

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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RISING STAR: CHINA'S NEW
SECURITY DIPLOMACY

by Dr. Bates Gill

A Book Launch
co-sponsored by

The Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
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The Freeman Chair in China Studies
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Welcome and Introduction:

Richard C. Bush III, Director
Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies;
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

Featured Speaker:

Bates Gill
Freeman Chair in China Studies
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Commentary:

Jing Huang, Senior Fellow
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PROCEEDINGS

DR. BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Richard Bush. I am the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and on behalf of myself and Jeff Bader, the Director of the John L. Thornton China Center here at Brookings, and on behalf of Bob Faherty, the Director of the Brookings Institution Press, it is our great honor and privilege to welcome all of you to this book launch event. We really appreciate your coming.

This is a special occasion for all of us because we are launching a book by a dear and former colleague, Bates Gill. The book is "Rising Star" and one can play around with the title in a number of different ways. First of all, Bates himself is a rising star of course, and one part of his rise was his 4 years at Brookings when he was the inaugural Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and my predecessor. He built a really great program, and the program itself is four rising stars from Asia. The book also is about China as a rising star. We usually talk about China as a rising power, but the use of the word "star" to think about China is interesting, and I will let Bates play with that if he wants to. I am not going to steal it from him.

The book I think is very important in that it examines China's security policy as it rises, and it looks at it more from the inside out. The United States and powers on China's periphery tend to obsess on things like China's defense spending and how much China is really spending on its defense establishment. We worry about antisatellite launches and how much coordination really was there. Bates has done us a real service by examining how China fashions its security policy from the Chinese perspective itself and what China's leaders are trying to accomplish, and I think that provides a real contribution to how we understand China. So the book is very important and we are very pleased to have Bates with us today.

I must tell you that today is your big opportunity to get the book because if you buy the book today at the bookstore on your way out, you get 20 percent off. After today, you lose that opportunity, so as Chairman Mao says, "Seize the time."

We are going to ask Bates to talk for a little while to introduce the book. We will then invite our colleague Jing Huang, also of the Thornton China Center, to offer a few comments, and then we will open it up for discussion. But without further ado, Bates Gill.

(Applause)

DR. GILL: Thank you very much, Richard, for that very, very kind introduction. I want to thank you and Jeff especially, and also Robert Faherty of the Brookings Press, for the real privilege to be before all of you today. And I want to do a special shout out to the Brookings Press because everyone has heard those nightmare stories of authors and press and trying to get a task like this accomplish. I want to recommend the Press to everybody. It was a wonderful experience, a great team working together, and we

managed to put this book together and turned around in spite of my losing the manuscript on an airplane once in the very latter stages of the process. We managed to get it turned around in a relatively quick time with excellent reviews, peer reviews, et cetera, so I want to thank them all very, very much.

I also want to just take a second or two before getting into the book to extend my appreciation to a number of other people. All of you in this room are persons that I greatly admire and I am looking forward to your comments and critiques, but nothing like this can get done without standing on the shoulders of people who have done excellent work before you, and I acknowledge all of you in this room for making that kind of a contribution to my work. In particular, let me start by thanking three special people who were my bosses and were influential in the early stages of this manuscript which began when I was working at Brookings, in particular Mike Armacost, former president of Brookings who is hanging on the wall back there, and Richard Haass, the two guys who brought me here. And then Jim Steinberg who read over the manuscript several times and was very, very helpful in helping me push this book in the direction it has taken. Also my current boss at CSIS, John Hamre, is just a fantastic mentor and supporter of this kind of work, and I want to thank him as well.

I was fortunate to have something like six anonymous reviewers of this book, sorry to those who might be in here, but it is going to be published apparently in spite of your comments. I do appreciate that. And I'd also like to give a special thanks to a number of other folks from our clan who took time out of their busy schedules to give me their insightful critiques--folks like David Shambaugh, Evan Medeiros, Taylor Fravel, J.D. Yuan, Mike Glosny, Iain Johnston, and Andrew Scobell. Most of all I want to thank the research assistants, as anyone who has engaged in this kind of work knows, who are really the critical part of all of this and all of the great work that they do. Two of them I had at Brookings were just fantastic, Jamie Riley and Jennifer John, and then over at CSIS I had the support of people like Drew Thompson, Matt Oresman, Jennifer Feltner, Melissa Murphy, Huang Chin-Hao, and Eve Cary. So it is definitely a work of a multitude of people. And last and absolutely not least I do need to thank my dear wife Sarah Palmer who many of you know, a great partner, a great supporter, and as everybody knows in these sorts of exercises, the person who suffers most when a person is trying to get a book finished. This book has been underway now for some time, all too long, and I am very, very pleased to have reached this point at least.

I think for the cognoscenti in this room, perhaps much of what is trying to be put forward here will be somewhat familiar, but I think that the time is opportune to take a step back, take some stock of what I am terming China's new security diplomacy, mostly targeting a Washington, D.C.-oriented policy audience, but I think it will be useful to students as well as to the general interested observer to try and have a deeper understanding of the motivations and implications behind what I think has been a far more proactive, far more constructive, and I think increasingly successful set of foreign and security policies emanating from China over just the last 5 to 7 years. It is an opportune moment to take a look at what has been driving this, where do we see it on the

ground, and what are the opportunities and challenges that these developments pose to us here in the United States as well as to the broader international community.

