

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

OPPORTUNITY 08:  
THE LONG WAR ON TERRORISM AND  
STRUGGLE AGAINST EXTREMISM

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**PARTICIPANTS:**

PANEL ONE:

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE WAR ON TERROR

**Moderator:**

MICHAEL O'HANLON, Senior Fellow;  
Director, Opportunity 08  
The Brookings Institution

**Panelists:**

U.S. REP. PETE HOEKSTRA (R-MICH.)  
Ranking Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

ANTHONY BLINKEN  
Staff Director, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

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PANEL TWO:

THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR  
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

**Moderator:**

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Greetings everyone. Thanks for coming, and thanks to the Hilton Embassy Row for the setting here including the curtain from which our two star panelists have just arrived, and we are expecting one more in a few minutes, but let me first tell you a little bit about why we are here and then introduce our panelists.

I am Mike O'Hanlon from Brookings. Along with Melissa Skolfield and Bill Antholis and another colleagues at Brookings, I direct the Opportunity '08 Project which seeks in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way simultaneously to foster debate on some of the key issues facing the country, and we are delighted that today we have the opportunity to face the question of the Long War on Terror, although many people would want to have a debate even right away about the title of the topic. Also I want to thank very much three campaigns that have sent representatives today to foster debate on this question, and we have two of the three represented right here. To my immediate right is Randy Scheunemann, on behalf of Senator McCain. Randy was McCain's National Security Adviser in his previous presidential run as well. He was also the National Security Adviser to two Senate Majority Leaders, Senator Lott, and Senator Dole, and we are delighted to have him speaking today. To his right is Tony Blinken who as you know and many of you are aware is the staff director for the current Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden. The two of them will be joined shortly by Congressman Pete Hoekstra of

Michigan who, as you surely know, is the Ranking Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a supporter of Governor Romney, and will be arriving as soon as he has gotten through a couple of votes on the House floor.

What we thought we would do, we have two panels for you today, several Brookings experts speaking after this panel. We've got about an hour for each panel, and so we thought we would with no further ado go ahead and start up, and I hope that Congressman Hoekstra will be able to join in the process of essentially the opening remarks so that he would then speak third out of the three and we will go to a discussion period involving you thereafter. Each panelist is going to speak for 7 to 10 minutes or so and then we will hope for some discussion involving you as well.

Let me by way of motivation just say one last thing before turning things over to Randy, and we will just proceed down the row. What I remind you of by way of motivating the importance of this topic and explaining a little bit of what we mean by this topic today—although our panelists will be free to talk about whatever aspect of it they wish—is to go back to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's famous 2003 memo that was leaked intentionally or not to the public and the media in which he asked, well, great, we are fighting this war in Afghanistan, we're fighting this war in Iraq, we hope we're making progress in both—although one could debate whether that was indeed the case at the time he made that comment or any other time, but nonetheless—the point being whatever

we do in this current military campaign, what are the prospects that the next generation of al-Qaeda won't be even more numerous, even more plentiful, even more dedicated to attacking Western interests and carrying out acts of terrorism? That's the long war question.

There are many aspects to it ranging from what Congressman Hoekstra focuses on on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the hard power but quieter covert or intelligence-related side of going after terrorists around the world, to the longer-term question of how do we help, to be blunt, Islamic societies do better at offering a vision to their own populations that makes terrorism a little less likely to emanate from their populations. Again, there is no way to phrase the topic today that is uncontroversial, and I am sure there are people who would take issue with the way I just put that question. But in other words, the soft-power side, the longer-term issue of trying to foster political, economic, and societal reform within some of the countries that have been producing the greatest number of terrorists, and of course, some of them may even be in the Western world so we should not be too restrictive here in our domain of focus, and this is also very much part of the question for today.

I am going to stop talking because the panelists know full well we do not have enough time to cover all this, so they have complete license to hone in on whichever aspect they would most prefer, and with that I will turn things over to Randy.

MR. SCHEUNEMANN: Thanks, Mike, for that introduction, and I think you have framed the issue quite well and there may be some dispute whether there is a war on terror. It really is the transcendent issue of our time, and Senator McCain has been very forthright in describing the war with radical Islamic extremism as the most important challenge facing our country. If James Carville were playing a role in this election, contrary to what he said in 1992, I think it's the war on terror, stupid.

Senator McCain approaches his views on how to fight and ultimately prevail in the war on terror based on his four decades of experience in the national security realm. He knows the world, he knows it in a way that is fundamentally different from those that maybe have run a city or a state or bought up companies. He has focused for years on what to do to combat the threat of radical Islamic extremism. We are engaged right now from the Maghreb to Mindanao fighting radical Islamic extremists. Let me start with hard power to use Mike's categorization and I will move to soft power and then just briefly about U.S. government capabilities in both hard and soft power.

Senator McCain recently has made it very clear that he believes the central front in the war on terror is Iraq. He believes that not because President Bush has said it or even because General Petraeus has said it, he believes that because al-Qaeda itself said that, that it is the most important theater. He believes frankly that it is a fantasy to think that you can fight al-Qaeda in Afghanistan while losing in Iraq, that the consequences of defeat would be catastrophic. It is

clear, and Osama bin Laden makes it clear, that he views the United States as unable to withstand casualties. He cites our withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s and our abrupt withdrawal from Somalia in the 1990s. In his analysis, the United States and the West are weak and are not able to withstand al-Qaeda and extremist Islam. If we were to lose in Iraq and if we were to choose defeat in Iraq, it would dwarf Somalia, it would even dwarf the defeat that the Soviet Union faced at the hands of Afghan Mujahaden in the 1980s. It would empower Iran and all of the radical Islamic extremists that Iran is funding from Hamas, to Hizballah, to Syria. And it would also make things in Afghanistan far more difficult because what has been very little remarked upon is that if we lose in Iraq, there will be another surge and it will be a surge of al-Qaeda and it will be a surge of al-Qaeda into Afghanistan. Senator McCain has said, How long do you think those who were willing to embrace defeat in Iraq would be willing to stay the course in Afghanistan when casualties got far worse when the pressures on the NATO Alliance and some of the European allies who are fighting with us with restrictions in Afghanistan in the face of massive surge with al-Qaeda emboldened and an Iran emboldened?

McCain was the first really prominent elected official in this country to criticize the Rumsfeld strategy as far back as the summer of 2003. He made it clear that he believed there weren't enough forces on the ground and that the right strategy was not being pursued. In our view, that is leadership. That is the kind of leadership to look at and analyze a national security problem, and at a



time when many of the other candidates for the Republican nomination were engaged in other pursuits, McCain was calling for a new strategy and additional forces to win the war in Iraq. We can talk more about Iraq. I want to move on to other areas. I would just close on the Iraq part of this by saying that there have been very few serious proposals yet to do in Iraq with the exception of Senator Biden who has a very serious proposal that deserves serious attention and I'm sure we'll get into that when Tony talks.

Our longer-term strategy encompasses far more than military and intelligence, it needs to encompass all elements of our national power, economic, diplomatic, information, and in Senator McCain's view, this is not a clash of civilizations, but in fact it is a struggle within Islam for the soul of Islam between radical extremists of the al-Qaeda variety and the vast majority of the Islamic world that does not want to fly planes into the World Trade Center or have their sons and daughters grow up to be suicide bombers. We need to do what we can to empower those moderates and to give them a voice to face down the extremists of al-Qaeda.

We are going to start with the premise that America has real strengths America has real strengths here. People want to come to this country. People want their sons and daughters to be educated in this country. They want to trade with this country. We still despite our occasional moments of introspection and self-doubt are the model for much of the world. Our allies are critical in this, and it is a little bit surprising to see some calling for a unilateral military force

against an ally like Pakistan which sounds a little bit more like cowboy diplomacy than the Bush strategy in some cases. To be a good ally we've got to be a good listener and I think frankly in the case of some of our European allies, Senator McCain has been critical of this administration's conduct of diplomacy and that we need to do more. We also need to realize, and I am sorry Congressman Hoekstra is not here on this point but I'm sure we will come back to it, that some of the things we have done have been strategic negatives for us, Abu Ghraib, detainee treatment, the continued fact of Guantanamo being open, have huge strategic costs for us in prosecuting the long war against terrorism. I would suggest it is irresponsible to the point of absurdity that the answer is to double Guantanamo as Governor Romney once suggested.

This is a battle of ideas just as the Cold War was a battle of ideas and it will not be won solely with military power or with intelligence power. In this battle, scholarships can be as important as smart bombs. In this battle, economic growth, opportunity, and political space are critical in many countries. Senator McCain agrees with the formulation that we have accepted the illusion of stability with autocratic regimes, but we have not gained stability. Autocratic regimes are fundamentally unstable because they fear their own people and they fear change and they fear openness. On this point when you're talking about countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia or others, I occasionally like to quote John F. Kennedy from another idea on another ideological challenge and that is, "Those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable." I think

that is a lesson we need to think about very carefully when talking about so-called pillars of stability like Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

Let me just briefly make a couple of comments about the organization of the U.S. government to conduct this long war. Senator McCain has been very forceful in making the point that we have not constructed the kinds of institutions to meet 21st century challenges. After World War II as we all know, we constructed the institutions, whether it was NATO, we developed the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods instruments, that were instrumental, indispensable in prosecuting and ultimately prevailing in the Cold War. We have not done that now. We have created some bureaucracies in the Department of Homeland Security or the Director of National Intelligence, but we haven't really begun to do the kinds of changes that are going to be necessary to prosecute and prevail in the long war, and Senator McCain has proposed a sweeping overhaul.

A couple of the key elements include a significant expansion of our ground forces, the Army and Marines, to 900,000, realizing that recruitment will be difficult but it still be forces at a far lower level than we maintained in the 1980s for example. He has proposed a 20,000 strong Army Advisory Corps dedicated to training and working with foreign militaries on a long-term basis to help them meet the challenges of al-Qaeda and extremism in their own countries. He has proposed expanding language training and the Foreign Area Officer Program which has been long neglected by the U.S. Army, and creating a new military specialty in strategic interrogation, strategic interrogation that honors the

Geneva Convention and employs psychological techniques that are recognized to work very well as opposed to some other techniques where you tend to have a detainee tell the person what he wants to hear so that the unpleasant treatment stops.

He has proposed creating a new Office of Strategic Services, an OSS, because of the essentially dysfunctional Director of Operations in the CIA that has been singularly unable to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. He has called for bringing back something like the United States Information Agency which unfortunately in the late 1990s with bipartisan agreement was dissolved and merged with the Department of State, but has said that the idea of getting our message out to the people directly is fundamentally different than the message of diplomacy. It can't just be an under secretary's office with small resources, but should be a dedicated agency with professionals to get our message out to the world.

Let me conclude there. I hope there is time for questions. I hope I have stimulated some thought. Thank you for your attention.

MR. O'HANLON: Outstanding presentation, Randy. Thank you very much. Tony, the floor is yours.

MR. BLINKEN: Thank you, Mike. Thank you, Randy. Speaking on behalf of Senator Biden, and in my personal capacity and not my day job capacity, I think the first thing I should say is that on many of the things that Randy touched upon, Senator Biden would be in violent, violent agreement with

Senator McCain. In fact, many of the initiatives that Randy pointed to, they have partnered on a number of them. And speaking not as a Democrat or obviously a Republican but simply as an American, I think so many of us profoundly Senator McCain's leadership on so many of these issues, very tough leadership and difficult leadership, in the context of his own political situation, and looking at just the case of interrogations and the image that we present to the world, there is a lot to admire.

