

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION  
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TAIWAN'S 228 INCIDENT:  
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1947

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the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies  
and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs*

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### **Panel I: *Looking Back***

**RICHARD BUSH:** On behalf of the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), it's my great pleasure to welcome all of you here today for this special program. I particularly wish to thank Dr. Peng Ming-min for coming from Taiwan, Professor Lin Tsung-kuang for coming from Iowa; Dr. Neil Kritz for agreeing to serve as a panelist on very short notice; and Gerrit van der Wees of FAPA for his outstanding support and cooperation.

The subject of today's seminar is the February 28<sup>th</sup> Incident, commonly called 228, whose 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary will be observed next Wednesday. We wish to explore what 228 means, both retrospectively and prospectively. We are not interested in using the Incident as a weapon in the current political campaigns on Taiwan. That would be inconsistent with the educational missions of Brookings and FAPA. Moreover, there are larger issues at stake.

What do I mean when I say that the issues at stake are more significant than contemporary Taiwan politics? To begin my answer, let me go back to the mid-1990s when then-President Lee Teng-hui was emphasizing what Taiwan people had in common. In Chinese he used the phrase *shengming gongtongti* ( 生命共同体 ). In English translations of his speeches, he insisted on using the German sociological term, *Gemeinschaft*. In plain language he spoke of "a community based on a common experience." He spoke of Taiwan as, "our common homeland" and about a "collective consciousness." He spoke of "fifty years of a common destiny forged in fortune and misfortune have united us all into a closely bound and interdependent community."

Now, I happen to have a lot of respect for what Lee was trying to do here, for reasons that I will come back to. But there was an assumption behind these assertions of what Taiwan people had in common, wasn't there? It's almost a sleight of hand. Lee's assumption was that people on Taiwan actually believed that they had a sense of common destiny and collective consciousness. And part of that shared sense of the present and the future had to be a shared sense about the past.

This brings us to the issue of memory and how the past is remembered. One might say, for example, that South Africa after the end of Apartheid it was one country with two different histories – one in the minds of the black majority the other in the minds of white minority. Similarly, one might say that Taiwan has been one country divided by two versions of the past – one in the minds of the Taiwanese majority and the other in the minds of the Mainlander minority.

These two different narratives apply to the story as a whole. They also apply to the individual episodes that make up that larger story. Today's seminar is about 228, the

first and most tragic of those episodes, and we will hear some of the many perspectives that exist on it.

Not surprisingly, debate about the past in general and over major events like 228 has been a significant element of Taiwan's politics for decades. During the martial law era, the regime regarded the mere discussion of 228 to be a challenge to its legitimacy and so used its tools of repression to make it a non-issue. When martial law was lifted, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – in response to the families of the 228 victims – started to push for more openness and clarity on what happened in 1947. President Lee Teng-hui set in motion a process of reconciliation. However, 228 as a political issue continues to this day.

This brings us to the question, is there a compelling reason to move forward this process of reconciliation to bring about closure that is that is acceptable to all sectors of society? I can think of a couple, and here I go back to Lee Teng-hui.

Lee focused on a common destiny and collective consciousness because Taiwan was caught in “a struggle for survival” and had to “work together as one person.” According to Lee, Taiwan would only meet the survival challenge it faced – and we know the challenge to which he referred – if it could forge a stronger political consensus and reconcile the differences that divide people. By implication, that includes the division over the past and what it means.

Second, it's my personal view that Taiwan's political system hasn't worked very well in recent years, and this has handicapped efforts to address pressing policy issues. Coming to closure on the past will be, I would say, one way among several of improving the island's democracy.

To suggest reconciliation is easy. To do it is hard. Fortunately, there is a lot of experience from around the world that might be adapted to Taiwan. And arguably, the need to do so is has only grown since Lee Teng-hui identified the “struggle for survival” and the need to “work together as one person.”

With those short remarks to frame our discussion, let us first watch a short video of scenes of Taiwan sixty years ago and then move to the first panel, to be chaired by Dr. Wen-yen Chen, the executive director of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs.

[Documentary Film]

**CHEN WEN-YEN:** It is a great honor to be here with Dr. Bush and his Center. I am Wen-Yen Chen. I am the Executive Director of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs.

We have three distinguished speakers for this session: Professor Steven Phillips on my left side, Professor Peng Ming-Min, and Dr. Richard Bush.

Professor Phillips is Associate Professor in the History Department and Director of Asian Studies at Towson University in Baltimore. Before he joined the faculty of Towson University, he was an historian with the U.S. Department of State. Dr. Phillips has published several books on Sino-American relations and on Taiwan. He received a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University in 1998.

Professor Peng Ming-Min was educated in Japan, Taiwan, Canada, France, and the United States. He holds a Doctor of Law degree. He was Professor of International Law and Chairman of the Political Science Department at the National Taiwan University until he was court-martialed and jailed in 1964 because of his writing a manifesto for Taiwanese self-salvation. He then escaped to Sweden and later to the United States, where he taught at the University of Michigan and other universities, and he published a memoir called *A Taste of Freedom*.

[Technical Interruption]

**DR. CHEN:** ...Before [Richard Bush] joined Brookings in 2002, he almost served five years as the Director and Manager of the American Institution in Taiwan.

So let us start with the first speaker, Dr. Phillips.

**STEVEN PHILLIPS:** I'd like to thank the Formosan Association for Public Affairs and the Brookings Institution for giving us an opportunity to re-examine the political implications of February 28 on its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary, an event that stands at the intersection of academia and activism, or perhaps of history and politics.

My charge is to offer a historical overview and to discuss the immediate impact of February 28 on Taiwan. I'll start by offering a larger context for February 28. February 28 and its aftermath represented a conflict between decolonization and reintegration, when the legacy of 50 years of colonial Japanese rule clashed with the centralizing efforts of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. Taiwanese hopes for a smooth integration into China in late 1945 turned to concerns over Nationalist misrule in 1946 and finally exploded in early 1947.

A short poem published in a Taipei magazine summed up the way many Taiwanese felt about the events of 1945 and 1946:

American bombing startled heaven and moved the earth,  
the news of Retrocession led to boundless joy,  
the Nationalist takeover was debauchery,  
the government was sinister and dark,  
and the people appealed to heaven and earth.

I'd like to suggest, however, that not all Taiwanese had the same problems. For example, some of the difficulties faced by average Taiwanese included inflation,

corruption, unemployment, sanitation, and food shortages, as suggested by the video we have just seen. Prominent Taiwanese were disappointed to find that the end of colonial rule did not increase their role in governing the island. Further, to some, the new regime did not live up to the standards of law and order or efficiency that they felt had existed during Japanese colonial rule. In fact, I would add that Ambassador John Leighton Stuart's report on February 28 will list the lack of political participation as one of the key factors leading to the Incident. These men also feared that economic dislocation and chaos from the Mainland's civil war would spill over to Taiwan.

The Japanese legacy was unavoidable. I would argue to you that all of the Nationalists' greatest weaknesses had been the greatest strengths of the Japanese. This isn't the place to claim that Japanese rule was good or just or fair. But to a remarkable extent, the things that the Japanese colonial administration did best -- maintain law and order, offer a predictable administration, build an efficient bureaucracy -- were the things that the Nationalists did least effectively.

As one Taiwanese wrote later, "We entered 1947 without even a bit of the hope that comes with spring time, as the situation of society worsened day by day." The Incident could have occurred in late 1946 or early 1947, as several short-lived outbreaks of violence broke out between the government and islanders around New Year's. For example, on February 14 Taipei's rice market closed due to a small riot as citizens attempted to buy decreasing amounts of rice at increasing prices. A crowd of up to four thousand marched to the nearby city government offices.

As the video shows, the explosion occurred after the evening of February 27, when six police officers attempted to arrest a woman selling cigarettes in Taipei. The legacy of colonial rule was central here as well. Nationalist attempts to enforce state-sanctioned monopolies on products such as cigarettes were particularly unpopular, and reminded many of similar Japanese colonial policies. After a policeman struck the woman, an angry crowd gathered, and violence broke out after an officer fired his weapon, killing a bystander. The next day, 2,000 to 3,000 Taiwanese marched to the Monopoly Bureau headquarters. Hundreds of these protestors moved on to the Administrator's office. That afternoon, a soldier or police officer fired into the crowd, sparking an island-wide uprising. The provincial administration had badly underestimated the Taiwanese willingness to transform general discontent into concrete action. Taiwanese gained control of most of the island as Nationalist soldiers, almost exclusively young draftees from the Mainland, had little stomach for a fight. The collapse of Nationalist authority was sped by the quality of troops sent to the island in late 1945—the Nationalists were aware of their limitations, but simply did not expect an uprising.

The initial reaction of Taiwan's most prominent citizens to the uprising was cautious. Many were Japanese-era leaders of the movement for greater autonomy who had been elected to post-Retrocession assemblies. They accepted Nationalist rule, but wanted to implement reforms to increase the island's autonomy from Nationalist China. When confronted with the takeover of the island by their less wealthy neighbors, they sought to limit violence against Mainlanders. For example, Lin Xiantang personally

protected a Nationalist official from angry Taiwanese. A smaller group of islanders sought independence or a United Nations trusteeship for the island at this time.

The video also highlights the role of the committees established to resolve the Incident. On March 1, members of the Taipei City Council hurriedly organized the Committee to Investigate the Case of the Arrested Smuggler to bring calm to the city and seek punishment of the policemen responsible for the conflict. This group soon became known as the February 28th Incident Resolution Committee. The organization in Taipei was duplicated throughout the large towns and cities of the island.

