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DEMYSTIFYING KASHMIR

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Featured Speaker:

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Author, *Demystifying Kashmir*

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. COHEN: Good morning. My name is Steve Cohen. I am a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings. When I joined Brookings in 1998, that was the initiation of Brookings India-South Asia Project, and since that time we have done many things which I won't recount to you here. Besides a number of books which are on display outside, what we have done has been able to bring in visiting scholars and, in one case, a visiting general to Brookings. Navnita Chadha Behera was one of those visiting scholars, and the result of her year at Brookings was the book that we are proud to launch today on Kashmir.

To discuss the book, we have not only Dr. Chadha but also Tom Pickering who is one of the most eminent diplomats of our time, Hasan Askari Rizvi who I think is certainly one of the most eminent Pakistani scholars of his or any generation, and Dr. Ashley Tellis of our neighbors next door at Carnegie, certainly one of the rising or is a risen scholar diplomat, actually not only had a great academic career but then served for a couple of years in the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi and has been involved in American policy as has Ambassador Pickering.

Among our other visiting scholars here was General Jehangir Karamat, and we hope to have General Karamat back one of these years in a capacity.

For many years, Kashmir was characterized as an insoluble, knotty problem, and I think it was Clinton who called it the flash point of World War III.

That was the characterization during the Clinton Administration and earlier administrations because many of the India-Pakistan disputes revolved around Kashmir and in many cases people simply resolve the India-Pakistan rivalry into Kashmir. So Kashmir was seen as the center of all problems. As India and Pakistan went nuclear, that increased the stakes.

Dr. Behera Chadha has really taken another look at Kashmir, and I think has gone beneath the surface understanding of Kashmir in the way in which you peel away an onion and has discovered, as most of us have known in fact, that Kashmir is a many layered problem. It is not a simple problem, single problem. Therefore, the basis of this kind of analysis, solving Kashmir or even managing Kashmir requires many different approaches Kashmir.

I think one of the great contributions of this book, *Demystifying Kashmir*, this by the way is the Indian edition that has just been published. One of the great contributions of this book is the chapters on policy where she systematically goes through the alternatives and options for many of the participants in the dispute or players in the dispute -- the Kashmiris themselves of different sorts, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the United States, China and other countries. I think it is a tour de force, not only of analyzing Kashmir itself but also looking at the policy implications of this complex analysis of a very difficult problem.

The format today will simply be that Navnita will speak briefly about the book, describe and outline what she has done. It is available here, and certainly

we don't want to have a complete review of it, but she will make a few keys points. Then Ambassador Pickering, Dr. Rizvi, and Ashley Tellis will offer their comments on both the book itself and also policy issues surrounding Kashmir.

With that, let me sit down and ask Navnita to come up and speak to us.

MS. BEHERA: Thank you, Steve. It is a pleasure to be here. Let me just say a few words on the book because I think the idea is to as far as possible have a discussion going, and so I look forward to hearing more comments and questions from the audience.

All I wanted to say about the book was that traditionally Kashmir is understood and known as a territorial issue between India and Pakistan. The second layer of explanation has been that it was a Hindu-Muslim issue. It was an ideological issue between a Hindu Indian and Muslim Pakistani and Kashmir getting caught between these two mutually exclusive sorts of ideologies. The whole attempt in the book is actually to counter both the theses, that it is neither to be understood as a territorial issue nor has it been actually a Hindu-Muslim conflict.

It should be seen and should be understood more as a battle of state-making between India, Pakistan and people of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the line of control, who are often eclipsed in this battle between the two big states. They are the real stakeholders who lose out on getting their voices heard in this whole imbroglio. That is the whole attempt. It is the vision of what kind of state

did these two states want, the battle between a democratic federal polity or on the Pakistan side, a nationalism. That was the basis.

What did Kashmiris themselves want? Their desires and their political aspirations have also changed over a period of time. In the forties and fifties, their desires were very different from the ones that, let us say, led into the sixties and definitely nineties onward. It has completely taken a different complexion there.

Another issue is from the point of view of understanding the causes of the conflict, and I think more importantly for resolving it is to understand the issue as a question of political rights of the people that we are talking about. If we understand it as a question of political rights and their political aspirations, then one thing that we really need to keep in mind is the very, very deeply plural collector of the Jammu and the Kashmir state. Often what happens is that Jammu and Kashmir gets translated into Kashmir Valley, and Kashmir Valley gets translated into Kashmiri Muslims, and the general thesis that is put out there is that Kashmiri Muslims are waging this battle of secession against the Indian state. The reality is far more complex. Jammu and Kashmir is like a medley of different communities and each having a different set of political aspirations.

I think if we are able to look and identify a viable solution, a lasting solution, then you have to take into the political aspirations of not just the majority community which is rightfully made its claims on the right to self-

determination but also the other communities because the biggest piece of the puzzle is that right to self-determination does not have a single interpretation when you look at the different communities of Jammu and Kashmir. Each community interprets the right to self-determination in a very different way. Unless we have a clear picture as to what these complexities are, it is difficult to come up with a solution.

The positive side is that the peace process is unfolding. It is at a very early stage, I think. We are still trying to identify the stakeholders. We are still getting across the definitional problems of the parameters of what the Kashmir conflict is all about. There are a lot of firsts that both India and Pakistan have made on both sides. Pakistan has, after 50 years, at the official level said that okay, we were not looking at a plebiscite as the way to go about looking for a solution for Pakistan. I think more important than giving up the plebiscite option has been General Musharraf's statement that religion need not be the basis for looking for a solution. I think that has been a very big shift in the position there.

On the Indian side too, I think from 1971, we have come a long way, from the point that the Indian establishment used to think. It is an integral part of India, and Pakistan has no locus *standi* in looking at Kashmir. They have come a long way in not only acknowledging the rightful locus *standi* of Pakistan but also admitting at the official level that the final settlement of Kashmir is still pending.

I think the target breakthrough has been both sides, New Delhi and

Islamabad, are grudgingly albeit but irreversibly realizing that the cannot come to a solution of Kashmir until they start listening and involving the local stakeholders, people on both sides of Kashmir. No solution will last if it is only negotiated between New Delhi and Islamabad. You have to involve the local stakeholders. That is where I just put this idea.

