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RED AND BLUE NATION: HOW DEEP IS AMERICA'S POLITICAL DIVIDE?

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Keynote:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. NIVOLA: Good morning, everybody. I'd like to get started because there's always the risk that the Congressman may be called away at any moment. So, I'd really like to get going here.

I'm Pietro Nivola, the Director of Governance Studies at Brookings, and I and my co-editor Dave Brady are here from the Hoover Institution welcome you to today's discussion.

This is December 8, fortunately not December 7. Gladys, thank you for not holding this – organizing this event around the day that would live in infamy. December 8 for Catholics is a day of the Immaculate Conception. For Buddhists, if you're a Buddhists, it's the day of enlightenment. And our book is not exactly immaculate, but it is a good conception, and I hope it will be enlightening to you.

At any rate, the subject of our discussion today is a notion that gets bandied about a great deal, but it really is poorly understood, namely that the politics of this country have become in some sense – and I'm going to put this between very big quotation marks – in some sense more "polarized."

Now before we can drill down into that question, let me just say a couple of things. First, trust me, we have not been overtaken by events, namely last November's election. This country is blessed with a remarkably resilient and supple democracy. And once again, I think it's showed its capacity to re-balance itself. And indeed, it is true that the new equilibrium does, to a considerable

extent, reflect the pivotal votes and indeed the power of the electorates' vital center.

But let's not forget what this election was not about. It did not suddenly wave some sort of magic wand over our politics and banish once and for all the intense partisanship that we've seen in recent decades and suddenly sort of poof, kind of usher in an era of good feeling.

Intense partisan contestation in this democracy, as in any other healthy one, is pretty hard-wired. And it's just a matter of time before we're going to be hearing about it all over again. Watch what happens in the run up to the 2008 election. Believe me, you're going to see the Dems and the Grand Ole Party demonizing one another once again pretty soon.

So, hang in there. In less than two years time, I can promise you that we're going to be back in this room discussion how deeply polarized our political parties are. So that's my first comment. My second one is more enjoyable, which is to introduce Congressman Tom Davis, whom I deeply admired and who's agreed to get us started today.

Congressman Davis has just been reelected for the 7th time in Virginia's 11th District. He's the chairman of the Government Reform Committee.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: For a couple more weeks.

MR. NIVOLA: For a couple more weeks. He has a strong reputation for working across the aisle and for taking his congressional oversight

responsibilities very seriously. Here's a quote from an article about him in *Role Call*, "Kudos to Representative Tom Davis, Republican of Virginia, who takes his independence as a member of the legislative branch seriously and who has actually focused on oversight for a long time and who has managed in this era of tribal politics to cement a good working relationship with his ranking minority member, Representative Henry Waxman." That was written by our friend and often collaborator Norm Ornstein at the American Enterprise Institute.

On page 34 of our book, Bill Galston and I write in one paragraph, "Crucial component of the deliberative activity of Congress is the oversight function. Congressional oversight of the executive branch has faltered in the past half dozen years. How much of this neglect can be imputed to "polarization," rather than simply the effects of unified party control is a very difficult call. It is inaccurate, however, to portray the republican controlled Congress as supine.

Early in 2006, for example, an investigating committee of the House issued a report on the executive branch's response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A more blistering Congressional critique of executive mismanagement in modern times would be hard to find." Guess who wrote that report? I welcome Congressman Davis.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Well, thank you. You know, after that Katrina report, somebody asked me, they said, you know, Tom, you were chairman of the campaign committee for the republicans in 2000-2002. You've

been a good partisan. You just wrote a blistering report against the administration. Are they angry with you? And I said, well, I think they were pretty upset for the first couple of weeks, but I think we're all patched up because Dick Cheney called a couple of weeks ago and invited me to go hunting with him, so I thought we were all fine.

You know, I'm going to really talk today about this remarkable book, which I look forward to reading in total on Red and Blue Nation. And just to give you some thoughts on somebody who's been through the campaign committee for the republicans as chairman in 2000 and 2002, who saw polarizations and realignments taking place in certain parts of the country, I always start with a story. I'm going to go back quickly to my college days. I went to Amherst, which is a small college in New England.

In the fall of '67, a group of us – you always went up a week early. You had the bull sessions in the dorms as you were getting acculturated to what you were about to get in. And it was a class of high SATs and overachievers, and it was clear there was one guy in the class there who's SATs weren't as high as everybody else's and his grades hadn't been as good.

In fact, this guy was just plain dumb. It was clear from the first day. And his name was Moose McGee. And Moose was a football player, a heck of a football player, and he led us to victory over Williams three out of four years, so that's what the admissions committee saw in him.

But the Moose had one thing the rest of us didn't have. This guy had instinct, man. He operated on instinct. He could walk into a complex lecture and not understand a word that was being said, but he would hone in on the buzz words that the professor was throwing out. And he would write these buzz words in his notebook and regurgitate them in some fashion in the final exam or the final paper, not always in the appropriate context. But the words were there, and he'd get the benefit of the doubt and get a C minus.

And this is how the guy operated for four years and walked across the stage class of '71. He wasn't Cum Laude or Magna Cum Laude, but he graduating dead last in the class and you wondered what happens to a guy like that when they go out in the real world. I didn't know.

For 10 years, he never made the alumni bulletin, which is quite an achievement. Because in a class of 300, although we had people like Scott Tarow(?) and David Eisenhower and others in the class, a lot of doctors and lawyers, if you got married, it was an automatic. You were in the bulletin, you know. If you had a hot date, you might make the bulletin. Moose never made it.

But I go back to my tenth reunion. I'm a hundred feet from the car and one of the fraternity brothers comes up and says Davis, did you hear Moose McGee is coming back for the reunion. I said, "What's he doing?" I haven't the slightest. Poor guy, we're all so successful and stuff, and you know, we don't want to flaunt our success in front of this guy. He was, after all, he was a brother.

And well, about an hour later, this chauffeur-driven Rolls Royce pulls into town. And the Moose is in the backseat. He's not driving it, as you might of expected. He gets out. He's got a couple little Mooses with him now. He takes a suite of rooms at the Lord Jeffery, the nicest hotel in town. Class dinner, we had not quite this many people but it was a room and we went around, everybody just takes a second to tell us what they're doing. Moose doesn't say a thing, except he gives a $250,000 check to the alumni fund. I mean you could have heard a pin drop. Everybody is afraid to ask.

But later in the evening, this is a reunion weekend and it's an open bar, and you can imagine a couple hours later, I'm back – for the record, getting about my sixth diet coke of the night – but I'm back there and the Moose is there. And one of the fraternity brothers comes back and he says, Moose, he says, I don't get it. We're all doing pretty well, but you just wrote a sixth figure check to the college. He said you were the dumbest guy in the class. He said, "How do you make that kind of money?"

Well, the Moose illustrated with his answer why the most important attributes you can have, whether it's politics, business, athletics is instinct, not intellect, instinct. And he said well, guys, he said I had a few bucks when I graduated from the college so I bought into this small company that makes these gasket heads. He said we found out we could make these gasket heads for a

dollar a piece, but we could sell them for five dollars a piece. And he said, you know, you just can beat that four percent profit.

So, in this August body of intellectuals here today, I'm just going to instinctively try to give you some instincts in terms of my reaction to the issues that are raised in this book. And I think I'll start with the map of 2004, because I think it's really pronounced when you take a look at this 2004 election map. This was a map where cultural politics became the dominant themes in the political landscape.

Culture has always been a part of the patchwork quilt that makes up American party coalitions. But I don't think it's ever been quite as dominant as it is today. You know, parties, you know, historical contexts, culture is a part of it, ethnicity, economics, regionalism; all of these go into making up parties.

But if you take a look at this map, basically you'll find out that the closer you got to a city, the more Democratic it became. And the further you got from a city, the more republican it became. And republican cities like San Diego, Indianapolis, had never gone or very rarely gone democratic that year. And you've got rural areas like West Virginia that had traditionally been democratic were going republican pretty heavily. In fact, had Bush lost West Virginia in 2000, you know, Florida wouldn't have mattered. But in fact, he carried it and his margin went up in 2004.

A very cultural election and the interesting thing is as you look at

these rural areas and you look at the blue in the rural areas, you can see down the Rio Grande Valley, those are majority minority counties.

So Indian counties, Hispanic, and Black majority counties and the Black belt here in the South make up the rural areas that Kerry carried, plus two other groups, college towns and what I call the Granola Belt, the areas out there – I love Blaine County, Idaho up there, surrounded by a sea of 65-70 percent Bush county, but that's Sun Valley, Idaho, 59 percent for Kerry. Teton County, Wyoming and you look at Jackson Hole going democratic.

You know, Aspen, Vale, this is where all the beautiful people are out there vacationing and buying things and now voting. And not just the beautiful people, you get all the slackers that come into this college towns and it's kind of the hang-alongs in there and just drive up the margins in Charlottesville and Aimes and Iowa City and places like that.

It's really interesting to behold, and if you want to look fascinatingly in Montana this time where Conrad Burns lost, he lost in Missoula. And you know, traditionally, you'd say he'd lose in Silver Boat or Deer Lodge County, these traditional labor strongholds. Missoula, where they have same day registration, overwhelms the presidential turnout and just overwhelmed him.

So, these components are still there. And of course, I felt the war, just to the liberal culture base, just re-gave a lot of oxygen to it. So, that's kind of the way it's worked.

Now, let me just point some of the wealthiest precincts in America, your Potomac, Maryland, McLean, just locally went for Kerry. But some of the poorest areas in – the only – we have a trailer park out in Fairfax County out there in Dulles that went heavily for Bush and for Allen this time, one of his best precincts. And in fact, Oliver North is one of the three precincts we weren't carried in Fairfax.

Culture still is a very dominant theme and particularly in suburbs and in somebody who's represented the suburbs, both as head of the county government in Fairfax and now is a representative, you start understanding that.

I traced the marriage amendment in Virginia this year and tried to see well, there's got to be some kind of correlation between the marriage amendment vote and George Allen, and there is in some cases. But in Fairfax some of the strongest areas have voted – this is the county that voted against the marriage amendment. Some of the strongest areas that voted for it went heavily democratic.

And you'll look at it a little closer and they have large African-American Muslim majorities, ethnic majorities. These are people who are very traditional on some of these cultural – but for other reasons are voting democrats. And of the course the trick in this business is you try to – whatever your – in putting together coalitions is, you want to add up to a majority and not a minority and it seems like to me the cultural alignment has helped the republicans narrowly

in 2000 and 2004, given other factors can really blow back against them in some circumstances.

Now, the South has long been cultural. As you read the book, *Southern Politics*, they talk about race being the central issue of southern politics that kept it in one party for so long. But in 1928, a huge cultural component when the democrats nominated a Catholic and a vet, in the outer south, which was not quite as heavily invested in the race issue as the deep south, broke away and voted republican. In my state of Virginia in 1928, voters not being akin to splitting their tickets, in fact, is the – as Hoover swept Virginia, carried in three Congressional seats for the republicans in 1928, carried in one in North Carolina. Charles Raper Jonahs's dad got elected that year. And Jonahs came back, his son, in '52 with Eisenhower started the revival.

But 1928 in Virginia, three House seats went republican. 1930, of course, the Depression comes in and around the South, everything goes back to normal except one seat in Virginia in Norfolk, Menalcus Langford(?) gets reelected and by a pretty healthy margin in Norfolk. So, the democrats had a dilemma in 1932. They could not allow the republicans to get any kind of a beach head. They'd put up with this in the ninth – in both the fighting ninth, which had gone back and forth with the Slimps(?), father and son, throughout the teens and the twenties, and they did not want to have to deal with that now.

So in 1932, when redistricting came to Virginia, they ran nine

members at large. And that was the end of Menalcus Langford. His Norfolk base couldn't carry him in a statewide election. And that's how they dealt with it at that point.

A couple of other themes in this book is how much does – gerrymandering, because that's had an affect on polarizing the House. And as I read a kind of handout today, it said artificially locking down a number of non-competitor districts, redistricting process, and sconces and march partisan House members, but overall contrary to conventional wisdom, gerrymandering has been marginally complicit but not the prime suspect.

I will just speak for our caucus on the republican side. I think democrats are going to have the same problem. We operated under something called the majority of the majority rule, which is a terrible way to run the House. The string runs out on you after a while, but it's the way caucuses tend to operate. And, what would happen there is you'd have our members from the safe districts, there are only races to primary. They don't worry about general elections. They don't need to talk to their democrats, because all they focus on in coming back is their republican base.

