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Welcome and Introduction

DANIEL BENJAMIN, Director of the Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution

The French Elections

Chair:
JIM HOAGLAND, *The Washington Post*
Panelists:
LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, Skadden Arps, Notre Europe
PHILIP GORDON, The Brookings Institution
CORINE LESNES, *Le Monde*

NATO in Afghanistan

Chair:
CARLOS PASCUAL, The Brookings Institution
Panelists:
LT. GEN. KARL EIKENBERRY, Deputy MR. of the NATO Military Committee
ASHRAF GHANI, former Finance Minister of Afghanistan
MARVIN WEINBAUM, Middle East Institute

Islam in Europe

Chair:
JEREMY SHAPIRO, The Brookings Institution
Panelists:
DANIEL BENJAMIN, The Brookings Institution
TUFYAL CHOUDHURY, Durham University
JONATHAN LAURENCE, Boston College

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BENJAMIN: Well, good morning. I'm Daniel Benjamin, Director of the Brookings Center on the U.S. and Europe, and I want to welcome you to our fourth annual conference.

It's hard to think of a time when Washington has been more self-obsessed, whether it's the war over the war between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; the war over the stewardship of the World Bank; or, for those who have other interests, the question of who ABC News will out next. And so had anyone said that they wanted to spend the day simply refreshing Google news at their desk, one could have had a lot of understanding for them. With that said, I'm very pleased that so many of you have turned up to listen about some key issues regarding what is going on in Europe and regarding the endeavors that join the United States and Europe together.

As is customary for our annual conferences, we have chosen not to pick a single overarching theme for the day out of our belief that there is much more going on at many different levels than could ever be captured by such a theme and that this would be more of a limitation than an inspiration to creative thinking.

We're going to look at three very different kinds of issues today. First we'll look at high politics and the issue of Europe's changing leadership, and so our opening panel is on the French elections.

Later in the day we'll discuss the very crucial tests that the United States and Europe face together through their core institution, NATO, and its mission in Afghanistan. We'll consider the stakes and also the prospects for this difficult undertaking.

Finally we'll consider what's going on at the grassroots in terms of the changing composition of Europe and a demographic shift that may be the most dramatic that Europe has experienced in many decades if not even centuries.

Putting this program together has taken a significant amount of effort, not least on the part of or panelists, and some of them have traveled a great distance. I want to thank them personally for coming in from Europe. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi; Tufyal Choudhury; General Karl Eikenberry. All those flew from Europe. I think the door prize for the longest trip would go to Ashraf Ghani, who flew in from Kabul, but he made it a more humane endeavor by staying for the week. That may be a record, though, for distance.

Anyway, we also have to thank our sponsors, and I'm afraid we have too many for me to list right here. I think they should be on your program. But I do want to recognize one of our most stalwart supporters, Cesare Merlini of the Council on the U.S. and Italy, who has come here from Rome. And I also want to thank the German Marshall Fund for its generosity in supporting this specific event.

With that, I want to turn it over to Jim Hoagland, who's hoofed it up from 15th Street, which is also a long distance sometimes, and allow him to begin the panel on the French elections.

And thank you very much for being with us today, Jim.

The French Elections

MR. HOAGLAND: And thank you.

I want to commend the audience on getting up to be here at 9 a.m. It's a remarkable turnout. But I think you've chosen well. It's a fascinating election. I've just come back from ten days in Paris, and for me, being there for the first tour, the first round of the election, really was a pleasure, as well as a good bit of work, to see France, which many times has struck me over the last fifteen to twenty years as being in a mild depression. I don't mean economic as much as psychological. And on Sunday, April 22nd, the French at least briefly, but I think perhaps more than briefly, snapped out of it and went to the polls in almost record numbers for a first tour and were passionate about this campaign. They also succeeded in eliminating the extremes in this round in contrast to 2002. This was, in many ways, a vote against 2002 -- the results of 2002.

That's what I observed. Now we're going to go to people who have thought about this much more concretely perhaps than I've been able to do. They are well known enough you don't need introductions, but in case you do, it's printed in the overview that's available outside. So, I'm going to not take away from their time by going into long introductions and just simply ask them to give us a five- to seven-minute summary of their views on the French elections. Then we'll come back for a short discussion up here on the panel, and then we'll go to Q&A from the audience.

So, we'll start with Laurent Cohen-Tanugi from Skadden Arps.

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Thank you, Jim.

Good morning. I will -- with five, seven minutes' time I will maybe limit my remarks to domestic politics at this point, and then we can go on to broader subjects later.

It is, in fact, a fascinating election. I am impressed by the level of

interest that this election generates, including in the United States. I would say from a French point of view, it has really become interesting ever since the third man, François Bayrou, emerged, which made things a little more complicated and interesting.

What I would do is first give you my views about the outcome of the first round. I think this outcome is very positive, for a number of reasons. One, as Jim said, we've had a record turnout with almost 85 percent, which is really extraordinary and has not been seen since 1965, and that's clearly the result of the trauma of the 2002 election, which only had a 72.5 percent -- 72 percent turnout, and that contributed in part to Le Pen being in the second round.

But there also has been a very strong interest in the campaign for a number of reasons. This is a critical moment for France. We have new candidates, and also, as I was saying, the Bayrou phenomenon has generated a lot of interest and intensity in the race.

The second reason why I think the outcome is positive is that the socialist candidate, Ségolène Royal, made it to the second round, and I think this is very important first of all because that raises the stigma of 2002 when no candidate from the left was present in the second round and also because it gives the electorate a real choice and a clear debate between right and left, and I think that's -- if Bayou had been in the second round, things would have been blurred. There would have been too much sort of maneuvering in the debate and the choice would have been less clear.

The third reason, and this is not in contradiction; I think it's -- Bayrou's performance of 18.5 percent, or seven million voters, is quite remarkable. It was totally unexpected at the outset and I think it's a positive phenomenon. It will undoubtedly shake things up for the future.

And the fourth reason why the first one was positive is of course that Le Pen is now down to 10.5 percent. I think this is largely the result of

Sarkozy's strategy, which has been very controversial and criticized, but at least he has succeeded in taking away a significant number of voters from the *Front National*, and I personally believe that with Le Pen's age and if Sarkozy succeeds, we are likely to see the *Front National* recede in the future.

The other extreme candidates have done very poorly -- about, you know, 12 percent total, and so the outcome of the first round can be seen as a victory of the sort of government parties, which total more than 75 percent of the vote between Royal, Sarkozy, and Bayrou and, to some extent, a victory of the "yes" camps to the European referendum, which is like a reversal from May 2005.

Now, a few words on the the prospect for the second round. This first week has been dominated surprisingly by -- still by the third man, François Bayrou. Even though he's out of the race, he's managed to stay the center of the stage because obviously both camps are trying to attract as much as possible of his voters.

It's clear that for Ségolène Royal, her only chance of winning is to attract more than half of the seven million voters that voted for François Bayrou, and that's quite a challenge, because even though normally you would think that most of François Bayrou's voters would vote on the right, because after all François Bayrou is a man of the center right, the expectation was that the voters would split 50/50, and of course the challenge for Royal is to get more than that, and that's with the assumption that Sarkozy would only get roughly 30 percent of his voters. So, that's the challenge, and so you've seen this unlikely debate between Ségolène Royal and François Bayrou, again who's out of the race, so that I think is a first in the French election that you have a debate of that nature.

Obviously, the intensions were very different on both sides. Royal was, as I said, trying to show these voters that Bayou and her were not that far apart. Whether she succeeded -- I haven't watched the debate personally. I was away in the United States. I don't know whether she succeeded in any way. And

then Bayrou's agenda was obviously very different. It was just to occupy the stage and potentially appeal to Ségolène's own voters for the next round.

My personal sense is that I doubt that these debates will have changed the game significantly, and I think that this second week, starting today, will of course be dominated by the actual fight between the two contenders, culminating in the debate on Wednesday nights between Sarkozy and Royal. My sense is that the real issue -- the real uncertainties -- the margin of victory of Nicolas Sarkozy where there will be as was announced at the end of the first round whether it's going to be 54/46 or whether it's going to be more like 51/49. But, you know, I may be proven wrong.

And, finally, the third round -- the third round is of course the legislative elections in June, and there, you know, several questions are open. Are we likely to see another accreditation? I think that would be more likely if Royal wins rather than the opposite. And of course a key question for the future is whether Bayrou will be successful in building enough of a parliamentary force already in June to arbitrate between the majority and the opposition. That is his goal, and we'll see whether he succeeds in that, but he will definitely, in the longer run, play a role in French politics I believe.

Thank you.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent, thank you very much.

And next we turn to Brookings' own Phil Gordon, who has also just been in Paris and gathered impressions that he will now share with you.

MR. GORDON: Thanks, Jim.

Yes, like Jim Hoagland, I spend last Sunday in Paris. It's a tough assignment to have to go spend a spring Sunday, but Jim and I are devoted to our profession and we felt we had to do that --

MR. HOAGLAND: Absolutely.

MR. GORDON: This -- responsible analysts -- we did it on your

behalf.

Let me just also share a couple of reflections just -- I agree with so much of what Laurent said, but a couple of thoughts on the first round and then where it leads us for now.

Laurent rightly emphasized the turnout, almost 85 percent turning out, the most in the Fifth Republic. That's really important. I think his explanations were the right ones. The only one I would add to that is I think that this election -- the choice in this election is greater than it has been probably since 1981. That is to say, there's actually a difference between the two candidates, which I don't think you could say very much, frankly, about the last several elections, including 2002. Jacques René Chirac -- obviously when you look at it closely, you can find differences. But they weren't nearly, I think, as great as they are between these two. We now have a real choice between a Sarkozy platform and a Royal platform, and that I think helped turned people out, because they realized what was at stake. It wasn't just about overcoming the sort of mistake of the last election.

The other thing I would add on the first round that I think is worth noting -- Royal again emphasized the Bayrou vote. Okay, he went up from 6 percent in the 2002 election to 18 percent this time. That wasn't only because the voters suddenly discovered François Bayrou as a candidate or fell in love with his platform. I think the better interpretation of how -- and, Bayrou may be new to American voters, but he wasn't to the French. He's been around forever. Everyone knows who he is and who he was then. I think it can only reflect a real disenchantment with the other two candidates.

There are a lot of people in France who don't want Nicolas Sarkozy to be president, and there are a lot of people who either don't want Ségolène Royal to be president or didn't think she could win in the second round if she was against Sarkozy, so they went in search of Bayrou. I think that's the

explanation for this great boost in his votes up to nearly seven million people, and that's what makes it so interesting now -- which way are these people going to go to the degree that they were only voting for Bayrou because they opposed one or the other.

That actually plays out in the polling data. Sixty-five percent of those who voted for François Bayrou said they did so to stop one of the other candidates, not because they liked his platform on this or that issue, and they've been doing polls on those who voted for Bayrou then -- how they going to vote now -- and you see it again -- 46 percent of people voting in the second round say they're going to be voting against one of the other candidates, only 51 percent for; and that is even stronger vis-à-vis Ségolène Royal than Sarkozy. Fifty-six percent of those voting for Ségolène Royal, according to the polls, are doing so because they want to stop Sarkozy, and with Sarkozy it's 40 percent that want to stop Royal, which leads me to what I would want to say about where we stand now, given this duel between two conflicting personalities, programs, and platforms.

I think it's a largely negative campaign. Neither, as they campaign, is really emphasizing, “Here's my program, here's what I would do, and here's why you should vote for me,” -- but, rather, “Here's what's wrong with the other candidate.”

Royal focuses -- almost every third sentence is about the *brutalités* of Sarkozy and what he would do and his personality and we can't trust him; and I think that her strategy for winning is to rally enough people who are just worried about this guy who is threatening to dramatically change France. And he is doing the same thing, questioning her competence or experience, waving around her socialist program, and warning the French that this would be a reintroduction of the state that would ruin the economy and boost the debt, and also suggesting that if the Bayrou voters and Bayrou parliamentarians rally and support Royal, what kind of a coalition is that going to be? He's saying to voters: Do you really want

someone to be president who gets their support from the Trotskyites all the way to the UDF, which is actually on the right but they're only supporting her because they don't like me?

So, so much of this, it seems to me, is negative campaigning -- why you shouldn't vote for the other person. And, again, as Laurent suggested, what's really at stake here are these nearly seven million Bayrou voters. All of the other voters who didn't vote for one of the two lead candidates are either to the left of one or to the right of the other, and you can more or less guess where they're going to go. But what happens to these Bayrou voters, and the latest poll suggests that most will go to Royal but not enough, but more will go to Royal than to Sarkozy but not enough, and there are still 39 percent undecided among Bayrou voters. That's almost two million people who can tip this election one way or another.

Let me finish with what it means one way or another, and I'll save the foreign policy aspects for Corine and just focus on what it means for France.

The selection -- I think the theme of the selection has been changed. Both remain candidates; indeed the candidates across the board were running on a platform of change. Sarkozy most explicitly -- his whole political persona over the past years has been France needs reform; it's not going well; I'm a radical reformer; clean break with the past is what I'm proposing. And he offers himself as the true candidate of change. But so has Royal. Less explicitly in terms of her program but more in terms of her person. Enough of these older gentlemen who have been running France forever. By just her personality and her age and generation and gender, she is offering a change in France as well.

So, I think that has led a lot of observers, and particularly American observers or maybe Anglo Saxon observers to think okay, France is really going to change after May 6th. We're going to have something really different, and it might be much better depending on your point of view, and that's

a notion I would finish by questioning. No doubt France will change. Either of these candidates is indeed a new generation and all of that. But I think that there are a number of reasons to question the notion that we're really up for a radical break from the past, and, just very quickly, first of all, changing people at the top of France does not necessarily mean changing policies. The fabulous continuity that you've seen over the decades, really, has come about despite the fact that every chance they get they throw out whoever is currently in government and bring in the others who are calling for change. But that doesn't actually bring about change; it just means they're not happy with the current lot and they want a different lot and that's what they're going to do this time as well inevitably.

Secondly, Sarkozy's reform platform -- very interesting, bold. It's the boldest campaign that a French politician has run in the Fifth Republic. But there's a difference between even winning on that platform and being able to implement it. And the record thereto of reformers -- you know, most famously everyone remembers Allain Juppé prime minister in 1995. Then you get unions and teachers and doctors and nurses and students and truckers in the streets and the reformer backs off.

Even more recently, Dominique de Villepin, prime minister, tried the most modest of tweaks to the labor flexibility issue rather than Sarkozy's more radical approach, and you got hundreds of thousands of people out in the street again. So, what could be fascinating if Sarkozy wins is not is he committed to change, but can he do it. And the fact that Sarkozy's campaign has now shifted gears somewhat from the “I’m for a radical break with the past: Look at everything I'm saying, we're going to transform this country to a much more cautious -- you know, the *rupture* line has become the *rupture tranquille* -- we're going to go easy about this, I have to satisfy the centrist voters, too.

That suggests at least that he has always said that the only way you can actually transform a country as a politician is when you tell people in advance

what you're going to do; otherwise, you have no mandate for change. The fact that he's backing off a little bit now as he's running suggests that he, himself, may not be entirely convinced that the French are ready for such change, and that raises questions about whether they really are.

Bottom line, then, is I think if anybody can reform France domestically, it's Nicolas Sarkozy, but I'm not sure that even he can.

MR. HOAGLAND: Phil, thank you.

Now we turn for a view based really on foreign policy more than internal policy, and Corine Lesnes will tell us what she thinks this election means for foreign policy fanatics like Phil and me and, I would say, many of you.

MS. LESNES: It seems just about everybody has been to Paris this spring except me.

(Laughter)

MS. LESNES: And another thing you talked about the depression that you feel usually in France, and it's very true. I mean, I've noticed it when I've called people over the years, except when the soccer team is doing good, and you see really the upsurge of enthusiasm but then back to the depression about "where are we; what's our model?". So, I will start off with this campaign and especially these few last days by the aggression of people.

The people I could talk to are really extremely passionate and aggressive, and I think Nicolas Sarkozy more so than Ségolène Royal, but they've been polarizing figures, which could explain also the attraction that François Bayrou was representing -- much more calm. And that's really prejudging -- what can Sarkozy do as a change? People expect that people will be in dire straits if Nicolas Sarkozy is trying to do anything. So, there is a big aggression. Maybe it was a little bit aggressive in '81 when François Mitterand was elected, but I don't recall any reason that such polarization. For the United States, I would think that whoever is elected will enter a complicated phase in France's relations with

others. First, as you say, after the presidential elections, there will be the legislative elections, and three days after the legislatives elections, so on June 21st, 22nd there will be an important summit for the European Union in Brussels. So, it will be important if Sarkozy is elected. Can he make up with the Germans; he has been really a little tough or insensitive to the German problems.

So, it's true that there is some hope in the United States that Sarkozy -- especially for him -- would really improve the relationship. The United States is not really in the debate. It's in the debate as a positioning for candidates, but the relations -- I think there is more sort of consensus. I mean, it's hard to believe here, but I think if you ask the French people, probably 98 percent of French people think multi-polarity exists. It's not something which they'd discuss. It exists. It's not just United States. And so it's not an issue in the campaign if they don't talk about the world like Jacques Chirac would do. The world has to be multi-polar. I think it's just because now people believe it is, especially after Iraq.

And so you might have anticipated much more in-ward looking France for a number of weeks, months obsessed with what's our identity and now model. I don't see any rush to improve their relations with the United States. I didn't really -- I mean, sometimes I think that it's provocative, but we could miss in terms of the strategies, so even diplomats -- I mean, foreign diplomats. You could miss Chirac because he had developed a sort of vision and he's been there for a long time. Villepin had a stature that they don't have because they are new, younger. Sarkozy has been Minister for Interior. Ségolène wrote books about children and violence on TV. I mean, they are not -- they have not been really specialists or that much developing visions like Vedrine could do or some other people could do on foreign policy.

And the other thing I thought was a sign that there was a probably temporary but shrinking of French standing on the international scene or

diplomacy is the peacekeeping forces. I mean, the debate has started. France has 14,500 peacekeepers. A debate has started about the overstretching of these forces. Some people think that Jacques Chirac is the president that of course would have recognition on the world scene but got us stuck in Cote d'Ivoir and in Lebanon; when especially if you are in negotiation with Iran, it's a difficult place to be. And in Afghanistan. And all the candidates had expressed intention to reduce or reexamine the commitments for that -- and that's where, actually, I think the United States might miss Jacques Chirac, because he has been projecting France abroad. There has been of course Iraq, but at the same time Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, where France sent troops, which actually was useful, and then the European Union built this sort of model of peacekeeping at the European level, and that's been -- I think that's been useful, because in Africa you have to have some country. There are not that many countries that can intervene.

On Sarkozy it's really -- it's a little bit -- what you said about change. He came here in September, he had that big meeting with Bush, he developed a vision that was -- that would have been really a departure from the traditional French diplomacy towards the Arab world, and then he went back to France and he made very different statements. He doesn't have the same entourage as before on that foreign policy. You don't know exactly who would be -- maybe some -- no but I don't -- I haven't read really -- who would be the prime minister, so what kind of -- would it be Barnier -- Michele Barnier that everybody here knows, or would it be some more… At some point -- so, Sarkozy was presented as some equivalent of the neoconservatives, and now he has been backpedaling. You don't really know where he stands on a certain number of issues, and the latest example is Afghanistan. When just -- I think it was last Thursday he said that we have went out and went in to troops in Afghanistan and he mentioned withdrawal some of the special forces which are helping the United States special forces, but the peacekeepers -- the forces in the ISAF. He said that

they could -- he could really see a disengagement, and that would be -- that is -- can be a problem for NATO, for the US.

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine, thank you very much, and I thank Phil and Laurent as well. You've covered the waterfront so thoroughly it's hard to find questions that you haven't covered, so I want to start by asking you to comment on a couple of things that each other said, and I'll start with Phil's references to the change of generation that this election will represent, because Ségolène Royal is 53, Nicolas Sarkozy is 52, and so at least chronologically there will be a change in generations next Sunday.

Laurent, what does that mean? What will be attributable to their ages, to their formation, and particularly could you talk about something that Sarkozy said on Friday night that I haven't gotten a full excerpt on, but he talked in terms -- and I've heard some of the people around him talk in these terms as well -- as this election will represent an ending of the 1968 chapter, that this -- there's a generational change that will in some ways take its reference from or be an antidote to or be an end to 1968. Could you comment on those two things?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Sure, I'll try, and I'll make maybe a couple of comments also on what Phil and Corine said.

But on your questions, I think both candidates are not only from a new generation in the early '50s but they're both outsiders. Sarkozy, nominally he's a man *issue d'immigration*, as La Pen said, kind of from an outsider, but he's also -- he's not an inarce(inaudible). He sort of made himself, I mean he's obviously been political circles for ages, but he's still personally an outsider, and Ségolène Royal also. I mean, she vaguely circumvented the Socialist party. She was clearly, you know, supported -- she had minimal support within the party, and so they both, you know, embody an idea of change and so that will not only be the age and the generation but also their background and their -- the way they propel themselves to the center stage.

On the '68 issue, I think what is meant by that is that May '68 was really the defining event both for the right and for the left, and I think this new generation is -- who was a little bit too young to participate in the '68 events have sort of not been formed by this, but it's a new -- it's a new environment.

On the issue of change, I would like to agree with what Phil said. I personally think that Sarkozy has an agenda of change. As Phil said, he's the most likely candidate to actually implement it as the issue of whether he will be able to, but to that I think his margin of victory is an important element. I mean, if he has a strong victory that will give him the legitimacy to -- at least for a period of time, he will have a window of opportunity to implement change, and I think he's ready -- he's quite prepared to do so.

And as far as the negative campaigning, Phil, I think you see that now in the race for the final round because obviously the keys to show that, you know, Bayrou and Royal really cannot coexist. But I would say that Sarkozy's campaign in total has been on the program. I don't think it's been sort of only negative campaigning.

I'll stop there; also, I had a few comments on Corine's speech but I'll go back.

MR. HOAGLAND: Could I just press you a little bit on this change of generations idea. What specifically will change as a result of the fact that Sarkozy or Ségolène Royal will be in their early 50s? What changes?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Well, in terms of, first of all, the personnel around them, that will no longer -- I mean, it's a whole generation of politicians that will -- has been called to help, especially by Ségolène Royal, but these people are very unlikely to be part of the government, and I think the same is true, to some extent, on the Sarkozy camp. I think this generation has not been shaped by the post-war period, which is a negative view. They're not sort of -- in relation to Europe, for instance, they don't have the same kind of European faith

that the former generation had, and then maybe that's also one of the reasons why foreign policy and the world generally has been so absent in the campaign so they are much more domestically focused.

MR. HOAGLAND: Right, that's great.

That's a lead-in to you, because I was going to ask you to take that up and talk about it. But go ahead with your comment.

