

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

HOW TO RANK GOOD GOVERNANCE:
THE MO IBRAHIM PRIZE FOR ACHIEVEMENT IN
AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

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Introduction:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BRAINARD: All right, let's get started. I'm delighted to welcome everybody here today, and, you know, feel free once you've actually finished eating so that you don't spill to come up, so we can have a real conversation. Just go in the seats up at the front.

I am really delighted to welcome Robert Rotberg here and also to host this conversation today. Just in terms of the background, we're going to really be talking about the governance index, and that was launched through the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in conjunction with the Mo Ibrahim Prize. But, of course, the latest and biggest news was that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has announced their first prize-winner. And, you know, it has attracted a lot of attention because it's just such a wonderfully unique kind of a prize and such a stellar group of people that were involved in conceptualizing it. And then the actual selection process, including Robert Rotberg and Mo, who is somebody that we work a lot with here, as well as Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who has been here working with the former Finance Minister of Nigeria, and is moving from here to the World Bank where she will do many more great things.

As you know, I think, the former President Chissano of Mozambique was selected for this prize. We're not actually going to talk about the selection process today, although you're welcome to ask Robert questions about that if you'd like. But what I'd like to focus on is the recently published

Ibrahim Index of African Governance to talk about how to measure, how to assess the quality of governance in the region, because, increasingly, that has become the central focus of what are the kind of foundations needed for sustained, vibrant, democratic societies to thrive.

It provides both a new definition of governance and a comprehensive set of governance measures. Robert will give you a great deal more detail on exactly how it's constructed, and just before I introduce him, just by way of background for those of you who don't know him -- which is my guess is very few in this room -- Robert Rotberg is director of the program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the Kennedy School, and prior to that has been a professor at MIT, and prior to that as at Harvard again.

He's written a tremendous amount on African, Asian, and Caribbean politics. And the most -- I think one of the recent books is *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*.

So following his presentation, I'm just going to introduce all the panelists right now, just so that we can kind of get into it. Aart Kraay is going to talk about the governance index and bringing to bear the really deep research that has been done at the World Bank on related measures of governance. Aart Kraay is the lead economist in the Development Research Group. He is an economist who was trained, I guess at Harvard, which is close to my own background, and has been working on these governance indicators for the last few years on a variety of things before that.

And then Christopher Fomuyoh -- is that right? -- is Senior Associate for African Regional Director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute where he's been very involved in election observation missions in a whole variety of countries, democracy support programs. And so Christopher will bring to it a practitioner perspective.

Just by way of background, this whole program is part of the Transparency and Accountability Project at Brookings. It's been a very active week for this group. We have a bunch of events, and if you weren't able to attend them, they are up on the web, and I just want to point you to Charlie Griffin -- if you don't know him, he's sitting at the back of the room -- who is heading up that project along with David de Ferranti. And, please, if you're interested in this area, please make sure to talk to him on your way out so that we make sure that we have you in our future events and work here.

So with that long introduction, Robert.

PROFESSOR ROTBERG: Thanks, Lael. I'm delighted to be here and delighted to introduce the index of African governance to you.

The title of this event How To Rank Good Governance, that's the good part of the title. The Prize for Achievement in African Leadership is a part of the title which is usually linked, but it's very important that in our minds we delink the index and the prize. And I'll explain.

That's a short explanation, and I'll explain at greater length why they need to be delinked, because the index itself was used this past weekend

for the Prize Committee headed by Kofi Annan to think about the various countries and individuals, but the index is necessary for the Prize Committee's deliberation, but not sufficient. And in all these awarding huge prizes to people for governance, the committee naturally takes on all kinds of other ideas and examined all other kinds of qualitative information. The index was conceived separate from the prize and will, I hope, gradually enable itself to move away from the cocoon of the prize.

And here's the background to the index, which is very important to understand. The project is called Strengthening African Governance. And it's part of an attempt to improve the way in which African governance and leadership are developed. And it's part of a larger project to strengthen governance throughout the world, and it began more than decade ago in the Kennedy School with students. But it began even earlier when a distinguished colleague of mine, an economist, came up to me at a dinner one evening and said, "How come Africa's so far behind Asia?" And he said, "I don't want a long explanation," because in the 1960s he and I both knew Africa was ahead of Asia. So what's the explanation?

And it took me possibly 45 seconds, possibly 60, to come up with the one-word answer, which is "governance" is the problem. And governance -- therefore we have to find a way to solve for governance. So in my work at the Kennedy School beginning in probably '95-'96 -- it's hard to remember now -- we began creating a method of measuring governance, the first test with students

going projects outside of class, but bringing it to class and presenting it. So in addition to the regular work of class, the assignment with lots of different groups working outside of class together was to see if we could measure governance.

I put out a number of theories. These were pilot-tested, and as early as '99 or 2000, we were actually testing 192 countries. So we were pilot-testing, and we were doing it, usually doing countries in regions. And so we were able to demonstrate to our satisfaction -- certainly to mine -- by 2001 or '02 that we could do the measurement, and the important point was that we were building up a scheme of measurement which was from the bottom up, not the top down.

By that, I mean we tried to find those essentials which none of us in this room, none of us at Brookings, none of us in Washington, would want to do without. That is, this is a method of governance which is capable of measuring the performance of any government anywhere, that is, any jurisdiction, so that my claim -- which you can critique -- is that this method will work in the Republic of Cambridge, the Republic of Berkeley, Washington, D.C., which has an Oberlin graduate as Mayor, I'm pleased to say, and anywhere. And there are no cultural things which separate Africa from Asia, Berkeley from Cambridge and so on. In other words, the method is meant not to be culture-bound.

And when we began doing this with groups at the Kennedy School and elsewhere, there were questions about whether we could, in fact, prevent culture from overcoming. I think we must, and I think we have. This was discussed in Singapore a few years ago when I was teaching there briefly, and

again the same questions arose. And I think, to my satisfaction at least and I think to a few others, this can be done in Southern China, in Tibet, in Singapore, anywhere. And the students, as I say, have tested it over the years in groups.

So it's simply because it's now focused for the first formal rollout of governance, it's focused on Africa because a very enterprising and forward-looking Celtel pioneer sold his companies in Africa to a Kuwaiti set of investors, and with the nearly billion that he reaped from the sale, he was insistent as an African entrepreneur, of giving back to Africa. And he -- this is the greatest flattery an academic could ever receive.

He actually read my papers before I knew he existed. And he actually rang me up. I was on a World Bank mission in Antananarivo, and I got a call from someone I had never heard of that shows my ignorance, I suppose. And he explained that he had seen the papers, and he wanted to discuss with me doing an index of governance for Africa. So that's how that started.

Simultaneously, although I didn't know this at the time, he had conceived in his own mind the prize. So in his mind the prize came first. He then saw that he needed some objective basis to prepare a platform for a prize, and he read my articles on governance and also on African leadership which I had written. So the two converge.

And so the first rollout of what I hope will be other rollouts of regional governance indexing came in the hardest area: That is Africa is much more complex even if confined, as we do, to Sub-Saharan Africa. There are

more countries than in any other continent, and the data collection issues are much greater than they would be in any other part of the globe.

Now, we, as Aart Kraay and Danny Calthman know, because Danny was part of the original thinking that went into governance. Danny was at the very first meeting in Cambridge when I asked people to help me brainstorm about governance, and Danny was at a subsequent meeting as well, and possibly more than that. And the model in many ways, my object was to bring governance out of the closet. And Transparency International, Peter Eigen had done that brilliantly, if accidentally, with Transparency International in the '90s.

So I wanted to bring governance out of the closet, but I was very uncomfortable with the selection bias which is inherent in Transparency International and inherent in any perception-based series of measurements. And, as many in this room have done, I had been an expert witness for Freedom House; I had filled out forms for a Colombia project and various other projects, and I knew the weaknesses from first-hand acquaintance of relying on experts which most indices do.

So I tried to find a way with my students to use objective measurements, that is, use numbers that are out there and count the numbers rather than the perceptions. And we hope, eventually -- we haven't done so yet - - we hope eventually to be at the point where we're 80 or 90 percent using objective measurements of outcomes. We're not there yet. We're probably about three-fifths of the way. And this first index is, of course, will be improved

on, and next year's index. And Mo and I have discussed on the weekend doing this for at least a decade and probably longer, because nothing is as important as longitudinal data. You can't really make conclusions about anything without a long run of data.

And you can't show how countries improve, you can't really show how leaders are impacting on their countries, which is what we hope to show. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is a Kennedy School graduate. It's our great hope that however long she stays as president she'll make a positive change on Liberia. Liberia is now 43rd in the latest index of African governance. If she were able to bring that up through leadership efforts by five places, by ten places, she'd have a good claim on this prize in future years, even though she -- Liberia is very unlikely in the next decade or so to reach the upper quarter of the list. Also, she would have to be out of office for several -- for at least a year to be eligible.

Now, we define governance in the index as a good supply of political goods. The political goods are measurements and proxy measurements of the performance of government. We're insistent on that we're attempting to measure the delivery of political goods, so we measure the performance of governments. That's why this can be done in D.C. as well as any other place in the world, because we're measuring the delivery of services to you, to citizens, to inhabitants.

Now, we have broken the overall delivery of services so that we can measure it into five categories, 15 subcategories, and 58 sub-subcategories.