In the first part of this book I try to lay out what I see as a useful framework for understanding the motivations behind China's new security diplomacy. There's a bit of history there. I think it is possible to draw a line back even to the early-1980s and Deng Xiaoping's strategic assessment at the time that China was going to be entering a period of relative calm—an opportunity for China to focus on its top priority of developing internally—that there would not be a major world war, that there would not be a major nuclear war, and that there would be a period of relative calm and stability.

That vision, I think I panned out quite accurately. In fact, well before the end of the Cold War, Deng saw the direction of the international system, but this vision did not really cohere. I do not think into more specific and well-defined concepts and policy implementation on the ground until more like the mid- to late-1990s.

In the book, trying to find a date or a point at which we could begin to see more dramatic changes in China's new security diplomacy, I looked to the period of about 1998-1999 when this vision of Deng's began to cohere into some more authoritative *tifa*, sort of authoritative statements, coming from Beijing. Here is where we begin to see the crystallization of the new security concept, the notion that China can be a responsible great power, the notion that China's rise will be peaceful, then shifting into peaceful development, and now of course Hu Jintao's vision of contributing to a so-called harmonious world. I think all of these are of a kind and are an attempt to try and put a bumper sticker on the more nuanced and complex policies of what I am calling “China's new security diplomacy.”

From about 1999, and particularly the summer of 1999—I give a lot of credit to David Finkelstein in his definition of that important debate over the summer of 1999—we see a rather dramatic shift, I think, in many respects in China's approach to the outside world particularly as it implements policy beyond the rhetoric in implementing a host of, I think, generally constructive policies with its neighbors and beyond.

As a result, I argue, China today is pursuing foreign and security policies in which the general trend—there are obviously going to be exceptions, and some big ones at that—in which the trend is pointing in a way that Beijing is increasingly convergent with international norms of security, increasingly convergent with regional expectations, and even increasingly convergent with U.S. interests in the way it is pursuing much of its foreign and security policy. I am ready to take a lot of flak on that. It is probably not a particularly popular view in Washington to say something like that. But I think the case is pretty good and I am eager to debate it with people.

The core chapters of the book then are sort of case studies that demonstrate what I am talking about, where we see this trend in action. In each of these major case study areas I think there is a pretty good argument to be made that China has changed the way

that it is trying to operate internationally and doing so in a broadly beneficial, constructive way.

Let me back up just one step before I get to the case studies because I really did not touch too much on the motivation. In the book I argue that while you are not going to find any kind of smoking gun document that lays all this out for us to understand, I think it is possible and useful to look at a three-part framework to help explain what is motivating China to pursue this new security diplomacy. First I say that it is driven largely by China's number-one preoccupation, which is the need to deal with its internal development challenges and so, therefore, it is seeking a stable and calm and constructive set of relationships all around its periphery and well beyond. That, I think, is widely accepted now here in Washington as being a principal motivation, but I think it is well worth remembering that the Beijing leadership is predominantly concerned with getting its domestic house in order, and that has a real impact on how it then pursues its international relationships.

A second, but also important, part of this framework is that I argue China has sort of recognized the security dilemma, what international relations scholars would call the security dilemma. That is, around 1999, 2000, and 2001, and especially as they began to put forward this notion of China's peaceful rise, there was a very important spreading revelation on the part of thinkers in Beijing and that is that, if they were going to rise, they had to make sure that they reassured the neighbors that this rise was going to be relatively peaceful so that the neighbors would not band together, bandwagon, or try to seek to contain China. So, again, a part of the new security diplomacy is to defuse or deflect concerns about China as becoming a threatening power precisely again so that its external relationships can be relatively benign and constructive and China can focus on the real challenges of development and maintaining communist party power at home.

The third part about this framework that I think is useful is that China is pursuing this new security diplomacy in a way which seeks not to confront: for the most part, it seeks to avoid confrontation or adverse relationships with the number-one power in the world, the United States. Yes, they will take policies to cajole or coerce or co-opt or counterbalance the United States where it can, but to avoid, if at all possible a serious deterioration or, God forbid, some sort of conflictual or confrontational relationship with the United States, and these three sort of motivations come together and help drive forward what I am calling the new security diplomacy.

In the core chapters of the book we look at three issue areas that I try to put in big baskets and use as case studies. First, regional security mechanisms, which is a very broad term which I apply to such things as China's approach to alliances, China's approach to regional multilateral security arrangements, China's approach to security and confidence-building measures, China's approach to things like military exercises, bilateral strategic dialogues, et cetera. And as I argue in all the other issue baskets, we see—dating from about the mid- to the late-1990s—a very dramatic change in attitude on China's part in how it wanted to engage in these types of activities.

I go into painful detail in the book trying to lay out all of the different instances and activities that China is undertaking and I will not bore you with that here, but it is very clear, and I think it is one of the better cases in the book, of this new security diplomacy at work.

The second major issue basket is arms control and nonproliferation, and here, I think, is an even better case to be made that, dating from the mid- to late-1990s, we see an almost 180-degree reversal in China's public and real approach to questions of arms control and nonproliferation through signing on to the full range of international agreements, covenants, and commitments on arms control and nonproliferation; and secondly, entering into a range of bilateral commitments with the United States to take actions that they did not have to take, that they were under no international obligation to take but which they undertook because they thought it was important for the relationship with the United States and for their own interests. And importantly, there was a range of domestic steps taken in terms of standing up an export control system and beginning to truly enforce it at home. Again, there's quite a dramatic change from the China of the late-1980s and early-1990s as a major problem on the international scene as a proliferator. Today, China's conventional weapons exports have dramatically dropped. There are still persistent and serious cases that we need to be concerned about, but by and large the trend line is quite clear.