MS. BEHERA: Normally what happens is that the links are put mostly on the valley which brought on a brand of violence through the 1990s. But the northern areas, if you see territorially, it is a huge chunk of Kashmir, and we know very little about the northern areas as to what their political aspirations are. Again, there is no single voice there. There are a lot of voices there. Some of them want to acquire a separate status within Pakistan. Some of them would want to merge with Jammu and Kashmir, that little thin belt that you see over there, yes, that one. Some would want a final solution to take place as to where they have their brethren. This is the Ladakh area. Ethnically, the linkages between the northern areas are strongest between the northern areas and the Ladakh area. There are very different aspirations here.

Kashmir, supposedly it is a state which has its own constitution and all that, but if you were to look beneath those layers, it does not even enjoy the kind of constitutional rights that other provinces of Pakistan do. So, constitutionally and in terms of political rights, there is a lot that needs to happen in that area too.

On the Indian side, there are a different set of political problems, questions

of political rights that need to be addressed, and it is different.

What I am trying to say is basically it is very complex and each region, each small part has its own desires, has its own political agenda, has its own political aspirations. Unless we can find a way to reconcile them internally as well as find a meeting ground with India and Pakistan, we are not looking at a lasting solution.

What the book does, as Steve briefly mentioned, it talks about as to why the basic parameters have not worked until today, the three parameters of self-determination, nationalism and ideology. What are the problems in these three parameters? Why have they proved to be such a stumbling block because of which the Kashmir resolution sort of seems like a dream?

Also, what are the policies that haven't worked? Facing the issue hasn't worked. Force has not worked. The entire spectrum of force from low intensity conflict to threats of nuclear war have all been tried and have all failed to deliver Kashmir. That is why we are all back at the negotiating table now.

Also, what are the whole range of strategic options that all the different players have? It identifies a whole set. For example, India can carry on with this low cost, no risk strategy of just keeping the talks going but not really getting to change any maps or really look to resolve Kashmir or it could go no the offensive in several ways or it could genuinely look for a resolution. Likewise, Pakistan could go on with the jihad policy at the low key level or it could step it up

throughout India or it could go and try looking for a way to resolve Kashmir. Likewise, Kashmiris on both sides could get together, do a new coalition-building exercise or resort to the path of violence or alternatively look for a way to negotiate their political rights and a new set of constitutional arrangements for both India and Pakistan and between the two parts of Kashmir.

The international community too, it lays out different options for the international players as well as to whether they would want to stick to their old low risk, no cost policy of just supporting the bilateral efforts or they could acquire interventionist stance that the international community cannot stand the risk of a nuclear war taking place here, so we are going to come in and resolve the conflict for you or just create supporting structures for both of these countries, just nudge them in a very low profile, behind the scenes facilitator mode.

What I have tried to do is basically lay out this whole menu of options and also specify as to what the consequences of following these options are for each set of players, what the stakes are, why they are likely to opt for one option and not the other and what the consequences of those options are going to be. For more, I suggest take a look at the book.

Thank you.

MR. COHEN: Thank you very much. I think that is a great summary of the purpose and the direction of the book, but you have to buy it in order to actually find out the content.

Tom, would you like to join us now, please?

AMB. PICKERING: Thank you, Steve, very much and thank you Dr. Chadha, both for your presentation and for the book which I enjoyed immensely. I learned a great deal, particularly more about the complexities of the problem than I did necessarily about the ease of solution, but you have addressed both extremely well and I highly recommend it.

I begin as someone who has dealt with the region but carries none of the expertise that is present here in the room. Against that backdrop, however, I would like to venture into two areas of extreme hot water and talk to you about those for a few minutes in hopes that I can help to stimulate the conversation and add something to the set of issues before us.

The first has to do briefly with the role of outside powers which Dr. Chadha has just finished addressing, I think in an extremely adept way. Having been involved with some of you in the room in this process at various times, it has been my feeling that a couple of home truths are lurking out there that we should keep in mind. One of these is that the focus on the bilateral has made a great deal of progress and I think is important. It is obviously important to keep a negotiated solution before us all. The sense that a military solution has any viability, I think has been demonstrated as an abject failure, either through internal insurgency or through external intervention.

A second home truth is that in addition to negotiations, the outside folks

who might be interested, including this country, are pretty much driven by a couple of factors that we should keep in mind. One is the tremendously important question of the closer to which it appears that Kashmir and indeed any India-Pakistan conflict issue is taking us toward the potential use of nuclear weapons, the greater degree of interest there is in intervening, self-evident and true and I think easy to see. The second is more difficult because the complex of relationships which the United States enjoys with each of the bilateral parties helps to determine, if I could put in the absence of ringing alarm bells, how close we would come to engaging ourselves in the conflict. Over a period of time with the growth of increased United States interest in India and as well with the growth of increased United States interest in Pakistan in an entirely different way, in large measure coming out of 9/11 and in dealing with Afghanistan, we have, I think taken comfort, maybe ill-gotten comfort in the notion that as long as the bilateral dialogue can move along, we are in a situation where the alarm bells aren't ringing and where we have to extend ourselves.

I very much prefer Dr. Chadha's second alternative for bilateral engagement. I do think it is important for us to respect the parties' desires in this regard to the extent that we can. While Pakistan was never comfortable about totally bilateral engagement nor was India for different reasons and different directions, it does seem to me in fact that they have gotten used to that issue. The notion of a structured engagement with some interest in the resolution of the

problem rather than a passive engagement, hoping in fact that no more harm will be done by the parties themselves as well as a feeling of some frustration and maybe even a sense of desuetude about where the parties were taking the issue as long as they weren't taking it into the depths of hell scenario was always very comfortable.

But having been an activist as a diplomat, I lean toward a slightly more activist role for the United States with both parties, recognizing that the bilateral one-on-one relationship with both parties rather than a mediator or facilitator, a convener of grand conferences, an orchestrator of the permanent five members of the Security Council or any other grand design is a much more, I think effective role under present circumstances, I envisage it. It may be too much homeopathic medicine for some. On the other hand, in my view, I think it represents a serious opportunity.

The real question is: Where does Kashmir fit on the scale of American priorities? At the present time, I would suppose it is locked in a long-term battle for a place somewhere between 25th and 50th in importance, and that is not where it ought to be. For all of us who have been associated with South Asia, who follow the issues in the region with a great deal of attention and who know and understand the potential importance of moving ahead on this issue, and indeed despite the parlous times that might make a more activist American role important and possible, it is, I think for us to be cautious but at the same time

knowledgeable, aware, interested in and perhaps continuously in close contact with the parties for the kinds of opportunities, the kinds of openings and the kinds of arrangements that the sort of structured approach that you have raised with us as a possibility should be followed.