Remember, it's bottom up, so we worked to find the 58 sub-subcategories, and then we abrogated them into the subcategories and then into the five major categories. Your handout shows only the top level and the five categories.

And there are some very important assumptions here but if -- I'd be welcome to hear later if there are any -- if you -- you can, if you wish to, falsify the assumptions, but I continually ask my students and will ask you, if there is anything that you don't want as a citizen, let me know. If you don't want to be safe and secure; if you don't want to be subject to the rule of law; if you don't want to participate in your government; if you don't want high human development scores -- education, health, clean water, and so on -- let me know. And no one has ever taken me up, and that's why we think these measurements mostly work, these categories mostly work.

So we have safety and security, security, safety, public safety, then rule of law, a very tough area to measure. Then participation -- you see it in the handout -- then sustainable economic opportunity and, finally, human development. So there are 58 moving parts at the lower level, and the total of 75 or so moving parts in the index, which is why the website doesn't show it to its full glory. We're about to, in about three weeks, we'll have a publication of the 2007 index. It will be about 300 pages long and include 150 spreadsheets and so on. So those which you can get to through the website, if you're patient, but they still don't fully carry the complexity.

And then, in order to explain what we're doing, we have one

opening, introductory explanation of what's going on. Then we have a paper called Methods, Measurements and More which looks at some of the technical issues involved, some of the issues. Then we have a series of research papers on some of the coding that we did to reach the levels of certainty that we think we have.

Now, it's very important to set out some of the weaknesses of the index before you, and these are open for debate. The index is measuring performance of governments, but if -- and this assumes that a government delivery of clean water is something that government should do. But the clean water part is less than one percent of the total.

But corruption, using Transparency International and then going beyond Transparency International, using some of Aart's work and going beyond that and using some of the Transparency data, which is not publicly available, enabled us, because Transparency doesn't do all the countries in Africa so we had to go beyond that and look at some of the unpublished data, and corruption, if a country is corrupt, it is evaluated at about seven percent of the entire index. Safety is roughly 10 percent of the entire index. This is a bias that most of us want to be safe and that you can't have rule of law, participation and so on without security and safety.

So in a sense, the index is consciously weighted in favor of safety and security, corruption, those are the big items -- several other items big -- but many items are at the one percent level.

Now, my problem with the index is that Interpol has stopped collecting real numbers for crime in Africa, so we discovered that much too late in the process, and so we're using a proxy, a survey on crime which is pretty good but not perfect. And this year we're going out and collecting homicide data directly, country by country, and we're collecting crime data country by country because we want real numbers. We don't really trust perceptions.

Nevertheless, the headlines in South Africa even before Lucky Dube was killed, confirmed our numbers because the South African press headlines were, "South Africa Third From The Bottom" in safety. See, they were pointing to the President who was in denial about safety for a long time, as well as about other issues, and we think we've captured many of these things reasonably well, and I look forward to your suggestions on how we can use better proxies, if there are any, for some of the 58 sub-subcategories, and how we can refine some of the issues that we find still too perception-based.

And there are a few places which we think are very robust, and they rely on coding efforts for election, for participation, for physical security, for human rights, various issues like that. And there may also be some critique, some I'd like to hear them on things we should not include but have included. That is, there may be one or two of the 58 that some of you think don't really, really, really measure governance. I think we have an answer to those types of critiques, but maybe not a good enough answer. And I'd like to hear them.

This is a work in progress. And so your help will be greatly

appreciated as we move forward. And Chris and Aart's criticisms, I look forward to them so that we can make this the best possible index.

Now, final point. I mentioned strengthening African governance at the beginning. My purpose in getting the index going, inventing it, creating it and so on, is to strengthen African governance and it's not to create an index, per se. The index is only a tool in order to help African governments and civil societies help themselves move forward. The premise here -- the premise here is really very strongly felt that what is most lacking in Africa in general is good governance. Good governance is what will improve the lives of Africans, what will make better development and will produce greater peace and fewer lives lost. And that's an argument which I can continue if you ask about it in the question period.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. KRAAY: I should apologize for being hopefully inarticulate [sic] without power point. I am only slightly more articulate with power point, so we'll see how this goes.

All right, so it's a real pleasure to be here to discuss the index. Hopefully, this is going to pop up in a second. You know, what Bob Rotberg has done is something that's really quite courageous in coming out with the index because, as Bob alluded to, he's been -- yeah, he's been criticizing efforts to measure governance for quite some time.

I remember participating in a workshop he organized at the Kennedy School some five or six years ago in which he was quite vocal in his criticism of what both Danny Calthman and I have been doing with the Worldwide Governance Indicators for some time. This is actually the first time that Bob has put his money where his mouth is and come out with an index listing all the ingredients, listing what all the subcomponents are, describing all the methodology in a very public forum. And so this is very good because this is how we have a way of discussing data, moving forward thinking about how to measure governance.

So the punch line, you know, so I'm a big fan of measuring governance. I've been involved, professionally, for over a decade in the production of the Worldwide Governance Index Indicators project that many of you are familiar with at the World Bank. So I'm a big fan of efforts to measure governance. And African governance prize is a fantastic idea. I wish I were rich enough to be able to finance a prize like that. It's super.

Again, we're not really going to talk about the prize, but what I want to do is talk about sort of first of all the index, how it differs from what's out there, what its value-added may be. And I also want to call attention to something that Bob mentioned as well, which is that, you know, we shouldn't think that there's a mechanical relationship between indicators and prizes. And I don't mean this specifically just in the context of the Mo Ibrahim Prize. But people use indicators for prizes all the time, and the prizes are a whole heck of a lot bigger.

Think, for example, about the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation just handing out two to three billion dollars "nadier" based on a mix of indicators, five of which are actually taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project that I produce. Think about IDA, the soft loan window of the World Bank that hands out something like \$10 billion per year in aid based, very mechanically, in fact, much more mechanically than the Mo Ibrahim Prize on the World Bank's own internal assessments of country policies and institutions.

So linking prizes to indices is something that's very, very important. I think I want to really emphasize the caution that's in order when doing so. And those are the specifics that I want to cover.

First of all, I want to talk a little bit about what exactly the index measures. It's sort of tongue-in-cheek that I chose this acronym, MOI, for the Mo Ibrahim Index when you think about there was a president in Kenya by that name who was not noted for his good governance.

Hopefully this will come down again in a second, then we can keep going with that.

But I want to talk first of all about, you know, one important issue where Bob and I fundamentally disagree is in terms of what we ought to be measuring, and so I want to talk a little bit about that. I also want to talk about something that Bob has stressed a lot about the alleged sort of objectivity of the index and, you know, how it doesn't rely on experts and so on. I think this is actually a complete red herring. We don't need to be wasting time on that

particular point, and I'd like to explain why.

And then I want to talk a little bit about measuring levels and changes in governance using the Ibrahim Index looking at what -- first of all, draw some comparisons with existing measures that have been around a lot longer, understanding a little bit more carefully what actually drives levels and changes.

And also one very important point that I want to make is the absence of and acknowledgement of the imprecision in measuring governance. The index that we're discussing doesn't acknowledge this in an explicit way. I think that's a really big problem. It's something that's easily fixed, and something worth doing.

So what does the index measure? Here I think the real issue in the area where Bob and I disagree is the distinction between core governance versus development outcomes. When you look at what the index measures, some of the things, you know, we all would look at and say, yeah, this clearly is sort of an input or a key feature of good governance, things like safety, security, participation in human rights. We have measures from the Economist Intelligence Unit scoring the competitiveness of elections.

Basically, the first three components of the index I have no trouble calling governance. You look at the other two components of the index, though, sustainable economic opportunity which includes things like per capita GDP, per capita GDP growth, human development which includes things like life expectancy look a lot closer to development outcomes to me than to the

governance inputs that drive -- that among other things contribute to good development outcomes.

So this is a picture just to give you a sense of what happens when you split up the index into -- onto horizontal axis, the governance component, what I call the governance component. So security, rule of law, and participation (inaudible) the vertical access, the -- what I call the development components.

So the first thing to note here is that the correlation is okay between these two, but they're really not that strongly correlated. They're measuring different things. Now, I think all of us can agree that being higher on the horizontal axis and being higher on the vertical axis is a good thing. I don't think there's any disagreement about that. But when you think about whether you want to measure governance or whether you want to measure some amalgam of governance and development, then which axis do you look at becomes important.

Now, this matters also, because when you look at particular countries, there are some countries that really stand out in here. I want to draw attention to countries like Sudan, for example, just jumping at to look at Sudan at the end there in sort of the top left corner. There's a country that ranks near the top, actually, in terms of development outcomes and dead last in terms of the core governance. Niger is a country that's a nice example of the other way around. Niger ranks nearly dead last on development, 17th in what I would call core governance.

Now, I think this is interesting to know, when you lump all this together, though, and you think, well, are we measuring governance or are we measuring development, if you want to use the Ibrahim Index to measure what is core governance, you're going to really sort of mess up the rankings of some countries by putting a heavy weight also on development.

Now, why does this matter? I think this matters because I think this is sort of a big problem, big issue in measuring governance. In governance and development, I don't think are synonymous. Governance is something about how governments exercise the public authority for the common good or the common bad, as the case may be.