I do start from a different point and I think Senator Biden would start from a different point. The question I think he would ask is this, after the events of September 11, 2001, the American people gave this administration one mission above all others and that was to defeat al-Qaeda and to dissuade others from signing up to their cause. So I think the question we have to ask at the start is where are we in that effort now, and it really goes to the same question, Mike, that you asked with the famous Rumsfeld snowflakes as they used to be called, these memos that floated down and one of them failed to melt before it the ground and got out into the public.

I think the answer is a tough one. Look at the most recent National Intelligence Estimate, at least the public portion. It is called "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland." What did it find? It found that al-Qaeda is now better positioned to strike the West than it has been at any time since 9/11. It found that al-Qaeda has regenerated, to use the public words of the NIE, in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. And it remains determined to strike us here at home. To me, that

should put to rest the refrain that a lot of us are tired of hearing that we are fighting them over there so we don't have to fight them here. One does not follow from the other.

It also talked about Al-Qaeda in Iraq, not al-Qaeda, but Al-Qaeda in Iraq, an independent group that is now affiliated with mother ship al-Qaeda back in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To many of us, and I think to Senator Biden, Al-Qaeda in Iraq is what you might call a Bush fulfilling prophesy, it didn't exist before the war, it does exist now. Randy is right that we have to deal with it, but parenthetically, and I don't want to get sidetracked into a discussion of Iraq unless people want to, Senator Biden has said if you killed every single jihadist in Iraq tomorrow or eliminated them or they disappeared, you would still have, we would still have, a major sectarian civil war on our hands that needs a political solution and dealing with the al-Qaeda in Iraq, while it is necessary, is not an answer to the problem of Iraq and, frankly, it is not an answer to the problem of al-Qaeda.

Polling suggests that we are now more isolated in the world than at any time in recent history, and despite an op-ed I read I think yesterday or the day before by Karen Hughes, there are lots of other numbers out there to suggest that our position has not materially improved. One recent poll, just to cite in Pakistan, here are the approval ratings for three people, President Bush, 9 percent; President Musharraf, 38 percent; Osama bin Laden, 46 percent. Those are not good numbers. Finally, we continue to get failing grades on what we're doing in

terms of protecting the homeland here at home in terms of implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

So if you start and ask yourself where are we now in prosecuting the most important mission this administration was given after 9/11 to defeat al-Qaeda, defend the homeland, and dissuade others from joining the cause, I think the grade looks pretty bad.

The second I would ask is why that is so, and I think this is cause for some discussion and reflection. To me there are a number of reasons, Senator Biden has spoken about this on a number of occasions, and this is obviously a little bit simplistic, but some of the problems he would point to are these, one, we have conflated under one label the war on terrorism the very disparate challenges from very different groups with very different agendas. One of the results of this conflation has been that we have tended to respond to every challenge with the same limited set of tools, military preemption and regime change. These may be applicable in some places, they are not applicable in lots of places, but I think that has gotten us into trouble.

The administration also has somewhat simplistically believed that you can impose democracy by force from the outside, it has equated democracy with elections, and on both counts I think that has gotten us into trouble. There was a very powerful second Inaugural Address that President Bush gave, and if you read the speech putting aside partisanship just as an American, the rhetoric was very powerful, and it talked about advancing freedom in terms that I think a

lot of Americans can relate to. It speaks very much to our history, to our aspirations, and for that matter, to aspirations of people around the world. But this is far off course we have gotten. The day after that Inaugural Address, one of the leading German newspapers wrote this on its headline, "Bush Threatens More Freedom." So we have a problem.

Finally, this comes back to two sort of original sins. Again, after 9/11, I think when history really looks back on this administration, it will judge the administration not so much for the mistakes it has made because God knows we all make mistakes, we all would have made mistakes no matter who had been in charge, but in a sense for the opportunities it squandered. There was an extraordinary opportunity after 9/11 to bring this country together and to bring the world together in a common cause and for a little while I think the administration actually pursued the right path in the way it went about dealing with Afghanistan. But then we got radically, radically, radically off course principally with Iraq but in other ways, too, and this opportunity that was squandered I think is something that haunts us to this day.

Very briefly let me suggest, I will just list them, 10 things Senator Biden has suggested we need to do to get back on track, and I am happy to discuss them at greater length in the course of our conversation. First, end the war in Iraq responsibly. He has a plan to do it. I won't bore you with the details. You can also just read O'Hanlon and get some similar views. Finish the job in Afghanistan that we put to the side. Build a sustained relationship with Pakistan in a way that



we haven't done. Make it a presidential priority to secure loose weapons around the world, something that we also have not done over the last 6 years. As Randy suggested, build effective alliances in international organizations and new structures. These are not points of weakness, these are points of strength. The idea that we should be going after a network of extremists who increasingly have an opportunity to get their hands on lethal weapons without building a network of our own I think is very much mistaken. That is exactly what we need to do. Taking on radical fundamentalists alone, taking them on without the rest of the world, is not only not necessary, it won't work.

We need to advance freedom as the President suggests, but not the way he has gone about doing it. We need to do it by building up democratic institutions, not simply holding elections, and we need to be doing much more to bolster moderates around the world. Two of the most recent examples where we failed in that task were opportunities we may have had in the Palestinian Authority and in Lebanon. I hope we get those chances again. We may not.

As Randy suggested, and I am very much in agreement with him, and more importantly, my boss is in agree with his boss, the war of ideas is central to this effort. The idea that we are on the losing side of a PR campaign with a mass murderer is astounding. We need to regain the power of our ideals. One of the ways to do that as Senator Biden has suggested is to shut down Guantanamo, shut down Abu Ghraib, make it very clear immediately that we won't torture people and we will not send people to countries that torture people.

We have had a lot of talk about an Axis of Evil; we also need to be concerned about an Axis of Oil. Many of the candidates running for president have put out plans to try and limit our dependence on foreign sources of oil. I won't go into the details; Senator Biden has a detailed one and others to as well.

The ninth point in our ten-point plan--since you always need ten points--make sure that our last line of defense is also our best line of defense. Here we need to do much more to implement some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that have not been implemented. In particular, failures to adequately screen cargo coming into this country, the inability of first responders to talk to one another, a very unfortunate decision to cut a huge amount of federal funding for local law enforcement, all of these things need to be looked at and reversed.

Finally, you've got to pay for all of this. How would we do it? I can tell you how we would start. One, the tax cut that the administration gave to people making over a million dollars a year totals about \$80 billion a year. Take a piece of that. Put it in a trust fund for homeland security. We did that with cops in the 1990s, we can do it on homeland security now. You would pay for all of the 9/11 Commission recommendations in 5 years. We would spend less money on missile defense although it's not actually a huge amount, but you could save a few billion there. And finally, if we figure out a way to end the war in Iraq responsibly, we are spending about \$10 billion a month on Iraq now, \$120 billion a year, at least a piece of that could go into some of these other efforts, although

to be very, very clear and very frank, a lot of it would, one, still have to go into sustaining some presence in Iraq or in the region, and frankly, to rebuilding a lot of the military assets that we squandered over the last few years. Let me end with that.

MR. O'HANLON: We have been told that Congressman Hoekstra is on the way. I am not going to play Joe Torre and ask for a pinch hitter. We actually have a couple of very distinguished members of the Romney campaign here including his former lieutenant governor, but rather than ambush her with a request, I will invite her as all of you to make comments or questions from the audience and will keep waiting for Congressman Hoekstra and when he arrives we will give him a chance to speak. With that I would like to turn it over to all of you if you're ready. I've got a couple of questions I could pose, but in the interests of getting you involved, let me open the floor and please wait for a microphone which will probably be my microphone, so you may have to wait just a quick second, but identify yourself if you wouldn't mind, and feel free to pose the question generally or to one of these two gentlemen in particular if you wish. Yes, here in the front row.

MR. MILLER: My name is Alistair Miller and I am the Director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and I also teach at Hopkins. Both of you mentioned there's a need for a multifaceted approach, that emphasis on the military isn't going to do it, that you need to involve economic and development and other things. I just wondered what your bosses would do in

order to take what has been called a whole of government approach to this problem, how they would try to address a better spread of resources to other things than what has been the focus through the military.

And also you both mentioned multilateral institutions. How would you engage with them, the U.N. and regional and functional organizations, to prosecute this long war?

MR. SCHEUNEMANN: Thanks. I'm happy to start on that one. On the issue of intergovernmental coordination, Senator McCain has called for a civilian/military equivalent to what we passed for the military in the 1980s, the Goldwater-Nichols Reform which was really fundamental in spurring the concept of joint operations rather than stovepiped uniform services and has had, as Mike and others who are far more expert than I am, a very significant impact on how the military is able to operate, but Senator McCain has said we need to expand that to the civilian agencies.

Right now we've got in Afghanistan or in Iraq only a couple entities of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the State Department, and some USAID, and that's it. There needs to be the Commerce Department, the Education Department, the Agriculture Department, the whole depth and breadth of the U.S. government needs to be engaged in this long war, and not in just Iraq and Afghanistan, but in places where we are fighting al-Qaeda sympathizers or related terrorists whether it's in Morocco or whether it's in the Philippines or anywhere in between.

On the multilateral institutions briefly, Senator McCain has long argued for a greater role with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has argued that we should have had a NATO role earlier than we did in Afghanistan, but also has been very critical of NATO for its shortcomings and its continued national caveats for example in deployment of some of its forces in Afghanistan. He has also proposed the creation of a new entity called the League of Democracies to get around what is really the central flaw of the United Nations and that is as long as we decide the only place international moral and legal authority comes from is the United Nations Security Council, you give a de facto and a de jure veto to autocracies in Russia, and in China, and so it is no coincidence that the United Nations is not able to act effectively in North Korea or in Darfur or in Iran because Moscow and Beijing are shielding each of those states. The League of Democracies would get together on a basis of common moral values, a moral basis, and it would give countries that don't have a role in the Security Council like Japan, like India, like Brazil, a place to have a voice.

MR. BLINKEN: I know the Congressman is here. I'm happy to answer quickly.

MR. O'HANLON: Go ahead and answer why don't you, and then we'll welcome the Congressman and give him a chance to make his remarks.

MR. BLINKEN: Very quickly, taking the second piece first, on international organizations, Senator Biden has made it clear that in the ideal world he would want to work through and build up international organizations including

the United Nations, but there has to be a new bargain and the new bargain is this. If the United States is asked as it should be to play by the rules, we have a right to insist that the rules actually be enforced including by the Security Council. If that understanding had been in place before the war in Iraq, we might have avoided the war. And in the Balkans in the 1990s, we tried for example in Kosovo as we should have to go through the Security Council and that became bogged down, and in very much the way Randy described we went around it, not something we would want to do or like to do, but it is something we would go if necessary. But our first effort would be to try and do things with others and not alone because we are better off that way.