The second issue that I want to discuss, which is even more perilous is to look at what I would call principles that might apply to a settlement and opportunities that might accompany the application of such principles to a settlement, not necessarily because they are espoused by an outside party or by the inside party but because they represent, in a familiar way, what those who are looking at the situation might seek to draw out of a sense of equity and fairness. As a result, they might be completely disastrous in reaching a settlement. They may be so far off what political realities, the motivations of ideology and indeed the visions of self-determination which you so wisely talk about would actually bring us to.

But let me take an opportunity, if I can, to do this and to pick up in that regard on some of the points which were emphasized in your book and which you emphasized this morning, which I think are helpful in trying to fashion principles and maybe a sense of opportunities. Let me try to do this briefly because there are others to speak.

I think it is extremely important that a primary interest on our part should be with Kashmiris, recognizing the great diversity that is portrayed in your book

and recognizing the huge challenges that have to be faced even in what I would call intra-Kashmiri debate and resolution. Here, I think that one principle we can be guided by is some of the principles that have come out of the Northern Ireland the potential settlement still awaiting completion there. Here, I would think that, for me at least, the principle of large-scale autonomy for Kashmir in a potential solution is extremely important. That has been widely recognized. It is not a new idea, but I think it is significant.

Within Kashmir and how that is defined territorially presents a challenge. One can see obviously the application of principles of representivity, protection of minority rights as well as the recognition of majority rule, and one would hope those principles could be applied there.

I think it is important to look at a second set of principles that our mutual friend Farooq has championed, but I have always thought made a lot of sense, and that is to accept at least current conventions on the ground with respect to state-to-state territorial divisions by making a massive effort to empty them, if I could put it this way, of political meaning. To some extent, that plays into the hands of autonomy because the opportunity there would in effect be able to unite Kashmir in a common legislature and government, at the same maintain the notion that the line of control could become the international boundary. This doesn't require an enormous twist of diplomatic intelligence to make it happen. It requires practical steps, and that is the opportunity, and I think that can be done.

I have a couple of other opportunities that I think are important. One of those comes directly out of what is the status of Kashmiris vis-à-vis Pakistan and India. My view, obviously, is full independence is not possible or achievable and maybe not economically viable. Options for populations to move on one side or the other could produce a combination of cacophony and chaos. So why not basically make Kashmiris both Pakistanis and Indians all at the same time? This might work. It may not work, but it might work and it is an interesting opportunity and there is nothing in the canons of diplomacy that rules this out.

A third principle that I think that has to apply to a settlement is demilitarization and full authority of local police in their regions to deal with issues of law and order and full respect of the international community including both India and Pakistan for that particular step. I believe that is not only feasible but important and certainly possible.

I think that with respect to the notion of a depoliticized boundary, you have the issues of trade and economy. In my view, these are important in that trade across the lines, to be begun very slowly, but it ought to be the vision for the future. In addition to that, that naturally raises the question, both with respect to Kashmiri citizens and their travel but also their trade and business activities with regard to both Pakistan and India, that they would have a unique and very interesting status and that it would open the door, very early in my view, for the absolute necessity to create a customs union or a free trade area between India and

Pakistan, a good derivation of a settlement as the process could move ahead.

There are many other ideas that are out there, but I throw these out because I loved reading your book and looking for the kinds of thoughts that might support these, and I think they are there. There are also some very interesting arguments in your book that will make this particularly hard to achieve.

So with that, let me in fact turn the floor back to Steve. Thank you for the opportunity to say a few words.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Tom.

Professor Rizvi, would you like to comment?

MR. RIZVI: Ladies and gentlemen, Kashmir has been the most contentious issue between India and Pakistan, and one reason why it couldn't be solved was and perhaps continues to be that both India and Pakistan tried to articulate the issue with reference to their nation-state identities and that made it difficult to find avenues of political accommodation on Kashmir between the two countries. If Kashmir is to be resolved, then the focus has to shift from the notion of nation-state to the human beings, to the ordinary people, to the common people, their welfare and betterment. If focus goes to that side, then perhaps we can find ways to resolve the Kashmir problem.

It is important that since 2004, the two states are trying to shift away from the traditional approaches and find solutions which are not really conventional and trying to evolve new perspectives. It is in this context, that is, in the context

of searching for new perspective, that this book becomes relevant and important because this book talks about new perspectives and emphasizes the dimensions which have remained neglected in the past, and it emphasizes going beyond the notion and interests or approaches of the two states and focusing more on the dynamics of the Kashmiri society, which gives it an important dimension.

The basic argument is that Kashmir is greatly divided. It is diversified. You have multiple identities -- ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional. That is the main argument, and there is no unanimity on the political objectives of these diverse groups which are to be found there. This is true that Kashmir is a diversified society, and any solution of Kashmir would involve building that diversity into it, rather than ignoring or bypassing that.

However, if there are different identities based on any consideration, this does not necessarily mean that Kashmiris are perpetually divided, fragmented and they cannot come together because these identities are overlapping. They are not exclusive -- one, two, three, four. They are overlapping identities, and if you have overlapping identity, then there is a greater possibility of evolving a framework for political action. A person may be following a particular religion, but then he may speak the language which is shared by the follower of another religion. So you have overlapping identities, and these different identities become relevant at different points of time. At one time, one identity may be relevant; at another point, another identity may be important.

Therefore, the important is how do you articulate these identities. How do you emphasize what kind of political discourse you are pursuing? That is how identities become relevant in the political domain. Here, if the objective is to articulate these identities in a kind of framework, a pluralist framework to evolve a solution, perhaps these could be useful and helpful. Moreover, aggregation of diverse interests, diverse identities is possible. I can't get into the details because then it becomes a discussion of political science, but to me on the one hand, I agree that you have to recognize the diversity, but diversity can easily be built into the process and diversity will not be a problem in finding a solution.

In the past, there have been leaders in Kashmir like Sheikh Abdullah on the Pakistani side. Even today, you have sectional leaders. If they are able to interact with each other on both sides of Kashmir, if they interact with their own people, they can aggregate their demands into certain broad categories which are very much possible.