Development outcomes today most definitely reflect governance today; they also reflect a long history of governance successes and failures in countries. Where do we draw the line? This is something that's very difficult. Where do we draw the line between governance inputs and development outcomes? There is no bright line to divide them. And, you know, in our own work in the Worldwide Governance Indicators, there are some things we use that people would argue really are development outcomes; that are some things that people wouldn't say so, so strongly. I don't think there's a clear dividing line.

But I think one of the important reasons why we construct measures of governance is in order to be able to analyze the effect of governance and outcomes that we care about. If we put all the outcomes we care about in a governance index, you make the links from governance to

outcomes tautological. And it just becomes useless as a tool for research. You know, being a researcher at the World Bank, that's something near and dear to my heart; it's not the only reason why we construct indices, but I think it's something that people should be aware of as a limitation in the index.

A second main point I want to talk about has to do with the objectivity of the index. This is something that's really stressed strongly in -- Bob stressed it strongly today, it's stressed strongly in the website, it claims to capture clear objective outcomes, okay.

Now, this is a -- so I'm going to sound a little defensive here, and frankly defensive, about this, because when people get around to criticizing the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the first thing they say is, Aah, it's all subjective, okay. Now, in order to enter into a debate on this, and this is a debate that Bob is clearly keen on entering by making a strong case for the objectivity of the Ibrahim Index, we need to define terms, okay.

Now, the best way to think about subjective versus objective in a way that has content in this debate is to think about the way that doctors diagnose, think about symptoms. So in the medical literature there are objective symptoms and subjective symptoms. A subjective symptom, you come to your doctor and you say, "My arm hurts." In objective symptoms, you go to your doctor, and your arm's bent in half, and the doctor says, "Your arm's broken."

Okay, what's the difference between those two symptoms? The difference between those two symptoms is that objectivity implies external

verifiability, okay. Anybody, any doctor looking at your arm would conclude the same conclusion: Your arm is broken. If you come to the doctor and say, "My arm hurts," one doctor could say, "Oh, your arm hurts," another doctor will say, "Ah, you're faking it, who knows?" It's not externally verifiable.

So that makes it sound really, really appealing to come up with objective indicators for governance. In fact, so appealing that, you know, the World Bank's Executive Board and Development Committee have called explicitly for the World Bank to develop specific, disaggregated and objective indicators to assess governance, okay. If there's a small problem, they don't exist. To the first approximation, purely objective indicators of governance simply do not exist.

Why? Well, virtually all indicators of governance, all measurement of governance requires subjective judgment, some to a greater extent, others to a lesser extent. But it's almost impossible -- and I'll be happy to sort of entertain suggestions that people are going to pop up about measures that are truly objective that are, according to this, you know, useful way of distinguishing between subjective and objective data and that are useful as measures of governance, okay.

And this index is no exception. And I think that's fine. I think it's fine that measures of governance rely on subjective judgment, so how does it work in the Ibrahim Index? Well, I'm going to talk mostly about the core governance components. Remember, participation, security, and -- gosh, brain

failure -- the third one -- rule of law, of course, it's right there. So rule of law, transparency, corruption, what are some of the ingredients here?

Heritage Foundation -- this gentleman is from Heritage Foundation here, so he can just speak about this one way or the other -- but the expert assessment folks at Heritage about contracts and property rights. Judicial independence, Freedom House subjective assessments on a one-to-seven scale. Public sector corruption, a rise in Transparency International corruption is no accident; it's called the Corruption Perceptions Index, right? In fact, there aren't any objective measure of corruption out there, and that's something important we ought to be measuring.

Participation in human rights, competitive elections, EIU expert assessments combined with the judgment of, you know, a whole team that Bob has working with him resulting in a zero-one-two scoring. And, you know, it's Chris's background in elections observation, I'm sure he can say a lot more about the inherent subjectivity that comes into making a judgment as to whether an election in a particular country was not free, partially free and fair, or completely free and fair. Subjectivity and judgments are everywhere in the core governance component: By our count something like 16 or 17 out of the 24 ingredients of the core of the index are clearly subjective.

I think that's great. I think it's fantastic, but I don't think we should pretend otherwise. In fact, should we even care about the distinction? I think, you know, it's important first of all to recognize the crucial role that's played by

subjective data reflecting, you know, the judgments, the perceptions, the experience of people in measuring governance. There's a couple of reasons. I think two main ones to remember is that, first of all, often it's the only type of data that exists. I already mentioned in the case of corruption, it's very hard, given the clandestine nature of corruption, to come up with a purely objective measure of corruption.

It's also, in my view, the only really good way of bridging the gap between de jure rules on the books and de facto outcomes on the ground. Let me give you a good example of that, and this is a favorite example of mine, in fact, using no data that I produce: On the horizontal axis, what we're looking at here is two measures -- three measures, actually, crowded on one graph of electoral integrity. On that horizontal axis we gave in place of the people surveyed, goes and asks households, Are elections free and fair, in a large number of countries?

horizontal axis. On the vertical axis, we have two measures that are produced by Global Integrity. Global Integrity is a Washington-based NGO that's done some fantastic work on measuring some of the sort of key ingredients of integrity and public sector accountability.

So, the red dots that you have here -- this series here, which as you happen to notice are completely uncorrelated with the horizontal axis, is a compilation of eight or ten objective measures, de jure measures of whether laws about the independence of election monitoring agency exist; whether there's a constitutional right to vote; and so on and so forth. Here you're measuring

objectively de jure rules. Are they correlated with whether people think elections are free and fair? Huh-uh. They're not correlated at all. Correlation is zero. It's actually weakly negative.

Then the series in black dots over where you see the country names -- this also comes from global integrity, but this is where the experts in global integrity, the experts whose judgment Bob doesn't want to rely on look at the rules, how they exist on paper and ask in practice are those rules followed? When you look at that, then, you know, you start to see, you know, a reasonable correlation between the two measures. And so in terms of, you know, can we rely purely on objective measures of narrow de jure rules, I don't think we can.

Now, this is not to say the subjective data is the be all and end all of measurement. There are obvious difficulties with subjective data. To the extent that it comes from survey questions, there are good survey questions and bad survey questions. There are good surveys and bad surveys. There are lots of problems we can discuss. There's a variety of biases that have been alleged against survey-based data. Danny and I have written extensively about this. If you want to argue about any of the biases you think are in expert assessments and surveys, let's do so afterwards. You know, I don't think they're really a big deal.

We should remember also that there are these enormous challenges in looking at the kind of objective data that people want to use as indicators of governance. So, there are -- and I'll just mention two. One is just

factual accuracy. So Bob mentioned a big problem -- homicide rates. Interpol doesn't collect them anymore and report them.

How are you going to get data on homicide rates from individual countries from going to -- unless you go through the back alleys of every city in every country and count all the dead bodies that turn up, you're not going to get the homicide rate. What you're going to get are official police statistics on homicide rates, which, as we know, reflect a whole plethora of confounding factors, like, you know, the main ones being nonreporting, the willingness and the ability of the police to recognize that murders exist, and so on and so forth. There are many, many, you know issues of factual accuracy in coming up with objective data.

And then of course once you get something you feel you can measure well objectively and factually, often the things that you're best able to measure well factually and objectively are some of the things that are the furthest away from the kind of governance, things that we care about. So, think about anticorruption. What's -- something you can measure is, is corruption illegal. According to global integrity in something like 41 out of 43 countries they surveyed corruption is illegal. That's not very helpful. It's useful to know, but it's not very helpful. Knowing whether an anticorruption commission exists is something we can factually determine. Where do we need subjective judgment perceptions and so on is in assessing whether the anticorruption commission is, in fact, effective, and that's a very different story.

(Inaudible) say briefly before we get to comparisons with other sources, but this is a bit smaller a point, but since Bob mentioned it I think I'll just spend a second to talk about it. And there's two issues here in terms of the choice of sources that have gone into the index. The first that concerns me a little bit, but it's not that big a deal because, you know, there's not much we can do about it, but there's quite a few sources that go into the index, maybe about a quarter -- Bob can tell us better -- that don't have time variation, and I list some of these here. It's just that's the way the data is. They're interesting bits of data, but they're collected either very haphazardly over time or they're more or less one (inaudible) efforts. And so, you know, that's -- it's a data problem, but it's one that's worth point out, because when we start looking at changes over time we have to realize that changes over time in the aggregate index are, of course, only coming from those underlying components that do change over time.

And the other point that I want to raise, and also I just mention it partly because Bob asked specifically about this, but when you come up with an index it's important to justify not just what goes in but what you left out, okay? And so for example of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project that we've been involved with, we've generally been as inclusive as we can possibly be with the limitation that we very explicitly rely exclusively on subject data. That's a choice that we made eleven years ago when we started this project. It's one we're comfortable with and we stick with. That means that we have some 33 different cross-country data sources that go as ingredients into the index. I didn't do a good count, but roughly the overlap between the sources that we use in our

governance indicators and the source that Bob uses is about six. So, I'm not particularly flog all the other data sources, and some of them don't cover Africa, and many of them don't cover every country in Africa, because those are certainly issues, but it would be useful to have a discussion about those other 25 or so sources that, you know, have interesting information on governance -- you know, why aren't they used -- could they be used -- could we maybe use them even though they don't cover every country in Africa to try to fill in the gaps or just deal with the fact they don't have complete coverage as many -- I shouldn't say "many" -- as a number of the sources that are in the index currently do.