The third issue basket that I get into is a little bit more amorphous. I am trying to grapple with the questions of China's approach to issues of sovereignty and intervention. Of the three cases, I think this is probably the weakest but it is still very, very interesting to look at how China is approaching these questions, from a traditional approach to issues of sovereignty and intervention, which had at its core the so-called, "principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states," to an approach which is more nuanced now. It is slightly more flexible, and I think there are indications of it becoming all the more so as we move forward. In other words, a recognition on the part of leaders in Beijing that an iron-clad approach to state sovereignty and nonintervention simply is not in China's interests to pursue and that on a case-by-case basis, especially when there is a strong consensus within the international community, intervention is possible, that China might even take active part in it in different cases.

I try to put more flesh on this argument by looking at China's approach to counterterrorism as one example, and also putting a lot of detail into China's approach to international peacekeeping and nation-building activities—again, dating from the late-1990s and coming forward. So those are the three main case studies.

Let me quickly conclude with the "So...what?" chapters at the end where I try to talk about what this all might mean. Chapter 5 talks about the challenges because I do not think that this is a story about sitting down together singing kumbaya and being happy ever after. But clearly, China's new security diplomacy raises new questions and new challenges for the United States because as China becomes a more effective international player, as it builds stronger relationships and puts forward this image of constructive and benign rise, it complicates matters. It allows China in many respects to more effectively

pursue narrow, self-interested aims in the international system that might be contrary to the interests of the United States. So it makes our job much, much tougher, quite frankly, in dealing with China as we work with other international actors. Such issues as how we will move ahead on China-Taiwan-U.S. relations is more complicated, China-Japan-U.S. relations become more complicated, differences over the longer-term resolution of the North Korea nuclear standoff, and peace on the Korean Peninsula become more complicated.

China is, in some respects, putting forward alternative structures, alternative concepts, and alternative approaches to security in contrast to the traditional U.S. bilateral alliance system, and this complicates our efforts in Asia. China is strengthening partnerships with our key friends and allies across the region and beyond, which introduces new uncertainties often into our alliance relationships with countries like South Korea, with Australia, with Singapore, or with our friends in Europe.

I noted already that we have continuing differences with China over questions of nonproliferation, arms control, and military modernization. China is in a stronger position today to pursue these aims, somewhat freer of international condemnation and scrutiny precisely because it has been so successful in the pursuit of its new security diplomacy.

So I do not want people to come away with the notion that I am overjoyed with China's new security diplomacy and think that it is inevitably pointing us in a positive direction. I think we are at a very uncertain point and as Americans and policy analysts, we need to embed this more nuanced and complex understanding of where China's position is in the world today and how it makes our job a lot more difficult.

I do conclude though, in the book in Chapter 6, that there are indeed so far unaddressed and not fully realized opportunities in all of this as well, and that we need to think a lot more sharply and keenly about how it is that Americans can find common ground in this new security diplomacy and try to drive China to further embed itself in the positive aspects that I have described in this new security diplomacy. I try to do that in the three major issue basket areas—regional security mechanisms, arms control and nonproliferation, as well as on sovereignty and intervention—and let me just tick off a few of the things that I am suggesting.

For example, maintaining and expanding our military-to-military relationship with China. There is an opportunity here for us. We ought to be deepening our interaction with China in the full range of multilateral security mechanisms at work and unfolding in East and Southeast and Central Asia. We should be strengthening our coordination with regional allies on issues related to China and listening carefully to what our allies have to say about their relationship with China and how we can work in concert to achieve our interests vis-à-vis China.

I argue that we need to work all the harder to make sure that we realize a long-term nonmilitary resolution to the differences across the Taiwan Strait. On arms control and nonproliferation, we should be intensifying our focus on those remaining persistent

cases that we have with China. The Bush administration has sanctioned China more than any of its predecessors, but the persistent cases still go on. I think we need to step up and have a much more serious dialogue beyond the pro forma knee-jerk sanctioning regime, in that this does not seem to be working very well.

We can do more to help China bolster its domestic export control capacity. That is something we have not really engaged with them as yet. I make an argument for us to strengthen and regularize our strategic nuclear dialogue, which has sort of gotten off the ground last year, but there is much, much more that can be done to assure that the U.S.-China offense-defense balance does not move in a destabilizing direction.

Then finally, on the question of sovereignty and intervention, I suggest that we need to intensify our dialogue regarding objectionable and threatening regimes, something which was started under the Bob Zoellick senior leaders' dialogue but which I think has drifted somewhat and certainly needs to be revisited. I think we can do more with China to reach common ground in defining and addressing new transnational threats. I think there is an opening in China to begin recognizing that threats do not stop at national borders, that indeed we are facing emergent and complex problems which emanate not from states but from substate sources, and that this is going to require both of us, the United States and China, to be much more innovative as great powers in thinking through questions of sovereignty and intervention and how one deals with these nontraditional security threats. And we should be encouraging China to expand its support and participation in U.N. peacekeeping and nation-building operations.

At the end of the day I know that this is not going to be easy. There are a lot of political reasons in this town and obviously strategic interests, more broadly, which will make it difficult for us to pursue what I think should be a more opportunistic and nimble and truly strategic approach to working with China. But we have little other choice, in my view, and to ignore the new security diplomacy, its challenges, and opportunities, is only going to create difficulties for us over the longer-term.