On March 6, the Resolution Committee drafted a plan for reform—sometimes called the General Outline. Under the broad heading of "letting Taiwanese rule Taiwanese," islanders demanded to hold the most important posts in the provincial administration. They also sought promises of greater Taiwanese representation in the justice system; the abolition of the propaganda, trade, and monopoly bureaus; guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and that Taiwanese not be drafted and sent to fight on the Mainland. I think one tragedy of February 28 was that Taiwanese overestimated their ability to bring peaceful change in Republican China, which was a fantastically violent place that did not offer mechanisms to put forward a moderate reformist program, to remove Nationalist officials, or debate provincial-central relations.

The top Nationalist official on the island, Administrator Chen Yi, appeared to accept many of the requests of Taiwanese. Whatever Chen Yi's motives or plans, he had to contend with a central government in Nanjing that knew little and cared less about the nuances of Taiwanese political aspirations. Leaders in Nanjing saw the takeover of the island by Taiwanese as a rebellion, and evaluated the Resolution Committee's activities in the context of thirty years of struggle against warlords and Communists. Chiang Kai-shek's role remains controversial, but clearly he and those around him saw the Taiwan problem as something to be solved quickly and decisively, so that they could turn their attention back to fighting the Communists. Note that Nationalists later called January 1947 the start of the Communists' all-out rebellion. Some officials on Taiwan reinforced these perceptions. They downplayed the crisis, then exaggerated it, in order to cover up their own inability to prevent the conflict or reach compromise with the Taiwanese. Returning to the theme of integration, Chiang and the Nationalist military reacted to February 28 the way they reacted to any armed challenge to their authority—with overwhelming force whenever possible.

On the morning of March 8, the first Nationalist military reinforcements arrived in the northern port city of Keelung. Fighting broke out with Taiwanese as these forces moved southward toward Taipei. Over the next two days, thousands of soldiers landed in Keelung and on the south coast at Kaohsiung, and reasserted the government's control by indiscriminately shooting anyone on the streets. Martial law was declared throughout the island on March 9. Resistance collapsed quickly, as Taiwanese were poorly armed and lacked a unified command. Furthermore, most prominent islanders never sought a pitched battle with Mainland forces.

Some islanders had used the crisis to further their larger agenda of political change. Now, the Nationalists exploited the Incident for their broader ends of eliminating political opposition. Even as the island returned to Nationalist control, the government embarked upon a movement to "exterminate traitors" by rounding up Taiwanese who may have offended anyone in the government. This was accompanied by the "clearing of the villages" campaign, where soldiers and police hunted down individuals who had fled the cities.

Estimates of the number killed range from unbelievably low (500) to absurdly high (100,000). Those who have closer ties to the Nationalist government provide lower figures for the dead and injured, while supporters of Taiwan independence or critics of Chiang's regime insist on higher numbers. Today a figure as high as 28,000 is often raised. Although discovering how many died is an important way of understanding the scope of this massacre, knowing who was killed helps make clear the Incident's effect upon later political activity. As soldiers spread terror through the island, they crushed the Taiwanese as a political force able to advocate change outside the Nationalist state or party structure.

The Incident and its aftermath had a greater impact upon the island's elite than did the return of Chinese control over the island in late 1945. Many of the most vocal critics of the state and promoters of expanded autonomy, usually prominent figures from the Japanese era, died, fled, or were frightened into silence. For example, about half of the Taipei city council was dead or arrested by early April 1947. The promise of future terror kept the Taiwanese on the defensive. Police took photos and business cards from the homes they searched, and arrested visitors to residences under surveillance. In short, one impact of February 28 was that the tactics and policies that would be hallmarks of the later White Terror era were in place in early 1947.

Another impact of February 28 is that it gave the Nationalists an excuse for further oppression. For example, newspaper editorials stated that those who had called for more democracy in early March 1947 were despicable traitors acting purely in their own interests. They also warned that some evil conspirators remained hidden. Nationalists came to blame an improbable mixture of Communist conspiracies and the poisonous legacy of Japanese colonial rule for the events of February 1947.

The state also moved ahead with decolonization at gunpoint. Chen Yi outlawed Japanese-language materials and phonograph records, and ordered the confiscation of military uniforms, flags, and other items from the colonial era. Nationalist sources listed collaborating gentry and landlords as the main groups that had collaborated with the Japanese and had participated in February 28. In short, February 28 allowed the Nationalists to return to the issue of Japanese colonial rule time and again, not as a matter of history, but as a matter of ongoing conspiracy against the state. The labeling of wealthy Taiwanese landlords as a problem also facilitated land reform in the early 1950s. Unlike the circumstances that stymied land reform on the mainland, the Nationalists would never need to compromise with the rural landowning class on Taiwan.



Through February 28, the Chinese Communists gained a propaganda victory and a chance to claim a role in Taiwan's history. Ironically, the Communists reinforced Nationalist propaganda. They connected the islanders' animosity toward the Nationalists to the larger struggle on the mainland, in effect placing the Taiwanese and their political activity into Mao Zedong's narrative of national awakening and social revolution. However, the fact that Communists participated in the Incident does not prove that communism as an ideology was important. The most visible communist leader on Taiwan was a woman named Xie Xuehong, who organized youth and led short-lived resistance to the Nationalists in the central part of the island. The Communists later stated that a People's Government was created in Taizhong on March 2, 1947, and that it organized a military force to fight Nationalists. There is, however, little evidence to back up the contention that Communists or the ideology of communism played a major role in the events of February and March. Communists had been brutally suppressed by the Japanese, and colonial propaganda and military training certainly did not inculcate islanders with an affinity for the international socialist movement. In reality, the few Communists residing on Taiwan failed to attract a large following. In this sense, the Mainland's "problem" of communism came to Taiwan in 1947, but with few actual communists. The Nationalist solution, an authoritarian police state, logically followed from the "discovery" of communism on Taiwan.

By the end of 1947, the Incident began to disappear from public discourse on Taiwan. For example, in a speech before the Taiwan Provincial Consultative Assembly in December 1947, General Peng Mengji, who had been accused of ordering the massacre of thousands of islanders, stated that he did not want the Incident discussed further. He said that a small group of people were deliberately or accidentally raising the Incident and noted that this was "regrettable." As the Chiang Kai-shek regime collapsed on the Mainland and retreated to the island, its leaders had little interest in discussing this potentially explosive event. Until the 1980s, February 28 meant heightened police alerts to prevent any gathering that might turn into a public protest or secret conspiracy against the regime. Discussion of the Incident was safe only in exile, particularly among the slowly growing independence movement.

In the long run, February 28 and its aftermath became central to the independence movement and the democracy movement. It served as evidence of the dangers of mainland rule, justification for permanent separation from the mainland, and it caused some of the first leaders of the independence movement to flee to the island. In his introductory remarks, Richard Bush discussed Lee Teng-hui's formulation of a community based on a common experience (*shengming gongtongti* 生命共同体). February 28 today is an important, but also a very problematic, aspect of the ongoing debate over the definition of a common Taiwanese experience and identity.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

**DR. CHEN:** Our second speaker is Dr. Peng, and he will speak on the relevance of 228 for the understanding of present day Taiwan.

Dr. Peng?

**PENG MING-MIN:** Thank you.

On this 60<sup>th</sup> remembrance, what happened on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 1947 is generally called an “Incident,” but I think this is a minimization, considering its scope and its profound long-lasting ramifications. I would submit it is more proper to call it a “general uprising,” a “full-scale revolt” against KMT rule.

In 1945 under MacArthur’s orders, the Chinese army arrived in Taiwan. They were welcomed with extreme enthusiasm. People were almost ecstatic, but soon it turned into shock, outrage, and despair because the army conducted itself not as liberators, but rather as rogues or roguish conquerors. Pillage, robbery, and rape evidenced the government’s incredible incompetence and corruption. In two years, by 1947, those like myself who lived through this period clearly saw that the situation had reached the boiling point. We were sitting on top of a powder keg that could explode at any time, and it did. The small incident involving the cigarette vendor served as only a spark to ignite this explosion. All this happened without prior preparation, without any organization, without any leadership.

Japan ruled Taiwan for 50 years. In 1895 when the Japanese Army arrived, there was a disorganized and ineffective opposition to Japan, but after that, for 50 years, there was no large-scale opposition to Japanese rule, only small sporadic incidents mainly in the aboriginal area. But it took only two years for KMT rulers to make the whole island rise up against them. This fact says a great deal about the nature of KMT rule in Taiwan. The result was 28,000 massacred. Those killings meant several things. First, at that time, the population in Taiwan was about six million. This means that everyone had members of their families or their relatives or their friends or their friend’s friends who were killed in this revolt. Excepting those who fled to other countries, the cream of Taiwan’s society and leadership -- opinion leaders, political activists, and dissidents -- were rounded up and exterminated. Those who fled abroad were convinced that Taiwan was doomed unless it cut ties with China. That was when the Taiwan independence movement started.

As far as politics are concerned, after this uprising, a void, a vacuum was created in which the KMT was at complete liberty to do whatever it wanted. Martial law was proclaimed. Terror reigned. People were so terrified by this event that 228 itself and politics in general became absolutely taboo. The first thing the parents taught their children was: don’t talk about 228, don’t touch politics -- much less get involved in politics. This lasted more than four decades.

Even among families of the victims, this event is not talked about. I was once approached by a lady I didn’t know. She told me she knew that her father was killed in 228, but she didn’t know how, why, or where. She asked her mother. The mother refused

to answer that question. She asked me, "Do you know?" Of course, I didn't know. That was a very sad case I encountered.

So after that, the divide between those who identify themselves with Taiwan and those who identify themselves with China became sharper, deeper. It is painful for me to say this because I have good friends on both sides. The animosity between those two groups was already breeding as the KMT arrived in Taiwan, but after 228 it became even more decisive and deep. Inside Taiwan, rancor and resentment ran deep in the souls and hearts of the terrified silent majority. Outside Taiwan, the Taiwan independence movement intensified. A mutual mistrust and mutual contempt subsist through today and remains a very evident, crucial ingredient of Taiwan's politics.

