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DARFUR AT A CROSSROADS:

GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

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P R O C E E D I N G S

OPENING REMARKS

MS. FERRIS: Good morning, everyone. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and Co-Director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, which looks particularly at the situation of internally displaced people around the world.

I want to welcome you to this discussion of Darfur at a Crossroads: Global Public Opinion and the Responsibility to Protect. For more than four years, the people of Darfur have been subjected to violent attacks, economic deprivation, destruction of property, and forced displacement. The roots of the conflict are a complex mixture of factors, including historical grievances, ethnic tension, disputes over distribution of economic resources and benefits, political questions about balances of power within Sudan, and conflicts over control of scarce natural resources — water, land, and livestock. All of this is exacerbated by the proliferation of arms, the fragmentation of opposition groups, and the policies of governments of Sudan and indeed in the region.

The casualty figures in Darfur are high, and they are increasing. More than two million people have been forced from their homes, eighty thousand in the past several months alone. The crisis in Darfur impacts on the still fragile peace process in Southern Sudan and indeed in the region. The fact that Chad now hosts some 220,000 refuges and almost the same number of internally displaced persons is a testament to the potential of the Darfur conflict to destabilize the region.

Humanitarian organizations have mounted an impressive effort in an extraordinarily difficult situation. This relief effort is costing more than one billion dollars a year. It involves about fourteen thousand humanitarian workers who are assisting almost four million people. But humanitarian access is difficult, and it's been particularly difficult to reach those who are not living in camps. The U.N. estimates that it has access to only 70 percent of those in need of assistance.

The security environment is terrifically dangerous, and some non-governmental organizations have had to suspend operations in parts of the country because of attacks on their staff. Just 10 days ago John Holmes, the new U.N. Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, was turned back by soldiers at a military checkpoint on the road to an IDP camp in North Darfur, despite high-level assurances from the Sudanese government that he would be given unrestricted access to displaced people. While he attributed this to a communication mishap, he also indicated that his experience was symptomatic of problems that ordinary humanitarian workers faced every day on the ground.

But humanitarian operations are only a stopgap measure. Until the conflict is brought to an end, women will continue to be raped, civilians will continue to be killed, and people will continue to flee from their communities in fear.

In spite of the 2005 World Summit where the responsibility to protect was launched and in spite of repeated efforts by the international community to intervene in this situation, these efforts have been unsuccessful. The people of Darfur have been at the crossroads for a long time, and citizens in this country and around the world - at least some citizens - have been demanding action.

But there's a gap between public opinion in the U.S. and global public opinion and effective international action. To address how that gap could and should be breached, we have a distinguished lineup of speakers this morning, beginning with Steven Kull, Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes and editor of World Public Opinion.org, who will release the findings of a new global public opinion survey, which was carried out in partnership with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Steven is a faculty member of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and has played an important role in the BBC World Service Poll of Global Opinion and polls of the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs.

He will be followed by Gayle Smith, who is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and director of the International Rights and Responsibilities Program and Energy Opportunity Program. Gayle brings to this discussion her many years of experience in Africa, where she worked as a journalist for a number of well-known news agencies and also served as special assistant to the president and senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council from 1998 to 2001, and as Gayle will discuss she's also working now with a new initiative called the Enough Campaign, which is a citizen grassroots initiative to stop genocide.

Gayle will be followed by Susan Rice, a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program here at the Brookings Institution, who has a distinguished career in public service, including serving as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1997 to 2001 and a special assistant to the president and senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council from 1995 to 1997. Susan has written extensively on African issues and has submitted testimony just a couple of months ago on Darfur before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Jason Small of the State Department will not be participating in this morning's panel, but we know that the State Department is eager to contribute to the debate on Darfur, and we look forward to including their representatives in future events we organize on Darfur.

So, we'll begin with Steve and we'll hear his presentation and then have an opportunity for questions directly related to the poll before we hear from Gayle and Susan on some of the broader issues. Thank you.

MR. KULL: Thank you all for coming this morning.

For some decades now, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, previously known as the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations — they just changed their name in the last year — has been conducting polls of the American public periodically, and for some years now the Program on International Policy Attitudes has been working closely in developing and analyzing those polls.

In 2006 the Chicago Council decided to conduct its poll not only of the U.S. but also of China and India, and some centers in South Korea, Mexico, and Australia said well, we're interested in participating in some way as well. So we decided to take the lead and recruit more countries, more centers around the world to be part of this larger study so that we could have comparative data around the world, and overall we succeeded in recruiting what is now a total of 18 countries plus the Palestinian territories. Today's release is actually one in a series.

Now, since these were independent centers, they decided themselves which questions they would ask, and so in terms of what we have today, we have a total of 14 countries plus the Palestinian territories who participated in the questions related to Darfur and the responsibility to protect.

These are the countries that are part of this set of questions: the United States, Mexico, Argentina, France, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia; then, in the Middle East — Israel and the Palestinian territories and Iran; and then in Asia — China, India, South Korea, and Thailand. We have about what represents here about half of the world population.

Now, as far as the methodology, there's a lot more information in the handout that you've probably already received, the samples ranged from 593 in Israel to 2,458 in India. In most cases, it was about a thousand. That means that that the margin of error ranges from plus or minus 2.0 to 4.1 percent. For the group that was interviewed in relation to the questions we're exploring today we have a total of 18,679 respondents. The polls were conducted from June 2006 through March 2007.

The driving question in our analysis and in the questions that we formulated is, “Are we seeing the emergence of a new international norm in regard to the potential for the United Nations to intervene in the internal affairs of a state in the event of severe human rights abuses?”

Now, as you may know, there was a World Summit in 2005 that unanimously endorsed the following statement — this is an abbreviated version:

"The international community through the United Nations has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, so clearly the implication here is that this could entail the use of military force."

We wanted to dig deeper. Does this attitude appear in the world public as a whole? So, the first question we want to ask is: do people around the world think the U.N. Security Council has the right to intervene in the event of severe human rights abuses? Again, the question is does it have the *right* to intervene? So, the question we asked is, "Do you think that the U.N. Security Council should have the right to authorize the use of military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide?"

And, as you can see, in all the countries that answered this question a clear majority said that it should have this right: 83 percent in the U.S. and 73 percent in Mexico. In Europe, 85 percent in France – that was actually the highest with the U.S. close behind – 69 percent in Ukraine; 64 percent in Russia. 83 percent in Israel — not surprisingly Israel is one of the strongest on this issue. And in the Palestinian territories, 78 percent; in Iran, 69 percent — I think that's quite interesting; South Korea, 74 percent; and, quite interestingly as well, China at 72 percent. Of course China is a key player in this process and, as we know, the Chinese government has not always been supportive of the idea of the U.N. intervening in this way. 63 percent in India and 62 percent in Thailand.

The white space between the "should" and the "should not" represents those who say “don't know,” and, as you can see, in some questions those “don't know” responses are quite large, particularly in the developing countries.

Now, we also have some data from Globe Scan from 2005 from a separate poll that asks this same question: "Should the U.N. have the right to authorize force to stop severe human rights violations such as genocide?" And, as you can see, in Africa there's also quite strong support for this idea — 80 percent in Ghana; 75 percent in Kenya; 66 percent in Nigeria; 66 percent in Tanzania; 65 percent in Zimbabwe; 64 percent in Cameroon; 55 percent in Angola. South Africa was the only country that didn't have a clear majority, but it was a clear plurality at 47 percent, and across these eight countries, on average 65 percent approved of the idea of the U.N. having the right to authorize force to stop severe human rights violations such as genocide.

Now, does the U.N. Security Council have the *responsibility* to intervene in the event of severe human rights abuses? This obviously raises the bar considerably higher. One is yes, okay, they have the right if they should choose

but is there some imperative here? Do people *expect* the U.N. Security Council to act in the event of such human rights abuses?

So, the question went, "Some people say that the U.N. Security Council has the *responsibility* to authorize the use of force to protect people from severe human rights violations such as genocide, even against the will of their own government." There is the key line. And that was put front and center so that there was really no ambiguity. So, obviously, this raises the bar considerably higher than just does the U.N. Security Council have the right.