Let me go to some comparisons. So, first of all, you know, one thing to remember is that governance rankings for countries in Africa is -- it's getting to be an old game. There's a lot of products out there. Worldwide Governance Indicators -- we rate over 200 countries on six dimensions since 1996. We have complete country coverage -- all 48 countries in the Ibrahim Index starting in 1998. So, you know, we've got almost a decade of time series variation in these indicators for every single country in Africa.

World Bank and African Development Bank have their own CPIA assessments. I only bring this up, because I love to bash on my employer for not making this data public in a more transparent way than they do. Unfortunately, the Bank has only started making this data public for IDA countries, which is actually almost all the countries in Africa anyhow, so that's not a big deal if you're interested Africa, but they don't make this -- they've only recently started making

this public. But, again, these are interesting data sources that are out there that can be compared with the index as a reality check.

And, again, I want to make very clear that the spirit of some of the pictures I'm going to show you now is not to say that one source is right and other sources are wrong, okay? There are many different data sources. A fundamental issue in measuring governance is that data sources disagree, okay? And so it's incumbent upon ourselves, and it's particularly incumbent when you produce a new index to show why your index is different from other indices and what the -- you know, where the difference is, what we learned from the discrepancies. That's why it's interesting to look at pictures like this. So, I'm just going to sort of blow very quickly through these pictures, and you have then in your handout.

One thing to note here -- I'm talking only about the core governance components. So, here for example we have Worldwide Governance Indicators, an average of our rule of law and control of corruption measure and rule of law transparency, corruption measure of the Ibrahim Index on the vertical axis. This by far is the strongest correlation in levels between sort of alternative measures. Why? Because this measure in the Ibrahim Index relies on, you know, very much on a similar set of perception-based measures to the ones that we rely on, so since we're averaging similar things we get similar outcomes. That's not very surprising. A little bit less so for participation in human rights where there's some more divergence in terms of what's going in underneath, particularly the reliance on human rights.

Where things are a little bit more interesting is when you start looking at changes. So, the next three graphs we're going to again look at the three core governance components of the Ibrahim Index, but on the horizontal and vertical axis we've got the changes between 2000 and 2005 instead on the horizontal axis, on the vertical axis. So, here you -- first of all you see that it's a much weaker correlation. You get some countries that stand out as really wild discrepancies, so you look at -- Eritrea is my favorite example. Eritrea is the single largest improvement in the rule-of-law component on the Ibrahim Index -- single largest improvement. Why does it improve? Because U.N. sanctions were lifted. That's one of the measures. It's a country under the U.N. sanctions between 2000 and 2005, and because of the ratification of a U.N., whose details escape me, Eritrea ratified that. That scored positively in the Ibrahim Index. Those two things together contribute to making it the largest improvement between 2000 and 2005.

When you look at the sources that go in the rule-of-law control of corruption in Eritrea Worldwide Governance Indicators, put them altogether and you get the biggest single decline in Africa, okay? Different data sources point to different conclusions. So, it matters what you look at, and you need to think really hard about what other kinds of things you want to be measuring. If you want to be measuring (inaudible) ratification of lifting of U.N. sanctions, then this is a good thing to look at in the case of Eritrea. If you want to look at other things, then you want to look at other indicators.

So, you know, there's a summary here of what some of the oddities are. I've mentioned Eritrea already. You can also, the graphs and levels, pick out some oddities as well. You have Rwanda sort of eleventh best in the worldwide governance -- sorry, Rwanda is eleventh in the Ibrahim Index, eleventh worst in WGI. Mozambique scores quite poorly in the Ibrahim Index. Actually it scores quite well in the Worldwide Governance Indicators.

So, this -- again, the important thing to realize from this is that you really have to drill down into the components of the indicators. It's great that Bob has made all this data available so that people can look at it and see what drives the difference and then ask ourselves if you want to rank countries according to one index or another, what are we really ranking countries according to?

Let me say a little more about the changes. Now, the changes are particularly interesting and particularly important, because when you think about the Ibrahim Index it's kind of -- or the Ibrahim Prize, I should say -- it's really designed to reward leaders who improve governance, okay? -- which is fantastic. I mean, you don't want to just reward leaders with good governance, because then it's the usual suspects of sort of well-performing countries at the top and you have countries that are disasters. In the example of, you know, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf that Bob made, countries like that even -- they improve a lot from a low base, don't get recognition. So, you really do need to look at changes. It makes a lot of sense.

So, I did a little exercise that I thought was interesting. What I did is I first took the changes in the overall Ibrahim Index between 2000 and 2005. You

can calculate the variance of those changes, and then you can do a little variance decomposition and ask how much of the variance in changes is due to changes in the underlying five components? So, when you look at that, 92 percent of the variance in changes in the index are due to the core of governance components. This is good actually, because I don't really like the other components. I think their development -- the development indicators -- things like per capita income, inequality, and so on -- change very little. We know that. And so they don't contribute much to the variance of changes. Not surprising, given I think we ought to be focusing on governance, I think that's actually good, for the core governance components in fact account for most of the changes.

Now, let's unpack that a little bit further. This 92 percent consists of -- well, safety and security -- the variance in that contributes about a quarter of the total; rule of law, a little less than a quarter; and the really big one is participation in human rights. Participation in human rights -- changes in that account for most of the variation in changes in the index. So, how do you see this? Easiest way to see this is do a little graph like this. On the horizontal axis you have the change in the overall index. On the vertical axis you have a change in the participation component to the index. And see this really strong relationship. I mean, there are exceptions. Eritrea is down here. Remember it improved, because it ratified some conventions on the overall index. It certainly didn't improve in terms of participation. But by and large, if you know that a country improved on participation, you're quite likely to know that it improved a lot

on the aggregate index. In fact, and this is more technical that I want to get into but the slope of this relationship is kind of proportional to the share of the variance that the component accounts for.

Now you look at, say, the human development component. So, again we have the change in the overall index here, change in the human development component on the vertical axis. Deliberately I've made the scale the same as on the previous graph and you see there's no relationship. And, again, the slope of this -- there's way in which you can interpret it as the contribution of the change in this index of the overall change. It does not contribute. That's more or less what you take away from this graph.

Now, since changes in participation matter so much for changes in the overall index, it's interesting to ask well, where do those changes in participation come from? So, that's what I do in the next two slides. So, on the horizontal axis now we've got the change in the participation component of the index, and on the vertical axis we have the change in the electoral integrity component. You see a very steep slope. Very strong relationship. That's telling you again that most of the variation in the participation of human rights component is coming from variation in the elections component, okay? By contrast, things like change in human rights doesn't explain anything, okay?

So, why is this interesting? Well, I think it's interesting for a number of reasons. First of all, you want to know where the changes are coming from when you look at overall improvements in the index -- who improved, who didn't? You want to know what drives those changes. The first thing you want to look at

this variance decomposition exercise tells you is you want to look at countries that improved in the electoral integrity subcomponent of participation. And what does that consist of? Well, these are four indicators, anchored in the same source, which are subjective assessments produced by the EIU. They're sort of 012 ratings are elections not free and fair, sort of free and fair, really free and fair. And they're entirely subjective, which I think is great, because I don't know how you measure whether elections are free and fair without using subjective judgment. I think it's entirely appropriate that this index -- you know, a large part of the changes it reflect something that's very important. I think that democracy is really, really important. I also think that we can best measure it with subject expert assessments that, while it professes not to like, but they're actually playing a really important part here in the changes in the index.

Okay, the last sort of -- last but one point I want to make is that margins of error are really, really important. This is changing gears a little bit. And this -- for those of you who have heard me speak before about the Worldwide Governance Indicators, you're tired of this, because this is my -- I've been saying this for ten years and nobody ever seems to listen, so I'll just keep on doing it and hopefully people will start paying more attention. And the important point here is something that is inconvertible that nobody can disagree with -- that any effort to measure governance is going to be subject to imprecision. And the question is what we do about it and whether we recognize it.

Why is there imprecision? Well, specific things that we want to measure we measure them precisely. I mentioned homicide rates, if that's something that you want to use. That's very hard to measure precisely. And the other reason, of course, is that there's gaps between the things we measure and things we care about. That's the definition of using proxies to measure governance. So, these sources of imprecision are always there.

One of the unique things that we do with the Worldwide Governance Indicators is that we actually calculate explicit margins of error associated with the estimates of governance for each and every country, for each component of governance, and for every year that we do this. And we display them, and we try to get people to pay attention to them.

Why are they important? Well, here's a picture, okay? Here we're using the Worldwide Governance Indicator's rule-of-law indicator, just to take one of them. We have all the 48 countries in Africa that we cover. The heights of the bars are proportional to the scores, and roughly the ranking of countries is pretty similar to what it is in the index. That's not really a big deal. Now, look at the country in yellow here. This is Swaziland, which hopefully you can read on your handout. It's colored yellow, because it's the median country in Africa.

Now, let's do ourselves a thought experiment. These vertical -- you know, thin vertical lines here indicate the statistically likely range, so here we're being explicit about the imprecision. We're being precise about imprecision. So, what we can ask ourselves is let's look at the lower bound of the statistically likely range for Swaziland and ask ourselves how many countries in Africa are worse

than -- are significantly worse than Swaziland? So, you kind of read across here and you find the first country, which is Congo, whose upper bound of its confidence interval falls below the lower bound of Swaziland. So, we've got about ten countries down here that we can really say with confidence, with statistical confidence, that, you know, these guys have worse scores than the middle country. And then you do the same exercise here. You go across, you look at the top end of the confidence range for Swaziland and you ask how many countries at the bottom end of their confidence ranges is better than the top end of Swaziland? And we get, you know, six or seven countries here. So, I'm comfortable using our data to say that, you know, we can really discriminate between these guys at the bottom and these guys at the top and know that there are significantly different countries in the middle. But that leaves 30 more countries in the messy middle. I don't think we can say with a great deal of significance one country is better than another within this group, okay?