Second, just one quick example in terms of our internal structuring, one of the things that Senator Biden has taken the lead on with Senator Lugar of Indiana is trying to build up a postconflict reconstruction and development capacity at the State Department, and this is something that Carlos Pascual has worked very hard on and was in fact the first director of the office. The idea is to create, and again there is an overlap with what Randy said, much greater capacity outside of the Department of Defense to do the kinds of things we've been called on to do since the Cold War on average once every 18 months and for a duration of 5 to 8 years, and that is the dirty words national building. We are going to be doing it. We have been doing it and we're going to keep doing it whether we like it not. We ought to have the capacity to do it, and one of the things we need and what this legislation has tried to put in place is a standing roster of experts on the

civilian side, on the judicial side, on the police side, on the engineering side, so that when we go into a situation like in Iraq we can get in very quickly and not just with the military, but with people who can hopefully help that society and prevent it from falling apart and creating a vacuum that is filled by very negative forces.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Congressman, welcome. We are just at the beginning of the Q and A so your timing is very good. We are delighted to have Congressman Hoekstra here representing the Romney campaign. Both Randy Scheunemann and Tony Blinken have given their introductory remarks representing Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and we are delighted to listen to you speaking on behalf of Governor Romney. Thanks for being here.

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: Thank you. It's good to be here. It's a little bit of an awkward position being in Congress and speaking for someone else especially when I'm as fully invested in the struggle with radical jihadism and those types of things as I am with my role on the Intelligence Committee. I just got back from Afghanistan and Iraq on Monday and so as I go through this, I will try to keep my perspective out of this and try to more accurately reflect exactly where the Governor is.

We see we have a very similar perspective on a number of these things and obviously that's one of the reasons why I'm on his team. But it doesn't necessarily mean that I have fully studied every position or statement that he has

taken on this, and so somewhere through this if you hear something you really like, I may take credit for it and say that's really my idea and it's not his. But let me just share a couple of thoughts and perspectives with you and then join in the discussion.

I also haven't studied Senator Biden's or Senator McCain's campaign statements because right now I'm not in a campaign mode. Right now we are working on trying to get solutions to get us through the struggles that we've got in Afghanistan and Iraq and other places in the world and that is the most important thing that I do each and every day rather than try to find fault or find differences with the other candidates who are out there.

The first point is obviously the big point of the discussion in Washington today and in the presidential debate is your position on Iraq. The thing that the Governor and I very much share in common is that we don't view Iraq in isolation and it's one of the things that perhaps was a really missed opportunity last week when the President talked, here we are in a situation where we have had General Petraeus's report, we've had the report by Ambassador Crocker, the President gets an opportunity for addressing the country on Thursday night. We are at a point where we have just taken down two suspected plots at some point near fruition, one in Germany, one in Denmark, we have just had two additional tapes come out from bin Laden, and the focus of the whole week is Iraq rather than the larger context of this threat that we face from radical jihadism, that we can't focus on Iraq as the sole front, it is a part and al-Qaeda has made it a part



of the struggle, their struggle against the West and our struggle against them. So the Governor believes that we need to be successful not only in Iraq, Afghanistan, but we need to have the capabilities to confront radical jihadists wherever they believe the fronts may evolve to.

To do that the Governor has proposed a number of things that it might be wise for Congress and others to consider, the first of which is an expansion in the military, increasing the budget, right now it's about 3.8 percent of GDP, and recommending increasing it to 4 percent, and increasing the number of troops by an additional 100,000. One of the things that I found very interesting in this trip in this past week was, it was my ninth trip to Iraq, fourth trip to Afghanistan. There is no doubt that the commitment that we have asked of our troops has been significant. We've got folks that are there in their second or their third tours. We have stretched our military. It is time that if we are going to seriously confront this threat for the long term, we are going to have to expand our military and make the investments because we believe that this is a long-term threat.

The Governor is also believing that we need to address some of the issues that some say lead to and have maybe led to the conflict, but the whole issue of energy independence, putting in place a Manhattan Project, putting in place a real focus on energy, that we are never in the position where for such a valuable commodity to our economy that we are dependent on the whims of folks in Venezuela, Nigeria, or in this case the Middle East, but that we put in place a

national project, it's a national security issue, it's an economic security issue, that we develop energy independence.

This is kind of interesting, I think a number of the campaigns are talking about how do we go into these countries and address the issue of nation building whether it's the kinds of proposals that you've talked about and that I have heard as the question here, the Governor's Special Partnership Force, in many ways the same kind of attributes, but identifying the people and the resources that the U.S. can provide whether it's Special Operations Forces, military forces, working with civilian agencies. But I think the key ingredient that I didn't hear necessarily identified was that the plan and the vision that the Governor has is that he recognizes that to get the kind of results in these questions where you're "national building," the key ingredient is local participation, that you need to shape U.S. involvement to reflect the culture, the society, the capabilities, and the history of the countries that we are trying to help. Being in Afghanistan, being in Iraq, and seeing where we are clearly indicates the weaknesses that we've had in nation building, but I think it also demonstrates the failure of the strategy that says we're going to put a strong U.S. footprint on what the final outcome is going to be. If we're going to be successful in nation building, we need to recognize, we're seeing this in Iraq now, the significant turnaround in the Sunni provinces from a military standpoint, and there is an argument was it the surge and those kinds of things. I met with some of the Sunni tribal leaders last fall before the surge began and before we had had the engagement with the Sunni

tribal leaders. The key ingredient was that the Sunni tribal leaders made the decision to flip from partnering with al-Qaeda to partnering with coalition. Then the U.S. military could come in and provide them with the assistance so that the tribal leaders working from the bottom up could provide the solutions that they need. That is I think what we also view on economic development and reconstruction, that we need to provide a significant amount of leeway in responsibility to what the locals want to accomplish.

And I will just touch one more point. We need to strengthen the partnerships and alliances. In a successful strategy facing the threat from radical jihadism, the model is relatively clear, Special Forces, Special Operations, reconstruction, some military but a limited military footprint, intelligence, logistics, partnering with local governments, to drive an effective strategy which means that you partner with the countries where you want to go in and be effective. I thought you said it very, very well, if we're going to join these relationships, the relationships have to be accountable and they have to be effective. In Afghanistan, going after radical jihadists, NATO, it's a great talking point that we've got a coalition in Afghanistan, it's not an effective strategy if the coalition is one that ties your hands because everybody that has troops in the country has a vote on just about every tactical decision and a veto, it's not a vote, it's a veto, so you need to develop the organizations and the bilateral relationships but you need to make sure that you do them effectively because with the kinds of threats that we face today, you can't face those threats by committee.

So that's a summation of kind of where the Governor is, a few Hoekstra thoughts thrown in between, you can sort out where and when each one of those might occur. The stuff that you like, those are the Governor's ideas, the things that you've got concerns about, those are my ideas. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Unless you're from Michigan.

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: Unless you're from Michigan.

MR. O'HANLON: In which case you can reverse.

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: Unless you're from the 2nd Congressional District of Michigan. That's right.

MR. O'HANLON: Fair enough. That you very much, Congressman. We would like to resume the discussion. We've got three excellent perspectives on the table and we would like to hear more from you.

MS. WILSON: Thank you all for participating today. I am Laura Wilson with the Center for U.S. Global Engagement. The three of you have touched on to some degree the necessity to address the civilian and military nexus and the appropriate way that these should play out in the field and perhaps a bit in Washington as well. I'm not sure if you caught the "Vanity Fair" article on September 10 that talks about this quite a bit in the trans-Sahara area where the military is playing some role in providing humanitarian services to win the hearts and minds, and the development from the U.S. government think maybe that should be something they're doing.

Tony, you particularly mentioned that Conflict, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Office that's been ongoing for about 3 years now is an attempt at least trying to answer this question, but what we have seen is it hasn't been funded by Congress essentially in 3 years. So what I would like to know is what are your candidates' positions in really investing political capital and trying to address this with real answers that will help the Department of Defense and the Department of State and USAID to work collaboratively and cooperatively in the field to address these areas that really need attention and need a joint approach, not just one approach or the other? Thanks.

MR. BLINKEN: Very quickly, I think what you've already heard today from the three of us I think it's fair to say, I don't want to speak for the other candidates, but I suspect there will be a commitment by all three represented up here to do just what you're talking about, and the next president will have a tremendous opportunity to try and do that because of the frustrations that have built up with Iraq and the way we've been conducting the larger struggle against radical fundamentalists. So I think there's an opening, an opportunity, and I know speaking for Senator Biden that this is a commitment, it would be a priority, but I have to tell you what I heard from the Congressman and from Randy suggests that it would be the same thing with Governor Romney or with Senator McCain.

MR. SCHEUNEMANN: I agree with that. I think that there is a huge bipartisan consensus that we need to do nation building better. It was an unfortunate example of criticizing nation building in 1999 that some of then

Governor Bush's senior folks criticized and Senator McCain was rather lonely in calling for increased intervention and "nation building" in Kosovo, for example. But these are the kinds of conflicts we're going to face, whether it's best to enhance an office in the State Department or whether it's best to go back to how AID used to work when if you look at what AID did for example in Vietnam, the number of personnel it had and the way they got out in the country, the way they were integral in the CORDS (?) program and other programs, certainly suggests some when you're in an act of counterinsurgency model, it's probably different in a place where it's small terrorist cells you're facing in North Africa for example rather than a whole-scale national reconstruction, but I think that is the dialogue that the next president, and certainly if Senator McCain is president, will have with the new Congress in getting the right kind of structure in place and getting the right kind of resources to make sure the structure has the ability to do the job.

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: This is one of the things that Governor Romney has excelled in in his professional career, getting the right resources and providing the leadership to get the resources aligned against the problem. It's a very sad example, and I'm not making any excuses for what happened this weekend for Blackwater, but we are in much of Iraq today, we're evolving from a war situation to the nation building, but what you have with the Blackwater situation is you've got SEALs, Delta Force, Rangers, soldiers, and we train soldiers to do certain things and soldiers make lousy policemen. When the Bradley or the armored-up Humvee goes down the street in Baghdad or Kabul, it

doesn't say to serve and protect. It sends a very, very different message when you're riding down the roads in Iraq and you're in one of these convoys and they take defensive driving tactics and they're driving people off of the road as you're going by. That's what they do, and that doesn't work very well for nation building.

On the flip side, policemen make lousy soldiers. So this is, and I think all three of us have said it, very much about when you're fighting a war, have the military do it, when you are doing reconstruction and you're doing the nation building, get people who have been specifically trained to perform that task and don't have people who have spent their whole careers being trained to do something else and say we've trained you to fight a way but by the way now, we want you building schools and doing these things and embracing the populace and all those types of things. It's inconsistent. Don't ask a marketing guy to do finance. We just don't do it. Don't ask a marketing guy to engineer your next car. It won't run. It may look nice, but it won't run, and those are some of the kinds of problems that I think we're seeing today and with some of the proposals that Governor Romney has made, that's exactly what he wants to address.

MR. O'HANLON: We've got about 10 more minutes for this panel. I'm going to take two questions at a time and try to do two rounds. So let's do the two gentlemen here in the center, please.

QUESTION: I'm Charles -- and I'm a local economic consultant. As a layman while I have about 10 pages of issues, let me boil it down to a couple

sentences. One is what I heard today sounds suspiciously to me like expanding the scope of the mission to not only include military and political nation building, but the missionary, religious portion of the mission in order to curb the jihadists of the Islamic faith. That seems to me to be an internal issue. What I would like to know is why we don't refer more to the old containment policy which seemed to me to be very successful without being as intrusive as I think some of proposals we're hearing today.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. We'll take one more in the back before we go back to the panelists. Yes, sir.