"Do you think that the U.N. Security Council does or does not have this responsibility?" Now, the numbers are not as strong as to whether the U.N. Security Council has the right, but they are still quite strong. Seventy-four percent in the U.S. say that the U.N. Security Council has this responsibility. A plurality in Argentina of 48 percent say that it does as opposed to just 27 percent who say it does not, with a substantial number not knowing. Armenia, clear majority, 66 percent; Poland, 54 percent; France, 54 percent. France is an interesting one. Keep your eye on France, because in general, it's quite strong, but it also has the highest number saying that it does not have the responsibility with 39 percent and not very many saying there that they don't know. A plurality in Russia of 48 percent to 31 percent not; and Ukraine a plurality of 40 percent to 16 percent. Once again, the Palestinian territories and Israel expressed a rather high number, 69 percent in the Palestinian territories and 64 percent in Israel. Now, for what it might be the most interesting number, 76 percent among the Chinese say that the U.N. Security Council has the responsibility to protect, take this action. Slight majority, 51 percent in India with large numbers saying don't know; just a quarter saying does not; and a plurality in Thailand, a 2-to-1 ratio between those who say it has and does not have it.

So, again, we did not find a single country that disagreed with this position. The only variation was between whether it was a plurality or a clear majority, and with the exception of France, in every case it was 3 out of 10 or less saying that it does not have this responsibility.

So, putting all this together, you can see that of all these 14 countries plus the Palestinian territories, in every case you have some endorsement of the idea of the U.N. Security Council taking such action, either saying that it has the right or that it has the responsibility. In addition to the countries that we just mentioned, in Mexico, Iran, and South Korea they didn't ask the responsibility question, but in every case 7 out of 10 or so said that it does have the right. And, as you can see, in every case the number saying that they have the right tends to be larger than those who say that it has the responsibility, but still the numbers on responsibility are quite strong.

Okay, so now how do these principals apply to Darfur? We need to remember that when we're dealing with these kinds of questions, there is not

necessarily a very high level of awareness of the situation. Even in Africa we found that in 2005 with Globe Scan only 36 percent said that they were really following the situation there, and that's actually the same number that Pugh just recently found in the United States, but substantial numbers of people do not know anything about it. I was doing focus groups in India, and I was really quite struck how at the very low level even among rather educated people. So, the first question we were trying to determine is what the normative orientation is. Now we're trying to see, okay, how do people think this applies to the situation in Darfur? So, we said, "Do you think that in regards to the violence that is occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan, the U.N. Security Council has a responsibility to authorize intervention, has the right but not a responsibility to authorize intervention, or does not have the right to authorize intervention?"

Well, let's start on the right there. "How many say does not have the right to authorize intervention?" Well, as you can see, in every case it's quite small, never more than 20 percent. But you can also see, just to the left, very large white spaces, very large numbers of people saying “don't know.” So, it's not well formulated in the minds of many. Starting with the United States, 48 percent say that the U.N. Security Council has the responsibility, and another 35 percent the right. So, a very large majority endorsing the idea of some action and 48 percent perceiving it as imperative. In Argentina, 22 percent say that it has the responsibility, 15 percent the right. In France, you have the highest, 55 percent saying that it has the responsibility and 29 percent the right. Poland, 23 percent the responsibility, 23 percent the right; Armenia, 29 and 15; Ukraine, 10 and 22. And, again, with all three of those countries, big percentages saying they don't know, presumably just because they don't have enough information. Israel, very strong — 46 percent has the responsibility, 31 percent the right. India, also surprisingly strong given the low levels of education there — 29 percent has the responsibility, 30 percent the right. China, also quite strong — 20 percent the responsibility, 38 percent the right; and Thailand, large don't know — 17 percent the responsibility, 17 percent the right. So, in every case you have a clear plurality or a majority saying that it has one or the other, but it's not fully formed. Clearly, in the more developed countries, it's a much, much stronger point of view.

Now, we also had one question in Africa. It's not a perfect question for what we're trying to do here, but it is still in some ways indicative. The question was, "In the event of a conflict like Darfur happening in your country, which one of the following, if any, would you most prefer to intervene to help resolve the conflict?" and the were offered four options, and one of them is to not have any foreign military, and that's what's most interesting to me is that only 11 percent said we don't want any foreign military; 57 percent endorsed one of the three options that did involve outside intervention, with the largest number, 30 percent, saying the United Nations, 22 percent the African Union, and 5 percent rich countries for a total of 57 percent. Another 7 percent said all, which it's not exactly clear what that means. It was a volunteered response, but probably some

of those were generally endorsing the idea of some kind of outside intervention. So, here again you see a real receptivity to the idea of outside intervention among Africans.

On the use of troops, we asked, "Would you favor or oppose the use of troops from your country to be part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur?" And here the French charged right to the head of the pack, 84 percent saying that they favor it, which I thought was rather remarkable given that the French government has not been — has been somewhat — well, I won't characterize it. You follow the news. In the U.S., 65 percent approve of the U.S. contributing U.S. troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur. But this comes up in other polls as well, with majorities endorsing U.S. participation in some kind of multilateral operation in Darfur.

But then all of the others basically you do not see majorities endorsing the idea of participation. Now, Israel — that's not too hard to understand, but with most of these you're looking at countries that have not, with the exception of Poland, have not, in general, participated in peacekeeping operations. So, I think probably these low numbers are more reflective of their concept that this is not the kind of thing that we do; this is the kind of thing that the great powers do. But it's also interesting that you don't have large numbers rejecting opposition; you do have large numbers saying “don't know.”

So, in summary, coming back to our original question, do we see the signs of an emerging norm, and I think the answer is clearly yes, and historically that's how these things tend to happen. It tends to be that the idea is generally expressed by elites, the public endorses it and then governments tend to follow, even though they may have it endorsed it in principle.

When we look at the emergency of, say, civil rights, in the United States, there's this myth that the American public was somehow dragged into the era of civil rights. But even previous to Brown vs. Board of Education, you had majorities endorsing the Civil Rights Act.

So, the public, again, tends to be ahead, and governments tend to follow only when the publics are already there. That doesn't mean the publics are demanding it, only that they say that, yeah, that makes sense. It might even seem self-evident, and that is clearly the situation that we have not only in the U.S. but around the world. That people perceive that, yes, the idea of national sovereignty being this preeminent principle that cannot be contradicted, that just doesn't hold when it comes to severe human rights abuses such as genocide, and we now see that this is spreading. There's clearly an indication that this is growing, and it's a question now of how are governments going to, in a sense, follow through on the principles that they, in a sense, have endorsed, such as in the responsibility to protect summit, the genocide convention, and so on.

Often there's this assumption that oh, publics will only support using military force or taking action when it's related to their national interest, narrowly defined, and that is not really sustained by polling data.

So, now we will — let me just take a few questions on the poll itself. If it's a question about sort of the broader themes, the broader questions, perhaps you can wait for the larger discussion after we hear from the other commentaries.

Jim. Yeah.

JIM: I just wondered if the poll might have been affected by the use of such a strong word as "genocide" and if instead you had talked about, like, "massive violations of human rights," particularly with respect to countries — well, certainly in this country because it's a very charged word and one that's been used with respect to Darfur, but also in Israel and Armenia. Do you think that might affect the results?

MR. KULL: Well, that's really the question that we're dealing with here. What is the norm in relation to such a severe human rights abuse as genocide? That's the first thing that you want to establish: are there cases where the U.N. has the right/responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of the state? So, if you say "severe human rights abuses," it's a little vague exactly what that means. A term like "genocide" makes it very vivid. If you remove the word "genocide," chances are it would go down a bit — I don't think it would go down real far. We have asked some questions at times along those lines. But at this point, I think that's the first question to be asked: are there any conditions? And that is, you know, in a sense what we are arguably dealing with.

SPEAKER: Thank you, (inaudible), Embassy of Sudan. First I would like to say that the linkage between genocide and what's happening in Darfur is incorrect, and this is a mischaracterization we received in Sudan and the National Evaluation Commission from the U.N. and they clearly say that what is happening in Sudan is not an intentional genocide. Therefore, this linkage between genocide and Darfur is tremendously affecting the result of the poll.

Second to that, is the Council ready to send a mission to Sudan just to see — this is the area where the people are — there's a conflict there and so that you could have a view of the people in Sudan, having in mind that NDI have sent three mission to Sudan for public opinion. We have received them and they have some results. So, this is going to correct the result of the poll. Thank you.