It is true, after half a century of KMT-controlled education and KMT-controlled mass media, this divide seems to have become less conspicuous. But ironically, after the democratization of Taiwan, once the KMT became the opposition, this divide seemed to be resurrected due to the irrationality and excess of KMT behavior as opposition. With their majority in Congress and the mass media controlled by them, there are various attempts to prolong and preserve the privileges they enjoyed during the authoritarian period in Taiwan. Worse still, they seem to be in collusion with China due to China's open and repeated threat to use force against Taiwan and to deploy missiles aimed at Taiwan. All of these things remind the people of Taiwan, in their collective memory, of the horror of Chinese rule. It is not unlike the Holocaust to the Jewish People, but in the case of Taiwan, this 228 Incident has become an epithet symbolizing the worst, ugliest aspect of China's national character. So 228 remains a lively, virulent issue in Taiwanese politics. It is a fixation in any serious political discourse or discussion about Taiwan-China relations. 228 remains an ingredient seldom missed in those discourses and debates. It is a ghost haunting the collective conscience of the people of Taiwan and also it is a benchmark by which the people of Taiwan judge any politician about his or her degree of love (or lack of love) toward the people of Taiwan. If you have any doubt about that, ask Mr. Ma Ying-Jeou, former mayor of Taipei and now head of the KMT who is aspiring to be President in 2008, why keeps visiting the survivors and the families of the survivors of 228 and to convey his regret, his excuses and offer consolation. Why does he do it? Because this is a very serious, important issue for the current politician running for any public office.

Everybody is in favor of reconciliation, but when offenses or crimes are committed, only the victim has a right to offer forgiveness. The offender has no right to demand it. They only can beg for mercy. They can only confess. This is the thing they have to do for reconciliation. This is the main obstacle in Taiwan for reconciliation because it is not done, because the loudest voices calling for forgiveness come from those who have committed those offenses, those crimes. This is the main obstacle to reconciliation.

The offenders should take responsibility. Who are they? Taiwanese are very forgiving people, and they are not trying to take revenges against anyone, but still the responsibility is not clear in this very unfortunate event.

I have to repeat that everyone is in favor of reconciliation. How can one comfort the victims' families if the loudest voice calling for forgiveness is saying, forget about it? It is a 60-year-old event, and the loudest voice comes from the offenders. This is the most serious obstacle to reconciliation.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

**DR. CHEN:** Thank you, Dr. Peng.

The third panel speaker is Richard Bush, who will speak of the role of George Kerr, the author of *Formosa Betrayed*.

**DR. BUSH:** Thank you very much, Dr. Chen.

Today I wish to examine 228 by reviewing how it was remembered by one American participant-observer, George H. Kerr. George Kerr was born in 1911. He first set foot on Taiwan in 1935. During World War II, he studied Taiwan to prepare for a possible U.S. Navy occupation of the island (along with future Senator Claiborne Pell). And he returned there in 1945 as a naval attaché and soon converted into a Foreign Service officer in the three-person American consulate in Taipei.

My presentation is rather dry and academic after the eloquent talk we just heard from Dr. Peng. But I believe how George Kerr remembered 228 is important because his 1966 work, *Formosa Betrayed*, was for many years a leading non-scholarly book about Taiwan. To this day, it is a source of information about Taiwan during the eighteen months after the Nationalist take-over of the island in the fall of 1945, including the February 28<sup>th</sup> Incident.

Although *Formosa Betrayed* is a very informative book, Kerr did not, I am sure, strive to write a detached account -- far from it. Although the author fills the pages with facts and anecdotes, and on the whole reports what he observed or what was seen by those he trusted, his sympathies are clearly with the Taiwanese majority. And the cumulative effect of his reportorial technique is a passionate polemic that damns the corruption, brutality, and inhumanity of the KMT regime. We should, perhaps, see him in the tradition of American muckraker journalism.

In my short presentation, I would like to touch on three issues. The first is what we might call the mechanics of memory -- what were the sources on which Kerr drew to write *Formosa Betrayed*? Second, how does his reporting at the time of the Incident compare with what he described in the book? And finally, how should we evaluate what he says in *Formosa Betrayed* about American policy towards the Incident? For if there is one point on which Kerr allows his morale outrage to show, it concerns the U.S. government's response to 2-28 -- in his eyes its immoral non-response -- and its refusal to

intervene. The excuse he cites for this approach, which becomes a recurring refrain, is that “Taiwan is China now.”

As for the first subject, what were Kerr’s sources? *Formosa Betrayed* is a richly detailed account. The reader feels as if he is on the streets and meeting halls of Taipei watching events as they unfold: demonstrations, machine-gun fire, debates among Taiwanese leaders over the demands to make to the KMT authorities, and the indiscriminate killing after military reinforcements arrived on and after March 8<sup>th</sup>. But how did Kerr manage such detailed story in a book that was published more than fifteen years after most of the events described?

Kerr tells us in the preface that he prepared a draft manuscript in 1958. Still, that is thirteen years after his post-war arrival in Taiwan and eleven years after 228. He does mention that he and a United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA) colleague collected raw materials in 1948 on conditions in Taiwan in 1946 and 1947. He also drew on contemporaneous newspapers, letters and UNRRA reports. He does not mention a personal diary, which suggests that he did not keep a diary.

Kerr had one other source, and that was a long report that he wrote in Nanjing in late March and early April for U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart. Stuart gave the report to Chiang Kai-shek on April 18<sup>th</sup> to let Chiang know the reality of 228. Kerr based that report on his very recent personal recollections and the classified cables he had sent to Embassy Nanjing from Taipei. The report was subsequently declassified and published in August 1949 in the *China White Paper*. So it was available to Kerr when he wrote his manuscript in 1958.

If one compares the report in the *China White Paper* and the account of 228 in *Formosa Betrayed* you find that the report provided the basic structure of the story that Kerr tells. In some cases, the language is exactly the same. The additions to the *China White Paper* account in *Formosa Betrayed* can be probably accounted for by UNRRA reports, letters, newspaper accounts, vivid personal recollections, and the mechanics of writing a story.

Can I guarantee that when Kerr sat down to write his draft in 1958, his idiosyncratic collection of materials plus some slippage of memory after eleven years did not produce some deviation from what actually happened in Taipei in the days of late February and early March 1947? Of course not. And there are two issues in particular that deserve examination. This is my second topic: how Kerr’s reporting at the time of the Incident compares with what he described in *Formosa Betrayed*.

The first is the presence of elements in Taiwan who wanted a more radical response to the Incident than the sort that the Resolution Committee in Taipei sought from Governor Chen Yi. Some accounts suggest that these “radical elements” were fueling a vicious negative spiral which made more likely Chiang Kai-shek’s negative

response.<sup>1</sup> Kerr does not ignore this problem – he says that more radical Taiwanese demands were complicating the effort of the Resolution Committee. In my view, this is an issue of analytic interpretation and emphasis. *Kerr's* interpretation is that the “radical demands” were fueled by rumors that troops were coming from the Mainland and that the KMT side was negotiating in bad faith. What Kerr did not know – but it would not have surprised him – was that Chiang Kai-shek had issued an order for the troops to be shipped to Taiwan on March 5<sup>th</sup>. My general interpretation is that Chiang issued that order not as part of some sort of Taiwan-specific action-reaction negative spiral but because his forces were losing ground to the People’s Liberation Army in Manchuria and North China. Consistent with two decades of past behavior as a military leader, he wished to pacify his rear areas, including Taiwan.

The other issue concerns a difference in Kerr’s classified reporting and his account in *Formosa Betrayed*. That concerns Taiwanese arming themselves to fight the Nationalist forces. He mentioned that problem in an early classified report and one right before the beginning of the crackdown. In the latter report, he also mentioned that underground elements were preparing for direct action should the negotiations between the government and the Resolution Committee break down, and that gangs made up of “rascals” were ready to make trouble.

So why was this not mentioned in *Formosa Betrayed*? Was it because Kerr when he was preparing a manuscript for publication did not wish to cast the Taiwanese in a negative light and give the KMT, by then firmly in power, a reason to dismiss the moral case of his book?

One explanation is the simple one. When he wrote his manuscript in 1958, Kerr based his account of 228 mostly on the report he prepared for Ambassador Stuart to give to Chiang Kai-shek. That April 1947 report did not make reference to Taiwanese arming themselves, which under the circumstances was understandable. He didn’t want to give Chiang any reason to excuse the abuses of his troops. The explicit information about Taiwanese arming themselves was only available in classified cables, to which Kerr did not have access at the time he wrote his manuscript over a decade later. It may just have slipped his mind.

But that explanation is undermined by an article that Kerr wrote eight months after the massacre, in which he referred to “younger, more radical Formosans” who had gone underground and were “dedicated to the destruction” of any corrupt, repressive mainland regime.<sup>2</sup> If he referred to that article when writing the manuscript, which is plausible, it probably would have triggered a recollection.

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford U. Press, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> George Kerr, “Formosa: The March Massacres,” *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. 16, November 5, 1947, pp. 224-226.

In sum, based on this attempt to reconstruct how Kerr went about recounting the 228 Incident itself, I come away concluding that he made an honest and good faith effort to present an accurate account. By and large, he used contemporaneous materials and did not rely that much on his fading memory. Although he makes moral judgments about events, he started with a factual account of what happened. The only issue on which he may have pulled his punches is that of Taiwanese arming themselves as the crackdown was beginning.

It is Kerr's account of the American response in *Formosa Betrayed* that I find more problematic.

He recounts, for example, that three days after the initial Incident a Taiwanese doctor came to the consulate with a dum-dum bullet that had been fired into his office by a passing patrol. The doctor asked that the consul file protest with the government because the bullet was illegal under international law. Kerr reported that Consul Ralph Blake took the position that this was a matter between a provincial governor and his people and not a U.S. affair. As Kerr put it, "This was China now."<sup>2</sup>

The case of the dum-dum bullet was an example of some real and practical dilemmas that the consulate faced during the 228 crisis, whatever Kerr's own views on U.S. policy.