MR. STEVENSON: Thank you. My name is James Stevenson. I was the USAID Mission Director in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, also a senior adviser at SCRS. The question I have, everybody seems to understand that the long war is a counterinsurgency war and 80 percent of counterinsurgency is nonkinetic and it's carried out by civilians. All of you gentlemen seem to agree with that. But the hard fact is that USAID's budget is being cut by 27 percent next year; its operating budget has been cut by 15 percent, and SCRS has never received the funding that it wants. I trained the military that's deploying to Iraq. Counterinsurgency primarily except for the Special Forces is done by civil affairs people who are reservists. In the abstract, everybody seems to understand this, but in reality the tools simply aren't out there and I wonder to what extent all of you realize that really what is needed aside from a civilian Goldwater-Nichols is probably a new National Security Act and a new Foreign Assistance Act that is



going to pull all this together for us to be able to have the tools to do what needs to be done. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Congressman, do you want to start this time?

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: Sure. I think the first question about the intrusiveness, I think the plan that I see the Governor advocating for is a lot less intrusiveness than where we are today and that is through the bilateral relationships and partnering and coordinating with the host countries in a role that is consistent with what they want to achieve and consistent with the capabilities and the activities and the support services that we can provide. I see it as a long time before we ever get into regime change. It is about containment, it's about working with the governments that are in place, and I don't see us going out and being much more intrusive.

Referencing the second question, with the plans that the Governor has identified, I think it does talk about reforming the agencies so that we actually do put in place the capabilities and the resources to be effective at those kinds of efforts that you've identified. So I think actually the two questions go side by side. I don't see the Governor pushing an intrusive strategy, and I seem pushing a strategy that is very much of an assistance strategy to the governments in coordination and cooperation identifying what is the most effective strategy to get a positive end result in the country that we are working with.

MR. BLINKEN: I think actually Senator Biden would give a very similar answer to both questions. It's not about being intrusive where we don't

have to be. To take just the example of, as I suggested at the outset in my opening remarks, regime change, we need to focus much more on what we can do to effect conduct change, not regime change. Think about the logic of what we've said in effect to certain countries starting with Iran. First we say we want you to give up your nuclear program and don't build nuclear weapons, and then in the next breath we say and by the way, if you do that, we still want to take you down. There's not a lot of logic there, and if I were on the receiving end of that message I don't think I would respond in the way we'd hope they'd respond. So we need to be looking at how we can effect conduct change, not regime change, working with other countries who have the kind of powers of persuasion in some cases and powers of influence that we lack.

In the case of Iraq where we have been very intrusive, I think the Congressman put it very well. We need to be looking at how we can build up local capacity to eventually hand off the problem, but let me just pause very briefly on this. Everyone in Washington now seems to agree that when it comes to Iraq, we can't do it by military means alone, we need a political settlement, a political solution. Yet the political strategy that the administration has been pursuing and, for that matter, others not in the administration have been pursuing, I think is fundamentally and fatally flawed. The strategy is this. If we just give the central government in Baghdad enough time to get its act together with the surge and with our military presence, it will come together and it will secure the support and trust of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. That is not happening and it

won't happen. There is no trust within the central government, there is no trust of the government by the people it purports to serve, there is no capacity on the part of the government to deliver security and services, and there is very little prospect that it's going to build that kind of trust or capacity anytime in our timeline that we still have left in Iraq.

So what do we need to do? What's one of the possible outcomes? It goes along the lines of what the Congressman was talking about and what Senator Biden has been talking about for more than a year, that is to try to build up local capacity, devolve power in Iraq to the regions so that people have control over the fabric of their daily lives, over the police, over jobs, over education. It's one thing that is actually working in Anbar right now. It might be able to work more broadly if this became our political strategy. And that is not intrusive, but it is helping people build that kind of capacity at the local level.

Finally, on the second question, again I think we are in very much the same place and a new president, certainly Senator Biden, and I believe both the other candidates represented here would look very hard very quickly at whether we have the right allocation of resources and in particular whether we are doing the right thing with our assistance budgets, but we have to look very hard at what's been done with the Millennium Challenge Account, how that fits into AID or doesn't fit in, and how we rationalize this. I have to give the administration credit for two things very quickly. One is I think the concept of the Millennium Challenge was a good one which is accountability. If you want American

taxpayers to be spending a lot of money abroad, we ought to make sure that our money to the extent possible is being well spent. So the accountability piece is something that has a lot of support, but not if it becomes a zero-sum gain and we are taking from one account to pay for another. The second thing is I think the administration has been right to try and start to rationalize foreign assistance by looking at the different parts of government that are doing it and asking a simple question as they used to say about the Reagan administration, does the right hand know what the extreme right hand is doing? There's an effort to rationalize, and I think that the next president and the next congress has to go a lot further in that direction.

MR. SCHEUNEMANN: On the missionary comment, I don't think anything that Senator McCain has said or certainly that I said should be meant to imply we're on a crusade to convert Moslems. I said explicitly that this is a struggle within Islam between the small minority of radical extremists and the large majority and we need to empower the large majority. With containment, I don't know what you're going to contain, a billion or more Muslims? How are you going to contain a billion Muslims? You can talk about containment as a strategy for debate with a country like Iran, but not it seems to me with Islamic extremism that has global reach, that has attacked us and our allies in Europe, and will do so again if they have the ability.

On intrusiveness in Iran, let me disagree a little bit with Tony because we've probably agreed too much for a Democrat and a Republican, and

let me cite Ronald Reagan in a slightly different way than Tony did. In our policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s we did both. Ronald Reagan said it was an evil empire and we should leave it on the ash heap of history, and we also engaged in useful discussions about conduct. I think we should never depart from the fact that the vast majority of the Iranian people do not like the regime they live under, that is why there is a brutal crackdown going on against labor, universities and others, and that we should side ourselves with the majority of the Iranian people who want to see a different regime than the mullahs who are leading to them to ruin through their nuclear ambitions and their repressive policies.

On the question of what to do with AID, part of the problem and part of the reason we've used the military so much is it becomes the default option because they are the only ones who are on the ground that have the logistics, that have the personnel, who are able to do things. You can go back to Bosnia after the Dayton agreement, Karl Bild showed up from the E.U. with a couple suitcases of money and no people and the military was there and they were the only ones who were all over the country. So of course when you start talking about manning roadblocks or digging wells or reconstructing schools, they are the one with the boots on the ground, if you will. I think we do need to change that and I think we've agreed.

And finally on Iraq, let me just say it defies logic it seems to me to say that somehow we will have more leverage with the Iraqi government and

other factions in Iraq, that somehow the Shia will be more inclined to compromise with the Sunnis, for example, if we tell them we're leaving. It defies logic.

MR. O'HANLON: In the interests of keeping to our schedule, let me just take one last question and give a final round for each. Sir, in the back, please.

MR. WEBBER: Steve Webber at the Program on International Policy Attitudes. There has been a great deal of polling in the Islamic world in the last 5 or 6 years by Pew, World Public Opinion, BBC, suggesting that we are really losing the ideological war in the Islamic world. We also see that most of the public in the Islamic world oppose attacks in Americans and at the same time, many approve of attacks on American troops in Iraq. So is our policy defeating our public diplomacy? And is the solution to winning this long war increasingly our troops?

MR. O'HANLON: Randy, do you want to start this time?

MR. SCHEUNEMANN: As I said, part of what we need to do in increasing our hard and soft power to fight and prosecute and eventually prevail in this long war is to increase significantly the size of our armed forces because as Congressman Hoekstra said, third and fourth tours, National Guard and Reservists activated, is unacceptable and not the way to do it, it's unfair to the military and their families, but that is only part of the solution.

In terms of public diplomacy, I also addressed that with the need to bring back a dedicated agency as Senator McCain has called for to do our public

diplomacy that in a country like Egypt that isn't worried about the Mubarak regime day to day and what they're thinking and what they're going to do at the next Arab League summit but is thinking about how to communicate directly with the Egyptian people. I am not familiar with the poll you cited, but if your poll is right that they oppose attacks on Americans, we need to get that message out and we need to get that message out within Egyptian society and isolate the extremists who do believe that attacking the World Trade Center is okay even if more maybe believe attacking American troops in Iraq is okay.

Finally, I think we need to be candid about addressing the hypocrisy in a lot of the positions of the Arab countries. The Arab countries did very little to help the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein. They did very little. They were silent when the Kurds were slaughtered, they were silent when the marsh Arabs were slaughtered, they were silent when the Shia were slaughtered, so there is a more than a little bit of hypocrisy in inter-Arab politics, that is, Sunni politics, going on when you hear some of their statements about Iraq. They have also been noticeably reluctant to devote some of their ample financial resources because of our dependence on Middle Eastern oil to provide for the reconstruction of Iraq, and I hope that changes.

MR. BLINKEN: I think Senator Biden would say you have to do both, this is actually not a zero-sum gain. He has worked with and supported Senator McCain's efforts to increase the end strength of our military for reasons that all of us have cited. We have an overstretched military. If we sustain the

commitment we're making now in Iraq for another 6, 9, to 12 months, that strain will get even more severe and I think unsustainable, so we have to do that.

But the premise of your question I think is exactly right. This is not something that we can solve purely by military means, in fact, even primarily by military means. A friend of mine sent me some photographs the other day from Beirut and they were banners that are hung on lampposts in the streets with large numbers, 5, 27, 36, and then a picture of a bridge or a picture of a house or a picture of a road, and these were the numbers of bridges, houses, and roads brought to you by Hizballah that had been rebuilt since the war a summer ago. We are not in that game and we have to get in that game. We had opportunities. It is hard to say now, it is hard to prove it in the present, but we had opportunities as you suggested earlier with Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority, and with Lebanon to try and build up moderates with whom we can and should work at a time when it could have made a difference. When Abu Mazen was first elected, Senator Biden went to him and said give me a list of 10 projects that Congress can fund right away that you can put your name on to build up a constituency for you so that you show people you can deliver real results and real change in their lives. It took a year to get the list, and then when we went to the administration and said we've got to give money directly to Abu Mazen, not through NGOs, he has to get the credit, it got bogged down in Congress, and it didn't happen. Similarly in Lebanon there was an opportunity not just to get the Syrians out, but to try and build up the Lebanese government, build up its military so it could become a



counterweight. We didn't do it, we haven't done it, it was an opportunity that was missed. Would it have worked? I don't know. I do know we didn't try.

CONGRESSMAN HOEKSTRA: I think we have covered the three points, but just to give Governor Romney's name out there one more time, let me just share a couple of thoughts with you. I think we are all in agreement that you need a stronger military, but then I think you can take a look at what Hizballah, and I think it's a great example, what they did in Lebanon. I was Lebanon within the last year and a half and that's exactly what you hear. Lebanon has done all kinds of reconstruction projects and we're still talking about it, and these are going in to meet the basic needs, so what Governor Romney has talked about is basic fundamental restructuring of how we deliver those kinds of capabilities so that we can act with the kind of speed and the kind of agility on a global basis that our opponents do. Then the third component of this is if you help people or if you do something, it actually would make sense if you would tell others in the country or others in the region about what you've actually done.