MR. KULL: Thank you for that comment. That gives me an opportunity to clarify something. The question asked, "Do you think that in regard to the *violence* that is occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan, the U.N. Security Council…" The question did not say genocide. We were very careful to say that so people can make their own determination as to what is occurring there, and

presumably some of the people who say that the U.N. Security Council does not have the right or has the right but not a responsibility or don't know, some of that may be derived from believing that genocide is not occurring or being uncertain about it, so, yes, there's definitely a discrepancy between the — support in regard to genocide and the specific case of Darfur. So, that would suggest that probably there's not a unanimous view that genocide is occurring there.

MR. BIRNBAUM: David Birnbaum at the Wilson Center. I was most surprised and indeed astonished and encouraged by the findings in respect to China. Do you have any explanation for that?

MR. KULL: Yeah, that's a really interesting question. I have done focus groups in China, and when I've brought it up people express those points of view consistent with what what we found in the polls, and they seem quite comfortable with it, and it did not seem that it was really salient in their mind that this was different — that the point of view they were expressing was different from what their government was doing. Knowledge of the situation in Darfur was quite low, and it was all quite fuzzy. But the principle of intervention was clear in their mind, and, again, they didn't have it in their mind the way we have it here that the Chinese government takes a position that's odds with that — with the concept of intervention in internal affairs.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Just a very important follow-up on the gentleman's question about China. The right to intervene said — polled at 72 percent and the responsibility polled actually higher than the majority of the polling. Do you have any opinions on why that is?

MR. KULL: I really don't. Maybe the concept of responsibility evoked something that's stronger than the right. You know, the numbers are so close that I wouldn't focus too much on it, just that both the numbers are really quite high.

Maybe one more question.

MS. FERRIS: Yeah, could we have one more question on the poll itself, and then feel free to save those questions to ask after our next two speakers.

MR. WATERS: Murray Waters from UNA. I assume that the difference between the total figures here for each country and a hundred percent is a no answer.

MR. KULL: Yes, that's right. That white space in the middle is a "don't know" or just didn't answer.

MR. WATERS: I also assume that no question was asked as to whether or not the individual respondent would take action himself or herself in the form of a petition or whatever the back way.

MR. KULL: No, we didn't ask that question.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, thank you very much, Steven, for an interesting poll which raises many, many questions. Let me invite Susan and Gayle and, Steven, if you could join us here and again there will be an opportunity after the new two comments for additional questions both on the poll and on the larger question of perhaps an emerging international norm in support of action to protect.

PANEL DISCUSSION

MS. SMITH: Good morning, everyone, and thank you very much. I think this poll is a real dose of good news in terms of where public opinion is on an issue that obviously matters a lot to this audience, and I was intrigued by the question about China. I think while we can't offer definitive reasons for why the numbers are so high in support of both the right and the responsibility to protect innocent civilians, I think there are indications that part of what this suggests is the notion of the responsibility to protect is something that in many ways transcends national policies. Almost without regard to the positions of the various governments in that list on something like Darfur, populations across the board seem to, I think, aspire to some notion of the global common good, if you will, whereby innocent civilians who are under attack whether by their government or by other forces are owed some protection by the rest of the world. And, at this point in world history I will take good news anywhere I can get it. So, that's the first point I'd like to make.

I'd like to talk a little bit about one of the intriguing things here, which is the gap between what we're seeing in terms of public interest and the realities of public policy, and I think there are some distinct reasons we're seeing that gap but also some things that we can do about it.

I think we've seen in this country and abroad that the notion of the responsibility to protect, again particularly with reference to Darfur, has captured the public imagination that there is great interest that seems to permeate the entire political spectrum, people of all faiths, and people of all ages. In terms of the reality of policy, I'm afraid that what we've got is something where the world, including the United States, has not acted on the responsibility to protect, and in fact what we've done is kind of left the undermanned and under funded A.U. and the nongovernmental agencies to hold the bag, if you will, while the rest of the international community contents itself with issuing statements.

There are several reasons why we've got this gap, and let me try to lay those out. One is that I'm not sure that the public interest that we're seeing in this poll, but also importantly that we're seeing manifested in a tremendous amount of

public activism, has yet translated to policymakers and politicians. I think there is still a belief that voters in particular don't put this too high on the priority list and that it's not really a make-or-break issue. Part of that is that I'm not certain they're up to date. I hope there will be a showing of this over the next 18 months and on the Hill and in other places, because I think it is very informative. But I also think it's because the advocacy ask coming from the broad community, in which I include myself and our organization, has tended to be a fairly simply one. It has been do something about Darfur, say something about Darfur. That's a relatively easy ask and one that's relatively easily satisfied.

A second reason has to do with the media, which, in addition to public opinion, is a very powerful instrument of change as we all know. We did a project at the Center for American Progress with the Genocide Intervention Network a couple of years ago called Be a Witness where we tracked cable and network coverage of Darfur as compared to three other life-changing issues — the runaway bride, Tom Cruise's leaping on the couch on the Oprah show, and whatever it was Michael Jackson was doing at that time.

(Laughter)

MS. SMITH: And what we found — and we're about to watch this again, and if you have candidates for what we should compare it to, we'd be happy to hear those — but what we found is that in many cases, including at pivotal times in the Darfur crisis, like when then Secretary of State Colin Powell used the term "genocide," there were 2000 minutes of coverage on these other three stories versus two minutes of coverage on Darfur. That's a really important fact here, because for policymakers and politicians, it's one thing to get the petitions and see the activism; it's another to hear the constant drum beat of media coverage demanding public action.

A third reason is I'm afraid that out of the experience, in particular of Somalia, there has been a conclusion implicit, but explicit in terms of what we've done since — that we can act in these crises so long as there is no real cost and no real risk. The damage done by the killing of those Marines in Mogadishu is one that has suggested that, again, we should intervene, we should stop mass atrocities and genocide, but we've got to do it in a way where nobody gets hurt, nobody gets killed, and it doesn't cost too much money.

I understand the political blowback that occurred at the time and the very real fallout that comes when risks are in fact undertaken and damage is incurred. But I think that's another obstacle to translating this public interest.

A fourth, if I'm counting correctly, is that Africa, while it has moved up the priority list is still at the bottom. Now, it's important to note here that Africa is not the only part of the world where one has seen mass atrocities or indeed genocide. In recent times, it's been the primary region of focus because of

Rwanda, and now Darfur. And, again, I think we are seeing more attention to Africa but not yet enough.

For example, a small fact in terms of diplomatic coverage — and I know this is something that Susan when she was Assistant Secretary pushed very hard on changing — we have twice as many diplomats in Europe and Eurasia as we do in Africa. I am pretty certain that if the crises, real or potential mass atrocities that we're seeing in places like Northern Uganda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or of the very dangerous situation we're seeing in Zimbabwe were happening in Asia or the Middle East, we would probably see a bit more political attention given to them by both the Executive and Legislative branches.

So, there are a number of factors that have to do with what boils down to political will. There is another factor here, which is I think capacity. Now, in my view, political will is the most important ingredient. I think we all know that when politicians and policymakers capture and act upon that political will they can do almost anything. But there are some real capacity deficits here. If you look at the President's budget most recent request, for example there is no funding in that for a hybrid U.N./A.U. force for Darfur, although that is theoretically the objective of policy right now to get that force in there. There is a $600 million deficit in global peacekeeping, even though, again — and we've seen here — there is public interest in, and one would hope that would translate into public support for, spending in this critical area. Of our foreign assistance, although that budget has grown, it has not grown in the area of prevention or in making the kinds of investments that might allow us to act on the responsibility to protect by getting ahead of the curve.

So, we have this deficit in political will. We also have a practical deficit in capacity. In other words, if we wanted to do absolutely the right thing in Darfur today, we don't have it in the budget; we don't have it in our human resource base or deployments; and we don't have it on our policy agenda in any meaningful way.

Let me just point to three things that I think could turn this around and help translate this into action. One is going from the general to the specific, and this gets to what was just mentioned in terms of the difference between people agreeing that there should be the right or the responsibility, but translating that to the demand that there be action.

The activism we've seen from the grassroots community is remarkable, and there is no single thing that has had more impact on U.S. policy and attention to Darfur by the Executive and Legislative Branches and by the media than that activism. However, the ask there is a very simple one, and the more that ask and the more advocacy can get to some of the specific and concrete actions that the United States needs to take, I think, the greater our chances of translating agreement to a demand.