And we keep getting things about the base this, the base that, and they have had I think a very detrimental effect in terms of being able to work across party lines, forge coalitions, and address what I think are the meaningful issues in this country like, you know, in a globalizing economy, what do we need

to do in America to compete educationally, I mean everything else. What do you do with the retirement baby boomers? What's the effect on the system going to be as the baby boomers retire on the federal budget? You know, what about energy independence?

These are issues that I think are very important to the future of this country. They're not really addressed in this map. They're not really addressed much in Congress. In fact, if you look at these Senate campaigns this year, you've heard very little about it, heard a lot about some article somebody wrote 20 years ago or something like that. But you're hearing very little about it.

And a lot of this comes, I think, because of the polarization within the parties and just the inability to have discussions across party lines on these issues. So, I think the gerrymandering has had a detrimental effect by creating so many safe seats now. About three fourths of the seats are pretty safe, that members look to their primaries and so democrats are looking over their left shoulder at their left flank; republicans looking over their right shoulder and the right flank. They're more worried about a primary than anything else.

And we're seeing this playing out in Virginia this year in the primaries for the state Senate and the House of Delegates in trying to get a meaningful transportation bill, which to my constituents is the only reason we look to Richmond for anything is to try to get a transportation system. And we've got members who are just frozen in safe seats around the Commonwealth just

looking at what happens if they vote for any kind of revenue enhancement.

So those are the kinds of issues that we have now. EJ Dionne has talked about the, you know, a lead up to this on religiosity and values voting. And I think that is still a major component, but I get the feeling, giving the fissures that are created by the globalization of the economy and the issues that raises in trade and everything else, that some of the clash now between a republican White House is going to be markedly market oriented, free trade, and a democratic Congress that has some I owe you's coming out, the Democratic Party has a different perspective, that the issue matrix may change.

And depending who the parties nominate in 2008, you're always constantly going else – minor realignments. You see components in every election. We may be ready for something different. I've thought for some time that we might see something different. But the economy has generally been good enough that people haven't' even focused on these issues.

So you get the people from California and nobody voting for free trade out there along the coast in these areas that elected basically on cultural issues. I ran some races out there in the Bay Area and we had some good republican candidates, but if they voted wrong on guns one time, they'd get blasted up there and that was the end of them. Or in Matt Fong's(?) case, he'd given a contribution to a Christian organization, Reverend Sheldon's group, and that was the end of him. I mean, there are just certain thresholds culturally that

members couldn't get past and so we never got to a discussion of these other issues.

So I think the subject of this book and the scholarly approach to this is fascinating reading. And I look forward to reading it in full and even making more comments when I'm better informed. And I, of course, have high respect for the authors and the contributors to this.

So, I think I will stop there and do a couple questions if anybody has any before I get back to the House. We are in the midst today of trying to get a few bills passed, including major trade bills. I've got a postal bill up that is – everybody who cares about the bill is satisfied, except for – we're in a fight between the republican study committee and the appropriations committee over how certain things are scored under some arcane scoring rules.

So if the majority leader calls, I have to get back up and try to finish this out and pass at the Mike. But that's where we are. I'd be happy to take any questions anybody has on political alignments and at least share my instincts.

SPEAKER: Several commentators have commented about how personal the animosity has gotten, how bad it is in the hallways. And I wanted to get your perspective over time whether you think it's just the political class that is developing this polarizing or whether you think red state people are staying out of blue states, and blue state people are not touching down in red states. Does it go

all the way back to who you're representing?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: I think it's driven by leadership. You know, we found this in Virginia when you had one party domination. Everybody voted Virginia gentlemen and ladies, and once it got close, it got very, very personal. And it's driven by leadership that for one reason or another think that getting personal works to their advantage one way or the other.

I've had a great relationship with Henry Waxman, my ranking member, which causes some problems. In fact, when I came up before a steering committee, the question is you're close to Waxman, how are you going to be able to handle it, you know, you're not tough enough. And it's just not in my nature to be nasty.

And I just pointed out to some of the legislation we were able to move through on a bipartisan basis and said some of this stuff, these school vouchers and stuff like that, which Henry didn't support, but having a relationship made a difference when they offer 60 amendments or 2 amendments and we could move the bill through the floor. And I think they understand, but a lot of it is style.

I think Boehner is going to be much easier to deal with than Delay on those issues, quite candidly on our side. I don't know how Pelosi will develop, but Hoyer has a great reputation for working with everybody. And you know, we'll just have to see. But a lot of this is leadership driven. Average members

actually get along okay. You see people sitting back and forth, and you don't have the number of trips that you used to have, where members could have bonding experiences.

But, I don't feel it's that bad among rank and file members. Now, the new people coming to town sometimes bring a little chip on their shoulders. Some of our members in '98 did, and at this time, you know, they're the enemy we fought. But over time, I think there are enough grownups in the room that if we get some leadership, I think it'll dissipate. But part of this is practiced, it's managed, it's conscious. We want to keep our distance. We want to stay tough.

We want to hit them hard because that was, in point, part of the way the republicans came to power in '94, was by personalizing it. And part of the way the Democrats came back was by personalizing it against a leader or two or three or four, depending how many people screwed up in a given year.

EJ?

MR. DIONNE: Wonderful to hear somebody who follows the returns from Deer Lodge County. I wanted to ask you two related questions, which are to what extent do you think the old formula for building a republican majority was shattered in this election, and whatever you think of that, what do you think a new republican majority would look like?

If you were building one now, if you were running the RNC or the party or the White House, how would you build a new republican majority and

how new would it be from the old one?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Well, I've always felt, you know, everybody talks about the middle class – did anybody see Lou Dobbs last night on this assault on the middle class? I had to turn this thing off. I could only watch it about five minutes. But it was – I've always felt that we are the party of strivers. That's how I envision myself as a republican. I am an economic conservative.

And I – we're the people of the upward mobile groups who look at an opportunity. We're not the handout groups and we're not the guilty rich. And if I were looking at a party, I would be looking at ethnic groups. I would be looking across some of the cultural lines and throwing that out and just try taking a look at our economic policies. That, by the way, happens to coincidentally play very well in my district. But if you're Virgil Goode and you're sitting down there in Martinsville, where your factories are closing and your unemployment rate is up, that's probably not a formula.

So there's a lot of institutional resistance among members who are republicans or have switched or whatever that they don't want those alignments. So, if you take a look at this, it works very slowly. It will be dictated by your presidential candidates. Nothing like a presidential election crystallizes these things.

You know, Goldwater did more on the civil rights issue to polarize the situation with LBJ. African-Americans had started to trend democrat, but you

know, he still had some strong support there. But the Civil Rights Act of '64 crystallized it for a generation, maybe two generations for African-American voters.

So I think it will have to change at the top. And that is, you take a look at the nominees. If the republicans were to go to a brown back or something like that, I think these get encrusted and even get hardened for the republicans. On the other hand, if you nominate a McCain or a Giuliani or somebody like that, this will – I don't want to say it will be irrelevant, but will be less relevant.

We see this in Virginia in terms of the coalitions for the republicans when Oliver North ran for the Senate and when John Warner ran. When John Warner beat Mark Warner in 1996, I was Warner's campaign chairman. We swept the suburbs in Northern Virginia. We did well in the urban area, and he lost the fighting ninth district and got really trimmed in the urban and the rural areas.

When Oliver North ran, he carried the ninth district. Of course, in Fairfax County, it was a different story. He was radioactive out there. He's – we used to say when North came to Fairfax, you couldn't find me with a search warrant we stayed so low, because it was – he just didn't play there. But you go out 30 miles and he's there in his plaid shirt and everybody loved it.

And so, but this stuff crystallizes at the top first. You know, we had – the South was emerging. It goes back, because that's certainly where my

expertise is, is the South was starting to emerge out of a two-party system. It had dissonant coalitions for republicans, Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas, who put together, you know, African-Americans as part of the – Linwood Holton(?) in Virginia, they were putting together multi-racial coalitions for the republicans, which is the way you might have thought it would have started. Because republicans were the party of the African-American fighting one-party democratic rule in these states for you know, 60-70 years. But it didn't last. After Goldwater, it was just so dissonant with the state and national, so I think this stuff comes from the top down. And who the parties nominate will – can have a huge bearing on how this is affected. I also think from both the Bush campaign and the Kerry campaign last time, there was an accentuation of these cultural ties. And the republicans by methodology, by their micro targeting, by getting the subscription list to *Guns and Ammo Magazine* and mailing the heck out of that, democrats doing the same thing with some, that they exacerbated these tensions.

But it's not permanent and it's driven from the top. And that was – I think there are underlying issues, economic and the like that are going to make for some big changes, but it's got to come from the top. You need some cataclysmic event at the top I think to start moving things around in a national way. It's kind of inarticulate but I think you understand what I'm saying.

MS. MULLIN: My name is Mary Mullin and I come from

Massachusetts. I was wondering – Massachusetts is known as a democratic state, but almost always has a republican governor. And I was wondering if you could explain that a bit.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Sure. I mean, well, they don't now, but Devlin was kind of a – not viewed as a traditional Democrat. I mean, he came out of nowhere to win it and everything. It was four straight republican governors with a lopsided legislature. By the way, Rhode Island is the same way. Rhode Island has now had governors – look, voters either – Wyoming, a very republican city has a democratic governor just elected with a large majority over an overwhelming republican legislature.

The reality is given these alignments, there are a lot of people who may be self-described republicans or democrats who aren't comfortable with all the elements of the coalition and frankly aren't comfortable with one party in control of things. And if you look at the American electorate over the last 50-60 years, the majority – I think almost two thirds of the time, we've had divided government.

In fact, I think one of the huge contributing factors that – two years ago, I wrote a memo on leadership saying when you hold the House and the Senate and the Presidency, your time is limited. The last time a regime held it three straight cycles was 1966 when the democrats took a 47 seat hit in the House. Voters like divided government. They don't trust either party. Last time the

democrats held everything was ‘92 and they took it on the shins in ‘94 and you had a republican Congress going back.

So, I think voters, you know, prefer divided government. I looked at it this way. When we were elected in ‘94, I said, eh, the voters elected us to protect them from Bill Clinton. Then two years later, they reelected Clinton to protect them from us. And it’s kind of the thing where given the coalitions that make this up, there is a segment of voters that are just not comfortable and so they divide government figure. And you know, they’ll put up with the minor irritations of government shut-downs and impeachments as long as nothing major happens when one party controls everything. MR. NIVOLA: John, is that you back there?

MR. RAUCH: Jonathan Rauch, Brookings. Thank you, Congressman Davis. Just following up on that, what is your own personal view of the experiment in unified control we’ve had the last four years? Do you think we’re better off substantively as a policy maker with divided government with unified? I ask a bit naively, but I have some republican friends, and indeed, the polls are showing a lot of republicans are now saying they prefer divided government.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Next question. Let me give you this. Here’s the reality. No party controls government because there’s a Senate. We’ve presided over the Senate. We didn’t control the Senate. How many

filibusters in the last Congress? There were dozens of filibusters. I mean, the Senate is kind of the bastion that gives you divided government even when you don't have divided government.

But look, I'm not going to sit here and defend the last Congress. I just went through a campaign where I tried to step away from it as quick as I could. You know, I was quoting Ornstein and Mann's book every chance I could get, showing that I wasn't – in '96, I had to convince my constituents I wasn't a freshman republican, you know. I've got one of these districts out there that still is a self-identified republican district, just like some of these suburban Philly's – Philadelphia districts are still majority registered. And people want to be republican but they're more concerned about the social right than they are about the democratic left.

So are we better off with divided government? Not – not if somebody comes forward with an agenda and needs to move it through, which about every generation, you need a little bit of that. But on a consistent basis, I think divided government works pretty well.

MR. NIVOLA: Congressman, can I butt in and ask a question?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: You can, sure.

MR. NIVOLA: I was intrigued by what you said about the role of the primaries in driving members toward the extremes. But the actual number of challenges hasn't increased; it's pretty modest. Yet, there's this concern about the

threat of a possible challenge, right?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: I mean you've got the club or growth out there that can come in a just drop a million dollars on you and you can ask Schwartz about that or Chaffee about the threat of doing that. And you've got the same thing on the democratic side. There are just enough challenges to keep people on their toes. I'm sorry.

MR. NIVOLA: So, that's – well, that's – you're answering the question. I mean, I just – I guess I was wondering how real is the threat and how much – or is it being exaggerated?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Well, from where I sit back there in the cloakroom, huddled up there by the voting boards in the back where they keep the computers and watching members who vote late on some of these issues, it's a concern.