MR. GORDON: I was just going to add to that the reason your question about generation change is such a good one is the answer is: almost nothing. I mean, it's a nice way of saying you voters are not happy with France, and we're different, because we're a new generation and therefore you should be happy with us. But there's nothing that automatically goes with it as if the younger generation is pro-American but the older one isn't or the younger one is more capitalist than the older one. It doesn't imply that, and it's a nice way -- you know, to get elected in France, you have to promise the appearance of change but also reassure people that you're not actually going to do it.

MR. HOAGLAND: Let me challenge you on that. With what both Corine and Laurent have said, which is that both of them expect a lessened interest in and ability -- well, they didn't say "ability," but less commitment to power projection in world affairs, and I must say I heard some of the same themes when I was in France. That's a change. Unless you think they're wrong.

MR. GORDON: No. That is the most striking thing to me about this campaign from an American point of view -- is the degree to which these global affairs are not playing in it. Let me say two things about it. The other Laurent mentioned -- Europe is a -- when I said the answer to your question is almost nothing, for me the exception is Europe, and that is generational in the sense that the previous generation of leaders, whether on the right or the left, whether you're Jacques Chirac or Valéry Giscard d'Estaing or François Mitterand. Europe was something that brought peace to the continent. It got it out of the

war that they lived through, and therefore there was a rock-solid commitment to it. You couldn't question it. I don't think that's true of this generation, and it's certainly not true of these two candidates. There's no automatic -- Bayrou is another 50-something who happens to be supportive of Europe, so it doesn't mean you're against Europe, but I don't think either of these two candidates left have any particular affinity for or passion for the European Union, and that's going to be important, because in the past you could always assume that. So, it's a combination of their own generation, which no longer feels obliged to think that if you're not totally in love with Europe you're somehow against peace and the fact that the European Union itself is changing with enlargement and all of that, so that's the first point.

The second is the issue you referred to about the global affairs. I was struck -- I was only there a short time but I've been following it closely from here as well. Foreign policy is just not playing a role in this. Go to the website. You mentioned these debates. Go to the coverage of the debate between Bayrou and Royal. They have all these subheads of topics you can click on and read the text or watch the video. Europe is one of them. The other twelve are all domestic. And I watched -- you probably did, too, Jim while you were there -- they haven't debated yet but the two candidates did the big interview shows, you know, where they go on for 90 minutes, and I watched all of it. I fell asleep for a little while because I was jetlagged --

(Laughter)

MR. GORDON: So unless it took place during those 20 minutes, these words didn't come up -- "Iraq," "Afghanistan," "war on terror." I mean there was a nice contrast to the U.S. debate where we had candidates debate last week where the first third of it was about Iraq and then war on terror and all of that. This stuff didn't come up at all. If it hadn't been for the French hostage, Corine, in Afghanistan, even Afghanistan wouldn't have come up. I think that's

important for Americans to notice, that these are not the issues that are getting the attention, and that may well be different from Chirac and previous leaders who cared about the cold war and France's role in it. That is striking about what is going on now.

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine, your two colleagues have basically suggested that Nicolas Sarkozy is going to win on Sunday. You skirted that, so I wanted to ask you what you think the result will be, but let me do it in this way. Let me ask you, given the fact that your two colleagues have essentially said Sarkozy's going to win, why at this point should a French person vote for Ségolène Royal, and what should an American think about Royal if she wins? Is that good for the Americans or not?

MS. LESNES: So, I think that comes back to the generation issue. A French person is voting for Ségolène Royal because she is here is a young person --

MR. HOAGLAND: But Sarkozy is a year younger.

MS. LESNES: Yes, but she is the one who wants to protect some kind of welfare, and people --

MR. HOAGLAND: That's not a generational issue; that's continuity.

MS. LESNES: Yeah, but it's ironic that actually older people who are more conservative and waiting for the conservative candidate are the ones who want to dismantle this social welfare, while they are sitting on their retirement benches. And the young people they want to protect -- they want to -- they don't even have access to that, so they want to, if they get access to that, to profit from those benefits.

So, it's -- I think the 25 percent of young people unemployed play a big, big part in that vote for Royal, so that's a good reason to vote for her, and that's really a generation gap in -- in terms of them bringing a new generation to

power, they are not different but they speak different. I mean, their language is different. I mean, we knew that about Nicolas Sarkozy, because he can be really blunt. I mean, really *parler vrai* -- but -- and Ségolène Royal, she's speaking -- it's funny because she's not attracting women, but she's speaking words that are not common in the political language. You know, she's talking about things have to be done without brutality. I mean, she's having those kinds of words that are more traditionally in the family circle or in the -- and I think it's interesting.

And then what's the United States could think of Ségolène? It depends I guess on the foreign minister. She has some -- I mean, Chirac we were talking a little before about the taxation on financial transactions, so she wants to do that, too, but Chirac actually also started that, so I think she might be, actually, quite in the Chirac tradition.

I don't know, Philip, you might know that much better.

MR. GORDON: I don't know if the MR. wanted me to intervene. I think that's right, and I think -- I mean, what I said about her and Sarkozy having a natural affinity for Europe I would say is even more true of her for the United States. We also have Daniel Vernet, a great *Le Monde* diplomatic correspondent. If I'm right about foreign policy, I don't know what Daniel's going to have to do in the coming years, because it won't be an issue, but certainly where the U.S. is concerned, where Sarkozy is famously pro-American and unabashedly so, I think Ségolène Royal has no interest in this country.

MS. LESNES: Yeah, it's been blurred as well. I mean, you might think that on Turkey she might be more interesting for the United States than Nicolas Sarkozy on the Turkey relationship with Europe, but she has made some declaration but it's not -- is it really reflecting what the Socialist Party says? I mean, there are lots of blurred lines like this.

MR. HOAGLAND: I see Laurent chopping at the bit over there to get in, and I want you to get in on the points you want to make, but could you also

a dimension to this, whether the impression I got is right or wrong, and it is that one of the principal differences between these two candidates is their view of the institutions of France, the political institutions. What are those differences, and what's the significance -- but perhaps also you could add a word about their attitudes on the institutions of Europe. We've heard from both Phil and Corine that they are not as committed to Europe as their predecessors. How do they view the question -- we know their positions on the European constitution, which was rejected by French voters. What does that reflect about their real attitudes toward European institutions as well as French institutions? And then there are the points you wanted to make.

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: The only thing -- actually they overlap to some extent. First on the institutions and domestic, I think -- as you know, Ségolène Royal has been running on a theme -- not only a theme but also a method of so-called participatory democracy. I mean, the way she really got where she is now is by, you know, talking to the people about -- not only about social issues almost exclusively but release of micro-social issues. I mean, transforming -- the functioning -- this sort of socialized system function, which was not -- which is not in the French tradition, the role of the president of the Republic. But that worked. I mean, she had a great internet-based campaign and she had -- first phase was listening to people and see what the people wanted and that's how she got her sort of public opinion success and then got the nomination for the Socialist Party and so on. So, that's one very important aspect of her sort of political vision, and she also sort of endorsed in the course of the campaign the sort of six Republic ideas of (inaudible) and trying to sort of really change the concentration of power of the Fifth Republic and so on.

Sarkozy has a much more traditional view of the presidential function. In fact, you know, given the (inaudible) the five-year term is (inaudible). He sees the presidential function as much more like either, you

know, the President of the United States or the British prime minister or the German chancellor with much more hands on. He sees the prime minister as being more like, you know, *super chef de cabinet* but, you know, the president being more hands-on. But on the whole it will be -- you know, he's the most faithful of the Fifth Republic with a strong leadership, and to some extent in my view the situation of the country calls for that -- I mean, a strong leadership. So, that's one aspect.

On Europe, I sort of disagree a little bit with what Corine suggested in the sense that I think that there's a real -- Europe has been a little bit more present in the campaign than it had been in the past because of the no, the French no to the referendum--and as a matter of fact France has a problem and that all of Europe is waiting for the result of this election to see what's going to happen to France and to Europe, and I think there's a clear difference between the two candidates.

I think that, you know, Sarkozy has said that he would -- you know, he was in favor of a sort of simplified treaty that would no longer be a constitutional treaty but would be an ordinary treaty and would be limited to the institutional reform that had been agreed in the constitutional treaty and that he would have that treaty ratified by parliamentary votes as opposed to a referendum. And so that is not very much in line with the German agenda. In the June European Council, the idea is really to launch a new intergovernmental conference to have that simplified treaty put together and hopefully adopted at the end of 2007. So, the Germans who were still hoping to get the whole constitutional treaty adopted have now given up on this idea.

And so what I mean by that is that Sarkozy and Merkel absolutely on the same wave length to do this, where as Ségolène Royal has still, you know, wants to do another referendum but also put forward this strange concept of *l'Europe par la preuve*, which means, you know, before talking again about the

institutions, Europe has to deliver results -- the results on the social front, on globalization, which is obviously Europe cannot deliver anything until its been -- its institutions have been streamlined and, you know, everyone knows that there's no consensus in Europe about the social issues, etc. So, there's a real gap between the German presidency agenda and Ségolène Royal's very vague program in Europe, so I would disagree on that. That's really one of the very important discriminating factors between the two candidates on what would happen on Europe very quickly after the election.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent, I'm impressed you so rapidly picked up on the change in terminology and said "simplified treaty." I was talking to François Fillon, one of Sarkozy's chief lieutenants, last week and I used the phrase "mini-treaty," and he reacted in horror and said no, no, we talk now about simplified treaty, so.

Corine, I wanted to come back to a point you made and ask you to expand a little bit on it. Sarkozy is known for being friendly -- to taking a very friendly view toward Israel. What happens to France's traditional Arab policy if Sarkozy is elected?

MS. LESNES: That's a question --

MR. HOAGLAND: Yes, it is.

MS. LESNES: That's a question our leaders are wondering about. I read when one of our correspondents did a story about a dinner. They had dinner in Paris with their ambassadors and Sarkozy and they were really wondering about him. He wrote in his first book that he didn't know yet actually what was his interest in the Arab world, and -- but although he had been once to -- I think it was maybe Syria -- and he enjoyed the markets and, you know, some kind of touristy comments on that. That was in his first book, and in his second book last year he devoted more space to Israel than to the whole Muslim world. So, it's something we can wonder about.

MR. HOAGLAND: But I guess my question is your sense, then, of if he tries to dramatically change or drop or do away with the Arab policy, what will the national reaction be? What will the French people do, say, think?

MS. LESNES: I don't know if that could happen, because in this period that will be probably inward looking, you know, and in the U.K. things are going to change, too, so thank God we have Solana. I mean, he's the one who is now on Iran -- for the European Union. Actually, I think that that has been shifting a lot to that -- and it's true that decisions are made at this level. I mean, helping the Palestinians, the Hamas issue -- I mean, all those things are -- in a way after Chirac, things might be more European -- decisions might -- more European on the foreign policy level.

MR. HOAGLAND: Interesting idea. That leads us, Phil, to let you wrap up this segment, and then we'll go to the audience to talk in terms of anything you want to say about anything Laurent or Corine has said and particularly on that last Arab policy question. But Corine said that during this campaign there has been almost no talk about the world, the multi-polar world as Jacques Chirac sees it, and that's certainly true. What struck me was that there's been very little talk about Jacques Chirac during this campaign, and certainly that's a subject that Nicolas Sarkozy has not wanted to talk about. He's been willing to criticize the governments that he was part of, but he does not attack the president.

Give us your sense of Jacques Chirac's legacy in foreign policy or in domestic policy as well and why would it be that there has been so little talk about this incumbent government?

MR. GORDON: That's a good question. Let me -- first on the Arab policy, I think that illustrates nicely this dilemma of change that I was talking about. I would say that Sarkozy actually has much greater prospects of changing French foreign policy than domestic policy just because it's so much

freer for the president to really be able to do what he wants. He doesn't really need parliament and, frankly, doesn't really need public opinion; and, frankly, public opinion doesn't, as we've been saying, care that much about these things. So, it may be if the domestic front is stifled by resistance, issues like the ones we've been discussing -- Arab world, Israel -- would be a place where he actually could do more that would be -- and his views, his expressed views on Israel and the Middle East are not very much in line with the majority of French public opinion, but that wouldn't constrain him too much. On that particular point, of course there's a large Arab population and a large Jewish population in France. That would be a key issue in those communities, but more broadly than that I don't think it would be a major thing for him and therefore he would have some scope for breaking, which is a nice segue to the Chirac issue.

You're right, Chirac is not a figure in this campaign except to the extent that both candidates are sort of running against him and his legacy in different ways, but, again, both of these candidates -- when we come back to the theme of change -- are more explicit in criticizing France than is par for the course. They both are basically saying things are not going well. And that implicitly or explicitly is a criticism of Jacques Chirac, who was president for twelve years and according to the candidates and according to the depressed public that you said you discovered, Jim, didn't get anything done in those twelve years, and that sets up this mood of we really need to move on. So, in terms of legacies I think it's a highly negative one, or at least that's the perception of the French people themselves, which is why it's easy to run against that legacy right now.

MR. HOAGLAND: The ex-depressed now energized French public.

MR. GORDON: Correction.

MR. HOAGLAND: We have about half an hour for questions. If

you would raise your hands I'll call on you and we'll have somebody come with a microphone for you. If you would identify yourself, we would appreciate it, and the first hand was over here.

MR. WICKS: I'm Dan Wicks. Up until recently, I was with the State Department.

The point that Foreign Affairs has played a very small role in the campaign certainly seems to be valid, but I've noticed in the last couple of weeks, if you look carefully Nicolas Sarkozy has actually said some things that seemed rather interesting, particularly in regard to this principle of stability that France has always regarded as very important.

Sarkozy, as we all know -- the idea that (inaudible) is the very worst thing you could say about someone. And Chirac -- often he quotes civility as his guiding principle. Sarkozy explicitly criticized that, and in regard to particularly regimes that are unacceptable and France hasn't accepted. Again, this is Jacque Chirac (inaudible), and as we all know Chirac had this sort of proclivity for cultivating dictators and he really went beyond sort of feeling that in all countries as you find them there almost seemed to be a delight in cronyism with certain people we would regard as unacceptable.

I was just wondering if anybody has any sense that things might change in that regard.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent, would you like to take a swing at that one?

MR. HOAGLAND: Sure. I think that, yes, Sarkozy has -- I mean, he actually had a press conference on foreign policy and he said a number of things, and one of them was actually being more strict on principles and on human rights and implicitly criticizing Chirac's attitude towards Russia, for instance, or through some African regimes, so I think you will -- if he's elected, you will see some change in that in sort of a mild version of neoconservatism

being more, you know, from the principles.

I think also one of the -- if I can come back one of the reasons why foreign policy has not been at the forefront of that, both candidates had a problem. Sarkozy had a problem with Chirac. Obviously, he needed some form of endorsement from Chirac. He got a minimal one, but he was still -- and for that he couldn't criticize Chirac on foreign policy and so he was limited by that and Ségolène Royal for other reasons. But I think there is -- my sense is that there is a huge expectation or certainly concern by the French electorate about, not foreign policy per se but about the influence of France in the world, and that's sort of the reverse side of the sort of national identity debate that was in the campaign vis-à-vis immigration and so on. But the role of France in the world and the loss of influence of France in the world in the past few years -- in Europe, in Africa, in the United States -- I think is sort of an unspoken theme of the campaign.

And, lastly, about the Arab policy, I think Sarkozy will be definitely constrained by, you know, the bureaucracy, the French diplomatic bureaucracy. But also he said a number of things. He talked, for instance, about the Mediterranean Union having a much stronger partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean. I think he's very much focused on economic development for the Arab world, so I think there will be some initiatives in that direction.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent, could you just concisely give us your sense of how the national identity debate evolved during the campaign. What really has it been about? What does it mean, and perhaps my two other colleagues will comment on that?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Well, I think it was started by Sarkozy trying to capture part of the electorate of the *Front National*. Obviously, he came out with this strange idea of a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, which was very controversial. I still don't understand what he wants to do with that, but somehow that succeeded, and then of course Royal followed suit on that,

and so it's -- you know, obviously it reflects, first of all, the issue of immigration and the riot of 2005, but also, as I was just saying, I think more implicitly it has to do with the worry about globalization and about -- you know, the no-vote on Europe has been very, very disturbing for the French electorate even the majority voted no, but Europe has really been sort of the column of French policy and projection in the world since the war, and when you take that out, there's really nothing. So, France is at the loss, and I think this debate on national identity has not only sort of domestic immigration cause but also the role of -- in the place of France in the 21st Century world, but that has a been a much more unspoken theme.

MR. HOAGLAND: I'm struck in the final days of the campaign that the national identity debate really had not evolved into a debate in the sense of a clear discussion of opposing ideas. It was there as a slogan, and I think it was very useful for Sarkozy's strategy to try to do to Le Pen what Mitterand did to George Marchet in the Communist Party, which was essentially to take away its electorate.

Corine, Phil, do you have anything to add on that, or --

MR. GORDON: Yeah, very briefly on the two points. On national identity I think – Laurent is right, this was most of all a political strategy to take La Pen voters and as such obviously worked brilliantly because he reduced it by eight or nine percent.

Sarkozy has played a -- it's more complicated than many people think, because it is often seen from abroad and criticized within France as being just a pure, almost racist, nationalist strategy, but it is more complex than that. The tough side, indeed, is emphasis on national identity, patriotism. Sarkozy says: You want to live in France, then speak French -- if you want to be French, speak French. And he also says: If you don't like France, you may leave, I think people should have a certain patriotism and loyalty to their country. And that has

been very effective in winning over those frustrated national front voters. But the more complex side is, for example, he's also for affirmative action and measures, which is so radical in France, but to promote integration into society, and he's also -- the third panel with Jonathan Laurence and Dan Benjamin and others may speak of his efforts to reach out and create links between the state and Islam. So, it's not just a purely right-wing, Le Pen-like approach; it's a little bit more sophisticated than that, but you're also right to emphasize that it wasn't a debate and that Royal sort of felt obliged to get on the bandwagon and wave the French flag and sing the *Marseillaise* and realize that a lot of French people feel this way and she didn't want to get caught being on the wrong side of that issue.

Very briefly on Dan Wick's foreign policy question. I think he's right, and I don't want to -- when I say it's going to be hard for Sarkozy to change, let's also be clear -- you're right, this is a radically different foreign policy approach that he's proposing. How far he'll get with it we don't know, but on all the issues he mentioned -- affinity for the United States -- it's not just liking the United States or its foreign policy, but if you look at, you know, the preface he wrote for the U.S. edition of his book, he explicitly says we're similar countries, we stand for fighting terrorism and spreading freedom. I mean, the last -- the way things are going here, the last neoconservative round may be in Paris after May 6th, because he's for all of the sorts of things -- ending relationship with dictators. He specifically criticizes Chirac's Africa policy, and that is radically different. What will actually happen, who know, but it's very interesting that a French candidate is proposing such things.

MR. HOAGLAND: Second hand I saw was a gentleman in the next to the last row. He's got his hand up. Thank you.

MR. WALKER: Martin Walker from UPI. I'm wondering whether we're going to see exactly the same level of turnout on Sunday -- the same 85 percent. In particular, I'm wondering whether we would be right to

assume that all of Le Pen's voters would be voting for Sarkozy or all of the group (inaudible) of Trotskyites, Communists, Greens would be voting for Ségolène Royal. And it seems to be the mathematics of this are really very interesting, and I'd like to know particularly from Mr. Gordon if there are any recent polls that give us pointers to this.

MR. GORDON: Well, I think your instinct, Martin, the way you asked the question, is right. I don't think at all you can assume that the votes will sort of go in their natural direction. I could easily imagine -- I mean, Le Pen himself was severely critical of Sarkozy during the campaign. The polls we've seen on that say that about 60 percent of those who voted for the national front in the first round would vote for Le Pen. But that's not -- you know, that's --

MS. LESNES and MR. HOAGLAND: Sarkozy.

MR. GORDON: Right, sorry, for Sarkozy.

MR. HOAGLAND: (Inaudible)

MR. GORDON: Yeah, should clarify that for me, yeah.

That's not -- you know, it's certainly not the hundred percent you might instinctively imagine. I could easily also imagine on the far left. I mean, if you're genuinely a Trotskyite voter, if you supported (inaudible) or something, politically your dream come true would be a Nicolas Sarkozy presidency. And will they bother to turn out and take time on Sunday to -- you know, so the line that everyone is saying we have to -- you know, anything but Sarkozy, we have to block him – will they actually do that I think; I think as maybe you suggest, the result be more abstention where they just can't bring themselves to vote for either of the candidates. And that's why I said the most important thing at stake is the Bayrou voters because there are so many of them and they're so fungible.

MR. HOAGLAND: Gentleman right here in the front.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Jim Lowenstein, retired Foreign Service officer.

Two questions, really to Phil. The fact that most young voters voted for Royal, it seems to me, makes Sarkozy's task in doing anything very dramatic domestically much more difficult than it would otherwise be.

Secondly, looking ahead to the legislative elections, what is all of your senses about the mood of the French? Do you think they'll vote in favor of giving Sarkozy -- let's assume he's elected -- in giving Sarkozy strong legislative support or, on the contrary, in wanting to make sure that he's balanced by not having a majority in the legislative assembly?

And, finally, the one thing in foreign policy that seems to me clear is Turkish membership in the E.U. is dead if Sarkozy is elected.

MR. GORDON: I'll be brief and then maybe my French colleagues will react. On the first point, again I can only agree. It's not just young people voting against Sarkozy but the negative numbers I gave you before -- the large number of people who are voting for their candidate because they want to stop the other really doesn't bode well for reform under Sarkozy. He got, what, 30, 31 percent in the first round, so we know that a third of the French explicitly like that program. They want to do what he says he's going to do. You can't radically reform a country with 30 percent. If he wins in the second round, it's likely to be pretty narrow, I think we'd agree -- you know, 52, 53. That's pretty narrow as well, and remember the poll I quoted you before that even among his voters 40 percent are voting for him because they don't like her or the Socialist program. Given that and as alluded to before, given the track record of reformers in France -- and again I sort of maybe put this to my French colleagues -- can you really imagine him standing up to all of the young people who will be in the streets when -- again, if Dominique de Villepin couldn't get away with a little tweak that said if you're under 26 you can be fired again if you're employer hires you. If Sarkozy tries to do the things he's really talking about in the economy, well, those 300,000 who came out to protest against Villepin's tweak, they're

going to be out in the street again and they're going to be supported by all these others who are against him, and so is he going to be willing and able to really stand up in the face of that, you know, I have my doubts, but again I'd be interested in what the others think.

