THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

OPPORTUNITY 08

THE STATE OF THE MILITARY TODAY

Washington, D.C.

Friday, June 29, 2007

Moderator:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Hi, everyone, and welcome. I'm Mike O'Hanlon, and this is an event today to discuss the state of the U.S. military with a particular eye to its near-term challenges in coping with the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we won't be confined to that particular near-term subject completely, nor should you in the discussion.

I'm delighted to be able to present this event today as part of two initiatives and efforts at Brookings: one, our Opportunity 08 effort to frame issues for the presidential race—and we have a website, Opportunity08.org, we invite you to peruse. There will be some papers there from Peter Singer, Peter Rodman, and myself among other things and other topics. And then, secondly, this is co-hosted by the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings that Peter Singer directs and that we have now had operational for about year. So, we're delighted that you came to be part of this discussion and these two initiatives here at Brookings.

I'm going to just say a brief word about the panelists, and then Martha Raddatz, our moderator from ABC, will lead the discussion. She will introduce the topic and then call on each of us to give a few remarks and then we'll have a discussion. Martha will ask a few questions, and then we'll invite you to participate. The Opportunity 08 effort at Brookings is being done in partnership with ABC, and we're just delighted to have Martha and some of her colleagues involved in this effort as well.

Just a quick word on each person here. I think you know them and I don't have to say a whole lot, but beginning on my left Peter Rodman was recently in the Bush Administration Pentagon as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He's had a very impressive record in and out of government, and we're delighted to have him as a Senior Fellow here at Brookings.

Peter Singer, as you know, has been here for a number of years, directs 21CDI, was the Director of the U.S. Project on Relations with the Islamic World for a number of years and helped spearhead the creation of the Doha Qatar Summit, which we now have every February, and in addition has written a couple of remarkable books on children at war and also on private military contractors. Very timely subjects.

General Dan Christman, retired, was, as many of you know, the Superintendent of West Point for a number of years, which means he has a particular window into understanding the way in which junior officers in the American military are trained and the state of morale and the state, more generally, of the U.S. military from the point of view of that group; and, more generally, he's had a number of jobs in his distinguished career, including Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a number of very interesting experiences but with a final service in his career for five years as Superintendent of West Point, now at the Chamber of Commerce.

Martha Raddatz many of you know as ABC White House

correspondent, and just a wonderful friend. I think of her personally and first and foremost as one of the best defense reporters in the country. That's how I got to know her when she was at National Public Radio, and she has never strayed from this subject. Of course, her coverage of the Iraq war has been remarkable for years. Her book this year, *The Long Road Home*, has been very moving and a wonderful, although very emotional account and moving account, of the experience of one unit in Iraq in 2004, and we're just delighted to have her lead the discussion today. So, I'll turn it over to her at this time.

MS. RADDATZ: Thank you, Michael.

I just want to say a couple of things, because it is on topic about the military and the challenges the military faces in the future and particularly how stretched the military is, and my own experiences over there. I must have said that term a hundred times on the news -- "stretched thin," "stretched too thin," "Army breaking," -- so it will be interesting to see how we define that today and at what point we say it is or what we'd do with that military in the future.

When I am over there, I get the real human beings talking about what these multiple deployments mean. Michael mentioned this battle I wrote about in 2004, which was very dramatic, and the men and women of the First Cavalry Division that year in 2004 lost 168 soldiers. They're now all back there, and during this deployment they got the news that they would be staying 15 months instead of 12 months. So, when I think of that, I think not only of the soldiers, but I think of the families, because I know the families well of a lot of

military who are deployed at this point.

I also pick up little anecdotes when I'm there. I mean, there are Marines who've been -- and certainly their deployment is shorter, but going again and again, there are Marines who've been deployed five times. There are some Special Operations forces who have been deployed seven times since 9/11 or more. I remember one of the last times I left Iraq a couple of months ago, one of the commanders of a Special Forces unit said the problems -- you cannot believe how complicated these problems get. It's not just deploying these forces, sending them home, the drama of leaving their families, but he sensed that they were also becoming one-dimensional people, that you really are removed from your family, you're removed from society, it is all you think about, your entire focus is there. So, I think the complications of the military and stretching the military to this point and these multiple deployments we will be feeling for decades and decades, and that's just one of those minor things that I picked up that I think is not being talked about but I think a lot of people think about.

And one more quick story, and that is also the future of the military. I remember an incredible experience a couple years ago with John Vines, who was then the number two over there in Iraq who -- an old Vietnam hand -- and we were stuck in a sandstorm in Tal Afar, and H.R. McMaster was there, if you're familiar with him; and General Vines, because we were there for two hours just started talking to this young group of commanders about how different it was today than he ever imagined it was, and he was apologetic, saying

I'm so sorry, it's my generation's fault for saying we'd never get in engagement like this again, we'd never fight a war like this, and now here you all are not with the training you should have for this type of engagement. But he was so encouraging. He just said it's up to you, you're so bright, you have capabilities that we have never imagined you'd have, and you're all -- I mean, they're all young mayors running around or they're stabilizing their nation building, they're fighting conventional battles, they're fighting counterinsurgency. But to see those generations of soldiers together and to listen to General Vines made me think what will the next generation of soldiers be telling the generation after that?

So, I am going to throw it back to Michael O'Hanlon at this point. All the gentlemen will give opening remarks and then we'll open it up to questions starting with my friend Michael O'Hanlon.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Martha. You've already heard from me. I'll be brief. I just want to make two framing remarks, now getting into the substantive issues that Martha's begun to talk about.

One is -- and you'll hear some of the information about the force from others on this panel about the state of strain, the strain of deployment, the way in which the war is going, and how it's affecting people. I just want to raise one broad point, which is there's been a lot of discussion recently in the media with some prominent stories in both the *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* about how the administration is developing plans to cut the force levels in Iraq in half by next year, or at least the combat forces, that a lot of this seems to

be in the works. People talk about the inevitability of those sorts of drawdowns as a result of the strain on the force.

I want to say I think those stories, frankly, were somewhat misleading. My own impression is that the Administration strategy will remain to sustain as much of a surge-like capability as possible throughout the rest of the Bush presidency. Peter Rodman may or may not want to comment on that. He probably does know more than I, although he probably isn't -- in fairness to him, I don't want to imply that he is privy to every detail that's emerging these days in the planning, but I think that there is a danger of people starting to assume that we're all coalescing around a common strategy towards rapid drawdown in 08.

I do not think that is the likely scenario, and my strong expectation would be that even if we have to cut by a couple of brigades or three brigades, let's say, by next spring/summer due to force rotation constraints, that the Administration's default strategy is going to be to keep well over fifteen brigades in Iraq for the rest of the Bush presidency.

No one can be totally predictive. The Administration is never going to settle on one policy in advance, and nor should it, but I just want to heighten, in a sense, the importance of the issue we are debating today, because I don't think it would be correct to assume that we are inevitably headed to a cut in forces, making the whole question of strain sort of irrelevant because we're going to be addressing it through drawdowns anyway. That is not the right way, in my judgment, to understand the baseline on policy. You would not hear General

Petraeus and others trying to walk back our expectations about September if they didn't think they were going to need a lot more of the same for a long time to come, so we're really shaping up to have a big debate in the fall about future Iraq policy, and the issue of what the force can withstand has to be a big part of that discussion. So, that's issue one.

Issue two -- and then I'll be done -- is simply to say the following: that we're all going to discuss the quantitative indicators of strain on the force, whether it's too much, whether it's tolerable. Obviously, it's not good to see the number of divorces and suicides and difficulties in recruiting and all these figures that we're all familiar with and will learn more about today in the discussion.

I want to raise, however, for me what is the central issue in all of this, because I don't know how to predict when the force will break, if ever. To me, there's a fairness issue, and Martha got at it as well with her stories. We're asking too much of too few for too long, in the words of General Keane, former Army Vice Chief of Staff, and what I would submit is that whether you are a proponent of this surge or not, whether you're working in other capacities to end this war quickly or not, I believe that until we have reached a national consensus on a decision to draw down the force substantially in Iraq, we owe it to our men and women in uniform to add to the force. It's overdue. I think Mr. Rumsfeld's legacy -- and, frankly, even General Schoomaker's -- will take a hit for being against an expansion of the Army and Marine Corps. I think it was mistaken policy, but it's never too late while the operation continues to try to make partial

amends, and this is why for me I'm actually more impatient than Secretary Gates. I'd like to see 25 to 50,000 people a year added in the short term while the war is still going on.

