, so you can't look at, for example, memoranda of conclusions that come out of the CCS meetings or memoirs that have been written by prime ministers to make some judgments about this, but it does leave you with the unsettling sense that we don't quite know what India intended. In fact, it may be possible that what India intended itself changed over time during the duration of the crisis which makes the analytical problem of whether deterrence really held, I think, even more problematic.

There is a derivative of consequence of this, and I think that derivative of consequence is that the effectiveness of U.S. intervention in each of these crises becomes essentially uncertain. If we knew the Indians were going to do something and we could tell at the end of the process that U.S. intervention actually prevented the Indians from doing what they set out to do, then one could draw the conclusion that U.S. intervention was effective. But if there is a fundamental problem with the evidence about what is it that the Indians really intended to do to begin with, then I think it becomes harder to make a judgment about what the causal effectiveness of U.S. intervention was.

I'm not intending to suggest that U.S. intervention in these crises is unimportant. I think it is extremely important for a variety of reasons. It's

just that we can't quite be sure about what we achieved. My own judgment is that over a period of time, this intervention, the importance of this intervention will actually continue.

There is a quite interesting piece that a colleague of ours, Feroz Hassan Khan, did, I think, about four or five years ago called the Dependence-Independence Paradox or something to that effect, which is a quite interesting piece because he makes the argument that because of the structural weaknesses in both of these states, although both states have a desire to pursue independent foreign policies, the process of nuclearization in the subcontinent has actually made both states even more dependent on outsiders to, in a sense, save them from the worst consequences of the crises that they find themselves in.

So, even if one cannot satisfy oneself about the causal effectiveness of U.S. intervention from a strict perspective of deterrence theory, I think one can at least console oneself that U.S. intervention will continue to be quite important in any future crisis as it obviously has been in various ways with the differing intensities in the four crises that Steve and his colleagues investigated in the book.

The third point that I would make, reading these four case studies, in a sense, together is that crises in South Asia are invariably nuclear crises and they will always be nuclear crises. I think that is a simple, non-

controversial, obvious conclusion from the fact that nuclear weapons are present in the region. The fact that nuclear weapons are present in particular ways, however, gives these crises very interesting dimensions.

Because the nuclear forces in the subcontinent are not ready to use, sitting on a shelf nuclear forces, but are demated in various forms of separation, the fact that crises will immediately generate pressures on both sides to ready these forces in whatever shape or form they take implies that every crisis in South Asia is going to have a nuclear tension.

Now, 1987 was probably the only exception to this rule because it's not clear whether both sides actually had standing nuclear capabilities or nuclear capabilities of even the most rudimentary sort in 1987. Clearly, that process, that moment had passed by the time the 1990 crisis came around, and so in 1990, 1999 and 2001-2002, one saw nuclear tensions to all these crises.

My view is that this is a fact of life. We ought not to be surprised by it. It is going to be part. It's going to be a permanent feature of South Asian crises, but it's going to have a peculiar quality. Because these forces are, in a sense, separated with neither side having full transparency about what the other side is doing or, for that matter, third parties not having full transparency about what each of the other two players are doing, you are going to invariably end up with differences in perspective

on the nuclear dimension of the crisis because, in effect, what all the players in this game are seeing is only one slice of the pie. Of course, they will make decisions based on what they see or in anticipation of what they expect to see. The crisis will evolve in accordance with that dynamic.

Now, this is always going to be unsettling because people are going to ready their capabilities and this process is going to be not fully transparent, but my view is that the alternatives to having this kind of a nuclear regime in South Asia are worse. If the alternative is to have standing nuclear forces which are, in a sense, transparent, primed, ready to go, to my mind that is far more destabilizing than all the uncertainty that comes from having nuclear forces in bits and pieces that are readied in complex ways.

And so, one has to, in my judgment, accept the reality that however unsettling these piecemeal perceptions of what is happening in the nuclear arena may be, they are probably the best one can expect, and certainly one should expect that nuclear elements will simply have a role to play in all crises.