MR. NIVOLA: Uh-huh.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: I mean it goes through members – you know, I don't mean that members won't take a tough vote for the good of the country once in a while, but I mean, ultimately, political candidates votes their own interests in terms of coming back and reelecting. It is my theory – James Buchanan won a Nobel Prize out over that. He was a professor out at George Mason. So that's the reality and that's the talk and that's the threat all the time.

MR. NIVOLA: Diana, did you have – sir, go ahead.

SPEAKER: Congressman, I think you were in one of my classes at Amherst College and after hearing you about McGee, whom I don't remember, I'm very glad I gave you a grade higher than a C plus. But I do have an Amherst-related question. I think the last and maybe only president coming from Amherst College was Calvin Coolidge. No offense meant, but could you envisage a national career for yourself?

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Well, first of all, let me just say I did tell the Moose McGee story once. It was on C-Span. I got a call from David Eisenhower. And David said Tom, I don't remember Moose McGee. And I said, Dave, he was a composite figure. So, I just – well, I mean this is a national career. I mean serving in Congress is a national career. Being a committee chairman is national. And you know, you still get to spend nights at home.

And you know, my wife is in the state Senate in Virginia as well, where they – I will tell you and you talk about party threats, Virginia has got so many primaries going on in the legislature over so many that supported revenue enhancement for transportation. My wife supported it and won her primary with 80 percent. In our area, they want transportation answers. They don't want you to come back and say we didn't raise your taxes but your commute has gotten a half hour longer.

But these are fundamental issues that divide. Our party's problem has been not that our mission statement is bad but taking that mission statement

and implementing into a policy. It's great to have a philosophy but ultimately, you need policies. And we have just not been able to, and you can look at the last two, four years and put that into any kind of cohesive policy.

Generally, the White House leads the way. I never understood why the White House led with Social Security. Medicare, hey, that's right on top of us. I can understand that. But, so you've got all of these kinds of things and individual leaders matter. And crumbling of coalitions – I mean Roosevelt, for all his strengths and weaknesses, cobbled together a coalition that lasted a long time. But part of that was leadership and his ability to not just understand it, but to go out there and make it work and have people believe. A part of the failure of coalition sometimes can be a failure of leadership. I'll just stop it at that.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks, Congressman. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I want to ask you what issues and which people, which individuals, if you had to sort of put some people up here on the stage and develop an agenda that said this agenda and these people define what I think are the best of the Republican Party, circa 2006. So you don't get to put Reagan up there, but you've got to deal more in the here and the now. Who are those people and what are those issues?

Because I just would editorialize and say to the extent that I would say that there was a time when it was clearer, the last few years it seems to me, the party has gotten way off the track for reasons that you know about. So I'm

interested in what you keep talking about or you made reference to the mission statement and the philosophy and et cetera, and I'd be interested to know what you think that is and who and what represents it.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: I think it's all over the lot. I mean I think that the Pense element from the conference is certainly an element of the coalition. If you take a look at the polls right now, in almost every poll the two leading republicans are Giuliani and McCain. I mean that's a seat change from where the party is in primaries 8 years ago, when you take a look at where a culture is. But probably your greatest innovation is out in the states where you have republican governors that have to govern, some more successfully than others.

Take a look – I mean Huntsman in Utah, hands on people who understand business, who are republican economically, who are not liberals, not pushing a liberal social agenda, but not driving that to the front either are folks, I think that as you take a look at the future of the party – but look, it's a – this is a vast, diverse country. Alabama is a lot different than California. There's a religiosity, a secular ethnicity and everything else.

And the problem for our party is do we want to be a national party or do we want to end up being a rural, white male party. And we have a lot of republicans that describe themselves as, you know, pro-gun, pro-life republican.

And I'll never forget when we had that special election for Norm

Manneta's seat. I was not chairman of the campaign committee then, but I was involved with it. And we had a meeting and all our members were up there. It kind of tells you how parochial members get when one of the members said well, do got the gun owners? Are they all out? Do we have them mobilized? And I said there aren't any in that district. Well, how about the church people? We got all the Christians? There aren't any.

So, what's a republican? It's different in the Silicon Valley than it's going to be where most of these guys are from. And if you want to cobble together a majority and if you want to govern and if you want to be a national party, you have to retool. I don't decide what the middle of the road is or what – where the mean point. The electorate does every four years. And the beauty of the two-party system is that parties retool.

If you nominate a Goldwater and McGovern and you end up, you know, down in the dumps, you retool yourself to come back to fight in the political marketplace, which the voters ultimately decide. And the intervening events, the economy, all these things have an effect on that. But our party right now is I think looking for a way forward.

And you can look at the President's numbers to say that that's probably not going to be the direction we take. We're going to do something different. Now which way they go, I think, is going to be – that's what history is going to write at this point. But – so I would get a group of people who probably

couldn't put anything together now and say look at these folks.

But in the governors' races, where you actually have to govern, that's where you want to look for the future of the party. Because we're a great party on the outside. I mean nobody is better in beating up the people, whether it's talk radio, whether it's our mayoral guys, members.

But when you've got a governor and you've got to piece together a coalition and you've got to make hard decisions, that's tough. I mean that's what brought us down is having to do that for so many years and having everything. And anybody with a grievance gets angry with you when they perceive you as controlling everything. Groups that helped elect us in '94 were out there screaming for our heads this year.

And democrats will find the same thing. The good news for the democrats is that regardless of what Congress does, you still have Bush in the White House. And unless he can rehabilitate himself in some significant fashion, that's still a guy to beat up on and keep their base happy beating up on somebody.

Good news for us is we don't control everything now. We have a foil. I can't tell you how important it was in the 2000 midterms that Jim Jeffers walked across the aisle and became a democrat. Because we can run against the Senate being, you know, holding up the agenda, even though when we got a chance to enact the agenda, either nobody wanted it or we couldn't enact it.

That's just the way it works. And it works both sides. I don't

mean that to be critical. That goes both sides. This is a tough business governing in this day in age and disappointing people and cobbling together a coalition in a complex country with a lot of different interests at stake.

MR. NIVOLA: I want to thank you, Congressman Davis –

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Thank you.

MR. NIVOLA: -- for having joined us today. And I hope that you'll come back for Act Two, which will be about a year from now where we'll be asking the question well, so what, who cares whether we have political polarization. Because I'm sure no one will be able to answer that type of query better than you.

And I just want to wish you all the best for the 110th Congress. And I hope – I pray actually that Henry Waxman will work as well with you as you worked with him.

CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: I think he will. I think – again, my mom said do unto others as you'd have them do unto you. And I hope – well, we know – the good news and the good relationship between a committee chairman and ranking member is that you know, there are things you fight about. There are serious differences in our philosophies. But we don't fight about what we don't have to. And I think that makes a huge difference. In the House, unfortunately, they were fighting over who the chaplain was going to be; remember that?

I mean, it just gets – now they're fighting over the smoker's lobby,

which for the record, I think they ought to get rid of it. But that's – you know, that's how bad it can get. And you know, we're all adults. People expect us – look, I'm a hard partisan at election time. I've got the record to prove it, 2000-2002. We ripped the skin off of some of the democrats. We ended some careers. But when it's over, people expect us to act like adults. And we'll see how we do. But I'll be happy to come back anytime.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. NIVOLA: I've just been sent a note here that Jeanne Kirkpatrick died yesterday. I'm very, very sorry to hear that. And my deepest sympathies go out to her family.

Okay. Here we are. Okay. This is sort of Part Two of our session today. And let me begin by mentioning what are sort of the main bones of contention over this phenomenon called political polarization. Basically, there are four.

The first is that while most people agree that our politics have become in some respects more – certainly more partisan but also more polarized in recent decades, the question is in which respects – and over that, there is a lot less agreement.

Secondly, there's also a little consensus about – as was brought up in a question earlier, a few minutes ago, about whether the phenomenon affects

principally or exclusively the political class or actually runs deeper and extends to the mass electorate.

Third, while some observers really believe that the current partisan divide is remarkable by historical standards, others are not so sure. And you're going to be hearing from my colleague Dave Brady at some length on that subject.

And finally, of course, the causes and consequences, not to mention the remedies are a matter of intense dispute and debate. So with these puzzles in mind, Brookings and Hoover got together about a year ago and teamed up to try to get to the bottom of this complicated matter to figure out what's going on and try to make some sense of it.

And we're publishing two volumes. This is the first. The second will be out about a year from now. And the first volume is – consists of the following contents: first of all, a framing essay that I wrote with my colleague Bill Galston; followed by a really pivotal essay by Morris Fiorina of Stanford University, who – let me grab – excuse me – wrote this book about two or three years ago, *Culture War: The Myth of a Polarized America*, which really got the whole debate on polarization started. That's followed by an essay by Dave Brady of Stanford and Harri Han(?) of Wellesley College, who are here in the front on the history of polarization, especially with respect to the Congress.

I should back up for a second. The Fiorina essay is followed by a

very interesting exchange between him and his coauthor, Matt Levendusky of Yale and Allen Abramowitz(?) of Emory and Gary Jacobson of the University of California at San Diego. Well worth reading, very lively.

The essay by Brady and Han are followed by comments from James Campbell of Sunni, Buffalo and Carl Cannon of the National Journal. That, in turn, is followed by an essay by our Brookings senior fellow, EJ Dionne with comments from Allen Wolff of Boston College and Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center. EJ's chapter deals with the key role of religion in the polarization debate.

The fifth piece is by Diana Mutz of the University of Pennsylvania, and it deals with the role of the media. It is followed by comments from Thomas Rosenstiel of the Project for Excellence in Journalism and Gregg Easterbrook, who is a visiting researcher fellow here at Brookings.

Finally, we have the essay by Tom – my colleague, Tom Mann on the important question of whether gerrymandering is at the bottom of the polarization problem and to what extent. His interesting article is followed by comments from Tom Edsall of Columbia University and Gary Jacobson, again, of UC San Diego.

Now, I want to – don't want to forget to mention here that none of this would have been possible without the support of three foundations, MacArthur, Rockefeller Brothers, and Smith Richardson. And we deeply thank

these three funders for supporting our work. I also want to thank my staff, Gladys Arrisueno, Bethany Hayes, Andrew Lee, and Erin Carter for having pulled everything together. This is a complicated juggling act and they did a great job.

Now, what I want to do is proceed as follows. I'm going to present – quickly, sketch the main findings, especially in this volume. I will then introduce the panel, the panelists, who are the main contributors to this volume and ask them some questions so they can discuss their work. Then that'll be followed by some give and take among the panelists and then we'll, again, open this up for Q and A from the audience.

Okay. First, how divided are we? The general answer that we sort of came to is that the notion of a great American culture war is bogus. We all agree with Professor Fiorina on that. But it is at the same time true that our politics are more partisan than they were in nearly a generation ago, and the partisan differences have gotten sharper or more polar, if you will, on certain issues, for example, questions of foreign policy.

Second, is political polarization a top-down phenomenon or a bottom-up phenomenon? The answer: it's mostly top-down. That is, driven by the political class. We all agree on that. But several of us contend it is also somewhat a bottom-up phenomenon. That is, here by popular demand, so to speak.

Is today's polarization unique historically? The answer: if you go

far back enough in time, polarization today, especially in the Congress looks more like the historical norm than the historical exception.

How much of a role does religion play? Answer: observant religious voters have been flocking to the Republican Party and driving the party to the right on some "values issues." Secularist – excuse me. That by no means shows how religious I am, but densely populate the democratic base and drive that party to the left on such issues. But overall, religion has not yet trumped other factors, such as class and race as determinants of voter preferences.

Do the mass media contribute to polarized politics? Answer: quite likely and in at least four ways, by segmenting audiences into sort of etiological sort of echo chambers, niche markets; siphoning off potential voters, mainly moderates and independents into entertainment outlets; the horse-race effect, which is as Diana Mutz will clarify later, tends to de-legitimate the losers in elections; and televising incivilities, sort of the in your face cat fights that are on TV.

How much does gerrymandering polarize the House? Answer: By artificially locking down a number of noncompetitive districts, the redistricting process, to the extent that it's gerrymandered, tends to entrench some arch-partisan House members. But overall, contrary to conventional wisdom, gerrymandering has not – has been just basically marginally complicit, a marginal contributor to the problem, but not the prime suspect.