And, to finish on a little bit of a zany note, if you'll forgive me, Max Booth, Frank Kagan, and I have all pushed the idea of recruiting foreigners whether they are illegal immigrants in this country or not, but the idea is you cannot grow the force fast enough from the normal recruiting pool today, and we think it's simply unfair to our men and women in uniform to keep asking so much of them. Adding 5,000 people a year is less than one percent of the total U.S. ground forces. It's not going to make a big difference. I'm more impatient than that. Even as we may have to wind up concluding that Plan A and the surge have failed, in the short term I would submit until we've reached that decision we should be trying to increase the size of the ground forces on fairness grounds alone without trying to predict when and if it will crack due to overuse.

With that, I'll turn it back to Martha, and thank you.

MS. RADDATZ: Thank you.

So this will be the new immigration reform.

(Laughter)

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: What's not to love.

MS. RADDATZ: If at first you don't succeed -- and it kind of marries up all his problems. It'd be a very interesting.

I have to agree, Michael. The President gave a speech yesterday at

the Naval War College, and to me it was a little rehearsal for what they will probably say in September. I wouldn't describe it as the glass half full speech but the glass almost full. It was there's hope everywhere in Iraq. So, I thought, this is going to happen in September. They will find places where thing are going well. They will present that, and even though they're doing planning, which you have to do for drawing down, I would probably side with Michael on that, that I have a feeling this surge will remain.

Let's hear from Peter Singer about what you think.

MR. SINGER: Thanks.

As part of Opportunity 08, Mike asked us to wrestle with the challenges that the next President will face, whoever that is, and when it comes to the role as Commander and Chief, it's a good-news/bad-news story. The good news for them is that they'll become commander-in-chief of the best-trained, best-equipped, most educated force not only out there today but probably in history. The bad news is that that excellence is under siege as it's never been before in the period of the all-volunteer force. And it really comes down to the fact that while the military's been at war for the last six years, other than maybe at our airports the nation hasn't, and so the result has been a series of small compromises and hard questions deferred that are now coming due, and most likely they're going to come due hardest on that next President. And you see this in general in the U.S. military but particularly for the ground forces where they're at what in my take is what Malcolm Gladwell called a tipping point. We don't know where it is, but

that quality, that excellence is under siege, and if the trends continue, it may just tip over.

And you hear all sorts of people talking about this both at the junior officer level and at the senior level, and there's a couple of telling quotes that are in the research that we've done. One is from General Cody, the Army Vice Chief of Staff. This is what he told Congress in 2006: "What keeps me awake at night is what this all-volunteer force will look like in 2007." What should be keeping the next President awake right now, those various candidates that you see out there debating, is what it's going to look like in 2008 and beyond. Colin Powell describes it: "The active is just about broken." Barry McCaffrey's quote is: "The wheels are falling off." You hear these kinds of dire claims, and what is it that they mean when they say that?

It really breaks down into two areas. The first is personnel, and the second is equipment. On the personnel side, what people tend to focus on is the raw recruiting numbers, and this really became an issue in 2005 when the Army missed its recruiting target by 8 percent, which was the largest miss that it had in over 20 years. Now, to me, what wasn't the big deal about that was the number but the fact of the huge efforts the Army was already putting in to try and meet that number. They'd added 1300 new recruiters, and they'd raised the recruiting budget five times what it had been previously. And yet they were still making that miss in '05. And so what happened then is that changes began to occur and a series of stopgap measures, and that's everything from the Stop Loss

Programs that kept in 8000 enlisted soldiers; pulling folks from the individual ready reserves, about 15,000; and also changing the standards of who you allow in the force, and that's everything from the age standards, which went from 35 years to 40 years, to in the middle of 2006 just when they changed it to 40 years again changed it to 42 when the numbers on recruiting didn't show that they were occurring.

The same thing is happening with the Marines. The way they've met their goals is by pulling people out of the star pool. This is basically a pool of recruits that have said "I will join but not this month" -- after I graduate, for example, and so you stockpile them in a pool and then they join later. What they're doing is dipping into that pool, which means you meet your standards now but later on you're in big trouble. And what's interesting is that the Marines are worried that their pool of recruits is down to 41 percent, the Army's is down to 12 percent. So, these are some very serious trends.

You also see this within the officer corps. Recent graduates of West Point are leaving the force at the highest rate in three decades.

So, these are trends to worry about, and so we may be meeting the raw numbers, but we're meeting them by moving the goal posts.

The second concern within personnel is that maybe we're lowering the standards. This is one of those things that people don't like to talk about openly, but we need to start wrestling with this, because it's our challenge of keeping that high-quality force out there.

In the last three years, we've multiplied by six times the amount of Cat. 4 -- Category 4 -- recruits that we allow in. These are folks that test at the bottom percentile, a group within the -- it's basically called the Armed Forces Qualification Test. We've had a 50 percent increase in waivers of enlistment for "moral turpitude," drug use, medical issues, and criminal records, and we've doubled the number of folks that we've allowed in who didn't graduate high school.

Same thing is occurring within the officer corps that we have to worry about. Last year, the army promoted 20 percent more captains to majors and 20 percent more majors to lieutenant colonels than the standards that it had held to previously. Even then, those weren't enough. You have a 17 percent shortfall in the number of major slots to fill out there. Same thing within the elite forces.

And so when you hear these presidential candidates go out and say oh, my solution to the problems are double, triple, quadruple the number of Special Forces --again, the number is raising concerns there. The Navy is at 86 percent manning levels for its Seal teams, and in fact it's failed to meet its authorized enlisted levels for the Seal teams over the last five years, and what's worrisome is that last year the pass rate for physical training among Seal recruits made a jump from 34 percent to 77 percent in one year, and that raised some eyebrows as to what's going on.

Same thing within other specialties like information operations

officers where the Army's had a 40 percent shortfall. It doesn't think it's going to be able to meet it in seven years.

And of course all these trends are happening with National Guard and Reserves just as harshly.

The other part of this is the equipment side. We've had more than 1200 vehicles destroyed in Iraq, and that's everything from trucks to fighter jets, and it's not just from enemy action. It's from accidents and just from simply wearing out. The equipment's wearing out at about five to six times the rate that they would be in peacetime, and the age is catching up to us. You know, for example, the average age of the M-1 tank is 20 years old right now. They're getting older than the soldiers that are driving them, and the result is we have readiness problems. The Army Chief of Staff found that two-thirds -- two-thirds of the Army brigade combat teams are not ready for combat. Same thing within National Guard and Reserves. You can break it down by state, but what should be interesting to these presidential candidates is that the readiness level and, for example, New Hampshire is 49 percent. Readiness level in Iowa is 47 percent. These are really worrisome trends.

The problem is that it's been mainly business as usual in how we respond to them. When you look at our budgeting, we're still focused on those centerpiece programs that have their origin back in the Cold War, and that's within each of the services whether you're talking about DDX or FCS or the like.

And the other problem is that our acquisitions and reform system --

our acquisition system is still incredibly inefficient. Cost overruns continue to happen. You know, for example, the top five weapons programs are over cost by 29 percent. That translates to $122 billion in extra spending that we didn't anticipate. F-22 is a good example of that. It was projected to be 145 million; it's up near about 360 million right now.

Now, those things happen, but what should concern us is that we're still giving the contractors performance bonuses for these. On the F-22 they got a 91 percent performance bonus even though we have those cost overruns, and we still have the trend of good ol' fashioned corruption. The Assistant Attorney General found that about five percent -- five percent of that defense budget was lost through straight-up graft, and then you add in the way Congress does business. About 14 -- well, actually about $15 billion in pork money was put into the defense budget last year and close to 3,000 earmarks. So, if we were talking about a business, we would be disturbed. This is incredibly inefficient. For a nation at war, we should be seriously disturbed.