Another point which I want to emphasize here is that despite the diversity and multiple identity, India and Pakistan are going to be the primary players in the game of politics about Kashmir, but they have to be more realistic which I think they are becoming realistic.

Insofar as diversity is concerned, I think there was understanding and accommodation of diversity even in various proposals. For example, if you go to Rowan Dickson's proposal of 1950 when he talks district level plebiscite,

basically, he was trying to accommodate diversity. Then if you look at the proposals in track to diplomacy, there are proposals which accommodate regional, linguistic and ethnic diversity. The third example would be that if you look at General Musharraf's in October, 2005, seven zones, basically it is an acknowledgement of diversity. Then in December, 2006, four point proposal which talks about four things including self-governance and autonomy, making the line of control irrelevant without removing it. These are the kinds of points that emphasize that yes; there is a possibility of finding a solution.

I want to very quickly mention two points about Pakistan. I think one point made in the book is the notion of dichotomy between the military and the democratic political forces in Pakistan. Yes, in the past, this was a major obstacle, a major problem, because if the political forces would go ahead for a solution of Kashmir, the military would jump in and stall the process. But I think at the moment, this dichotomy is not so relevant.

In fact, the basic dichotomy is between the Islamic jihadists and the political right versus the rest of the country. Therefore, there is a lot more support in Pakistan now for evolving an acceptable solution of Kashmir and mainstream political forces may question General Musharraf's legitimacy to negotiate with India, but they are not opposed to the notion of peace with India and an amicable settlement of the Kashmir problem. They support that idea of peace.

Moreover, in Pakistan, you also find a large number of people who could be

described as fence-sitters. They are sitting on the fence, not siding with the supporters or opponents, and they are looking at the process with a lot of skepticism, a lot of doubt. If this dialogue, current dialogue, leads to some conflict resolution -- I am not talking about Kashmir, I am talking about other issues -- if there is some movement in the direction of problem-solving, most of these people are going to be on the side of the peace lobby. Therefore, the developments that take place in the next year or so would be very significant in either increasing support for resolution in Pakistan or decreasing support, depending on if this can lead to some kind of solution of the smaller problems.

Another point is that the military has its own reason to go for peace with India, but I will not get into that discussion.

I also agree with the author's advice to the international community that they should help the two sides, help to create infrastructure for a dialogue, but basically it is India and Pakistan who will have to look for a solution. For the dialogue, the author talks about a sustained kind of dialogue with patience. I think I agree with that.

However, I would add one point, that is, along with sustained dialogue, along with a lot of patience, there is also a need to focus on problem-solving because if things start moving in the direction of problem-solving, I think there is a greater hope for finding a solution that will be acceptable to India as well as to Pakistan and also to the people of Kashmir, and that will bring greater peace in

the region.

Thank you.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Askari.

Ashley, would you please like to conclude the presentation? Then we will go to Q and A.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Steve.

Let me start by complimenting Navnita on writing a really superb book. It is a great book in the best sense of the word in that it first informs you often at a level of detail that most of us have forgotten simply because of the passage of time. It delves at different layers beyond just the political into the sociological, the cultural, the linguistic, and so it is an education that is just worth the money spent, simply acquiring knowledge about the facts which often are not found in a single place within two covers. It stimulates you. Even if you disagree with some of the takes that Navnita has on different issues, it at least forces you, compels you to think about what your own position on the issue may be. Simply as a work of scholarship, it is a first rate book, and I commend it to you for your consideration.

I want to just say a few words about where I think the process with respect to India and Pakistan and Kashmir is today and why I believe that one can be in principle optimistic for the first time since 1947, that at least the contours of a solution are perceptible. The reason for this optimism is not because I have any

secret information about what is happening in the back channel or what the leaders of the two states are actually talking about but because I think there is a fundamental change in the structural factors that until very recently actually prevented a solution to this problem from being realized. So I am not making the argument that a solution is imminent or that it is going to be easy. I am just saying that for the first time, the contours of a solution are perceptible because there are fundamental changes in the structure of the problem that are significant in terms of the ability of both sides to actually reach convergence on the issue before us, and I want to just highlight those four factors.

The first factor is that I think there is a clear recognition on the part of at least the two principal parties, and there are two principal parties -- I agree with Hasan completely -- India and Pakistan, that the use of force has reached the limits of its success. When one thinks about the use of force, one thinks about the use of force at two levels, the interstate level and the intrastate level. Clearly, the presence of nuclear weapons on the sub-continent and a series of wars that have failed to yield a fundamental decision Kashmir have led both sides to the recognition that there is no military solution to solving this issue. Interestingly, one of the paradoxical consequences of 9/11 and the global war on terrorism is that it has also resulted in the use of intrastate violence reaching the limits of its success. This doesn't mean that the jihadist phenomenon can be eradicated tomorrow, but I think there is a very clear recognition that the use of low intensity

conflict as a means of changing the status quo is becoming increasingly inadmissible, increasingly unacceptable to the international community.

What is even more important is that the leaderships in both countries, and particularly in Pakistan, have now reached the stage where they recognize that the use of low intensity conflict as an instrument through the use of jihadist forces actually holds the potential of putting at serious risk the viability of Pakistan as a state itself. This is an evolution that, of course, has been on the train for many years, but the developments of 9/11 and the aftermath have brought us to a position where the leaderships have now recognized that they have to find some kind of an alternative to the use of force, whether that be at a state level or at an interstate level or at a substate level.

Now this is a structural change in the situation which did not exist as recently as a few years ago. One can only be optimistic that thinking on both sides of the border has evolved in this direction.

The second structural change, I think is a change that I would highlight on the Pakistani end, and that is a growing recognition in Pakistan especially within the leadership, and here I talk about the current military leadership in Pakistan, the recognition that Indian success is in some sense unstoppable and cannot be derailed through strategies of innovation through low intensity conflict. I think this has been again an evolution that has been many years in the making, but within the last decade there is a growing recognition in Pakistan that India has

somehow discovered what might be called the magic of the market and is moving in a direction where its trajectory does not permit it to be pulled down a notch or two and its trajectory does not permit it to, in a sense, simply surrender what it already holds on to, which is the prize in Kashmir itself.

So there is this recognition in Pakistan that a new strategy is required, and this is reflected in what I think is the most significant, momentous and consequential change in the Pakistani position in recent years, which is the progressive effort to redefine the problem in Kashmir from being one of a contestation over territory to a struggle to protect the interests and the welfare of the Kashmiri people. This, I think is momentous because it really provides the first breakthrough in principle to the conundrum of opposed positions which come out of established national positions which have been in play for about 50 years.