What are some deeper roots or causes of polarization? First of all, party realignment in the south, that is, the loss in the democratic party of its conservative southern democratic base; the end of the Cold War, which sort of created a situation where the parties were relieved of having to pull together and could afford to start pulling apart in the absence of this great external threat or the evil empire. Partisan divergence on certain foreign policy matters and certain wedge issues are also an important contributor.

Now here's a bit of a preview of what we're going to be discussing a year from now. So what? How much difference do polarized politics make? The preliminary answer, and this is pending further research, is that actually the polarized parties, in Congress, for example, have brought less legislative gridlock than commonly assumed. But they seem to have complicated four essential tasks in the political system.

One is addressing the nation's long range fiscal imbalances and restructuring the welfare state; sustaining a dependable foreign policy; third, ensuring a sound process of judicial selection and maintaining the independence of the judiciary. And finally, there's a problem perhaps ensuring a public trust in our governmental institutions. Okay. Now let me tell you who the panelists are. First of all, Dave Brady – by the way, I want to express special appreciation to those of – to my colleagues who flew in all the way from the West Coast for this event. That's a long way to come for a book launch, even by

Brookings standards. I also want to thank Diana Mutz over here for being on the Amtrak on a weekly basis to come down for our various functions here.

Dave Brady is my co-editor. He's a senior fellow and deputy director of the Hoover Institution. He has the Bowen and Arthur McCory Professorship of Political Science at Stanford. He's the author of at least a half a dozen important books on Congressional elections, parties, and Congressional history.

Morris Fiorina is also the author of at least a half a dozen key books that are required reading in any respectable college political science course on American politics. He holds the Wendt Family Professorship in political science at Stanford. Again, his most recent book, *Culture War: The Myth of a Polarized America* is really largely responsible for having ignited this entire national debate about the meaning of political polarization and is in many ways what inspired our project. And, as I mentioned to him, in his honor, I wore a purple tie today.

Bill Galston, my colleague is on the panel. He's a Brookings senior fellow, author of another big batch of books on American politics and public philosophy and American public policy. And he's my co-author on the lead chapter of the book.

Diana C. Mutz is Samuel Andrew Stouffer Professor of political science and communications at the University of Pennsylvania, where she is the

Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics at Penn's Annenberg Center. She's the author of several books on political behavior and psychology, the most recent of which is *Hearing the Other Side*, which was published recently by Cambridge University Press.

Tom Mann is a senior fellow with me. He holds the Harriman Chair in Governance Studies. He's one of the nation's leading Congressional scholars. His most recent book, *The Broken Branch*, has received widespread acclaim and rightly so.

And finally, EJ Dionne, author of the well-known book, *Why Americans Hate Politics*, which is also sort of a driving force behind some of our thinking here. He's a senior fellow in my department. He's also, as you know, a syndicated columnist with the *Washington Post* and a professor of government at Georgetown University. EJ is the only person I've ever met, aside from my classmate, Bill Weld, the former governor of Massachusetts, who graduated Summa Cum Laude from Harvard. Everybody graduates with honors or even magna from Harvard, but I only know two people who graduated with a Summa, so that's EJ for you.

Well look, let us take a few minutes break here to get organized and get up on the stage, and then we'll resume.

(Recess)

MR. NIVOLA: Okay. Let's begin here with Professor Fiorina.

I'm going to ask him a two part question really. First of all, we've been talking about political polarization, but what is this thing? What is political polarization? And how does it, if at all, differ from partisan sorting?

Second part is how deep does it run. Is it just really an elite phenomenon or does it drill down deeper into the mass electorate, the average voters?

So, Mo, you're on.

MR. FIORINA: Thank you, Pietro. And thank you all for coming out on such a bitterly cold morning, at least by West Coast standards.

In the book, we try to debunk a narrative that had become dominant about American politics probably beginning with Pat Buchanan's speak at the Republican National Convention in 1992, in which he declared a religious war, a war for the soul of America, and culminating after the 2004 election, when Gary Wills wrote a column called the End of the Enlightenment, in which he compared red state voters to Al-Qaeda and Simon Shama(?) wrote a column in which he said the divisions in the divided states of America now resembled Sunni/Shia.

And the narrative, as you can infer from these kinds of remarks said that the depolarization of politics in this country, which we all agree has occurred at the upper level, certainly the national level in many of our states, that that polarization was driven by the fact that the populace, the electorate is

polarized, engaged in this fast cultural war.

And what we did in the book, which Pietro showed you was to amass a lot of evidence showing that that was not the case. This is what I take to be the common sense definition of polarization. Think back to your college stat courses. Two urns here full with blue, red, and gray marbles, the one on the left is about one third blue, one third gray, and one third red. And the blues are all D's for democrats, and the reds are all R's for republican and the grays are all I for independence.

At time two, when we look at the urn, all the I's are gone. The independents are gone. Everyone is either a blue D or a red R. And this is what we mean, I think with the popular definition of polarization. It means the middle has vanished. The extremes have gained at the expense of the middle.

And what we've showed is that is if you look at public opinion data on people's positions in the country using the big databases, the general social surveys, the national election studies, Gallop and so forth, there was virtually no evidence of that. We had a lively debate in the spring about whether more or fewer people call themselves moderates today than did years ago.

We found some Gallop data afterwards. This is the percentage of people in Gallop surveys calling themselves either liberals, moderates, or conservatives in the seventies, eighties, nineties, and 2000's averages. As you can see, liberals are down a little, about 20 percent. The middle row as conservatives,

they're about the same. The upper row or the upper line is moderates. So, it's the case that fewer people called themselves moderates in the 1970's, a generation ago when nobody was talking about polarization than called themselves moderates in the 2000's, when everybody is talking about polarization.

But what has happened as we recognized in the book and is the substance of our paper is there has been partisan sorting. And what we mean by that is this in a comparison of two urns. Now, these are identical in terms of the numbers of reds and blues and grays. They're identical in terms of the numbers of D's, R's, and I's, but they're related differently.

The urn on the left, there are a fair number of blue R's and a fair number of red D's. That is conservative democrats and liberal republicans. In the urn on the right, there are far fewer. The blue are much more likely to be D, and the red are much more likely to be R.

Now something like that has clearly occurred at the upper levels. The republicans in Congress for example have gotten rid of their northern liberal wing. The democrats have gotten rid of a lot of their southern conservatives. And to some extent, that has occurred in the population as well. But again, following our general point, this is mostly a top-down phenomenon, we show in this paper, in this volume, that the sorting at the mass level is less than at the elite level.

And what we did was several things. First, we divided issues into

categories, new deal type social welfare issues, racial issues, cultural issues, and defense issues. And then we looked at how people out there in all of America, all across the nation, ordinary republicans and democrats, how they felt about those issues. And what we found, again, contrary to a lot of popular literature, like Thomas Frank and so forth, What's the Matter with Kansas, that Democrats and Republicans today remain better sorted on new deal issues than anything else.

You know, if you want to tell an ordinary republican and democrat out there apart, the best information you can have is social welfare type issues. We found in regard to racial issues and cultural issues, that originally these were not partisan sorted at all, that if republicans and democrats didn't differ, they had become significantly partisan sorted. But, still they haven't reached the level of new deal partisan sorting. And by the way, on the new deal issues, the sorting has increased, not decreased over time. Not only is it still more than racial and cultural issues, it's also gone up over time, rather than declined.

Defense issues, it's an interesting category. We see no increase in sorting until 2004. And then you see a big jump. And the question here is will this – will Iraq be like Vietnam, it's going to leave its stamp for a generation, or will it be something that goes away when we get out of the war. And it's just simply too early to tell. But the parties now have – are appreciably separated on defense issues in 2004.

We then broke down the categories into individual issues and

looked to see if there might be one particular issue driving something. What we found there was a variety of patterns. On some issues, both parties are – Democrats are becoming more liberal; Republicans are becoming more conservative. It's other issues, it's all moving on the Democratic side. In other issues, it's all moving on the republican side. In other issues, they're both moving in the same direction but not at the same rates. So lots of different things going on that a simple argument that democrats are moving left and republicans are moving right doesn't full capture.

And finally, the point of which I said at the beginning, the sorting is limited. The sorting at the mass level is not nearly as extreme as the sorting at the elite level. And for example, take an issue which has been considered to be the touchstone issue of the culture wars, abortion. This is from the 2004 national election study. It is taken right around the time of the election. These are only people who call themselves strong republicans and strong democrats, so it's like half of each party that is most strongly identified. And as you can see, among republicans, and again, opposition to abortion, this is just a central element of the republican platform, a quarter of the strong republicans say abortions should always be legal. And about 40 percent are simply out of line with their national party's position, strong republicans.

On the democratic side, it isn't quite as much. And the democratic leadership has finally gotten -- finally begun to believe they have to support a few

pro-life candidates here and there if they're going to have a majority. But in their base in strong democrats, about 33 percent, about a third of them take what you could call a pro-life position. That is, abortion should never be permitted or only in the most extreme cases, rape, incest, or when a woman's life is in danger.

Now, the current election I think – I mean, it's a little premature. But I think it very much validates the line of work I've been talking about, that the US electorate in 2006, the independents were there in numbers at the polls, 26 percent and this is a midterm, which is 50 percent lower turnout than in the presidential elections and the drop off is primarily among independents and weak partisans in the midterms.

Moderates, self-identified moderates who went to the polls were nearly half the people who showed up this time around. There have been a number of columns, EJ Dionne has written one. I think Revenge of the Center was the headline it ran under. Out where we were, seeing other things called the Center Strikes Back and so forth, that there was lots of indication that the biggest swing against the republicans in this election was various kinds of moderate categories. Self-identified moderates, seven percent, independents, 12 percent swing to the democrats, suburbanites 10 percent swing, very much sort of a revolt of the center.

And I – it's going to – when the detailed political science analysis come out, they're going to show a lot of different things going along, I'm sure.

And they'll probably show that the – I'd say, in the end, about 50 percent was accounted for by moderates and independents. But given the number of independents, that's all.

But I think at the very least, this election should put to bed this notion that the base strategy is the wave of the future, that the old strategy of trying to capture the center no longer is relevant, and you can win by firing up your base. That, I think we saw the pitfalls in the base strategy here.

There's plenty of split ticket voters out there. There's plenty of floating voters out there. Even if they say in one election I'm a democrat or republican, they can move. The map of state governors looks a lot different from the map of the – Bush Gore map, that we see a lot of states in which Bush carries and yet they have a democratic governor or Gore or Kerry carries and they have a republican governor.

Obviously, California here, I always read murder mysteries when I take my cross country flights and yesterday, I brought along Tom Edsall's Building Red America. It's sort of a combination murder mystery and suicide story.

The most interesting thing to me was that I've always blamed, like everyone else has always blamed Carl Rove for the base strategy. Because there are certainly different reams of copy on this. And he reports that it's really Matthew Dowd's fault, that Matthew Dowd convinced Rove, who was at that

point following the compassion conservative strategy, that he did some analyses, which I'd love to see showing there weren't any moderates anymore; there weren't any independents; there weren't any split ticket voters.

There was nothing to be gained by that strategy to mobilize the base. And ironically, Matthew Dowd, and I assume it's the same guy, was Schwarzenegger's pollster. Now, what is Arnold Schwarzenegger but a creation of split ticket voters and floating voters. In the recall election, 20 percent of Schwarzenegger's vote came from people who said they voted for Gray Davis the previous year. And this last election, more than 750,000 Californians voted for Arnold on the top line, went one line voter to lieutenant governor and said well, I won't vote for Republican McClintock. I mean there's lots and lots of split ticket voters out there.

And finally, just to go one level down, t his is a map of the country, which looks at states whether they're all blue, all red, or mixed. That is they've two chambers of the legislature plus the governor. As you can see, the country is about half split at least. So it's the case that there are lots of people out there who cast different voting decisions at different levels at different times on the basis of different issues, and the whole notion of a red/blue cleavage that runs right from the very top right down to the very bottom is bogus.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks, Mo, very much. Now, we – originally, Gary Jacobson was supposed to be among – on the panel here and his role was to

challenge Professor Fiorina a little bit anyway because he would argue that Professor Fiorina somewhat understates the extent of polarization, at least at the mass level.

I'm going to ask Bill Galston to impersonate Gary Jacobson, whether he's willing to or not. But in light of the recent election, the revenge of the moderate middle or however you want to call it, what is your take, Bill? I mean, would you lean toward or tilt toward Gary's side of the argument or closer to Mo's?

MR. GALSTON: Fiorina paid Jacobson not to come.