My background is marketing and if you go and let's say we get this reconstruction done and you don't tell anybody about it, it doesn't make any difference. You can't rely on the people in the region just to communicate it among themselves, you actually have to go out and you have to go out and take credit for it. Who has a great communications network? Al-Qaeda. Take a look at what they do on the Net, their web pages and that. They communicate in real time, they communicate in lots of languages, and they've got their message down

and they're spreading it. I believe that within a day of the collapse of the Iraqi government, Iran had two stations being beamed into Iraq with quality television programming and they had been planning that 8 to 9 months ahead of time, that's what they figured it took to get it ready. We still really don't have an effective communications program in Iraq. Bin Laden's tape comes out last week, I guess the first one came out about 10 days ago, and there has been no U.S. response. So in this case again you can take a look at what your enemies are doing. They've got a good communications and marketing effort about what their message is; we come up short. They are agile in terms of economic development assistance, we come up short. And the place that we will be the best is with our military which in this equation and with the threat that we are facing may be the last valuable of the components that we will have in place. And so that's why the Governor is talking about rebuilding the military, but what he is talking about is significantly restructuring the aid delivery system and putting in place a communications and marketing effort so you move forward with all three efforts.

MR. O'HANLON: Before we take a quick 5-minute break, please join me in thanking the panelists.

(Recess)

MR. O'HANLON: -- promise to be done by 2:30, and I appreciate your flexibility on the time. We are delighted now to have Panel 2, which is made up of Brookings experts, all of whom have been actively engaged in the broad

question of the long war on terror, again, define as you wish, define in different ways, all of whom have been doing numerous writings, which you can find at Opportunity08.org or Brookings.edu, and all of whom I'm honored to be with at Brookings.

We are going to proceed in the following order; Phil Gordon over here, who has recently published a very, very good book on this subject, *Winning the Right War*. And I encourage you to not only listen to him attentively, but buy the book, please, and you will not be disappointed.

I should say Phil has had a broad portfolio and takes a broad perspective in this book. As many of you know, he was the Founding Director of the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings.

Now he is focusing on not only that region, but the broader Middle East, which he's always worked on through European auspices and other approaches and interests. And he's been a long standing observer of Turkey, recently traveled to Pakistan, so a lot of background and expertise with Phil.

Peter Rodman was at the Pentagon with a comparably broad portfolio, International Security Affairs during much of the Bush Administration. After Peter, Tammy Wittes will speak. She is working on a project on Arab political reform and has also done a paper for Opportunity 08 with Martin Indyk on the broader Middle East region, just as Peter Rodman has, as well.

And finally, Hady Amr is our Director of the Brookings Doha Office, which, as some of you may realize, is one of the three main overseas offices

that Brookings has now or overseas interest of this type, and is essentially running our annual forum every February on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, a forum that produces a lot of material for the web site and is one of the best conferences, frankly, in the world today.

So we're delighted to have each of them speaking. We'll look forward to your questions afterwards, and we'll start with Phil.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, Mike. This is obviously a well timed panel. We've just gone through the sixth anniversary of 9/11 and I think that affords us a good opportunity to look back and ask ourselves how we're doing, is the approach we're taking successful, is it working, and I think that the broad judgment on that issue is that it's not working nearly as well as it ought to be or that we need it to be. There hasn't been a terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11, which is obviously a major accomplishment and good news. But more broadly, there have been more than twice as many major terrorist attacks around the world in the six years since 9/11 than in the six years prior to that. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, are still at large; al Qaeda is reorganizing itself on the Afghan/Pakistan border.

As some of the previous panelists discussed, the U.S. standing in the world is perhaps at an all time low with all of the opinion polling in the Middle East and the Muslim world, indicating that.

I think it's fair to -- we're bogged down in Iraq with no solution in sight, which has become a haven and possibly a producer of terrorists rather than

reducing the number. I think when you look at that balance sheet over six years, you have to conclude that we are not in this war on terror where we would like to be six years after it was launched.

Now, if that's right, the obvious question to ask is why. What are we doing that isn't working? What might we do differently? And there are various perspectives on that issue, and no doubt, you will hear some on this panel, as we heard some on the previous one.

Some argue that it's just a matter of time, that we've adopted the right approach, but this is a challenging problem, and it's not fair to judge a grand strategy for transforming the Middle East and making America safe after six years, and we need to give it more time. Fair enough, and that can be argued, although, as I've said, I think it's -- enough evidence is in that we're not on the right track.

An alternative explanation for why things aren't working as well as we might like is that -- is similar to the first, but it says we need to be much more vigorous about it. We're broadly on the right track in confronting our enemies, going on the offensive against them, and transforming the Middle East, but we need to be much more energetic.

Newt Gingrich says that this is like World War III and we need to fight it with more energy and intensity and resources. So that's another hypothesis, that we just need to up the efforts a little bit.

I'm not convinced of that either. I think -- Mike has called this panel, and a lot of others have called it the long war on terrorism, I think we've been

fighting the wrong war on terrorism, and that it's not just a question of giving it more time or putting more resources on it, but actually rethinking the basic way that we're going out it, and let me tell you what I mean.

I mentioned the Gingrich argument, that we need to fight it much more vigorously, and this is like World War III; that's an analogy that's out there, somehow this is a world war. Norman Podhoretz has a brand new book, a brand new best selling book, called *World War IV*, again emphasizing this notion that we're in a colossal global struggle that needs to be fought in a similar way to World War II. I think that's the wrong, and in fact, even a dangerous analogy.

If you buy into the World War II analogy, if you believe this threat is so great that we need to do something similar, then you have to accept, I think, the consequences of that in terms of -- in all sorts of terms.

In World War II, we operated a draft, we had 16 million soldiers in arms, and we spent 40 percent of GDP on defense. If that's what this is similar to, then someone should propose that and defend the notion that this threat as we see it is worth such a commitment and that that's the right way to approach it.

I think that a different argument should be made, in fact, a different analogy should be used. If we're going to use any analogy for this war, and all analogies are obviously imperfect, I think we're on better grounds in thinking of it like the Cold War, rather than like World War II, or like Korea or the Vietnam war, any of the others that have been put on the table in recent months, including by President Bush.

And the reason I say the Cold War is a relevant analogy for what we're fighting, it has to do with the very basic idea that the Cold War wasn't primarily a war at all, or it certainly wasn't a traditional war. It was a long term ideological war and battle of ideas in which we had to stave off the adversary, outlast it, and ultimately convince people who were on the fence in this ideological struggle or who risked being on the other side that our society and approach was more appealing than the other side.

And ultimately we did that, it took a long time, it was costly, it wasn't pretty, sometimes it did involve real wars, but ultimately we won it successfully. And I think that we would do ourselves a great favor if you ditched by raising this notion of what we should call this.

I don't really care what we call it. I think people now refer to it as the war on terror and it's going to be hard to get away from that. But I think we'd be better off if we ditched that way of thinking about it, that it's somehow a more -- a traditional type of war that we can win with military means and recognize that it's mostly an ideological struggle.

Now, if I'm right about that, and I promise to be brief and set a model for the others so that we have time, so that Peter has the time to disagree with me. What would you if you accepted that this is a long term battle of ideas and ideological struggle? And I'll just tick off a couple of themes that we can address in the discussion, and some of them have come up already. But the first thing you do, obviously, is, you defend yourself and you contain the threat. Containment was

mentioned in the previous panel. I think there's something to it. The context is obviously different. But to say that you have to defend yourself and then defeat the threat ideologically doesn't mean you do nothing. There's a lot we can do with the intelligence and judicial means and police means and sometimes military means to protect ourselves in the face of this threat.

And the other relevant thing about containment, remember, the parallel with containment in the Cold War is, we didn't adopt it then because it was a perfect, wonderful strategy. It had all sorts of flaws. We had to live with the threat, it was risky, and it involved some moral compromises that we never liked.

We adopted it because it was just better than the alternatives. And that's what I'm suggesting now is, there's a very serious threat out there, but to think that we can somehow use our military forces to transform the Middle East and end the threat that way, I think we actually run the risk of making the threat greater than it already is.

Second, I think if you thought about the war on terror in this way, you would pay great attention to your own values and the appeal of your society. And I think that the representatives of the McCain and the Biden campaigns emphasized that in the first panel, that even as you're defending yourself, you need to establish your moral authority and earn the respect, again, of those people who may be on the fence in deciding which side of this they're on. And examples were given. Guantanamo I think is a sore that costs us more than we get out of it by holding these last few hundred detainees indefinitely. The whole torture debate, and



you know, examples like the President's signing statement after the McCain amendment that basically said even though it's now the law of the land and the view of the Congress that we don't torture, we want to hold that open -- option open anyway.

I think the price we pay for things like that is far greater than whatever benefit we get from such measures. I think you would focus on allies and alliances if you were thinking about a long term ideological struggle, recognizing that you need the help and cooperation of others around the world.

And in that category, too, I fear, in the last six years, we have not done very well. The opinion polls were cited and all the anecdotal evidence adds up to show that we're not as respected as we should be in the world.

And this isn't just a matter of being liked; it has real practical consequences, especially in a world of democracy, where public opinion actually matters. If we want parliaments in friendly countries and leaders in friendly countries to do things we want, whether it's sending troops to Afghanistan or contributing other ways, it matters what people think of us, and we need to build those alliances. And then finally, if we thought about it in these terms, we would do everything we could to avoid driving the enemy together and seeing it as a monolith and everything we could to divide that enemy, again, drawing lessons from the Cold War, rather than seeing our adversary as one big colossal block that we had to fight all at once, we would recognize that there are great divisions among different adversaries that we might have, and our greatest mistake of all right now would be to

allow them, and particularly al Qaeda, whose goal I think this is, our greatest mistake would be to allow them to turn this into a clash of civilizations, somehow with Muslims feeling obliged to side with the other side because they don't feel embraced or welcomed by our side.

I think that type of framework for thinking about this issue would help us as we move forward in what will inevitably be, as this session is entitled, a long war. Thank you.

MR. RODMAN: Thank you. Sometimes I feel I'm not earning my keep at Brookings if I agree with Phil Gordon or my other colleagues. But I have to say, many of the points he made are correct.

Let me put it this way, I have three points I'd like to make about the long war. And let me say -- by the way, I think the phrase, "long war", is a useful one. This is John Abizaid's coinage, and I think he's on to something. This is a long term problem and we need to face that. But I think the other part of the phrase, "war on terror", is a misnomer. Terror, as we all know, is a tool. The people who are doing this to us are not doing it because they like to see body parts fly; they want us dead for political reasons. They want to transform the world in accordance with their fanatic ideology. In other words, it's an ideology that is confronting us, and I think we shouldn't be shy about identifying it.

It's Islamist extremism, it's radical jihadism, as the Congressman was saying before. There has been some nervousness about identifying it, but I think we cannot survive or win this war unless we know clearly who the enemy is.

The second point, and here I am agreeing with something Phil said, there are natural barriers to the spread of this ideology, which we can reinforce, and that's what our strategy should be about.

I think most people in Arab countries or in Muslim countries don't want any part of this fanaticism. They are our natural allies and we should see the key part of our strategy is to reinforce these people, bolster them, and show solidarity with them because they are on the front line. It happens that Iran is playing a greater role in this. Our Arab friends, in fact, almost all the friends we have in the Middle East, Arabs and Israelis, see Iran as a growing threat, a geopolitical threat. Iran's bid for Hegemony in the region, of which I think its pursuit of nuclear weapons is a part -- is a threat to all of our Arab friends. And Iran is a revolutionary power that is an ideological threat.