The fourth and the last point I want to make is the issue that the book really suggests through the evolution of its story, and that is: is there reason to believe that the future will be different from the past?

Steve's own judgment, I suspect, is one of qualified pessimism, if

one can phrase it in that sense, because he draws the conclusion that the structural contradictions that I laid out, in a sense, in my first point still exist and that those structural contradictions will continue to beset the leaders on both sides.

I think he is right, but I think one needs to qualify that judgment somewhat. I think there is a near-term problem and there is a longer-term problem. The near-term problem is the fear of some kind of a catalytic conflict, which is brought about by a terrorist incident provoked by one of these subnational forces that runs amok and confronts the victim with the political imperative for hitting back either at the immediate perpetrators of the incident or the state that supports this, which at least traditionally has been Pakistan.

The fact that this has not happened in the last 10 years or so in any significant way, I think points to an evolution which provides reason for hope over the longer term.

So I think Steve is right, that the danger for catalytic conflict in the near term is high, and I would argue that it is high provided three conditions can be met:

First, the incident that occurs is one of sufficient scale and significance that it actually jars the sensibilities of the body politic. This, in the South Asian context, is actually a very high threshold because there

are large amounts of violence that take place as the background condition in South Asia. So for something to be truly catalytic, I think there must be an issue of scale and significance that really shocks the body politic and compels even politicians who are otherwise desirers of peace to contemplate an option for war.

The second element which I think would be important to have a catalytic incident, in a sense, result in war is that there must be a capacity for clear attribution, particularly an attribution that leads directly to a state sponsor. Absent this attribution, I think it is going to be hard in political terms for leaders to basically say, okay, we think the time is right to respond through some kind of punitive action.

This has been extremely hard to do. I mean in the Indian case, if you look at the events after the parliamentary attack in 2001, it has been extremely hard to conclusively find attribution as the whole Indian legal process has demonstrated since.

The third, I think, is going to be the quality of the leadership response in the immediate aftermath of the attack, particularly on the part of the Pakistani state which will invariably be seen as the natural supporter of any instance of this kind.

So I think these three elements would have to interact in a vicious way for India to, in a sense, move out of what seems to be now its

traditional pattern which is to threaten the use of force, to mobilize with a preparation to engage in coercive diplomacy but not actually cross the line and go into the use of force itself.

But when one thinks over the longer term, I think there is reason for more optimism, and the reason for more optimism is that I think there are structural changes afoot in the India-Pakistan relationship which will take a long time to mature. I mean this is not something that one can imagine a transformation occurring in about a year or two years but probably over five or ten years. I just want to flag what I think are those changes that will have an impact over the longer term.

The first change, I think, is that there is a growing recognition on both sides that the use of force to resolve their disputes has really hit the aspect of the curve that there are diminishing returns. Although the use of force may have a cathartic kind of quality where you feel the need to hit out in order to send a message, I think both sides have come to the recognition that beyond that, beyond satisfying that cathartic need, there are no clear political objectives that would be solved by the actual use of force. I think that is really very important because as long as the leaderships on both sides are minimally rational as they have been, that acts as a very powerful break with respect to unleashing the use of force.

The second element, which again I see as part of the structural

changes occurring in the subcontinent, is that there is a very slow but very important transformation in Pakistan's definition of what it believes the Kashmir dispute is. I think the Pakistanis are moving in an evolutionary form from thinking of Kashmir as a territorial dispute where the solutions must involve territorial changes to something that is more subtle.

President Musharraf has, of course, been critical actually in shaping this new recognition. If this new recognition holds and continues to take root, I think we could be moving to a new kind of a status quo where resolution of this issue actually becomes possible over the longer term.

The third element is the changes that are taking place at the Indian end. In the old days, the Indian position on Kashmir was there is no problem. There's nothing to discuss. The only issue out there is the return of territory which Pakistan controls, which New Delhi believes is rightfully its own.