What is very interesting is that as Pakistan has moved towards the evolution of this position, there has not been a serious backlash from what I think is the vast middle of Pakistani society. There has not been a serious backlash from very important constituencies that matter in Pakistani politics especially the armed forces. As Hasan correctly pointed out and Ambassador Pickering referred to earlier, the new struggle is between the forces of extremism and the forces of moderation, and this provides an enormous space for people who otherwise have different political values to agree that if the solution is to be found in terms of a redefinition of human welfare, then at least the kind of proposed nationalisms that

locked both sides into positions that they could not escape from, in principle become tractable for the first time.

The third structural factor that I would flag is the Indian willingness to change its own positions, and this too is occurring at two levels. Although the legal position in India is that the issue of the dispute in Kashmir is essentially settled and there is nothing to be resolved except Pakistan vacating its aggression in the portion of territories that it controls, the practical upshot in India has been a willingness to concede that Pakistan does have a *locus standi* in this crisis, even if only at a practical level and not at the level of law.

The important consequence, though, of this willingness to shift position here is that it has propelled New Delhi to change its own strategic objectives with respect to Kashmir. Traditional India strategic objectives pretty much revolved around freezing the status quo. When I talk of the status quo, I don't mean simply a territorial status quo but a psychological status quo, a status quo that covers all dimensions of interactions between India and Pakistan.

Today, the Indian State recognizes that the solution to Kashmir will not come in terms of a more durable freezing of the status quo but rather in engagement, not only with Pakistan which is of course a principal actor but also with the Kashmiris of different stripes themselves. So the shift in strategy from in a sense sitting back, restating one's legal position and expecting nature to kind of take its course, now being replaced by a willingness to engage actively, even

though there is no magic solution that the Indian leadership has at this point, provides a very important shift in the Indian position which takes us some degrees forward towards this kind of eventual settlement that is waiting out there to be grasped.

The fourth structural factor that I would flag for your attention is that there is a recognition, again on both sides, that there is going to be no international bailout, no matter what the concerns of the international community are and they are very serious. As Ambassador Pickering pointed out, in times of war and in times of crises, they become more acute than usual. But the fact still remains that neither side can count on the international community to, in a sense, provide Kashmir or the resolution of Kashmir for it on a platter. And so, what this does is it compels both sides to actually reach a resolution on the strength of their own effort and the strength of their own resources. As long as both sides have the opportunity to, in a sense, rely on the international community to provide this political bailout, the incentives to engage in the process that we are beginning to see underway just did not exist.

Today and after 2001 to 2003, it has been amply clear that while the international community will intervene to prevent a breakdown of deterrence, to prevent a breakdown of peace into war, they are not willing to intervene to, in a sense, adjudicate the equities of the Kashmir conflict. That is an issue that has to be done by the two states themselves and has to be done with their own resources.

I think when one looks at these four factors, one begins to see, I think, a change in the kind of environment that afflicted this problem traditionally, and it gives one reason for hope that at least in principle some movement towards an eventual solution can be found out. What this eventual solution is, I don't think anyone quite knows yet.

What Ambassador Pickering flagged appears to be the solution that is tentatively being explored by both the Pakistani and the Indian leadership, and it essentially consists of ideas that revolve around the following cluster: the notion that the two sides of Kashmir would be united essentially by soft borders rather than hard borders and that these soft borders would be reinforced by increasing social and economic integration; the idea that both halves of Kashmir would have an opportunity to revise the terms of incorporation within their own states as well as create new bridging structures that go across the international border; the third notion being the notion of the thinning of military presence or the presence of security forces on both sides; and finally the last idea being some kind of an oversight mechanism that would bring all the parties together to, in a sense, protect the equities of all the actors, should such an agreement be reached. This appears to be the broad contours that both sides are struggling towards to define the solution.

We don't want to underestimate for a moment the difficulties that afflict every one of the facets of this solution. These are difficulties that are as much

practical in some instances as they are conceptual and theoretical because they really involve tampering with very cherished notions of sovereignty that both sides have in different ways. But I think there is still a reason for optimism, as I said, because today there is the outline of a solution which in principle can be imagined, which until very recently could not.

Two sets of risks that both sides will have to deal with if a solution is finally reached: The first is whether the leadership on both sides will be able to sell this to their respective polities, not because there are great differences in principle but politics is always a contentious business and even good agreements can be challenged for less than solid reasons.

There are different dimensions to this problem. In Pakistan, it is going to be less the ability of President Musharraf to sell this to the army or to the political process as it will be to sell it to the fringe actors who are committed to resolving this through force of arms. On the Indian side, the biggest challenge is going to be whether this agreement can be sold to those who will oppose it for ideological reasons and for reasons of being out of power, making it a convenient target when they don't have the ability to, in a sense, get the gains or the benefits that come from this kind of an agreement.

Let me end on that note. Thank you very much, Navnita, again for a great book.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Ashley.

I think we have heard three excellent commentaries on a remarkable book. I would only add one thing, that South Asia has always been seen as an area of contention and dispute and conflict, but clearly I agree with Ashley and others who have spoken on this, that there is a prospect for an agreement or some kind of resolution, some kind of management of Kashmir in a way that would be a good example for other regions of the world.

With that, let me go to Q and A. I will call on Ambassador Schaffer first. Please identify yourself, and if you can address your question or comment to an individual, that would help.

QUESTIONER: I am Teresita Schaffer from CSIS. Let me join in the congratulations to Navnita for a wonderful book that I appreciated particularly because it did focus on the Kashmiris, but I have a question for her in that regard.

She has very rightly talked about the essentiality of engaging with the Kashmiris and involving them as the primary stakeholders. MY question really has to do with leadership. Who among the Kashmiris -- and here I am talking primarily about the Indian side of the line of control where I think the challenge is particularly great -- has the ability to attract enough followers to be the vehicle for this kind of engagement?

MS. BEHERA: There is no single spokesman, I think, on the Indian side of Kashmir, and I think we have to recognize that. There is a whole spectrum of the traditional political leaders, the mainstream political parties who have been

elected, who are members of the legislative assembly. That is one whole spectrum of them. The other spectrum is, of course, the whole of the separatists which voice a sense of wrong that has been done which also needs to be accommodated and addressed.