I think Iran is attempting to make itself the leader of this radical Islamism. When Ahmadinejad makes statements or sends a letter to George Bush, he's trying to set himself up as the counterpart of George Bush, the spokesman for all Muslims and all -- all Muslims, and I think -- I don't think he's going to succeed in this.

I think most Arab countries are not interested in being led by Persians. I think, as I said, there are natural barriers to this. There's also the Shia/Sunni Split. But Iran is seeking to achieve a kind of crossover appeal.

Iran not only is supporting Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon, but Iran is supporting the most militant forces in the Palestinian community who -- Again, this

is arousing resentment in much of the Arab world, and I think, again, these divisions are a clue to allies that we should be able to find, people who do not want to be dominated by Iran or part of some transnational jihad that is lead by Iran.

Another natural barrier is nationalism. From my pains, I used to read the WAHI statements. In fact, it's always a good idea to read these. When bin Laden or Zawahiri or any of these characters issues a long statement, I always read the whole text, because there are a lot of little things in there that the media don't always pick up. Zawahiri is obsessed with what he calls hateful nationalism. He's, of course, the spokesman for Global Jihad, and he has denounced the Iraqi people, the Palestinian people for being preoccupied with what he thinks is parochial interest, at the sacrifice of, you know, the transnational jihad.

He thinks the Iraqis and the Palestinians have been seduced by what he calls U.S. inspired democratic political processes. Even Hamas denounced, because, again, Hamas was obsessed with its particular problems. So I mean this, again, is a clue to something. To the extent that people in that part of the world have a national identity, that's a barrier to this transnational fanaticism.

The third point I want to make is something a little different. There are -- terrorism certainly is a problem, a huge problem, but there are retail ways of addressing it, there are wholesale ways of addressing it, and we need both.

Now, retail is Homeland Security, it's law enforcement, it's intelligence, it's, you know, trying to catch these guys before they carry out their plot, that is an absolute necessity. The wholesale level is something else, it goes to

motivation, the enthusiasm that drives this, and there's a kind of euphoria out now in that part of the world of the people who are caught up in this and who think they're on a roll and think they have us on the run, and that is -- we need to address that in some way. And this, of course, gets back to ideology, which is the motivator. But we know from experience that ideologies can be defeated. They can be discredited by failure.

Communism was an ideology, and it ran out of steam many decades ago because it couldn't deliver on its promises, and all it was was a system of brutality and lies. Everything it promised, it couldn't deliver on, and so people lost enthusiasm and it decayed.

Revolutions have a life cycle. Now, as I said, the problem now we have is, the opposite is happening. There's a euphoria out there that needs to be deflated in some way and somewhere. And, in fact, Iraq, I believe, is a perfectly good place, in fact, a crucial place to inflict a set back on them.

And to the extent that moderate Iraqi's can gain some control over their destiny, build institutions that are resistant to this extremism, you have inflicted a set back on the jihadist, and it is -- I think the President is right, he says this is the crucial battlefield right now, and if we walk away from this battlefield, what we'll see is the opposite of what I'm recommending, you'll see an explosion of euphoria among all of the crazies in that part of the world that will take years to recover from. There's no way to be strong against terrorism, there's no way to be strong against Iran if we walk away from the battlefield in Iraq. All of our friends in the Middle

East, Arab friends, Israeli friends, they view Iraq in this context. We cannot be strong against Iran if we are weak in Iraq.

Now, let me finish with taking that point to a broader level. I'm a little bit worried that the next president, whoever he or she is, is going to feel that, you know, what his or her obligation to the rest of the world is, oh, to try to reassure the rest of the world of American modesty and American deference to multilateralism; in other words, to be the un-Bush.

But I think the fashionable criticism of American unilateralism is stale by now. That's not the issue that we face. Given our domestic debate over Iraq, I think what the world and what that region are worried about is the opposite. I think potentially one of the most destabilizing factors in the world in the coming period is likely to be fear of American weakness.

And I think what the next president is going to have to do is, reassure the world, not that we're modest, and polite, and differential, or we'll never use force again, but just the opposite, to reassure the world that we are strong, we are still committed to the security of our friends, and that we're capable of defending our friends and our allies and our interest throughout the world. That is what the next president is going to have to think very hard about. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Peter.

MS. WITTES: All right. Well, my path here is to take us down one level and focus in on the region of the Middle East, and specifically the Arab Middle East and its immediate neighbors, and talk a little bit about the consequences of the

war in Iraq for the American role in the Middle East and America's ability to achieve its goals in the region, including the very important goal of combating terrorism.

But I want to start by drawing one important distinction, and here I guess I will earn my keep at Brookings by disagreeing with Peter. But I think that there is a material difference between the war against bin Laden as terrorism, what is called the long war or the war on terror, and combating the rise of Iran in the Middle East.

And I believe that not only because in terms of behavior, Iran and al Qaeda are engaged in very different sets of activities, but also because they are motivated in different ways.

I think when you look at what Iran and its regional allies are doing today in the Middle East, it's really about power politics, it's about nationalism, as Peter suggested when he was talking about Hamas, and his -- it's about local politics in many cases, and it's much less about ideology than is the case for bin Laden. So I think it's important to distinguish between these two types of actors. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, and some of its allies are terrorist movements. But when we talk about a war against those who attacked us on September 11, we're not primarily talking about Iran and its allies in the region, and I think we need to preserve that distinction.

Now, when you look at the consequences of the war in Iraq for American interest in the Middle East and the American role in the Middle East, you see two major consequences. The first is the decline in American power and

influence, which we've discussed at great length today and which Hady is going to address, as well. And the second is a natural consequence of the removal of Saddam Hussein, and that's the rise of Iranian influence.

There's a new fault line, as Peter was describing, in the region. It's not exactly a Sunni/Shia Split, it's really one that pits status quo actors in the region, including both Israel and America's Arab allies, against revisionist forces in the region, radicals who have a very different, much more violent vision for the region that includes the removal of American influence and the restructuring of politics in a number of states in the Middle East. And this revision is coalition, which is headed by Iran, but also includes Hezbollah and Hamas and the Alloye regime in Damascus, really came out into the open, I would say, it sort of had its coming out party last summer during the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the wake of that war, you saw the public popularity across the region of revisionist leaders like Hezbollah and Hamas and Nathralla and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Presidents of Iran, you saw their popularity soar in Arab countries, among Sunnis and Shia alike, and they were making a bid for public loyalty, not just in their local context, but across the region.

So what we tried to do in our Opportunity 08 paper and what I'm going to try and do here is, outline how an American role in the region post-Iraq war can help to respond to this revisionist challenge.



I think what's at stake here over the longer term is really the stability and ultimately the prosperity of this region, a region whose stability is crucial to America's national interest, crucial to the international economy.

And the stability that I'm talking about is not just interstate, not just regional stability, but internal stability within Arab states. I'm talking not just about the possibility that Iraq's internal strife might spill across its borders and draw on its neighbors, or that Iran's nuclear program might provoke a regional arms race. If you listen to the Arab government, that the U.S. is now engaged in constant dialogue with trying to build a coalition to block Iran's rising influence, they are as worried about the impact of these regional radicals on their internal affairs as they are on their external security. The Sunni states in the gulf region, like Saudi Arabia, are worried about the impact of Iran and of the empowerment of Iraqi Shia on their own Shia communities, which are sizeable and which are generally disadvantaged, underprivileged inside these states.

The Sunni states of the Levant, like Egypt and Jordan, are worried about the impact of these calls for violent resistance on their own populations. In Egypt last spring, according to polls done by our colleague, Shably Hohumi, Hassan Nasrallah, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were by far the most popular world leaders, not just regional leaders, but world leaders ranked in Shibley's regular poll, and that was the first time that had been true in his years of polling there.

Domestic radicals in Egypt make the same arguments about the government that Hassan Nasrallah makes about Arab governments in the region, that

it's a corrupt government that sells Egypt to the United States, that makes humiliating deals with the Israeli's, that fails to serve the needs of its people. So the internal radical critiques and the external radical critiques are reinforcing one another, and this is an increasingly dangerous dynamic. So the United States has an opportunity here I think to build a coalition to contain the influence of Iran and some of its friends around the region, a coalition that would include these status quo Arab states and Israel. But it's not going to be an easy task, it's going to be a tricky task, because we don't agree with these governments on how to view all of the developments in the region, and they don't necessarily agree with one another.

So really what this is going to require is much more agile diplomacy by the United States in the Middle East, including a willingness to be pretty flexible sometimes about who we ally ourselves with and when we alter those alliance relationships, how do we go about this, four key elements I think that I'll just touch on very, very briefly and then pass it on to Hady.

The first, I think you've already seen the Bush Administration pick up, which is reengaging in Arab/Israeli peace efforts, using the Arab/Israeli peace process as a sort of cement for this coalition between Israel and what the Bush Administration is calling the moderate Arab states.

But there are some difficulties here, and that's that our Arab allies in this coalition don't necessarily agree with us on how to deal with two important actors whose engagement in this peace process is going to be critical to its outcome. One is Hamas and the other is Syria. In both these cases, Saudi Arabia and Egypt

would really prefer, if at all possible, to co-opt these actors, to bring them back into the Sunni fold, so to speak, rather than see them remain in an alliance with Iran. And, therefore, they've been very reluctant to help us with the sort of containment measures that we have argued are necessary to limit the influence of Hamas and Syria on a new Israeli/Palestinian peace process.

So those are two arenas where I think you're already seeing some contention within this coalition we're trying to create.

Second element, contain civil strife in Iraq and deter neighborly intervention there. That's obviously a subject we could spend another two hours on easily. But if you want to look at some of the details that Martin and I are laying out, you can take a look at our paper.

Third, we need to build a more sustained, more detailed defense relationship with the Arab states of the gulf. This is really unfinished business that stretches back to the aftermath of the last war that the U.S. fought in Iraq, expelling Iraq from Kuwait back in 1991, and the necessity to help the states of the DCC develop their own defense capabilities and develop a defense relationship with us that will deter Iran aggression and that will prevent an arms race in the region should Iran become a nuclear power. And finally, and I'll end on this, I think it would be very easy, looking at the analysis I just laid out, to say, well, then there's really no place here for continuing this freedom agenda that President Bush laid out, and it really just makes sense to jettison the idea of trying to ask these Arab states that we

want to ally ourselves with against Iran to ask them to undertake destabilizing risky domestic reforms.

I would actually argue the contrary. I think it would be a mistake to abandon the American effort to advance political and economic reform in the region. I think, in fact, it's central to building stable, sustainable U.S. Arab cooperation.

First, because, as I said before, the domestic radical oppositions inside Arab societies and the external radical voices are feeding off and reinforcing one another. And in order to blunt their power and counter their claims, Arab governments do need to address some of their own governance failings and shortcomings.

Secondly, because the necessity of building this U.S. Arab Israeli coalition to contain these revisionist forces puts Arab states in a real dilemma. They need to cooperate with the United States strategically more closely than they have in the last several years, at a moment when the U.S. is widely hated across the region by their own public.