On the second round, I would only say that the tendency is that the French are fed up enough with *cohabitation* that they will want to give him a majority. All of the indications are, as they've done in the past, when they get to vote in the legislatives after the presidentials, they would rather not create cohabitation for five years, and that's what -- I think that works against Royal, because her efforts to woo Bayrou in the center raises the question, you know, do we want to start off that way with such a diverse coalition?

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine.

MS. LESNES: On the second point, I would be of the different opinion. I would bet that it would play the other way around, that people will -- some people won't vote for Ségolène Royal, you know, and they will vote for Sarkozy. I mean, also if this is a personality -- it's an election, it's a presidential election. But then they definitely -- do they really want everything that Sarkozy is proposing in terms of this dismantling of the welfare, those -- so, I would actually bet -- I mean, do you think people are looking at what's happening here now? I mean, maybe the legislative work is blocked, but people might like to have some counterweight to -- especially to somebody like him who has been really polarizing and was not like Bayrou could have been, sort of center.

And on Turkey, I think it's unfortunate that probably Turkey candidacy is dead, especially now with what's going on in Turkey.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Yeah, just one point. I think 53 percent, Phil, is a big victory by French standards except for the 2002 aberrations, so if you get 52 percent that will be quite a lot. And any one thing that may moderate,

at least for a while, the sort of third round in the streets is really the fact that there is a general feeling that the country is really at a critical juncture and that, you know, something has to be done. So, that may actually help both the cohabitation issue and also the sort of giving Sarkozy a chance to make some changes.

And then finally on Turkey I would say that, you know, Turkey's killer is Chirac, because by putting a requirement to have a referendum for any new addition, you just killed it anyway.

MR. HOAGLAND: Yes, sir.

MR. MITCHELL: Gary Mitchell from the *Mitchell Report*. I want to ask the question this way. All of you have made the point fairly clear that there's a clear choice in this election. This question really also comes from trying to understand why the turnout was as significant as it was. And so the first question that I have is while it's -- you've made it clear that this is -- that voters have a clear choice, I'm interested in whether voters think they have a good choice in this election.

And, second, I'm thinking about it in U.S. terms. High turnout is typically generated by one of two factors, a dominant personality -- a Reagan or an Eisenhower, etc. -- or a dominant issue -- Iraq in the 2006 elections, the economy in the '92 elections. And I haven't -- in what I've heard this morning and the things that I've read -- I may be missing something -- I don't get the sense that you have either of those factors at play in this election -- the dominant personality or the dominant issues. So, I'm -- to paraphrase Walter Mondale, what I'm asking you is *où est le boeuf*?

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine, why don't you --

MS. LESNES: Well, I think the -- you have a personality, you have Nicolas Sarkozy. He is not just anybody. I mean, it's -- people are scared. Lots of people are really scared. People -- there was a big surge in voting registration. That's what so made a -- even abroad, so it's been in the media. I

mean, the (inaudible), it might (inaudible). So, you know, it's -- I think he's making, really, this election his program -- I mean, his program in immigration. I mean, he's telling people if you are unemployed and you refuse two jobs you're out of welfare. So, that's really something. I mean, never heard -- I mean, never heard of. And Ségolène Royal is saying we don't want this type of brutality. We don't anticipate that people are fooling or cheating the system. I mean, she has a -- but also she would also do some renovation of that system. But it is -- the way he speaks is pretty blunt, and people -- I think that he has been, really, the force behind this mobilization.

MR. HOAGLAND: Laurent.

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: I would say yes and no, because -- I mean, from what you said, and Sarkozy is really a liberal by U.S. standards, but I think that there's a -- yeah, there's a polarization on Sarkozy, there's been a sort of demonization of him by his opponents, and the proponents think that he has the leadership quality that will help France get out of where it is now. So, there's this aspect. On Ségolène's side I think there's more for negative than a positive. I think even the Socialists are -- would have preferred another candidate, I think.

But in your second criteria, I think the issues -- as I was saying, I think there's a real feeling that this is a very important moment for France both on economic issues, on the place in Europe and in the world, that France really needs to get its act together, and so I think that's -- even if it's not expressed like this, there's a feeling that this is very important.

Now, in terms of a clear choice and a good choice, again, I think that people on the left would have preferred -- I think if you'd had a debate between (inaudible) and Sarkozy that probably would have been a better choice than the one we have now. But, I think it's clear at least, and -- I don't know, in my view and on the right, Sarkozy is the best candidate for that camp.

Now, I think on the left it's probably a different question.

MR. HOAGLAND: Well, but that's a little bit in retrospect that some Socialists now feel that perhaps they could have had a stronger candidate.

Phil, give us your sense of Ségolène Royal as a personality in the campaign in the sense of the question, but also pick up on the question I put to Corine a little earlier: What should the United States make of a Ségolène Royal victory?

MR. GORDON: On the first point, I think it's -- I broadly agree that the negative reaction to Ségolène Royal didn't help turnout, but I do think it's important to note, as I think, Jim, you're suggesting, there was also a sort of enthusiasm when she first appeared on the scene. I mean, the Socialists had a primary, which they didn't normally do, and she cushed the more experienced male competitors and they got 200,000 new adherence formal members of the Socialist Party. It was partly because you could sign up on line for 20 francs and you could never do that before. But it was also partly because people were excited about this idea of a change, so that dynamism did help contribute to the excitement and turnout.

On her as a person and her role in all of this, I think the initial mood is the one I described: great enthusiasm for this new face, change, and all of that. The critique that she really wasn't up to it because she wasn't experienced enough I think during the campaign has hurt her, because she hasn't really met the -- answered those questions about her background, her experience in all of the internal polling on that, you know, in terms of who is more *présidentiel*, who is more of a statesman, who should be in the *l' Elysees* palace where De Gaulle and Mitterrand and these people were -- Sarkozy is way ahead of her. She made some mistakes during the campaign, especially on foreign policy, and so that I think is really weighing down -- weighing her campaign down on the personality side, aside from all the policy issues we've been talking about.

Just on the personality side, I do think there's a mood in France.

All the skepticism about Sarkozy that there is -- and there's an awful lot of it, as we said. There's also a little bit of you know, this is still France and this is the institution that Charles De Gaulle created and is she really up to it? There's a real question about that.

MR. HOAGLAND: American foreign policy affected by her victory?

MR. GORDON: Well, I suggested before that she doesn't have a natural affinity for the United States. That was a sort of euphemism. I think it could be really problematic. I think her instincts are those of traditional French socialism; a deep skepticism of the American hyper power; deep skepticism of American capitalism; resistance to American hegemony around the world; different view on Middle-Eastern issues; different view on use of force around the world. I think she would be a very difficult partner for the United States. And her constituency would only push her in that direction.

MR. HOAGLAND: You'll hear no disagreement from here.

Right here, sir.

MR. PLOWDOWSKI: Chris Plowdowski, the Manufacturer's Alliance.

In the past 50 years or so, the former French presidents Charles De Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, François Mitterrand have made a point of supporting the policy towards Central Europe through close diplomatic channels, also economic cooperation and the François Mitterrand strong support for democracy. Relations have slipped between France and Central Europe over the past few years. Would there be any difference between any of these two towards that, for example, as Angela Merkel has made a point of putting it maybe not on the front burner but on some burner in trying to repair some of the bad blood that had been created?

MR. HOAGLAND: I'm going to ask the author of *Notre Europe*

to answer that question.

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Yeah, I think that -- I mean, Chirac has obviously made some diplomatic mistakes with Central Europe in connection with the Iraq war, and I think that now that countries are within the European Union, so it's really no longer an issue, and Sarkozy, not only because of his Hungarian descent, but also because I think that reflects his own views about, you know, Atlanticism and so on and also, about the free market. I think it will be much more the same wavelength as these countries, so I would expect that things will be smoother in that direction as well.

As far as Ségolène Royal, I've never heard anything about Central Europe from her, so, no idea.

MR. HOAGLAND: Yes.

MR. KNOX: Ed Knox, (inaudible) College.

My question I think connects at several points about generation, about Europe, about shock in a way. Do we know how either of the candidates feels about the use of French or English in public forum? Do we know anything about their own competence in English, and does that have anything to do with anything?

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine.

MS. LESNES: Hmm, let me think. When Nicolas Sarkozy came here I don't really recall. I mean, it's definite not Dominique de Villepin was permitting English and Spanish, and as far as Ségolène, I don't know. Daniel, who you might know? No.

MR. HOAGLAND: I have no indication that she speaks English. Sarkozy does.

MS. LESNES: She has to speak English. I mean a 50-year-old person that's been to -- I mean, she has to speak English. I mean, would she be -- François (inaudible). We've seen him in interviews. But I don't know about the

public. Probably they might not be as attached than Chirac to francophonie, but it's a nice institution, francophonie. Why not. I mean, it's a --

MR. HOAGLAND: Sarkozy has questioned this French obsession with French, and he has encouraged the French to learn more English and use it less -- or use it more comfortably.

MS. LESNES: But does he speak fluently?

MR. HOAGLAND: He speaks English but not -- as you say, he's not Dominique de Villepin, but he does speak English, and Ségolène Royal I don't know, but the least you can say she is not a frequent visitor to the U.S. or Britain.

MS. LESNES: She visited China.

MR. HOAGLAND: All the way in the back, last row.

MR. BOBINSKI: Thank you very much. Kris Bobinski from Warsaw in Poland.

I'm puzzled about French society. It's a society which committed a revolutionary act in 2005 rejecting the constitution. It massively turned out an election where the leading candidates presented a program of change. And yet Philip Gordon says this society will resist change, and I think he's right. So, when this French society goes off to this election, I mean, will that be a new, more exciting phase of this collective nervous breakdown that France is going through?

MR. GORDON: Jim, why don't you tackle that.

MR. HOAGLAND: I'm just a bystander here. I'm going to ask Laurent to tell us about the French nervous breakdown. Actually -- you see signs coming out of this campaign, this election, that they're moving away from a nervous breakdown, but, Laurent, what's your sense?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Well, I think there's a national identity malaise. I think France has never really gotten over, you know, the end of the cold war or the, you know, globalization, all this transformation, and then largely in my view because no French politician has ever been able to explain to the

French what this about, that it was not all bad, that there were some opportunities, and so on; so this has not happened, and even including in this campaign where, again, the world was totally absent, so there is this huge fear and resistance of globalization and about the loss of France's influence and prestige in the world, and so I think to me it's really the key underlying issue, and -- but I think there's also a feeling that there needs to be a change and then France can't go on like this forever. And so the one who will be successful we'll know next week, but beyond that is the leader who will be able to adapt -- adjust France to the new world realities in a way that is both effective and smooth, and that's not easy.

MR. HOAGLAND: There is an anecdote that may reflect something of the sense of contradiction that you're posing in your question, and it has to do -- I visited the Sarkozy campaign headquarters, and I have to say it's one of the most professionally run campaign headquarters I've ever visited, and they do an intense amount of polling and focus -- well, they don't do focus groups in the sense that we do, but they have -- they pay a lot of attention to what is happening today in terms of what the public wants to hear, and I was really struck by a speech that Nicolas Sarkozy gave while I was there in which the candidate of change, the candidate of *rupture*, emphasized at great length that he was the candidate who would be there to protect the French people, and he went through a list of the ways in which he would protect them, obviously internal security very much one, but he kind of hit that lightly because he had already established that, that he's the law and order candidate.

But he was talking very much about protecting the French from the pressures of globalization, which goes against and is somewhat contradictory to the thrust of his earlier campaign, and what that suggested to me was that they were getting a sense from their polling that they needed to emphasize Sarkozy's attachment to protecting the French, using that word. Whether it had a lot of content or not, it was an effort to put that word very much in the voter's mind. So,

you do have this sense of contradiction between the French realizing that they've got it pretty good but they can't continue to go on having it pretty good simply because they've run out of ways to pay for it in the future.

So, there has to be some change that favors Sarkozy. But then when they get up to the moment of saying we have to change it this way, then they tend to step back and say well, I really didn't mean to change it that way. So, there is a dynamic, there is some sense of contradiction.

But what struck me, again, was that it was being discussed in a relatively positive way for a political campaign. There is this fear factor. There is the demonization of Sarkozy. He shaped his campaign in large part to say: You see, they're demonizing me, I'm not really as bad as that. And I think he's been fairly effective on that so far.

We have time maybe for two more questions. Right here.

MR. CHESTAIN: Yes, sir. Ken Chestain from the Pentagon.

Realizing that the focus so far has been on domestic issues and not much discussion of foreign policy, there are two key foreign policy issues that the new French president is going to have to address almost immediately after taking office. First, the future of Kosovo. Has either candidate given any impression on how they would either continue the current policy or change the policy on what happens with Kosovo?

Second, ballistic missile defense, especially since Russia has made such an issue of it recently.

MR. HOAGLAND: Good questions.

Phil, knowing your attachment to Kosovo?

MR. GORDON: I'm glancing over at Daniel Vernet for help on this one and he's not giving it, so I suspect that I don't feel so badly because they don't appear to have mentioned it. It's certainly not in the campaign. I mean, you know, on the TV interview shows and all that. This just doesn't even close to

coming up, and Sarkozy has shown himself willing to challenge Russia, so you can imagine not being afraid of taking a stance, but I don't know that either of them have addressed it.

Same is true for missile defense. I don't know if they have specifically addressed it.

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: Yeah, there was an interview that *Le Monde* gave where they were asked this question and they pretty much answered all the same thing, that there has to be discussion among Europeans first and so on, but my sense on Kosovo -- they would go, you know, in the E.U. line. I mean, they wouldn't -- they would stick to the E.U. line, and same for the second question.

MR. HOAGLAND: But am I right that neither candidate has been critical of the United States on the missile deployment issue, that in fact there's a good bit of support in France for missile defense?

Daniel, would --

MR. VERNET: I think you're right, but there is a sense of the necessity of discussing this question, but not (inaudible) after elections, and -- but is it a question which is a question (inaudible) about nuclear (inaudible). I think it’s difficult to address this question.

MR. HOAGLAND: Now that we've got the microphone, Daniel Vernet, could you expand a little bit on that last point about the whole question of deterrence. We have Chirac in his final days saying and then trying to deny that he said: Oh, it's not so serious if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. I'm paraphrasing very roughly: We can always wipe them out. Which has a certain logic to it I suppose. But what do you mean by the discussion of deterrence?

MR. VERNAY: I think after the end of the cold war, the French government tried to put aside a discussion about the French nuclear doctrine because a doctrine of nuclear deterrence for France was based on the cold war

relationship between West and East, and now there is the sense that it's necessary to discuss missile defense not only because the U.S. is building this system in Poland or in the Czech Republic, but marginally speaking. And -- but missile defense questions of French doctrine of deterrence, and that the reason why we avoided up to now to open this discussion. But I think there is, again, some people -- politicians and experts in France who are eager to start a discussion about missile defense not only in France but in Europe and what does it mean for the European defense policy if there is one.

MR. HOAGLAND: The French attachment is a theory.

Last question?

MR. GRECO: Thanks. Ettore Greco from the Brookings Institution.

May I ask the speakers to be -- to elaborate a little bit more on the European platform of Mr. Sarkozy, because this is a very important subject. He was characterized as a brutal pragmatist. That is a fascinating definition, but his pragmatism may be helpful in a sense, for instance, to help Europe to sort out the constitutional debate and to also find some way out of this constitutional deadlock, because he has indeed proposed some very specific way to solve this problem. At the same time, I think he made several points that may be worrying from the point of view of the E.U. policy, especially the general emphasis on that nativism and national identity may become a problem. Also the European level. And then his own austerity to let Turkey in, especially because of the argument he has used by saying that Turkey is simply not European. He has (inaudible) also to make more specific arguments during the campaign.

And then the third point I'd like to emphasize is this strong emphasis over strong industrial policy and the protection for -- the need to protect national champions, which also may be of a certain relevance for European -- at the European level. Thanks.

MR. HOAGLAND: That gives us a chance to address that question and any other thoughts that have come to you and to wind up our session.

Laurent?

MR. COHEN-TANUGI: To raise a question, I think, as you said, on the constitutional treaty I think Sarkozy has a pretty much -- has a clear plan and that is on line with the rest of the European Union, so that should work, so you'd have a simplified treaty, and then there's a second step. A second step would be to have probably a convention around 2009 in connection with the parliamentary election, but I think generally he's quite ambitious on Europe beyond the treaty, because he would like to go forward with new policies on, you know, immigration, energy, security, a number of things. So, I think he's quite ambitious while still being a pragmatic and not this sort of Euro -- you know, not like the previous generation, but I think he wants to go forward.

Now, on the economy, I think -- or maybe on enlargement -- clearly today politically it's very difficult to press for further enlargement, and especially to Turkey, until there's been a real leap forward within the European Union as such, institutionally, etc. Europe is not ready to -- and so for the time being, I think this issue will be put to rest. He's more in favor of developing strategic partnerships with Turkey and with North Africa, etc., and he will push in that direction.

MR. HOAGLAND: Corine?

MS. LESNES: Just a point just to -- because hearing -- I think we didn't -- maybe we assumed that Sarkozy is going to win and I was thinking maybe we -- it's true that we have to make the case that Royal might, as well, win. She has the momentum right now because the debate has been profitable, and hearing your reactions it's very interesting because it seems that you think that French people don't want change but they are attracted by change. So, in a way,

she would be the ideal candidate, because she embodies change. She's a woman. But she's not going to bring change. So, you can have the privilege and a pretty woman at the head of the country.

(Laughter)

MR. HOAGLAND: Phil, lead us into the coffee break.

MR. GORDON: Okay. Three quick points. That used to be my view, Corine. Before my latest trip, the previous trip, that was my sense -- that she was the perfect candidate, because she embodied changed without threatening to really change, but her campaign has been weak enough, it seems to me, that it opened up just enough space for him to be in the lead.

Secondly, on Europe, I think brutal pragmatism is the right way. Nicolas Sarkozy would be, if he wins, prepared to stand up to Europe. You know, he criticizes monetary policy; he hates competition policy; he has his own view on Turkey; he thinks Europe should be decided by the Big 6 and not by, you know, all of these countries all over the place; and he'd be prepared to say those things and that could be a radical change on European policy.

Last point, I certainly won't be in the business of making predictions, especially when the transcript probably won't come out until after the --

(Laughter)

MR. GORDON: But I would say that I think the way this final week plays out -- there's a debate Wednesday night. He's ahead in the polls. His job will be, to put it in an American context, not to be Rick Latseo. If you remember the debate with Hillary, and being aggressive and tough and walking across the stage and -- he needs to show the French people that even though she's going to accuse him of *brutalité*s, that he's actually a soft, cuddly guy who's going to look after their interest and protect them from too much change.

MR. HOAGLAND: Not only does he remember Rick Latseo, he

will remember a 1993 debate between parliamentary candidates, and it was fascinating. I watched the video tape of it while I was in Paris. Ségolène Royal is at one end of the table, he's at the other, and he gave her enough ammunition to accuse him of browbeating her and she did it masterfully, and he will remember that I think.

Phil -- you'll notice that Phil wound us up in an answer that was divided into three parts. How much more French can you get than that? Thank you for your time. Thank you for showing up, and thank you for your questions.

(Applause)

Back here at 10:45, I think, Dan, is that right?

MR. BENJAMIN: Right.

(Recess)

NATO in Afghanistan

MR. PASCUAL: Good morning. My name is Carlos Pascual. I'm the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program here at The Brookings Institution. I'm very pleased to begin with our second panel today at our annual conference by the Center on the United States and Europe.

In this second panel, we are going to focus on an issue which is out of area, so to speak, on Afghanistan where the success of this venture has vast implications for harmony within NATO, the relationships between NATO and the European Union, and how the relationship between the E.U. and the United States might develop into the future.

It also has enormous global implications as well, because it is a mission being conducted in a country where there is generally a sense of understanding for why the intervention in Afghanistan is being made; where a democratic country is emerging and is seeking help; where there's a U.N. mandate where virtually every country in NATO is involved, where the E.U. is involved, where other countries are involved -- and, indeed, it presents a situation where the inability to succeed or failure in Afghanistan will have wide-ranging ramifications and implications beyond just Europe and beyond the Europe-American relationship. In fact, it will send signals about the capacity internationally to engage in counter-insurgency activities and to support countries that are seeking democratic change. And so it's in that context that we have the ability to bring together a panel which is really extraordinary.

We have with us General Karl Eikenberry. Karl is now the Deputy MR. of the NATO Military Committee. Before that, he was the head of our Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan. He previously served once before in Afghanistan as the principal U.S. military advisor to the Afghanis and so has seen this from different perspectives as a NATO commander and as an individual

directly working hand in hand on a daily basis with the Afghan leadership.

We have Ashraf Ghani, who was formerly the Minister of Finance of Afghanistan; currently the rector of Kabul University; a non-resident Senior Fellow with us here at the Brookings Institution; and an individual who has seen these developmental and transitional challenges from many perspectives, including a long career in the World Bank.

And we have Marv Weinbaum. Marv is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Illinois, and before that he was a lead analyst in the Department of State at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and certainly one of the leading scholars on those parts of Central Asia and South Asia and currently also scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute.

So, we really have just an outstanding group to be able to bring us a range of different perspectives from the military to the economic to the political and the social and how those in fact interact with one another.

We're going to start with General Eikenberry, and each is going to speak for about seven minutes, and then we'll have a bit of an exchange here among the panel and then we'll go into Q&As with the audience.

Karl, kick us off.

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: Well, good morning. I'd like to start by thanking The Brookings Institution for hosting this event. Brookings has done so much for the furthering of understanding in the United States, indeed globally, about critical security issues domestically for us and internationally, so it's an honor to come back here once again for a very important topic.

I'd also like to specifically say thanks and express my gratitude for my three colleagues up here -- Dr. Ghani, Ambassador Pascual, and Dr. Weinbaum who all, in their own ways and their own areas, have done so much to try to enhance operations in Afghanistan and our prospects for success there in

the longer term.

Carlos told me that I had a total of seven minutes to give remarks. I'm down to six minutes and fourteen seconds, so I'd better hurry.

What I'd like to do is just very briefly, then, talk about three topics and then, based upon what my colleagues say up here, I know the most important part of this session will be the questions and answers and group discussions.

The three topics I'd like to talk about -- first, just give you a quick assessment more on a security -- from a security perspective of how we're doing in Afghanistan; secondly, talk about very briefly the longer term; then, third, talk about NATO.

So, first of all, the assessment -- how are we doing. If I could go back to last year. Last year, 2006, we saw during the spring, the summer, and the early fall much higher levels of violence than we had experienced previously in Afghanistan, especially in Southern Afghanistan and in Southeastern Afghanistan, levels of violence that we did not anticipate in 2005.

Now, what led to that outcome in 2006? A variety of factors -- complex, different relationships between these factors but, very briefly, first of all security forces, inadequate levels of security forces, especially in Southern Afghanistan and Southeastern Afghanistan, to set the necessary conditions for the firm establishment of better governance.