Well, I will neither impersonate nor channel Gary Jacobson, nor am I going to try to treat Jacobson and Fiorina as sort of off on switches. There is a continuum here. I'm going situate myself on the continuum and you can make your own judgements as to whether I'm closer to one than the other.

And let me begin on a note of emphatic agreement. First of all, yes, it is the same Matt Dowd, and he's recently co-authored a book in which he's totally recanted his famous 2001 memo and argued that in fact, American political parties are collapsing and virtually every voter in the future will be mobile voter. So, you know, those of you who traced the conversion of Stalinists and staunch anti-communists in the late forties and early fifties will recognize this phenomenon.

So, let me just make a couple of points of emphatic agreement with

what you've just heard. First of all, the thesis that polarization means the disappearance of swing voters was always an implausible thesis and it's been I think refuted I'm sure by the 2006 elections. We saw it in not only moderates and independents, but also Catholics and Hispanics swinging very significantly and a finer grained analysis from I'm sure a lot of other groups.

Secondly, if polarization is taken to mean the end of political competition or competitiveness, then 2006 was not a good year for that thesis either. Here are some statistics. The number of competitive congressional districts settled by 10 points or less more than doubled in 2006 from 32 to 66. The number of highly competitive congressional districts settled by margins of five points or less more than tripled from ten to thirty-three. And by the way, lest you think that was a sign that democrats narrowly took a large number of seats, in fact, 20 of those 33 seats were narrowly held by republicans. And so, there's still some low hanging fruit on the tree for democrats.

And it's also the case that after 2006, more states can appropriately be regarded as purple, not only Virginia but a number of states in the southwest that were previously considered to be solidly republican states.

So, the question then arises what about polarization? Has the 2006 election simply eviscerated that thesis? Is it purely a top-down phenomenon with no legs in the electorate? The answer is no, I don't think so. And I'm going to take as a very quick case study foreign policy polarization.

To begin with, I do not accept the thesis that foreign policy polarization at the level of the mass electorate began in 2004. As a quick snapshot, Vietnam created a split within each political party, first the Democrats in the late sixties and the early seventies and then in the Republican party from 1975 until 1980. For the Democrats, it was resolved in favor of the dubbish wing of the Democratic party, and for Republicans, it was resolved in favor of the hawkish wing of the Republican party.

And those developments mirrored to a considerable extent developments at the grassroots level. One saw that, it seems to me, very clearly demonstrated in the vote on the authorization of the use of military force in October of 2002, where the Republican Party was entirely united on the question. All republican senators, for example, voted in favor of that resolution. For democrats, it was a nearly even split, 27 in favor, 23 opposed. And I can assure you that they were not entirely oblivious to the feelings of their constituents.

Now, some findings from three recent surveys. From a survey taken in November 2003 by the Pew Research Center -- this was well before things were seen to be going sour in Iraq. Here's a proposition. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength, Republicans 69, Democrats 44. I am very patriotic, Republicans 71, Democrats 48. We should all be willing to fight for our country, right or wrong, Republicans 62, Democrats 46.

From the 2006 exit polls, about the war in Iraq in general, those in

the category of strongly approve, 87 percent of the people in that category were republicans; 12 percent were democrats. Strongly disapprove, exactly the reverse, 11 percent republicans, 87 percent democrats. Should we withdraw some or all troops? Among those who said no to that proposition, 75 percent were republicans. Among those who said yes to that proposition, 74 percent were democrats.

And now on the analytical question, has the war in Iraq improved US security. Those who said yes – of those who said yes, 84 percent were republicans, 15 percent democrats. Of those who said no, it was 21-77.

And finally, from a survey released just yesterday, copies of which have been made available to the panel and the audience, the world public opinion knowledge networks poll, here are some questions plucked almost at random from this survey. Here's one. As a general rule, if leaders of some countries grow more afraid that US will use military force against them, do you think on balance this tends to be? And here's the first option: good for US security because then they are more likely to refrain from doing things that the US does not want them to do. Fifty-three percent of republicans said yes to that, only 20 percent of democrats and just the reverse, of course, for the bad for US security.

Here's another question. Which position is closer to yours? The only way to counter the threat of terrorism is to find and destroy terrorists. It is

naive and pointless to try to understand their intentions or to imagine that we can address any of their concerns, republicans 55, democrats 20, and the opposite split for the other take on that question.

Even assessments of facts, some say that a campaign of repeated air strikes could fully destroy Iran's nuclear program. Others say that even if air strikes took out some targets, Iran would just rebuild, et cetera, et cetera. Do you think it is or isn't possible to fully destroy Iran's nuclear program through air strikes? Republicans 48, democrats 27.

On questions of whether or not we nonaggression pledges with Iran and North Korea as a way of conducting nuclear diplomacy with them, should the US be willing to make such commitments? Republicans 31, democrats 55. Another factual assessment, do you think the US military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force? Well, 68 percent of republicans think so, but only 14 percent of democrats.

Do you think that the US should or should not have permanent military bases in Iraq? The same kind of split, dramatic differences on the question of whether we should withdraw all US forces within six months, on a one year or two year time line, you would add all of that together and you get three quarters of democrats and less than a third of republicans endorsing some kind of time line.

Even assessments of other people's beliefs. At this point do you

think the majority of the Iraqi people want the US to commit to withdraw US forces according to a time line of no more than a year? Seventy-five percent of democrats think that's what the Iraqis want, only thirty-five percent of republicans, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

The point I want to make and you know, I cannot predict the future. The point I want to make is that right now there is a deep fundamental polarization, not just at the elite level but at the public level in the mass electorate on not only what we should do in Iraq right now and a year from now, but fundamentally, how do you think the world works.

Do people respond to diplomacy? Do they respond only to force? Can we talk to our enemies? Can we obliterate our enemies? These very fundamental premises that will drive US foreign policy in the future are a matter of deep contestation and almost no agreement between the two principal political parties today. If that's not polarization, I don't know what is.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks, Bill. I want to move to Dave Brady next. However, I just want to give Morris Fiorina a chance to respond or comment on anything that you've said if he wishes.

MR. FIORINA: Just a clarification. What we found in our data was that there had been no increase on sorting on foreign policy issues until 2004. It wasn't that the parties weren't sorted. They have been since Vietnam. But there was no increase and then in 2004, we did show a sharp one. And the

question is how long it's going to last.

And the only -- you know, and I don't know the answer. And I certainly hope the answer is that it goes away. I hope the situation is not as deep as Bill suggests. But I think to a great extent people take their cues from leaders. And even about such factual things as are there weapons of mass destruction, is diplomacy over preemptive war, et cetera, clearly people are keying off Bush.

I mean I agree completely with Gary Jacobson that Bush is a divider and not a uniter. And it's less people's fundamental positions then the sort of what Bush has done and what he's telling them. The semi-hope is that if there's another republican who sort of has a different world view and starts espousing different principles, that we'll see a reflection of that bringing the parties closer together. But Lord knows whether it's going to happen or not.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks. David, help us put today's polarization in a historical perspective. What's different and what isn't? How does the partisan polarity, especially in Congress compare to the past? Is it sort of striking by historical standards or is it just par for the course?

MR. BRADY: So, my coauthor, Harri Han is out there. I get to present. If there's any hard questions, she'll answer them.

So, the answer to the question is so – first let me say what we did. We have a measure which you can sort of consider the Americans for Democratic Action of Act 1867, so needless to say, the ADA didn't work. So we have a

measure of ideology that goes back – takes all roll calls from 1867 to present. 2002, I think is what this table shows.

And the idea is how often to republicans and democrats cross lines and vote with each other? And so the answer is here's the United States House of Representatives. So this is partisan overlap in Congress. And the scores are from 1867 to 2003. We chose 1867 because there was in fact a republican part then that wouldn't go away. And so the question is look at that. So, if you go back the line is flat, absolutely flat until you get to the post World War II period. And so the greatest line shows that this sort of overlap between democrats and republicans is at the 10 percent level. And then the dash line is at the 25th percentile on the chart.

But what's the point to be made of that? The point to be made of it's only in the post World War II period and only there where there's this significant period of overlap. By the 1980's, by the end of the Reagan Presidency, the line is right back down to where it's been in American political history.

So, as you can see looking at the House of Representatives, the unique period is not the present. The unique period is the post World War II period, where there was a lot of overlapping. And that's pretty standard, right, because you had Rockefeller republicans that were often more liberal than conservative southern democrats, so there was overlapping voting on that set of issues and that shows up right there.

And now here's the scores for the Senate. And essentially Senate democrats on top, Senate republicans on the bottom, and again, it's the same pattern, flat line prior to essentially World War II. Now, note that there is a little bump in the 1920's. That bump is mainly the result of the bipartisan farm movement.

As you know, in fact a famous Brookings book on realignment by Jim Sunquest(?) showed that the 1920's the economy, the farm – agriculture economy didn't increase. And so from about 1920 on, after prices fell after World War I, democrats and republicans from farm states tried to get agriculture subsidies. And that little bump of cross partisan voting, Democrats and Republicans voting alike, is in fact that period and results of those votes are essentially the farm movement. So, only when you control – compare the present period of polarization to the immediate past, i.e. post World War II period, is this period unique.

A couple of other comments. Our paper investigates electoral and other data to see if this period is like any other in our past, both in terms of not just voting at the congressional level, but in terms of elite and in so far as we can use electoral results to estimate survey results. And our answer is yes. This period is most like the 1890 and the 1910 period, most alike in a number of senses.

First, in the 1890 to 1910 period, there was this economic

transformation where there was free flow of capital and free flow of labor. And in the United States at the present time, free flow of capital drives economic change, and the results were some similar issues. What about immigration? How much of it? Who should immigrate? Tariff, there were tariff issues at the time, still tariff issues. The comment that the Congressman made about what the democrats congress is going to do with free trade movements is going to be different from what the republicans did.

There's also this whole set of what you might call the Lou Dobbs globalization issue, in which William Jennings Bryan was the Lou Dobbs of his day. The moral and – in the process of that occurring, there was also a set of moral issues. Just as there are today, there was a set of moral issues in the 1890's. Interestingly, creationism comes up one way or another in both periods.

But the notion is that what's happening is as these economic transformations occur, a moral American way of life is going down the tubes and that has to be fought. That's true in both periods. Yet, the interesting point is the modern period, the 1890's compared to the present time, the present time, there's actually more cooperation.

And here's the line of bipartisan unity in Congress, again, from 1867 to 2001. Important point to remember about that line is that the line is going up, so that even though there's polarization and the paper gives you the measure of bipartisan unity, just democrats and republicans voting alike again, there's

more of that than there was in the 1890's. So, the 1890's were a more polarized period.

And then finally, we add a little speculation on how do these things get resolved. And the answer – the vehicle is they get resolved through political parties. Because you'll note that the sorting is on political parties. The comments are all on how republicans and democrats divide. And what happens is that one party takes a position that continues to lose out.

So you're thinking William Jennings Bryan as a classic example. He was nominated and came close in 1896 and he was on the silver to gold at a 16:1 to parity. And he was anti-tariffs. That benefited Republican business. He was anti- the gold standard, anti-US intervention and so on. But the result of it was that he lost in 1896. He lost by more in 1900. He took a break in 1904. They nominated him again in 1908, and he got beat again even more soundly. And by 1912, the democrat party decided that they were not going with that sort of fundamentalist view, and they went with Woodrow Wilson, a progressive.

So, our view is polarized and there's no question about there's a polarization at this period, how deep and how it gets resolved, the political parties are the essay. And so consistent with Mo Fiorina's last comment, say on foreign affairs, et cetera, the extent to which candidates need to win to get to the middle and change the view, the question is how it sorts out through political parties is what happens to the nomination process. And who the republicans nominate this

time seems to me to be a crucial question.

Thanks.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks, Dave. I guess you have the advantage of being in the California sunshine to have such a lucid view of the historical pattern. The trouble with us beltway types is that we have historical amnesia a lot of the time.

But let me go now to Tom Mann. Let this machine, the guillotine rise here.

(Recess)

MR. NIVOLA: Voila. Now, Tom, in your chapter of the book, you argue that partisan gerrymandering is at best sort of a secondary or tertiary explanation for safe seats and partisan polarization in the House of Representatives. But in last month's election, the number of seats gained by the democrats actually fell somewhat short of the historical average for six year midterms and didn't seem to fully reflect the strong swing of the electorate to the democrats in the overall popular vote.

So, if it wasn't gerrymandering, what explains this continuing noncompetitive rigidity of the vast majority of House races? That's one question, and then if there's time, I have a second one for you too.