So how do we expect Arab states to work closely with us on these issues of mutual concern without engaging in a higher degree of repression at home, to push back against public sentiment that opposes U.S. Arab strategic cooperation? We have to help our Arab partners extract themselves from this dilemma, and I think reform is a key to that, it's a key to showing Arab public that moderation and stability are good for them and that just as we press for the realization of self-determination for Palestinians, we also press for Arab citizens across the region, and

we want our new partnership with the region to be built not merely at the government to government level, but as the result of an alliance between America, Arab governments, and Arab citizens who all want a future of stability and prosperity for the region. So I'll leave it there.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Tammy. And I should have said earlier that Hady has also written an excellent paper with Peter Singer on our web site on strategic communication policy and many aspects of fostering a better dialogue with the Islamic world and improving many of the Islamic world's efforts to foster political reform from within, so we look forward to his comments, as well.

MR. AMR: Thanks, Mike. I want to thank Mike for organizing this Opportunity 08 and the distinguished speakers for were before me. One of the benefits of speaking last is, you've got a few more minutes to think about your remarks, but one of the problems is that just about everything you wanted to say has been said by someone else -- This panel is called the long war on terror, more or less, and two of our speakers in the previous panel, the representative of Senator Biden and the representative of -- is that working now? That's working now.

Okay. So two of our -- two of the speakers this morning, the representative of Senator Biden and the representative of Senator McCain, talked about this as a war of ideas. My co-panelists stress on that, Phil starting that off.

Ever since 911, our leaders have been telling us that to win the war on terror, we have to win the war of ideas. And we've also heard reference to the fact that, more or less, America's standing in the world, not just the Muslim world,

but in the whole world, is at sort of life time lows. I was born in 1967, so you know, that's a long time, as well.

In thinking about this panel, given everything that's been said, I just want to tell a couple of stories. The first is, I remember a couple of years ago when Peter Singer and I were writing a paper for National Defense University, there was a presentation by the director, a great title, Director of Global War on Terrorism, there's someone in the Pentagon that has that title, and in part of his presentation he gave, one of the slides was, you know, winning the war on terror, securing America's home land, and there were three -- that sort of -- it's like this sort of Greek columns, and you know, there's this thing on the top, and the three columns say, one, you know, fighting and killing the terrorists where they are, that's column number one; column number two was defending the home land; and column number three was hearts and minds, war of ideas. So I just kind of raised my hand and said, sir, can you please, you know, you've got these three Corinthian columns holding up this roof, which is our national security, how much are you spending on each column.

And he hemmed and hawed and he didn't want to answer, and I said, look, if you had to answer, how much would you say, at least in proportions, are you spending on each column, and he said, well, I'd have to say 100 in fighting and killing, ten in defending the home land, maybe one, if you're lucky, on war of ideas. So I wouldn't want to be sitting at that table, but unfortunately, that's the table that America is sitting at, and I think we should keep that in mind.

I also wanted to tell another story, which goes back to ten years before I was born, which is that in the middle of the Cold War in 1958, an African American gentleman in Alabama was sentenced to die for stealing \$1.95 in change. He received the sentence, he received the conviction, and he received the sentence from the judge.

Why am I mentioning that today? I'm mentioning that today because this became a global international issue. This is before my time, but it became such a global international issue that the Secretary of State and the President of the United States called the Governor of Alabama to get the sentence commuted. And this was not -- and this actually started an avalanche of problems for the U.S. in the war of ideas of the time, which was with the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union used this example and dozens of others—not as egregious, but also sort of painful examples from our history—to really smear the United States and really bolster their side in that wars, the Cold War's war of ideas.

And that brings—I'm telling that story because it brings us to the issues that Phil raised—two in particular the presidential campaigns raised this morning, which is the following; and I've got about six points I think that we need to do to really win this war of ideas and win this long war.

The first is, we have to do -- America -- we Americans need to do what we did during the Cold War, people did before I was born, which is confront who we are. America couldn't win the Cold War without embracing the ideals of the Civil Rights Movement, and we can't win the war on terror without closing

Guantanamo, without, you know, dealing with the Abu Ghraib much more forcefully, and I would also argue, without really working more closely with the American Muslim community, which is really seen as a litmus to how America deals and treats with the American Muslim community as seen by the world as a litmus test for how America feels about Islam and the world. And we need to do a much better job, particularly, you know, that 1958 event happened as radio and television started spreading around the world. The world we live in today is a world of You Tube and the internet, and when I've gone around and traveled around the Arab world, in medium sized cities, even Morocco, I get confronted with questions about, didn't congressman so and so say this in, you know, on the floor yesterday in the Congress, and I'm like, well, I don't know, I've been traveling, I really don't know what was said. But, you know, an 18 year old in Marrakesh knew what was said.

And so we need to do a much better idea -- a much better job at addressing certain sort of negative statements that come out in the U.S. today. So, for example, when the first American Muslim became a member of Congress and wanted to be sworn in on the Quran, and a, you know, member of Congress from my home state decided to condemn that as un-American and undermining our American values, that was big news in the Muslim world. It might not have been big news here. But we need to be vigilant on dealing with that.

The second issue -- the second approach that I think we need to undertake is, we need to reflect on this approach that we like to articulate, which is,



you know, we need to work with sort of our moderate, you know, Muslim and moderate Arab allies. Yeah, we do, we do need to bolster their efforts. But there's no better way to alienate people than to not invite them to participate in dialogue. And it's a difficult and painful thing that we have to go through. But unless we, you know, in the Muslim world, deal with the more conservative elements of society, we're just going to continue to alienate them further.

That doesn't mean that we need to go as far as to work with militant groups, with groups that advocate taking arms against the United States, but I don't know, let's just say that Sweden decided that they just couldn't take America anymore, it was too conservative, it was just a giant pain in the neck in the world, and so they were going to give, I don't know, \$1 billion to, I don't know, Jesse Jackson to make America a more progressive place.

Well, how is that going to play in middle America? That's the approach that we use in the Arab world, and we just can't continue doing that.

The third thing we need to do is, we need to abandon this approach of sort of better communications. You know, in 2002 and 2003, I got to do about 90 focus groups across the Arab and Muslim world, with high school students, college students, professors and the like. They got a big dose of what America is. They get to watch CNN, they got to watch Fox News, they know our TV. commentators. What they're missing out on is dialogue. And so what was done shortly after 911 was, we created these radio -- these American state owned radio stations, like al-

Hurra and Radio Sawa, the radio stations, to broadcast information to the Arab world, because maybe they weren't getting enough information.

Guess what, they got plenty of information. What they're missing out on and what they really crave is an opportunity for dialogue with Americans. And there are various ways that Peter and I outlined in our paper to embrace that.

The other three points -- the other two real key points that I want to really address are, one is money. I talked earlier about the three legs of the table, one that was 100 units wide, one that was ten units wide, and one that was maybe, if we're lucky, one unit wide. If we don't devote significantly higher resources to this hearts and minds thing, we're just going to fail.

And the second thing is, we need to have much more -- the final thing is, we need to have much more coordination and integration among agencies and really harness the power of the presidency and cabinet members to really, you know, communicate ideas, to respond to bin Laden videos, to, you know, react immediately to statements like, you know, the statement made about Keith Elson wanting to swear in on the Quran. We have plenty of examples of positive leadership, it's just not coordinated well enough. So with that, I'll wrap up my comments, I think I've been going on a bit too long, and allow my colleagues to -- allow you all to ask questions.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic, Hady. We have a little less than 20 minutes. With my first panel, my MO for moderating was equal time; for this panel, it's unequal time. Please say who you would like to respond to your question. We'll

have at most two people responding to each one so we can get through a number of comments and questions from you. So please, who'd like to start? Sir.

MR. BOWMAN: My name is Joshua Bowman, I'm in the Air Force Fellowship Program at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, and I don't really care who responds to this question. But we talked about a resurgence in al Qaeda, and largely that's due to our -- the fact that we don't have access to Northern Pakistan.

And regardless of which approach you take, whether it's a military approach, or a communications information approach, diplomatic social approach, how do we gain that access to Northern Pakistan in order to rectify that situation?

MR. O'HANLON: Phil, do you want to take that since you've just been?

MR. GORDON: Because it's such a hard question. I mean it's an obvious problem and there's not a solution to it. I wouldn't recommend going -- I mean the national intelligence estimate that came out a couple of months ago identified this area as the greatest problem, where al Qaeda is reemerging, we know they're there. But I wouldn't recommend the United States going in and dealing with it, which could create a greater problem than we have on our hands already.

So we're limited to working with the Pakistani's and trying to get them to do as much as they can to deal with this problem. The government of Pakistan, President Musharraf, insists he's doing all he can, deploying Pakistani

soldiers to fight the problem, they are, I think, credible suggestions that less is being done than they would have us believe.

If you look at where the al Qaeda members in Pakistan or the region who have been apprehended or killed have been apprehended or killed, it's almost never there in the northwest frontier provinces.

So even the cooperation we're getting with Pakistan on this issue is not effectively dealing with the problem. So we can -- what we have to do, and I think this is a common theme among all of us, is work on the broader context so that fewer people want to join this movement and go and assemble in this ungoverned region where they are. But I think, as I've described, our options for doing that are distinctly limited. There was a recent, in terms of the last panel on different candidates, there was a recent political debate about this issue, if we knew -- if we had actionable intelligence that al Qaeda was in this region, would the United States act on it. I think almost anyone running for president would give -- say, of course, we would. I mean if you knew there was a target there, people plotting to attack the United States, you would. I don't think there can be any debate about that.

The problem is, we very rarely get actionable intelligence of who's plotting where. They don't sit in large camps with targets on the top and a neon sign saying we're plotting an attack on the United States. These cells can be very small, hard to find. We are not very well equipped to find out what's going on in that region.

So it is an immense problem, but clearly the solution to it, it seems to me, is not American military forces going into the region.

MR. COVER: Stanley Cover with the Cato Institute, also on Pakistan. I'm beginning to see reports that Pakistani Army soldiers are laying down their arms and deserting. Their argument, as it's been reported, some of them feel they don't want to kill fellow Pakistani's -- at the behest of what they see as foreign involvement, foreign encouragement. So you can say, well, Musharraf isn't doing enough, but the soldiers are beginning to desert. I don't know how serious a problem this is, but I have begun to see reports; then what do you do?

MR. O'HANLON: Peter, do you want to start, and then, Phil, you can chime in if you wish?

MR. RODMAN: Yeah, I hadn't heard that, but it's entirely credible, and it obviously adds to the problem, and that's the reality we face. I don't have an answer for that. The Pakistani military I think is doing maybe the most it can do.

These are areas of the country where the Pakistani military never set foot since the founding of the state and where the British didn't set foot, the tribal area. So the political problem of going in there is difficult to start with. And I'm not sure American forces are going to do better if they were to go in without having actionable intelligence. So this is a problem, it's going to have to be dealt with on a practical level by trying to get the maximum cooperation out of Pakistan, it has to be

dealt with at the wholesale level, as I was discussing, trying to effect the broad motivation of people. This is a hard case.

If you've seen the terrain in that part of the world, it's just -- the idea that you can control it, seal it, seal the border is just ludicrous. But, you know, we can try to isolate that region, but that's not a solution.

MR. GORDON: Well, I don't have too much to add, as I said, because I don't have the solution either. I think one telling point comes from -- Peter referred to the federally administered tribal areas. I don't know anywhere else in the world where the government basically admits that it doesn't have control over its population. The fact that it's just called that tells you a lot about the situation.