Let me conclude there, and again I want to thank Richard and Jeff, Bob Faherty, and the Brookings Institution for everything that you have done to help me get this book completed, and I look very much forward to Jing Huang's comments and to the comments of the group. Thank you so much.

(Applause)

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Bates, very articulate, illuminating, and rather provocative. Now we invite Jing Huang for a few comments.

DR. HUANG: Thank you, Richard, and thank you, Bates, for letting me participate in this great event and to celebrate an excellent book written by an excellent scholar.

I have to warn you because this is the season that is not really enjoyable because of allergies. So if I sneeze or blow my nose, forgive me.

In looking at China we notice three things. Number one is the size of China—such a great country. Number two, such a great country is rising so rapidly. And number three, it has brought so many problems or benefits to the entire world. But if we have to look into China with these three very specific and unique features, to China's leaders I say they are fundamental dilemmas.

Number one, as a great power, the Chinese leaders see threats to China's security coming not from outside of China, but from within China. In other words, their concerns about security are more from within China rather than from the international area.

Number two, I have to draw a little comparison to say the second feature or second dilemma. If we look at premier powers, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, all those great powers grew with a precondition—that is, all of them had a military that is capable of fighting a massive war outside the country. In other words, they have the military capability of global reach along with their rise, but China does not have that. Even to this day, the Chinese military simply cannot fight effectively 200 miles beyond China's border. That is another dilemma. So how can you secure great power status without the necessary military means to do so?

The third dilemma, and I think this is more fundamental, is that China's rise will inevitably bring China into some conflict of interest with the premier powers, especially the United States of America. However, given China's condition that was just mentioned and also discussed by Bates, China has to try every means possible to avoid a confrontation with the United States. It is not just because it can never ever win the war, but because the United States is vitally important for China's rise and continuous development. So that is the overall picture, and I think that Bates captured this picture very precisely and that is why he offered his analysis of China's security policy, identifying the motives, the sources, the outcomes, and the results very accurately.

What Bates tried to argue are three areas about China's security policy that we will have to examine very carefully. Number one, it is exactly because China sees a threat from within and not from outside that the first security policy, the first goal, is to make sure that China maintains international peace, they call it in Chinese jargon “a peaceful external environment.” It is very important, not because China needs it, but because only with a peaceful external environment can the Chinese leaders or the Chinese people concentrate on the domestic problems which are much, much, much more serious.

Secondly, the Chinese realize that China's rise is not achieved through expansion, but achieved through integration. That is, China has integrated itself into the existing international system, a system that is based on the market economy and led by democracies. This is not China's international system, it is our international system, and China integrates into it. Therefore, the well-being and the development of this system are very, very important, vitally important, for China's further development. Another perspective that is very important in China's security policymaking is to make sure that China's development will be constructive and positive for regional development,

especially for the Asian Pacific area. That is why China has adopted this new concept called a “collective security concept.” My good friend Chu Shulong is the one who helped greatly to build up this new concept. He published an article as early as 1998 about the new concept.

What is the new concept about that Bates also articulated? That is, economic interdependence and integration of China into the system that has put China in the same boat with all the other people. Security is no longer a traditional concept. It is a new concept that needs to be secured by nontraditional means, not just politically and militarily, but also economically, diplomatically, and cooperatively. That is why we developed the three C's in Chinese security diplomacy, that is, communication, consultation, and cooperation.

And number three, which Bates also argued very eloquently, is that in order to avoid a confrontation with the United States, China tried to work out a kind of framework, a mechanism in the region. The reason is not just that this would help the Chinese to counterbalance the Americans. No, that is not the case. That is because China's leaders realize that only by putting themselves in the same boat with all the Asian countries can they gain the most powerful leverage in dealing with America, because the United States has a very high stake in that area. Forty-two percent of our exports go to that area, and 48 percent of our imports come from that area. By making the United States's interests and China's interests intertwined with each other, it is very difficult for the United States to do anything against China. In other words, China will try to avoid a confrontation with the United States not by counterbalancing or counterattacking the United States, but by making it very difficult for the United States to make any unilateral move against China. Whenever the United States wants to take unilateral action against China, it hurts us, too, because our interests also intertwine with China's interests, not just by international economic interdependence, but also by the fact that China has stepped into those areas, has identified or secured their interests in the same areas that we think are important for us. That is what the importance of this book's argument is all about, that is what Bates's argument is all about. This of course, like he said, just shows how successful China's security policy is, but that presents a serious challenge, as Bates said very elegantly, to the United States. The challenge is not just that their hard power or their success will challenge our success. No, it puts a fundamental challenge to our thinking and approach toward the international world.

Is this approach still working, especially given the present administration? Or do we have to redesign our approach toward international affairs? That is where the problem is. Again, Bates made a very sound recommendation. First, he argues or recommends that the United States should reinforce and deepen its bilateral relations with allies on all China-related issues. In other words, he is offering a new approach—that we reinforce our bilateral relations with a multilateral approach, which is a very sound recommendation.

Second, he argues that we have to understand that our interests and China's interests are kind of intertwined with each other so, therefore, we want to reinforce our

bilateral relationship with China based on communication, consultation, and exchanges. Doing this is not to help China but to help ourselves. In other words, we have to involve China into international affairs in a positive way. We want them to get involved in international affairs which matters greatly to our interests. We want them to be involved not because they are more powerful or more influential, but because we have to make them understand that they have more stakes and have more responsibility in these affairs.