MR. MANN: Well, I can take care of that one in two minutes and then we go to the next. Just first a note on Tom Davis, who I enjoyed immensely

and I trust everyone did today. He believes you can see viscerally politicians believe gerrymandering accounts for the lion's share of uncompetitive districts and ideological polarization of the parties. And he's one smart analyst of American politics. So we have to take this question seriously and not dismiss it.

The other reason to take it seriously is he's one of those republicans who actually uses the I see when democrat is used as an adjective, rather than a noun, suggesting, you know, this is a man of great reasonableness who can work across the party lines.

Pietro, what I'd say first of all is beware of historical averages. You know, whether we use the sixth year of an administration or midterms in general, there's an extraordinary range it turns out in the last two six years of an administration midterms. We had first of all the President's party gaining seats in Clinton's second term. And the previous one in 1986, we had a gain of only five seats for the party in the House of Representatives.

It's true the three previous ones in '74, '66, and '58 had swings in the 40's. This time we had 29. Many analysts said there's no way you can even get to 15 needed because of the uncompetitive nature of our House districts, because of redistricting. In fact, we got double that. And if you look at the pattern of results, there were many seats decided by less than 1,000 or 2,000 votes. It could have, without the extraordinary effort of the Republican Party at the end, it could have been 40 seats easy.

But the bottom line is that there is still enough play in our electoral system and it is a fact that when you get an aroused angry public determined to vote no in a referendum on the performance of the government, you set in motion forces that can produce more change than one would anticipate given the size of the national swing, say five or six points, and the margin by which incumbents have been elected, just one little datum.

The average swing in the seats captured by the democrats in the House was not equivalent to the five or six percent nationally but was fifteen percent. The point is that you generate very nonuniforms when – and it turns out a majority of the republicans that lost had one with more than 60 percent of the vote in the previous election. So, all of which is to say there's a lot more flexibility than one might imagine in this system.

Having said that, there's no question but that there has been a decline in the percentage of competitive seats in the House, not just recently. If you look in the book in the paper, you'll see the pattern has occurred, the trend throughout the 20th century. And in no sense is the most recent – are the most recent developments out of line with what has been happening in the past.

Now, if you just think about it for a minute, you would understand why gerrymandering can't account for the most recent, most of the recent declines in competitiveness and then translated into polarization. All you need do is look at other governmental units. Electing officials don't redraw their district lines on

a regular basis and find the same kind of patterns have obtained.

We tend to get thrown off because we look at individual states. And we see partisan gerrymanders. We see bipartisan gerrymanders. We see the two operating simultaneously. And there is no question but that it has that effect on individual states. But when you cumulate over time across states and over time, you find that its impact is much more limited.

In short, Pietro, what accounts for it is first of all, a set of developments occurring in constituencies that have nothing to do with line redrawing, having to do with residential mobility, people sorting themselves. It has to do with the increasing strength of party in voting for the House of Representatives.

But then at the elite level, the top-down side plays an extremely important part. If you look at party platforms, if you look at the interest group alignments of parties and you look at the recruitment of individuals into each of the parties, you see that the (off mike) of the parties has sort of reshaped the nature of those two political parties, which largely accounts for much of the polarization that is taking place.

MR. NIVOLA: So, let me just follow up on one part of this, Tom. I mean, do you see this breakdown of competition, this lack of – this decline in competitive seats as a major source of polarization? That is, does it drive members more toward ideological extremes or not?

MR. MANN: Yeah. It does contribute to it and I agree that the threat of a primary sort of has a real impact. So, if we could increase the number of under competitive seats measured by the underlying partisan characteristics of the seat by 10 percent of the House, we would change the fundamental dynamic in the institution.

So, even changes at the margin to which gerrymandering contributes make a big difference. And if we look at levers for change, there's been some interesting work. By the way, disagreement among scholars -- Nolan McCarthy and his colleagues Pula Rosenthal(?) believe and do exist through simulations the changing – using neutral redistricting practices and changing the character of constituencies would have almost no impact in diminishing partisan polarization.

If you look at some interesting work done out in California by Bruce Cane and his team, they go through some redistricting efforts. And even in California, where there is such residential segregation, you can, in fact, increase the number of competitive districts by about 10 percent, 15 percent, which if cumulated nationally would have a significant impact.

So, yes, I think it contributes to it, but it's gone well beyond, well beyond anything having to do with redistricting.

SPEAKER: Tom, like you, I think my views on this subject have just changed over time as new research comes in. And I wonder – this is the

question. If the real key is the primaries, and you combine that with the party sorting that we talked about here, that each party now has a really homogeneous primary constituency and they have to get through that stage before they reach the general election.

And in the old days, you might be able to sort of do one and then do the other. And Nixon always talks about run to the right in the primary and then go to the center. You can't do that anymore. They've taped everything you've said. They're running it on the internet. And so maybe it's just a case of both parties just get pinned down because of the party sorting and the elites too are that way to begin with. The primary reinforces it and then there's really no way to move to the center and the general.

MR. MANN: I think that's right. And remember, the number of competitive primaries has not increased. In fact, by some measures, it's decreased. But the threat is real. You know, I once wrote a little book called *Unsafe at any Margin*. I mean, the paranoia in the cloakroom so the parties on the Hill is enormous. All it takes is one or two examples and the lessons of the few are shared by the many.

SPEAKER Actually, Harri Han and some of her colleagues wrote a paper recently or I think it's coming out that shows that's exactly what happened.

SPEAKER: Could I ask one quick question on this without

wrecking out time? One of the things I thought was powerful about your paper is that we tend to attribute to gerrymandering all aspects of districting, when in fact, people tend to sort themselves out more than we realize by politics. So that in many of these districts, they would be overwhelmingly republican or democrat no matter how you drew the lines. You know, a fair set of lines would still produce a lot of districts that were strongly of one party or the other. Could you talk about that?

MR. MANN: Oh, absolutely. I mean, imagine trying to draw a competitive district in the Bay Area of San Francisco. I mean, it would take an extraordinary gerrymander to –

SPEAKER: Tom, that would not be possible. Republicans there meet in phone booths late at night.

MR. MANN: So that's where you've been spending your time, Brady?

MR. BRADY: Yes, absolutely.

MR. MANN: So it really does limit the potential competitiveness. But, there is still room. I would say right now by measures using a presidential vote across districts, we have potentially 80 to 100 districts that are in a range whereby you could imagine some competition developing, but you've put the incumbency advantages on top of that. And the numbers tend to shrink to maybe half of that under normal circumstance. But when a national wave develops

because of public discontent, it then can move out significantly beyond that.

If we increased say the number of competitive districts by another 50-60, I think that could change the internal dynamics of the legislature. But as we will see and this goes to Mo's point, other things can change the internal dynamic as well. I mean one of them is divided party government, which forces certain – both parties to be at the table when decisions are made and brings along a kind of accommodation.

I would argue that in this next Congress, the democrat majority, understanding the limits on its policy possibilities, both because of the super majority requirement in the Senate and the Presidential veto, are structuring their agenda to be limited to be an agenda that would naturally attract some republican support. And they also clearly believe there is now public market for a governing party that is into fairness and civility.

And therefore, they will, at least at the beginning, try to run the House and the Senate in a less partisan fashion, even though the external forces remain largely the same, a sort of polarized electorate that's sorted itself by party. So there are possibilities that are basically put in motion at the elite level.

MR. NIVOLA: Okay. So, one moral of that story is gerrymanderers can't survive a category five electoral hurricane or maybe even a category three, actually. They just get washed out to see.

EJ, let me pick up with you on your chapter on religion. Much ink

has been spilled of course on the power of the religious right in American politics and how it supposedly has pulled the political parties apart. You write in your chapter that religion is unquestionably a major source of political polarization in today's electorate. But it is just one source among many others or several others.

Explain to us how you came to that conclusion. And what does the midterm election once again tell us about the role of religion? What if anything has changed since 2004?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. I want to use this because I want to put some papers up. But Tom mentioned redistricting in the Bay Area and I can't help but share something I heard yesterday. Lee Hamilton tells a story that in the Baker Hamilton Commission, they were debating, you know, the cost and benefits of withdrawing from Iraq. And Hamilton said yeah, back, you know, in the 70's, they were saying if we withdrew from Iraq – if we withdrew from Vietnam, the communists would be in San Francisco. And Ed Meese looked up and said the communists are in San Francisco.

I love this country. And also I'm still sitting her thinking what it would look like to have William Jennings Bryan interviewed by Lou Dobbs. You know, it's worth noting as you said that, you know, Bryan was a free trader. Lou wouldn't like that. It would be a great debate.

The – thank you, Pietro. I just want to thank the folks, Pietro and David, for organizing this project. Because I've had enormous fun doing this. I

had enormous fun writing this paper. And I am somebody who has spent years trying to get everybody to take the role of religion seriously, particularly liberals. And when I did this paper, I found that everybody was taking religion so seriously and I was wondering wait a minute, we haven't' abolished polling places. We don't just express our views in churches, synagogues, and mosques.

So, contrary to much of what I had done over many years, I spent a lot of time with the data trying to eliminate the religion effect, just to see if there was anyway if you crunched the data enough, you could say religion is an artifact of region or it's an artifact of something else.

And the simple truth is you cannot eliminate the effect of religion. In fact, it's a very important factor. But it is one of several factors. And the others that are decisive in our politics at the moment are race, certainly, which wipes out the effect of religiosity, a point I will get to, class, and region. These are all drivers, and some of these effects on our politics overlap.

The new religious divide is not primarily among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, although there are important differences among those groups. And there are also important differences within them. The split now is much more between moderates and modernists on one hand and traditionalists on the other or the highly observant people who attend religious services frequently and those who do not.

Now that is a real change. In 1960, the gap in support for Kennedy

between Catholics and Protestants was 40 points, a 40 point difference. Now that – those kinds of splits have gone away. As I say, there's still a difference between Protestants and Catholics, but nothing quite that dramatic. And of course, it was especially dramatic that year because Kennedy was the first Catholic elected President.

In my paper, when you get this book as I hope you will, you will discover that my essay is full of tables. I have not, for years, written anything that had more tables in it. One of the reasons I put all of these tables in is because there's a lot of fascinating data available from the 2004 exit poll that was either never published or was not widely available.

And I put this out there because I think there are a lot of things said about religion and politics that are sometimes unmoored from data. And I'll get to that at the end. But also, because I wanted to put the numbers out there for people to offer – to counter my arguments or to supplement them or to offer their own.

Point number one is that the whatever we say about the religion factor, it does not overcome race. Indeed, there is a standard thing you say well, highly church going Americans are republican. Well, that happens to leave the most religious group in America by most measures, which are African-Americans. And indeed, church going African-Americans are nearly as democrat as African-Americans who didn't go to church.

This is to a very significant degree a white phenomenon. Just to give you quickly on the numbers, whites who attend religious services weekly or more voted 71 percent for Bush, occasionally, 54 percent for Bush, never 38 percent for Bush. Among African-Americans, Kerry got 85 to 95 percent across the board. Highly religious African-Americans were slightly more republican, but 85 percent democratic seems like a pretty healthy majority to me.

Latinos are in a different place altogether. They are – in some ways, they are between these two groups that yes, there is a religious effect. Latinos who attended religious services weekly or more voted narrowly for Bush, but only narrowly for Bush. And in my own analysis, the Latino vote was much more affected by region than it was by religiosity. But that – the Latinos are the one place where the Catholic Protestant difference is very important. Protestant Latinos were in the 2004 election rather surprisingly strongly for President Bush, so that is where that divide persists.

Region is enormously important in American politics, I think McCain more so in the last election. And there are enormous difference by region and by state in the tendency to observe a particular faith. In the West, 23 percent said they never attended religious services. Only 11 percent of southerners said that. In the South, 24 percent said they attend religious services more than once a week and in the East, only 10 percent say that. So there are real differences by region.

There are also – and thanks to the exit polls, you can actually analyze the number of states. There were really dramatic differences across the states. In Georgia, only 7 percent of the voters said they never attended religious services. In Washington state, the highest I found, 26 percent said they never attended and so on. And so, I think when we talk about these effects, we have to be very attentive to the importance of region. And indeed, regionalism and state effects can be more important. Even if you never go to church, if you live in the South, you voted 46 percent for Bush compared – these are compared to only 24 percent in the East.