I think there is a shift in the Indian position which is an acceptance of the fact that whatever the legal position is, there is empirically a problem between the two sides which must be resolved. Both Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Manmohan Singh have taken this more pragmatic turn even if they have implemented it only somewhat halfheartedly and absentmindedly over the last several years, but there is clearly the shift that this is a problem that has to be solved. It has to be solved within a

new set of parameters, and those new sets of parameters will have to be of mutual recognition that there will be no physical territorial changes as part of that solution.

I think the fourth aspect, which is again part of what I see as the structural changes, is there is growing recognition in both countries that there will be no international bailout that, in a sense, supports the interests of one or the other wholeheartedly. So if there is a solution to the problem, it's a solution that both have to find between themselves. I think if this element again continues to develop roots, then one could see the contours of a long-term solution to the current problems that bedevil the relationship.

This does not by any means imply that reconciliation is imminent. I think you will need to have stronger political parties, stronger leaders on both sides for that to happen, but I think for the first time in about at least 30 years, since the 1960s, one can begin to see the contours of what this alternative solution would be. So, I'm actually more optimistic when one looks at the relationship over a longer time period, though Steve and his colleagues caution that there is an ever present catalytic crisis in the near term as something that we ought to take seriously.

Thank you.

DR. COHEN: Thank you, Ashley, and thank you, Ambassador

Schaffer and Peter, for marvelous glosses on the book, and I really appreciate the comments.

Let me respond briefly, and then we'll go to your questions and comments.

I think that I should have mentioned this earlier, but the book will be published in South Asia by HarperCollins, both in India and in Pakistan. So I hope to go there for a book launch where at least one of my co-authors will join me. Unfortunately, they couldn't be with us today.

Second, on the case of -- especially Ashley, you referred to this -- after the book was done, the Pakistan army got more deeply involved in internal security matters in its own country. While I was in Delhi a month ago, the news was that essentially two divisions of the Pakistan army had been pulled out of Kashmir in the West, Pakistan's India front, to fight elsewhere.

I think this may be part of a trend in Pakistan where the domestic threat is seen as more serious than the India threat, but it's going to be a long road before that happens.

I think that the Pakistan army still is primarily oriented towards India, but I think that diplomacy, both American, Indian and Chinese, I think in this case in particular, maybe even Saudi diplomacy to help reorient the Pakistan army which is at the center of Pakistani politics away from

Kashmir and towards its own internal security problem. I think that's going to be a critical issue. If they can do that, then you may see better results in Pakistan and also I won't say a resolution of the Kashmir issue but, in a sense, putting Kashmir on a shelf where perhaps it belongs.

But, again, these things happened after the book pretty much went to press. There is an op-ed piece I wrote with Moeed Yusuf about this that's available outside.

Secondly, I'm not so optimistic that people really believe that nuclear weapons are demated. In both countries, I've talked to responsible officials who just assume that on the other side they're not demated and that, in fact, the other side is ready to roll instantly. So, you could see in a crisis the discovery that, in fact, weapons are deploying or actually moving around the countryside. In fact, some of the accusations or stories of various crises was that weapons were being trundled around the countryside especially in Pakistan. So that's still an open question.

Another aspect of that, of course, is if Iran goes nuclear, the Saudis will certainly make a claim on Pakistani nuclear arsenals, and you may well see Pakistani nuclear weapons deployed in or around Saudi Arabia or the Gulf just as a matter of state policy. So, that could lead to a recalculation on the Indian side as to whether their weapons should be "demated" or not.

But let's turn to you for comments and questions. Let me again thank the three of you for marvelous comments.

Let me first call on Ambassador Raminder Jassal. Raminder was the face of India during the Kargil crisis. He was the spokesman for the Minister of Defense and became sort of a TV star. That was India's first televised war.

Raminder, would you like to add a few comments about how you saw the crisis from your vantage point in New Delhi?

AMB. JASSAL: Sure. Thank you, Steve. Thank you all, the panelists, who spoke today.

I'm afraid I'm not really in a position to comment on the book as such. Actually, I should be in a very good position to comment on the book. I haven't read it as yet.

DR. COHEN: That shouldn't inhibit you from commenting.