A great power is a great power not because it is powerful, but because it understands and realizes that great power always comes with greater responsibility. That's what Bob Zoellick's statement was all about, a "responsible stakeholder." That is what the U.S. wants China to be, and I believe Bates's recommendation to involve the Chinese more positively, more constructively, in international affairs where we have shared interests is the best way to push China or help China to become a responsible stakeholder. Of course, if China becomes a great power with little sense of responsibility, then that China is what, using George Bush's words, is evil, and that's the kind of China we do not want. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Jing. We will ask Bates to return to the podium and to field some questions. Please identify yourself and wait for the mike. Let Jeff ask the first question.

AMBASSADOR BADER: Bates, a terrific presentation. You referred briefly to the concept of counterbalance—you did not emphasize it but you referred to it—and I wonder if you would expand a little bit on that, the degree to which you think that counterbalancing American power is a large or a small part of China's strategic thinking. For instance, as we look at their expansion of influence in Africa, in Latin America, and in the Middle East, in what framework do you see that? Do you see that as counterbalancing or do you see that as having other purposes? As we look at issues like various rogue or bad actors in the world—the Ahmadinejads, the Chavezes, others—does China see those as opportunities to balance the U.S. or does it see them as problems? Is the old Chinese language of a multipolar world still relevant and is that part of the counterbalancing philosophy, or do they regard the U.S. relationship and the other factors you talked about as much more important?

DR. GILL: Thank you very much, Jeff. I will have to write another book now thanks to those questions.

Large or small part? I would say a very, very important part. I do not think we should overexaggerate or see it as the principal or overriding core aspect of China's new security diplomacy, but it is an important aspect, and we can see it playing out in very important places. I think the best places to look, and maybe rather than use the term "counterbalancing" in trying to employ what the Chinese themselves would probably prefer a more nuanced term, I think Bob Sutter and others use the term "soft-balancing." So in other words, there is balancing going on, but without that hard "C," counter, as part

of to make it more nuanced. But you can see it I think in action best if you want to look at certain regions. You mentioned certain regions, in places like Central Asia and in Southeast Asia, where China is much more proactive in putting forward quite publicly the terms of reference and frameworks and concepts which are, if not contrary to the American approach to security affairs in those regions, posing an alternative approach. So I think that is a method of counterbalancing or soft-balancing that we clearly see.

In other parts of the world, I see the effort more sporadic and less successful. We can take Africa or South America as examples, maybe because in both of those regions there is already a very dominant, very active, and broadly successful American influence underway. We should not sell ourselves short in Africa whatsoever. If anything, under President Bush for example, we have seen a massive intensification of American diplomatic, military, and financial resources being poured into Africa. If China is trying to counterbalance us in Africa, it has got a long way to go, and I think it understands that pretty clearly. But it is going to continue to pursue for its more narrowly self-interested purposes, I do not think for counterbalancing, but for more narrowly self-interested purposes relationships with regimes that we do not particularly like as in Sudan or even with Iran.

I would perhaps take China's relationship with North Korea and its evolution as a kind of welcome sign for us because here we do have a case of long-standing support for an objectionable and threatening regime on China's part, but with time we have seen that China does not want to play the counterbalancing game really—at least not overtly so—on the Korean peninsula and is prepared to take action, even intervene, in the internal affairs of a sovereign state such as North Korea, in order to build a good relationship with the United States and achieve its own interests. So it is a mixed picture, Jeff, but I think for U.S. interests, the place we ought to be looking at most carefully for signs of counterbalancing and the like would be in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. I think there are some serious issues that we need to be watching.

QUESTION: Herbert Levin. Bates, hedging, the idea that no matter how well we manage things with the Chinese, we still have to prepare to defeat them militarily. How do the Chinese evaluate this concept of hedging and how do you deal with it in the book? How do you understand it on the American side?

DR. GILL: I do not get into the debate. There are so many other good persons out there who really delve into the whole question, the issue, and the concepts and so forth. I do reference it in a few places. In trying to come up with an easily accessible understanding of the debate in the United States about China and our future, I will admit to rather simplistically boiling it down to two camps. No one in here will be surprised what those camps are, but one is called the China hawks, the other I call the engager-hedgers, for want of a better term. So I try to get into that debate a little bit and talk about how important hedging is, because as China becomes more successful in its new security diplomacy it presents real challenges to us.

You said that hedging has a military component, which it does, but I do not think that it is solely so. Hedging, I think, has to also involve not only smarter preparations for the worst in military terms, but also smarter preparations on our part in terms of our diplomacy and our economic engagement with the parts of the world where China is active. But I think it has to be an important part of American security diplomacy with regard to China and with regard to our interests in Asia. It is just a fact that China's future remains uncertain and its long-term intentions building upon its successes of the new security diplomacy are still unclear to us. I guess the main point of the book is, if anything, hedging becomes all the more necessary because the success of China's new security diplomacy really complicates and makes our job all the more difficult to achieve.

QUESTION: Hiro Matsumura of CNAPS. Based on research, what is emerging for China's future state identity? What I mean is, what will China aspire to and what kind of role will China play to spread international fears. The U.S. and France have a clear-cut sense of direction of what they want to do and what kind of status they want to join in international affairs. Currently, China is pursuing power for power's sake, so power without purpose. Internal development may be an instrument to achieve whatever the ultimate objective is so we do not know what they want to be.