Second is that we don't really have any replicable models of success. You certainly can't look at Darfur today and say well, the way to do this is to issue statements, under-fund an A.U. mission that is too small and doesn't have a sufficiently robust mandate, and hope that the perpetrator will change his mind. That's not a model that is going to sustain and kind of feel confidence that we can actually do this. The challenge we have is defining that model in the abstract. I don't think we've, again, got a model in recent history that works there, but that's another thing that I think needs to be done. How can this happen, and what does success look like?

And the third and last thing I would say is that we need to inject this into our broader political discourse about foreign policy. It's very striking to me that the fears that I think many of us have had that the situation in Iraq would cause many to conclude that intervention period is a bad idea has not apparently — and I know you didn't ask this specifically — but has not apparently affected public opinion in the United States or elsewhere about the utility of intervention. That said, we have a very disaggregated foreign policy discourse.

We talk about Iraq, about the use of force, about the strengths and weaknesses of the U.N., and then there's a separate discussion about Darfur. So, my final point would be that the more that we can integrate this kind of public opinion into a broader and arguably more potent discourse at this point on America's role in the world on our foreign policy into the future I think the greater our chances of, again, translating agreement into actual demand and action.

And with that, I'll stop and turn to Susan.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, very much. And Susan.

MS. RICE: Thank you, Beth. Let me begin by saying good morning, and I want to join my colleagues in thanking others on this panel. Thank you especially, Steve, for what's a very interesting and insightful, and I hope it's one that you'll be able continue to follow up and integrate into your own surveys, these questions as they pertain to African public opinion, because I think this is a very interesting set of questions to continue tracking.

I also want to thank Beth for her leadership and effort to organize this event. We're all very appreciative of it, especially me since I wasn't here to be helpful. So, thank you.

And also thank you to Gayle for her ever brilliant and quite insightful analysis; it's always a pleasure to be able to back on a panel with my good friend and colleague.

It's interesting that Gayle spent a good bit of time examining the gap

between U.S. public disposition and opinion and U.S. policy as it relates to the responsibility to protect, as well as specifically to Darfur, and noted that something that I want to underscore which I found particularly fascinating. And that is 65 percent of the American public, as validated in multiple surveys, is willing to contemplate the involvement of U.S. military forces in a peacekeeping — and in fact it would be a peace enforcement operation — in Darfur. Having served in the U.S. government in the 1990s, having seen the so-called Mogadishu effect first hand, that's a striking finding. The fact that the American public is willing to contemplate, even in the context of our overstretch in Iraq, the involvement of U.S. forces in a multilateral peacekeeping mission to save lives in Africa I think reflects at least the possibility, if not the reality, that we are moving past that, as Gayle noted, despite the horrific consequences of Iraq. And so I think that that is a fascinating and important consideration and finding.

But what I want to talk about for a few minutes is first of all how there may be gaps not only between the perceptions of the public and the policy of the government here in the United States but also how those gaps might manifest themselves or appear to manifest themselves in other countries around the world, and I will draw on some findings that we at Brookings gleaned from a project that I participated in on force and legitimacy, which I'll explain in just a second. I'll conclude with some comments about U.S. policy and the direction I believe it ought to go in and the implications of these survey findings for the potential to shift U.S. policy.

Between 2004 and 2006, my colleagues and I here at Brookings, led by Ivo Daalder and Jim Steinberg and subsequently Carlos Pascual, engaged in a series of dialogues under the rubric of a project called Force and Legitimacy. We sat down for several days with former government officials, academics, elites from a wide cross section of countries to discuss the question of when is it legitimate and appropriate to use force in international affairs. So, we looked at counterterrorism; we looked at the question of preemption; we looked at nonproliferation; and we looked in depth at the question of humanitarian intervention. We had dialogues with European counterparts, with counterparts from the Middle East, Israel, and Egypt in particular, with Africans, with Mexicans, with the Chinese and with India and Pakistan.

Now, it's interesting — as I said, these were elite dialogues, but what we found is that what we heard from government — former government representatives, from academics about their perceptions of the responsibility to protect and in particular whether it would be appropriate for the international community to engage or intervene in a place like Darfur tended to closely track the approach and the policies of the governments from which they came. But what the survey shows, which is very interesting, is that in many instances in the countries that we were having these dialogues with there is also a significant gap between what is the elite perception and the government perception on the one hand and the public perception on the other, and it's a gap that I might — I would

not have anticipated prior to the findings that Steve has shared with us.

As he noted but I think is worth reiterating, it's remarkable that, broadly speaking across the globe, the international norm of the responsibility to protect is very well ingrained considering how brand new it is — really, not even two years old as a matter of international policy or law. But let me just comment specifically on a few cases.

We had a dialogue with Chinese counterparts which was quite interesting, and I'm going to have to oversimplify and try to synthesize the findings, but in the case of China, there was an interesting acceptance in principle of the notion of the responsibility to protect. But when it came down to any specific case, most notably Darfur — but, frankly, any case — that agreement in principle eroded, evaporated into no, we can't possibly agree to that. And so to find the Chinese public having a greater willingness to embrace a responsibility, even in the right, and that number being far larger than any of us might have anticipated, is remarkable indeed. And while given the nature of the system of governance in China, it may not soon translate into changed policy. I think it bodes well for the future, and it certainly — if not for Darfur in the short term — and it certainly indicates that the Chinese public is, even if as relatively uninformed as the American public about Darfur, really plugging in, in an interesting way, to the broader issues and debates that animate the international community.

In Europe, the elites, those that we engaged with, were far more forward leaning than in other parts of the world, with the exception of Africa. They were more or less with the American participants in feeling that there is a right — there is a responsibility, and in the case of Darfur more needs to be done, and that's reflected in the European data that we've seen, so they're not a particular gap.

Mexico, a very interesting gap. Our Mexican interlocutors really, to a substantial extent, reflected the traditional Mexican government angina about any external intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. They are hard core sovereignty is sacrosanct. There's a good historical reason for that, obviously, and it permeates much of Latin America. But at the elite level, there was very little acceptance of the responsibility to protect, particularly applied in any real world cases. But if you look at what the Mexican public said in this survey, 73 percent at least acknowledged the right of the international community or the Security Council to authorize that objection.

Israel, as you might expect, a fair degree of coincidence between elite opinion and public opinion.

We did not have, in your survey, Steve, an opportunity to look at what Egyptian opinion was, but we had the Palestinian territories, which may or may not be an interesting proxy, but our Egyptian interlocutors also were very, very wary of any effective application of responsibility to protect, and yet we see it

next door in the Palestinian territories, 78 percent acknowledging a right, 64 percent a responsibility.

The other interesting gap was with India. India has a long and distinguished tradition of participation in international peacekeeping, as you well know, but also as a staunch leader of the nonaligned movement for many years a sort of retro adherence to sovereignty as remaining sacrosanct, and we heard that from our Indian interlocutors, indeed also from our Pakistani interlocutors in the context of these dialogs, and I found it interesting that while in India there wasn't the same robust findings, still 63 percent acknowledged the right and 51 percent a responsibility and 59 percent willing to contemplate action specifically in Darfur. So, even there the public seems to be somewhat ahead of elite and perhaps government opinion.

Africa — and I look forward to subsequent surveys where we get more data — the African elites and African government represents with whom we spoke were very forward leaning on the responsibility to protect, very forward leaning on humanitarian intervention. The A.U. charter — which, you know, no longer places sovereignty as inviolable and contemplates the need for these kinds of interventions — is really very deeply internalized with our interlocutors, and it's interesting that public opinion seems, with the data we have, to track that but perhaps not as strongly as we heard at the elite level.

And South Africa remains to me a fascinating outlier about which I really do hope we can learn more through additional surveys, not only when it comes to the responsibility to protect in this set of issues but a whole range of human rights issues that have come to the fore as South Africa has served on the Security Council and acted in the Human Rights Commission and elsewhere.

So, overall, in the U.S. and around the world there is far greater acceptance of the responsibility to protect the role of the Security Council, and even specifically for action in Darfur where people are aware of Darfur, than the policies of either the U.S. government or the other Security Council governments would suggest.

U.S. policy I'd like to turn to now as I close and comment with something that ought to be obvious, but it's remarkable to me how anemic and simultaneously constipated U.S. policy is on the question of Darfur, and it's grossly out of step with U.S. public opinion and in fact with the bipartisan view of Congress.