First of all, the first responsibility of any American diplomatic post is to look to the safety of American citizens in its area of responsibility. Indeed, as early as March 2<sup>nd</sup>, the consulate saw to that responsibility. Now according to accepted diplomatic practice, it is the established authorities with whom the diplomatic post must cooperate in order to ensure that its citizens are not harmed. Obviously, there is a big dilemma in the case of a civil conflict when, arguably, it is the authorities that are most responsible for the conflict. Embassy Nanjing gave Consulate Taipei strict instructions in this regard: "You will also realize that in this situation American officials must only look the constituted authority, whose responsibility it is to afford you adequate protection."

The issue of Americans' security was related to a second dilemma, and that was whether the consulate should be a haven for local residents in danger. Kerr describes one Incident in *Formosa Betrayed* where some mainlanders took refuge in the consulate on March 1<sup>st</sup>, but Consul Blake quickly had the government remove them. Interestingly, Kerr doesn't describe a similar Incident the previous day that casts Blake in a better light (for the simple reason that the first one was not mentioned in the Stuart report; the second Incident was). Here again, however, there was an established policy: diplomatic posts should not become a magnet for people caught up in mass violence. Embassy Nanjing ordered Blake to be "strictly guided by that policy."

The third dilemma concerns the issue of taking sides in the dispute between the Taiwanese and their new Mainlander overlords. Here, the consulate was split, with Consul Blake taking the by-the-book, non-interventionist approach and Kerr and the U.S.

Information Service officer, Robert Catto, believing strongly that the U.S. government should stand up as stalwarts for U.S. ideals.

Compounding this dilemma was a special feature of postwar Taiwan: Taiwanese hoped and expected that Americans, particularly American diplomats, would save them from the misbehavior of their new rulers. As late as January 10, 1947, the consulate filed a report that described the tendency of Taiwanese to look to the United States as their salvation in light of looming civil war on the Mainland.

The instructions that Consul Blake had to follow were clear and reconfirmed by Embassy Nanjing: non-intervention. That principle guided how the consulate responded to pleas for help both before and during the crisis (much to Kerr's disgust – "This is China now."). Contrary to that principle, however, the consulate took the bold step making the following recommendation to Embassy Nanjing on March 3<sup>rd</sup>: "After gravest consideration Consulate concludes only practicable solution would be immediate American intervention in its own right or on behalf of UN to prevent disastrous slaughter by Government forces if loosed on capital. . . . Then Government might yield to opportunity to be relieved of serious and continuing military liability during present Mainland difficulties."

It is hard to see how such a suggestion would have been transmitted in the first place if Blake did not agree with it. It is hard to see how Kerr would have been ignorant of such a recommendation, since it was likely consistent with his own views. Yet there is no record of it in *Formosa Betrayed*, if only because it was not in his April 1947 report to Ambassador Stuart. But it is such an important initiative that one would think that Kerr would have remembered it. Or did he choose not to because it is an inconvenient contradiction of his thesis of an insensitive, "this is China now" U.S. policy?

By the way, there is no record of a reply from Nanjing or Washington to this proposal.

Another aside, it is a reflection of the chaos and stress of the time, that the consulate did not in early March think of the one practical recommendation that might have prevented the disaster that was about to befall Taiwan. That is, despite the daily and growing rumors that Nanjing was going to send troops, no-one thought to urge the government in Nanjing not to send reinforcements to Governor Chen, and so put pressure on him to negotiate with the Settlement Committee.

We might ask what the odds were that Chiang would entertain such an idea. The odds were probably pretty low. As I have already suggested, he probably saw Taiwan in early 1947 as a rear area that needed to be pacified so that he could get on with the business of fighting Communists, who were creating much bigger problems in Manchuria and North China. This was, after all, less than two months after the end of the Marshall Mission and at the beginning of civil war.



We might also ask whether the U.S. government might have been prepared to take a major initiative to intervene to save Taiwan, either militarily or politically. Aside from the crisis that was brewing on the Mainland, it happened that in late February 1947, official Washington was in a crisis of its own over the withdrawal over Britain from Greece and Turkey. As the 228 Incident was unfolding in Taiwan, the Truman Administration was defining a bold new challenge to Soviet expansionism.

I mentioned at the outset that George Kerr was a participant-observer of the 228 Incident, and that as such he is an important figure in how the Incident is remembered. As it worked out, he was more of a participant than observer. He felt deeply the pain of the Taiwanese at the hands of Mainlander officials and soldiers, and found it impossible to maintain the unemotional distance expected of Foreign Service officers. Consul Blake attached a note to one of Kerr's reports saying that even though one couldn't question his sincerity, Kerr should have used a more objective style. However, he (Blake) simply didn't have the time to make major corrections, particularly when there were no factual errors. One detects in both the reporting and in *Formosa Betrayed* deep divisions within the post over how to reconcile the mission of the post with the desire to meet the human needs around it.

In the end, the conflict between Blake and Kerr, and between Kerr's pro-Taiwanese heart and the State Department's regulations on how diplomatic posts should operate in times of civil disorder and government repression, was just too great. Kerr was ordered to Nanjing, nineteen days after the Incident had begun. It was a measure of Ambassador Stuart's good sense that he saw the value of having Kerr write a report on 228 that was first put before Chiang Kai-shek and then became a key part of *Formosa Betrayed* (a kind of revenge on Chiang). It was a measure of Kerr's disgust with U.S. policy that he resigned from the Foreign Service in May 1947. But it is a measure, perhaps, of his maturity eleven years later that his account of 228 was quite objective and his recollection of U.S. response was, in the end, more restrained than the intense outrage he felt at the time.

Thank you.

[Applause]

**DR. CHEN:** Thank you, Dr. Bush.

Now we have about 15 minutes open for questions and discussion.

**QUESTION:** [inaudible]...and there are also people in communist China who are intoxicated by freedom and democracy and you bet they will have revenge, dissatisfaction. Could this result in another 228? Will the PRC commit the crime of humanity again? And what should the U.S. do to prevent that?

**DR. CHEN:** Do you have any comments?

**DR. BUSH:** First, with respect to your first question, Ma Ying-jeou spoke in this room 11 months ago. We felt that he is an elected leader of Taiwan, certainly for one of the biggest political jurisdictions. He is a leader of one of the political parties. Taiwan is a democratic system now. The people of Taiwan have elected a leader to be their president. The situation is a little bit different now.

Your second question begins with a hypothetical premise and we should examine that hypothetical premise. Certainly nobody wants to see a repetition of 228, but on the other hand, it's worthwhile I think to examine the circumstances under which the kind of military attack that you talk about might -- and I underline the word "might" -- occur, and what might be done to keep that probability very low or zero.

I happen to think that the probability is not zero, but it is that through the creative and responsible work of statesmen in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington that it should be possible to keep that probability very low so that a repetition of 228 is not something that people have to be afraid of.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. I am Albert Keidel with the Carnegie Endowment. I have two questions, one historical. What is happening on the Mainland at this time [in 1947] in KMT rear areas? Is this an anomaly in terms of behavior of the KMT at this time for areas that it was occupying, and was that different from what the communists were doing in areas that they were capturing or occupying?

Second, you mentioned retrocession. What was the legal basis in 1945 for that retrocession? What was the document that was used as a basis for that?

**DR. PHILLIPS:** First, as far as the Nationalists dealing with the rear areas, yes, there has been research on topics such as small uprisings immediately after World War II. The Nationalists took care of these issues as they took care of the problem on Taiwan after February 28. We might see the nuance of how a peasant uprising with some communist influence on the Mainland was different from what was happening on Taiwan. I would make the case that to a great extent the officials sitting in Nanjing did not see a huge difference, and problems in rear areas were crushed on a regular basis. If anything, you need to add to it the tremendous humiliation the Nationalists felt, Nationalists on Taiwan in particular, to have lost an entire province in about 3 days. Horrendous officials -- that the peasants are going to stand up to these people or local leases, stating, we are just not paying this tax anymore, we have got to have some more local self-government and get it crushed. In some ways this is about the scale.

The Communists had difficulty with people like the secret societies and such in areas under their control. The Communists did not make the claim to being the state in as much as of China, so they did not have to worry about as many revolts. Remember that the Nationalists were claiming that we are the government of all of China and any unrest anywhere was their problem. This gave them responsibility for vast areas, and most of the local-central conflicts.

**DR. BUSH:** The legal basis was the declaration at the Cairo Conference by Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Churchill that Taiwan should be returned to China. And then once the war was over, General MacArthur authorized forces of the ROC government to take over Taiwan from the Japanese.

**SPEAKER:** When you say that these are the bases, I think the Cairo Declaration or the Cairo statement or some statement is not the document. They are only –statements, the outcome of which is still uncertain. It is a policy statement and not a treaty ratified by the congress. The only legal basis as a student of international law I only have to say is 1895 when the Ching Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan and the peace treaty in '52 Japan renounced all rights, everything of Taiwan. So it detached from Japan, but it did not attach to any other country. This was done so deliberately, but it is confirmed better by, for instance, the Foreign Minister of England, Anthony Eden openly said in '50 in the British Parliament that the status of Taiwan is undetermined and no other document which said Taiwan is a part of China. That is purely a bigger point of view.

**DR. PHILLIPS:** Can I just briefly say, this may not have been a legal argument, but the Nationalist position on Taiwan was the same as their position on the unequal treaties. Treaties signed by the Ching Dynasty under duress were illegitimate. I am not saying that you buy that as a legal argument, but I raise it to help you understand their approach. These agreements were unacceptable because of how they were signed.