This is truth in advertising. Every data source that you can think of is going to have margins of error. The question is whether people are transparent about them. So, in the interest of transparency, I calculated quick and dirty margins of error, or the Ibrahim Index, okay? Commerce is now the median country, Swaziland -- I know where Swaziland is -- doesn't matter. Same exercise though.

The first thing you notice is that relative to the scale of the index, the margins there are a whole lot bigger. Why is this? One is that the index relies on fewer sources than, say, the World Bank governance indicators do.

And this comes back to my point I was making that we really need to think about what sources to put in, what sources to keep out. Bob has made a big deal of leaving out subjective sources, but actually there's already a bunch of subjective sources in there. Maybe we should add some more and try to bring to those margins of error down, because the more sources you have the lower the margins of error are going to be.

The other thing that's important is the number of independent source that you rely on. So, if you look -- so, here I chose deliberately participation component of the Ibrahim Index, the reason being that in the participation component, while there are some twelve different sources -- variables -- they're all coming from three different sources. They're coming from Economist Intelligence Unit, the Cingranelli- Richards Coding of State Department Reports on human rights and so on, and the third one, which -- with another brain failure I forget. But there's only three independent sources. So, the big standard errors here reflect the fact that there's a small number of distinct and independent sources. I think it's important to have margins of error so that we can take seriously which country comparisons are significant and which aren't, okay?

The last point I want to make -- this is kind of a fun thing. We're not supposed to talk about the price, so we're not going to talk about the price. We're going to a little thought experiment, ask ourselves -- let's assume, and I think this is an entirely justifiable assumption, that Gisano is the right to pick as

the winner, okay? Eminent panel selected him. They must be right. They are right to have selected him.

The question is what indicators could we rely on that would have picked Gisano, recognizing that the links are imperfect and so on and we don't want to do this in a very mechanical way? So, you look at, say, the top five improvements. I'm not picking Ibrahim Index here, because the next slide I'm going to the same thing with the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and, guess what, Mozambique won't show up on either list, okay? So, truth in advertising here. Top five improvements in the Ibrahim Index 2000 to 2005 are emerging postconflict countries. Who improves a lot? Angola, Rwanda, Eritrea, Burundi, Sierra Leone? Now, to get the prize, you need to be an ex-leader. So, for four out of five, there are no ex-leaders over the period that we're looking at. Dos Santos has been in power forever, Kigami's been in power -- in fact, he's recently postponed elections which some -- they were kind of uncomfortable about. Kigami's been continuing in elected power for quite some time. There are concerns about the eroding democratic accountability in Rwanda as well. Afwarki's (phonetic) been in power forever without the benefit of any elections. Carbon, Sierra Leone, continues in elective power. Burundi is the only place in the top five improvements that actually has an ex-president we could look at. And Weoya is -- he's an eligible ex-president, and he's been out of power for more than one year. He also came into Iranacoo and he was tried, although acquitted, for the murder of his predecessor, so it's somebody you probably want to think about bestowing a prize like this on regardless of his merits.

Mozambique? Mozambique ranks smack in the middle -- 25th out of 48 countries in terms of improvements.

Again, I'm not claiming that the Worldwide Governance Indicators would have picked Mozambique as a winner, okay? When you look at who are the -- so, here we have the top five improvements of three ingredients of the Worldwide Governance Indicators in 2000, 2006. Sort of countries that show up here a bit more that don't show as much in the Ibrahim Index are, in terms of changes in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda. Nigeria shows up. One thing to note here, the little stars beside them. Because we have explicit margins of error, we can say something about how significant these changes are. The countries with stars -- the one or two stars -- are countries where they have really significant changes, and this is just linking back to the previous point that I made about the importance of having margins of error.

If you look at Mozambique on the Worldwide Governance Indicators -- I just want to make one point. See here we have the six components of the Worldwide governance indicators. The three bars for each component are 2006, 2000, and 1996. They -- our indicators go back to 1996, so we have, you know, over a decade of variation in these indicators, and so, again, this is a very pedestrian point, actually, but when you want to look at people who have been in power for some time -- so I think that Giso came into power in the mid 1990s -- early 1990s I believe -- early -- anyhow, he's been in power since I think before the beginning of the 1996 indicator and he served two terms and stepped down. So, partly you have to go further back in time to really pick

up the big changes. So, a big change that occurred Gisano's watched is the improvement political stability and absence of violence. You look here, going from the bottom 10 percent of the countries to up around the 60th percentile. Look at how these nonoverlapping confidence intervals are signaling a really big and significant change. So, that's something we definitely can lay credit for to Gisano, and that's, you know, I think one of the many reasons why he was cited for the prize.

Other areas of improvement -- they're a little more modest. You know, some improvement in regulatory quality, not much in the way of movement on corruption, some improvements in rule of law and so on. But in terms of, you know, what stand out in indicators with respect to Gisano is really the restoration of security, which Bob correctly notes, is something very important since the end of the civil war in Mozambique, okay? So, you know, bottom line here is actually fairly pedestrian. It's difficult to use cross-country indicators to pick winners. This is not for the Mo Ibrahim prize; it's also important for the (inaudible) Corporation; it's important for IDA. The important thing is that you can't use these indicators in isolation. You need to worry -- you need to bring in a lot of other information to come up to decision to identify winners. You know, as, you know, producers of cross-country indicators, we're the first to admit that they're not the be-all and the end-all.

So, just to wrap up and summarize a few bullets, the Ibrahim Index is a useful tool to continue raising awareness about the governance agenda in Africa and, for that matter, anywhere else, and if Mo Ibrahim or somebody else

wants to fund comparable prizes elsewhere in the world, I think that would be fantastic as a way of really shining a light on success.

In terms of the index in particular, I think while it's -- you know, it's a useful start, I think there's a lot of scope for improvement. I think one is to have more of a discussion over the whole of governance versus (inaudible). Do we want to be measuring governance? Do we want to be measuring development?

I've talked at length about this sort of subjective/objective stuff. This is just a red herring. It's really not worth making a big fuss about, and we've got to recognize that there are very few purely objective measures that people are going to take very seriously, and those ones that you can find are ones that are hard to measure themselves and difficult to link to outcomes. I think there should be some more justification of which sources weren't used. I mean, remember, there's 25 or so sources that we use in the Worldwide Governance Indicators that aren't used in the Ibrahim index. You've had discussions about weighting, what type of weighting schemes give more weight or less weight to things, but there's a first-order weighting decision, which is what you put in and what you leave out. What you leave out gets zero weight by definition. So, that's worth having some more discussion on. And I think having more effort to really cross reference this with other indicators and to develop explicit margins of error I think is very, very important in order to warn users to use these kinds of indicators in an intelligent way.

Thanks.

DR. FOMUNYOH: I don't have PowerPoint, so I probably should sit down and begin the process of opening this up and making it as interactive as can be. And I think Lael was right in saying at the beginning that I come to this from a practitioner's perspective and would take on where Aart and even Bob himself left off, because I think this is a very commendable effort, and I really appreciate Professor Rotberg and his team putting a lot of effort into this and a lot of work and putting these issues on the floor. Ultimately, as Professor Rotberg said, the ultimate goal is to strengthen governance in Africa, and the index is only one tool, and I want to believe it's only one of several or many tools that can help enhance discuss about debate about governance in Africa.

I think about two weeks when I participated in a phone conversation on the release of the index, I didn't make the point about my hope that this index could also be presented across the African continent, and I know that (inaudible) have already gone into that, because my hope is that it could generate the kind of discussions that we'll be having here this morning on the African continent itself, because one of the benefits of having an index like this put out is that it demystifies the discussions about political leadership on the African continent, because truly if Africa is bleeding today in a number of countries, it's because of proper leadership. So, I'm hoping that this index can contribute to that effort.

I'm also hoping that the index can find ways to incorporate a lot of the supply side desire for governance amongst Africans, that it's a lot of focus on service delivery, which is very (inaudible) or rented as we know. But my hope is that we can then find a way to have African civil society organizations, African

media, African political actors take on (inaudible) discussions on the criteria that I used, hoping that some of it can find its way through into the political leadership milieu and help foster respect for the criteria that has been laid out. I'm also delighted to know that there's going to be an effort to make this an unwell exercise, because I think in the last decade the (inaudible) reports that have been put up by the World Bank, the U.S. Department of Human Rights reports, Transparency International, Freedom House ratings -- all of those unwell events have helped sharpen the focus and attention on governance on the African continent, and I think this index will be coming in a timely fashion to add to that exercise.

It's kind of difficult to say when you (inaudible) trying to put a weight on each one of these tools, but, you know, I would like to believe that the cumulative impact, the cumulative effect, of all of these instruments coming to the fore overshadows whatever weaknesses would appear in each one of the particular instruments but that the cumulative effect is going to be sending forth a very strong message to those that govern in various African countries that the world is watching and that Africans in (inaudible) are watching, and hopefully that even as Africa tries to put in place mechanisms such as NEPAD and the African peer review mechanism, they can burrow information, they can burrow the (inaudible) that are used in some of these instruments to kind of put in place mechanisms that can endure and that can last coming from Africans themselves.