If you step back and look at how the United States government has dealt with the issue of the genocide in Darfur, it's really not a pretty picture. The genocide has been going on for over four years. As Beth said at the outset, depending on whose numbers you believe, as many as 450,000 have died; 2-1/2 million displaced or made refugees. The situation is spilling over into the

neighboring countries and seriously destabilizing Chad in the Central African Republic. In just the last week we've had Janjaweed raids into Chad; we've had five African Union peacekeepers killed, and humanitarian access, despite numerous agreements to improve it, remains of serious concern.

And, yet, the U.S. government approach in policy has been, over the last three years — since in the first year we didn't pay any attention to the genocide — one that I have characterized as a pattern of bluster and retreat. They scream loud, they call it genocide, they remonstrate, they bang the table and say this has to stop; they threaten action and do nothing. Bluster and retreat.

The most striking example of that was back in November on this very podium. The President's special envoy, Andrew Natsios, came and said very plainly that if by January 1st, 2007, the Sudanese government has not stopped the killing of innocent civilians and accepted unequivocally the deployment of a U.N. African Union hybrid force, then the United States would implement Plan B, Plan B being an unknown or uncertain package of economic sanctions, some of which if implemented might have some significant impact. Well, you all can look at your watches and see that today is April 5th, 2007, four months later. Nothing. No action. Statements by the administration actually walking back this threat. Andrew Natsios quoted as speaking in various forums no longer describing the situation in Darfur as genocide. The Secretary of State in testimony effectively ruling out any more robust U.S. action.

This is not the approach of a government that is serious about stopping a genocide, and yet in effect what we have done — we, the United States; we, the international community — is to allow the perpetrators of genocide, the government of Sudan, to dictate the terms of the international community's response to that genocide, to, in effect, say no, you can't come in to stop it with this kind of force; no, you can't come in with this composition; you can't, you can't, you can't. And instead of the international community saying "excuse me, but you all are perpetrating the genocide, we're here to stop it, we're not negotiating with you on the means and the methods of stopping it," we've done just the opposite. We've negotiated — for months — going on to a year.

It's been almost a year since the African Union said to the international community, indeed to the United Nations, that while we have made a significant contribution to the security situation in Darfur and the A.U. deserves huge credit for being the only forces on the planet willing to take bullets to save people in Darfur, they said that look, this mission needs to be larger; it needs a more assured funding stream; it's needs greater logistical support; we want to transition to a U.N. force, will subsume our forces under that force and move ahead. It's been almost a year and nothing's happened. Literally, nothing's happened.

We have walked away from a chapter 7 U.N. Security Council resolution, which we championed and backed that authorized that U.N. force of 22,000 and

negotiated again with the perpetrators of genocide on a so-called hybrid force, the U.N.-African Union force, which would be smaller, would have a mandate derived from the African Union in which, again, the perpetrators of genocide have a say in the outcome. It would be a force that would have all the complexities and weaknesses that we saw in the Balkans where you have the whole dual key phenomenon and challenge, and it would be predominantly African without the external support from NATO and other countries that might be needed to increase its strength and viability. And, very importantly, there aren't the African forces there; there isn't the excess capacity to get from the 7,000 level to the 20 or 22,000 level. So, we basically created a fiction, this hybrid and, even so, a far lesser force, the Sudanese government continues to thwart and reject, and we do nothing. So, this is indeed a disgrace not only for the United States, for the entire international community.

Moving ahead, I believe strongly that we should implement this Plan B. Should have been done months ago. It may or may not be effective, depending on what they put in the package, and it will be less effective to the extent that they've leaked elements of it previously. We ought to move beyond this hybrid. We've given the Sudanese too much time to dither with that. They've rejected it. Six months later, almost. We ought to say we're no longer negotiating on the composition of the force; we the international community will deploy a force that we believe to be effective on our own terms. We need to accept that the diplomacy in negotiating the terms of the entry of such a force has run its course. It has failed. And every day that we continue to bank on diplomacy, we're allowing more and more to die and the region to become further inflamed.

I have argued in other contexts, and I continue to believe that it's past time that the international community and the United States give the Sudanese government a very short duration ultimatum in which to accept an effective and robust international force with a mandate to protect civilians or face the threat of the use of military force. I think that force can and should come in the form of air strikes targeted at the aircraft, the airfields, and the other assets that have been involved in the genocide itself. We can do that with the assets we have. It's exactly what we did in Kosovo in a far lesser humanitarian crisis, and it's striking to me that we aren't even discussing or contemplating that in the context or Darfur.

The fact is we have a choice. We can play this game of bluster and retreat and negotiate and do-si-do in perpetuity, or we can stop the killing and try to prevent the spillover from magnifying.

The Bush administration — despite the fact that it is in a weakened political and practical state domestically and internationally — on this issue still holds a great many cards, and it has a choice whether to play those cards or to fold and let history judge it accordingly.

Steve, what your findings show is if the administration steps up to the plate four years later and demonstrates the guts to play its cards, it can count on not only significant Congressional support on a bipartisan basis but also significant public support or at least be in a position to cultivate that support to fruition.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much all three of you for very stimulating and provocative remarks that I'm sure will lead to many questions.

Before opening the floor, however, let me just throw out a couple of questions, if I may.

Gayle, to start with you, why Darfur? Why not Democratic Republic of Congo or Sri Lanka or Colombia or other places where they're suffering? What is it about Darfur that seems to have captured the imagination of the grassroots in this country and elsewhere?

MS. SMITH: I think there are two things. On one level, Darfur is very complicated if you look into a number of the underlying reasons. On another fundamental level it's really very simple, and I think the very stark descriptions both in words and in photographs of civilians being literally chased out of their homes and their villages destroyed and burned and they left was so stark that no one could look at that and say that that's explainable, that that — it's just simply a case of fundamental right and wrong.

But I think your question gets to another point that's important here, and I think the survey gives us reason to be hopeful, which is that there are any number of places in the world today where one could make the case that in order to act on the responsibility to protect, we ought to be up and moving. Darfur is one of them. It's the most dramatic, and I think in many ways the most urgent.

But getting to that means, in my view, that we not only respond to these in the short term but we start to take a 10-, 15-, 20-, 25-year look at this. Where do we want to be in 10 years? Because unless we start to change the status quo — and as I suggested earlier, working this into our political discourse, building in the more effective tools, calling for specific actions from our governments and making clear to the people for whom we vote, or not, that this matters — we're going to see another one of these in two years, in three years, in four years, in five years. Any one of us could name 10, 11 countries where this could happen.

So, how do we start making the investments now so that we are not, every two or three years, coming to this state too late and just with a statement but again getting ahead of the curve? And I think that's the real challenge here while we've got Darfur in the global imagination and while people are expressing a real desire

and I think commitment to see something done there, and as your survey suggests in other places. How do we translate into making the investments now for being able to deal with the range of countries that you mentioned?

MS. FERRIS: Especially given the reality that funding and interest is much easier to sustain when there's an emergency than the longer term preventive or peace-building initiative.

MS. SMITH: Right, but I — if I can say one point on that, I would bet a whole lot of money that had we acted swiftly and effectively in Darfur in 2003, there would be fewer Sudanese lives lost, fewer casualties among peacekeepers than we've already seen for the A.U. force, and certainly a lot less money spent on the peacekeeping, on the humanitarian assistance, or on putting things back together when and if this is ever resolved. So that's the other thing.

MR. KULL: I can add something to that. When there's a schema of conflict, of civil war, that's something that Americans tend to go "oh, boy, should we get involved in that?" When there's a schema of victimization, when one group is truly victimizing civilians, that elicits support. When there's a kind of racial dimension that's bringing in the concept of genocide, that makes it even stronger, and so when — during Kosovo there was support, and we asked questions about whether people believed that it was genocide and there was that perception. So, what's key in each case is how is it read, how is it assimilated, how is it structured, what's the narrative here? And from those what we know is the narratives of victimization and genocide are very powerful for eliciting support, not necessarily again eliciting demand but when leaders are willing to tell that story, to present that narrative, people tend to express their consent to take an action.