And so where I'll end is this. When we hear the presidential candidates talk about what they're going to do on defense, the first is they typically don't base these trends. The second is if they do, they do it in a manner that I liken to sort of a poker game. One candidate says well, my solution is I'm going to raise the size of the military by 40,000. Another one says I'll see you, I'm far more pro-defense, raise it by a hundred thousand. Another one says no, no, no, no, I'm the most pro-defense here, increase the size of the military by

200,000. And they say the same thing within -- you hear the discussion now -- percentages of GDP. That's dodging the hard questions.

There's really two categories that we should be pressing our candidates to answer. The first is if you're going to expand the military, just how do you plan to do it given the current problems we have right now in recruiting and retention? What's the tradeoff that you're making between quantity and quality? And then the second part of that is, okay, if you're going to raise it by 50,000, 100,000, 200,000 what are the units that they're going to be in? What are the specialties? Tell us that. That's what we want to know. Or is it just a matter of just recreating the force that we had in 2000?

The second part of it is we should be asking what are your plans for the equipment crunch, not just the personnel side but the acquisition side, because basically there's three things that you can do. You can either focus on buying the new, and then the question to them should be okay, how are you going to meet the demands in the here-and-now, the 10 to 15 years before these new systems arrive? Or is your answer okay, I'm going to focus on buying the old. If that's the case, what are these systems that you're going to cut? Which one are you going to cancel? Or are you going to try and have it both ways? Are you going to try and buy the old and buy the new? And if that's the case, how are you going to meet that in a time where the supplemental budgets are probably going to go down, and also that you have a tax base that's shrinking as you have basically baby boomers moving into the next stage of their careers? How are you going to

meet those? Those are the hard questions we should be asking our presidential candidates right now. Thank you.

MS. RADDATZ: Don't think I'm not writing those questions down.

(Laughter)

MS. RADDATZ: I'm always looking for good questions. In fact, maybe not. We've been waiting for the presidential candidates, you know?

One of the things I just want to remark on is did you wonder why journalists get cynical? You hear statistics like that, and I just think of the press releases I get from the various services month after month about meeting recruiting goals and retention's great, painting a very rosy picture.

I just want to make one more point. I'll probably but in here a lot. But the class that just graduated from college is the war class. Their entire time in college we were at war in Iraq. I had an intern of mine make some random calls around to some top colleges to see how many graduation speakers even mentioned it. She said one college. So, I thought that was quite a remarkable statistic and where our heads are as a nation, since you brought that up, and the challenges we face in the future for exactly what you're saying.

General Christman, it's your turn.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Thanks, Martha.

First of all, my appreciation to Michael, to Brookings, and, Martha, to you for what you've done to chronicle the challenges of our forces, for

your wonderful book, and for the insights that you provide constantly on what's happening overseas. It's really wonderfully done and professionally done.

I'm going to talk about the Army. Michael asked me a month or so ago to answer the question, "So, how are the Armed Forces faring here and what should be done?"

The faring issue I think really has focused on those of us that wore the green suit on the Army. Our Chief of Naval Operations, as you may know, was asked by Secretary Gates, "So, what's your biggest challenge?" and he said, "the Army," and I think encapsulates the issue that we face here. Of our services, the one that I served in for 36 years is the one that's under the greatest stress. So, I want to talk about that.

I was commissioned into a draft Army in '65, soldiered through the hollow Army -- and it was that in the mid-1970s. We spent more of our effort, of our passion defending this Army from within than from without. It was part of the rebuilding process in the '80s through the professionalization, the deployed professional force, and then this situation that we're in right now as an observer, as a veteran observer.

So, that's my context.

To answer the question up front, the Army is not broken. Where I would disaggregate the Army, though, is really in three parts. The deployed Army in Iraq and Afghanistan is the best force that I have ever seen. The junior officers and the NCOs get it. They're professional, they work together as a team,

and they understand jointness. That ethic has been engrained. They understand combined logistics operations. They know intelligence fusion. They've been there so many times, it's -- as Barry McCaffrey actually has chronicled, it's a professional deployed military family. The problem with the Army is those 20-some-odd brigades in the active and added even more in the Reserves -- those are broken. They are combat-ineffective. As Gordon Sullivan has described it in our Association of the U.S. Army, in poker terms, we're all in. Every active component brigade that we can envision deploying in any reasonable time frame is already deployed, and so those units back in the States to respond to a national emergency, to a national disaster, a brigade active combat formation cannot do that within any reasonable time frame absent a tremendous amount of cross-leveling that has to take place with equipment and trained leaders.

The institutional Army is the third part. Deployed operational force, nondeployed combat brigades, institutional Army No. 3. That is under tremendous strain, but it's doing, frankly, better than I expected, and in many respects better than this country deserves given its decisions years ago not to increase the size of the Army and not to resource it adequately. And I'm talking about the institutional base now, Army Materiel Command, Health Services Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and the schoolhouses. Talk to any commander, visit them, look at the backlog of maintenance, and see the condition of that schoolhouse, the condition of the Materiel Command and its procurement cycles, and you understand how terribly strained they are. So, in the aggregate --

in the aggregate -- I am surprised the Army is holding together as well as it has. The deployed Army is the best I've seen; nondeployed, in my judgment, broken, institutional, holding together.

So, that's the bottom line, Michael.

I want to talk about really four pieces of this, though, as we get to a bottom line discussion, Martha, in the panel here.

And I want to start, really, with a 30,000-foot perspective that was offered last month in many respects by Paul Yingling. I hope that you've read the *Armed Forces Journal* May piece by Paul describing how we got it -- in Sir Michael Howard's terms -- how we got it nearly all wrong in the 1990s. And I think -- let me just be provocative here, because I was part of the commander's conferences that dealt with the question of the future of the Army during that period, and I'd argue that Paul Yingling in that portion of his article about did we get it too badly wrong in the 1990s in preparing for the next war, I'd answer yes.

And I'll tell you a quick story. I had just come back from a patrol in Kosovo, actually the last one I engaged in as a three-star general -- indoor Serbian enclave -- and I met some of our young West Point graduates from the classes of '98 and '99. One young man named Nate Self, who distinguished himself some years later in the battle of Tora Bora, was the mayor of this town.

Martha, you chronicled that term in your book.

So, I went to his NCO and I said so, Lieutenant Self is the mayor, and the sergeant said hell, no, sir, he's the chancellor of the entire region. He was

running everything -- schools, public services, as well as security.

We knew in the 1990s, late 1990s, what the future of the Army was forecasted to be. We sensed that, because we were deployed. In 2001 we had 200,000 troops -- in 2001, prior to 9/11, 200,000 troops deployed in 80 countries. This was prior to Afghanistan and Iraq. So, the nature of future operations was, in my judgment, quite visible. Yet, in the commander's conferences that we attended, one in particular -- I challenged the speaker -- kept introducing every topic to all the senior commanders, three and four stars, by saying, "Remember, all we do is war fighting." That's not all that we were doing, and so several of us raised our hands. My classmate Rick Shinseki was the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time. He had just published his vision, a vision for the Army that said the Army will be dominant across the full spectrum of operations. And so I said General Shinseki, I understand what Colonel so-and-so was saying here, but our soldiers are now deployed in contingency operations, in stability operations, in peace enforcement missions around the globe. That's not all we do -- war fighting. And General Shinseki, to his credit, said yes, Dan, you're right. But he was let down by us and by his senior commanders who did not foresee the future of land operations, of ground operations.

And what I want to encourage is one semantic, here, Martha, to encourage this audience in our Army to do is not look at Don Rumsfeld but look within ourselves at how the Army intellectually envisions this next two or three or four decades and what will be the role of land combat, of land operations, of the

role of ground forces in general, and that is a topic which, sadly, has been consumed in this fire of current operations where young officers at junior, middle, and senior grades are, frankly, incapable because of time demands to wrestle with that. And so I give Paul Yingling and those around him who rallied to that article a great deal of credit.