And in some states – in Louisiana for some reason, it was the one place I found where non church goers, non religious service attenders still voted for Bush. So that was where he had his irreligious agnostic vote in the country. By the way, somebody told me about a bumper sticker they saw recently that said militantly agnostic. And underneath it said I don't know and you don't either. Cut my own position as it happens, but I liked the bumper sticker.

The other effect is class. And Mo and Gary and others have done some very important work on social class. We act as if culture and religion have totally wiped out the class dimension in American voting. Not true. Class remains a very important driver, and I think it was particularly important in this election, this 2006 election, especially when overlaid with region, particularly in states like Ohio and Michigan, states that have really been hit hard by the new

economy.

I think class is actually – there's a lot of data which my friend, Bill Galston, pointed me to about six months ago that sort of really points in fact to a kind of re-emergence of class politics. But again, as I say, I tried to say well, maybe this religion thing is totally overrated. And so I looked at voting by both class – income class, which was what was available and the church attendance, religious observance.

And on the one hand, it is clearly true that there is an independent class effect. And across the categories of religious attendance, income mattered. But it turned out that religious attendance mattered more. And just to give you an example, at the extreme ends, on the one hand, if you want to find a Democrat, find a poor non-church attender. People who earn less than $15,000 a year, that probably also includes a lot of graduate students, who never attend religious services voted 74 percent for Kerry.

If you want to find a republican, find a rich churchgoer. People earning $150,000 or more who do attend religious services once a week or more voted 76 percent for Bush. But within those income categories, just to take the low end, even among people who earned less than $15,000 a year who were strongly for John Kerry, among those who attend religious services weekly or more, you had a 55-44 percent Bush margin. So there is clearly a religious effect no matter how you slice this data.

But, and this is where I want to close. So, yes, there is religion. Yes, there is also race, class, and region. The religious vote is actually quite complicated. And my friend and colleague, John Green, over at the -- now at the University of Akron, now at the Pew Research Center did some wonderful survey work before and after the 2004 election.

And I just want to give you one example of why one needs to be subtle in discussing this religious question. His survey found that 23 percent – 26 percent of the electorate could be classified as white evangelical Protestants. But then John asked a whole battery of questions about behavior and attitude and divided the various religious groups into categories, which he called traditionalists, centrists, and modernists. And we won't go into – you can figure out basically what those all mean.

Among white evangelical Protestants, only about half fell into the traditionalist category. The other half were either centrists mostly or a few modernists. And their voting behavior was very – quite different. The traditionalists were indeed the conservative white evangelicals that you see talked about all the time in the media and in think tanks and the like. And they really were strongly republican, strongly for Bush.

The other half of the white evangelical community was on the whole republican, but not – by not nearly the same margin. And it appeared that this group indeed was open to mobilization, open to, you know, switches in their

behavior.

Well, if you look at what happened in 2006, I think Bill wants to say something about this at one point, so I'm just going to make three quick points about '06 and stop. The first is Green's '04 analysis, which I cite in this paper, turn out to be quite prophetic. Because one of the areas where you did see significant gains for democrat were among the white evangelical Christians who were less churchgoing than their more conservative brethren. It was like a seven or eight point swing democratic. If I remember the number right, it's 31 in '04 to 38 in their House vote.

Now, that's a significant swing. And you saw in general a swing among white evangelicals toward the democrats among churchgoers toward the democrats. Now a lot of people use this data, I think, in a mistaken way. They said uh-huh, the so-called – I don't like the term God Gap. Pardon me, because I don't think God has – I don't know what God thinks of all this survey data, so I don't sort of like to implicate God. But, the God Gap has been reduced said a lot of the headlines. Not true.

What happened is that yes indeed, Democrats did make substantial gains, some significant gains among the religiously conservative. But they gained even more among the people who never go to church or rarely go to church or synagogue. And so, in fact, and I'm not sure if this is good for politics, but it's good for my essay in this book. The religious divide actually deepened in 2006,

even though it may have become less politically significant because it did not contribute to the republican victory.

I think there's a habit among political analysts that when a party wins an election, the groups it wins are very important and the other side has to worry about them. And when a party loses, its key groups are no longer seen as so important. So the gap has indeed grown slightly but may become less important.

What I think is in this election, you saw the democrats really for the first time after discovering God in the exit polls of 2004 – you can find him anywhere – they decided to do a lot more work in religious communities than they ever did. That work bore some fruit. But I also think something else happened, which is that I think that just as the current religious polarization owes in part to the cultural divides of the 1960's, I think that a reaction to today's sharp polarization may well lead to a rendezvous with moderation and at least a slight healing of the religious breach.

Thank you.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks, EJ. I want to – I know that Bill Galston has some comments on this subject, but I think I'm going to hold off on asking him to give us those comments until after we've heard from Diana Mutz because she wrote a truly fascinating paper on the role of the media in sort of amplifying the partisan divide, and I don't want to shortchange here.

Let me just mention one thing, though, EJ. You know, it is striking even in this last election that voters who attended church more than once a week voted overwhelmingly republican, so that – those guys are still, you know –

MR. MANN: Well, there's still a very republican constituency. There's absolutely no doubt about it. That's why, in fact, the divide did deepen. Because the nonattenders voted even more democratic than they had in the past. So the divide definitely is there.

MR. NIVOLA: Right. Diana?

MS. MUTZ: I'm going to be echoing a lot of what the last two speakers have said in emphasizing that what I talk about in this chapter is the fact that although media may, for a variety of reasons, play a really important role in pushing people toward more extreme perspectives, media are really only one influence in a much more complex process. And when I say that, what I mean is not that there isn't any support for the theories that I'm going to talk about, about how media do divide us. There is actually empirical support and I think fairly decent support for all of them.

But what's also the case is that no one has tried whole hog to tie trends in polarization to media in particular. So the issue of how much of a role media plays is really something that's yet to be resolved.

One of the key things that's changed in the media environment that

clearly accounts for much of the theorizing about the role of the media in political polarization is the extent of choice that we have. Nothing is clearly more different for me than the media environment that I grew up in than the huge proliferation and choice of programming that we have now. And you know, this is something that is pretty obvious to all of us, the consequences of it are less clear.

There is one set of evidence out there suggesting that what we've done basically through niche marketing and this proliferation of choice is support programming that is more partisan in nature. And thus, if you're a liberal, you can find more liberal programming on television. And if you're conservative, you can find more conservative programming by watching Fox news and so on and so forth, and that what happens as a result of that is that people are exposed to more information that reinforces their preexisting predispositions. And as a result, they become more extreme in their political views.

Now, that's something that I don't think is new necessarily. That is, if you go back far enough in our nation's history, we had a very partisan press and even as recently as, you know, the 1980's and the 1990's, if you studied who read what newspapers in towns that did have two newspapers, you found that the conservatives went to the more conservative publication and the liberals to the more liberal one.

So, I think this kind of self selection process is been going on all

along. Whether or not we've made it a lot easier by having a great deal more choice is really the key question. And there is some evidence very suggestive of the fact that we have made it easier to experience reinforcement of our views.

The second and perhaps even more important aspect of choice in our media environment is that we no longer have to watch politicians. We – essentially, the expansion in the number of news sources we have is nothing compared to the expansion in the number of entertainment sources that we have.

And, one political scientist, Marcus Pryor, has really argued that that's really key to understanding how media related to political polarization. And his argument is basically that nowadays, people who are not all that politically interested and involved aren't forced to watch the debates because there are lots of other things that they can watch on television at that time. They're not forced to watch the news because you can also watch the Simpsons at the same time that the news is on.

And what happens is the people who are only marginally politically involved aren't pulled into the process by some of this involuntary exposure to political news and that as a result, they're not the ones turning out to vote anymore.

So the argument is not that the general public has really become more polarized, but rather that the people who turn out to vote are far more likely to be people on the extremes of the political spectrum and people in the middle

don't show up. And as a result, the electorate looks a lot more polarized than it used to be.

Both of those are essentially technology driven kinds of explanations for the role of media in polarization processes. But those aren't the only ones. There is another well documented trend in media coverage that also suggests that media may play a really important role in making people angrier about the outcomes of the electoral process.

One of the things that I just pointed out in the previous comments is that we don't often pay a lot of attention to the losers in elections. And every election produces winners and losers. And one of the things we know about how media covers the electoral process is that there's a tremendous amount of emphasis on explaining election outcomes, not by political substance or by virtue of the fact that one candidates ideas were actually more popular than the others among the mass public, but rather about strategy. That is, who had the better consultant? Was it really all about Carl Rove? Was it about the swift boat ads and so on and so forth?

And so, one argument that I think makes a lot of sense is that when we emphasize these types of explanations for electoral outcomes and that's something the press does quite heavily, we convince people on the losing side that their loss was not a legitimate loss, that their loss was just a function of having the wrong consultant or the wrong ads at the wrong time or not having responded to a

particular faux pas and so on and so forth.

And, this trivialization of the outcomes makes people on the losing side feel a lot worse about their loss, because they lost for the wrong reasons, not because their ideas weren't the most popular ones.

Yet another theory for which there's quite a bit of convincing evidence that I think also ties media to polarization involves how journalists cover opinion, in particular, how – what range of opinion on a given issue do they cover. And this gets called a lot of things, sometimes the media bracketing of opinion, the media indexing a hypothesis.

But basically, journalists spend a lot of time covering political elite. And so when political elites themselves become more polarized, what they're reporting on is a more polarized range of opinion than it was in the past. So as you can see, this is a top-down theory that says look, what happened is elites polarized for a variety of unrelated reasons, and journalists are simply covering the political class and they are more polarized, and thus, the mass public gets fed a diet of extreme this and extreme that, much more so than they would be predisposed to on their own.

Finally, a fourth theory that tying polarization to medial coverage has a lot to do with political programming in particular. And that is the kind of political programming that tends to be most popular these days are – is the so called shout show television. That is, shows really purposefully bring together

people who disagree with one another typically in a very heated and uncivil kind of format.

Now, what's interesting about this is that on one hand, we're all used to this. You know, if you turn on Sunday morning TV, you expect to see people screaming and yelling at one another and interrupting and so on and so forth. And you might say well, what difference does that really make?

Well, several people have commented today about the fact that you know, really our political leadership, they're adults really. And they know how to compromise and they know how to talk to one another. And yet the impression we as the audience get from watching them behave in this manner is that they're not adults.

Who screams and yells like this in our day to day lives and acts this way? And in fact, the series of laboratory studies that I've done exposing people to uncivil television, it's not that it really changes people's minds about the side that they support. It doesn't at all. But what it does is it makes you think the opposition is even more idiotic, inexcusable, and so on and so forth.

And so, it becomes much more easy to villains the opposition. They're not just wrong. They don't just hold different view points. They're evil. And as a result, if you consider that kind of gap between how I feel about my preferred choice and what I think the alternative is, that suggests polarization as well. And television in particular is very good at doing this. There's obviously a

lot of competition and political shows aren't the top of most people's list of favorite programs, and so there's a need to kind of spice them up and make them more entertaining in order to draw audiences.

Unfortunately, an unintended consequence of this, by using this type of incivility and having members of the political class in our faces screaming at one another, we come away with the impression that these people aren't at all like we are. They really aren't adults. They really are uncivil and don't know how to compromise and talk in a civil manner.

And a lot of my research shows that people come away with much stronger positions. They don't change their minds. They're persuaded, but they come away with much stronger attitudes toward the sides as a result of being exposed to polarizing debates like those.

I will stop there.

MR. NIVOLA: Thanks, Diana. Well, I'm sure you've had to digest an enormous amount of fascinating important information and I'm very glad that you've – most of you have stuck with us for the past couple of hours. I'd just like to open it up now to questions from the floor and also comments from the panel.

MS. OCHOWSKI: Thank you. Peggy Ochowski. I'm a journalist with the Hispanic Outlook for Higher Ed. I'm also writing a book on immigration. And immigration is one of those issues I think where there's

polarization within the parties. We've seen it with the republicans, and Rom Emmanuel tells me that the democrats aren't talking about immigration because they're just as split as the republicans are over it across the spectrum he told me.

But, I'm wondering, to add another layer of complication to this polarization thing, what about polarization of certain issues within a party?

SPEAKER: That would be an example of an issue where the parties aren't really sorted yet. Just like abortion, originally, you couldn't tell democrats and republicans a new issue that came on the scene. I agree the democrats have these economic problems within the party that to the extent that immigration has a negative economic effect, it's felt at lower levels, people on the lower rungs of the ladder, those are democrats. And so we'll just have to see how it turns about.

But I mean, the population as a whole, this is one of these issues where we really could make progress. This is basically enforcement plus is about a 65 to 66 percent supported. Let's tighten the borders and at the same time, provide a path to citizenship. And that crosses parties.