**SPEAKER:** Any peace treaty is signed under duress.

[Laughter]

**DR. CHEN:** This side over there.

**QUESTION:** I have a very short comment and a question. My comment is that President Chiang Kai-shek is a dictator. He makes all the decisions. The decisions influence 228 -- has nothing to do -- an ordinary citizen -- there is no comfort between you and me because policy council has nothing to do with people. The decision makers should take the full responsibility.

My question is, there were 28,000 Taiwanese were killed during the six week period following February 28 -- can you tell me how many -- were killed during that immediate period of time? Thank you.

**DR. PHILLIPS:** I would say if you tried to sort of amalgamate all the different sources, perhaps 500 or so. I think 500 to 1,000 would be fair. The first thing the Nationalists put forward in early March was that more Mainlanders had been killed than Taiwanese and that the true victims of the Incident were in fact Nationalist soldiers. But I don't know that anyone ever did a count. The Nationalists sort of left it at that and by April they didn't want to talk about it anymore. I'm happy if somebody has better numbers.

**DR. CHEN:** One more question.

**QUESTION:** I am a Voice of America correspondent. I have a question for Dr. Peng. You just mentioned that the obstacle to reconciliation is that it is up to the victim to grant forgiveness. What we know is that other political leaders already sent apologies to those victims, then also set up the fund to try to make reparations. According to your opinion what are the conditions for reconciliation?

Then I have a question for Dr. Bush. You just said that that it is up to the [inaudible] political reality is different from international law, but right now the Chinese government says that anti-secession law and the United States also said the bottom line is their national interest. How do you comment on this double deterrence U.S. policy toward cross-Strait relations?

**DR. PENG:** [inaudible] did express [inaudible] to aid but in which capacity. It is not really officially as a government, and personally of course he was really sincere. But what I'm saying is just paying some money to the victims is not really reconciliation. The reconciliation must come from the bottom of the heart and the offender must repent, must confess, and must take responsibility. That was not done even in the investigation of the truth and reality of 228, which has met with so many obstacles and there are five that are still secret. Still it is one of the hardest tasks for the historians in Taiwan to pin down where it was happening, who is responsible. And a professor of history in one of Taiwan's universities has studied the question and his final conclusion is that supreme responsibility lies with Chiang Kai-shek; consequently, he was assaulted by all the media of KMT people, so still the responsibility is not clear. That is what I meant, and this payment, money, is not the way. It is of course better than nothing, but it is not a real solution for reconciliation. Reconciliation must come from your thinking, from your mentality, from your heart, from dearly feeling sorry. We don't see any way that this offender has shown this kind of sincere regret. We don't see it.

**DR. BUSH:** I'm sorry, I really didn't understand your question. Maybe you could ask me during the break.

**DR. CHEN:** We will take a 15-minute break and then come back at 3:50.

[Recess]

## Panel II: *Moving Forward*

**TSUNG-KUANG LIN:** Thank you very much for your kind introduction. I am very happy to be here to take part in this symposium to help commemorate the Sixtieth Anniversary of 228.

228 obviously is one of the watershed events, if not the watershed event, in the modern history of Taiwan. It has bound many of us together. So how do Taiwanese see the event, see the origins of the event, see how the event unfolded, and see the event's varied ramifications?

But first, let me start with what the Taiwanese failed to see back in 1945. They failed to see the reality of the situation at the end of World War II. They did not see that, after fifty years of separation, Taiwan and China were very different--different political entities, different societies. They were different in economic advancement, social development, educational level, cultural climates and a host of other things. Most important, Taiwanese at the end of the war failed to see the existence of their own identity and their own nationalism--the sentiment that was started during the Japanese period.

Instead, they allowed their identity and nationalism to merge with Chinese identity and nationalism, the Chinese they hardly knew because of fifty long years of separation. It is noteworthy that the Taiwanese emotional attachment to China had been reinforced during the war years due mainly to the Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, as well as Japanese aggression in China. Thus, at the end of the war, many Taiwanese had developed a high degree of sympathy for, and emotional ties to, China.

A renowned Taiwanese scholar said it best to reflect the Taiwanese sentiment at the end of World War II when he wrote a poem in which he expressed his euphoria over the end of the war, over the end of the colonial rule and over the "return" of Taiwan to China. He was no doubt expecting a Taiwan under the future Chinese rule would become a land of freedom, equality and democracy--and a highly "autonomous," "model province" of China. This sentiment was widely shared by the Taiwanese of the time. They welcomed the Chinese and they had placed tremendously high hope and expectation for the Chinese rule.

But, then, the Taiwanese were soon to be disappointed--terribly disappointed--as they began to encounter the Chinese from the other side of the strait.

First, they encountered Chinese intelligence agents dispatched by the Nanjing government--the agents said to be under the control of Dai Li, the notorious head of China's secret police. Then, the Taiwanese were stunned to hear the insulting words of General Ge Jing-en in October, who upon his arrival in the Taipei Airport scolded the people and the land of Taiwan. He labeled the land ugly and worthless (*jian-tu*) and the people, low-down and contemptible (*jian-min*). One can imagine the incredulous look of the Taiwanese who were present at the airport to welcome the general. It should be noted

that the Japanese civil servants were still in charge of the administration of Taiwan at the time General Ge arrived.

Then, in the same month, October, the Taiwanese would encounter the first 12,000 Chinese troops--the 12,000 ragtag Chinese troops. The Chinese certainly didn't look like a triumphant army. If they looked bad, their discipline and conduct were far worse. Nicknamed the Beggar Soldiers by Taiwanese, they behaved much like armed thieves, thugs and rapists wherever they went.

More significant, Taiwanese came face-to-face with Chen Yi, the newly appointed Governor-General of Taiwan. Was he the same Chen Yi who headed a Chinese delegation to Taiwan in 1935 to congratulate the Japanese colonial government for its outstanding accomplishments in developing Taiwan? Was he the same Chen Yi who was known to have put his national socialism in practice while Governor of the Fujian province? Soon after his arrival, his policy of total political domination and merciless economic exploitation--and expropriation--simply outraged the Taiwanese populace. Widespread corruption of the Chen government officials further fueled the Taiwanese anger and frustration. We don't have time to go into the details. We have seen the video and we have heard and read a great deal about the behavior of the Chinese officials and soldiers, as well as Chen's policies.

Therefore, within months after the arrival of the Chinese, the Taiwanese began to realize that the Chen government was actually a foreign colonial government like its predecessor. In fact, it was worse--much worse--than the Japanese. The previously mentioned Taiwanese scholar now began to criticize the Chen government and its policies through a newspaper, *Min Pao*, where he served as the publisher. He also began to tell his children about the difference between the Chinese and the Taiwanese. Clearly, in his mind, a line had been drawn--a line that was first drawn not by the Taiwanese, but by the Chinese. On one side of the line was the Chinese who considered themselves to be the new rulers; on the other side, the Taiwanese. And this line was to be drawn as sharply as possible. Even if a Taiwanese desired to identify himself as Chinese, he would not be allowed to cross that line either.

As I indicated earlier, just before the arrival of the Chinese, many Taiwanese had submerged their identity and nationalism to Chinese identity and nationalism. As a result of Chinese repression, discrimination, exploitation and corruption, however, now on the eve of 228, they rediscovered their hidden sense of identity. From the Taiwanese perspective, therefore, 228 was not an unexpected, simple, or isolated incident. It was a spontaneous outbreak. It was an unplanned popular uprising against a repressive, exploitative, corrupt, unjust, inept government that was clearly ruining Taiwan.

The Taiwanese consciousness and their emerging sense of identity might have galvanized the Taiwanese anger and frustration against the Chinese rule and, thus, might have contributed in certain degree to the outbreak of this popular uprising. Nevertheless, the newly rediscovered consciousness was not deep-rooted enough or strong enough to

stand up to the 35,000 well-armed Chinese reinforcements that arrived in Taiwan on March 8 and afterward.

It is not my intention here to repeat what others have said about how the Chinese used high-handed measures to suppress the uprising, which is an understatement. But I do call your attention to the atrocity, the massacre that was committed by the troops. No one knows for certain the number of Taiwanese killed, but it was staggering for sure. A general consensus seems to be somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000. That is a huge number in light of the fact that the massacre was committed in a matter of days and weeks.

The killing didn't stop there, either. It was followed by the White Terror during which campaigns were launched by the government of China to eliminate potential leaders of Taiwan. Students, journalists, Western-educated intellectuals, Christians, well-to-do entrepreneurs and, ironically, anti-Japanese resistant fighters became prime targets of these campaigns of elimination. The Taiwanese scholar that I mentioned twice before was no exception. He was taken by five secret agents just before noon, March 11, and was never to be seen or heard of again. It was no exaggeration to maintain--as Taiwanese do--that the cream of the crop of a generation was in such manner liquidated--many of whom vanished without a trace.

The sense of Taiwanese identity and the Taiwanese consciousness that seemed to have sprouted days before 228 now came to an end. 228 paved the way for the establishment of a martial law rule that lasted forty years--the longest martial law rule in the history of modern times. During this period, the Chinese rulers in Taiwan continued to look to China for identification, they pushed for China-centric education, they tried their darn best to prevent the resurrection of Taiwanese consciousness, and, of course, they made sure that 228 was taboo.

It wasn't until the 1970s that the Taiwanese democratic movement was started by some who were old enough to remember 228 and those who held dear--in secret, of course--to their Taiwanese identity and consciousness. In the 1980s, this democratic movement finally yielded some results when it forced the end of the martial law rule and, since the late 1990s, with the ascendancy of the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan has now developed itself into a vibrant democratic state. Please allow me to repeat that the democracy that the Taiwanese are enjoying today was very much rooted in the rebirth of Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese consciousness.

No two situations are exactly alike, of course, but today's situation seems similar to the one in 1945 in some ways. I would like to enumerate some of these similarities for all of us to think about--to see if they could be of value to policymakers in Taiwan, the U.S. and the PRC.