I wrote this piece here. I sketched this piece out, Martha, before I read Greg Jaffe's piece today in *The Wall Street Journal*. If you haven't read that -- front page below the fold -- you've got to, because it talks in many respects about what I'm about to describe here, and that's the need for intellectual recapitalization of our Armed Forces, of our Army in particular, through the prism of young officers at the 05 level and below, like Greg Jaffe.

So, I want to start at 30,000 feet. This whole question of *quo vadis*, really -- what's the future of ground operations for these next 30 or 40 years, and Yingling and others have a view on that. I don't know whether it's the right one or not, but it needs to be engaged. The Army needs to be engaged in doing this. Some of the first attempts to do this -- Rand's Project Air Force, for example, just published a couple of months ago -- frankly paint a little disturbing picture. It's a move I'd seen in the year 2000, chronicled at that point by *The New York Times* editorial board whom I visited shortly after their publications in that year that said the way ahead is information dominance, high technology, minimum land combat, fight the enemy, and destroy them from 30,000 feet. And many of us from the Academy staff went to *The New York Times* editorial board

and tried to dissuade them of that logic. Now, I'm pleased to see that *The New York Times* has actually changed their view on that. Over the last several years they have been outlining roles for ground operations for the Army and Marine Corps that are very different from their position six or seven years ago, and I applaud that. But that is part of this intellectual recapitalization that I'm referring to at the outset. So, that's the 30,000 feet.

Now, three issues. One -- Peter's raised it already -- junior officer retention, junior officer hemorrhage; the second is this intellectual component I was talking about to make sure that we're not just the best trained force in the world but that we also are the best educated force, officers and NCOs, and that's far different than a training command responsible for that; and, finally, the physical recapitalization of our Army, which goes well beyond equipment and things like FCS -- Future Combat Systems.

Now, let me talk, first of all, about the junior officer hemorrhage. It is bad. In rough terms, it's this. If you graduated from the military academy or indeed even from ROTC in one of the scholarship programs, within months of your completion of obligated service -- at West Point it's five years active and up to three years in the Reserves -- within months of that, 60 percent of a cohort is gone; 40 percent stays in. Now, there are some surprised looks in the crowd. Frankly, given the experiences outlined by Martha and Peter, I'm surprised it's 40 percent, and in fairness, that decline started in the 1990s -- dotcom boom, downsizing of the Army, what's the future of the land force -- but it has

accelerated during this period of the late '90s and into the early years of this decade as these classes have completed their obligated service.

The reason is simple. (Inaudible) the chairman has discussed this with me in private, and it simply is repeated combat deployments. We saw this in Vietnam. My own West Point class of 1965 -- all of us served a minimum of two tours -- two hardship tours -- in East Asia -- Southeast Asia -- and those that stayed in were very small at the 20-year mark, and all they've done is to move this decline curve to the left as a result of the Op tempo the Army's experiencing.

So, that's the challenge. The implication of it, Peter has suggested -- everybody's getting promoted to major, everybody is getting promoted to lieutenant colonel, selection rates well over 90 percent. Some of those shouldn't. Let's be candid. And in that promotion sequence lies, sadly, perhaps the seeds of some future ethical and moral challenges the Army is going to have to address. The Army is trying -- I'll say this, Martha, if you'd like, more fully in the Q&A -- to address this with some incentives that appear to be working a bit, incentives to entice junior officers especially to stay in longer. Brands of choice, station of choice, and, hallelujah, fully-funded graduate schooling. Now, that's helped a little bit in attenuating the drop, but it's a hugely important issue. The implication is, in essence, the hollowing out of the middle officer corps of our Army -- senior captains, majors, and junior 05s.

Second, intellectual recapitalization. I suggested this earlier. The future of any force, of any service really resides in its officer corps. The

Air Force and the Navy, as well as the Army and the Marine Corps, had invested literally hundreds of millions in putting their junior officers in graduate school over the years to train and educate them to be knowledgeable public servants able to deal side by side with the Peter Rodmans of the world. Peter I met when I finished graduate school at Princeton on the embassy staff in the 1970s in the middle of the cauldron called Vietnam. The Army still sent me to Princeton graduate school for two years. You wouldn't believe the client curve in fully funded graduate schooling until recently, and the challenge is that it's the officer corps that needs to look within itself and undertake this healthy debate about wither the future of land forces.

Greg Jaffe describes a scene in his article today that was a mirror image of what happened to me in 1974. Jack Cushman commented on it at Leavenworth. It brings in a series of general officers, one- and two-star, to talk about the Army and Vietnam in glowing terms, and they met these recalcitrant captains and junior majors just back from two combat tours, and it was a bloodbath. It was an internal revolution within the Army that Jack Cushman and others pushed, advocated, and out of that, frankly, came a rethink of how the Army would organize and train itself to be successful in the waning years of the Cold War. And it's that that's going on right now. The Yingling article has spawned a lot of internal debate. It's been criticized by the two-star general cohort, but we need to be open to these kinds of debates.

I got on the websites last night to see what's being published in

Military Review, *Parameters*, and even *Army Magazine*. My good friend General Atkinson is a wonderful publisher in that magazine, but very few articles are talking about this fundamental, strategic, long-term question. That's the intellectual recapitalization. Physical --

Martha, I'll stop here, because actually Peter talked about that very, very well.

What Peter didn't mention was the facility side of it, the schoolhouse side of it that I alluded to at the beginning. It's that biowave of expenditures, the equipment recapitalization, and facility recapitalization the Army has said will take about 20 to 30 billion additional each year for three to five years at the end of our operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq to reset the force; and the concern, which I think Peter has outlined, is this will occur more than likely in the middle of yet another urge for a peace dividend in the middle of biowaves or entitlement spending now confronting pay-go provisions on Capitol Hill. This is a hugely important time for the Army to get its argument right with Capital Hill and with our constituencies to make sure that we don't lose this window again and get it too badly wrong for 2030 and 2040.

Thanks, Martha.

MS. RADDATZ: Thanks, General Christman. That is something that I've looked at. I haven't read Greg's article yet, although he is so fabulous. It's been very difficult for me as a television correspondent to explain to people what this means when officers aren't signing up again or they're leaving and the

retention, and the way I've explained it to people is the training is so great for young officers. It's like a fighter pilot. If you lose six out of ten fighter pilots, you have six airplanes that aren't being flown, you have six missions that aren't being accomplished, you have a huge pool in the middle of your operation, and it is just as vital on the ground, more vital certainly now because we're in a land war.

And just one other point about these deployments that I was thinking of. It is different from Vietnam in these deployments. In Vietnam, and I don't know the statistics here, but they were in engagements maybe every 40, 50 days. Every single day the U.S. military is on the ground, every single day they are deployed, they are at risk. They don't even have to go outside the wire. That does something to people. That raises your adrenalin constantly, and I know there seeing problems with that, but it is a very different kind of deployment, a very different kind of demand. It is not going over there and seeing battle maybe once a month; it is constant, and that chews people up. Thanks.

Peter Rodman.

MR. RODMAN: Martha, thank you.

I think Michael invited me here this morning to put this discussion in some kind of context. I'm not an expert on the raising and supporting of armies and navies and air forces, but the problem that we've been discussing here this morning is obvious. The stress on the force is obvious, and that is going to have to be a major factor in any policy deliberation that takes place in the U.S.

government now and for a long time to come. I support the measures that the President announced earlier this year to expand the Army and the Marine Corps. I support any other ideas that come along to do that, even the O'Hanlon foreign legion idea. I think that's a creative idea. But we all recognize that none of these ideas -- I think even the foreign legion idea -- is going to have any quick effect and help us solve our problem in the near term as long as we are engaged in Iraq. Now, unfortunately the real problem is how do we measure this cost and the cost of continuing this engagement? How do we measure that against the consequences of not succeeding in Iraq? That's a painful question. What are those consequences? And I guess, as I said, I'm here to provide some strategic context. If we do not succeed in Iraq this has an effect on the strategic environment and on the missions, the future missions and burdens on American forces.

What would be the consequences of imposing defeat on ourselves in Iraq? First, I think you would see a tremendous euphoria among all the radical forces in the Middle East and see the demoralization of our friends. You'd see an acceleration of the radicalization of every conflict in the Middle East.