My fifth point has to do with the whole question of delivery, because that's something that NDI and a number of other organizations that have worked

on the core of governance issues and that tend to be very focused on democratization are also beginning to pay a lot of attention to how do we make democracy delivery? How can we make sure that a country doesn't have a sudden uptake in terms of improvements on some of the criteria because of one event, be it an election, an end to civil war, or cessation of hostilities but that the citizens of the country or the governance in a way that allows the citizens of the country to see a direct impact in their daily lives and their well-being because of these changes? What does it mean in Angola today that the civil war in Angola has ended? But if you did a survey among Angolans, are you going to get a sense that people feel that their lives have been impacted solely by the end of the civil war? And so finding a way to hold the feet of African leadership to the fire is a very commendable exercise.

At the same time with all of these positive points, I also am a little troubled about the weighting of some of the categories, because I think that if we're not very careful that could -- the outcome that factors in the way that it's given to each one of the five categories to present a situation that could be read differently, especially by the political elite on the African continent. For example, the notion of safety and security. I know that there's a lot of effort to broaden that definition to meet today's definition of human security and to focus on human security in a broader sense than regime security that if a country, such as Gabon, tops the list on the category of security and because of that is projected to (inaudible) here of an index on governance in Africa, it can send a very wrong message. And so while we try as much as possible to stay away from receptions

and to focus on deliverables, we also should avoid creating a false impression that a certain type of governance has (inaudible) in such as Gabon today is what African countries should seek to emulate. So, in many regards, I think de-linking their word from the categorization of countries is a good thing. The example of -- the comparison between Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia and Liberia's position versus Omar Bongo in Gabon, who has been in power for 40 years, and Gabon's position in the top tier of this list is something worth pursuing, and I hope that the performance of the country because of the legacy and the inheritance doesn't inhibit our ability to pick out the good leaders on the African continent and project them to, you know, kind of benefit from some of the rewards that come with governing justly.

Let me also say as I did before that my hope is that invariably we could find the -- what comes out of these discussions are recommendations that can help Bob and his team fine tune and maybe even break down some of the categories to allow us to be able to capture the essence of what's really happening on the African continent, but overall I think this is a worthwhile contribution and one more instrument that can allow us to shine the light or to shed the light not just on the success stories but also on the (inaudible) that remain on the continent and still need to be worked upon.

DR. BRAIANRD: I think what I'd like to do is open it up to the audience and then as you're answering questions you can come back and respond to some of the points made by the discussants as well. So, I'd just ask that there -- I think there's a microphone? Yes? So, when you get the

microphone just identify yourself and your institutional affiliation so that we know. There's a question right here. Nope, right behind you. Right here.

SPEAKER: Free-lance correspondent. I have a comment and question to the first two speaker. May I do one by one?

DR. BRAINARD: Sure.

SPEAKER: Professor Rotberg. I admire you all brave to come out the index, and am I heard correct that you said that your index apply to anywhere any country. I would like know have you apply it to the country other than African country? And also that the big purpose for the (inaudible) is to solve the people's problem, and the (inaudible) is a very big issue of the -- for the people, and there's a no (inaudible) category in your index component. And as to -- as the second speaker mentioned that the data, if I (inaudible) correctly, is a subjectivity and certainty. So, the big problem is that (inaudible) correction and where the data coming from. Thank you.

DR. BRAINARD: All right, we're going to take two more. There's one up here and one in the back, and then give each of the speakers --

SPEAKER: Oh, can I making the question for the second one?

DR. BRAINARD: Oh, I thought that was your second question.

Yes, go ahead.

SPEAKER: No, that's just for Professor Rotberg.

DR. BRAINARD: Okay.

SPEAKER: And for the second one is you talked about (inaudible) versa department, and the department is one of the (inaudible)

category in the commons (phonetic), and not many people make mistake include the World Bank, because department always have some negative thing that didn't include the environment of the -- in equality, so I think that's big problem there. Thank you.

MS. DORNTHIGH: Thank you. I'm Siberman Dornthigh. I'm with Johns Hopkins (inaudible), and this is a question for Professor Rothberg. I wonder if you would respond explicitly Aart Kraay's observation which I think was quite valuable, distinguishing between the development components and the more pure governance components, and do you find those suggestions useful in terms of thinking about how you might refine the index and if you would let us know how and why. Thank you.

MR. KADU: Thank you very much. I'm Kamala Kadu. I'm (inaudible) National Security Affairs of the Institute of World Politics, a Nigerian originally. Mine is not a question but a couple of comments that will hopefully assist you in the valuable work you're doing. (Inaudible) Mo Ibrahim will be here today. I was his employee in Soto. I was director of Logistics and Security in Soto for him.

Okay, first of all I notice a widespread ignorance about what Africa represents, you know, in this part of the world. The journalists and policymakers -- they need to visit Africa. They need to know more of Africa. The formal tools and paradigms we use in evaluating other places do not essentially apply to Africa all the time. In Africa the nuances, the psychological and (inaudible) issues are more important than the formal structures.

Two, corruption is a major issue in Africa, but in extending these spectrum of corruption or like Western institutions and the World Bank, the financial institutions in the Western world, to help Africa. Most of the money that has been stolen from Africa is residing in institutions around here. Africans require a lot of information to help themselves to internally react to the pervasive lack of governance. If they could be empowered with information regarding who (inaudible) and who has done what, that would help a lot.

Then part of the issue in Africa can be traced to the way the countries were originally (inaudible). No (inaudible) so keeping people who are not intrinsically homogenous in the same countries -- that has created some of the issues.

My last point, and this may not be very popular, is that when we talk about democracy as a preferred system of governance, we intrinsically assume that the structure, the support mechanisms and devices like checks and balances, rule of law, present but are prevalent. In the absence of those structures, like you have in the predominance of African countries, democracy as practiced in the West is not necessarily the best for Africa. We need to find a hybrid that actually takes the country and the continent forward and then begins to develop those institutions that support democracy.

Thank you very much.

DR. BRAINARD: Okay, why don't we give Robert Rotberg several minutes to respond to whichever of the comments and questions and then we'll go down the line with the other panelists.

DR. ROTBERG: Yes, thank you. This is very easy. On terms of the students at the (inaudible) school have ranked Asia, ranked Latin America. So, we have numbers for any part of the world one wants. But we haven't done in any part of the world except Africa formally because of the lack of resources to -- it takes -- as Aart knows, very well, it takes a lot of time and effort to, first, of all gather the data and, secondly, to analyze them properly. So the answer to the question -- the first question is yes, we have done the rest of the world and any country you want there are numbers existing but not on a formal basis.

Second point, I think you haven't drilled down far enough in the index. The -- there are eleven health components in the last part of the index. Maybe it's only seven, Mike, I can't remember exactly. But we do look at a number of health components, and the argument -- partial answer to the next question -- the argument here is you can't have good governance unless you deliver to the people what the people expect from their governments, which is health --

SPEAKER: -- clean water, which is part of that, is another. I want to also make a general plug which the index tries to cover. What I've been telling, and various other Kennedy School people have been telling their students for years about development is that there are two things that make development go forward, one is the education of girls, the second is clean water. No two other elements are as important. So we include those in the human development part of the index.

Now, we also have a -- one of the 58 components attempts to measure environmental sustainability, and this is if you like the weakest part of the index, because the whole environmental area is very tricky, but we think this is one of the issues that governments, particularly in Africa, but the rest of the world need to concern themselves with, and that individuals want from their governments, but it accounts for two-thirds of a percent of the entire total score, so it's not very robust.

The second question, I'm delighted to have the question about development in governments because I think that cuts to the heart of the fundamental disagreement that Aart and I have, and it is a very deep disagreement, and I can understand, having helped develop a very important index, the World Bank index that Danny and Aart have done over the years, it's critical to defend it, but I don't think you can discuss governance without the economic component, nor the human development component. And what Danny calls -- what Aart calls core government, that is the real red herring. There's no such thing as core governance that doesn't include what citizens of a country want, and they want health and education.

Anyone who's lived in Africa, worked in Africa, know that if you ask Africans what they want from their government, they clearly want safety and security. They want rule of law, but they really -- and they want participation, but they really want their -- and they count on their governments more than we do to deliver educational services and health services, so that's absolutely critical, and no government worth its salt anywhere in the world, but particularly in the developing world can justify itself if it doesn't produce as good schooling as possible, as good health services as possible.

And I think one can make an argument, you know, to reply to everything Aart said would take a good hour or two, and would justify it. I mean Aart had a lot of time, we have less time, so that's a discussion which will have to continue separately.

The answer to the third question, the word democracy is consciously never uttered in the index of African governance, because democracy is really many components, and I take Bob Dahl's view, and I have for a long time, and we tried to look at what it is that governments should be delivering from the point of view of the citizens, and there are various components of what are loosely called democracy, but because it's such a loaded word and has such cultural biases now, we try to stay away from it.

One more point -- a couple more points quickly. The margin of error question and the time variation question are covered fully in the printed materials that go with the index of African governance. They're all covered, and Aart's right about the time variation question, and we raise it and set it out in various ways in our printed materials, so that's all covered.