If you look at international military forces that were available in Southern Afghanistan and Southeastern Afghanistan- not at the levels that we needed. Afghan national security forces, combinations of the army and the police- again, not at adequate levels.

Against that, then, governance in the south and in the southeast and the east. Inadequate capacity of governance, and then in some particular instances in some provinces indeed some very severe problems with the quality of the governance that was in place.

The fourth factor was inadequate levels of investment in Afghanistan. Here, international investment in two domains in terms of economic infrastructure and then social development programs, especially in the area of economic infrastructure -- roads, power, water.

Another area was the growth of narco-trafficking, which I think was well predicted by Dr. Ghani several years ago but still unanticipated more broadly by the international community and by the Afghan governance. And then the growth of narco-trafficking as it was taking place. Go back to some of those other issues that I've talked about -- inadequate security force presence, governance problems, inadequate investment -- all of that fueling and playing to the rise of narco-trafficking and criminality.

And then the final point has to do with the sanctuary that the enemy enjoyed inside of areas of Pakistan in the tribal areas. Again, complex set of issues, interrelationships between them.

Now shifting to an assessment of 2007. Actually, I think in the short term in 2007, we're reasonably well postured for success. If we go back to those factors that led to times of trouble in 2006, let's go back over those.

First of all, security forces, international security forces- a much higher presence in Southern Afghanistan and Southeastern Afghanistan, indeed, Eastern Afghanistan. I'll give you one example -- Helmand Province. About fourteen months ago today in the Helmand Province in Southern -- Southwestern Afghanistan, international military forces -- there were about 150 U.S. soldiers who were in Helmand Province. Today in the Helmand Province in that same area, there are over 3,000 British soldiers in a very capable task force. So, the growth of the strength of the international military forces has been a very important factor, and then, indeed, the transition that occurred from U.S.-led coalition militarily last year over the fall and the winter. That was a difficult transition that we were going through.

I think everyone knows military transitions of command are always difficult, but this was unprecedented. We were going from a U.S.-led coalition to a NATO military command, and so there was a loss of momentum during that period of time. But NATO now firmly has the mission.

More important for the long term when we talk about the security forces, Afghan national security forces, now we have much more capacity and the Afghans have a much greater capacity of army forces in the south and the southeast. The police program is behind that of the army by several years, but even in the police program we're starting to see signs now of success.

With regard to security forces, the decision that the United States made several months ago to leave an additional combat brigade of several thousand U.S. soldiers in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan will make a profound difference. As well, the decision that was announced several months ago as well that the United States to invest an additional $4 billion in Afghanistan national army and police training and equipping will also make a difference.

Second factor is improvements in governance. I'll come back to this but, broadly, if we look in Southern and Southeastern, Eastern Afghanistan, at least at provincial level there have been improvements that President Karzai's administration has made.

In the area of reconstruction, I talked about the under-investment that had occurred in the south and the southeast. Another decision by the United States several months ago announced an additional $1 billion of reconstruction development aid. Most of it focused in the south and east, a lot of that going into economic reconstruction and development.

And then, finally, with regard to Pakistan, steady efforts over the last several months by Pakistan to try to attack the sanctuary that the Taliban enjoy in parts of the federally administered tribal area, and indeed in Blukistan Province in Quetta.

Now, shifting to the longer term having laid out, then, a picture where in 2007 opportunities for success, the longer term is theory of concern. In testimony that I gave to the House Armed Services Committee several months ago, I termed the challenge that we were facing in the longer term, or the real threat that we were facing, as what I defined as the irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan among its people.

It's fair to say that -- now, several years after the establishment of the constitution, the presidential elections in Afghanistan, the parliamentary elections in Afghanistan -- it's also fair to say, at this point in time now, that the people of Afghanistan are asking the question: What is this government delivering in terms of security? What are they delivering in terms of goods and services?

So, we've moved beyond the phase about the Afghan people justifiably taking great pride in how their government was brought into being to a phase where now they want delivery of security, they want the delivery of goods and services.

If we're going to succeed in the long term in Afghanistan, then my sense is that we need what I would say a very significant increase in terms of government programs, justice programs, and development of the economic infrastructure.

What the military can do inside of Afghanistan, and what the international military forces can do -- we use the metaphor "we can provide a shield." And we can provide a shield for the Afghan people and for those international organizations in support of the Afghan people. Behind that shield for them to gain time and space, to develop governance, to develop justice, to develop their economy, to develop social programs. But that's all we can do -- is provide a shield. Increasingly our hope is that the Afghan police and the Afghan army will grow and have the capability to stand up and provide that shield themselves. But the military cannot win this conflict by themselves and much

more needs to be done behind that shield.

And then the third point I'd make is with regard to NATO, last. First of all, what has NATO brought to Afghanistan, to the Afghanistan campaign? They brought more forces. I talked about that. They brought more nonmilitary capability. It's interesting when you talk to commanders on the ground inside of Afghanistan that they will tell you at any level -- whether at their provincial level, the district level -- they'll tell you that one of their best weapon systems available is economic reconstruction and development projects. We're finding that NATO commanders -- non-U.S. NATO commanders -- still relatively new to the campaign are sending words back to their defense ministries. They're sending words back to their capitol that much more needs to be done in the nonmilitary domain.

The third advantage that NATO brings is in terms of the image war that's being waged right now against Islamic militant extremists that heretofore, when it was the United States-led coalition that had the responsibility for international security presence in Afghanistan -- it made the Jihadis' image war campaign a bit easier because it was focused against the United States. And now that we have a vibrant alliance of 26 nations, 11 other partner countries -- 37 in all -- it does take that particular tool, that particular part of the Jihadi image war off the table, and that's been very helpful for us.

And then fourth and finally, longer term what does NATO perhaps have an opportunity to achieve through Afghanistan, and that's in the area of their own military and defense transformation as a military alliance via the campaign in Afghanistan. Perhaps during the question and answer we can talk about that more.

Challenges that NATO has -- first of all, inadequate forces against what the political commitments were that were made several years ago. We're still short of forces. We're also finding that the forces that are in Afghanistan to

various extents have restrictions that are placed upon them, and so this causes military inefficiency strategically, with restrictions being placed upon forces inside of Afghanistan. I think that at some point in time this could cause political military problems within the alliance; that is, if there's one tier of countries that commit their forces into Afghanistan to fight anywhere, there's a second tier of nations that put restrictions about forces going into combat that could become a political issue within the alliance at some point.

We also have challenges with regard to the Afghan national security forces and the program to develop the Afghan national security forces in that we have inadequate levels of NATO contributions to that mission.

And then third and finally, the political military integration of the mission for NATO inside of Afghanistan. What do I mean by "political military integration?" Up until NATO took over the responsibility for the entire Afghan-wide mission, you had a U.S. diplomatic lead and a U.S.-led coalition militarily. Now we have a NATO military lead, but still to evolve is where on the international front does the political direction and coherence come from?

Secondly, with regard to NATO, the question about what is their level of ambition politically within Afghanistan? That still has to be defined.

I remain optimistic about the NATO mission in the end. Who would have thought -- if I could ask this group to raise your hand if you thought five years ago that NATO as a military alliance would be outside of Europe with 37,000 forces fighting under a NATO flag in a counterinsurgency mission inside of Central Asia. NATO has been in Afghanistan since 2003. It's expanded steadily since 2003 to the point now it has the responsibility for all of Afghanistan. At each stage of growth and adaptations, there have been shortfalls, but NATO continues to evolve. And despite the shortages I talked about -- shortages of forces, restrictions on forces that exist today, shortages of forces for the Afghan national security force mission -- there seems to be no wavering of

political will within Brussels, within the NATO alliance about the long-term commitment to the Afghanistan mission.

So, I'll stop there, and, Carlos, thanks.

MR. PASCUAL: Karl, that's great. Thank you.

Ashraf.

MR. GHANI: Good morning. It's a privilege to be on a panel with General Eikenberry, Ambassador Pascual, and Professor Weinbaum.

In 2001 I argued that there were three scenarios possible for Afghanistan: A narco-mafia state; a linen tango, which meant one step forward, three steps backward; and a developmental state. Today the contestation for Afghanistan is defined among three networks. Each of these is both local and international. The first of these networks is centered around a series of national programs that have yielded or are beginning to yield major results for the citizens of the country.

Telecom -- $800 million of private sector investment having generated two and half million phones within four years. A rural development program that has dispersed $240 million to 70 percent of the villages of Afghanistan where legitimacy of the government in each of these areas, as a result of this program, is very high. And, of course, reform of the national army. Trust in the national army is still very high.

But there's a second network. It is focused around loops of corruption, lack of accountability, and lack of transparency.

The first part of this is Afghan. The Minister of Interior exemplifies the degree of corruption and lack of legitimacy of the government, and today there's a high degree of distrust in institutions of government at both the provincial and national levels. The second is the "beltway bandits." As each dollar of the United States assistance, only 20 cents gets to Afghanistan. Eighty cents goes back. And this is creating a huge crisis of confidence in the country.

Third are the United Nations agencies. They have refused to account to Afghan people as to what they have done with the over $2 billion of assistance and there is no transparency or accountability. And it goes on.

Particularly depressing is over $600 million in technical assistance. That is not creating any capability. The same organizations that keep talking about capacity refuse to fund higher education in the country.

The third network is one of criminality, violence, and terror. The drug industry now is no longer a network. It's a pyramid focused on 25 individuals at the top, and it's a global series of cartels. Of course the overwhelming amount of the money from the narcotics trade comes to the West. It does not go to Afghan farmers or even traffickers. And unless the global -- the narcotics issue is handled at the global level, there are not going to be local solutions. And terror, again, is a regional and global network that is funded and organized.

Despite this, Afghanistan is really unique today because there's a second chance. I know of no other country in a post-conflict situation than in the sixth year of post-conflict history has so much international attention focused on it. We actually have more attention focused on Afghanistan today -- from Europe, the United States, Japan, and Canada of course -- than we had in 2001 and 2002. At that time, we had to persuade the rest of our partners, that we matter. Today the commitment is very high in terms of both forces and resources.

As General Eikenberry outlined, nobody in 2002 would have expected that today we would have 35,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan. It was a hard startle but we were there. So, what's missing? But before that we need to recognize the most important asset in Afghanistan. That asset is the people of Afghanistan. It is not going to be international forces or resources that is going to bring legitimacy and order to Afghanistan; it's the judgment of the ordinary people.

So, we need to highlight both the utility and the limits of force. First, force is clearly needed, and Afghans are unique in having surrendered the legitimate monopoly of means of violence to international forces. There was a total consensus on this in the country in 2001 and 2002. We wanted international forces to come, because we were incapable of establishing a legitimate monopoly of means of violence.

However, mistakes in the use of force and in active insidious propaganda campaigns and the deterioration of security may now be bringing back Afghans to the tipping point of their tolerance. The legitimacy of NATO in Afghanistan is seriously an issue. If more Afghan citizens are killed to area bombardment, any killing of Afghan civilians any day is going to decrease it. The level of tolerance is no longer there. People expected a security dividend and they are not seeing that.

The second is one hates to ask the larger question in the life of General Smith -- fantastic book on Utility of Force. Are we fighting the right war in Afghanistan? And will there ever be enough forces to militarily conquer Afghanistan? If the answer to the first question is not there -- the second question, namely enough forces would not be committed --then the critical issue of coherence needs to be asked. Today the missing element in Afghanistan is lack of strategic coherence.

Force, political process, and economic process are not aligned to create a credible series of dividends for the ordinary people of Afghanistan. Each is going on its own. The danger in particular is that given the vacuum from the economic side, the military is forced to assume a burden for which it does not have the capability and therefore will take short-term measures. What made the bond process possible was a very careful delineation of the future and adherence to the pact we delineated. Since 2005 coherence has been sadly missed.

What will bring coherence? I have an article forthcoming in *The*

Europe's Word where I have offered the details, so just with my two minutes I will conclude in the following.

First, coherence demands consensus around state building as organizational principle. We have not established this agreement. We've been improvising in silos on the military, on economic, on the political process but the coherent pursuit of a goal of state building is not been at the sector.

The state building process requires co-production. It's going to require international actors and Afghan actors to agree strategically, not just tactically, and the blame game must stop. The blame game is not serving anybody.

One agreement or reaffirmation of the goal is from both sides taken, then existing business practices and approaches that have proven ineffective in the building must be discarded. Europe and United States in particular must decide is the purpose of their economic assistance to Afghanistan to benefit their limited farms around the beltway or to deliver benefits for the people of Afghanistan? Both are not compatible any longer. You cannot operate with a number of unaccountable farms along the beltway and win the legitimacy from people of Afghanistan. With the same amount of money, you can deliver ten times more. But the modality of business practices is to change. And particularly use of national programs.

Now, where -- who are the stakeholders that are really going to make the critical decision? First let us recognize 65 percent of the population of Afghanistan are under 20 years of age. And today the most common definition of a Talib in the south is an unemployed youth.

NATO won a very decisive victory in the south last year and it's been underappreciated. But that victory cannot be consolidated unless it is followed by making the youth stakeholders in the system. Therefore, the strategy must become three-prong. Force needs to be combined with economic and

political processes.

And, to conclude, the first network, which is national programs focused on state building and delivery to citizens, must be strengthened. The second network must be transformed and its corruption eliminated. And the third network has to become -- contain an element. With these, Afghanistan is not Iraq. The Afghan people want nothing more than to be part of a globalizing worth. The problem is that the modalities of cooperation are actually giving them a sense that they're not being given the chance. And that means a rejection of opportunity rather than embrace often oppositional approach.

Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Sure, thank you.

Marvin.

MR. WEINBAUM: After the insightful analyses that we've already heard, I think that it perhaps falls to me to step back a bit. What I see as the premise of this morning's discussion -- the mission, NATO, and coalition forces -- is necessary to Afghanistan's stability and stay in recovery. But it also serves, as we've already heard here, as a critical test of the will and the capacity, separately and collectively, of our militaries and our governments. In gauging success in Afghanistan, I believe that our expectations ought to be fairly modest for what has been historically a weak state that has endured nearly 30 years of conflict. It's destroyed traditional economy. It's a country with limited natural resources and, for the near future, certainly limited human resources as well.

I believe it was summed up quite well a number of years ago when Ashraf Ghani here -- if I've quoted you correctly Ashraf, you said something to the effect, "If only Afghanistan could reach the status of a normal, low-developed, a low-income country."

So, what I'd like to in the few moments that I have here allotted to me is just to review what I think are some of the stakes for the United States and

its military and donor partners in Afghanistan. Perhaps there will be an opportunity now and later to look at some of the mistakes as well.

It should be self-evident that the United States and Europe have little chance of succeeding against the terrorist networks that we see directly threatening us if Afghanistan were to return to the conditions that prevailed before 9/11. Well, we can differ here over whether Iraq without the U.S. and its coalition partners might be less hospitable to al Qaeda and foreign militants. But there should be little doubt that should the project fail in Afghanistan, it would very quickly become the nerve center for terrorist operations regionally and very likely with a global reach as well.

Perhaps if there's time later, we'll also have an opportunity to discuss whether we've paid too high a price in conflating the conflict in Iraq with that in Afghanistan. And I'll perhaps get a chance to explain what I mean by that later.

Now, closely related to this is that an insurgency that succeeds in Afghanistan is likely to put Pakistan at risk of an expanding and deepening radicalization. A likely political destabilization that could in time allow, we fear, unfriendly elements access to nuclear weapons and to raise the chances of armed conflict on the subcontinent.

Moreover, the evidence of our determination to defeat the neo-Taliban and their allies is likely to dissuade those in Pakistan from holding a Pashtun card meant to be put into play in the event of an early international withdrawal and state failure in Afghanistan.

We can't ignore, as well, that a re-Talibanized Afghanistan is almost certain to be perceived in Central Asia -- the Central Asian Republics -- as carrying the contagion of Islamic radicalism. One of the effects of that would be to reduce further remaining Western influence in that area in favor of stronger Russian dependence.

There are other high stakes in Afghanistan, among them -- and we've -- it's been alluded to already -- the ability of NATO to achieve unity of military command and interoperability, both of which obviously have implications for future NATO missions. Plans by the United States to forge a strategic partnership with Afghanistan are naturally contingent on the survival of a Western-oriented regime, and we could debate here whether such a strategic partnership is in the interest of, certainly, Afghanistan. I think it's a separate matter.

Our hopes of curbing the massive drug trade, whose destination is primarily European markets, require not only tactical assistance in the eradication program but, more importantly, progress in the security sector sufficient to allow for rule development and better governance.

We have a different kind of stake in Afghanistan's democratic institutions and constitutional values. The Western community and others have invested politically, financially, and philosophically in a Kabul government that demonstrates commitment to support stable, functional government that's also Islamic. Fostering democracy would be difficult under the best of circumstances in Afghanistan, but for the foreseeable future it will also need to be defended militarily against its enemies.

Most of all what we have at stake, it seems to me, in Afghanistan is our very credibility. We have come to be viewed broadly by Afghans and others -- yes, especially the Pakistanis -- for our practice of forming alliances devoted mainly to serving our own national interests, interests that when satisfied have led us to desert our friends. That certainly is the perception. Understandably, being perceived as being unreliable means that those whose cooperation we seek from national leaders to the villagers are inclined to hedge their commitments, are less willing to take risks.

All this said -- and I'm leaving out of some of these stakes whether

we have an economic stake here. Perhaps we could go into the question about -- as we did in the mid-'90s when we thought we -- our only stake there was the building of a pipeline, at least the support for those who were planning to do so.

I want to say for all of what all our stakes is -- of course it's the Afghan people who have the most at stake in our prevailing militarily and succeeding in setting them on the course to some economic vitality and state building. We have had from the outset the advantage in that the overwhelming number of Afghan people have recognized that they could not succeed by themselves and have welcomed an international presence and resources. However, what we've learned after five years -- and I think much of the discussion here has directed us to that -- is that it's possible to forfeit our welcome, that that welcome is not unconditional. And we've also been reminded that despite the high stakes that I'm suggesting exist for the United States and NATO member states, their continuing commitment to the effort cannot be taken for granted.

Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you very much to all three of our panelists, and excellent presentations for setting foundations here, and I think all three of you in your own way have made very clear that what we have here is a mission that I think hangs in the balance. There have been very real successes.

Ashraf, as you put it, there is a chance to succeed, but I think all three of you, and from different perspectives, made very clear that there is a prospect for failure. And that failure I would define almost more as a state that has become ruled by incorrupt hands where there is an increased dominance of narco-traffickers influencing the governance of the country and the environments on the ground where the Taliban may not necessarily take over but can disrupt in ways that make it difficult for effective governance to take place and, finally, as Marv indicated at the end, where the welcome of the international community

may no longer persist. And I think that kind of creates the context that I'd really like to explore here further of what the chances of that happening are and what we do to get away from that.

I want to go back to a point which Ashraf made and begin, General Eikenberry, with you on a question on this issue of strategic coherence where Ashraf laid out the necessity of having coherence among the military strategy, the political strategy, the economic strategy -- and I know you believe in that very much. But the starting point for that means that you have to have an effective military mission, and there are two parts to this. One was, as Ashraf implied, potentially a declining credibility for that mission in the way that it's been carried out. Can you speak to that and what's happened and what can be done to correct it?

And, secondly, you know, let's go back to your point about the south and the southeast on the size of the mission and whether that mission is in fact big enough and effectiveness between the international presence and the local presence.

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: Well, several points. First of all, with regard to the development of coherence on the security side, I think that there has been, Carlos - over the last several years, we've made pretty good progress in that area. We've managed to work with the Afghans and integration with the international military forces, so we're doing, compared to, say, several years ago, a very good job of horizontal security integration, and we're starting to develop vertical capabilities as well.

What do I mean by that? Back in 2002 the only security force program that was moving forward was that of the Afghan national army. Somewhat belatedly in 2005 is when we start to then have a much more comprehensive, holistic approach towards the building of the police. Very frankly, we lost three years though before a coherent program and a sufficiently

scaled program was developed. Some of the problems we see with security right now with criminality do go back to that failure to deliver a strong police program quickly.

So, we start to develop. By late 2005 there's a good police program underway. I would agree with Dr. Ghani, we still have some very significant problems that are being faced within the Ministry of the Interior, but I'm a bit optimistic at this point that we're starting to see signs now in the final wing, the intelligence wing, the national security directorate -- at the National Directorate of Security -- a kind of Afghan combination of CIA and FBI put together much more focused on intelligence operations. They, too, as an organization are starting to develop capacity. But importantly now we're working with the Afghans to integrate those forces, so the full integration of intelligence in operations -- we're starting to see emergence of good capacity at the national level. The Afghans created, with our assistance, what were called regional commands. Five regional commands now exist throughout Afghanistan unprecedented in Afghanistan's history. So, you have five regions of Afghanistan, full integration of the army, police commands now at the regional level, and the National Directorate of Security, also at the regional level, and there's also border police commands that are aligned with those zonal commands or regional commands. And then at the provincial level we have integration as well.

So, that has been a relatively -- I think an important success. As Afghan capacity develops on the security front, there self-confidence increases. Very importantly, back to what Dr. Ghani said, aspirations of the Afghanistan people to exercise the monopoly of the use of force of their own legitimate Afghan security forces -- that's critical to our success. The sand is going through the hour glass right now for the international military forces. International military forces, our tolerance for making mistakes among the Afghan people -- it's

diminishing. It's diminishing every year, and that's understandable. What the Afghan people want -- they want to exercise their own sovereignty. The most important manifestation of sovereignty is the control of your own domestic security forces.

It's in the area of the integration, though, the military -- the security piece with the nonmilitary, on both the Afghan front and the international military front that we're having the most difficult challenges right now. We're doing better in certain areas. I think in Eastern Afghanistan, Southeastern Afghanistan last year in 2006 we had some relatively important successes, especially in Eastern Afghanistan where the campaigns were brought together very well on the military and the nonmilitary side, but still to date capacity building capabilities on the nonmilitary side within the international military community -- within the international community -- are lacking. Still to date, as an example, we're now five, five and a half years into the Afghanistan campaign. Although we have great programs for the development of Afghan national army officers and noncommissioned officers, we have excellent programs for the development of police still to date. There is no basic governance academy in Afghanistan for the development of Afghan bureaucrats. Not along the G8 model, just a fundamental school that develops nation (inaudible), teaches basic ethics. There are not the capacity-developing programs that exist on the nongovernment side within the most important ministries of Afghanistan at the levels that I think Dr. Ghani was talking about.

And then still today -- militarily, culturally -- very frankly, we still have problems today, and I'll finish with this final point, Carlos, probably going on too long here. But on the military front, culturally within our military officers like myself -- we were brought up in the '70s and the '80s and we were brought up in a universe that our great campaign that we had to get ready for was going to be the fight against the Soviet Union, the campaign that would last 30 or 45 days.