Secondly, specifically, I think you would exacerbate the strategic problem that Iran now represents. If the American strategic position is seen to erode, how do we deal with what I think all of our friends in the Middle East see as in fact the number one threat today, which is the threat -- the geopolitical and ideological threat of Iran? Our Arab friends agree on that. Our Israeli friends

agree on that. What is the effect on our credibility? We are in the process of reassuring all of our friends in the Middle East that we're there to protect them, we can hold the ring against Iran. What happens to the credibility of those reassurances if they see a bad outcome in Iraq? And, as I said, the question relevant to our discussion is what is the future burden on American forces if that were to happen?

Now, this is in the realm of speculation. What is the effect on the -- in terms of the demoralization of our military if we impose on ourselves a defeat in this conflict? But, more broadly, what would be the consequences in terms of additional responsibilities for our forces in a region that will have become much less stable?

I'm not pointing to any particular contingency, but I cannot believe that any upsurge of Islamist radicalism in the Middle East is going to mean our forces get a break from responsibility. This is the strategic problem I'm worried about as I listen to our domestic debate.

Right now, the fashionable discussion is all about American unilateralism and American arrogance and American hubris and America throwing its weight around. Well, I would predict, on the contrary, that potentially the most destabilizing factor in the world in the coming period may be the fear of American weakness. If we are driven out of Iraq, what the world will look to the next President for most of all may not be some great display of self-abasement and humility, you know, to be the un-Bush. I think, rather, that the

world is going to look to the next President for reassurance that the United States is still strong, that the United States is still capable of acting decisively, that the United States is still committed to the security of its friends.

Now, again, I cannot make this concrete about what is the burden on our forces. But the foreign policy problem will not go away, and the doubt about American staying power -- removing that doubt is going to be an uphill battle for the United States if Iraq ends badly.

Now, maybe I should just say another word about Iraq itself. I agree with Michael, what he said at the very beginning. I believe the President and General Petraeus are determined to accomplish what they set out to do. I don't think they're looking right now for ways out, you know, looking for an exit until they have accomplished what they set out to do. So, I, too, look a little skeptically at some of these reports. People already have their withdraw plans on the table. We shall see. I think if things go well, options do present themselves. That's the whole point of what is being undertaken, but --

And Martha mentioned the President's speech yesterday, and I think, yes, indeed we will have a discussion of a glass half full, half empty, three-quarters full. We'll certainly have that discussion in September and maybe even before September.

But the question we'll have to ask -- and this is just a point about metrics -- I just -- I have -- this is something on my mind. You read about benchmark metrics. Metrics are a great management tool, but I think we suffer

right now from a surplus of metrics. There's a quarterly report that I was involved in when I was in the Pentagon, Section 9010 of the Defense Appropriations Act, and we have 25 benchmarks. The law that was passed, a supplemental appropriation, has 18 benchmarks. I've seen interagency papers with, you know, several dozen things we want the Iraqis to do.

I hope General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker can cut through some of this and focus on what is strategic. What are the factors that would indicate whether this enterprise is worth continuing or not? What are the most important -- what are the strategic trends? A big part of this I think may be a more big picture assessment, and there will be some imponderables in it and things that are not quantifiable. But that I think is what is going to be necessary.

What is the strategic result so far from the new strategy that's underway? Just for what it's worth, I'll say I'm moderately encouraged by what's happening on the military side, and I think now that a comprehensive set of operations is underway, it's certainly premature to declare failure when we've just begun a wave of offensive operations.

On the political side in Iraq, that has been more disappointing, but so, again, in September if not before September, we'll have to weigh all these factors together.

So, it is too early to predict, in my view, where this country is going -- what decision is going to be made by this country in the fall. But I'd just throw an idea out there. Everybody asks us what our Plan B is if this fails, but I'd

just throw the idea out there that what if there is some (inaudible) progress on the military side and even on the political side, what if it does seem to lean toward the positive? Do opponents of this war have a Plan B? Are they prepared to acknowledge what might -- I mean, just hypothetically -- be a reasonably encouraging picture in the fall? Anyway, that's just a thought.

Michael.

Martha.

MS. RADDATZ: Okay, thanks.

I'm just thinking, Peter, about the new strategy, and I have to say that I have heard it explained to me over and over, and the difference to me I don't really know other than the fact that there's a surge going on, and when you talk about the strategic implications and we look at this in the fall and I think it's something, you know, we're certainly in the media watching, we have heard the President say that the Iraqis have to meet some political benchmarks, and whether there are a series of benchmarks for the political progress or not, that's going to be measured in the media, that's going to be measured in the American public, and you have to have the backing of the American public. To me one of the things that has been lacking is, again, sort of bringing the public in, and now that they're focused on this, now that so many people want a drawdown, want us out of there, that really does matter, and believe me, come September or before that, we're all going to pull out President Bush's speech from last November with Maliki when he said he's the right guy for Iraq. We're going to pull out the speech in January

when the President announced the new strategy and said we have to have progress now from the Iraqis. To me, that is the real measure of what will be looked at in September even more than the military progress, which I know there has been progress militarily but there's been progress in the past and that hasn't helped.

I want to ask one question, and then I'm going to open it up, and that is where we started and what we've all talked about, about the breaking point of the military. We've all talked about it, we've all seen what's happening to the military, but -- and I'd like to start with Michael -- how do you know? Who decides whether we really are doing too much given the global demands, given what's happening in Iran, given how the rest of the world already looks at us, not particularly how they'll look at us after Iraq, depending on how that turns out?

MR. O'HANLON: Martha, great question. Of course it's a critical question. All I can do is transform the question a little, because I can't answer it. I don't know at what point you say from Peter Singer's statistics -- or Dan Christman's statistics -- that 65 percent attrition of first-term West Pointers is too much whereas 60 percent was barely tolerable or that having 12 percent of category 4 recruits is too high but 6 percent was okay, because of course the real measure in the end is that people just leave in droves faster than we can replace them. At that point, you've failed, so you can't wait for that moment. That's the obvious way to measure it, but then that's too late. So, I don't know how to read the warning signs.

The way I transform it, and maybe this allows me to offer a quick

reaction to Peter Rodman's way of looking at the surge, for me it raises the bar that the surge has to achieve in order to be worth continuing, and I think that the bar has to be fairly high. I've been a conditional supporter of the surge. I still am, although we just put out a paper this week trying to develop a Plan B for soft partition in case it doesn't work. But I think for me the standard is going to have to be substantially higher than what it is seeming to accomplish so far even in military terms.

The Pentagon's report that came out two weeks ago suggested no drop-off in civilian fatalities in Iraq in the first quarter -- or, excuse me, in the springtime period. Now, Peter's right -- Peter Rodman's right, Peter Singer's right, too, on other points, but Peter Rodman's right that it's early and we have to be a little bit patient. But if we've seen no drop-off at all in civilian fatalities so far -- yes, in certain categories, but then they've been compensated for by increases elsewhere -- that's not good enough.

I would personally -- and I'll end on this point, it's meant to be a provocation not a definitive analytical judgment -- if we don't see something closer to a 50 percent reduction in civilian fatality rates by the fall, as well as at least one big breakthrough on political consensus, I start to say the risks of continuing this are not necessarily worth the risks to the force and the potential for a collapse -- and I don't think any of us have the analytical tools to predict in the way we'd like to and therefore we have to ask it in these terms of risk versus progress. The progress is going to have to be pretty impressive to warrant a

continuation of these risks.

MS. RADDATZ: And, Peter Rodman, if I could of you, since you talked about defeat in Iraq and how that would be viewed in the region and the dangers of that, but you know how we're already viewed in the region, how does that play into it, and so I ask you the same question essentially that I asked Michael: How long can you do it if success doesn't appear apparent?

MR. RODMAN: I was engaged in a lot of discussions with Arab allies, as well as Israelis, and they are rooting for us. I mean, there's no way around it. They worry -- and as I said, they look at Iraq in this wider context. They see Iran as the looming problem, and they worry very much about an American setback in Iraq as, you know, putting into question our credibility, the credibility of assurances we're trying to give them about Iran.