Now, there's a very central point which should be put on the table, that the problem with the World Bank government indicators, the problem with our index is exactly the same, that is, we're relying on sources that, in many cases, haven't been produced even by the bank, other part of the bank, or by the IMF frequently enough. So we're doing -- the JENI Coefficient are not done for every country every year.

One example, World Health Organization, maternal mortality rates are out of date by two or three years. So we're working to fix all those data problems and so on.

MS. BRAINARD: Aart.

MR. KRAAY: I think Bob just said I talk too much, he's right. So in response to Mr. Chin's question, or just a tongue in cheek point, but if you want to see rankings of other countries for the last ten years, you can look at the world by governance indicators, which covers 200 countries for the last ten years. Let me say a little bit more about, you know, why aren't we, for example, measuring environment or inequality? This is interesting, because it also leads into Professor Dernsite's question about the issue of, you know, do we measure outcomes or do we measure governance.

And there's a couple of related points there, and I'm afraid it will be a little bit jumbled because I don't think quickly on my feet. But the first point is, just in terms of thinking about the sort of outcome data. There's a sense in which data on infant mortality, for example, is an objective, in the sense that it's, in principal, externally verifiable.

But the other sense of the word objective, of course, is produced by a disinterested party. Now, who produces the underlying statistics on which infant mortality is based, governments do. Who produces education attainment data, governments do.

If you start ranking countries too much on the kind of data that governments themselves produce, you create obvious incentive problems, okay. And I think this is an important issue in objectivity versus subjectivity that you need

to keep in mind. There's great temptations. Suppose that, you know, there was a lot of money at stake instead of a little bit of money at stake, the Ibrahim Prize, and the people really started looking seriously at the educational health attainment data, then people are going to start looking very carefully at the kind of fiddling that governments can easily do with the underlying vital surveys and so on. So this is one issue.

The second issue, again, on this point of outcomes versus inputs, inequality is a great example. How do you measure inequality? Everybody says, well, of course, you use the Genie Coefficient. First of all, there's issues of timeliness and so on that we don't need to rehearse, that's obviously a problem.

But what is that measuring? That's measuring inequality of outcomes. From a policy-maker, what you care about is inequality of opportunity, okay. Is there systematic discrimination against people? Are there institutional factors that create gaps between skilled and unskilled wages, between women's wages and men's wages and so on? These are the things that we really care about.

Eventually this, together with differences in ability and a whole other stew of things, gives you inequality, the Genie Coefficient. But the sort of things we want to measure in terms of governance are really the ingredients. One last example, and again, this is really more answering Professor Dersight's question, which is, you take health and educational outcomes again, so first of all, there's an issue of how objective in the sense of impartially produced that data is. But also, using this as data to measure governance is a little bit like telling people that they

would be sort of better basketball players if they were like Michael Jordan, okay. That's not very helpful.

If you rate countries -- countries in Africa need to improve governance, and you say in order to improve governance, you would need to improve things like life expectancy, educational attainment and so on, it's just saying, well, you'll be more developed if you're more developed.

I think the more interesting question is to the extent that we're able to go underneath an outcome like educational attainment or infant mortality and go a step below it. Do we measure -- do teachers show up for school. Absenteeism is a huge issue. There are interesting efforts going on by colleagues of mine at the World Bank to measure absenteeism. Do teachers show up I think is closer to governance than the educational outcome.

Why don't teachers show up? Well, it depends on how they're paid, how they're recruited and so on. All of these institutional details are the things that we want to be devoting our effort to measuring in the hopes of understanding why some countries have bad development outcomes like low education, prevalence in malnutrition and so on and so forth. And finally, the margins of error, I'll look forward to seeing it, I didn't notice the discussion of margins of error in the papers that are on the web site, and the most glaring --

SPEAKER: The important thing, the web site doesn't fully capture the index because of what we didn't do to the web site.

MR. KRAAY: Okay. But most interestingly, I'd like to see the margins of error on the data in the web site, then we really have the margins of error present and acknowledge, which I think is an important gap so far.

MS. BRAINARD: Christopher, any final thoughts?

MR. FOMUNYOH: (inaudible)

MS. BRAINARD: Okay. Let me ask if there are any last questions and then we'll both answer them and wrap up, because we're going to run out of time. So I count one, two, three, four, five, six, all right. Keep them short. Can we start up here? Thanks.

MR. MITCHELL: This is a question for Professor Rotberg, Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. It's a short question, the answer may be too long, and if that's the case, I'm fine, it can be answered later. But I was struck by your opening remark talking -- the dinner with your colleague, when he said, you know, how did this balance shift between Asia and Africa, and you said, simple, governance. The question it seemed to raise for me is, how did that happen? In other words, if there was a time at which Africa was ahead of Asia and the answer to that question was governance, what's the answer to that question? And as I say, if it's too long for today, go on to the other ones.

MR. KIM: I'm Anthony Kim of the Heritage Foundation. This is really fascinating conversation since, you know, I'm working at the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. And my quick question is to Professor Rotberg.

You mentioned that, you know, you have, you know, an equal rating system, you know, 58 variables, no water access, maybe one percent or less than that -- maybe ten percent -- 15 percent. Just out of curiosity, what kind of mechanism you have in terms of signing different ways?

MS. DERRICK: Thank you. Vivian Lowry-Derrick, the Academy for Educational Development. My two want to say -- I think the idea of this is to have

particularly the Mo Ibrahim index. I have a maybe two part question. The first is, Aart, you talked specifically about elections and the lack of objectively verifiable indicators.

And I'd like to ask Chris to comment on that, because I can think of several that seem to meet, even when you drill down, that could be very easily verified, the levels of fraud, intimidation, press freedom, media access, violence, et cetera, so that's one question. And then the second question, again, is, I think for Chris and Professor Rotberg, about African reaction to this -- to the Mo Ibrahim index. And have there been discussions with Africans? And, Chris, maybe for you, you spoke a little bit about the AU, and I'm thinking about the peer review mechanism, and ways that this really can, any of these indexes, can reinforce that and help deepen African capacity to respond to this. Thank you.

MR. CLEMEN: My name is Max Clemen, I'm from working with -- and I have one comment on the whole set up of the index. I think -- do not get my wrong, I very much appreciate, and I think it's very important.

But as it looks mainly at how governments are acting, and that the persons doing this, maybe we look too little at structural reasons, because, you know, sometimes even there is a revolution and a completely new government is set into place that wants to do everything different, but strangely, after a while, it all looks the same, and that might just be because the actors are acting within a framework that sets a certain limit to the logic of their actions. And sometimes we really do need to look at these kind of systematic problems and how we can solve those. Thank you.

MR. MALM: Hello, Larry Malm, I'm a research analyst here at the Brookings Institution. I was actually going to ask the waiting question that was asked earlier, so I'd like to reemphasize that in hopes that you'll get to it. And my second question was, what are the policy implications that should be taken out of this index and other industries like it for people outside of Africa, specifically in perhaps the U.S. government or institutions here in Washington? And perhaps also, what are the policy implications that should not be taken from industries like that by people like that?

MS. BRAINARD: Okay. I think we got everybody or is there one more? Why don't we go in reverse order, so Chris, we can start with you and just, you know, respond to whichever questions and any final thoughts?

MR. FOMUNYOH: Sure. This is probably the opportunity I was looking for to raise my issue, which I know Bob has been anticipating, which is the place that democratization should find or ought to find in this kind of index. And I think this builds on the first question that was raised about governance, because when you say that Asia kind of took the move ahead of Africa because of the governance issue, it underscores a recommendation that poor governance has contributed to where Africa is today.

But you cannot isolate governance from the whole process of democratic governance. And while a philosophical decision has been made to keep democracy and democratic governance outside of the whole realm of the study, I think that's probably something that's going to need to be reconsidered. Because even when Africa did badly on the one party ruler, on the military rule, governance did exist. I think what we're trying to address is good governance,

maybe in comparison to poor or bad governance, and until we recognize and are comfortable seeing it publicly, the democratic governance is what makes the difference, that's even how governments respond to citizens and the needs of citizens, that's why they deliver to citizens, because they want to be responsive to citizens.

Inasmuch as the lingo of democracy support or democracy by itself may have gotten caught up in other considerations here or elsewhere, I think we cannot shy away from the fact that democratic governance is really what we're after. And I think that's something that the Mo Foundation and the team that has worked on this index is going to have to sit down and reconcile it -- or else it's going to be very uncomfortable -- where you're laying out all of this criteria that out of the democratic governance, but you're shying away from the word democracy, and therefore, putting governance out there as if Africa was never governed. It's always been governed, even when it was a matter of colonies, it was always governed.

That leads up to Vivian's question about elections. And I'm glad that the -- under the -- and even rule of law, elections were mentioned, because elections have this incredible advantage of bringing to the floor in every country or in every society a lot of other issues that have more to do -- a lot to do with just participation. It's during elections that you get a sense of the level of corruption in the country, the level of transparency which public -- are managed, issues with regards to the strength of the judiciary to apply the rule of law, you know, questions of poverty and how they are addressed, so there's a whole host of issues that get triggered when a country is going through an electoral process.

And you almost feel like -- inasmuch as we would be the first to say that elections do not -- a democracy make, elections are so important that they ought to be weighted differently, given more weight.