MS. RICE: Can I just add to that? It's a very interesting observation, and it's a partial explanation for the debate we see waged over the semantics of what's going on in Iraq. One of the reasons, presumably, why the administration is so reluctant to acknowledge the obvious, which is that there is an ongoing civil war in Iraq, is because it does have the impact of changing public perceptions about the wisdom and the effectiveness of our presence there.

It's also interesting that you see some folks, like Senator McCain, who obviously is very committed to long-term, robust U.S. involvement in Iraq, raising the specter of genocide as a potential outcome should the U.S. forces withdraw. So, it all plays in.

MR. KULL: That's right. He's read the polls.

MS. FERRIS: And, Susan, leaving aside for a moment the question of U.S. foreign policy, because I suspect there will be a number of questions there, what would it take for global public opinion to result in effective exercise of

international action to fulfill the responsibility to protect? Is it a question of the elite developing a better relationship with their own public (inaudible) or something that can be done on the international level?

MS. RICE: That's very interesting. I'm not sure how much can be done on the international level that isn't national in its origins, although it's a worthy thing to consider and explore.

I think many of the observations that Gayle made that relate to the United States frankly pertain to at least the other developed democracies where the predisposition at the public level for implementation or action with respect to the responsibility to protect has yet to infuse, in a meaningful way, government policy. I mean, it's made of the same difficulties we see here.

It's, particularly in Europe, a relatively underdeveloped public grassroots movement, a reluctance or refusal on the part of media in some countries to give it the air time that it deserves, although certainly in places like Britain there's much more good coverage of what's gone on in Darfur and indeed in other parts of the world where atrocities are taking place.

But the challenges are the same, and I'm not sure to what extent it is possible to galvanize a global grassroots movement, but it's not impossible in that we've seen it, for example, on Jubilee and debt. We've seen it, to a certain extent, around poverty reduction, certainly more robust in other countries than here. But it takes time and deliberate mobilization.

MS. FERRIS: Sure.

MS. SMITH: If I can just add a quick couple of points to that, and I agree absolutely with that. I want to add one that's kind of 30,000 feet and one that's practical.

One of the things that's taken root over the past five years is that our frame for looking at the world — and I think this is true in more countries than the United States — is pretty exclusively terrorism and being against it, which makes good sense. It's been less about what we're actually for. And I think, again, part of what it's going to take to get on the right side of this is to flesh out that vision of what we're actually for — what is the moral imperative in a world that is growing more complicated and where mass atrocities can occur but where we have the advantage that we didn't have years ago seeing them in real time and being able to respond more quickly. So, I think part of it is, at the uppermost levels, a change in framing a different way of thinking about what leadership means, whether that's in the Security Council, whether that's China's arising power, whether that's the United States.

At a very practical level you asked a very interesting thing about will it

take elites getting closer to the publics, and, yes, it will. I think one of the things that has changed, though, very dramatically in the last three or four years is that we now have a moment where CNN every night when they do the news they have the best from YouTube, they have internet reporters. There is a real changing phenomenon where mass action, self-appointed mass action, is now beginning to, if not fully drive but influence and shape, the news on the one hand and the political debate on the other.

When Rwanda was happening, I don't think there were a lot of members of Congress who had their staffs looking at blogs, but I would bet money that they do today. So, I think one of the optimistic signs is that while that is a great aspiration and it's always an ideal that elites would actually listen to their people, I think there are more tools available today for making that happen, and not just in the United States but in most of the countries that you listed.

MR. KULL: I'd like to add that when there's an emerging norm, there's a tendency for people throughout to say well, I would do it but I know others aren't willing to do it. That is something you see in the public. People say I'm willing to but my neighbors aren't.

MS. SMITH: Correct.

MR. KULL: And you hear from people in the elites — oh, I'm for it; we in the elite, we have a more refined ethical sensibility, but the public, they're just — they just think about their pocketbook, they don't care about these things. So, and then, well, we, America, we would do it but other countries won't do it. So, throughout the system there are all these people. This is one of the features of an emerging norm, and part of the process is everybody communicating with everybody and gradually finding out that oh, well, you think so, too; you think so, too.

And when you think about mobilizing the public, it's really not that those publics or those grassroots groups come in and say you know, Mr. Congressman, if you don't vote differently, you're at risk in the next election. It's really that they become a kind of voice for the public to kind of close that loop so that they at least raise the question. Now, maybe the publics aren't so averse to this. Maybe the publics are concerned about that and then gradually the image of the public changes. Also people hear it and then it promotes more information. Getting more information is a critical part of this evolutionary process, too. And then people communicate with each other. So, all of these things move forward and kind of build on each other.

QUESTIONS FOR THE PANEL

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. We'll now open it up for discussion, and we have microphones coming. And please identify yourself with your name and

organization.

MR. HAROLD: Scott Harold, Brookings. Beth, thank you for putting together an excellent panel. All three of our panelists, especially Dr. Rice's very insightful and anatomical discussion of the problem.

I'd like to ask Drs. Smith and Rice if you could give us a little bit further insight into what policy options governments have, as well as the American people and people around the world. In particular, I'm thinking here there is a divestiture movement to ask American companies and companies around the world to withdraw from Sudan, and of course there's also a movement to push for banning or not participating in the upcoming '08 Olympics in China particularly because of China's strong support for Sudan, and I'm thinking here in particular of China's decision. One of the national oil companies in China decided to recently give the Sudanese government a hundred million dollar palace. This seems to me to be something that's rather troubling. And given the long history of the Sudanese regime, which in the 1990s was sponsoring and harboring terrorist groups from all over the world and which is still a regime that is engaged actively in genocide, I wonder how long do we have to wait before we actually do what Prime Minister Blair suggests and offer air cover or even go further and help overthrow this man's regime. I wonder at what point do we take those steps? I would think soon would be better rather than later. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: I wonder if it's okay if we take two or three questions and then ask for a response.

MS. MULLEN: My name is Mary Mullen, and I worked with the Bosnia Support Committee actually, but I lived in Africa for five years.

Didn't the U.N. give a list to the ICC court of people that should be indicted for war crimes? I thought that's what happened. At least John Prendergast I thought mentioned it in one of his lectures. And also didn't the U.N. say that the government of Sudan was guilty of crimes against humanity? Wasn't that a statement that was just recently made?

MS. FERRIS: Okay, one more perhaps? Right over here?

MR. BIRNBAUM: David Birnbaum again. First I wanted to thank Susan and Gayle for their leadership and for their wonderful passion on this issue.

Susan, I have one question for you. You described, I think fairly, South Africa as an outlier on a whole range of international human rights issues. I find myself mystified by that stance, particularly given that South Africa itself in the anti-apartheid movement was so benefited by international support and forms of intervention. So, I'd be curious as to what your explanation is for that current

situation.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, we have some questions for both Gayle and Susan on China policy options, ICC?

MS. SMITH: Yes. Let me start with the questions about the U.N. and the ICC, and you are right in recounting the state of play. And there are a couple of pieces here. In the short term, there is more that the United States can do to cooperate with the ICC to ensure that these indictments can actually take place. A lot of that is sharing intelligence. There is a hesitation to do that on the part of the administration I think for two reasons. One is sharing intelligence you have to be careful about sources and methods. I've actually been there. You can do that. You can sanitize intelligence in such a way that you can pass it on.

The bigger and larger problem — and I think it's part and parcel of the problem we see in terms of the gap between public opinion and action — is that this administration is staunchly against the international criminal court to the extent that it has not only refused to ratify the underlying treaty but has in fact undertaken punitive measures against countries that do ratify the treaty. And I think that's something that in this very real-time case of Darfur hurts us because this is one of the instruments that can be used to put pressure on the Sudanese government and cause them to understand something which is not evident now, which is that there is a cost for their actions or some price to be paid. It's also an important instrument in the longer term because it's the international vehicle by which we are able to hold those who commit crimes against humanity accountable. So, it's kind of double impediment, if you will, at this point.

You're also right about the U.N., but I think there are a couple of things there we have to be mindful of. I think the new secretary-general wants to be active and do the right thing on Darfur. I'm afraid he's entering that period that seems to occur for everybody who gets involved — this brief baptism of illusions where there is the assumption that again when Khartoum says we're willing to negotiate this, that that's the track that needs to be pursued.

I personally believe that if Khartoum said we're willing to negotiate and actually negotiate it and let a hybrid force in, that would solve that problem. But I think we've seen a repeated pattern of refusal there.