You have given us many important examples of the positive signs. Essentially, there is water in the glass. Some say it is half full or half empty. The half-empty school will indicate that the regional diplomatic framework could be manipulated in a way for their advantage. Currently as you see the Chinese idea of which country could be included or excluded in the framework, which determines the future of Asian Pacific power distribution. And also on human rights, China's opposition to intervention into its internal affairs is also illuminating because they could have a double-standard as long as they want to avoid the outsiders' intervention to the Tibet/trans-Xinjiang problem. They could be happy to loosely define a new approach to internal intervention. I want to ask you, what could be the future shape of China's state identity? Thank you.

DR. GILL: Those are all fantastic questions, and this book is by no means offering a definitive answer to any of them. I think it is maybe, in some respects, intended to raise more questions and spark more debate. I do not think there is an answer in China for your question. I am certainly not seeing any definitive statement trying to argue that, "We intend to be like France in 2020." There are people who say things similar to that, but I do not think they are authoritative, and there is surely a debate.

I do not think it has been fully determined or fully fleshed out. In fact, I think the Chinese leaders themselves understand that their future is highly uncertain. I suppose there is a hope and an expectation that China can get through these next 20 to 25 years in a way that is peaceful at home and nondisruptive on the international scene—realizing national unification obviously is a major goal that they would hope to be able to point to as achieving by 25 years from now—and at the end of the period, I suppose there might be a consensus around the notion that China would emerge as the predominant Asian power particularly on the Asian landmass at that time. But beyond that, I think it is

impossible for us to really point with any authority to realizable expectations on the part of the Chinese leaders where they think they can be beyond that.

What I take away from all of this though is a relatively positive view that, at a time of such debate in China, at a time there simply are not well-defined, realizable goals given the uncertainty of China's future, this is maybe our best last chance to have as much of an impact and influence on what those outcomes are going to be going forward. So if anything, this uncertainty in my view argues for an intensification of our engagement and interaction with China because 20 years from now, China may be even more impervious to those sorts of positive influences.

DR. BUSH: Michael?

QUESTION: Michael Yahuda, currently with the Wilson Center. You have not mentioned the words “communist party,” and I would like to suggest that that is central to how China's leaders and how the system in China thinks about security and about relationships with the outside and what are the natures of threat. I know there is a whole emphasis on stability and economic development in China and you could argue in many respects they are to sustain communist party rule.

That being the case, it would suggest that the communist party has been very successful in preserving its rule, in adapting to new circumstances, in, if you like, integrating the rising middle class within China within its framework and so on. As it looks ahead or as it defines missions of world order, clearly it is going to define it in ways that are rather different from the United States, with the emphasis on democracy, values, the alliances that the United States has in the region in East Asia now especially in the first Cold War era emphasized very much the issue of values and so on. So I wonder whether you think that has a place in your thinking about security, motivation, and so on?

DR. GILL: Thanks very much, Michael. I quickly took a look in my index and see about a dozen references to the Chinese communist party in the book thankfully, so I actually mention it here and there. I think where it gets the most focus in this book is the initial chapter when I am trying to lay out this three-part motivation framework for what I think is driving the so-called, “new security diplomacy.” I state very clearly that underlying much of this is precisely the preservation of the Chinese communist party by achieving stability externally, working on the domestic social and economic challenges, and as China success internationally, also looking to that as a source of legitimacy for the party as it builds China's reputation globally as a constructive player. So it does get, I think, quite critical mention.

The issue that you are raising, I think, is beyond that and very important. It is not something that I treat in this book and that is basically, you are asking, as China succeeds and if it becomes a more influential player, are we bound not necessarily on the basis of power politics to get into trouble with China, but based on the nature of the regime that is running this increasingly influential country? I do not really get into that too much except

in the conclusion, arguing that if that is to be our future with China and if values and different ideological approaches to the relationship between state and citizen and so forth is going to become a factor, that again argues for me to intensify and increase those channels that have so far overall succeeded in bringing about some loosening, change, and positive social and political evolution inside China. In other words, the opposite extreme of attempting to contain, or simply on the basis of the fact that they happen to be an authoritarian Leninist regime, that would argue for withdrawal would be the wrong thing to do.

This obviously gets us into Jim Mann's recent book and the arguments that he is making there, which we can try to engage. But I do not really get into that too much in this book, except to argue that to accept the premise—as I have been saying since long before Jim Mann did—that we are going to have the communist party to live with for a while. I think a lot of us **said that** before Jim did, but given that fact, requires then I think not containment or withdrawal but, rather, an intensification of the very activities that have helped get us as far along as we have now in bringing positive change inside that country.

QUESTION: Hyeong Jung Park, Visiting Fellow at Brookings. As you have said, Sino-American consensus about North Korea is stronger than at any time in the past. In the past 5 years, people in Washington have been saying that South Korea is drifting to China and all this means that the U.S.-China relationship regarding the Korean peninsula has become more complicated. Now people say that the Six-Party Talks can be developed into a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia. But it seems that the current Bush administration does not have any appropriate policy regarding multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. We can be reminded that because of unilateralism, the coalition of the willing, and distractions from Northeast Asia because of the Iraqi war, that there is no coherent Northeast Asian policy of the administration.

What do you think about the possibility of the Six-Party Talks developing into a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia?

DR. GILL: Thank you very much for those issues. In the book I do point to the Korean peninsula as a fertile ground for us to expand common interests with the Chinese **to** leverage what appears to be China's keen interest and support for multilateral forms of engagement and security cooperation on the Korean peninsula. So I do try to address that, and it is one of the recommendations that I try to point forward.