In 1945, we saw a reality of separation between Taiwan and China. So do we today. In 1945 we saw the differences between Taiwan and China economically, politically, socially and culturally. Today, these differences may not be exactly the same

or in similar degrees, but they are different nonetheless. In 1945, China wanted Taiwan and a consequence of the Chinese takeover was the 1947 tragedy of 228. Today, the PRC wants Taiwan, too--by force if necessary. In the 1940s, the Chinese were contemptuous toward the Taiwanese because they claimed that Taiwanese had survived as Japanese subjects in the colonial period. Today, the Taiwan issue remains a thorn in the side of China, at least partially due to Taiwan's historical connection to Japan and the Chinese spite for Japan. Back in the 1940s, the question of Taiwanese identity was an issue, as we have seen. Today, the identity question remains a fundamental issue in Taiwan, in terms of domestic politics and international relations. In 1946-7, the mal-administration and policies of Chen Yi had stimulated the growth of Taiwanese consciousness. Today, the 1,000 missiles that the Chinese have installed to intimidate Taiwan have actually resulted in a rapid growth of the Taiwanese consciousness. Now, a recent poll showed that a mere 5% of the Taiwanese population consider themselves to be Chinese!

As George Kerr indicated, the U.S. Taiwan policy could be characterized as a policy of no policy. In the post-WWII era, the policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek in the Civil War and the Cold War was cast in stone in spite of all the U.S. misgivings about Chiang. Recently, we have heard of the U.S. policy of constructive ambiguity and the policy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait area. The Taiwan issue remains an enigma that few policymakers in Washington seem to understand or care. The "policy of no policy" that allowed a Chinese regime a free hand in Taiwan might have contributed in some way to the 228 tragedy. With so many similar factors at work in Taiwan in both the immediate post-war era and today, I sincerely hope that policymakers of all concerned are mindful of what happened in 1947 and will do their utmost to prevent 228 from happening again.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

**DR. BUSH:** Thank you very much. Randy?

**RANDY SCHRIVER:** Thank you very much, Richard, and thanks to Brookings and the Formosan Association for organizing this important event.

I have to be candid. When I first received the invitation to speak at this event I was hesitant, and I called Gerrit van der Wees and asked to speak with him about it. I said, the reason I am hesitant is that the topic you have assigned me, the impact of 228 on current U.S. policymaking, well, I'm not sure there is any.

[Laughter]

**MR. SCHRIVER:** Further, I think most senior U.S. officials -- the Richard Bushes, the Barbara Shrages, and the Daniel Kiangs -- are very well versed in the history of Taiwan. However, most other senior U.S. officials are largely unaware of these events. So I'm not sure I'm happy with what you have asked me to come here and talk about.



However, as I reflected on it, it struck me that this is precisely the point I need to come and make and expand upon. I think our senior officials are largely unaware of these events, which are being crowded out by other very important matters of the day -- Iraq, Afghanistan, counterterrorism, et cetera, but we need to understand the environment that we are operating in within U.S. policymaking circles and start to evaluate what it means for our environment when there is an event that has such deep important significance in Taiwan to this day, while it does not have such deep significant importance on the U.S. side. What does that mean? How is that consequential?

I think it is important because policymaking, despite the worst fears of our friends all around the world, is not a unilateral activity. People say the United States acts unilaterally all the time, but in fact, policymaking is interactive; it is a process of receiving and evaluating the policies and initiatives of others, responding to them, formulating your own policies. So what we have is an interactive process of policymaking between long-standing friends, Taiwan and the United States, and that interactive process is definitely impacted by this disconnect that I am describing here, an event of such extreme importance on the Taiwan side and of such little impact at the senior level on the U.S. side. How is this context, how is this disconnect, consequential?

Consider the counterfactual. Consider if people at the cabinet level and sub-cabinet level and people in the Vice President's and President's office were all very well steeped in this history, they have all seen this wonderful educational video, they understand that 28,000 people were killed simply due to their ethnicity and/or political views, they understand that for 40 years subsequent to that event people were not allowed to speak their language, study their history, honor those who were sacrificed as a result of 228. Consider that scenario among U.S. officials. Would there be a different view of proposals to either revise or change the Constitution, a Constitution that was promulgated by the people responsible for this act? Would there be a different view of efforts to rename streets, take down statutes, if senior U.S. officials were intimately familiar with these events?

We do not know. There is a reason political scientists do not like counterfactual argumentation. We cannot answer these questions. But what we can say is that oftentimes, these initiatives are received with a large degree of skepticism and oftentimes a negative response from the U.S. side. So this is something to consider if it is in fact this disconnect that is contributing greatly to this outcome that leaves all of us feeling uncomfortable, what is then that we can do to address this.

I thought long and hard about a way I could illustrate this more clearly, and I am sorry, but I kept coming back to an experience I had in October 2004. This seminar is a very solemn event and a very somber occasion, and I do not mean to make light of it with the analogy I am about to use, so forgive me for doing this. I think it demonstrates how a contextual environment can contribute to problems.

In October 2004 I attended my college roommate's wedding in Boston. He was marrying a woman from Colombia, so picture this, half the crowd was from Boston and half the crowd was from Colombia. I was there to honor my college roommate, my long-time friend of 20 years and be a part of this great day. But I also had tickets to the Red Sox-Yankees playoff game. I said to my wife, after the wedding service and before the reception had started, and there were no toasts so there was no first dance yet, I said, "Honey, we gotta go." She looked at me like I had three heads and said, "This is your college roommate. How could you be such a cold, callous friend?" I started to explain the Yankees-Red Sox: the curse of the Babe, the breaking of our hearts in 1946, '67, '78, '75 and '86 and so on. This didn't get me very far, so I said I'd ask my roommate, John, and of course this was unfair because he was born and raised in Boston. So we took it to John and started to approach him, and as we got close he looked at me and said, "What are you still doing here? You've got Red Sox tickets."

[Laughter]

**MR. SCHRIVER:** This resulted in a ripple through the crowd with the Colombian contingent looking at me like I was nuts and a terrible friend, and a Boston contingent trying to usher me into a cab to get me to the game.

This is perhaps a light example of people who are absolutely steeped in the Red Sox-Yankees rivalry and the significance of this, and other people who say this is just another baseball game. How in the world could you leave your roommate's wedding? Again I was trying to think of an example, and I apologize for the levity, but that is what I kept coming back to.

Now, back to the U.S. and Taiwan. This may sound like a long windup in order for me to deliver an apology for American ignorance and our unsophisticated ways, but in fact it is more a cautionary tale to my friends in Taiwan and our friends in Taiwan, because I could be equally critical of the U.S. and their ignorance of the aboriginal people in Australia, their struggle for political rights, the Maori in New Zealand, and examples all over the world where Americans do not have the kind of firm historical foundation that they should have. In fact, the list would not even start there. The list would probably start at home, our very poor record I think of dealing with historical rectification where our own ethnic groups have been mistreated. Have we done enough to repay the American Indians and all of the American indigenous people for the Trail of Tears, or the Japanese Americans who were interned in the Manzanar camp and suffered as a result of the presidential executive order that interned Japanese-Americans? There are still debates to this day about American slavery and whether we done enough to compensate the descendents of American slaves. So this is, unfortunately, very typical American to be un-historical and to be much more future-oriented than fixated on the past.

We are unique in this regard, and I say that not proudly, but when you travel around the world and you deal with foreign governments and citizens of foreign countries, this strikes you as an American that their conversations usually starts two centuries back and your conversation starts about breakfast that morning as an American.

So this is something that is unfortunately part of our political culture and one that is very difficult to change.

So where does this leave us? I think Americans should care about 228, and American policy officials certainly should care and certainly should take the time and trouble to be educated. But I think despite the efforts of the people gathered in this room, it is an uphill slog and I think for our friends in Taiwan who are committed and dedicated to the deepening and strengthening of democracy in Taiwan, who feel that historical rectification is an important part of that agenda, you need to understand the Americans you're dealing with, that your initiatives, your policies, are not going to be evaluated by the Americans you wish you had; instead, they are going to be evaluated by the Americans that you do have. This to me suggests that while this very important work continues, and I am a very strong supporter of the efforts in Taiwan to heal wounds and to deal with the past in a forthright manner, that some *realpolitik*, some very pragmatic consideration must be given to the international spillover and I think first and foremost of the spillover into the United States and the bilateral relationship. This is an uncomfortable truth that we cannot wish away.

I think as the very important work proceeds, and the educational efforts such as this proceed, we recognize the task at hand and how difficult it is with Iraq and everything else crowding out the voices here in this room. This is a longer-term effort in terms of educating Americans, a worthy one, but a longer-term one nonetheless, and there be some sensitivity to that as the work is done in Taiwan. So thank you very much.

[Applause]

**DR. BUSH:** Thank you very much, Randy. Dr. Lin has given us one perspective on what this means for the future. Randy has given us another perspective. Neil?

**NEIL KRITZ:** To join in this very important conversation, my perspective will be a little bit different in terms of trying to bring to the conversation some insights and lessons from the way other societies have developed various mechanisms to deal with similar issues because often times what -- not the actual solutions are more than they originally seem.

From a medical perspective, it is fairly broadly accepted that we have each developed some appropriate ways of confronting that abuse, of dealing with it, and not simply -- it comes back and haunts that individuals in ways that are unpredictable. Increasingly particularly over the last 20 years, political purge processes which while they do not get much attention, in country after country around the world a few people may be prosecuted, but more commonly there is some kind of a vetting process, some kind of process of looking at who was implicated and a variety of noncriminal sanctions or exclusion of people from various positions in society or within government or within the military-security services as a consequence of their implication in past abuses.

There are victim-focused mechanisms, compensation, and I would suggest that the various countries' experiences have suggested as Dr. Peng said earlier that simple monetary compensation is never fully satisfying by itself. There can never be an exact financial value placed on people who have suffered physical abuse, who have suffered loss of relatives and colleagues, and so that always becomes a controversial issue. Restitution of confiscated property gives a greater sense of actual justice for past abuses. The establishment of memorials, of remembrance events. And then there is the more recent evolution of what have been called truth commissions in various countries starting in Latin America in the early 1980s on which I will speak more in a few minutes.