If the Democrats want to have an issue have some progress and Bush wants something, that would be my candidate for sort of a major policy that could get it through.

SPEAKER: But those who are opposed to legalization of some kind, I suspect other than Latinos themselves and even Latinos have some splits

on this, feel far more strongly about it I think than supporters other than the business community on the other side. And so I think that's the tricky part of this question.

But it is – it's a great issue to raise because it cuts across so many – so much of this sorting or polarization, depending on which word you want to use, is the result of party positions lining up pretty clearly. And immigration is one of those where the party positions don't line up. And so it will cut across these lines.

SPEAKER: Right. A lot depends, though, on how the question is asked. I'm just looking to hear the exit poll questions that were asked last November. If the question is asked would you – are you in favor of offering legal status to immigrants, illegal immigrants, 61 percent of democrats said yes, but only 37 percent of republicans, so they're split on it. But if you ask the question should illegal immigrants be deported, suddenly there's convergence, and it's only 56 percent republicans who favor going that far.

MS. OCHOWSKI: (off mike) assume a so-called pathway to citizenship or is that just giving them like a temporary work visa?

SPEAKER: You could read in.

SPEAKER: You can decide what you think it means on the polling question. It's the mystery of polling questions.

MR. NIVOLA: Yes, sir?

SPEAKER: I noted in the slide and this is for EJ or for you, I suppose, that in the role of religion the language was but overall religion has not yet bumped other factors. Is that an indication that in fact there's a growing influence or a subsiding one at this point in time?

MR. DIONNE: Yes. I mean, the importance of this church attendance, you know, sort of religious service attendance issue, it's been growing as a factor over a period of time. And you know, partly that sentence in the essay was written to sort of put other factors into the discussion because now there has been so much emphasis on the religious factor.

And my hunch is and I agree with what Congressman Davis said earlier, is that you're probably going to see this recede some as a factor, but in this election, as Pietro pointed out earlier, the religious divide is still very strong.

Bill, you wanted to talk about '06 on this, right?

MR. GALSTON: Well, I'm going to suppress 95 percent of what I'm going to say and just give the 5 percent that I think is most relevant to your question. First of all, I think there is very strong scholarly evidence that over the past 20 years the impact of religious behavior, you know, church attendance is measured by standard indicators has increased in its influence on partisan affiliation, attitudes, and on voting behavior. And work by Larry Bartels of Princeton and also by Andy Kohut, I think both point very strongly in that direction.

Having said that, we tend to have a pretty narrow conception of religion and the religious agenda. One of the most interesting developments that's underway as we speak is an effort by people along different parts of religious spectrum to broaden out the agenda in all sorts of interesting ways.

And you have a very interesting discussion going on in the national association of evangelicals for example. You have the dust off of the Christian Coalition just a couple of weeks ago, and they brought on a new executive director, you know, who announced his determination to broaden, you know, the Christian Coalition's "religious agenda," at which point he was abruptly relieved of his duties after three or four weeks on the job.

There are all sorts of evidence that folks on the religious center and the religious left are trying to rally their forces and get back into the game. You know, to go back 100 years, the social gospel, which was a progressive manifestation of religious agenda was really on the front burner of American politics. It had almost disappeared but some folks are trying to bring it back and it's not clear to me that there's no base in the electorate for bringing it back. I mean there probably is.

SPEAKER: To which I say amen to everything Bill said.

MR, FIORINA: Can I just add one point that here again, there's both a top-down, bottom-up question. And predictably, while I certainly recognize the bottom-up part of it for the moral majority of religious, like the pro-

life movement and so forth, that when you look at the data on the relationship of religiosity to partisan attitudes and voting behavior, it doesn't just gradually increase, it explodes suddenly in 1992.

And that raises a question and it sort of holds after that. It raises the question of whether millions of Americans suddenly woke up and said gee, religion is more important to us now or whether there was something about 1992, like Bill Clinton. Now if you go back to 1988, you know, Mike Dukakis is this personally very conservative Greek orthodox candidate. 1984, Walter Mondale is a southern Methodist minister. There's no real – and Carter before that.

There's no real reason why religion should have become relevant to the choice of candidates except for a couple of issues like abortion. But then suddenly you get a guy who is an admitted adulterer, gay friendly, smoked but didn't inhale, whatever, you know. And suddenly, sort of these moral questions become of more concern, more relevant to people.

And so I think there's both – when you ask yourself a question, will we see a decline in these relationships between religiosity and the vote if the republicans nominate a Giuliani, you know, who really is a different sort of republican, or if the democrats nominate a very personally religious type of character. And I think we will.

So, I think there's both – you know, again, these are not sort of set in stone. These sorts of cleavages can go up, rise, and fall depending on what

leaders do.

SPEAKER: But Mo, the irony here of course is that Bill Clinton in some ways was the most religious presidential candidates in modern history.

MR. FIORINA: Yeah, yeah. What you have going on, I think, is, you know, a template left over from the cultural debate in college dormitories in the 1960's. Then, you know, becoming the template through which a bunch of cultural religious issues are viewed and Clinton after all was the first unqualified baby boomer to occupy the office. And so I think all of that history then came into American politics in a way that it hadn't been present previously.

I do think and this is a point that we didn't have a chance to join in our little colloquy. I think analytically the top-down versus bottom-up relationship is a very complicated one. I can tell you having seen this and observing it not only as a scholar but also on the front lines of politics, it is very difficult to be a political leader running for a democratic presidential nomination and not take into account the bottom-up sentiments on issues such as foreign policy.

And, you know, to some extent, rather than grassroots democrats taking their cues from their leaders, the leaders are lagging behind the grassroots in all sorts of ways. And I can tell you from 1984, the democratic primary of 1984 when I was Walter Mondale's issues director that the Mondale campaign got pushed into a more pro-peace stance in favoring the nuclear freeze, for

example, which given a different bottom-up set of influences would not have happened.

And your view is that the ratio of top-down to bottom-up is quite high. My view based in part on strong evidence but on part in personal experience is that the ratio is considerably more evenly balanced than that. And it seems to me, analytically, that's one of the central points we have to explore.

SPEAKER: I just want to say, Pietro, as you know I have a weekly responsibility here at Brookings, which I am now about five or ten minutes late for. I just want to say on Mo's point there is some evidence that this split actually predated Clinton, that the religious opening began before. And –

MR. NIVOLA: Well, 1972 was kind of big and then it goes away again.

SPEAKER: Yes. That's right. And you saw it with – and in the Nixon case, some of that was also regional as well as that's another case of that overlap of region and religiosity. And in '88 was an odd election because Perot, the Perot factor scrambles it where Perot got a rather secular vote. That 19 percent included a fair number of conservatives who were relatively secular.

SPEAKER: You meant '92. You said '88. In fact –

SPEAKER: I meant '92. That's right. Thank you.

SPEAKER: But in fact, in '88, Mo is absolutely right. There is almost no religion gap at all, right. And in fact, I think the fact that Dukakis was

a silent generation member and conspicuously not a boomer and very conservative in his personal life had an enormous impact on that.

SPEAKER: I actually agree with that point. We don't talk about this much, but generational change at work here. And I sort of have this – and maybe it's hope but also a feeling, it may be coming to an end. You know, sort of the generation, like you said, it's gone from the college dorms right up to president for politics. And maybe as we die out, you know, the country will move on.

SPEAKER: It's going to be a long while before that happens.

SPEAKER: Well, from the college dorms to the condos in Florida.

SPEAKER: You remember the (off mike) not dead yet?

SPEAKER: Well, my take on it is that if Dukakis had smoked dope, he'd be president.

MR. FIORINA: Well, if you look at the survey data on the younger generation's attitudes and things like – you can't believe the things like gay marriage are just not going to be issues in 10 or 15 years from now. And I mean trends don't always go in the same direction, but you know, there's just a lot of generational change going on and it may just wipe out some of these issues.

SPEAKER: Well, you know who's playing that card really heavily now? Obama. Obama has specifically said that he thinks the country is quite tired of leftover college dormitory conversations from the 1960's. He said

exactly that. And I think he has near perfect pitch for a broad popular mood here.

SPEAKER: Well, until Mo mentioned 1972, I was going to throw out -- the 1972 election, I was going to put out the hypothesis here that cultural/religious issues wax when foreign policy issues wane and vice versa. But there are too many anomalies to that.

SPEAKER: Acid, amnesty, and abortion.

MR. MITCHELL: Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. In the interest of time, I want to ask a question which you can view as rhetorical. And that is that listening to this conversation about polarization and whether – a, whether we are more or less polarized and b, whether it's an issue of at the elite level or at the level of the people and tossing into that the notion, Diana, when you were last here that Gregg Easterbrook offered the notion that what we're really talking about is opinionization.

To me, it strikes me that there's a sort of an interesting case study in front of us possibly. And that is that a group, a bipartisan group of people who have a history of being partisan delivered a set of 79 recommendations on the war in Iraq and other elements on which in theory they were unanimous. And it hasn't taken very long for the partisans on Capitol Hill to take pretty stridently in some cases different perspectives on that list of 79 recommendations from a bipartisan group.

And it makes me come back to Bill Galston's point coming from

this data that in fact republicans and democrats have fundamentally different perspectives not just on the war in Iraq but on how the world works and how it organizes itself. And I'm intrigued. I haven't gotten farther than that, but I am intrigued by the sort of juxtaposition of a group of people who've spent their lives being partisan coming together on this issue, handing the tablets with 79 recommendations on which they're unanimous.

And you know, the minute it gets to the Senate Armed Services Committee and elsewhere, we're beginning to see that partisan split and I guess it makes me wonder what is it in the final analysis that really makes people be partisan or bipartisan and is it a factor of whether they've got skin in the game. And that's as far as I can take it.

MS. MUTZ: Good question.

SPEAKER: Listen. My own view is that I think the world of the individuals on the Baker Hamilton report and I think they did their level best. It was a bizarre, absolutely separated, isolated exercise, disconnected from public officials and elected officials, who have a past history and a future, who connect with constituencies and therefore, a body like this can only surge the useful purpose when it provides a political cover for steps that individuals want to take on other grounds.

What we've seen so far, there's probably more of a market on the Hill among democrats and some republicans than there is in the administration for

this. But my bottom line is isn't it the most extraordinary thing? We're in the third year of a war. The public has – fourth, excuse me. The public has expressed its unhappiness. We have seen the failures, the consequences and we turn to an utterly completely independent outside group with no official standing to help us decide what to do.

I mean, why do we pay the President the big bucks and where has Congress been for the last four years? To me, it's a sign of utter breakdown in the capacity of our central political institutions and those who have key roles in them to do their own work. MR. NIVOLA: We have time for one more question. But before I take it, I just want to mention one thing. Our managing editor for this project was Richard Walker, who wrote a very, very excellent brief of this book. So if you don't have the patience to slog through our 200 odd pages in our book, by all means, refer to Richard Walker's policy brief.

Yes, you have the final word here.

SPEAKER: I just was wondering about Massachusetts again. I come from Massachusetts and D.C. I think it was McGovern. It was only Massachusetts and D.C. I might have the wrong one, but that only those two with the state and the District had voted democrat. Yet they're an entirely different type of state, except that maybe you could say that there are mostly students in Massachusetts and then mostly African-Americans here in D.C.

I was wondering why they were the only two states and why you

think they were the only two states that voted in that election. Did it have to do with McGovern perhaps?

SPEAKER: I thought you pretty well explained it. Mo, do you have anything?

MR. FIORINA: Well, I mean just if you raise states on a basis of republicans and democrats, Massachusetts is always very close to the end of the democratic poll and fight it out with Rhode Island maybe every now and then. And so it's just a – and it's also a different kind of liberalism that McGovern represented, which is a lifestyle kind of liberalism, that sort of thing. That's why we start to see the religious divide open up in that election. That was particularly attractive to a highly affluent upper middle class democratic party.

I was in Massachusetts for 15 years, so I know what you're talking about. It was the Brookline Cambridge segment of the Massachusetts Democratic party found that actually quite attractive. They just weren't prevalent enough in other states to carry the states. I think if you look across the states, you'll just see a decline in the democratic vote almost everywhere in every state. There were just a few where the levies were high enough to keep it from going over, and Massachusetts was one and the District is African-American.

MR. NIVOLA: The bumper stickers said McGovern, President of Massachusetts as I recall.

Well, thank you very much for coming. And thank you very much

to the panel for having done this.

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