Now we're fighting in wars, like Afghanistan, which are going to go on for 5 years, 10 years, 15 years. And so we're trying to change as military commanders at all levels' mindsets that think about long term, not winning a battle next month --that's tactical -- but developing resources that are needed for the long term. We're also very challenged right now thinking about the ways that we integrate the nonmilitary with ourselves.

You know, it used to be that we would think about fighting a battle and we'd punch through the enemy line, and the exploitation force in that battle somewhere against the Soviets in Europe would be tanks and artillery and fighter aircraft. As the hole was broken through the Soviet line, there was the military exploitation force. Now the exploitation force is roads. Now the exploitation force is the replacement of a corrupt district chief with a good district chief. Now the exploitation force is going to be the delivery of a good police force to a district that we in the Afghan national army are moving into. So, still today there's -- I think our military -- I think the NATO militaries have adapted well but we have a long way to go.

MR. PASCUAL: Karl, that's extremely helpful. Let me ask you to bring that back to an assessment of the south and southeast, which is where you started out. When you -- a tremendous amount of investment put into development of the Afghan national army as you say at the beginning on the side of the police, but if you were to make the judgment, is there enough security to create enough of an environment to have a sustained civilian presence in a way that you can actually get traction on economic and political activities? Can you in fact actually sustain the security in those critical areas?

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: I'm cautiously optimistic that we can. There are questions, as I talked about during my remarks (inaudible) with the cross-border sanctuary that must be addressed, and I know Pakistan is carefully looking at and they're engaged in the conflict on their side. But beyond that, we

have to be careful about making sure we define correctly who is the enemy that we're fighting inside of Afghanistan. Dr. Ghani said that the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan is defined sometimes as unemployed young men, and I entirely agree with that. In Kapisa Province northeast of Kabul, there's a very good governor name Governor Murad. I asked him once, "Governor, what's the biggest threat that you face in your province?" And there had been a so-called resurgence of Taliban, and I expected his answer to be "It's militant Taliban pouring into the province right now." His answer was, "My biggest threat's unemployment." We had a province that we were operating in and still operate in, in Southeast Afghanistan -- Paktika Province. Our forces together with Afghan construction companies -- and we worked very hard to build up Afghan capacity -- we built a road, not an interstate but a hard-packed dirt road, between the towns of Shuwana and Orgune. About 70 kilometers before we improved the road, it took about 12 hours to navigate that distance -- 70 kilometers. Now it takes two hours. Before we improved the road, our forces were ambushed along that road. I think over a six-month period of time we had 20 ambushes. Since the road was put in, no ambushes.

I went down on the -- traveled the road with the governor. We stopped about half way, went to a filling -- went to a gas station. By the way, this gas station was there before the road was improved, believe it or not. I asked the gas station owner how's business? And he was incredulous, said it's great, you know, it's great, don't you understand? -- you built a road. Then I asked a more important question, how's security? and he said security's wonderful. I said why? He was again credulous and he said the reason now security is good along this road is because we've got markets along this road; we've got a school along this road; because we have a road our children can actually get to this school; we have a health clinic so when our wives go into labor there's a reasonable chance they'll get to that health clinic -- we've got something along this road now in this area

that we will fight for and we will defend; if strangers come to this area we'll them to leave; if they don't leave, we'll report to the police. It's a long answer to your question, Carlos, but who is the enemy? The enemy can be the militant extremist Taliban. The enemy can be a corrupt district chief. The enemy can be a corrupt police chief. The enemy can be many other people who actually will not try to overthrow the government of Afghanistan. They're perfectly content to have a weak, corrupt government of Afghanistan exist. So, we have to be clear before we answer the question, try to address the question, how many (inaudible) forces do we need? If we define the enemy very narrowly as extremist militant Taliban, there's not enough forces available in the world, then, to help us achieve with the Afghans' success. If we're more nuanced than that, I'm optimistic that with the (inaudible) we have we can succeed.

MR. PASCUAL: I think that differentiation's important, but what it brings us back to is, is there enough space to in fact address those political and economic factors that are critical to, say, deal with that issue of unemployment, and on that let me come back, Ashraf, to you. You've laid out a number of reasons why the political and economic aren't working well enough from corruption, lack of capability, ineffective use of international resources, and in a sense one could almost say you've painted a picture that is so grim that you can't turn this around very quickly. It's a government that feels the impact of decades of destruction of human capital internally within the country. There are I'm sure real issues and problems with the role of the international community, but shifting that responsibility on a government, as you said, which has real problems with corruption isn't necessarily the answer either. So, where do you break in to this problem in a way that lets you start getting some traction?

MR. GHANI: I think where you break in is through national programs, so let me just explain how the ones we designed work and why if we could start 4 to 6 this year and 4 to 6 next year. We could regain momentum.

I mean, if you take telecom, the first time I raised the issue was in February of 2002, and everybody thought that was crazy -- how could one make money out of telecom in Afghanistan and get private sector investment? I asked President Bush personally to give us a $50 million open guarantee. The Secretary of Development in Britain gave me a team of six people -- topnotch experts on telecom -- who designed the rules. We gave the entire management of the process of review of submission of bids to that six group and took the Afghan government out of it. Because the playing field was laid very clear and the process of submission of bits was totally transparent, that Afghan cabinet came to the room the way everybody else came to the room, just looked at the thing.

The first thing we received was $5 million. Last year, the lowest bid was $40 million for the telecom license; $800 million of private sector investment this cap. The latest investment is $350 million. In another two years, the Afghan market is going to have five million mobile phones. Seventy percent of the country is covered. Now, you take this today and, like what Marvin says -- and if I may disagree on one thing -- we have fantastic natural resources. I disagree.

MR. WEINBAUM: Okay.

MR. GHANI: Right now one of the ten largest copper mines in the world is under consideration. The bids are between $1 to $3 billion. If this is handled transparently, the implications of what that will bring are phenomenal. They are right now proposals from American venture capitalists for oil fields in the north. They are proven full wells. And a group of venture capitalists is ready to invest in this and guarantee around $60 million in return. But the government has to have the credibility and the understanding, and this comes to a modality of partnerships. So, this is one way. If you handle the mining sector with the same sort of approach that the telecom sector received, within it, the structure of the ministry changes, because stakeholders come who demand credibility and have a

voice. You cannot push around telecom companies that have invested hundreds of millions of dollars and treat them with the same degree of disrespect that you're doing with ordinary Afghans who don't have a voice.

Gulf today is booming. There are at least $250 billion of surplus money in the Gulf. Some of this is ready for investment. It depends on the enabling climate to create the enabling climate.

Second would be a program (inaudible). The national solidarity is a program of (inaudible). We give -- again, it's -- I designed both of these programs. The second one brought about the World Bank, the European Union. The only people didn't join were USAID, because they don't understand and they just want the program through the beltway.

What did this program do? It changed the decision rights. Every community that becomes eligible for this -- and it's the village level -- needs to have secret ballot-based elections to elect its leaders, and it has to be men and women. It's a must. Unless the woman participates, they don't become eligible. Then it's complete transparency in terms of 70 percent of the village participating and determining their priorities. They're helped by NGOs and with the technical committee that helps them, they've implemented 16,000 infrastructure projects. On average, it costs USAID $250,000 to build a school in Afghanistan. This program builds it at 40,000 with $10,000 of local participation.

Now, that program could be transformed into program in rural enterprise. Nepal provides electricity – micro-hydro -- to 30 percent of its population. If we draw on examples like that, 40 percent of the villages in Afghanistan can be provided with electricity within three years. It's these visible things --

A third example so that I don't go on -- Kabul. Kabul is a mess. In every single way. The municipality is corrupt to the core. The people refer to the municipality as the place of loot. But Kabul could generate three or four billion

dollars in revenue if it's properly developed through secure property relationships, through investment of the infrastructure in the five provinces surrounding it. Security of Kabul, which is critical to the continuation of this government will come from a sort of approach that has been done now repeatedly with special planning.

To summarize -- not to go into detail -- expectations of the Afghans have been lowered very significantly, so this is the good news. Regaining momentum, the population wants the government to function. This not Iraq again. Afghan people are really sick and tired -- 99 percent of them. The last thing we want to see is more violence. Any type of hope that is given, they gravitate towards. So, if a sense of momentum were established, the population would rally.

I very much agree with the example that General Eikenberry gave -- and let me again express enormous appreciation for his dedication; I mean, the type of selfless service that General Eikenberry has provided to Afghanistan is second to none and is very, very deeply appreciated -- but it is this core of saying one has to take a grand idea and break it down into components that are sequenced. People in Afghanistan understand the following. You tell them what you want to do, then you do it, then you tell them that you've done it. That is what creates momentum.

Today the problem is that all the accomplishments of the government in the international community that are very real are not communicated in a coherent manner back to the population. So, everything is being perceived as being random. If it's brought to a coherent framework, then one of the things that coherence pays is that you manage the expectations of the population. Between 2002 and 2005 I think we managed the expectation of the population. The political calendar was very finely tuned, and so were these other measures. Now, that sort of initiative is what's required.

MR. PASCUAL: Ashraf, let me take the national solidarity program as an example. It's a compelling model, and the question, you know, that comes to mind is how much of it can one do? How significant and expansive can it be? How much of an impact can it have? And let's say if we take, again, these critical areas of the south and southeast, what's been the experience there with the National Solidarity Program? How much of an in-road has it made? Can it make more of an in-road? How much of it is threatened by the kind of cross-border activity that I want to get a little bit further into with Marv in a second?

MR. GHANI: Sure. The first thing is national solidarity is functioning in all the south. The smallest number of schools that have been burned have been in the areas where national solidarity is active. But the problem is, you know, after $240 million of expenditure, 5,000 villages today have finished phase 1, but phase 2 is not funded. Instead, you know, USAID has given a hundred million dollars to Kemonics to operate in Helmand Province and the large amount of that comes back to the country. National solidarity is not being funded by the United States. It's one of the few countries that has not been willing to come through with the program modality of cooperation, because there are a lot of other interests.

So, they're still operating of scale is a very real issue and can be done. Again, you know, there are large-scale surveys of all the southern provinces. The Afghan contractors, under the worst of circumstances, are able to operate in the south. And what's the problem? We do not have a coherent program to support the expansion of the Afghan contracting sector. This is going to be critical. This is not a time to insist on international procurement rules where nobody comes. You know, international fulfillment is formally very accountable, because all the rules are complied with. Substantively, people collude, because the number of people who come to conditions like that is very small, and the cost is going through the roof. One has to be able to look I think at very different

ways of operating.

My last observation here -- security is not going to come to all of Afghanistan in one day. We have to have a much more (inaudible) concept of security in terms of first focusing on those strategic areas that truly make the difference and then expand. So, you have to establish zones.

And the other part is, again, to echo General Eikenberry, what good governance delivers in terms of security dividends, force that's not. And rule of law particularly is important. Afghans have an unbelievable demand for rule of law. The problem is lack of supply of rule. So, corruption in the judicial sector is the one that really takes a toll.

Sanctuaries -- it's a very, very real issue, because, and here again let me pay tribute to NATO, because it's not sufficiently understood.

The goal last year of the terrorist network was to turn Kandahar into a second Baghdad -- to make -- to conquer at least four provinces of Afghanistan; to make the Europeans, particularly the Dutch and the British who were targeted and then the Canadians. They were deliberately targeted because they thought these would be soft. The goal was very clear -- to break NATO's unity. And they failed on all of these. This needs to be appreciated- that in the south last year, there was a very, very significant accomplishment. Now the issue is consolidation of this. And people in the south, with whom I talked in great detail, actually acknowledged this.

And related to this is that wherever the Afghan national army is being deployed in the south, people are actually collaborating, but they hate the police. They will go nowhere near the police, because they feel that the police are incredibly corrupt and actually violent. So, when institutions are built, the answer is to credible institutions people respond. But it is also not all going to happen in one day- the Afghan people are very realistic people -- particularly the Arab world people. It's not that everybody wants all the problems to be solved in one

day, but they want to see a credible path that the lives of our children are going to be better than ours.

MR. PASCUAL: Ashraf, thank you.

Karl.

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: If I could just make two points following up on Dr. Ghani's comment.

First of all with regard to the police, I would -- Dr. Ghani -- I would emphasize again that the police program, rather late in the offing, it's not until late 2005 that a coherent, well-resourced approach began. Unfortunately because it was late 2005, the Ministry of the Interior and the police forces of Afghanistan had about a four-year head start to develop their own unique set of business practices, and so what we now have is, beginning in 2006 slowly but steadily, a comprehensive reform process that's underway. I'm cautiously optimistic, so we see symptoms on the ground everywhere still of bad police and police that are not respected. But if the political will is maintained -- and we're seeing signs from President Karzai's administration of having political will in this area. I'm more optimistic that not necessarily in 2007 but longer term we'll see good results there.

Secondly, with regard to what Dr. Ghani had said about international practices for contracting in Afghanistan, here I totally endorse what he said. On the military side, we began a program we called Afghan First about a year ago, and the Afghan First program for the U.S. coalition -- which we then passed on to NATO and NATO has tried to embrace it-- is the question for any commander on the ground and any level in Afghanistan is if you're bringing in expatriates to do things, the question is why? And if it's really a necessity, what's your long-term plan to transition that to Afghan? And if you're buying material and bringing it in from outside of Afghanistan, same questions apply.

With regard to rules and regulations, unless you are extraordinarily

aggressive in trying to break through your own national regulations, then the status quo is what you live with.

I'll give you an example -- something as simple as bottled water. When I asked the question: Why does every bottle of water that our forces are drinking in Afghanistan have Arabic written on it and is it coming in from Dubai? Why are we not buying Afghan water? The answer was: it's impossible. We've looked at regulations. Impossible. Six months later with a lot of work, we finally now have Afghan companies that are bottling water. We're buying from them. We're saving the U.S. taxpayers what used to be $30 million of expense annually, believe it or not, for bottled water. We're down to 16 million. Four hundred Afghans employed, and those Afghan companies -- two companies -- now are branching out and they're finding all other kinds of markets inside of Afghanistan. It's a small vignette.

I can give another vignette in which we've gone now over the last several years from aggressive contracting in construction to where there were zero Afghan companies that could bid on Afghan National Security Force, army, and police construction projects -- we now have twelve contractors -- twelve Afghan contractors bid and generally win. So, the international community, the military forces were the big -- currently we're the big spenders in Afghanistan, and we need to have a much more aggressive, thoughtful approach towards long-term training Afghan labor capacity, build and production capacity, and developing economic capacity.

MR. PASCUAL: Very helpful.

Marv, let me come back to you and if we could focus on a --

MR. WEINBAUM: Before you do, Carlos let me say this is such a rare opportunity, and I hope -- I assume everyone here appreciates this. To have Ashraf and Karl to reflect on things that not only they have thought about but practitioners -- people who have been on the ground, having an opportunity to see

it and to do something about on what has happened during this particularly -- during the period that Ashraf was there and Karl. So, I -- you will get this nowhere else I assure you, and I'm sure that you do appreciate that.

Please, Karl.

MR. PASCUAL: Great advertisement for the Brookings Institution. How can we deny you the opportunity of saying that.

If we can focus on the cross-border issue for a minute, some have argued that unless the capacity of Taliban coming in from Pakistan is curtailed it will become impossible to in fact actually establish stability in the south, not because the Taliban will take over and govern and rule but that it becomes possible to sustain a disruption of that society where it increasingly becomes difficult for an ability to govern and establish economic activity, and so the kind of frustration, the sense of lack of ability to deliver that Ashraf was talking about then overwhelms and becomes a disruptive force. Can you talk a little bit more about the nature of this cross-border activity -- how serious is it; how big is it?

MR. WEINBAUM: Well, I think we have to start with recognition of this blame game that's been going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we can say with some confidence that you can't have a successful insurgency if there is no sanctuary, that this is a critical element in the sustainability of this insurgency.

But having said that, you can't also sustain that insurgency unless there is the soil in which it can grow. And the sad fact is that it has -- as we've learned, it has grown. The ability of the Taliban -- at the same time, let me say that the Taliban -- and that, itself, ought to be deconstructed, because there are different -- the term "Taliban" is used now to really subsume a number of insurgent groups. It's not all, obviously, the elements that are left over under Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah that operate today in Northern Baluchistan. We have dissident groups. We have groups, as we've heard, from within the

country who have their differences with the central government, with the international forces.

But I think the point we want to make here is that it will take Pakistan -- an effort on the part of Pakistan to see great strides being made in controlling this insurgency. And the trouble with Pakistan is that Pakistan has two policies towards Afghanistan. It has an official policy which recognizes that a stable, yes, prosperous Afghanistan would be to the interest of Pakistan. In fact, their destinies are so intra-linked here. If one should really fail, it's hard to imagine, as I suggested in my remarks, that the other would not be greatly adversely affected. So, that is the official policy. And then there is a recognition here that it would probably not be in Islamabad's interest to destabilize Kabul. I know there are many Afghans who believe that's exactly what they're trying to do, but I don't think so. I don't think that this is their -- certainly their official policy and a recognition that this would be a direct challenge to the international community.

At the same time, as I also suggested earlier, they do not believe that we have the staying power there. They do not believe that they can afford to be without an alternative should Afghanistan not succeed, should the insurgency lead to the international community's becoming fatigued and leave -- but whatever that they -- if they are going to have an alternative, it will be a Pasthun alternative and therefore their support for Pasthun militants -- and that includes the Taliban -- is a necessary part of their reserve strategy.

Now, the trouble is that in doing that, you also need to sponsor, yes, Jihadi groups within Pakistan who are important in supporting some of these insurgents. So, it's a difficult situation that Pakistan is facing.

And let me add to this that Pakistan's ability at this point in time to recognize the incompatibility between these two policies, and to do something about it is, we must admit, limited. There is -- it has now developed in the tribal

areas effectively a state within a state, and it is a state in which much of the time the Pakistan military finds it has no-go areas. The trouble is that if we really want to see Musharraf and Pakistan change its position here, it's going to have to (a) believe that there is no need for a Pasthun card because we are not going to be unreliable and we're not going to move out -- we're going to be there for the long term; (b) we have to re-establish our relationship with Pakistan. We have to convince the Pakistan people that what's going on in Afghanistan is in their -- that is, that conflict is not in their interest or, that is, to support the Jihadi groups is not in their interest. We have, unfortunately, with Pakistan conveyed the message that our partnership with Pakistan is with the military and with Musharraf and not with the people of Pakistan.

And, thirdly, we have to give Musharraf the political capacity to be able to confront his extremist elements and his Jihadi elements. We focus too much, in our lavish praise on him, on trying to encourage him to do more when, as I'm suggesting, he has not had the capacity to do that, and one of the main reasons he hasn't had the capacity is that he does not have the political constituency, and he will only have that political constituency if he is able to tap on what we believe is still the moderate nature of Pakistani politics, and that means opening up Pakistan's politics. Until he does -- until he's able to mobilize progressive forces who see that what we're doing is in their interest as well because for the moment now most Pakistanis, even some who seem to be or claim to be our friends or have been our friends, view what is going on in Afghanistan as not their war and what efforts have been done against the militants in the tribal areas is not their fight but rather a fight which has been fought on behalf of the United States -- that has to change. And I think it will only change when we've seen the empowerment of the mainstream -- we believe the moderate mainstream -- of Pakistan politics, of mainstream parties, and other forces which have been sidelined under this military government.

MR. PASCUAL: Marv, thanks.

And I'm going to resist the temptation on follow-up questions, because it's fascinating, and I want to turn to the audience and give you an opportunity to come in with questions. In the middle, please.

SPEAKER: I'm (inaudible) from the Estonian Embassy, and I have a question to General Eikenberry about caveats and restrictions enforced, as you said, but it's still an outstanding problem in ISAF, and it has been under much political scrutiny since last summer when phase 3 of ISAF expansion really took off, and how do you assess the success in NATO of stripping the unnecessary political restrictions and caveats, and can you approximate how much or what percentage of these 37,000 ISAF troops are really useful for a commander of ISAF? What has no geographical or other restrictions applied to them? Thank you.

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: Yeah, the -- you know, somebody has got to be serving in -- with regard to the international military command, somebody's got to be serving in the greater Kabul area. Somebody's got to be in the north. Somebody's got to be in the west. So, it's not a question that forces that are serving in different places of Afghanistan -- that they're not usefully employed. Afghanistan, for all international military forces, for the Afghan national security forces -- it remains a dangerous place wherever you are.

So, what percentage of forces, then, are in Afghanistan that have complete flexibility of maneuver, that can be moved from one region without delay to other parts -- I wouldn't get into terms of percentages. Some progress has been made over the last year, that we have a ways to go that the United States' decision to -- as I said during my opening remarks, the United States' decision to leave a combat brigade of about 3,000 infantry soldiers inside of Afghanistan above the levels that we have anticipated for this year -- that will be of some assistance.

But with these restrictions that are placed on forces -- if the level of fighting continues at about the same level that we have right now, for an extended period of time, the NATO commander -- it's just inefficient business practices.

The NATO commander, the ISAF commander, General Dan McNeil before him, the U.K. commander, General David Richards -- they're unable, then, to count on forces not only being able to move from one area to another area -- let's say Southern Afghanistan in extremis, but very importantly to take advantage of opportunities as well. So, when you have these kinds of caveats that are placed upon forces -- inefficient businesswide -- the only way to offset is more forces. But very importantly, then, the idea about winning a counterinsurgency with our Afghan partners -- you end up with a much more cautious approach. And to win a counterinsurgency, you need an opportunistic kind of approach.

Then, finally, I'll come back to what I said before with the restrictions that exist. This isn't for me to say, but I can only speculate that if we'd have the degree of fighting, say next year, the year beyond, and we haven't tried to find a way to level these caveats or to level the playing field so all forces have a kind of flexibility to go when and where needed, then I could imagine that in some of the capitals there could be some political concerns that there's unequal burden sharing.

MR. PASCUAL: Question in the back?

MR. KOTTA: Richardson Kotta (sp?), and I work for the Long-Range Analysis Unit of the National Intelligence Council.

I'm a demographer and I keep hearing the words "young men" pop up and with fear and the hope to employ all of them seems to be the way out of it, but truly when you have fertility rates between six and seven children per woman, you're looking at doubling the population in around 20 years, and with a young --

with a population that will remain largely young people it's a gambit that is impossible to win unless fertility comes down.

And the only country in the region that has actually done this -- if you look around the surrounding regions -- if you're waiting for employment or prosperity to do it, it hasn't done it in any country bordering Afghanistan. What happened in one country -- Iran -- most people probably don't know this, but Iran has a fertility rate that's very close to this country -- just about two children per woman. And they did it through public health systems that included contraception, that included women going to the provincial capitol learning about women's health and public health in general, and coming back to their village and running clinics and running door-to-door services.