More typically, each of these mechanisms around the world have focused on atrocities, physical abuse, in terms of the legacy of the past, on repression and the framework of repression, rather than on being designed to address past corruption. They do not work as effectively with respect to looking at these issues, and in the Taiwanese context, both have been raised in the debates in terms of how do you actually look at what has happened in the past and how do you address and deal with it.

The encouraging thing of course is that I would suggest in the past few years in particular there has been very significant and encouraging progress certainly when put in the context of the last 60 years in Taiwan in terms of starting to actually have a debate and discussion about this, victims have been identified, at least some compensation has been provided, memorials, the issuance of reports, the events that will be taking place next week. That kind of a public debate is important because one of the lessons that I think has emerged from a number of societies is it is important that society needs to be engaged in this. This cannot be an elite process if it is going to have an impact on people's lives and on how they deal with their past and come to terms. Let me suggest a few brief comments with respect to the various mechanisms and some of the lessons that may be relevant in the Taiwanese context.

First with respect to the question to the mechanism that first comes in society after society in people's minds, we need to hold the perpetrators accountable, we need to have the trials, we need to move forward. And perhaps in the Taiwanese context the most obvious lesson is these are difficult and painful for societies in any circumstance, but the challenge of prosecution years and years after the events in question become magnified significantly. Questions of evidence, questions of memories fading or at least subject to challenge of victims and witnesses and perpetrators. The notion, and quite frankly for many people, the image of putting perpetrators in their eighties on trial which emerges every few years when there is another Holocaust prosecution that comes up some place. And the situation in Cambodia where the race is on to try to actually create a tribunal before all the key perpetrators die, and of course they have already lost on some of those just in the course of the last couple of years, raising questions for people as to is it worth the effort. In Sierra Leone, two of the key defendants, one in fact just this week, died before trial.

Problems emerge in terms of ex post facto issues, namely, you want to prosecute people for things they did at the time, but were they in fact clearly illegal under the law

that existed that was in place at the time that they were committed, or will people be able to argue that in fact what I did may be wrong through the lens of today, but I can defend it legally in terms of what existed at the time. And that is particularly true for corruption.

When the Germans had to actually deal with the question of accountability for the border guards who shot Germans trying to escape across the border, this was a huge issue and a traumatic one. Were they following orders? Were they functioning within the legal framework that existed? Or were they in fact violating a higher law which in the end was the way the Germans established accountability because there was a higher law that people should have understood?

Statute of limitations questions exist. Has it been too long? And in the case of some countries, the answer has been to say, well, in fact given the political reality that prosecutions were impossible under the old system, the statute of limitations was stopped and therefore we can rerun it today now that we have emerged into democracy and we can start all over again. In other countries they focus on particular crimes like crimes against humanity which arguably under international law have no statute of limitations and therefore we can still prosecute years later.

But the nature of the transition affects the options in every country as well, and you can start to actually throw people in the dock and have prosecutions when you have a revolutionary radical transition where one side clearly wins and the other side clearly loses, that is easier. When you have the kind of gradual and more peaceful transition that you have had in a number of countries and that basically characterizes the transition in Taiwan where everyone is still part of the system and part of the game, then that becomes more complicated and more difficult.

There are a variety of different kinds of noncriminal sanctions that have been used, and as I mentioned, these generally sweep much larger numbers of people. Prosecutions even when they happen in any country target the tip of the iceberg or a few people because that is all that is doable. Vetting processes, purge processes normally target much larger numbers of people. Look at the arguments over de-Baathification in Iraq where quite frankly the decision was we are going to sweep very wide and they swept too wide, so anyone who actually fits into these categories of part membership gets excluded from positions, gets through out of the police, you have a vacuum in society, you have huge numbers of alienated people and jobless people. In case after case this has been the debate as to how widely you do this, and I would argue that in almost no country it has been done well.

In the transition from communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the debates over what was referred to as lustration, or purging people who had any implication in cooperation with the former secret police came up repeatedly. In Afghanistan today there is an effort to create a commission on vetting that will actually screen people and exclude those implicated in past abuses, but how to do it and whether politically it can be established remains a huge question. But the one thing that actually does become clear in all these cases is that if people are purged from society based on their affiliations, based

on their part membership, as opposed to based on clear evidence with respect to their own individual actions, that is a recipe for failure in terms of a transition to democracy and the rule of law.

Truth commissions which have more recently come to be referred to in many cases as truth and reconciliation commissions, and I would suggest that having the second term simply muddies the water. Reconciliation is a complicated process which can be helped along, but these are bodies to help establish facts. Truth commissions generally focus not on a single incident but on a period of time, on the nature of a system, the nature of repression, the nature of abuses.

The question was suggested in the earlier panel with respect to the perpetrators coming forward and apologizing and admitting what they did, and the question in country after country after country is what incentives are for them to do that? Why should they? So -- has suggested South Africa as the good model for Taiwan because the Truth and Reconciliation Commission there actually worked well. In many ways it was, but out of the more than 20 countries that have proceeded with this kind of a mechanism, South Africa is the anomaly. It is the only one that actually had the authority to grant amnesty from prosecution to perpetrators, and that was the incentive. Because in every other country they tried and tried and tried and a few perpetrators come forward because they cannot sleep at night after all these years, but for the most part they say why should I expose myself to shame, to potential liability? I'm going to stay quiet.

What happens is the commissions then become much more victim-centric, their information comes from the victims, and that is not a negative, that is not a bad thing. They try, but again they are largely unsuccessful with respect to getting perpetrators to come forward. In South Africa one of the lessons that emerged is that the model only works if there is a credible threat for prosecution: if people really think that they are risk, then maybe they will come forward because you have to make that judgment. You can even track within the South African experience that when a few cases were being prosecuted, when they were being done well and it looked serious and aggressive, the rate of applications for amnesty, there were 7,000 applications for amnesty to the commission, went up significantly. And when the prosecution was bungling, the rate went down because they thought, "Why should I stick my neck out?"

Private truth commission efforts like that that was recently suggested by Wu Nai-teh at Academia Sinica generally are not as effective for society because there needs to be a sense that this is the state, this is the society actually grappling with its own history, not just some private effort. There is a debate repeatedly within these bodies with respect to the question of whether you name names of the actual perpetrators, because on the one hand if this is the best you are going to do in terms of accountability, then let's at least get those facts on the record. On the other hand, if this is part of a process of moving toward democracy and the rule of law, what kind of due process is owed to people before you actually name them and implicate them and call them a perpetrator of these kinds of abuses and atrocities.

I would note actually in the context of the recent libel suit for allegations as to what he has done, I would suggest that the debate over naming names is one that needs to be thought about pretty carefully. These bodies generally work best when they have a broad-based membership so that it is not just one side establishing history, because if this is really going to have a transformational impact on society, then there needs to be a feeling that everyone has participated in this, that all sides have found their acceptable representatives, there are neutral people that they can accept, and that the body is credible. And sometimes in some countries the way that has worked is to take people from outside of the societies, take foreigners, people from the international community and actually put them on either on their own in the case of El Salvador or more commonly so that there is a sense of local ownership in addition to local members of the body.

Briefly, these bodies though provide an opportunity for everyone to come forward and tell their story, victim and perpetrator and bystander alike, to make them what happened to them and their family and their colleagues part of the official national history and record and feel as though they have been acknowledged by society and made part of the fabric of history.

The commissions as well explore issues that are not appropriate for prosecution because it is not just a matter of who killed whom, it is also a question of looking at what was the role of different sectors in society, and in some commissions it has been a question of what was the role of the educational system, the medical profession, the legal profession, the media, in creating an environment that actually made the framework and the structure of repression possible?

Look at the broader questions of what kinds of changes need to be made in society to that framework so that these kinds of repressive actions cannot happen in the future. Provide an opportunity to look at the nature of the political system and how that played into the process. And at best, the mechanism and the process force a public debate and dialogue, and in the case of Taiwan, it seems to me this is probably the most important element that could come out of this kind of a mechanism. A public conversation looking at one another in a mirror and trying to figure out what happened, how did this work, and establishing consensus, because at the end of the day, I mentioned that reconciliation is a complicated process and after years of working the issue I am still not sure I can say exactly what it means or when a society achieves it, but what this process can hopefully do is at least narrow the gap of misunderstanding, at least establish a baseline for coexistence among people.

Lastly, the other point that I would mention is the role with respect to education because in societies when this has worked well, undergoing this kind of a process establishes the basis for development of new curriculum, for education of the next generation, and in a situation where we are already 60 years past the events in question and the divide remains, capturing that information now and establishing the facts in an indisputable way and ensuring that the next generation understands that as crucial.

I mentioned at the beginning that not dealing with these issues whether on an individual or a societal basis does not make them go away, repressing them does not make them disappear, it simply emerges in other ways. Perhaps one of the most compelling examples does come from a different society. Jasenovac was the worst of the concentration camps during World War II that was run by the Ustashe, the Croatian Nazis. Under Tito, and years later under President Tudjman, the Croatian Nationalists argued that 20,000 Serbs died at Jasenovac, mainly of typhoid. Serbs believe that up to a million Serbs were slaughtered by the Ustashe in that same camp during that same period of time. The gap in history and in realities in which people live simply spread farther and farther apart and made it possible for the next round of conflict to happen that much more easily. So I think the lesson is narrowing the gap, establishing the facts now is the best hope, and based on that, reconciliation hopefully can happen over the longer period of time.

[Applause]

**DR. BUSH:** Thank you, Neil, for a really outstanding presentation. Neil's presentation and all the presentations will be done as a transcript and put on our website and the Formosan Association website so you will be able to access all of them and will not have to rely on your notes.