I did talk about the issue of the African peer review mechanism and what the AU is doing on some of those domestic initiatives on the continent, and my hope that these kinds of discussions can take place on the continent and help fertilize or increase the potential that -- in country, or you know, those discussions that are happening on the continent can get reached by these kinds of instrument.

I think the African capacity to absorb -- discuss on these kinds of issues have increased the last decade, and this is thanks to the wave towards democratic governance, something that we really shouldn't shy away from.

MS. BRAINARD: Aart, final thoughts?

MR. KRAAY: Just briefly. I can't resist to chime in on the issue of democracy. First, just to reiterate one factual point from the presentation I made, you know, try to keep democracy outside the realm of the index, but, you know, the fact of the matter, remember the little variancy composition exercise we did, the four variables that measure competitive elections and so on together changes in those account for almost half of the variance and changes in the index between 2000 and 2005.

Elections are not sufficient for democracy, but an important ingredient for democracy, I can't agree with Chris more, are squarely in the index, particularly in changes, first point. Second point, that's a good thing intrinsically. Mark -- I believe once said that it cheapens democracy to justify it only because of its growth and development benefits.

I think democracy is intrinsically a good thing, it's worth measuring on its own, and by the way, coming to the question of, if we think that democracy is an important component of governance, democracy almost certainly isn't the explanation for why East Asia grew faster than Africa in the '60's and '70's, because, you know, these weren't particularly democratic regimes anywhere.

And then briefly, Vivian, on your question, I probably spoke too quickly and not precisely enough. When I say that you can't get objective measures of electoral fairness and freedom and so on, what I mean is that there's judgment involved. You can look at whether there's repression, you can look at whether there's -- for tell signs of vote stuff and then so on, but at the end of the day, the sort of stuff that we as constructors of index use are zero, one, two, three scales, free and fair, sort of free and fair, not so free and fair.

Figuring out where different countries fall on that scale involves a good deal of judgment, no matter what sort of factual information you have before you. So that's the sense in which judgment rightly plays a role.

Policy implications, I think that's a fantastic question, it's one that we get asked all the time about the world-wide governance indicators and what you can and can't learn from them. The first is that indicators like the Ibrahim index and others are a fantastic tool for generating debate.

Ten years ago you couldn't say the word corruption at the World Bank. I'd like to think that a small contribution or, you know, one small reason contributing to a more open discussion of these things around the bank is the emergence of different kinds of data and discussions about data and so on. And every time I started to doubt that, I realized that each year when we come out with

the indicators, we get predictable shrieks and howls of outrage from about half of our executive board. You can guess which half. So, you know, these do foster debate. And I think the one policy implication is that if you want to have debate about governance issues, you have to have data, no matter how imperfect. And even if the Ibrahim index were the only measure out there, it would be fantastic in that sense in terms of generating debate and discussion.

But the negative lesson that's important to take away from it, as well, is that you can't use these indicators as a magic key to unlock the mystery of how to allocate aid across countries, to unlock the mystery as to why some countries are growing fast and others haven't.

These cross country indicators are really -- tool. When you want to start -- give policy advice in a country, you want to think about picking a prize winner, and you think about allocating aid and so on, you need to rely on a whole lot more information, even more judgment, even more subjectivity, you've got to live with that.

You know, we get paid what we get paid because of our good judgment, we like to think, in the policy analysis realm.

And, you know, so judgment looking carefully at all kinds of supporting information is key to really starting to think about how to design strategies to improve governance.

MS. BRAINARD: Rob Rotberg.

MR. ROTBERG: Okay. Bullet points because we're running out of time. Very important, the first question, bad governance leads to poor development or lack of development, and it leads to conflict. It also leads to increasing

corruption. And there was corruption in Asia, but the money actually stayed at home and the money in Africa fled.

And if you can -- so what happened was, a huge divergence between Africa being well governed in the early years of independence, Ghana was twice as wealthy as Taiwan in 1965 or '66, twice as wealthy as Korea in that period, the difference has to be -- you have to look for the difference, and there are various things, the difference has to be governance, and one of the components of governance is education.

And if you look at the slope of the educational changes, okay, if you look at the scope of the health changes, Asia went like this and Africa went sideways. I don't know what the accepted figure of the bank now, but Tanzania was de-developed between 1965 and 1995, by 20 to 30 percent simultaneously; Asia went from below Africa to way above it.

Weighing the Heritage question is very easy. It's explained in our literature. We ran the weights across the five categories. First we weighted them, each component twice as much as the other components; then we decided after doing that we would weight them equally because the differences were trivial. Within the categories, there are weighing issues, too, fully explained in the material connected to the index, basically corruption is over weighted, safety is over weighted, for reasons I talked about earlier. Most everything else is really weighted equally, except there are more components for health than for education, so there's a slight over weighing of education.

Another important dated question is, we don't rely on 2000 -- 2005, we rely on 2002 to 2005, because they're very -- there are very great problems with

the numbers in the 2000 part of our index. There are too many missing cells, there's statistical problems.

Vivian, I think you're right, I think there are objective measures of elections. I think we've got at some of them, we'll continue to try to refine that. A question about how the African index is played in Africa, it's played very well so far. We've had two or 3,000 responses, short responses on the web site. All but, you know -- the only ones that are negative are about the choice of Chasano there are a few negative ones there from Mozambique, who remind us of the death of the journalist, Cardoso, and how that came about.

And there are a few quibbles by people in one country thinking they should have ranked higher than another country, perfectly reasonable. The peer review, done well in Ghana, done abysmally in South Africa. The differences are basically -- the similarities in peer review, they're all subjective. There's very few outcome measures, very few objective measures, very difficult even in Ghana to know what's going on. The Rwanda exercise will be somewhere in between. So the peer review mechanism is very, very flawed, and of course, they're not doing any really difficult countries yet. That's another long discussion.

We're attempting to link up this year and go on for several years with African institutions and African counterparts so that we can generate data locally by having local people on the ground assisting us, also on a build capacity for this kind of effort.

And we also want to find a way, the UN is not doing it effectively as it promised to do, and the World Bank has a section doing this, they're really not underway. We want to deepen the ability of African countries to have statistical

control, statistical offices generate the data. The biggest problem, and we really haven't talked about it yet, which are data problems. They're enormously complicated. We talked about that at great length on our written material.

Structure, the structure question, that's a long discussion and a fundamental disagreement. Structure is important, but leadership, in my view, is far, far more important. And that in the smaller -- the more fragile the country, the poorer the country, the more important leadership is. And I've written about that, and I'll speak for hours and hours on that, any of the news you want. The critical issue here is that, and I've demonstrated over and over again, that leadership does make changes. I just point to the difference between Africa and Asia, I point to the difference between Botswana and Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone, Will Reno has got a great chapter in a book of mine showing how Shaka Stevens destroyed Sierra Leone, the earlier Mugabe factor, and how -- are taking a very, very poor country, without diamonds at the time, and by leadership efforts, brought it up on the Asian model actually, on some of the Asian models.

Policy implications, I think this index has enormous policy implications because it started to be explicitly diagnostic. We want civil society to be able to say to the government in that country, look at what's happening, look at why Malawi is higher than Zambia, let's see if we can catch up with Malawi by improving in this area or that area, and because there are 58 sub-categories, you can zero in on two, three, four, five and work on those. And so civil society or responsible governments can use it.

Policy implications for the U.S. are obviously -- donor usage all over the world, foreign investment, those are obvious, and let's take one very obvious example. If the aid community wanted to focus on two or three countries with arteries of commerce that are deficient, mostly roads, but other things, as well, they could zero in, find those countries, and therefore, improve, my view, the economic growth potential of these countries by building and maintaining roads, so that's an argument.

Now, I'm almost done. I think it's very important to say, from my point of view, judgment should play as little as possible in making an index, not as much as possible, but as little as possible. Judgment is too much prone to selection bias.

There are arguments about Gabon, I won't make them here, but they're pretty well made, and my distaste for Gabon is as much as Chris', but Gabon does do certain kinds of things right. And the interesting proof of that is that the participation and rule of law scores for Gabon are low, human development scores are high, and security scores are high, so in other words, it works out.

I was also -- I know Malawi quite well and I was distressed that Malawi was so high, higher than Tanzania, higher than Zambia, but we checked and rechecked and we'll continue to recheck in the future, and it plays out of their reasons, which we do. Finally -- by the way, it's very important that none of you go away thinking that it is an index done out of the Ibrahim Foundation in London. This is a Kennedy School product and it's a partnership between the Kennedy School and the Ibrahim Foundation. The good news, let me end on the good news. The good news is that although the world government indicators explicitly, I assume because they're the bank, doesn't do any rankings, doesn't rank countries, the

correlation between the 2005 index and the 2005 world governance indicators are very high, about 50 percent of the countries are correlated, and the correlations are very high, and 50 percent are lower, and some are lower still.

So when we ran those correlations this week for this meeting, we were very pleased that there's a lot of overlap. The final point is only the WGI and the index of governments and the human development indicators cover all African countries, Index of Economic Freedom, the Global Integrity Index, et cetera, et cetera, only cover a few countries in Africa, ten, 12, something, and they're all improving, I understand that, and getting more.

But we were forced to reinvent the wheel, as it were, because all these other index, there are 140 of them that impinge on this question, bits of this question, there are only two and a half that really have all 48 countries in them.

MS. BRAINARD: Terrific. Well, please join me in thanking all three of the panelists, and particularly Robert Rotberg for an extremely rich conversation.

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