But I haven't heard anything about women except for one mention of it. What about Afghani women and when will demography change in that country?

MR. PASCUAL: Ashraf, do you want to take that?

MR. GHANI: Yeah, sure.

Several observations. One, the former dean of the School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins, Dr. Taylor -- God bless him, he's in his 86th year -- has actually started a program working with Afghan women in some of the remotest provinces -- the province of Daikondi and in Bamian, and the response from women on contraceptives has been unbelievably high. But he had to work with mothers-in-law as the basic instrument of getting the messages across.

Second, in terms of preventive health, Afghanistan's national program is actually a remarkable success. Child mortality has been brought down by ten percent in the last four years. What that means is 135,000 lives have been saved this year.

So, the point now is that there's a basis for a national program in public health, and its key direction has to be directed towards fertility. To be able

to bring those services, we're doing an incredibly poor job in curative health, but in terms of preventive health two core areas were to bring down child mortality and women at birth mortality. Now, this has to move towards issue of fertility. That is also a very psychological issue. A lot of people lost a lot of their children. The demographic profile is such that between 1 and 5, you lose an incredible amount; then between 18 and 25 again you lose. And unless an assurance is created in the absence of a social security system that there will be some mechanism to bring these together, you're not going to make headway. So, yes, the issue is extremely important, but it's going to come as part of a multi-prong strategy.

But in the first instance, job creation is going to be an incredibly significant driver, because without that you are not going to have stakeholders in the system, and the fact that none of the donors is willing to help higher education in Afghanistan is the kind of scandal that we should not just accept. I failed to raise money for Kabul University despite my repeated attempts. You know, all we needed a hundred million dollars to create the capability through distance learning and a lot of things. There is a refusal on the part of the aid industry to deal with innovative technical solutions. So, they'll build schools, but they will not pay for distance learning -- all power that becomes a driver.

You know, one of the critical issues in terms of change to that is to actually reduce the labor of women, and electricity -- availability of electricity -- does more to change that than anything else.

Second issue with regard to Afghan women, again we have been screaming for five years. Unless we are connected to the value change of the markets, this is not a place that you can get the Afghan women to auctions in the back room of hospitals. We have to be connected to the key value change of supermarket space. We came with an idea of saying "made by Afghan women" and asked the hundred largest supermarkets in the world to give us shelf space.

That is the type of measure that will change the well-being of Afghan women.

Afghan woman have always owned property, unlike Western women, and their status depends on the amount of property they own. Nobody could dare confront my grandmother because she controlled thousands of acres of land, including her six sons. So, I think that dynamic needs to be appreciated. There's a lot of emphasis on girls' education, and I'm all for it. But unless you give them the skills to earn a living, it is not going to fundamentally change into relations.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you.

Vanda.

SPEAKER: For anyone on the panel, can you talk about the weekend's violence in Herat, its causes and implications.

MR. PASCUAL: I'm sorry, could you say that again. We couldn't hear.

SPEAKER: Can you talk about the recent violence in Herat, its causes and implications? -- for anyone on the panel.

MR. PASCUAL: Any of you want to address that?

MR. GHANI: I'll do one. Karl?

MR. PASCUAL: No, I defer to you, Ashraf.

MR. GHANI: Well, of course my information is not up to date, but governance in Herat has deteriorated, and Herat is in danger of a sectarian consulate. The Shesini divisions in Herat have become pronounced. The whole issue of Herat is that we went from a very authoritarian one-hand government who controlled everything in a very hierarchical manner to replacing without bringing a system of governance to replace it. So, prosperity in Herat is less now than it was, and there are a lot of rumors -- nothing solid -- about a lot of maneuverings in the area being tied to the larger Gulf and larger Iran-U.S.-European sort of relationships.

The point is not to be surprised about violence in any part of Afghanistan. Possibility of violence is ever present. The key is the credibility of the response system. If we expect that there is not going to be violence, that is going to be the wrong assumption. Possibility of violence in many parts of Afghanistan is high, because why?

One, I know of men who for $20. they will put bombs under bridges. All you need to do is come with cash and you can hire people.

Second, between the Egyptian intelligence services in the 1980s and the former KGB, thousands of Afghans were trained in the art of terrorism, one from the Mujahideen inside the other from the then government side. So, the number of people who are available for pay to commit violence is very high. I mean, actually the good news is that we have not seen more violence.

Thirdly, small incidents can be taken through the rumor mills and made much larger. So, in that context, also part of the strategy this year the way I discern it, is that areas that were peaceful last year, like the north and northwest, are going to be subject to much more challenge, because last year the focus was very heavily on Southern Afghanistan, and that strategy did not work. This year I'm afraid that there is going to be much more diffuse strategy of challenging in different parts of the country so that the focus of the international forces will be spread.

MR. PASCUAL: Let me take one last question. Yes.

MR. SCHOETTLE: Peter Schoettle from Brookings.

A question to the whole group, but my question is the staying power of NATO, the NATO countries, and this government. I have the impression that Afghanistan was always a second-tier issue. We -- we were told about victory five years ago and then attention shifted, and I would like to hear some comments from our panel as the picture in Iraq changes, the pressure in the Congress to withdraw increases, what about Afghanistan? I don't have evidence

that our government has the staying power to accomplish some of these goals. What about the other NATO countries? What's their staying power?

MR. PASCUAL: Marv, you want to take that?

MR. WEINBAUM: Let me just take a part of your question. I think that it is, to me, remarkable that this is a bipartisan approach in this country to Afghanistan; that it has been an international project from the beginning, and I think that as we recognize -- as far as the Democratic Party is concerned in this country, it is useful to have Afghanistan to prove that we're not weak-kneed with regard to terrorism. But I think that this is -- there is a recognition -- as I read it -- there is a recognition in this country that some of the things I was saying here about recognizing our long-term stake in Afghanistan -- that the distinction is being drawn between the two. In many people's minds, our failure was to -- by portraying them as part of the same war on terrorism -- Iraq and Afghanistan.

What we did was to convey in many people, particularly in that part of the world, that this was really war on Islam. Without showing how Afghanistan had its own characteristics and why it was in the interest of the people in the region to -- particularly we're talking about Pakistanis -- to see that -- the outcome of that is going to affect their future. So, I guess what I'm saying here is that I think that it's unfortunate -- it was mentioned before -- how a few years ago Afghanistan seemed to be off the radar. I remember saying to many people at the time: You know what will bring it back -- if we have the sense that things are not going well. If there is an increased sense of urgency I think that that has happened.

Last year's fighting season demonstrated that unless we arrested that momentum, the Afghans, who have a wonderful sense of being able to figure out which way the political winds are blowing -- unless we arrested that momentum we could very well be on the other side of the tipping point, and I think that that has happened. The international community is showing a great

deal more engagement, even if individual countries are having difficulty with their own parliaments, their own cabinets. I, for one, feel that we have been able to demonstrate at this point that Afghanistan is not Iraq and that whatever happens in Iraq, although it may have impact on Afghanistan, is not going to change the basic mission for Afghanistan.

MR. PASCUAL: All right, thanks.

Karl, do you want to add on to that? Any other closing comments you want to add to that?

LT. GEN. EIKENBERRY: Well, just a few points.

First of all from a U.S. perspective, of course now in 2007, as I said during the remarks-- a decision made in January to keep 3,000 more U.S. troops on the ground for this year, highest level we've ever had, --additional $4 billion new money that's going to go towards the building of Afghan police and army, -- another billion dollars in reconstruction development. As I think all of us had said here -- and I think this is group is aware -- levels of money don't necessarily translate into effective results on the ground. And in a statement of will, I think that's clear.

Next, NATO. This is a very difficult mission for NATO. It's unprecedented. They're outside of Europe for the first time in their history. They're up against a tough, adaptive enemy in Afghanistan -- complex campaign, trying to integrate the military and the nonmilitary means. But having now been in Brussels for a brief period of time, the debate that dominates -- the discussions that dominate in the political halls and in the conference rooms in NATO and indeed on the military front is Afghanistan. Firm recognitions- the number one mission has extraordinary consequences for the alliance. We talk about the consequences if we should fail. More importantly, I think many in Brussels recognize -- many in the alliance, recognize the opportunities that exist for success for transforming the alliance and developing more capacity, putting on a

U.S. flag at this moment. When we look at the world that's out there today, there's more than enough for the United States of America. We need the NATO alliance. And so I don't see any diminishing of will. We can talk about tactical issues. Are there enough forces? Are there operational restrictions? No. Yes. But strategically, the way forward through the alliance I think is very clear in all the capitols. We have to succeed in Afghanistan. It's of vital interest to all of us.

And then the final point I'd make, I guess trying to tie this together, I think it was an important question you asked about timelines, and to get to what Marvin talked about timelines, important for Pakistan, important for the region. You know, what we're asking countries like Pakistan to do -- perhaps more importantly, the Afghan people to do -- we're asking them to make very, very profound choices today that have generational implications for all levels in these societies. We're asking an Afghan farmer to make a decision today about putting an irrigation system in to your field. What's Afghanistan going to look like three or four years from now? Is the international community going to be with the Afghan people? We're asking the Afghan farmer and his wife to commit their son to the Afghan national army. Is the Afghan national army going to be around ten years from now? Only if the international community commitment is firm. Politically we're asking the Afghan people -- we're asking the region to make choices. What's it going to look like ten years from now? So, the challenge that we all have right here -- the Afghans, the international community, NATO, the United States -- how do we push those timelines out to where the Afghan people, the region -- they have utter confidence that we have the will, that we're going to see this enterprise through to its success. If somehow you can make that transformation mentally, then very quickly we could start to see effects on the ground. It's what Dr. Ghani talked about -- getting the momentum going. You've got to get momentum going, but you can only have momentum if the people firmly believe that this enterprise is going to be lasting. And we're going to have

a democratic representative form of government 20 years from now. We're going to have some kind of capitalistic enterprise system that's effective. We're going to have rule of law. We're going to have security forces that appreciate the rule of law and that their loyalty is to their government and to the Afghan people. All very bold experiments. But debates that we have among ourselves that say that the question of the day is: How many more month? How many more years? Paradoxically if we try to compress that and make that shorter term, I think we're setting ourselves further back.

MR. PASCUAL: Karl, thanks.

Ashraf, any final comments?

MR. GHANI: Yeah. The first issue is that I think Afghanistan is one of the few areas where Europe and the United States agree. And this is a very important foundation to build upon. All my discussions with all NATO leaders and across the European parliament and other national parliaments indicate very strong support.

Second, Afghanistan is a bipartisan issue here. Not a single candidate for the Democratic Party's presidential election took issue with support for Afghanistan. With those two I think one can really move. The issue comes to a couple of areas. One, in terms of Afghan-Pakistan, we need an approach as imaginative as that that changed French-German historical hostility into cooperation, or Egypt, Israel.

The United States has a reducible interest in the West, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. It cannot choose. That's the heart of the problem. But the situation is being posed as a zero sum gain, and one needs to break that psychological mold to turn it into an area of common interval.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are joined at the hip. You cannot change geography. But the definition of national interest to Pakistan has to take place very clearly. We as Afghans have a great deal of difficulty understanding what

the national interest of Pakistan is. If they could identify to us clearly and unambiguously what their four top issues are and that then there is an adherence thread across the board, across different institutions of Pakistan. We'd be able to deal with it. We're realistic people. But also the regional component of this is really important. Afghanistan is the key to making Pakistan prosperous through its connection with Central Asia. So, that's another area.

The third issue is one needs to use these two years where we now -- the remaining two years of this administration -- to regain momentum. Afghan people need to see results that are concrete, and they need to see the statement of commitment. As General Eikenberry indicated, this project is not a two-year project. We minimally need to operate with a ten- to twenty-year horizon. In the absence of that, stability to Afghanistan cannot be brought.

Ambassador Pascual is here and he served in Ukraine. It took them ten years to minimally get to a political framework and then that political framework is still at issue right now. So, we need to become realistic regarding the timelines. Afghanistan's transformation requires profound commitment and effort, both from Afghans and from their international partners.

And, again, let me conclude by saying this is not a job we can do alone on the Afghan side. This is not a job that the international community can do for us. It requires very novel ways of partnership, and it requires regional focus. Not just Afghanistan. Not just Pakistan. But a modality that can bring us together towards ways that instead of blames we can find areas of cooperation.

Let me just give you one example of where that some of that cooperation happened. You know, Pakistan used to export. The royal sum of $26 million in exports to Afghanistan and under the Taliban. Minister (inaudible), who was then finance minister of Pakistan, and I reached agreement. Pakistan's export to Afghanistan during the two years that I was in office reached $1.3 billion of legal exports. There is a lot that can be done within those, but the

shift needs to take place from a mentality of strategic depth to one of economic cooperation. If that shift takes place, then I think the stability of both countries can be dealt with.

MR. PASCUAL: Ashraf, thank you.

Extraordinary panel and extraordinary insights. Just a couple of points I would highlight that I am struck by. One is understanding who the enemy is, and Karl, you pointed out very well that sometimes it may be the Taliban, sometimes it may be unemployed youth, other times it may be corrupt government officials but understanding the difference about who it is is going to require different tools.

Second, the very powerful examples that several of you gave about using local capabilities, contractors, villagers, local officials, the need to work through those channels.

Third, the importance to invest in local leadership and local governance capability and the fact that it hasn't been done adequately thus far. This is an issue in the near term and for the long term, in particular making those transitions.

Fourth, the cross-border questions that, Marv, you particularly highlighted well and the importance of Pakistan in dealing those, which also is its own long-term issue that's not going to be resolved overnight.

And, finally, the point that all of you have made in a different way about the time horizons that we're working with, that these are long-term horizons of transition and change.

We've not had a chance to really get into exploring the narcotics issues and how they play into this equation. We all know that it's an important part of this, and I hope you don't take the lack of conversation about that as a lack of recognition of its importance but really a reflection of the limitations of time that we have.

Let's give the panelists a tremendous hand. They've really --

(Applause)

Islam in Europe

MR. SHAPIRO: Can everybody take a seat, please? Thanks to those of you who survived to the last panel. There's a special door prize on your way out. This panel is on Islam in Europe. And I think this topic is always a little bit difficult in U.S./European context, because, of course, we see this issue very differently.

There's a lot of interest in the United States in the question of Islam in Europe, but it really is mostly through a counter-terrorism lens. U.S. counter-terrorism officials very often refer to Europe as the soft under-belly of the United States, and they mean by that that there is a sort of threat there, but that Europe is within our perimeter because we have visa free travel, and it's a lot easier to get here from Europe, and that, of course, the people who might radicalize there are much more skilled, they often speak English, and, of course, they can get here.

Whereas, of course, in Europe, the question of Islam invokes many, many more issues. It's wrapped up in virtually every social issue you could name, from education, to unemployment, and of course, not least this very difficult question of identity that we saw coming up in the French election panel this morning. And so what we're trying to do here is to combine those perspectives a little bit and show some of the ways in which European countries are trying to address the range of issues that Islam and the growth of Islam in Europe have brought to the fore. And for that, I think we have three excellent panelists. I can say that I think because I selected them.

I won't give you their biographies because they're in your list, but we're going to start with Tufyal Choudhury, who's going to talk about Islam in Britain and the measures that the British government has been taking to help

integrate Islamic communities, especially since the July 7th attacks in London.

Then we're going to move to Jonathan Laurence, who will talk about government policy toward Islamic communities in France and Germany particularly; and then to Daniel Benjamin, who has the added benefit of being my boss, so I'll probably be asking nice questions to him, who will talk about radicalization in Europe and what that means to the United States. So with that, I think we decided to go to the podium, yes, so Tufyal.

MR. CHOUDHURY: Thank you very much. I'm going to talk about two things over the next few minutes, the first is the changing dynamics within the Muslim community. I'm going to talk about the Muslim community rather than Islam in Europe, so what's happening in terms of the Muslim community in the context of Great Britain, and then also how government policy has also changed and adapted in a very short period of time. In relation to the Muslim community, the first thing I'd emphasize is the extent to which there is a great deal of change taking place at the moment, and the situation is very dynamic, it's very fluid. And sort of our understanding of what's happening in the Muslim community is constantly changing as a result of new information and new research that's coming out. And some of it is counterintuitive to what we may think. So as somebody who has done research on Muslim communities in Britain, early on, I spent a lot of time sort of looking at the socioeconomic disadvantages that existed within Muslim communities in terms of employment, education, housing. But there's also, because it is a complex picture, there's also quite an interesting other story to be told.

So, for example, in education, an 18 year old Muslim woman is more likely to go to a university in the UK than the average British woman. In terms of belonging, what's been interesting -- the Home Office, the Interior Administration in the UK does a citizenship survey, which is a large scale survey of people to get an idea of their attitudes and perceptions around integration.

And what was interesting in the latest citizenship survey was that in terms of a sense of belonging, there's no real difference between Muslims and other groups of communities in the UK, in terms of their sense of belonging to the UK. But you could identify factors which affected that sense of belonging. And again, what was interesting in some of the research that's been done looking at these statistics is that the sense of belonging a person has makes no difference, for example, depending on where they live, in terms of whether they live in ethnically concentrated areas or whether they live in extremely diverse or in extremely un-diverse areas. So a Pakistani living in the North of England in a town with large Pakistani communities will feel as British as a Pakistani living in an area with no other Pakistanis, so that was quite interesting.

The thing that does make a difference to a person's sense of belonging, to being part of the British -- being part of Britain, the British identity, is actually their experiences and perceptions of discrimination. So people who have a greater sense of discrimination, of having been discriminated against, are less likely to feel that they belong.

And other statistics that have come out which are, again, quite interesting is that Muslims have a higher level of trust. And all ethnic minority groups have a higher level of trust in political institutions than the majority population. They're more likely to vote, which, again, is counter-intuitive to what we may have seen to be the case.

That aside, there is still quite significant socio-economic deprivation. And I think a lot of issues around -- a lot of the focus of government policy is around dealing with educational attainment, dealing with under employment rather than unemployment, so people who aren't being employed to the extent they should be given their skill sets, and some of that is also needed to tackle discrimination in the work place.

I'd also mention the issue of identity. A lot of the research is

showing, for example, the importance of religion that's an identifying marker particularly amongst younger Muslims and why that's happened. Why has religion become full grounded in their identity?

And again, it's important, when looking at Muslims, is to realize that it's quite a complex and diverse set of reasons. So, for example, some Muslims -- identification of a Muslim identity is something that's done in opposition to and in rejection of being British or being western. But at the same time, there are a lot of young Muslims for whom identifying themselves as Muslim is often a response to experiences of discrimination.

It can also be, and this is perhaps more interesting, is that it can also be about, particularly for young women, it can be a discourse that they use in negotiating with their parents. So if their parents are trying to place restrictions on them, a Muslim identify, a Muslim discourse can be a way of negotiating with them, saying, well, actually, you can't tell me not to go to school, you can't tell me not to be educated or go to work because Islam says that I can do these things. So that's the way that young people use Muslim identity, they use it quite fluid in different ways. Similarly, for young men, it may be about masculinity, it may be a part of their sense of masculinity, saying they're part of something important, part of something big. It may be an assertion of their identity against other male groups in their local community.

It can often be about sort of finding a youth identity. The sort of attraction of the Muslim identity for a lot of young Muslims is that it's a blank slate on which they can be creative, on which they can actually do something, because it's not occupied by their parents, who may have more of an ethnic identity, and it's not something that's occupied by anybody else.

The fact that it's a blank slate can be dangerous at the same time, but I think that's the attraction for a lot of people, is that it creates a space for them to experiment with their identity.

And within that context, there's also been an emergence of what I would call a discourse in identity, around being a British or a European Muslim identity, and that has actually been triggered by a response to sort of extremists or radicals who said, well, this is what Islam is, this is what being Muslim means. And I think a lot of Muslims have found that there's no room now not to enter into that debate, and actually having to articulate for themselves what they assume, what they think Islam means in opposition to extremists groups saying, well, actually, you're wrong, this isn't what Islam means, this isn't what being Muslim means.

So there's quite a strong, vibrant discussion now around what is British Islam, what is European Islam, and that's being generated in response to extremists and radicals. So that's the sort of -- the dynamics of what's happening in the community.

In terms of government policy, there has been quite significant shifts, and I'll just pause at a couple of those. First, after the July bombings, the government's approach is very much to -- well, there are two things, one is the security response, and that was the counter-terrorism measures that took place. But in addition to the counter-terrorism measures, the Home Office, which was in charge of policy at the time, sat off a series of working groups, and those working groups sort of reported over the summer on measures for dealing with extremism, and a lot of those measures were dealing with socio-economic deprivation, dealing with housing, education, and employment issues.

Some of those dealt directly with issues of radicalization. One example of the policy recommendations was something called the Radical Middle Way, which was a road show of religious scholars who would go out to communities and talk about -- and address some of the questions that young people had.

More interesting, there's also been to de-couple policing from

issues of radicalization and communities. And so the Preventing Extremism Unit, which is what the civil servants have called it, the Preventing Extremism Unit, which used to be in the Home Office, which dealt with policing, is now taken away from the Home Office and is part of the Department of Communities and Local Government. I think that's quite a significant shift, because it's now in a department that deals with local authorities, municipal government authority. And I think that comes back from -- needs recognition that even if you have -- if, for example, you have a machine like a metal detector, a radicalization detector that people can walk through and you can do a reading of how radicalized somebody is, the question then is, what do you do.

And I think the government's realization is that policing isn't the only took that you can possibly use, you can't lock everybody up. And actually, there's a much more complex set of reasons there and you've got to have a more complex and multi-faceted approach, and that involves education, that involves other sort of socio-economic factors, that involves communities, empowering communities to take action. And that discussion around dealing with radicalization is also part of a wider process that's happening in the UK and other European countries around -- discussions around integration and identity. So what does it mean to be British, what are British values, and that feeds into a political context in which we're about to have a Scottish prime minister for the UK, the point on which is the 200th anniversary of the active union.

And so the need to identity what is Britain and what are British values is also -- Muslim identity is also playing into that debate. But I think the debate has -- the two policy responses, there's also, as well as the security and the department -- local government, the government also create an Integration Commission which is reporting back in the summer. An Integration Commission looks more widely at how the UK is managing migration, and that's more than just issues around Muslim communities. Muslim communities aren't seen as a

migration/immigration issue necessarily, they're more to do with integrating of settled communities.

The Integration Commission is looking at things like the new East European migrants, how parts of the UK that hasn't had migration from anywhere before is suddenly having people from the Czech Republican, from Poland, working in farms and in local communities there. So issues of integration are something that the UK and a lot of European countries are now having to deal with, how do you integrate new migrants, some of whom will settle over a long period of time, others won't. The other thing that's feeding into policy at the moment is an Equalities Commission, and this, again, will be reporting back in a few weeks time.