They're tribal areas that have been running their own lives for thousands of years without some outside power doing it for them, and Pakistan has very little control over what's going on there.

There have been reports of some Pakistani soldiers being unwilling to fight there, just as there are counter reports of actual clashes between the Pakistani Armed Forces and Taliban and the region, and I suspect there is a bit of both.

When I was in Pakistan a couple of months ago, I did hear a lot of complaints about the pressure we put on the Pakistani government to clamp down in that region, because for a lot of Pakistani's who have suffered terrorist attacks themselves when bombs are going off in Islamabad and other cities in Pakistan, we are often blamed, because they see this as, look, you know, leave the Pashtun alone, they're tribal areas, that's where they live, this is your global war on terror, and now

you're making it a local issue for us because you're forcing our government to challenge these people and they're retaliating against us. So that I think helps explain the great reluctance of the Pakistani government to deal with the problem. But other than working with the Pakistani government, I don't see what our alternative is.

MR. O'HANLON: I'm going to throw in a quick question before we call on you, sir, in the second row. While we're on Pakistan, one of the more notable things we've heard in the campaign is the idea using foreign assistance a lot more assertively to try to presumably help win hearts and minds, not necessarily, Hady, in the way you're saying is problematic, which is just to improve our communications or beef that up, but actually to help the societies in question become more prosperous, more stable, offer more opportunity.

I'm curious, Peter and Phil, and anyone else, Tammy and Hady, if you want to comment the war on Pakistan, you two in particular; is there a role for, especially once Musharraf has made whatever decision he's going to make and we have a new American president, to perhaps consider a much more robust American aid package towards Pakistan, the way former Congressman Steve Solar and others have advocated.

MR. GORDON: One sentence; in fact, we -- two years ago, when this issue first burst forth, we came up with a much expanded aid program dedicated to the tribal areas. Economic -- State Department dug into every, you know, pocket

of money it could find and we came up with a very large package for the tribal areas. Whether it's having an impact, I don't know.

MR. GORDON: I'll add a thought, and then Tammy may want to come in on the democracy piece. But on that, I also heard extensively in Pakistan the complaints among all aspects of the society that too much of our aid was military.

I mean the numbers are hard to really come by, but it is basically believed that we've given about \$10 billion to Pakistan since 911, and that far less than ten percent of that has been on the civilian side, and that the bulk of it has been going to the military, that many, I think it's fair to say, most Pakistani's resent as an authoritarian dictatorship.

And I was also struck there at the willingness, frankly, of individuals to talk openly about their resentment of their authoritarian government. So I do think there is scope there for us to get a better image in this critically important country by not being seen as just the funders of the regime and not getting our assistance to people.

The other thing I would say about Pakistan is that something very interesting is going on in Pakistan right now, which is, there is a democracy movement, it is making progress, and we didn't do it, and that's the best thing about it. Because the Pakistani's themselves have decided they didn't like the repression going on, they didn't like the military regime, and the official judges, when Musharraf tried to fire the Supreme Court Judge, people reacted. We didn't sponsor



Chaudhry; we had nothing to do with it. And it was an autonomous movement of Pakistani citizens saying we want our democracy back, we want rule of law and so on.

So I think there is an important lesson in there. And, by the way, I think we should get on the right side of this issue because it is an opportunity to the extent that the freedom agenda is right and we should be seen as doing the right thing. It's an opportunity for us to be on the right side in the eyes of the Pakistani's. The most important thing about it is that they're doing it themselves, and that I think would make it much more sustainable.

MR. RODMAN: Let me just say quickly, I think your numbers are wrong. I think the aid package, the five year aid program that the Administration announced a few years ago was half and half, a huge economic aid package, a lot of it earmarked for education to help support the state educational system to compete with the madrassas.

MR. O'HANLON: We'll try to get clarification on this on our web site, Opportunity08.org, a free advertisement. I want to move to the Arab world in just a second. So, Tammy, do you want to comment quickly first or not?

MS. WITTES: Well, I'll just say very, very broadly on the issues. I think you're right about the Pakistani package, but there's no question that in the immediate aftermath of 911, our military aid packages shifted much more quickly and with greater agility and more opportunistically than our foreign aid -- our

development aid, where, you know, we have big bureaucracies on both sides, but one proved more agile than the other.

And our friend from SCRS is absolutely right, AAIG's budget and ability to do this kind of work has really been degraded, so that's something we're going to have to rebuild. But as far as the campaign goes, foreign aid is never popular domestically, and American public perceptions are really distorted. They think foreign aid occupies 25 percent of our national budget; it's about one and a half percent.

So candidates who are talking about winning this war on ideas I think are going to have to be willing to put their budget money where their mouth is on this issue.

MR. O'HANLON: Sir.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is -- and I'm the correspondent of the Spain newspaper, *El Mundo*. And Mr. Philip, Mr. Gordon said that we have to divide the enemy because this is an ideological battle. My question would be, what should we do with political Islam, should we contain it or engage it? And I'm talking about the parties that are trying to participate in elections, like the Muslim brothers, for example, in Egypt, or the PJD in Morocco. And these parties, they are criticizing the governments because they are corrupt and so on. So what should we do, talk to them or just isolate them? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Hady and Tammy, if she wishes to comment on this one, please.

MR. AMR: I don't want to take away from Phil, but I -- no, I mean what I would argue is that, you know, we need to reflect on, you know, what our goals are, and if our goals are encouraging democratic processes, then we need to encourage groups to engage those democratic processes.

And obviously you have to, you know, decide where you draw the line in terms of who you deal with. But -- and it really depends, you know, group by group. But I would personally argue myself that you should encourage and you should engage groups, as conservative as they are, as long as they don't espouse or carry arms.

As long as they're willing to play by the rules of the game, the rules of the game are, you're participating in a process of ideas, not arms. So if you're participating -- willing to participate in a process of ideas, we should encourage and engage. I don't know, you'll probably disagree.

MS. WITTES: Well, I'll just make a couple of quick points. The first is, Hady was absolutely right in saying that the U.S. shouldn't be in the business of picking winners inside these countries, and that when we do, we really undermine our ability to have any impact. That said, we can't be entirely neutral. I think what our stance should be is to promote political freedom, to promote an environment in which all kinds of political voices can emerge and compete for public allegiance, and that means, by the way, yes, Islamists will be the first beneficiaries of that because they have right now a playing field that's very much tilted in their favor.

They've been allowed to operate where secular political movements have not been allowed to operate for a long time, and that's why they're so advantaged right now.

So, yes, they'd be the first beneficiaries, but in a freer environment over time, their claims can be tested. And I think the best situation would be where you have a multiplicity of Islamist movements competing for public affection, and not just one monolithic one that can use religious institutions as a base for organization.

The question then is, if you have that freedom, what do you do with it, do you exercise it responsibly, or do you use it to advocate or justify violence, and if you do, then I think the American attitude might well be, might reasonably be that regimes have -- would be legitimate to repress movements that exercise that freedom in an irresponsible manner. Finally, let me make one quick point about an important distinction between weak states and strong states in the region. The problems that we have seen in the Middle East of Islamist movements, winning elections in ways that people have found very destabilizing and troubling, those have occurred in states with very weak governments, where the movements involved, their primary characteristic is not that they're Islamist, but that they carry weapons, as Hady said. That's the real issue here.

Armed movements participating in elections in societies that are driven by strife, that's a problem, that's going to be a problem anywhere, and it's not their religious character that makes it problematic, it's their armed character. In

strong states, we have peaceful movements, like the PJD or the Muslim Brotherhood, I think it's a different story entirely.

MR. O'HANLON: We'll do one last question, please. Who would like to wrap up? Yes, sir.

MR. RICHMOND: I'm Al Richmond in the former State Department and USIA. I'd like to ask about military opportunity costs. A lot of discussion in today's panels about the need for better aid and better communication policies. But I've seen very little public discussion about the impact of having so much of our military resources devoted to one theater. I wondered if someone could comment, and I'd to see much more on what we could get out of a reduction in forces in Iraq in terms of better security or defensibility in other areas?

MR. O'HANLON: Why don't we go very quickly to anybody along the panel who wants to respond.

MR. GORDON: Michael, do you want to?

MR. O'HANLON: No, I'll pass. But, sorry, Phil, just anybody who wants to talk.

MR. GORDON: Well, there's something to be said on the opportunity cost in Iraq issue. And Peter made a very persuasive case about the costs of leaving or failing in Iraq. But I think it is also true, as you implied, that there are significant costs, including financial and opportunity military costs, of staying in Iraq, where we're spending, what, \$4 billion per week or several hundred

billion dollars per year in devoting, again, Mike would know the percentages better than I do, but a very significant chunk of our military resources.

Now, if we could have success with that devotion, then, you know, you just have to swallow those costs and it's worth it. But if devoting all of those resources only comes out as a wash, forget failure, I mean we can debate whether it's actually not succeeding, but if it's a wash, and you know, it partly helps in the context of terrorism, but it partly hurts, and it helps bring a bit of stability, but it's also a prorogation amongst stability, I don't know, personally, for a few hundred billion dollars a year, I need the outcome to be better than a little bit of both, not really sure.

MR. O'HANLON: Hady, why don't you feel free to answer also in this broader sense of opportunity cost even beyond the military, if you wish.

MR. AMR: Well, I would just sort of refer back to the table with the three legs, one that's 100 units thick and one that's ten units thick and one that's one unit thick. And I guess, you know, what I would say is, sir, you worked with USIA, I think the U.S. does a very poor job in not only engaging with civil society, it needs to do much more of that, but also, I would argue personally, and Tammy may disagree, I think the U.S. needs to do it in a much more branded way and in a way that the British and the French do much better.

I mean my -- one side of my family are fifth generation Yorkers, the other side are, I don't know, 50 generation Lebanese, and my Lebanese grandmother, who was illiterate, when I was in Beirut a couple of years ago visiting and doing a

little work with the British Consul, and I said, oh, she said what are you doing here, I said I'm doing some work with the British Consul, she said, British Consul, great place, your father took his first English lesson there.

You know, she -- a little old lady in a very poor neighborhood, worked -- grew up -- raised -- a single parent raised my -- working as a maid, knew what the British Consul was and knew that it did good things. Unfortunately, America doesn't have that kind of branding, and we're also not doing enough of that kind of work.

MS. WITTES: Very quickly, I'll just point out an additional opportunity cost, which is that it's very hard to do the kind of thing Hady is talking about when our embassies are walled off, barricaded away from people, where our American libraries, it takes you, you know, two hours and a body search to get into.

And, of course, we need to protect our personnel who are engaged in this kind of work, in often very difficult environments. But there are real trade-offs there, and I think we have to be creative about how to try and overcome those.

MR. RODMAN: You're obviously right about opportunity costs. The strain on our ground forces is tremendous. And if another contingency arose which called for ground forces, we would have a big problem.

But I remember a few years ago, the Tsunami relief effort in Indonesia, where we moved 15,000 personnel and 36 ships and 45 helicopters all came from Pacific Command, it was mostly Air and Naval personnel, which are not

strained to the same degree. So this country has considerable resources, if that's what the focus of your question was.

MR. O'HANLON: I want to thank you all for coming. And please join me in thanking the panelists, as well.

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