AMB. JASSAL: I just got a copy of that book yesterday. So I had a chance to glance over the last chapter on the way to this place.

Just one or two small points which I had mentioned to you earlier in the morning which was one aspect that the book covers is issues related to the media, and I wanted to mention that most of this analysis is based on a reading of the English language media, of newspapers in India. Now, the English language papers are important, but regional newspapers in

India like *Malayala Manorama*, *Daily Thanthi* from Tamil Nadu and *Ranchi Express* or *Punjab Express*, *Rajasthan Patrika*, these newspapers in the regional languages are perhaps as influential, if not more, than the English language media.

The way they informed of the war during Kargil. If you had riots in the state of Uttar Pradesh of young people being turned away from recruitment centers of the army, it was people who had basically been reading the regional language newspapers. So, I think their importance is something that has not been looked at enough in a lot of publications that I have seen, since, about the Kargil thing.

The second point I wanted to make was that I saw one or two lines in that last chapter. What troubled me was that sometimes there's an effort made towards too much political correctness in writing a book which deals with India and Pakistan and has authors from three countries. I think one of the examples would be there's a comment I think in that book which says that after initial military diversions India won a major diplomatic victory during Kargil.

I'm not sure if that is strictly an accurate representation because by the time the fourth of July took place over here, the conflict on the ground was virtually already past the point of where it was a stalemate. It was already virtually decided over there. The eleventh of July, the directors of

general military operations met, and they decided that two weeks later everybody would go back to the original places. Pakistani forces and the Northern Light Infantry would move back beyond the line of control. So, I think there is sometimes a political correctness.

The third thing, of course, is what everybody has talked about but it is war and democracy. I don't know if that is a factor because if you remember there were elections going to be held in India in October. Democratic governments tend to be wary of war as a general rule because its unpredictable consequences and they have to fight. I don't know whether there is some analysis to be done of how governments would react in this connection and this equation between war and democracy and whether that has a kind of role. Did it have a motivation in trying to finish the war as early as possible so that it's concluded well before the elections take place and it's put behind? This is one element.

Finally, the last point is about the third parties. I think third parties playing a role sometimes can be a bit exaggerated. You talked of four crises, one in 1990. I was here as the political counselor at that time, and I'm still trying to figure out what that crisis was which was resolved. So, I don't know really how much but sometimes even in terms of what looks like a recourse to third parties.

For example, during the Kargil War, India made a serious diplomatic

effort, as it made an effort in the media, to get people in different capitals convinced of our point of view that the Northern Light Infantry had crossed the line of control. That's not really inviting third party intervention. It is making a point of view heard, and it was not easy.

Even in the media until about three or four weeks into the war, I remember people, the media kept talking about irregulars who had crossed the line of control. It's when *Time Magazine* or one of these magazines had interviewed a soldier. So, there is, to me, a certain distinction inviting third party mediation or intervention and just getting third parties acquainted of a point of view and a reality on the ground. I think that sometimes is a little misleading.

So these are the three things.

I still believe that bilateral negotiations in India and Pakistan are going on. I think that is the main future ahead, and we look forward to a day when India and Pakistan will stop being a growth industry for crisis analysts.

Thank you.

DR. COHEN: Thank you, Raminder, excellent points.

Let me respond very briefly and point out of the crises, and I'll just summarize them to put this in extremely shorthand terminology. The 1987 Crisis really grew out of a plan or at least a speculation on the part of a

very few people that India might engage the Pakistan army conclusively before Pakistan went nuclear, and I think nuclear weapons were a factor in the Indian judgment. Now, they eventually pulled away from that, and there was no military action in 1987.

1990 was a different kind of crisis completely. 1990, we call a compound crisis. It grew out of two weak governments, a Kashmiri uprising and the suspicion that nuclear weapons might be floating around some place. So, in a sense, there was no intent on either side to have a crisis, no strategic gambit by the Indians or the Pakistanis, but these events coming together gave the appearance of a crisis especially in Washington.