The only problem is that in terms of individuals, there are no single individuals here that we are talking about. Even Hurriyat, which has long sought the claim of a single spokesman on behalf of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, actually has done very little to meet the test of representation, so to say. There are no members, there have never been any members from Jammu and Ladakh in its executive council. So that leaves out almost 49 percent of the population. There are no representatives from the Kashmiri pundit community in the executive council of Hurriyat. Even among the Kashmiri Muslims, the majority community, Hurriyat is a divided lot. The centralist leaders like Haseem Malik, Shrada Shah, they have all broken away over a period of a few years. There is a whole new class of political leadership that is emerging through the regional political party of PDP.

I think that we have to just accept the fact that there will be no single spokesman when we are looking at the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, that there will be a whole spectrum of people that you will be talking to.

The challenge, I think, on the Indian side is not so much in terms of identifying the established leadership. The challenge on the Indian side is can we

give voice to the solid majority that is out there, which feels differently but does not have a platform to articulate their voices. Somehow, can we bring them into the game of negotiating? I think that is the biggest challenge.

MR. COHEN: Frederick.

QUESTIONER: Yes, Frederick Gall from Carnegie.

I would like to ask you whether the real problem is a lack of unity of the political class in Kashmir or is it the fact that what we are witnessing now is the emergence of a political vacuum which is enlarging and enlarging and may give a lot of ground to extremist political groups? Do you think that no matter the division, the current political spectrum that we observe covers the entirety, if they are summed up, of the political reality of Kashmir today?

MS. BEHERA: Let me put it this way, the problem is not that of political vacuum. In fact, I think over the last four to six years, we have a remarkable renewal of faith in the people of Jammu and Kashmir in the ballot box. I think 2002 was really the point of departure here. They were able to use the ballot box to throw out the party, the National Conference, which has single-handedly ruled Kashmir for 27 years. So I think there is a renewal of faith in terms of using the political mechanisms to change their fate. In that sense, I don't see a political vacuum there.

I think on the other hand, we are at the other end of the spectrum where people are exploring different political avenues to make their voices heard. Even

in terms of the extremist forces, the jihadists are working partly for two reasons now. One is partly the fear factor and partly because it has become a very lucrative business for the commanders of different groups. There is a whole vested interest now to keep the violence going because they are making a lot of money out of it.

What it has lost over the period of the last seven to eight years is the widespread popular local support that we witnessed in the early 1990s. People are looking for a way out in that sense. There is no more political rationale for violence. Mirwaiz's latest pronouncement from within Pakistan is that the arms struggle has to give way. It has backfired. I think that realization is widely shared among the different spectrums of people. Violence has backfired, and they realize that.

The point is which kind of political avenues, what is the nature of those institutional mechanisms going to be, that still remains a matter of debate.

MR. COHEN: Next question back there and then up here.

QUESTIONER: My name is Kami Bartonamek, Kashmiri from the Pakistani part.

My question is to Mr. Ashley. I am sorry I don't know your proper name. If Pakistani leadership is cognizant of the fact that it cannot win Kashmir issue by force, then why is it so hard for India to acknowledge that and come up with some creative solution? My observation is that the Pakistani Army under General

Musharraf is willing to go to any extent to get some kind of resolution, but the Indian Government is lacking creativity or they don't have enough power to decide because as a democracy, they have to appease every segment of the society and that makes it very hard for them.

My question to Steve is this: Do you see Pakistani coming to a kind of economic power compared to India and then there will be a solution because then both countries will know that they have to lose a lot in order to keep fighting with each other and rather they should try to find some solution on a friendly basis?

MR. TELLIS: I think that one has to acknowledge that both the governments in India and Pakistan have come quite some distance from their positions of about 10 or 15 years ago on this question. I don't see it as a lack of creativity alone that is enough of that problem. I see it as part of the complexity of the issue, and I will give you a simple example.

Everyone agrees that one of the long-term components to a solution in Kashmir has to be thinning of security forces essentially on both sides of the line of control. This is easier said than done. It is easier said than done because at one level it impacts on the whole issues of state sovereignty. States have the right to keep whatever forces they want, wherever they want, as long as it is within their territory. It is also a practical problem. How can one justify moving in this direction if there is a continuation of violence which is perpetrated by various extremist groups within the region?

One solution to this is to say okay, let the state controllers of these groups put these groups out of business. Then the problem disappears, and then we can proceed to thin security forces. If it were true that all groups were controlled by the state, that solution would be viable, but we have now reached a stage in Kashmir where there are many groups operating in the area that really don't answer to any state institutions. As long as that remains the case, the idea that one can simply thin security forces is going to be very difficult to implement.

When one looks at the different facets of these solutions that have been proposed by President Musharraf in the last several months, one realizes that conceptually they make for very good ideas that ought to be explored, but implementing them is going to take a great deal of hard work because the circumstances on the ground don't quite permit them to be implemented as easily as one might imagine. It is these complexities of implementation that I think come in the way of a ready solution rather than simply issues of lack of creativity.

MR. COHEN: I will answer the question about Pakistan and the military and the economy. I think that beginning with General Karamat or at least Karamat himself and then I think it spread elsewhere in the army, came to the conclusion that Pakistan's economic model wasn't working and that while India was admired for its development and progress, there was a lot of concern that Pakistan was going to collapse economically. In fact, if it hadn't been for 9/11, the Pakistan economy was totally, just totally out of business. I think that has

been taken on board by Musharraf and the other generals.

I spent a couple of weeks in Pakistan recently, and I was astonished at, I won't say how dovish the generals were but how willingly they were or Musharraf was to talk about possible different arrangements for Kashmir. So I think that has permeated through the Pakistani establishment including the military which is a major change from the past, no question that, at least temporarily, Pakistan has changed.

I agree with Ashley, but I would put that slightly different. I would say the Pakistanis traditionally try to use the United States to put pressure on India for a Kashmir settlement. The Indians discovered in Kargil in 2001, 2002, that they could use the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. So, in a sense, the U.S. is in this peculiar of being used by both sides against the other, but I think they realize that since America doesn't show any great interest in being very active, that they had better sit down and talk.

I regret to say this, facetiously, of course. I could be out of business as a student to South Asian security issues. In a sense, I could have to find another form of employment.