On the question of policy options, I think they are multiple, and, interestingly, a couple of the things that you mentioned have both public activism and public policy dimensions, like divestment. Divestment has actually proven to be a very, very effective tool in a couple of ways, and one of those is getting more public attention from the private sector and corporate community, which is really important because those are all people who do have a voice with policymakers and decision makers. There is a movement on the Hill to kind of build further on the divestment work, and I think that's a very useful tool for the same reason I

alluded to.

Thus far, we have sent a message that we really would like you to stop this in Darfur, but if you don't there's no price or cost. So, I think that's critical.

There's a growing movement afoot among public activists to really look at the Olympics in China as another lever. I think that's probably a very important one. I think it's one that the Chinese may well pay attention to. I do think in terms of dealing with China on this, there is a much larger issue. I'm not aware that we really have a policy towards China at this point, and I think that this needs to be factored into a broader policy and strategy towards China where we've got to decide whether we're going to be at loggerheads in Sudan. Are we also going to be at loggerheads in Zimbabwe where, for example, China has been a very strong supporter of Mugabe? Or is there any possibility — I'm not suggesting that there is, just merely that it's worth exploring — that there might be some way to say to the Chinese — again, assuming there were a larger policy — that maybe it's important to get on the right side of history here and look at moving in that direction.

The last thing I'd say on the policy options is I think we've got to be focused really on two key things. One is the pressure. I've known the Sudanese government for a long time. I think there's a lot of evidence to suggest that simply asking them to cooperate in the war against terror, as we did when we were in office — is not sufficient. Pressure is another matter, to the extent that there's cooperation now. But the other is preparedness, and whether that's preparedness for a no-fly zone, preparedness to continue supporting the A.U. force as a stopgap measure — and it's not a very good one, but we should bear in mind that the A.U. is now talking about really leaving. Rwandans are saying it's time to go. Preparing by having funding for peace enforcement force in budget; preparing for the kinds of actions that Susan's described. I don't think there's any evidence of any of that's going on and unless that is in our back pockets where (inaudible) is going to playing catch-up and at worse just kind of wait a couple, few more years until this is really all over.

MS. FERRIS: Do you want to come in on South Africa?

MS. RICE: Okay. If I might just quickly on the policy actions question, which I might have a slightly different take. I'd make a distinction between what I think is useful approaches for grassroots mobilization and in bringing into this movement a larger and more energized share of the population, which I think is very important, and what will actually, in my opinion, have an impact directly on the immediate problem we face, which is stopping the killing of innocent civilians, in real time, where every day counts.

So, against that backdrop, I am supportive of the divestiture movement, largely for the reasons that Gayle said, that it is galvanizing students' groups in

particular; it has traction at the state and local level as was the case with the anti-apartheid movement; it brings the private sector into the mix, which I think is useful. I don't think, however, that as a practical matter divestiture will lead to a near-term end of the killing. It's a very different situation than we faced in apartheid South Africa where, you know, what we were really trying to effect over time was regime change through a responsible transition. Here we're trying to stop the killing today, yesterday, and tomorrow, and so I don't think it's useful for that purpose, but I think it's worth pursuing.

On the Olympics, quite honestly I'm not particularly enthusiastic about that approach. I don't mind it again as an advocacy point if that gets people fired up. I'm not sure that if I were sitting in the U.S. government I would advocate for the U.S. government actually withdrawing from the Olympic Games. Why? As Gayle suggested, we've got multiple issues on our plates with China, and while it would be nice if this were the only issue of significance, it's not. It's very, very important, but there are other very, very important issues out there as well. And, frankly, it's not as if China doesn't hold a few cards of its own with respect to the United States. So, I think I'd favor, you know, leaving that out there as an echo, as a possibility, but I think as a practical matter it's not a great lever, and anyway it's, you know, way down the road when we'd actually pull the trigger, and if we're still talking about this in 2008 then, you know, we've got a lot more to worry about than the Olympics.

A no-fly zone I think certainly is a step in the right direction. I have advocated for targeted air strikes as opposed to a no-fly zone not because I oppose a no-fly zone, but I actually think the targeted air strikes are a simpler, quicker, and more discreet option than the no-fly zone. For some reason, the no-fly zone has sort of taken on this aura as the benign military action where, in fact, it's a hugely asset-intensive, serious effort 24/7, you know, over a territory the size of France where there's very little in terms of logistical basis. And, frankly, to implement a no-fly zone, to enforce it, would require the kind of strikes that I'm talking about doing in the first place. So, that's my view of that.

I think there are other options we can contemplate. I'm looking for options that are short term that will have immediate impact, given the urgency of the killing. I think capital market sanctions, which we've talked about on the Hill, is something we should look at.

You know, the more robust manifestations of this amorphous Plan B are certainly worth trying and, as I mentioned in my prior remarks, should have been done some time ago, and coupled with a renewed effort of the Security Council with Britain and the United States coming into the chair over the next two months to push forward and really to challenge the Chinese to veto. I don't think they will. We have always backed away from putting robust things before the Council on the theory that China would veto. I think that we ought to test that theory.

Let me just try to take a stab, David, at your question, which is a tough one, and what's tough about it is that I would have surmised — and I think I still surmise despite the globe scan finding on South Africa — that there is probably still a significant divergence on this whole panoply of human rights and international issues between the public in South Africa and the government. The government has taken some positions on a wide variety of issues that would leave one scratching his or her head whether we're talking about HIV-AIDS or depending on how you look at it, Zimbabwe, that may have been — may or not be more rational from the South African point of view than it seems from our point of view. But certainly some of the — you know, Burma and other issues that have come up in the Security Council and the Human Rights Council where you would think that South Africa, given its leadership, given its democracy, would take a different perspective.

And analyzing the South African government is complicated. It's a fascinating, interesting, and difficult government to understand and in some cases indeed to work with. We did — and I think the Bush administration has tried. It's not easy, though. It never has been. And while there are a number of issues on which we have managed to find common ground to cooperate, there are many where we haven't, and this is not a new phenomenon. We could, you know, spend a lot of time talking about why. But I think one of the things we need to recall is that South Africa is a country, to a far greater extent than many other countries in Africa, where's there's a great deal of ambivalence if not hostility towards the United States and the Western world more broadly or the OECD — for good reason if you consider the history.

There is an aloofness, a sense of not wanting to be too closely associated with the U.S. or Western Europe that certainly manifests itself from time to time in government policy but I think does have some popular roots, and so I don't know. And that's why I'm interested in more survey information on this whole panoply of issues with respect to South Africa —how much the government is reflecting public sentiment or how much the government is pursuing a set of policies that may or may not be embraced by the population at large. But South Africa is a fascinating, wonderful, and extraordinarily complex country that, frankly, I think we need to work harder to understand better.

MS. FERRIS: Take some questions from back here? Fellow back here in the blond hair and the bright blue tie?

MR. MUSAF: Thank you very much. My question to Dr. Susan. My name is Collig Musaf from the Embassy of Sudan. Why are you adopting the same failed policy when you were in charge of African Affairs during the Clinton administration? That policy of (inaudible) regional war and isolation. That the same policy (inaudible) the civilian war in the south for more than 21 years, which was very destructive to the regional peace and to my country. This administration succeeded to stop the longest war in Africa by investing its

political (inaudible) and the leverage by encouraging the political sentiment and peaceful negotiation. The question, why are you not adopting the same policies as succeeded to stop the war in the south, the negotiation, and the political settlement? You didn't mention that at all — the political process, one.

Number two, because of that policy on political rhetoric, we have 16 different rebel groups in Darfur. There is no pressure on the rebel group because that is part of the conflict. It is not the government of Sudan alone. And the international community, in order to stop the violation in Darfur, should put pressure on the rebel groups and bring them to the table.

My last point — the government of Sudan does not oppose the deployment of the international peacekeepers because we would like that to be in our country. But because that would not help to resolve the conflict in Darfur, we have good examples — in Iraq right now we have hundred of thousand of troops, but they have not brought peace. We have a good example in Somalia right now. So the option, once it's tested and successful modeled before, is through political negotiation and political sentiment between the government and the rebel group. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll take a couple more. There toward the back?

MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you. Tristan Hoffman, UC Davis alumni. I was wondering what the panel's view was in regards to security firms taking over or supplementing peacekeeping operations specifically in regards to Blackwater. I'm curious if the panel feels that public opinion is beginning to warm to that idea. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, and maybe one from over here. Yes, the woman with the scarf.