I would differ with you on a couple of points though, because while we can have our arguments about what has taken the administration as long as this to try to get some breakthroughs moving on the Korean peninsula, I do not think it is fair to say that the United States has abandoned multilateralism. I do not think it is fair to say that we are opposed to multilateral forms of security cooperation in the region. Quite the contrary. There are many excellent examples—the Six-Party Talks just being one of them—of pretty intense efforts on the part of this administration to find multilateral forms of cooperation in the region. It is just that it is not the ASEAN-style forms of multilateral

cooperation in the region: It is more of an ad hoc, great power, interested multilateralism, which I think makes sense.

It is an acknowledgment on the one hand, on the part of the United States, that we cannot do it alone and that we do need to engage partners to address specific security challenges, so that is a good sign. And secondly, it is good because we have results. It is an effort to try to have real outcomes which are positive for the region. So I would just differentiate between different types of multilateralism.

And here is another aspect. China is prepared to engage in American forms of ad hoc multilateralism in ways they have not been in the past and not just sit quietly at ARF-style fora that do not get a heck of a lot done but, rather, to engage with the Americans. For example, on climate change in the region, ; to engage with the Americans on resolving the Korean peninsula challenge; and without the Americans, **China is** prepared to engage in real security cooperation that has real outcomes with its Central Asian neighbors. So I think I am a little bit more optimistic than you about the prospects for the United States and China to work together under the right conditions and circumstances in multilateral formats. Dr. Chu, you have been very patient.

QUESTION: I am a Visiting Fellow at Northeast Center of Brookings. First, congratulations for another good book. I know you have done good research on AIDS and other domestic problems in China in recent years. My question is, how much do you spend on domestic sources of China's security policies in your book? In other words, what is the major source you depended on to interpret Chinese security policy?

I think that for Chinese foreign policy in recent years there is a fundamental change in the way of thinking since the Party Congress. My judgment is that Chinese foreign policy will probably become nicer to the outside world, simply because the Chinese have less and less interest in the outside world. I mean, the leadership, the officials, the intellectuals, college students, general public, become less interested. That is a fundamental reason that I work and I teach in national affairs in China for the past years, looking at the top of the Chinese foreign policy -- what is wrong in the Chinese elite leadership that is not a political member or is not a vice prime minister? Look at how many people—international graduates working in foreign affairs after their graduation—and look at how many Chinese programs have been canceled in recent years because there is less interest from the general public. I wonder if you can talk more about the relationship between changing domestic thinking, ways of thinking in China, and implications for Chinese foreign security policy. Thank you.

DR. GILL: Thank you very much. It sounds like a universal phenomenon. I am relieved to hear that in China, too, professors complain that their societies and their students do not care about international relations. But it is a fascinating phenomenon and I have to say that I do not really address it as being a source. It is an interesting point that you are making, that almost paradoxically a diminishing interest in international affairs in China helps explain the benign or less-controversial or ideological approach to those relationships internationally. I do not really take that up, but I think it is a very, very

interesting point and it sounds to me as if it is one that you are probably going to be writing your next book on.

Just one observation about it though that has me a little concerned. I do not think anyone in China would consider Taiwan an international affair. Or at least that is the public line, obviously—that Taiwan is an internal affair. And I suppose if there were one thing that we would call an international affair that most greatly concerns us about our future relationship with China, it probably would be the Taiwan issue, my point just simply being that by not understanding Taiwan in its international context but, rather, looking at it predominantly as an internal issue, that I think has the seeds in it for some trouble going forward. So I hope in your work as an international relations professor as well as in broader efforts to bring greater attention to international issues to the Chinese public, that there might be some way of reminding the Chinese public about the broader regional and international implications of what most people in China probably consider very narrowly an internal matter. But thanks for bringing those questions up.

QUESTION: Bo Kong from Johns Hopkins/SAIS. Based on your account of China's security diplomacy in the last several decades, you seem to indicate that Chinese policymakers are very rational, that there is a lot of rationality in the way Chinese policymakers see the world and identify problems and then come up with solutions, and that the government seems to be a coherent actor in implementing those policies. However, I wonder, to what extent can you assume that rationality in the globalized China? I will use just one example. A lot of activities actually happen beyond Beijing. Provinces and local governments can actually take foreign policy initiatives, and a lot of activities by companies such as energy companies overseas complicate China's diplomatic interests. From that perspective, to what extent does China really have this control over its foreign policy?

This applies to a broader question about the capacity of the state. Based on China's security diplomacy in the last several decades, what do you conclude about the capacity of the Chinese state, one, to identify problems and come up with solutions and then to implement those policies?

DR. GILL: Those are great questions and I hope you are going to pursue them aggressively as part of your studies because I think you are on to something. My best excuse would be that I am attempting to try and put some definition and framework on a set of policies that have emanated from China between roughly the period 1999 and 2005. I think the argument is pretty good that—viewed in those more narrow terms—we do see a generally consistent, very rational, and largely coherent effort on the part of the Chinese leaders to implement this vision or this approach.

I take your point very seriously and would agree that as we move ahead—and maybe this is something I should have tried to deal with a little bit more in the concluding chapter—you are right in that, as China's different actors, different constituencies, bureaucracies, and players, become more active internationally, it is going to become more difficult for the Beijing, the foreign ministry particularly, to somehow contain these

forces and try to assure a continued coherency and consistency here. We already see the evidence of it in many, many interesting and varied places.