Because Washington underestimated the 1987 crisis, they overestimated the 1990 crisis. That's why there's such a disparity between American perceptions. There's nothing going on here except for the nuclear thing. There was some concern about that. In the South Asian calculation, there really is nothing going on here.

Of course, Kargil was the result of a Pakistani initiative, and 2000-2001 really had its own dynamic especially in terms of the Indian response.

Let me now really open this to you and this is your opportunity to ask questions or make comments about the book or -- obviously, you may

not have read the book -- to our panelists. Do you have any comments or questions?

Yes, sir. Why don't you wait for the microphone and could you address your question to a particular individual?

QUESTIONER: Alex Stolar from the Stimson Center.

I guess for you Dr. Cohen: Looking back retrospectively, what lessons do you think that the Indian side, the military and diplomats and civil society, drew about the nuclear risks during 2001-2002 and Kargil?

DR. COHEN: What conclusions did the Indian side reach on 2000-2001 and Kargil? I think the most important lesson is that taken to heart by the Indian army, and I'm writing a book about this now, about Indian military modernization and the lessons they drew from these wars.

The Indian army undertook a major transformation of their military doctrine wrapped up in two words, cold start. That is if another crisis appears, if there's another major terrorist attack of some sort, the Indian army will roll across the border in small numbers beneath the nuclear threshold, wherever that may be. It turns out while there's a lot of talk about this among army circles, the air force is totally uninterested in this, and the Indian Government seems to have not taken it into account at all. It's an army thing and the army, in fact, may not have done anything on the ground to prepare for a cold start except perhaps modernize a few

brigades.

There may be more talk than reality there, but that's the major development. The Pakistanis see this as something that's easily defeated or gotten around. But, again, for the Indian army to do that, to actually launch essentially a preemptive war against Pakistan beneath the nuclear threshold means that they have to know where the nuclear threshold is, the Pakistani response has to be inept and the notion of escalation has to be, in a sense, put on a shelf because obviously nobody wants a war which is going to go up to nuclear levels.

I think that's the major doctrinal development, but again that's only by army people. It hasn't been taken on board by the rest of the Indian Government.

AMB. SCHAFFER: Steve, I think there's one other set of developments that was an important consequence of Kargil and was probably reinforced by the mobilization of 2001-2002, and that is the quest by both sides for an arena in which there would be freedom of accidents by nuclear weapons. In India, this took the form of a lot of discussion of limited war, and this came both from serving military, from retired military and even from the defense minister of the day, George Fernandes. In Pakistan, this generated less talk, but a lot of people feel that Kargil was an effort to define this in practice.

My view, the problem with this whole idea is limited war is from whose perspective and how does it stay limited, and I think this is probably going to be the subject of a lot of military doctrinal debate, public or not. The encouraging thing is that in the last four years, no one has felt the need to do experiments in practice.

DR. COHEN: Yes.

QUESTIONER: Jerry Marley with CNA.

I just have a question for Ashley Tellis. You talked about these long-term changes between India and Pakistan, but you didn't really mention the shifting military balance.

From my research in India, it just seems as if the Indian military is a lot more confident than it ever was before in the past and that the Pakistan military is very tied down in the border areas and that doesn't seem to be a short-term thing. The whole area has been lit up, and it's going to keep going and going and might get worse or might get better. It's going to be long-term, and they're really tied down. They're pulling these forces out of Kashmir, and they're worried about the border areas.

The Indian military seems to be modernizing itself, seems to be doing well economically, and it seems to be building up its military and, like I said, more confident than ever.

I mean how is that going to affect things, 5, 10 years, 15, 20 years

out when you have -- I guess that military balance has been changing for a long time in this direction, but it seems to be shifting even faster than in the past. How is that going to affect the potential for a crisis between these two countries?

DR. TELLIS: I think it's a very interesting question. It's also linked to the question that Alex just asked.

I think the long-term prognosis if you think about, say, the next 10 years, is that the Indian military will be able to do what it might have wanted to do in 2001-2002 but could not which is have the capacity to initiate military operations on very short notice and actually conduct military operations which conclude in something other than a stalemate. I think that's going to happen.