We have a little bit of time for questions. Please identify yourself and wait for the microphone. We will start right over there.

**QUESTION:** Chiang Kai-shek is no longer around and his casket is still hanging in the air without a formal burial. So when we talk about the tragedy of the 228 revolt, I wonder if anybody has thought about the Incident from a broader historical context? This was a very disturbed era: 6 million Jews were executed by Nazis in the European War, tens of millions of killed in the Japanese Pacific War, tens of millions of people dead, 200,000 Chinese persecuted in Nanjing by the Japanese Imperial Army, and 30 million Chinese people dead during the Sino-Japan war. Finally, two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, where many people died. And of course, the 228 revolt or Incident happened in the wake of the Chinese civil war.

[Only 858 people have applied for compensation for crimes against them or their families in the 228 Incident, according to the ROC government's February 28 Incident Management Committee.] I wondered how many people were compensated or names were collected or things like that? 177 people were missing, and all together 858 people were considered dead in this Incident.

When it comes to reconciliation, we must get the numbers right. My question is, could there be a lot of people killed whose families decided not to make a claim, saying this is just in the past, we do not care anymore, let's look forward? Or could the other 27,000 people who got killed have no relatives or friends on the Mainland, or on the Mainland they cannot make a claim, or basically this 28,000 number just comes from the air?



Brookings put this number of 28,000 on the flier, versus 858. The difference is 33 times. So I will have to ask you to say a little bit about this.

**DR. BUSH:** I do not want to get into a long discussion about the numbers, but the number we put on the flier is based on some careful estimates of how many people were killed. It is not precise. Why there were so few claims based on deaths is another question, but I do not think anybody would suggest that the number of claims for deaths reflected the number of people who were killed in the Incident. Who has the next question?

**QUESTION:** [inaudible]...to what extent is the 22 Incident kind of used for a specific purpose such as Taiwan independence? Thanks.

**MR. SCHRIVER:** I would say neither of the above. I think it is an issue for Taiwan to consider very carefully and I think the very thoughtful presentation that was just made on other examples of attempts to deal with difficult histories is perhaps instructive, but I think it is primarily for the people of Taiwan to work through.

I think Americans and U.S. officials should pay attention and take the trouble to be educated on these events because I do think it is very important, yet I do not regard it as simply a tool or a political agenda item to advance the interests of one particular party.

**QUESTION:** Bert Keidel of the Carnegie Endowment China Program. I lived in Taiwan in the late 1980s and my Taiwanese students told me that their parents trained in Japan and told me of their experiences at that time.

My question is really to Randy Schriver and perhaps to Richard if he wants to reply. You say this is something in the distant past, it really has no effect on U.S. policy. But it seems to me that it reverberates strongly with the Tiananmen Incident, that if you have killings on this scale and it is publicized, it seems not only to feed energy into Taiwan, but also that same kind of energy deeply influences American policy today. It also seems that more than just indigenous peoples were being put down for rebelling, because these were the elites. Taiwanese society, in a way, was an elite of greater China, and those who were killed in Tiananmen were the elites of society in China at that time. So it seems to me to be quite powerful.

Can we find reconciliation around Tiananmen and would that in fact be parallel to reconciliation with 228, and how might we approach it, seeing the power that these kinds of things actually continue to have?

**MR. SCHRIVER:** I think that is a very interesting question. I actually thought about this before I came today because I think this is a contrasting example. I think if you polled cabinet and sub-cabinet officials in the United States and said, "Are you familiar with the events of June 4, 1989 and what are your general impressions of those events?", most people would be very familiar and they might have a very strong image in their

mind, perhaps it is the young man standing in front of the tank unwilling to move and cede his ground to the People's Liberation Army. As a result, does Tiananmen Square impact U.S. policy today? I believe it absolutely does. I recall vividly my time at the U.S. State Department when we were looking at the issue of the E.U.'s desire to lift the arms embargo and U.S. officials reminding them of the events of June 4, 1989; this was fresh on people's minds. So I think it is a contrasting example of how this tragedy is fresh in the minds, there are strong images among senior officials and it does impact. In the case of 288, unfortunately, there is not a complementary sort of impression that has been made.

I am not sure I completely understand your question about reconciliation of Tiananmen and whether that could be instructive for 228.

**DR. BUSH:** I'll take it. I think that 228 reverberates in a different way. As I said in my introductory remarks, the fact that there is a profound difference of opinion within Taiwan about the nature of the past makes it harder for the society to face the future, as one. Also, since the society faces a number of challenges and has to work those challenges through a democratic system, it is a handicap.

Second, I would agree with where I believe you were going -- that if Taiwan can come up with a creative way to reconcile itself over 228 along the lines that Neil was suggesting, then it provides a good example of how Chinese society and particularly the people of the city of Beijing could address Tiananmen. Obviously, there were many "Tiananmens" in other cities in China, but I think the idea of the blood debt is strongest in Beijing.

So just as Taiwan showed China how a Chinese society can move from authoritarianism to democracy in a stable way, so Taiwan might lead the way in showing China how to reconcile over these tragic Incidents.

**QUESTION:** I heard someone earlier refer to the 228 massacre and a way to reconcile. I would paraphrase Professor Lin's point, that if transitional justice is not preserved --... such as Belgium's colonization of Rwanda, whereby they gave benefits to Tutsi to counterbalance the majority Hutus and to give them independence without any regard for transitional justice. And, 30 years later in 1992, Hutus massacred 1 million Tutsi. This is such a vivid example for humankind. So I am urging the United States to deal more carefully with Taiwan's transitional justice. Thank you.

**MR. LEE:** I am Henry Lee, Human Rights Association. I would like to say, regarding the precise number of victims, is that according to the research of Taiwan's Human Rights Association, after 228, about 100,000 were missing or had moved around, couldn't be found. According to further research, they found out that 28,000 that is a very appropriate number.

Second, I believe that when we are talking 228 victims, we should say right after 228, and the White Terror and the blacklist and until now 60 years. In addition, that recalls 228 all up to now when people didn't talk about it.

Regarding the victims, it is not just the welfare of their families or their selves that matters, but also their psychology. This kind of reparation just can't compensate victims for that. What I mean is that everybody would like to have a reconciliation committee to find out all the details, from the 228 Incident, to the years of White Terror, to the blacklist -- all 60 years' history, so that we find out where responsibility for this lies. I think if we can do like that, Taiwan should be very proud to be a democratic country. Thank you.

**MR. REYNOLDS:** I am Michael Reynolds from International Solutions. I have enjoyed all the presentations today and the thing that keeps coming up, especially in the last presentation, is the idea that reconciliation, that closure, is needed. I believe Mr. Kritz said that repression doesn't make things disappear. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe you started from the position that on a personal level, that is, in terms of an individual, repression does not solve the problem. Then you included the analogy of masses of people, rather than just an individual. You also stated that you are not sure when reconciliation can be said to have been achieved.

Within this audience, certainly this may not be true, for this is a self-selected audience and even the speakers are people who are interested in the topic and who have a stake. However, looking on the ground in Taiwan at the vast majority of Taiwanese people, how can you say that people are not reconciled? I, too, do not know exactly what reconciliation is, but considering the relative harmonious way Taiwanese society operates, the high rates of intermarriage --

**NEIL KRITZ:** I do not think that any society benefits from hiding its own history. I think people need to have some clarity in terms of their own past, period. Otherwise you do have confusion. People need to know what happened, and even on a personal level, people need to have clarity in terms of what happened to their own parents and grandparents and others.

In the Taiwanese context, of course, it has not disappeared. The one thing that we have not really talked about is the extent to which dealing with 228 and dealing with the events that followed and how you deal with it have significant implications for the existing political parties today and for their standing and for their assets and for their ability to move forward. It is there. It seems to me that that is a reality. So establishing the facts clearly and having consensus -- I mentioned the South African example earlier -- has its plusses and minuses.

There is one plus that can be said about that whole process. Prior to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, people did live with different realities. A lot of people were able to walk along with blinders on, people in the white community, and really not be aware of and denying the past and saying, no, that stuff was not real, that did not really happen, that is just stuff that people are saying for political reasons.

The truth and reconciliation process, on a daily basis, had people coming forward, had historians and others all establishing the facts in a completely indisputable way. When that process was done, there was not anyone in South Africa who could continue to deny the facts of what happened, and I think that made for a healthier transition for the country to move forward.

It seems to me that you are right in terms of the divide and in terms of people interacting, but again, these issues it seems to me still play such a significant role in Taiwanese politics on a daily basis today that they have to be addressed and to establish that baseline for people on both sides. There are suggestions that exaggerations are made for political reasons on one side on the other, and people on both sides need to at least narrow that gap so that they can actually move forward.

**DR. BUSH:** If I could elaborate, I think you make a good point that the relative salience of this issue is connected with maybe a function of the degree of polarization in the political system as a whole, and if polarization declines, maybe the attention to this issue will decline and that speaks to a larger question of what political leaders regard as the key challenges. I suggested in my opening remarks that perhaps there might be a consensus at some point in the future, that the challenges Taiwan must face concerning what to do about a rising China and other issues might lead leaders to decide that perhaps it is in everybody's interest to reach closure on issues like this. Maybe not, but one could see it as one scenario.

One more question, and I will go to Mr. H.H. Chung back there.

**QUESTION:** [inaudible]... how to look forward and build our peaceful world. This is the more important thing. My uncle, the first uncle -- I believe the doctor maybe know him. He was 3 years in jail. The second uncle was killed. I would like to say that questions are very difficult to prove. This is true. Thank you.

**DR. BUSH:** I want to thank everybody for participating in today's event, which will contribute in a small way to the discussion on 228. Finally, I want to thank the Formosan Association for Public Affairs and Gerrit van der Wees and Chen Wen-yen for their outstanding cooperation in this event. Thank you.

[Applause]

- End of Transcript -