I do think that if things go on the way they are going with increased trade and movement of people and on the Indian side, the statements by Advani and Jaswant Singh about reinterpreting Juna and the whole notion of Pakistan, astonishing transformation of the BJP's position. I think if these continue to

happen, these events, and on the Pakistani side, a willingness to engage and to come off the traditional Pakistani position, I think there will be a Nobel Peace Prize at the end of the road for somebody.

Not for me, that is for sure. I definitely don't favor a peace settlement. It would put me out of business, the business of writing books about crises in South Asia. That is a joke, by the way.

AMB. PICKERING: Could I just make a few remarks?

MR. COHEN: Yes, sir.

AMB. PICKERING: I think also, Ashley, you touched on another reason why creative ideas advanced rapidly are still difficult is that the parties spent a long time convincing their publics for a long period of time they were right. They were not advancing creative ideas but establishing what I would call the recognition of their sovereign rights. Moving off that takes a certain amount of time, and I think that is difficult.

The other piece is that I think not only has fighting its disutility -- you and I both agree on that -- I think there is an added point that in all insurgencies of this type, you get fatigue of the public. The public just gets tired. You see it in the Middle East. This isn't necessarily always translatable rapidly into change, but it is out there. My feeling is from a long distance, that that is still a feature particularly inside Kashmir now of the situation.

MR. RIZVI: Can I just make a comment?

I think in addition to the dialogue that is going on between India and Pakistan, there is a need of a dialogue within each country because within each country, you have diversified opinion on the issue. If there is a dialogue among different groups within each country, perhaps consensus can be arrived very quickly.

MR. COHEN: the gentleman all the way in the back. Is that you, Allen? Do you have your hand up?

QUESTIONER: Thanks; Allen Crosset, Congressional Research Service.

I wanted to ask about something the author just alluded to and that may be an under-discussed aspect which is the role of money. There is a business, it seems, to be going on both with insurgency and counter-insurgency. The Center has pumped a lot of money, tremendous amounts of money into Jammu and Kashmir, not all of it perhaps well spent. At the same time, I have heard stories about some of the top Indian generals living the good life in the cool mountain air, not necessarily eager to get back to Delhi. When I met a Hurriyat leader, he was late for the meeting because he came in from the golf course.

So I wonder if this is maybe not attended to well enough, that the business interests, the money interests involved may have a momentum that could be hard to stop. Do you see this as a serious obstacle?

MS. BEHERA: Yes; there are two sides of the story on the money part. One is the vested interests. Very briefly, it is for real. The whole middle level

commanders, especially Hizbul Mujahideen and even Lashkar-e-Toiba and a couple of other groups who are really active on the ground. They are making such rich amounts of money from extraction, from cuts in their relevant activities, government sources everywhere, that for them to give up the gun, they are at variance with our top leadership. The top leadership of these military groups have a different set of political objectives. They would like the political part to be handed to them on a platter which nobody will do, but nonetheless they have a different set of objectives. The middle level commanders are loathe to give up the gun for the simple reason that the money they are making is far better than they would in case they were to give up the gun. It also applies to some extent to the para-militaries and to the army and the security forces of a different range. That is one negative set of the money part of the story.

The positive part of the money side of the story is that I think for the first time in Kashmir's history, because of the violence, a lot of Kashmiri youth which was earlier only confined to the valley have gone through different parts of India and discovered a completely new life for themselves which is peaceful, which is making money, which is living a very easy, comfortable life. The connections go back to the valley, whether it is handicraft or whether it is tourist business or whatever they are doing, whether they are sitting in Gaya or whether they are sitting in other parts of the country. The links go up to the valley. Stories travel back to the valley as to there is another way of living life, a very positive way of

living life.

So the positive spin on the money side of the story is that if we are able to push the Indians' unfolding economic success story, if we can somehow take it to Jammu and Kashmir and show people the other side of what their investments can do, the trade link which is going up to Kanpur, it is going to change the way Kashmir trades with the rest of India. It is really going to transform. Kashmir has never had anything, any trade links with the rest of the country. Things are in the works in terms of the momentum over there. How much it will take off, it is still at the very early stages at this point of time, but very positive stories are happening on the other side as well -- the economic wealth, the private investments.

Curiously enough, one flipside of the positive side of the story is that Article 370 does not allow Indian citizens to buy property in Jammu and Kashmir, to protect their ethnic rights, and that is actually becoming a deterrent factor for many industrialists in India to invest big amounts of money over there. So in this whole churning process where they are thinking and rethinking Kashmir's political relationship with India, on the economic side, there are a lot of questions also being raised on should we be looking at changing these rules of the game, allow the private investment to come into Jammu and Kashmir. Would that change things qualitatively around there? A lot of debate is happening there on the other side as well. There are both a good side of the story and a not so

optimistic side of the story.

MR. COHEN: We had a question here, Chris.

QUESTIONER: Hi, I am Chris Fair from USIP. I have actually, Navnita, a question for you.

I would add perhaps another structural consideration. I have been, for the last several years, looking at these militant groups, and I think Lashkar-e-Toiba is a really good example. It makes me think that it is not a Kashmir dispute; it has really become a different kind of dispute where the Indian heartland has been sucked in. For example, Lashkar-e-Toiba has been much more effective at recruiting Indian cadre and Indian commanders, and we saw this coming out of Gujarat. We saw the involvement with Simi. I think the best example of the devastation of these Indian-recruited Lashkars are perhaps their capabilities are demonstrated in the Mumbai subway assault.

I guess my question would be: Isn't it possible that maybe the Kashmir dispute per se, because of perhaps attrition, they don't enjoy the local support in Kashmir, but in fact we might see a decrease in the kinds of violence in Kashmir or certainly diminishing in the quality of violence, meaning not spectacular attacks, not attacks against hard targets, against the security forces, maybe grenades at the episodic tourist, but we might actually see groups like Lashkar forgetting Kashmir and really aiming for higher sites? You see this in their rhetoric, trying to both exploit and foster at the same time a greater Hindu-Muslim

issue.

At the same time, when I was in Kashmir this past, I think it was September, I was also struck that the Hindutwa politics in the plains have migrated up there. When I talked to NGO workers who lament not only the devastation of the geography of these pilgrims, they talk about roads being expanded, pilfering J and K forests to expand those roads and the whole business of the yasrah and the pilgrimage is becoming an entirely different phenomenon.

It seems to me the Kashmir dispute itself has actually changed because of these structural factors, and it makes me wonder substantially, irrespective of what happens to the LOC, we have brand new fish to fry that I don't think our policy approaches are adequately appreciating.