And the Equalities Commission is saying, how do we deal with long term structural disadvantages around education, employment, and housing for different groups, not just for black and minority communities, not just for Muslims, but across the board? So how do you close a gender peg out, how do you ensure equality for groups in lesbian and gay people, how do you ensure equality for disabled people? And so the discussion around dealing with disadvantage has moved away from focusing purely on Muslim communities, but looking more at how do you achieve equality within society. I think that's quite important. I'm going to leave it there because I'm running out of time.

MR. LAURENCE: I think part of the reason why the growing Muslim population in Europe is of interest to a U.S. audience, in part, to try and answer Jeremy's initial question is, for what many people consider to be its potential disruptiveness to the transatlantic relationship or to those areas of the world where U.S. and European foreign policy might cooperate. Instead, this presence would seem to drive us apart in those areas of the world. And even if we take into account that there are many demographic unknowns about the future of European populations and the proportion of what you might call potentially

Muslim individuals within those populations, we need to think about how, in fact, this disruption would actually take place, how would it happen, rather than allowing our imaginations to kind of run unchecked.

And so I'd like to put forth a couple of mechanisms, if you like, a couple of ways of thinking about how groups or blocks of Muslims in European countries might actually come to influence the policy process in those countries, and to discuss the likelihood of this taking place.

Now, on the one hand, we have a predominant image of urban unrest or violence. This was the image of the October/November, '05 riots in Paris, it's the image of the Garde du Nord of last month. That is, in a way, one point of leverage that these populations could potentially have upon their governments, and thereby, indirectly upon our relationship with their governments.

The second is the vote, - just acting as a kind of swing electorate in close elections. We know that German and French elections especially of late have been decided by sometimes tenths of a percentage point in certain districts, and so there we have the prevailing image of a united Muslim block or party sort of throwing its weight behind a certain candidate that would not necessarily be in the best interest of the United States. And then the third, of course, is pressure groups, organized lobbies, that sort of thing. But if we consider, especially these last two scenarios, they rest upon a number of assumptions which I don't think we can comfortably make.

The first assumption they rest upon is cohesiveness amongst these populations, a shared identity or shared public opinion on, say, foreign policy issues, and the prioritization of those issues within their overall political world view. And lastly, it assumes sufficient organizational resources that can't even be mobilized around these issues.

So I would say that, in at least the short to medium term, that the

obstacles to these pre-conditions make the use of these instruments quite unlikely.

Now, I'll admit that this -- good news can often come in strange forms. On the one hand, if we look at the French riots, for example, of a year and a half back, the good news of the otherwise bleak three weeks of rioting and destruction property was that these young people had, in a sense, bought into some sort of French dream and were enraged at having been left out of what had been promised to them.

If you like, it was a kind of -- a relative deprivation sentiment that drove them into the streets, plus a certain amount of post-colonial baggage that has not been sufficiently addressed. But we also saw that this was not a contagious threat, it did not spill over French borders, for example. I discuss in a report I wrote for the International Crisis Group on Germany why, for example, this sense of relative deprivation does not extend to the Muslim population in Germany, which is -- the short version of which is basically that German Turks have far lower expectations when it comes to their employment prospects, or indeed, their education prospects, and thereby, actually feel less left out, although they're not any less left out.

Now, the advantage, for example, again, this theme of the good news coming in strange forms, the advantage, if you like, of Germany's situation is that you had what might be called a mercenary population settling in post-war Germany for economic opportunity, as opposed to what's often viewed as a kind of post-colonial population in France, so there's less emotional baggage, if you like, in the German-Turkish relationship than there is say in the French-Algerian relationship.

But the disadvantage of that, of course, is that there's no linguistic residue from colonial experience that the French Muslims do have.

So there are I think some hidden characteristics of these

populations and of the relationships, and the specificity of the national government's relationships with these populations needs to be taken into account. Now, I've been speaking about German Muslims, Turkish Muslims in Germany, French Muslims, and I should issue just some caution that it is very hard to speak of these populations in these kinds of unified terms because, of course, it rayafies the potentially Muslim population. We know from available statistics and survey results that, in fact, their degrees of piety vary greatly within national groups, and in fact, within ethnicities within national groups themselves.

But let me take just the notion that I mentioned at the outset of electoral influence and just apply it briefly to the French case and see how far it goes.

So we know from survey data that at least self-declared Muslims in France tend to be rather left leaning than to identify overwhelmingly with the socialist party. There was a December poll in '06 which showed that if you included the extreme left, that self-declared Muslims are around 83 percent on the left hand side of the political spectrum and about 11 percent or so on the right hand side.

And so here we have a nice experiment of the 2006/2007 election campaign, the first campaign to take place since the riots, the first campaign to take place since April 21, 2002, when Le Pen made it to the second round.

There was great excitement over the candidacies of Royal and of Bayrou. All of this contributed to a surge in enrollment, several hundred thousand, perhaps even up to a million new voters, however, from the full range of ethnicities and backgrounds and genders in France, and so not in particular from Muslim ranks, but including a lot of new Muslim voters. Now, of course, there is no Muslim political party to speak of in France, but this was the first time that there were four actually Muslim candidates for the presidency.

None of them achieved the required number of signatures to

actually be on the ballet, and there is, of course, no other single organization other than the French Council for the Muslim religion that can claim to speak on behalf of this general population.

And if you add to that the fact that of the five million or so Muslims that live in France, only about one-quarter of them are eligible to vote because either of citizenship or age restrictions. You wind up having actually a rather small trance of the entire potential voting block.

Now, this doesn't mean, of course, that candidates aren't out to try and conjure some Muslim vote, this doesn't mean that Muslim community leaders themselves are not out to act like small boss tweeds and pretend that they do have great reserves of voters whom they can mobilize for one or another cause.

But if we look at what happened in the first round of the elections, so just about ten days ago, well, what happened, if you look at the electoral districts where there are large Muslim concentrations, without exception, Royal, Sarkozy and Bayrou came in first, second, and third. So even in the small circumscriptions if you take Clichy-sous-Bois which is where, of course, the riots first exploded in October of '05, this is located in Seine-Saint-Denis a region so called neuf trois outside of Paris, in Clichy-sous-Bois around 7,500 voters went to the polls on April 22nd, that represented about 82 percent turnout for that district.

Sarkozy did slightly less well there, it is true, than he did in the rest of the country. He still came away with around one in four votes, however, interestingly. Royal got around 3,000 of the 7,500 votes, Sarkozy got 2,000, and Bayrou got 1,000. The remaining 1,500 votes were split between the extreme right and the extreme left. Now, this was true of the overall Seine-Saint-Denis district. Basically the mainstream candidates, the top three candidates, got 75 percent of the votes cast, and the extreme right and extreme left split the difference.

So this is, on the one hand, unsurprising, because we know that Royal had -- that the socialist party has been polling higher amongst this population, but it is surprising because given Royal's stance, for example, on Iran, given the socialist party's stance on the UOIF which is one of the most popular federations of prayer spaces in France, these factors did not seem to influence the voting intentions of Muslim citizens.

Now, if we try and think about, just briefly, what some of the positive developments have been that might be contributing to political integration across several cases, I think that, without over-emphasizing their role, that the creation of so-called Islam councils has been crucial. Government policies have basically started taking steps to separate religious issues from citizenship or political issues. I think this is really a crucial point to make, because these consultations can contribute basically to the rootenization of the observance of Islam in Europe for those Muslims who care to observe the religion to begin with.

And it can bring together a variety of opposing movements who normally would never sit around the same table together, representatives of what you might call home land or official state Islam from the Maghreb or from Turkey, or indeed, from the Gulf, together with a more politicized variance of Islam, whether they're branches of the Muslim Brotherhood or others.

Now, those are some advantages of the consultation. The drawback to these consultations, whether it's the CFCM or the Islam Conference in Germany, is that they can tend to sort of stray beyond their mandate. So rather than just being a sort of state Islam instance where issues of religious observance are discussed, they can stray into sort of the more shady territory of values, and the imposition of the set of values. And so we see the Values Charter that was issued last week in Rome, we can see the citizenship tests that were proposed in various German *Länder*, and I think it's this area bordering between sort of state

responsible action and state overreaction which represents something of a danger zone.

And so just to conclude, I think there are some reasons to be less sanguine than I started off with, having to do, in part, with government -- a surfeit of government surveillance that can contribute to alienation.

There are also suburban areas and urban areas across the continent which suffer a combination of social ills. You have the regular sort of problems of the Bonuit, whether it's unemployment and discrimination, a lack of political integration into the parties, you often have very discouraging education statistics; if you look at second and third generation performance on the Pisa studies.

Now, again, in those instances where there is no sort of colonial linguistic residue, then intensified education courses are -- linguistic integration courses are clearly the way to go, but there are some systemic barriers, right. I mean if you look at German universities today, the fact is that there are 27,000 Chinese nationals enrolled in German universities, there are only 24,000 Turkish nationals enrolled in Germany universities. Now, it's true that Chinese nationals come to Germany to study, but it's also true that those 24,000 Turks enrolled in Germany universities represent just about ten percent of that age group, of the 18 to 24 age group, who could be enrolled. And so there's some serious deficiencies which are rooted in the design of the German educational system, and where clearly some groups require a bit more of a helping hand than they've been getting, and so the tendency to keep the onus upon the migrant population I think is being reviewed and that's healthy.

Finally, just on the topic of radicalization, I know that EuroPoll issued a report saying that around 340 individuals had been arrested last year of Muslim background, including over 50 who may have intended to become suicide bombers in Iraq. One interesting point about that is that 70 percent of those arrested were native converts. This suggests, in part, that the magnifying glass

being placed on the migrant communities could perhaps be brought back just a touch.

I think that the best way to approach, of course, the enduring integration issues that I've just mentioned briefly here is through continued institution building, through the settling of the questions of religious observance, addressing these issues of unemployment and discrimination, and most importantly, opening the doors of the political parties to the second and third generations, because that's where the political integration is going to take place, it's not going to take place in some Islam council, it's not going to take place just by hoping it will either. The political parties actually have to start fielding candidates and not just, you know, on the 12th position on the party list. So I'll just stop there and let Dan take over. Thanks.

MR. BENJAMIN: What I would like to do briefly is to look through the other end of the telescope. We've seen in the two presentations by Tufyal and Jonathan what the kind of large scale picture is of these Muslim populations in Europe's largest countries are, that is to say Western Europe's largest countries.

I would like to focus much more narrowly on what is going on in the mind of an individual who becomes radicalized. Frankly, they have a lot easier job, because even though the statistics are often fuzzy, they have statistics. We only have a few anecdotes to deal with. But on the bases of those anecdotes, we may be able to draw some conclusions.

And I would add to what Jeremy said before; one of the reasons we're concerned about this in America is that we have a parade of senior government officials who will tell you that, outside of perhaps Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the place that we're most worried about is Europe, where after all, we have had an awful lot of spectacular either terrorist acts or terrorist busts. And again, experts will try out different statistics, but the rate of arrests,

the number of conspiracies is dramatically higher than it is in the United States, much higher than the difference in the population of Muslims would lead you to imagine.

Well, as I said, I want to look through the other end of the telescope. And now I'm going to switch from astronomy to nuclear physics in my metaphors and say, there are two things that we need to be concerned about, the first one is fission and the second one is fusion. And what I mean by this is, first of all, to talk about fission is fission from the community, fission from the larger national community, that is to say.

Now, both of the previous speakers have talked about some of the issues that are driving this process of separation, and the actual mechanics are very, very hard to lay out. We have lots of causes and we have lots of correlations, but we don't have causation, at least that we can map out in a very simplistic sort of way.

But we've talked about un and under employment, and it's worth remembering that in most of the countries of Western Europe, unemployment for Muslims runs roughly three times that of non-Muslims. There is, of course, poor housing and ghetto-ization. I think in Britain, the worse two deciles of housing are occupied by Pakistani and Bangladeshi inhabitants, at something like five times the rate of anyone else in the society. There's poor access to education, Jonathan just gave you a great example of that. There's a very high level of incarceration. All of these things are very good reasons why people would become dissatisfied with the society they belong in.

I do agree with Tufyal that I think the most important point of all is discrimination. And, in fact, there's a large array of statistics about the number of Muslims who feel that they have experienced discrimination in one form or another across Europe, and of course, these numbers are quite high and quite worrisome.

Complimenting all of these sociological indicators is the fact that there's the growth of Salafi Islam in Europe, and we don't have hard numbers on that either; the best I've seen is that roughly 15 percent of European Muslims are inclined to Salafism now. Most Salafies are not violent, they're not Jihadi Salafies. But nonetheless, if you've embraced the Salafi view that the society itself is corrupt, the ambient western society, then you are going to be going down a road in which there's a much higher possibility that you will become in opposition to that society, not merely want to be separated from it, but also be, in a sense, at war with it.

Now, that is the separation side, the fission side. When things really get worrisome, and again, we're basing this on just essentially the few stories of the terrorists who have been either arrested or who have died and whose biographies have been reconstructed, there's fusion. And what I mean by fusion is, the fusion of local grievances, which we've already discussed, and global grievances. And this is the point at which the individual connects his own disadvantages, his own personal grievances and unhappiness with what is going on to Muslims around the world, specifically let's say in Palestine, in Kashmir, in Chechnya.

Now, there's a very large infrastructure that exists who essentially fostered this creation, it's primarily on the web in the form of something like 4,000 or 5,000 different radical web sites, they've been growing like mushrooms, and you get with your religion, these are web sites to tell you how to behave a proper Salafi life, they also emphasize that there is, in fact, a war going on against Islam elsewhere in the world.

Now, perhaps the best text that has ever illustrated this fusion of the global and the local and that has convinced -- that demonstrated this belief that there is a war against Islam, which is, after all, the fundamental tenant of the Jihadist movement, was the manifesto that Mohammed Bouyeri, the young Dutch

Muslim who killed Theo van Gogh, the sort of renegade artist, the one that he planted in his chest, remember that Bouyeri committed a very Dutch sort of murder, he rode up along side his victim on a bicycle, shot him several times, bent over the dying man's body, and then decapitated him in an emulation of the beheadings particularly in Iraq, but also in Saudi Arabia, and then he planted this document in his chest. And one of the things that you read in this is, over all the sense of grievance for all these things that are happening thousands of miles away to Muslims, but the connection is to Holland specifically.

And the thing that Bouyeri is most upset about is, of course, someone who's now in another think tank across -- just a few blocks away actually, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the involvement she had had with Theo van Gogh.

He talks about this movie, *Submission*, which involved the projection of Quranic verses on barely clad women's backs, but the thing that really got him was not so much the movie as it was the fact that she had introduced legislation, this was back when she was a member of Parliament, she had introduced legislation that was going to insist on testing the beliefs of candidates or civil service jobs, to make sure that they weren't radical Muslims.

So, you know, it's a remarkable case of yoking the absolutely incomprehensible together, but it shows the kind of mindset that we are dealing with and the kind of mindset that we have to think about and try to figure out how we don't want, what we're not going to create. And it's not just in Bouyeri, I mean one sees this also, for example, with the Madrid bombers, who were also feeling left out, under employed, frustrated in their jobs for various reasons, and finally furious about Spain's involvement in Iraq. And in an environment, a mental environment like this, Iraq becomes the charge, it becomes the catalyst for acting out, and we've seen this over and over again.

The same was true for Mohammed Sidique Kahn, who was also someone much like Bouyeri in the sense that he was an achiever, he was a model

citizen in many ways, he had been doing very well in his community, he seemed to be part of Britain, and yet suddenly Iraq unwound all that.

So this is the kind of mindset that we really have to worry about. And it seems to me that we need to think back, and by the way, we should be doing this in our own case, as well, because some of the things that are going on in the United States have the same, it seems to me, pernicious effects of making some of our Muslim citizens, Muslim inhabitants, connect with what's going on in other parts of the world.

But we really do need to ask the question, well, are the policy prescriptions then that we're seeing in Europe, are they all tending in the right direction. And I think Jonathan has been very pointed in identifying some that aren't in terms of excessive surveillance, and I do commend his international crisis group report to you, but let me suggest some others, and let me try to put this all under one rubik. The crackdown on terrorists comes at the same time as Europe's own crisis of identity. And to the extent that these two things are becoming confused, Europe is taking actions that will, in fact, trigger exactly the opposite of what they want, that is to say as many European countries are trying to sort out who they are and redefine their identity for the 21st century in a period when they have much more heterogeneous populations than ever before, they're taking steps that can often alienate those who are in their midst and actually persuade them that they are somehow in this battle between the individual and the state.

So, for example, every country in Europe now is debating on immigration restrictions, and there's nothing I think that is going to drive home the sense of insulation, isolation, and I think even fission in that kind of debate. Remember, I think Holland expelled what, 26,000 people after the van Gogh killing.

Now, it is inevitable that you're going to see a lot of revisions of

police powers and enhancements of police powers. But we've also seen that when these are overdone and when there are too many raids, as for example, we've seen in Britain, and those things are very, very hard to prevent, that these two can contribute to that sense of embattlement.

But even if we go beyond those very limited sort of state encroachments or very active kinetic state encroachments, there are also a whole bunch of things that are convincing Muslims, I think, that they are unwanted. Jonathan mentioned the loyalty test, the citizenship test. I don't know if any of you know about this, but this is almost comic. In the German state of Baden-Württemberg they introduced a test to find out if a person shares German principals and values. And by the way, remember, there are an awful lot of Turks in Germany who are now thinking about getting what they couldn't get before, which is citizenship, because you have second and third generation Turks who only recently have become eligible for the citizenship due to reforms. Well, the test involves attitudes towards, for example, homosexuality, and I think sex outside of marriage and things like that. And there's one commentator writing in -- that Tats wrote, it seems clear that neither the German Pope nor much of the CDU could pass this test.

Similarly, you know, a suggestion like Sarkozy's, which actually may have in it, you know, a kernel of his desire to improve integration, could also have a very negative effect. At the broadest level, I think the thing that we really need to worry about is, in some ways the wheel turning in the opposite direction from what we expect is, and I think you've heard this from both of my predecessors, as well, is more often the case that the antipathy is moving from indigenous Europeans towards Muslim citizens or Muslim residents than in the other direction.

This was underscored again recently. I see we have Jenny Abdo and Joel (inaudible) am I pronouncing that right, from Gallup here, and I was at

their presentation last week, and they have a whole array of data about how much various European Muslims feel to be part of their society. But if you look at it the other way around, you find some disturbing things. When asked directly whether they think Muslims living in their countries, and I'm quoting from a Gallup report, are loyal to their country, between 35 percent and 45 percent of the Germans, French, and Britains responded affirmatively. Well, this is something, you know, it's hard to hide. And these are the kinds of attitudes that we're seeing over and over again in the polling data: Muslims aren't loyal, Muslims don't want to be part of the nation, Muslims don't want to give up their religious practices and be part of the nation as, you know, the indigenous imagine it should be.

And I think that Europe really does need to separate out its problems, its counter-terrorism from its own identity crisis, and then I think in dealing with the latter, needs to reckon very soberly about what it is that it can do when it already has five, six, seven, ten percent of its populations who no longer fit those images of what a Frenchman, a German, a Britain is these days. And with that, I'll stop.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Dan. I think we've had a very rich set of presentations, and I think they sort of well illustrated the distinctions and approaches that we alluded to at the beginning. You can sort of listen to the discussions of the European policy approaches and be somewhat cheered, and then you can listen to the situation on radicalization and be scared out of your mind. So we can sort of see both the schizophrenia in both cases.

I guess I wanted to start by asking both Tufyal and Jonathan to sort of take up Dan's point about, from your perspective, whether there are tensions between the -- you both tended to point to the sort of community measures that the British, French and German governments are taking in an effort to integrate their Muslim communities, and obviously it's a wide range, it seems like a very innovative set of policies.

Are there tensions there between a lot of the counter-terrorism policies that Dan mentioned? We can think of several. The decision about who to talk to in these councils that are being set up in both France and Britain, the question about if you bring in radicals, does that then empower them and make them stronger in the community versus if you leave them out, does that isolate them.

Another one is one that Dan mentioned, which is deportations, not just of illegal immigrants, but also deportations of imams who are convicted of hate speech type crimes, which has happened a lot in France and is being talked about more in Britain. And finally, one issue which has been very helpful for counter-terrorism is the notion of profiling, which is a sort of police term for discrimination. So it would seem as it it cuts against both of your warnings, that discrimination is very toxic. So I'm wondering if you could address those or other counter-terrorism measures you might think are intentional.

MR. CHOUDHURY: You're actually right, there is a question around the counter-productive effects of counter-terrorism measures. And there was something that came up in the debate on the more recent counter-terrorism measures and the UK was introducing legislation to allow police to detain people for up to 90 days for questioning. And in the end, Parliament didn't agree to that measure and opted for 28 days, which still was a significant increase on the previous 14 days.

And the best contribution or two of the best contributions on this debate was by Lord Condon, who is a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, I think crystallized the issues really well. He said that what we have to realize is that ultimately, a lot of these issues will be -- policing issues require the trust of the community, because it's through gathering intelligence, and that's what we've learned from Lord Nyland, it's through gathering intelligence that you will get the information that you need to do the arrests.

And so the danger is in taking things that will give -- will definitely -- it's a difficult balance, but things that will give you a short term advantage for something that -- but the measure will actually be in the long term counter-productive in terms of your efforts, and he said 90 days detention was one of those measures, where he could see that in one of the two cases, 90 days detention may be necessary, but the short term advantage of those one or two cases in terms of the signals it sends out to the community, in terms of the fact that there may be somebody who then ends up detained for 90 days and is then released without charge and the effects of that on community trust and community cooperation with the police, he said is it worth it, and it's a very tough judgment call, but is it worth it, he said, you know, 28 days ultimately was the settlement.

And so that kind of legislation, and similarly with the legislation on encouraging and glorifying terrorism, which is the most broadly drawn -- I mean I read Dan's book and I realized that would actually come within the offense of encouraging terrorism, because it exalts -- it talks about -- because the offense is so broadly drawn that anything that might have an encouraging effect on somebody who might read it somewhere in the world or that might glorify that would then -- and even if that offense takes places outside the UK, if you come to the UK, you may be prosecuted, I mean that's such a broadly drawn offense, and the UK government's argument is that this won't -- it doesn't matter that it's broadly drawn because the Attorney General will decide who to prosecute. The problem is that every prosecution then becomes a political decision. And where you've got discretion coming in, whether it's in stop and search, whether it's in who you prosecute for encouraging terrorism, if people don't trust institutions, every exercise of discretion becomes a bone of contention, why are you picking on this case and not that case, because the law is so broadly drawn that Dan could be prosecuted, as well, but he's not being prosecuted, so that's the -- I think that's

the danger in the way that the counter-terrorism policy is being developed.