What is the political consequence of that? The political consequence of that is that it is going to give the Indian leadership many more military options to respond if they choose to.

But I think what you have two countervailing forces. On one hand, military options are going to increase. On the other hand, I don't see, given India's economic growth trajectory and the role that it seeks for itself in the world, I don't see an Indian political leadership becoming more enthusiastic about exercising those options because there are going to be economic costs. There are going to be reputational costs. There is going

to be uncertainty. Whenever you have a conflict, no outcome is foreordained. You can't be certain.

Traditionally, Indian political leaders seem to have been quite risk-averse with respect to issuing orders for war. I mean you see this in every crisis. And so, I think what you're going to get is increased capacity on one side but increased necessity for restraint as well at the political level.

I've always made the argument that the long-term future of deterrence in South Asia is stability not as a function of Indian weakness but stability as a function of Indian choice, and I think that is the best outcome that one can hope for.

DR. COHEN: I think we'll have Ashley serve as a discussant about eight months from now when we launch the book that Sunil Dasgupta and I are writing about Indian military modernization.

DR. TELLIS: No problem.

DR. COHEN: Because we agree with some of that but not all of it.

DR. TELLIS: I can't wait.

QUESTIONER: Well, I don't really know. I haven't read the book for one thing. Congratulations for writing it, Steve.

DR. COHEN: Could you state your name?

QUESTIONER: Yes. I'm Rajesh Kadian, and I've written, well, a couple of books on India as well.

I don't really know where to begin, but I think I'd start with where Ashley ended up about stability and Indian weakness. I think stability and Indian strength seems to be a recurring theme right from 1971 onwards.

Your crises, some of them are really storms in a teacup and others are not mentioned. You have the takeover of the Siachen heights, for instance, is not a crisis because India chose to occupy the heights and hold them.

The 1990 crisis actually is a sort of slowed reaction to the uprising that took place in Kashmir in 1989, if it's a crisis at all, but India has chosen and it is confident now with its place on the ground in Kashmir. So there, again, it's not a crisis.

It's a continuum of India's strategic view towards stalemates as stability. Siachen is a stalemate. So is Kashmir. The others were transient events.

On other occasions, India has acted very decisively, generally not with much success: Goa in 1961, against China in 1962, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Maldives in 1988. So, whenever India has chosen to be decisive, India has been decisive though not necessarily with the desired effects.

Thank you.

DR. COHEN: We did put these four crises in a larger context, and

there are a couple of tables in the book, one listing all the crises, the major ones and the minor ones and another listing, discussing very briefly the attempts at normalization between India and Pakistan. We've responded to your comment, I think, in the book.

But you could legitimately say there were other crises or other events that should have been included. We discussed why we didn't include some of these. A couple of these were really very, as you said, very transient, but we take your point.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Koji, and I'm a student at SAIS.

Steve, if I could ask you, you have interacted with both the armies for a long time now. Is there a change in the way that they see each other and the way that they think that they can evolve now and in the future maybe, like their views of each other?

DR. COHEN: Not as much a change as there has been among civilians. I think in Pakistan in particular, there's a different understanding of India or the understanding of India is changing very rapidly. In India, there's a sort of I won't say gloating, but there's a sort of a sense that India has won the race with Pakistan, especially in terms of economic development.

But, in terms of the armies themselves, these are men and, in a few cases, women. I went to a passing-out parade of a group of cadets in

Madras, Tamil Nadu which actually had about 20 women in it. The commandant said, here comes the lads, and the first 20 were women. It was quite interesting, an interesting thing to see.

But, in the case of the military, they're trained and they're taught to look for enemies, not for opportunities or friends. Professionally, they're pessimists and see the worst around them. They should be, and that should be their job.

But I think Musharraf has done a lot, in a sense, to get people thinking about the prospect of normalization with India. Now, I've talked to some Pakistani generals, very, very senior ones, who sort of laugh and say, yes, he's done this. It's like a peace proposal a day towards the Indians. He lobs one over every week towards the Indians, and the Indians are flabbergasted. They can't keep up with Musharraf's peace proposals.