You know, it would be nice to think there's some way to cut our losses in Iraq and reconfigure our position and be strong, you know, compensate in other ways to be strong in the Middle East. I'm not sure how you do that. I don't know how you square the circle. I'm not sure how you be strong against Iran if we're weak in Iraq, so I'm just saying that there's a price here, and I hope that our domestic discussion at least bears some relation to what's actually happening not only in Iraq but the implications for the region as a whole and for our whole strategic position from decisions we make.

MS. RADDATZ: How do you balance the practicality that we're all talking about here that the military is so stretched that recruiting is going to be

difficult, that retention is difficult? How do you balance that with what's happening in the region? At what point, really, do those collide?

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: I was concerned, Martha, about extra-regional challenges outside the region that Central Command hosts for its area.

MR. RODMAN: I mean, I agree with that, too.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: That's one of the reasons I had some misgivings about the surge to begin with. We have, as the Association of the U.S. Army says, played our poker hand, we're all in. So, what happens now if something in Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya -- if Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Palestinian territories, Lebanon breaks or, Heaven knows, in Western Pakistan to push our efforts there? We have a problem with no strategic reserve.

You asked the question at the beginning of -- your very first question out of the box, Martha, was how do you know when it's broken? And one of the tests for that is can the military respond to what the National Command Authorities want its military to do? And I would argue that, as I said at the beginning, I don't think the deployed force is broken, but Heaven forbid if the NCA decides to commit ground combat operations elsewhere in the globe having put 22, 23 -- all of the active combat brigade formations in this region. That's what worries me the most.

MS. RADDATZ: I just want to let Mr. --

MR. RODMAN: Yeah, let me make a couple of points. I think Dan -- I agree with Dan, but he has -- he spoke very precisely. He talked about

ground forces. There was a tsunami a couple of years ago. We moved 15,000 personnel in Indonesia, you know, for relief effort, and they came from PACOM and they were mostly air and naval forces, and we had the forces in PACOM even though we were fighting two wars in the Middle East.

The second point is what's the tipping point, because that's the question. We have fixed on September as some magical date and I don't know whether that's necessarily the moment of national decision. I mean, our country may decide that that is the moment of decision. I think it's arbitrary. Given how high the stakes are, if we have a strategy underway instead of operations underway that have some possibility of achieving a result, I mean, my bias is to let's see it -- let's test this strategy before we make a drastic decision. I'm not sure September -- and I think General Petraeus and General Lodearno were trying to, you know, get us off this idea that there's a binary moment in September when it's, you know, all or nothing, go/no-go, pass/fail, because that won't reflect either the reality on the ground or the stakes that are involved.

MR. SINGER: One thing I wanted to add to that is that the way we've met these other challenges is that we've turned our Navy and our Air Force into our strategic reserve. We don't have the capacity to respond on the ground to something, and I'm not just talking about, you know, large-scale operations. You heard the Army Chief of Staff quote. But also 88 percent of our Special Operations community is deployed in the CENTCOM, so you're trying to cover the rest of the world with that 12 percent. Same thing with pre-positioned

equipment and ammunition stocks. The only one that's full is for a Korea scenario. All of the others have been stripped out for Iraq.

And then, finally, we're talking foreign policy where we may see the real breaking point, and again we're talking about, you know, when do you cross this tipping point? You have an elastic response in Iraq. It's that other scenario that snaps that rubber band. It may be at home, and that's especially the case for the National Guard and reserves, and we saw this even in Kansas where if they had been hit by not one but two tornadoes they wouldn't have been able to answer, and the only way they answered the cleanup to that one was by pulling in equipment and support from other states and private companies, and that's a small-scale disaster. What about another large-scale one? And so I think it's that other scenario we have to worry about.

MS. RADDATZ: There are so many -- I'm going to open it up to questions now, but I was thinking about scenarios. What if the nation is attacked in a huge major cyber attack? What if our banking systems are shut down? What if our electrical grids are shut down -- do we then go after the offender militarily? I mean, there are all sorts of things to think about in the battle for the future.

So, any questions? Quite a few apparently. Let's start in the back.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER: Well, Martha stole my thunder a little bit, but I'm hoping to add a little twist on the particular question I have. As the wife a two-time Iraq veteran, I would like to also address how do you -- and I actually was inspired by Mr. Rodman's commentary, but I pose this to

all of you -- how do you address the balance of the toll of the mental and physical health on the military with the gain of winning in Iraq, and how do you operationally define winning in Iraq?

MR. RODMAN: Oh, that's to me? Winning? I think it's stabilizing the country and to the point where we can transition, we can turn the main responsibility over to them. That is an objective. In other words, leave in conditions having achieved what we set out to achieve, which is Iraqi institutions, modern Iraqi government that is taking on the responsibility itself for security and for everything else. That's -- that would be a pretty good definition of success. I mean, there may still be conflict going on inside Iraq, but it could be dealt with by the Iraqi forces and some smaller American and coalition contingent. I mean, that would be a definition of success, and that I think is what's up in the -- you know, hanging in the balance right now.

I think after the Samarra bombing -- if you're interested in my sort of assessment about what the strategic purpose of the surge was -- until the surge, I think the focus of our strategy was training and equipping in order to transition out, but the premise of that was that the political process was on track. You had this set of elections in 2005 which the insurgents were trying to derail and failing to derail. And this all made sense until the Samarra bombing of February of 2006, which shook the political structure. I mean, the political structure, instead of being a success story, was shaken very badly by Zarqawi and his colleagues and suddenly you had a political problem. You had -- suddenly we had a strategic

problem, and it did not make sense to continue our -- just to focus only on the previous strategy of just training and equipping and transitioning out, because the premise of that thing had been shaken.

The purpose of the surge, at least as I see it, is to impose ourselves on Baghdad, to impose on both -- the extremists on both sides in order to allow this political structure to get back on its feet, to buy time for the -- to dampen the spiral of sectarian killing and allow this political process to get its feet on the ground. That is why it is so important that we see that result -- some result in the political sphere, but I think the military objective was just to impose some stability and, you know, a show of strength to dampen this spiral of violence that was a product of Samarra. So, I think it was overdue for us to react. I think clinging to the -- you know, the previous strategy was just ignoring something very big that happened after Samarra. But I think that's what's being tested now, and I think it's premature to say that it's failed. You know, the government is functioning.

One thing worth pointing out is the second Samarra bombing. The political structure held. You had the leadership of all the communities coming together with I'm sure some American diplomatic support, and what could have been another massive shock to the whole system was dampened by I think some intelligent and statesman-like behavior on the part of the leaders of the Iraqi communities. I mean, it's not a trivial thing. But something that didn't happen a couple of weeks ago is worth noting. But that's -- does that answer the --

MS. RADDATZ: Well, answer the other part if you could about at what point the strain -- her second question.

MR. RODMAN: You're a family. You suffer this -- I can't speak for you or understand what you're going through, but then what is -- what is the effect on our people if something that -- a sacrifice for what turns out to have been in vain. Doesn't it mean something to people to have gone through all this stress and, you know, ultimate sacrifice and have something to show for it? I mean, how important is that psychologically to people? I can't answer that, because I'm not in your position.

MS. RADDATZ: Peter Singer?