On the other hand, some of the policing measures are very sensible, so something like the Muslim Safety Forum has been created which allows Muslim community organizations in London to talk about their safety. And the police are actually really doing the -- you can't go into community and say, well, now cooperate with us, when the community will turn around and say to you, well, where were you when we wanted your support in getting rid of the drug dealers on the streets, where were you when we wanted your support in dealing with the hate crime that we face, why are you coming to us now that you need something, and they realize it is a long term process of engagement that they need to engage in.

MR. LAURENCE: Well, the question of whom to include in these consultations is often a key one. I remember doing interviews with advisors to interior ministers in several countries, and you know, at the beginning everyone says okay, well, we're only going to speak with moderates, and everyone nods their head vigorously, says yes, yes, we're going to speak with moderates, and then they say, okay, well, what's a moderate?

And the consensus responses I've heard from these advisors, well, okay, we're not going to speak with anyone who plants bombs in subway stations, okay, so check one off the list right there.

And then the one participant I remember who had been excluded initially from a consultation, this was a leader of a Muslim federation in Italy said, well, perhaps if I prayed only three times a day, that would get me into the consultation. There were no-- it was very hard to set criteria for who would be included.

Now, the main tensions there, of course, were between those representatives essentially of the Homeland governments, who understandably would like to continue to have a certain influence over the religious lives of their

diasporas and even of the decedents of their immigrants, on the one hand, and then the more politicized variance of Islam on the other. Now, it's those politicized variance that are seen to have some sort of wall in common with those who are either willing to condone or commit violence, and that's where the question comes for the security forces, either to veto the inclusion of a certain federation or not in these consultations, and that's really the crux of the matter.

In Germany, I think that the situation is being handled a little bit over zealously in that the jump from leading a wholly religious life to condoning terrorism is seen as a sort of continuum, by security services. There are handy diagrams that are actually printed up in the office for the production of the Constitution reports that show this pyramid, about how you get to be a terrorist, and it starts off by leading a religious life. Now, that suggests a certain conception, again, which is a continuum which does not square with most counter-terrorism analysts' views of how someone actually gets jolted into the life of terror.

Now, on the question of deportations and this sort of thing, it's very interesting that even where you have government consultations that are seen as very permissive or overly, that make too many concessions to extremists, this kind of thing, the consultations are never asked their opinions about deportations of radicals, of imams who have either condoned or preached incitement of violence, and so that's one instance I think where governments have maintained their absolute autonomy and where these consultations continue to feel a little bit slighted as a result.

MR. SHAPIRO: Dan, you can certainly respond to any of that, especially the accusation that you committed a felony. But I actually wanted to ask you a slightly separate question, because you're painting a picture of Europe which is somewhat dangerous to the United States and which is not really taking the policy measures that it really should be to deal with the problem. And given,

in that sense, that it does represent a threat to the United States, should the United States be taking actions, either in terms of encouraging European governments or in terms of making its border with Europe, which is from an international prospective, one of the more open borders, more secure?

MR. BENJAMIN: First on the have I committed a felony issue, some years ago there was a television show called *Hack*, which I've never seen, I can say, but it was about a former cop who is now a taxi driver, but he still is drawn to law enforcement. In one of the episodes, I was told, there was a copy of -- someone had a copy of our book, and he was, in fact, arrested for having it because it suggested that he wanted to be a terrorist. So this is actually a transatlantic problem.

Well, there's no question that terrorism in Europe poses a greater threat to the United States than it does in many other parts of the world, Southeast Asia, if you will, or the Maghreb. And I think if you asked, you know, the top ten counter-terrorism officials in the United States government, what kind of passports the people who are going to carry the next major terrorist attack out in the United States, assuming there is one, what kind of passports they'd be carrying?

I think that most of them would say, eight of ten would say, well, they'll be carrying European passports, because that's where we see radicalization happening at a rather, you know, worrisome pace, and they're within our security perimeter, and we have the visa waiver issue.

Now, a lot of those people could be converts, a lot of them could be, you know, any number of different things. But the fact is that that is a particular vulnerability that we have. And certainly the statistics that have been coming out of Europe in terms of arrests and the estimates by, for example, the Home Office of how many militants there are very, very worrisome.

Now, what can we do? I'll tell you, if you want to start the next

war between the old world and the new, revoke the visa waiver provisions, because that would be an absolutely huge deal in Transatlantic relations, and I don't think that's going to happen, no matter how much the Department of Homeland Security lobbies for it.

I also think that we have a very difficult time having a discussion with Europeans about these issues for a number of reasons, one is that our own government has taken a fairly bare knuckles approach towards counter-terrorism, and so for us to go to the Europeans and say, well, aren't you kind of alienating the people who live in your country, would be rather problematic, not least because the Europeans would come back and say, well, if you hadn't invaded Iraq, we wouldn't have this problem. So it is a, you know, messy dialogue at a minimum. And I think it also underscores something that's very important, which is that at the end of the day, it comes down to an intelligence problem, and it's going to be our ability to discover radicals, militants, terrorists before they act that is going to ultimately be the most important thing we can do.

And in a sense, there's a success story there, because, first of all, when you consider the number of conspiracies in Europe, the Europeans have done very, very well at preventing terrorism, and I think that the intelligence relationship across the ocean, relationships, because they're all pretty much bilateral, are very, very good and getting better.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. I guess I'll open it up to questions from the audience. Does anybody have any questions?

SPEAKER: I just wanted to ask the question to sort of bridge both the radical analysis -- analysis of radical Muslims and then the general population. Do you see any trends, commonalities within these two populations that would cause majorities to become more radicalized or cause radicals to become more moderate, for lack of a better terminology? I mean, obviously, you know, although it wasn't discussed today, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is

very important in Europe; so is the Muslim Brotherhood and organizations like that, are they an important force in either radicalizing Muslims or in, you know, in the whole religious process of the majority, does that make religiosity one of -- a possible potential force of radicalization?

MR. SHAPIRO: Anyone want to take that?

MR. CHOUDHURY: Yeah, sure. I think most of the research that I've seen suggests that the most vulnerable to radicalization that there is, you have no religious -- previous religious education, and so those who have -- the difficulty is religious literacy.

And here, the problem is with the institutional infrastructure, with the mosques in the UK, at least, unable to connect to young people and provide them with sufficient religious literacy, so that when they're confronted with somebody who is an extremist say, well, this is what it all means, they don't have a way of sort of saying, well, no, you're wrong, because I know all this stuff, because the mosques just haven't been able to teach them properly. And the difficulty for the -- in the UK system is, well, who does the teaching, how do you make the mosques effective, should the state get involved in that at all, and how do you deliver religious education, should it be through school, should it be through mosques. It's a question of religious literacy, which I think is quite important. But most of the research that I've seen suggests that it's the ones who -- it's those who have the least religious education who are the most vulnerable to radicalization.

On the other hand, I also would say that a lot of people in the UK become involved in politics through their religious identity, in the sense that they get mobilized initially on a political issue, and whether it was to do with the (inaudible) in 1989, first Gulf Warsand subsequent events, what's interesting, and again, most of the research shows is that that's actually been a generally positive thing, because it's been the propeller that got them involved in politics and

engaged in politics.

But the actual participation of the democratic process over time is a positive thing, because people then connect up their issue with somebody else's issue, and somebody else's issue, and that actually -- the democratic process is transformative in that sense, and that's true whether it's somebody who's involved in sort of radical left politics or in green environmental people always come into politics through an issue they're passionate about.

You only have to look at the party at the moment to see how many cabinet members are former members of the communist party to see that, you know, as 16, 17, 18 year olds, they came into politics through extreme left politics, and that was their way in, and soon they sort of reflect on what they're being told and say, well, actually I don't agree, and you know, move more to the center. I mean you have to look at the former Home secretaries that we've had, all of them former members of the communist party.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah, there's definitely nothing better for transforming extremism into cynicism as politics. I wanted to just sort of reformulate her question a little bit for you, too, because there is this sort of rhetoric among European policy makers that what we're talking about here is a process of integration, it's making Muslims into Frenchmen, if you will, to follow Adriene Baber and it's this idea that they have to be instilled with civic virtue.

And then on the other side, there is this sort of rhetoric that the problem is radicalization, which leads a creation of Muslim identity, which leads eventually to violent action. There is a whole sort of third way type groups, a set of third way type groups in Europe which both reject the model of integration, especially the sort of simulation French model, and I think the Muslim Brotherhood are a example of this, the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe at least are, but also sort of reject the terrorism, the global Jihad struggle, and say what they're trying to do is create a religious European Muslim identity which won't make

them look like Frenchmen, but also won't make them look like Maghreb Jihadis. I'm wondering, is there a role for these groups, is this -- does this work counter to the European policy thrust, and is it something that European governments can take advantage of, and is it something which helps or hurts the radicalization process? Do you want to start with that, Jonathan?

MR. LAURENCE: Sure; the state Islam consultations that have been going on for the last say five - seven years are different from the contact that governments had with Muslim communities before then because they specifically broaden the discussion to include often Muslim Brotherhood affiliated federations or other politicized variance of the religion. Now, again, drawing the line at anyone who had been at all implicated in terrorism.

Now, there were many skeptics of these strategies, but what's interesting is that they seem to have been adopted pretty much across the board, whether across left, right divide. When political alternation has taken course, governments have kept the interlocutors the way they are. So there's some consensus developing in the large countries like France and Germany over the inclusion of even these sort of more intense or politicized religious representatives.

And if you measure, insofar as you can, the moderating effect of inclusion in these discussions, or the success of the cooptation, if you like, you can see some differences in behavior. If you look at the IUQE (?) in Italy, which is the equivalent of the -- more or less of the UOIF in France, or of the FIOE in England, you will see that at the beginning of the Iraq war, for example, when there were hostage takings, that the -- when the leadership issued a statement, it was often to the extent that, well, those hostages were asking for it.

As the government extended the promise or the possibility of being included in discussions for what's called the (inaudible) the federation actually began to take an active role in the public debate in speaking out against hostage

takings, speaking out against acts of terror in, well, against violence around the world, in a way that it just had sort of absented itself from the debate earlier on, because it didn't see the point, because it had no stake in the system.

Now, I know there's a big debate going on presently in this town about, you know, whether or not to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries, and that debate has been ongoing in Europe for a long time with these representatives, and I think that, you know, it sort of depends what you're looking for.

If you want to find encouraging signs, you can find some. Millie Gerush in Germany stopped its campaign for an Islamic order, for example, and adopted a campaign for "adjust order." Now, again, if you, you know, depending on your perspective, you could say, oh, well, that's semantics or that's just cynicism, that's just instrumental, you know, or you could say, oh, well, isn't that encouraging, they were offered the branch or the possibility of discussions with the government and they decided to moderate themselves, isn't that success of cooptation. But again, you know, it's too early to give a definitive sort of verdict on this stuff, but I think we do see movement.

MR. SHAPIRO: Dan, so moving to the micro level, what would you say that the Muslim Brotherhood and like organizations do for the process of radicalization?

MR. BENJAMIN: Well, I don't think they do very much. I mean we've seen very few terrorists who had a background in the Brotherhood. And I think, by and large, the Europeans would do well to engage in discussions with just about any group that doesn't espouse violence, because the hegemonic value, you know, in the sociological sense of bringing all these people in the tent is enormous.

Now, unfortunately what this runs up against is a very different notion of tolerance that we find in Europe. And I think the great phrase that has

started to appear in the literature is that there are a lot of sort of enlightened fundamentalists in Europe, and I think that really sums it up very well, that these are people for whom any kind of space for religious belief or ritual that is not in keeping with, you know, modern secular rational thinking is very, very problematic. And in this regard, I would certainly recommend having a look at -- Ian Buruma's book, Murder in Amsterdam, which I think is just a fabulous book on exactly this issue.

Now, it is true that European societies do face real issues that have to be dealt with. Wife beating, for example, you spoke about the imams who were expelled in France, or you know, female circumcision, or any number of other issues, these are all very big, difficult issues, but on the other hand, I think that all too often we find that the battle lines are being drawn in places that tell people that, people who wouldn't have anything to do with practices that we would consider to be a violation of human rights, that they're not wanted in these societies.

And that's why debates over issues like the head scarf are so problematic and become really so inflamed. We tend to think that the word "tolerance" means the same thing on both sides of the Atlantic, but it really doesn't. And I think Europe is in the process of redefining this term for itself, and it's a very difficult process.

MR. SHAPIRO: The intolerance of intolerance. Do you have a question? And please identity yourself if you would.

COLONEL DUTOF: Colonel Dutof (sp?), Foreign Policy Association and also the President of Indian Veteran Office Association here. Can the panel pinpoint the following and the problems of Al Qaeda in Europe?

MR. SHAPIRO: Is the question, is there Al Qaeda in Europe?

MR. BENJAMIN: It's been found in virtually every country in Europe in one way or another. Now, what is actually there right now post-

crackdowns, it's harder to say. It's also very difficult to say exactly when someone is Al Qaeda or isn't, because they're not handing out ID cards.

If you are acting on behalf of, you know, a certain set of beliefs, even though you have not plugged in say with the infrastructure in Pakistan or the federally administered territories, but you still want to blow up say half a dozen subways in Madrid, are you Al Qaeda or not, you know, these are issues that scholars debate.

Well, I think at this point, most experts would agree that the 7/7 conspiracy was connected to Al Qaeda, that these people had, at least two of them, had been in Pakistan and received training from Jihadist groups. It probably was not Al Qaeda itself, but it, nonetheless, was part of the radical Islamist international, if you will.

MR. SHAPIRO: I think the problem we're often having is that Al Qaeda has become almost more of an adjective than a group. Sometimes it seems to describe a certain type of belief and a certain activity that goes along with that belief rather than actual membership in anything that can be understood as a group. And we see this in the Maghreb and even in Iraq, where people adopt the name with or without connections, and sometimes it's hard to distinguish between the two, and that's particularly true in Europe, I think. Other questions? On the left here.

MR. HELLYER: Hello, Hisham Hellyer from the Saban Center and formerly Deputy Convener of the UK Governments Task Force on Preventing Radicalization and Extremism. Just a comment and maybe a query; since the subject of Salafist Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe came up.

Different anti-terrorism officers within Europe have actually engaged with both of these different types of -- actually, both of them do emanate from different understandings of Salafi Islam, and I think that's very positive in one way, as long as it's made very clear that these are actually not mainstream movements. The

Salafi movement, whether the Huwani strain or the pure strain that is now dominant in the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, these are not mainstream movements. They represent a small minority of Muslims world-wide and historically. However, the overwhelming majority of both of these establishments have been viciously against terrorism in terms of violence against the state, and they have been throughout their history, and for that reason, the security services have used Salafi imams to go into the prisons to deprogram more radical Jihadis, it's happened in the Muslim world, as well, it's happened in Singapore, it's happened in Indonesia, and usually quite successfully.

And if we don't get the distinction between radical Jihadism and salafis and mainstream Islam correct, then we may end up not only alienating people throughout these communities, but also losing one of the very valuable tools that we have in deprogramming certain types of people.

MR. SHAPIRO: Does anybody want to respond to that?

MR. CHOUDHURY: I mean just to agree with it, I know that in the UK, the anti-terrorist branch used Salafi imams because in terms of frames of reference, you know, they're the ones who are going to be most convincing. When it comes to those who support one, it's in telling them why they're wrong. You can't take somebody who completely doesn't share enough of the initial ground in terms of the frame of reference, so they recognize the value of that, absolutely.

MR. BENJAMIN: Hisham, I think before you came in, I did talk about the difference between the reformists Salafis, and a smaller group of Jihadi, but the other point that is true, I think, is that any -- once people become embraced in Salafi outlook, then they are, in fact, coming closer to a separationist view of their own role in European society, and that can be, you know, an intermediate step, it may not be, but it can be an intermediate step towards radicalization.

MR. SHAPIRO: Just behind Hisham.

MR. GESTANE: Yes, Ken Gestane (sp?) from the Pentagon here, a question. We've talked about mainly Islam, we've talked just a little about some of the radicals, Salafi, et cetera. What about the internal distinctions and the internal struggles between the Sunni and the Shia Islams which is being played out on the world today; what's the impact of this in Europe?

MR. SHAPIRO: That's a good question. Sunni, civil war, is it coming to Europe.

MR. LAURENCE:

I mean there is not a huge Shia population in Germany or France. There are perhaps some tens of thousands that have some prayer spaces which are often linked directly to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I have not seen any indication of spill over of those conflicts beyond the fact that those blamed for the degradation of security in Iraq remains the United States and not sort of whoever planted the given truck bomb.

MR. BENJAMIN: I don't think we've actually seen this play out much in Europe. But it is interesting that you do find Sunni-Shia antipathy in some American prisons, where there have been arguments over, you know, what kind of imam there should be there, whether there will be provision of two, and there have also been, you know, in prisons, you can turn any basis for identity into a reason to have a gang. So there have been fights and things like that in some penitentiaries.

MR. SHAPIRO: Anymore questions? Yes.

MR. RICHMOND: I'm Al Richmond, former Officer of Research in the State Department. I'm wondering whether you found useful in identifying variables that relate to extremism; have you found useful a dependent variable such as condoning violence against civilians for a political cause or actually approving the Spanish, Madrid, or the London bombings, issue questions like this

if they help pinpoint persons whose sociological variables on the questions might be useful.

MR. BENJAMIN: Well, I'm not sure that I can frame it in such an appropriate social science way, but I will tell you this, virtually everyone who has been wrapped up in Europe who was involved in some kind of terrorist activity had a cache of videos from Iraq showing the killing of American or other allied forces. So if that gives you -- if that's a good variable, then you know, we should run with it. But over and over, this shows up, and it's a very powerful indicator of radicalization. You seem uncertain about this.

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MR. BENJAMIN: Yeah, unfortunately we have a problem doing questionnaires of --

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

SPEAKER: I'm wondering if we could actually maybe turn that question around. Do these -- we have this notion that radical speech is an incubator of extremism and even violence. Does radical speech also play a role in these communities? Is it actual helpful in any way for integration; if we suppress it, are we hurting these communities in any way?

MR. CHOUDHURY: Radical speech, just on the question of the polling evidence, I mean I think part of the problem with the polling evidence is that the figures -- there are opinion polls which ask people, do you condone the terrorist attacks in London and so on, and the actual answer you get depends on how you ask the question.

So one of the questions was so broad, it said, do you think there are ever any circumstances in which violence may have been justified for political purposes that gets a very high figure. But then if you go to, do you think the July bombings were condoned, then it gets around about two or three percent, sometimes up to five percent. The difficulty with these questions is that they're

not asked of the general population as a whole, so you don't know whether it is just a statistical thing that you get in any general population rather than whether you get it within the Muslim community, and until you ask that of the general population, you can't -- because the figures are so small, they come within the margin of error of four percent on the opinion poll, so it's very difficult to tell how meaningful they are.

On the question of radical speech, I think -- my view is that it's difficult to say what -- the causational role between speech and action is very -- is difficult to draw -- my instinct it towards not regulating speech unless it's direct incitement towards violence, so the stuff around encouraging and glorifying, I can see why governments would want to restrict it, but I think the way that you counter that is through more speech and through alternative voices that counter that rather than trying to restrict or suppress particular forms of speech that you don't like.

MR. LAURENCE: If I can jump in on that. I agree completely with that argument. And one of the concerns that you hear most frequently in the American Muslim community is- after the next attack, will we lose our civil rights? Well, you know, if you start with salami tactics and you take away the right to speech, then you actually do help create that sense of beleaguerment, and for that reason alone, it seems to me an unwise thing to do. And I agree with Tufyal, I thought that the, you know, the best remedy for repulsive speech was more speech, and this is a sort of running debate across the Atlantic that we have, particularly with the Germans, when they get into restricting what you can say about the Holocaust or what have you, and I've never thought that it was particularly salubrious to outlaw things like that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, countering repulsive speech with more speech is definitely a principal of the Brookings Institution. But I think maybe we'll just take one more question. Bill, did you have a question?

BILL: Bill from George Washington there's a great many more reports of terrorist activity, either active or possible (inaudible) very alarming figures that (inaudible) put out (inaudible) than in France. Is there a distinction between the recruiting possibilities or future terrorists in France rather than England?

MR. LAURENCE: I think the French had a head start on this, in a sense, having been victimized by terror campaigns in earlier eras, most recently, of course, during the mid '90's. I mean Jeremy can perhaps answer this question more fully. But where the counter-terrorism apparatus was essentially overhauled and the powers of the so called political police became such that imams were being watched more closely, as were, you know, the tens of thousands of young French people of North African origin being surveyed, under surveillance to a far greater degree than elsewhere. So I would point to that, in part, but I think Jeremy might have something.

MR. SHAPIRO: No, I wouldn't really add too much to that. I mean I think you can certainly explain it just by thinking about police powers. Police powers in France for a long time have been much greater. And this is possible to a greater degree in France because they have -- they don't quite have the tradition of civil liberties that exist in the UK, and so it's less problematic in this society to implement these counter-terrorism measures than it is in the UK.

It's also I think, as Jonathan highlighted, the history is significant here. They don't like to talk about it now, but the United Kingdom definitely, before 2001, was -- the French police used to refer to London as Londonistan, and they really did have what I've termed as a sort of sanctuary policy, where they believe that although there were things that were going on that weren't terribly salubrious, that they didn't really effect them, and they weren't really worth the societal damage that would come from trying to crack down.

And, of course, since September 11th, essentially, actually, since

slightly before, that policy has distinctly changed. But, of course, the change itself has been very contentious and has, in the process of change, generated a lot of frustration in these communities, and that's a lot of what we see along the sort of difficult policy experiments that are going on in the UK, whereas for France, it's been going on longer, and it's actually a lot more consistent with their tradition of surveillance.

MR. BENJAMIN: I would add one other point, which is that it has -- a lot has to do with the different compositions of the Muslim communities and the different countries, insofar as the British community is predominantly Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and those networks are at a peak in terms of their activity in radical undertakings. It seems as though the Maghreb communities which were at a peak say ten years ago are now back on the ascent. And so if there's been more activity in Britain, that is largely a reflection of the fact that there are networks that connect Britain and the Jihadist infrastructure in Pakistan very efficiently, more so right now than those that connect, say, the Algerian GSPC with a larger infrastructure in France, or at least it has been activated as much, and that has been a very big issue.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, I think that's right. Although it is interesting; we tend to look at the terrorist attacks, the police tend to look at the arrests and what they're seeing on the surveillance, and on that light, the situation in France, from the police counter-terrorism perspective, is very worrying. You know, it's the old saying that the terrorists only have to get lucky once and the counter-terrorists have to get lucky every time. So far in France, they have been lucky- lucky because they're good, I think, but lucky, nonetheless, a lot, and it's not all that clear that that can continue. But it's certainly not the case that there isn't radical extremist activity in France.

I guess that gives me the last word, so I'll end there. And please give a round of applause for our panelists.