They're cynical about it, but others take it more seriously. I know many retired officers, in particular, would like to see a normalization with India, comprehensive normalization, because their judgment is that Pakistan is going to fail unless it settles its affairs with India. The more that domestic events in Pakistan become tumultuous, the more violence there is and the more regions are captured by extremists, the more this concern grows. So I think that in Pakistan you're beginning to see

rethinking in the army.

In the case of the Indians, their major enemy of the Indian army is the Indian air force and the Indian navy. You get service rivalry par excellence, and the army's role is highly bureaucratized and really fiscally oriented in terms of reform and really not very serious, I think. We're going to deal with that in the next book we write about Indian military modernization.

But I do think there's been significant civilian changes in Pakistan. Whether this will lead to anything is another question.

Yes, sir.

QUESTIONER: I'm Mel White. My question would be really to just survey the panel, I guess.

As Musharraf, if and when Musharraf follows through on his plan to step down from chief of army staff, does that increase or decrease the potential for India-Pakistan crises when you have the presidency and the chief of army staff roles split?

DR. COHEN: Peter, do you want to?

MR. RODMAN: I'd defer to Steve on something like this.

My judgment, for what it's worth, is that the senior military leaders right now are Musharraf's people, people he has elevated, people who, I think, think the same way he does on strategic issues. So, at least

initially, I would expect this handover to be a smooth one, particularly with respect to external issues.

DR. COHEN: I agree, and I think that Musharraf is going to be in pretty good shape if there's no significant challenge to him on the ground in Pakistan. So far, the parties have not been able or willing to mobilize at a level which requires the army to intervene. They've been dealt with fairly effectively by the police and by the paramilitaries.

Secondly, if the U.S. continues to support Musharraf because the U.S. is the source of most of the military and, perhaps increasingly, economic assistance. So I think his position is secure.

AMB. SCHAFFER: But I think you asked a different question. I think you asked whether it made any difference to the likelihood of an India-Pakistan crisis.

My answer is probably not because I think that, for the time being, he and the top army brass are most concerned about what's happening on the other side, on the Afghan front and in the areas where militants have actually been holding territory, namely the Swat Valley, and it would not be useful for them to have a crisis on the India front.

The problem will come if the people who have mounted the trouble in Swat decide that they need to go offshore and go over to Kashmir and make trouble there and are able to notch up the violence sufficiently that

they kind of pull the Pakistani political system along with them, in which case India's restraint may wear thin.

But, for the time being, I think it doesn't make much difference. That's a factor regardless of whether Musharraf is or is not both president and chief of army staff. So that change in positions makes, I think, no difference to the India-Pakistan equation.

DR. COHEN: One or two more questions, I think.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is Dean Rust.

I wonder if somebody would comment on the role of nuclear CBMs in South Asia over the past decade or so and whether anything that has been established has been of much utility? Do they still implement those things that have been established?

Are they looking down the road as to whether or not there might be more things that they could put together bilaterally that would help avoid escalation to nuclear weapons in a crisis?

AMB. SCHAFFER: I think that the nuclear confidence-building measures that are in place work very well as long as relations between the two countries are pretty good. They have not recently been tested in adverse circumstances because relations have actually been pretty good for the past four years.

There has been one recent effort to expand the array of confidence-

building measures, and that was the recent agreement on notification in case of nuclear accidents. The discussions tend to be green eyeshade stuff which is fine, which is useful, but the problem is that in the past when relations have been bad for other reasons, the first thing to go has been the actual use of the routine means of communication.

DR. TELLIS: I think, in that sense, the nuclear CBMs in South Asia are no different from CBMs anywhere in the world. Their biggest value is the process, that they create structured opportunities for conversations between people who have varying degrees of suspicions about one another.

I think they're very useful because are you better off not having them? The answer is no.

But can they serve as a break that really changes certain decisions that both sides will make when they are in a crisis? The answer to that is also no. When there is a crisis, there will be things that both sides will do with their nuclear weapons, and CBMs are not going to stop those things from happening.