MR. SINGER: It's a great question, because one of the fundamental differences between this war and Vietnam is that it's a family war and that 60 percent of the soldiers that have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have some sort of family responsibility, and that's a far greater percentage than we saw during Vietnam, and so it raises a question in the long term for the Army and the militaries: How do you support these extended deployments with this different type of structure? I would argue that one of the biggest challenges is how does the military -- how does that commander-in-chief in particular -- how does the President keep their promises, keep their promises to the families, keep their promises to wounded warriors, keep their promises to veterans, because one of the -- this is anecdotal -- I hate being the number guy -- is that at least in discussions with folks in the military, what they talk about as the biggest

challenge is the change in expectations in midstream while you're deployed. As Martha said, you think you're going to be there 12 months and then it's 15 months and the effect that that has is not only on you but also on your family, because you tell your daughter okay, I'm not going to be there for Christmas but I will be there for graduation, and then you're not able to keep that promise, and that's the hard part that we have to figure out. How do we meet those expectations, meet those promises, and that's talking about active duty deployed, but I think we've also got the same thing with veterans and wounded warriors that, you know, needs to move beyond just oh, let's fix Walter Reed.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: And it also, it seems to me, emphasizes -- and this group is very important to be able to carry this message -- this takes resources to make sure that the families who have sacrificed so much going forward have the support systems in place to be able to accommodate these separations and the inevitable problems that ensue from that. We're talking here resources in the sense of what percent of our gross domestic product goes to defense? When I was commissioned, it was 12 to 13 percent. Now it's 3.9, nearly 4. There has to be a national commitment, because one way you address the issue that you've raised about the balance that you are seeking in your question is to ensure that we have an increased size of the Army, of our ground component. What's been proposed, in my judgment, is inadequate. Frankly, I'm not sure quite how we get there, given the challenges of recruiting, but I think that we can. It's got to be an Army that's 600,000 to allow dwell time for families between combat

separations, but probably even more importantly to make sure that organizations like the Health Services Command are adequately funded to handle these inevitable post-deployment challenges that families face every day.

MR. RODMAN: And nobody's answered my question. What is the moral and psychological effect of making a national decision that guarantees that all the sacrifice will have been in vain? I mean, again, I don't -- I can't speak for somebody who paying that price though, either way.

MS. RADDATZ: I won't take answers from the audience, so --

(Laughter)

MS. RADDATZ: I'll just take questions here --

MR. RODMAN: Why not? That's not fair.

MS. RADDATZ: -- and I think that's something all of us have thought about, and certainly it depends on the circumstances of what happens in the end or -- I mean, I -- it's hard for me to imagine that the United States would just say we've been driven out. I mean, certainly you can say the Iraqis didn't do their part or we had expectations of them -- they didn't rise to -- I -- their circumstances would certainly say that. I think it's a debate dying in vain. I mean, to me every soldier, Marine, airman who has died over there died because they were doing what thought was right when they died, and we can have this debate a long time.

I just want to say one thing about the deployments, and I'm really bad at math. In fact, my parking place is No. 22, because they know if I transpose

it, it's still 22.

(Laughter)

MS. RADDATZ: I think if you do the math on the deployments now and you think of the 15-month deployments, come April they might have -- they would have to go to 18. Secretary Gates says he does not want that, but -- and I know there was a flurry of email traffic the other day when the new Secretary of the Army said something about 18 months. I don't think there re any plans for that. Oh, I'm wrong. Okay. But that would be unbelievably shocking for families if they had to stay there or if they had to do that in the future. I mean, you're not talking about missing two birthdays and two Christmases while you're deployed; you're missing everything.

Go ahead, sir.

PROF. SMITH: Bruce Smith, retired Brookings, now George Mason University. I'll duck this important recent question and address myself to an apparent paradox here. I remember the days when we -- the general alluded to the draft days -- I was a young professor at Columbia University, and I was in a few riots, and it's not too pleasant, and there were reasons why we went to the volunteer force. Now, it seems that this volunteer force worked just splendidly. Everyone's delighted with it. It worked very well. We had 200,000 troops around the world. There's only one circumstance apparently in which it doesn't work, and that is if we actually have to go to war, if we actually have to deploy people repeatedly. Then it doesn't seem to work. Now, we've talked about many good

things. Mike O'Hanlon's foreign legion -- I think that's great. I think we should have the don't ask/don't tell thing repealed. I don't know how much the numbers would improve, but let's do it that way --

MS. RADDATZ: Okay, I'm going to make you get to your question, because we're running out of time. I know you, professor, and, you know.

PROF. SMITH: Okay, the question is this. Doing all of the good things that we want to do -- the general wants to do -- aren't we still faced with the problem that people don't like to get killed no matter how big the bonus is. So let's have a soft draft. Let's register people. We don't have to call them up, but let's say we're going to register people, we're going to revive the Selective Service, we're going to revive the fact that when a nation goes to war the whole nation goes to war. Let's put it on the books. That might help encourage recruitment.

MS. RADDATZ: Michael O'Hanlon, you take that one. Just perhaps illegal immigrants you would --

MR. O'HANLON: I'll just make a couple of points, Bruce. One is -- and I'm sure you didn't intend anything, but I want to say how impressed I am by the soldiers and Marines and what they've been doing. I don't think that they or their families have objected to this war. In fact, I can't believe they've how long they've put up with it. Again, I can't believe how long they've put up with being so few for so long, so alone. So, you're getting at the same point I realize, but I just want to be clear that I don't think the force has been complaining about

risking their lives. They have a right to complain about getting second and third revisions to their deployment schedules, but I'm, overall, quite impressed and I think you are, too, so I don't make a lot of that.

But there is, I think, a serious issue here about national service, and while I'm strongly opposed to the draft, because I don't think it worked well, I do think there is a serious case for national service -- obligatory national service. I'm not quite up to endorsing it, but I think there's a serious debate to be had there with the military as one option that would be incentivized so you could choose that. You have other educational benefits above and beyond what you'd get from, let's say, other forms of national service.

Peter Singer, in his paper, has talked about something that Kathy (inaudible) endorsed as well, which is at least asking our commanders-in-chief or candidates for commander-in-chief to call the nation's youth to consider national service even if there's nothing obligatory about it.

So, those are the sorts of things I would suggest in addition to my foreign legion idea. But I do think the overall conclusion here is -- again, to drive home the same point -- we're asking way too much of way too few for way too long, and that should be a lesson of this war.

PROF. SMITH: Is that -- but can you avoid that? Whatever you do -- send them to the draft, to school, or anything else -- is that going to solve the problem? Can you really work through the problems you're posing?

MR. O'HANLON: My point is I think it's held up remarkably

well, but there's a problem with sizing, and we should have -- you know, we have known that certainly by 2003 if not before and changed the size of the force by then.

MS. RADDATZ: Admiral Pietropoli.

ADM. PIETROPOLI: (Inaudible)

MS. RADDATZ: Because no one would know you were an admiral, yeah.

ADM. PIETROPOLI: It doesn't sound like a Navy question, but when you talk about building the Army to 600,000 -- the standing Army -- which, if we are going to be in Iraq for some time to come at 150 to 200,000 combat troops, absolutely essential even if it's not achievable. But is it the Army's view or should it be the nation's view -- if there's one sort of overriding lesson you might take away from Iraq -- is that the idea of landing a large ground force, driving to some other nation's capital, defeating their military, and then holding that nation against the will of at least some percentage of the population isn't a good way for America to be? We're not good at occupying forces -- as an occupying force where we're not wanted. If we build the Army as you say, are we going to be building it for the eventuality of being able to occupy a nation of 25 to 30 million people the size of Texas, most of whom or many of whom don't want us there? Is that the plan?

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: No, clearly not. It's a plan to build an Army to engage friends, allies, and potential adversaries around the globe in a

period of sustained military-to-military engagement over the next 30 or 40 years. This will be an engagement-heavy period.

I happen to love the E word. President Clinton adopted a national security strategy that was called the strategy of engagement and enlargement. He dropped the enlargement term second term but kept engagement. I think it's a wonderful expression of what our military -- our Marines and Army -- will likely be doing for these next 20 or 30 years.

Yes, there'll be contingencies that we have respond to that will require lethal force, ground combat, but more than likely it's going to be that hard, slogging, day-to-day engagement with training, with stability operations -- yes, even participating in multilateral operations under NATO or the U.N. around the corners of the globe in regions that are failing or in failed states where, because of current numbers constraints, we simply haven't gone.

Classic case: Central Africa. Should have gone there in the '90s. Compelling case for that now. There's no way we could send a combat brigade into a contingency like that, but our view -- my view is that it's much more sensible for the Army to be engaging in these kinds of missions, to influencing potential adversaries, training allies and their forces in military operations and stability operations going forward than it is to let those states and nations fail and then attack them with precision weapons 30 years later.