MS. BEHERA: To some extent, I agree with you. It is way beyond Kashmir, but that is not a new development. It is like I think the Hizbul Mujahideen that were confiscated almost five or six years ago, they had made it very clear that they were not going to keep the violence confined to Kashmir. The strategy was becoming all India. It has been in the works. I think Gujarat and other incidents like that has just been canon fodder to them, easy recruitment, and I completely agree with you there. But there is a realization in the intent and establishment of the challenge they are facing.

I think you are right. The Mumbai blasts really drove home the point that it is not necessarily the guys coming from outside, but some of them could be right

in here, the local guys. In that sense, I think it is expanding. I agree with you. But on the other side, in terms of addressing the challenge, the networks that are expanding in Gujarat, Mumbai or Andhra Pradesh or others, a very different strategy is what is required to deal with these kinds of networks, Lashkar in the valley itself. I think there is that nuance beginning to come about, a realization that needs to come about, that even if you were to be able to deal with them in the valley, that doesn't mean end of story. There is a lot more happening there.

In the Hindutwa ground, I have a slight different take. Actually, BJP has used the Hindutwa ideology in Kashmir, but if you look at their record for almost about 10 years, I think the highest point of Hindutwa taking the Hindutwa plank, there was Murli Manohar Joshi's flag march. But since then, they have actually taken a very pragmatic stance. First they took it out of their Indian manifesto, the small business about removing Article 370. Then they moved it from their own party manifesto which was quite a big shift, not noticed outside. Then BJP national leadership has very publicly refrained itself from supporting the local Jammu and Kashmir BJP demand for clarification. They have stayed clear. Even Advani would refuse to go on record in supporting the clarification demand which is a very big important development there.

I think another important shift was made by Vajpayee who actually went beyond Nehru. Nehru's stand was that to all the secessionist groups who had taken to the gun, give up the gun and we will talk to you within the framework of

the Indian constitution. I think Vajpayee really broke new ground there when he talked about the Hizbul ceasefire and said nothing in the constitution, let us talk within the framework of humanity. That was, I think, completely breaking the mold from what BJP and Hindutwa were.

I think BJP has been taking a very pragmatic line on Kashmir, so I don't see it a spoiler factor. Yes, there are local politics. Last year in July, 2005, they sent one letter saying that you haven't built it all, but I think that had more to do with internal politics there. I think if you were to look at their track record, it has been actually quite positive. I don't really see BJP turning into a spoiler factor if we are able to arrive at peace in Kashmir.

QUESTIONER: I didn't mean BJP. I simply meant the concept of Hindutwa, not necessarily the political aspirations embodied by the BJP, more the individuals, the companies that run these tours, for example, and the people that go on those tours, not the political leadership necessarily that captures that ethos.

MS. BEHERA: I don't think they have much grassroots support there. I mean they are very limited to outsiders coming in there, but if you were to look at it in terms of grassroots support, I don't really see much evidence of that.

MR. COHEN: Navnita, I think that is another book, and we will invite you and Hadji back to write that book.

We have time for one more question. Dennis.

Navnita will be here afterwards, so you can catch up with her.

QUESTIONER: Dennis Kochs from the Woodrow Wilson Center.

I think it was Professor Rizvi who mentioned that for a dialogue, peace process, et cetera to continue over the long run, concrete things have to be achieved. I am wondering what in your view or anybody on the panel collectively, what has made it so hard for an issue, particularly the Siachen to get solved? It seems to be there, the apple about the fall off the tree, but somehow it never falls off. I am wondering what you all think about that.

AMB. PICKERING: Having dealt with Siachen at a bad time, I will tell you that my sense was that for many of the reasons that Ashley discussed in response to the question, the inability to move the country on a small issue made it necessary to wait on the small issue until you can get to the bigger one because moving on the small issue carried all of the difficulties of moving on the big one as a symbolic concession to the other side and had none of the advantages that came out of it with rare exceptions. The notion of confidence-building measures in the psychology of dealing with this issue has been reversed. Instead of building confidence step by step in a normal ladder, they have been seen as unconfidence-building measures with respect to management of the domestic political scene, maybe less in Pakistan than in India, but my sense was in India, that that was the driver and that made it hard.

Now we read in recent weeks that they are jointly surveying Sir Creek, so maybe we can see an opening here and maybe we have gotten close. Maybe that

notion which comes from the nineties when the issues were much more confrontational and the problems much more as a result intractable, is going to move. Let us hope, Dennis, that that is the case because I think normal diplomacy at some time will take over, but at the moment we have a kind of abnormal diplomacy that governed that particular issue which I think has been tragic because looking at this problem, having to solve the hardest problem first in order to bring your public along is climbing Everest to get to the foothills.

MR. TELLIS: Let me just say one thing on Siachen. The problem today is trying to understand what that solution looks like. The Indian Army has taken the view that if they are ever required to recover that land after having abandoned it, that is an unacceptable option. Before one thinks about what needs to be done to resolve Siachen, one needs to have a conceptual solution of what that solution is.

Are you talking of demilitarizing the area with no one present? Are you talking of both sides maintaining some presence, transforming the current presence into something else? Until those issues are resolved, I don't think you will get the kind of fixes that have been discussed publicly in the last few months.

AMB. PICKERING: Just to add to that, there was this totally abnormal preoccupation with before coming down, and I think the way some of the issues that you raised could be solved was to determine where people are.

MR. RIZVI: Their station.

AMB. PICKERING: I offered photography as the answer to that particular

issue which I think would do it, but nobody had any faith that could really answer that question.

The notion of deciding where you are now before you come down had to do with the fear of unraveling which is, I think an important point that Ashley made. I don't think that is beyond resolution in all honesty. I think the really depolitical issue was we are not ready yet to take this to the public. We have got too many other things to deal with. Too many other domestic issues trump this one.

MR. COHEN: Let me Ashley, Askari Rizvi, Ambassador Pickering and, of course, Navnita above all for making this, I think an excellent discussion of a remarkable book. I think that after we invite you back to write that second book about the spread of extremism in India, we will have another book.

Let me also thank Bob Flaherty and the Brookings Press because this book was written partly while she was here, partly in India. We had a long distance arrangement which actually worked out quite well. If it hadn't been for email, you wouldn't be here today.

Please join me in thanking this panel.

(Applause)

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