DR. COHEN: Yes, two more questions, back there and then Colonel Datta here.

QUESTIONER: Al Milliken of Washington Independent Writers. I was just curious. How does India view Pakistan's responsibility with

nuclear weapons? Do they view them giving away technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya?

DR. COHEN: Ashley, why don't you take that one?

DR. TELLIS: I think they've been quite perturbed by the whole Qadeer Khan affair because they see that as, well, there are several dimensions to their concern, but one is that it leads to deterioration in their strategic environment insofar as it assists new nuclear powers to, in a sense, come into being.

They're also concerned about the issue from a different perspective which is what does this tell us about the responsibility of Pakistan as a state, and that's another dimension of concern.

The third was a simple, straightforward issue which actually became quite acute in 2001-2002 which is the Indian fears that Pakistan may not have actual positive control over their nuclear weapons.

I think there's at least three dimensions that one could kind of tease out of the various things Indian political figures have said over the last several years.

On the security per se, which is the last issue, I think the Indians are more confident today than they probably were in 2001-2002, but they, like us, are still hoping that at some point there will be a full accounting of what exactly Qadeer Khan did just so that there are no further surprises kind of

lurking out there.

DR. COHEN: Colonel Datta.

QUESTIONER: Colonel Datta, Foreign Policy Association.

In the panel's opinion and authors' opinion, of course -- they're the same -- what could have been the decisive war of the last four crises if it had led to an all-out war, less than nuclear weapons?

DR. COHEN: I'm not quite sure if I understand the question. Which would have been the decisive war had there not been nuclear weapons?

QUESTIONER: Without the nuclear weapons, suppose the nuclear weapons were out of the way, due to the intervention of, say, America or other countries, what could be the decisive war of these four crises?

DR. COHEN: Yes. I think 1987 could have been decisive had had Pakistan, in a sense, fallen for the bait and done things militarily which would have led to a massive Indian response. That was the last time. That was the last moment when Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons and India had conventional military superiority, that India could have achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan and destroy the Pakistan army maybe, probably, and they didn't do it. The gun was not fired.

Other than that, I think they were all stalemates that neither side had military advantage, supreme military advantage. The Indians did not have supreme military advantage, and certainly, by Kargil, nuclear

weapons made the politicians pull back in fear. I think 1987 was, in a sense, the gravest crisis because there was an opportunity to finish off Pakistan militarily. The Indians didn't do it.

Let me add one more point, I think, to your comment, to a comment over here, and then we'll conclude. I think that we have to look at the Indian side also when it comes to nuclear weapons. If the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal were to fail catastrophically and if India were to go off and say, we've been betrayed and the pro-nuclear group in India would have said, we've got to really have a major nuclear program, you might then see more Indian testing and that probably would lead to an overt declaration of nuclear weapons by the Pakistanis.

There's been a competitive missile arms race in both countries. Should the Indians decide, and again I don't think this is likely -- I think it's very unlikely -- actually go ahead and go to a next generation nuclear weapon which some Indians have advocated, then the Pakistanis would probably respond. Then you get an overt declaration of presence and also deployment.

They may well be deployed now. We just don't know, but in a sense it's a tacit agreement between the two sides to claim that they are not deployed. This is one area where verification would be useful. In a sense, if there was an indication, a demonstration that weapons had not

been deployed, then that would be very helpful in terms of maintaining stability. That's very hard to do technically, but the technical means are developed. So it would be possible, I think.

With that, let me conclude and thank my panelists particularly.

First, let me thank my co-authors for helping me write and for writing this book. As you read it, you'll see we tried to smooth it out so we speak with a single voice, but naturally we came from three very different perspectives. There were some disagreements, but we agreed on the final text. You should have seen the stuff that was left out.

Indirectly, let me thank my co-authors and let me thank my panelists for joining us and adding, I think to the intellectual richness of this moment and, again, thank Brookings Press for publishing and thank you very much for coming and your questions. Thank you.

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