So, this engagement-heavy period for the Armed Forces is something that will require, in my judgment, an armed force -- certainly a ground

force -- of Marines and Army substantially bigger than the authorized number that we've entered this conflict with, and that's 480,000.

MS. RADDATZ: Ma'am?

Just probably two more.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER: Thank you.

As someone who has worked as a civilian psychotherapist clinician with the military, one of the things that I learned -- this is a couple years ago -- one of the things that I learned -- and we're not going to get into the mental health question -- one of the things I learned with the military is you have a plan, you execute the plan, and you get out. I don't see this as the paradigm that's happening now.

General, I'd like to ask you, and perhaps Mr. Rodman and all of you, as you talk about the need to increase our military and our reserve and work with other countries to help us out, going into help out in a crisis, like the tsunami, is not the same thing as going to war and get killed. I think that's two separate issues. So, how do we engage other allies or other countries, rather, because we are losing -- we don't have that many people signing up. We don't have a draft. What would be your suggestions on how we can -- or our leaders -- can engage more folks, whether it be in this country or other countries, to join up with us to increase the size of whatever Armed Forces that we need? Thank you.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Let me take a stab, and I'll ask the other panelists here to join me. It's a thoughtful question. First let me do it narrowly

with respect to our own domestic enlistment challenge, which you correctly highlight.

The Army needs about 80,000 new recruits each year to maintain its force, a stretch goal of 84, 85, to begin a ramp up each year towards the authorized increase, Army and Marine, of 60,000-plus. As you know, they missed that in May by a couple thousand. Michael O'Hanlon has hit one point that I thought was essential for this, and that's an encouragement not just from national leaders, Michael, but from schools, from regional leaders about the nobility of service, of public service with military as an option. I agree with that notion.

We also need to be careful as well -- I'll just push back a little bit with Peter with respect to concerns about quality. I'm concerned about numbers. This is a volunteer force that has as its incentive the market. If we need riflemen, we need to pay them and encourage them to join. How many times have we heard national leaders encourage people to joint the Army, the Marines, the Armed Forces? I've heard that very, very seldom of late. But it's that national commitment from all levels of our public sector for service in our Armed Forces that's so essential.

On the quality piece, what I'm going to push back just a bit on -- Peter had said the increase in Cat. 4, the lowest mental category. Last year there was a tremendous brouhaha over that -- oh, my goodness, we've doubled it from 2 to 4 percent. When I took over my battalion in 1980 on the East German border

by the Folda Gap, my battalion had in it Cat. 4s in excess of 40 percent; so, yes, we're increasing Cat. 4s, but in that area, in over 40 -- I think last year we enlisted 16 people who were over the age of 40. At age 64 I think age 40 is pretty damn young.

And high school diplomas. Again, I'm not worried about that. GED programs are really quite beneficial. About 20 percent, now, of the Army's cohort is non-high school diploma GED. The number one graduate of the Naval Academy this last year, GED Marine Rhodes Scholar. So, there's an awful lot in that pool that can populate a force.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER: Are you worried about any type of criminal background?

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Sure. Oh, sure, yeah. But, again, the commander of the Recruiting Command -- Major-General Tom Bostick -- was my company commander in this battalion that had 40 percent Cat. 4s. He's now a two-star general and is in charge of the Recruiting Command. We have disaggregated the issues of the blotter, the criminal record. The vast majority of those are drug incidents on the marijuana side and beyond. Very, very few are actual criminal offenses that rise to the level of a long-term incarceration.

Your second point is also valid, and that's how do you encourage allies? Everybody has made an awful lot of NATO's commitment in Afghanistan. It's wonderful. But the problem is the constraints on NATO's forces in terms of where they're deployed. Frankly, that's the crime. German has this wonderful

army and it's deployed in Northeastern Afghanistan where it's not needed. And the defense expenditures in NATO, roughly 2 percent of GDP for the vast majority of countries except for France and the UK, and if you take countries like the Benelux and take two battalions of that force and deploy it, you've exhausted their rotational capability. There has to be a national commitment going forward to encourage allies -- like NATO, like Japan, and others who are leaning forward, Japan in particular -- to contribute combat formations, as they have, to contingencies around the globe to compliment the US.

MR. RODMAN: I'd like to make a plug here just to add --

MS. RADDATZ: Okay.

MR. RODMAN: -- make a plug for security assistance for training and equipping friendly countries precisely for the same purpose, and, you know, this is something administrations of both parties understand the value of, and Congress is always reluctant. It's a very cost-effective way to train forces that can handle a crisis so that American forces don't always get called upon.

MS. RADDATZ: Okay, last question.

MR. LEE: My name is Fitzhugh Lee. I'm a seventh generation officer in the Armed Forces, a Navy F-18 pilot currently flying a desk for Senator McCain for a year before I go back to flying. I've been kind of surprised at the -- as we're talking about policy, we haven't talked much, with the exception, sir, of strategy, which you would think -- what would drive our policy so we don't have a strategy policy mismatch. Can we separate a discussion about future military

force structure without bringing in other aspects of our national power?

General, you alluded to the fact that we do more than just fight battles kinetically now. But there seems to me from, again, two tours in the current war (inaudible) in Iraq, we're severely limited by some of our other federal agencies that -- and this kind of gets bent in, you know, nationalizing this war. So, as we discuss future force structure, I'm not so sure that while the strain on the military is important, what do we hope to achieve and are we the only folks that should be looking at this?

MS. RADDATZ: I think that's a great question. I read something the other day. For instance, the State Department is 25,000 people. There are only 11,000 Foreign Service officers and yet they're playing a role in this war and they're so undermanned it's incredible. You probably like that fighter pilot analogy then, huh?

Why don't we have Michael talk about that.

MR. O'HANLON: I'll going to say a brief word. Others may want to --

MS. RADDATZ: And then you can close it out.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, and I'll -- but I'll pass it along before I do close it out.

I think you're totally right. I think that one of the advantages, for example, of a broad call to national service is that other kinds of government service could be considered to be applicable. I think certainly any kind of a

national service that was obligatory -- not that I'm favoring it per se -- should definitely go beyond the military for that reason. I think the discussion of the budget, which Peter Singer brought us back to in I think in a very useful way, does have to remember that not all of our money can go towards DoD, and sometimes we get better benefit whether it's from security training programs or from increasing the size of the security -- the Stabilization and Reconstruction Corps that Carlos Pascual was beginning to develop before he came here to Brookings. So, I could go on but probably not very comprehensively in the short time. I just want to back up your point and leave those few little examples.

Others may want to quickly comment before we conclude.

MR. SINGER: I would just say two things. The issue of quality becomes more important in this time of the strategic corporal, so the burden's on them, it's a fusion of all these trends, and the idea of the strategic corporal is that they have greater responsibilities. What concerns me is that we have those corporals, those NCOs, serving as mayors and not giving them the skill set, and I think when we hear this discussion we have this odd dichotomy in American politics where it's don't expand the government but it's okay to expand the military, but then it's that disconnect on the ground that's the problem. That's why we haven't been able to solve this situation in Iraq -- is that the rest of the government hasn't arrived. And so what I would argue is that we might, in this grand strategic debate, want to talk about expanding other agencies' ability to deploy, to support, because right now they don't have the personnel, they don't

have the structure, the training, and they can't even get there on their own. So, we might, you know, instead of adding another brigade combat team, say hmm, it might be better to create a number of PRTs. They're drawing from other agencies and we'll get a lot more bang for the buck out of that.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Why is Fitzhugh Lee not in the cavalry?

(Laughter)

MR. LEE: And the last three were Navy and Marine Corps.

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Your point on strategy is superb. There are, obviously, elements within our defense establishment where the military has got to play in the development of that. QDR, defense guidance, national military strategy -- each of those requires thoughtful, educated officers that have the wherewithal, the chutzpah if necessary, to challenge traditional thinking and make sure that their views are heard when the issue of shaping future strategy is developed.

MS. RADDATZ: Mr. Rodman, any final thoughts?

MR. RODMAN: No.

MS. RADDATZ: Okay. Thank you very much. It was a pleasure being up here on the panel.

(Applause)

LT GEN CHRISTMAN: Thanks, Martha.

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