I just happen to have done a lot of work on China in Africa and there are examples—and I think it is going to grow—of players there, whether it is Chinese Diaspora or whether it is so-called, “state-owned companies” and other players, even interagency tensions between the interests of the commerce ministry on one hand versus the ministry of foreign affairs. I suspect that these differences and tensions are going to only increase as China's international relationships become more and more complex and difficult to control and it will be interesting to see just how well leaders in Beijing are going to ride herd over or attempt to enforce some kind of consistency and coherency.

I do not know if you noted, for example, Hu Jintao—I guess he was in Namibia or was it Nigeria—on his recent visit in Africa, sat down with a bunch of Chinese businessmen and lectured them on the need for Chinese companies to adopt the notion of corporate social responsibility and to be good actors and so forth. So I think it is a rear-guard action obviously on his part to try and reimpose this harmonious world vision upon increasingly recalcitrant and active players of the Chinese system. I take your point, it is an important one, and it is one that I think all of us as observers of China need to be digging into all the more deeply. Just how effective can the foreign ministry and other key players be in really putting forward a coherent, broad policy going forward, of course, and the ASAT test in my mind is another example of where you have disconnects between different actors. For us looking at this, I think we need to get more and more used to this and be smarter in trying to interpret these trends.

QUESTION: Fu-Kuo Liu, CNAPS Visiting Fellow. Thank you for your wonderful presentation and also this wonderful book. You mentioned from the very beginning three points, especially the second and third ones. When you mentioned the security dilemma, we understand that with the rise of China, China has been trying very hard to send up a peaceful image. But at the same time, it is very difficult to convince a lot of countries of China's peaceful image. To come to the third point, you said that the motivation drove you to think through these structures. It seems from the security policy of China, it has been trying very hard to avoid conflict with the United States, but I would really like to know from these two motivations how exactly you come to terms with strategic competition at this moment.

I would think that China is trying very hard to avoid conflict publicly with the United States. But under the table everybody knows that in every regional cooperation organization, from Central Asia to Southeast Asia, one can feel there is potentially an anti-American feeling or that kind of developing trend. How do you come to terms with this part? I have not actually read your book but I would like you to elaborate more on this. Thank you.

DR. GILL: Thank you. I do flag this as an issue area that we need to be a lot more concerned about and devoting more of our resources to trying to follow. As I started out with Jeff, especially in such key areas as Central and Southeast Asia, I think it is

possible to identify both conceptually and in terms of policy on the ground efforts by Beijing to counter or otherwise compete with the United States for influence, so it is a concern.

I would disagree with you a little though. I think I heard you say that there is this emergent anti-Americanism in places like Central and Southeast Asia. I think that is probably too strong of a term. Yes, owing to policies in pursuing the global war on terror and in other policies, I think, we have had a lot of setbacks and some difficulties in our international relationships. There is no doubt about that. I would not yet call it a trend or some sort of irreversible, immutable development on the international stage that cannot be changed. I would also argue that to the degree there is anti-Americanism or that this trend is gaining some ground, I would not say that it is China's doing necessarily, although obviously China will try as it can to take some advantage of that situation. Washington is as much to blame for those perceptions in those parts of the world as is China. China is simply doing what any rational great power would do and looking at the international scene as it is and seeking to take advantage where it can. So I am a little bit more optimistic maybe than you that we not look at these relationship in Central and Southeast Asia in zero-sum terms. In fact as I try to argue in the book, there is enormous untapped opportunity I think for us to engage with China and reverse some of the trends that you have identified.

DR. BUSH: We will make this the last question.

DR. GILL: Charlie? I know he is going to have a hard one for me, so there we go.

QUESTION: Charlie Snyder of the Taipei Times. I was wondering if you could expand on China's Taiwan policy in view of its new diplomacy. For instance, if I were in Taipei reading your book, should I say this is very nice because its new, cooperative, and interpretive policy means it will not risk its international position and its economy to do something rash? Or should I say in this policy they are building up international support including support in the United States for the ultimate takeover of Taiwan? Or is there a third possibility?

DR. GILL: Thanks very much, Charlie. That is a great question. Let me try to put a little bit of nuance on that because it is a complex issue. A similar question has been asked of me in other fora and my response is that the Chinese new security diplomacy vis-à-vis Taiwan is a combination of intensified carrots and intensified sticks. and that, yes, I think is a part of its overall strategy in the new security diplomacy: to create a space with regard to Taiwan so that it can realize national reunification, preferably through diplomatic and economic means obviously, but at the same time, under this rubric or under this umbrella of a more benign and constructive set of policies internationally. It is **also** more forward quite aggressively in military terms to exercise that option if it thinks it needs to - a very complex intensification of both carrots and sticks. So if you are in Taiwan today, I think I would largely breathe a sigh of relief that China's preference for a military solution here is probably vastly diminished. I think it

looks to Beijing as being more likely that it can achieve it through diplomatic and economic means. And I suppose whether you are sighing a sigh of relief or you are saying uh-uh depends very much on who you are in Taiwan today, and there are going to be those who are going to breathe a sigh of relief because I think the new security diplomacy probably argues in favor of a peaceful environment across the strait in the near to medium term. But there are going to be those who are not going to be very happy because it also argues for China increasingly positioning itself with its neighbors, with the United States, and even with very, very important constituencies on Taiwan in a way that is going to help it realize its goal of reunification over the longer term.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. That was terrific.

DR. GILL: Thank you very much.

DR. BUSH: Thank you all for coming. Please join me in thanking Bates for a really stimulating program.

(Applause)

DR. BUSH: Remember "Rising "Star" in the bookstore 20 percent off today, "Seize the time."

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