MS. LARSON: Hi. I'm Ms. Lee Larson from Georgetown University. I have a question for Dr. Rice. Could you please describe further this military option? You say short term air strikes could lead to the stopping of the killings, but what is the long-term option? Does the air strike lead to peace and prosperity? Does it lead to a long-term stop or (inaudible) of the killings? And does it stop the proxy war between Sudan and Chad? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: All right, another question? Yes?

MR. DAVI. (Inaudible) Davi, the Sudanese (inaudible) party. Thank you, all of you, for the good discussions and good speech you have given to us regarding Darfur. My question is to Mr. Steven Kull. You mentioned that as long as we are discussing the Darfur issue (inaudible) region of the Sudan. Why did you not include the Sudanese opinion in your survey or in your report of how U.N. can be accepted or rejected to intervene (inaudible).

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Maybe we should start with that question then. Steven?

MR. KULL: I would love to do that, and if you know of any centers in Sudan that would like to cooperate on that, I would be eager to participate, work together with them on that. The nature of this undertaking was that centers around the world agreed to participate. I can say that it's been interesting to me that over the years when we have done polling on these issues that they have actually been well reported in Sudan. So, I look forward to any suggestions that you have, or anybody has, of how we could do that. I think that would be a very worthwhile thing to do.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Susan and then Gayle and the perhaps we'll wind up.

MS. RICE: Let me try to address three of the questions that were asked — the gentleman from the Embassy of Sudan, the security firm question, and the question of whether what I advocate would have salutary impact over the long

term.

Quickly, let me start with the security firm question. The short answer is I don't think that solves the problem, for two reasons. One, it doesn't get us past the principal issue that we've wrestled with over the past many months, which is that of whether we are in the business of awaiting the consent of the Sudanese government for whoever deploys, whether they're African Union, U.N., NATO, or private. You know, I don't see Blackwater shooting its way into Darfur anymore than I see the U.N. shooting its way into Darfur, at least not without the Sudanese government being previously pressured to relent, which I'll come to in a second, which relates to what I've advocated. And beyond that, I have not gained greater confidence in either the capacity or the trustworthiness of many of these private security firms from the experience we've seen in Iraq where at least in extreme cases they have themselves proved to be rogue elements. I'm not talking about any particular firm but just as a general matter, so I'm skeptical of that.

To answer the question from the gentleman of the Embassy of Sudan, who — I won't debate your characterization of the policy that the U.S. government pursued while I was in and while Gayle was in the administration. It's wrong, but let me just address your proximate question, which is why do I not advocate negotiation. There's a very simple answer to that question. It's not that I oppose negotiation. If I thought negotiations would work, that would be great, but the administration, which actually has been pursuing a policy of negotiations, doesn't follow my course, as demonstrated by the failure of that process over the last three years that negotiations don't work with your government on this issue. Your government took an affirmative decision in the context of a conflict to resort to genocide. You cannot negotiate the end to genocide. You can potentially negotiate the end to the underlying conflict, which the administration has tried to do and should continue to try to do, but let's be clear. There's a difference between the underlying conflict and the separate and distinct decision by a party — in this case, the government of Sudan — to perpetrate genocide in the context of that conflict. There's only two ways to stop genocide. One, persuade the perpetrators through pressure or incentives that it's no longer in their interest to continue the genocide — and we've not succeeded in doing that in this case, because we haven't mustered significant pressure, and the incentives have been offered but they haven't been accepted.

The other way to stop genocide is to physically, effectively protect those people who are the victims or the potential victims, which is what we, the international community had contemplated and have tried to do in our authorizing a robust U.N. force.

So, that's the only way you stop genocide. I think that if your government were serious about ending it and doing it through negotiations, you would have done it by now. We've been at this game for three years, and the genocide's been going on for four years, so how long are we supposed to be fooled by the notion

that the government of Sudan will change its approach through negotiations? That's why I no longer have any faith in the prospect of a negotiated solution.

The other reason I am skeptical about the utility of a negotiated solution is because where there have been negotiated solutions — whether the DPA or even the CPA — the government has not adhered in every instance to all its terms. We could spend the next 20 minutes going through a litany of agreements the government has made and broken going back well before the CPA, which is not to say the other parties are blameless — they're not. But it's not as if a signature on a piece of paper ensures success. So, those are the reasons why I'm skeptical of the continued utility of negotiations.

To clarify what I'm advocating. I'm not suggesting that the use of force is a panacea to solve our problems. What I'm trying to confront is the very proximate question of how do we physically protect those civilians at immediate risk of death in the context of this genocide. And, as I said just a second ago, two ways to stop a genocide: persuade the perpetrators to stop through pressure or incentives or physically protect the people. I have suggested that after saying to the government of Sudan you have a week, you have two weeks, you pick the deadline to accept unconditionally the deployment of a robust international force — and I think that ideally would be a U.N. force with a significant African involvement — and if you fail to accept that force whose mandate is to protect those civilians at risk, then the international community and the United States will participate in a military action, targeted strikes, that we will sustain until you change your mind and allow that force to deploy. That's essentially what we did in Kosovo, okay? And eventually Milosevic, a far more significant military adversary than the Sudanese government, assented. And, you know, there's still international presence in Kosovo.

That just deals with the problem of protecting civilians. I don't pretend that it solves the underlying problem of the region or the root causes of the original conflict or even the problem of whether the government in Sudan is a regime that continues to deserve the support that one ought to hope it would have to govern. I'm not talking about any of those things. I'm just talking about protecting civilians. To resolve the underlying conflict — well, there still needs to be negotiations. There will need to be a whole post-conflict process. There will need to be development. There will need to be other efforts conducted with the states in the region. So, this is a piece of the puzzle; it's not the sum total.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Gayle, any final thought?

MS. SMITH: Yes, just a couple of things. I was briefly taken back to some of our dialogue with the Sudanese, but coming back.

On the private security firm question, I would have to agree with Susan and even a bit more forcefully. I think it's a really bad idea, for a couple of

reasons. As we've seen in Iraq, there isn't any accountability. Even on the upside, though, in a case like Liberia where security sector reform is critically important, contracting that out denies to the United States the residual relationship that comes from our people in uniform working with the people in uniform from other countries, and I think particularly in cases of post-war or post-crisis countries, that's a fundamentally important relationship, and oftentimes it's the channels through which we come to understand a lot of things that are less well understood, quite frankly, on the civilian side about post-war countries.

The other thing is you get into an area where there are literally no rules of the game. Who goes to the ICC if there's a violation? How do you legislate or enforce any accountability in operations on the ground? And I think, frankly, if you look at Sierra Leone, if you look at some other parts of Africa where private security firms have been prominent, I think the conclusion would be, on balance, that it was not a good idea.

On this larger question that you were just answering, Susan, about would air strikes solve these other problems. I think Susan's adequately and precisely explained why no, it wouldn't; but it would, if you will, be the wedge or the lever by which the fundamental challenge of protection could be pursued. But I think in all of these cases, whether we're talking in the general on the responsibility to protect as the survey does or with respect to Darfur, it's fundamentally important and critical to our success that we have a long-term policy in mind. We can ill-afford to run around putting out fires without having long-term strategies. I'm afraid that what we're seeing in Somalia today, for example, is a case of having put out a few fires, being able to ignore it because it was just smoldering and not in flames and now coming back to it. What does this mean in terms of Sudan? Sudan has been a foreign policy challenge to the United States for quite some time, and it will be for quite some time. Part of what we need in addition to moving swiftly to ensure that civilians are protected, which is the bottom line and has to be the first priority, is a long-term policy instead of instruments that will ensure that ultimately what we see in Sudan is a government that represents the diversity of all of the Sudanese people and where we are not moving from Southern Sudan to Darfur, perhaps over to the east to continue to try to have some impact on recurrent and successive conflicts. And that's really the bottom line. This is an immediate crisis now, and therefore there's a need to act on protection, but it's a long-term challenge in any of these countries, and unless we look at the short term and the long term at the same time, we're going to be having too many pleasant, enjoyable but frequent meetings here at Brookings and other places to talk about how to fix it.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you all very much for coming this morning, and a special thanks to our panel Steven Kull, Susan Rice, and Gayle Smith.

(Applause)

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