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Diplomacy and Security: Building a Solid Agenda for U.S. Foreign Policy

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MODERATOR:

CARLOS PASCUAL, Vice President and Director
Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

PANEL PRESENTATIONS:

MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

KURT CAMPBELL, Senior Vice President and
Director, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

MORTON H. HALPERIN, Senior Fellow
Center for American Progress

PRISCILLA A. CLAPP, Retired, Minister-Counselor
U.S. Foreign Service

ARNOLD KANTER, Principal
Scowcroft Group

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Hello everyone. I am Michael O'Hanlon at Brookings. I appreciate your coming very much. I apologize for the little delay. I think because you have all been patient, we will start right up with the presentation. I think Mort will begin or at least his team will begin, and Kurt and I will look forward to weighing in a little bit later. I apologize again for the delay in getting started. I know Carlos will be here very shortly and resume the M.C. role at that time. Thanks for being here, and Mort and company, over to you.

MR. HALPERIN: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here. We appreciate you all coming out.

The first edition of "Bureaucratic Politics" was written at the Brookings Institution in the late-1960s and early-1970s. It continues to be read and used in courses even though there were weird things like the Soviet Union in the present tense and the Cold War is the dominant paradigm, so we thought it was time to do a new edition. In doing that, we found that while superficially a lot had changed, and certainly a lot had changed in the world, that the way that government works had not really changed very much at all, that the conflicts between agencies and the way they interact with each other and their dealings with the President and the relationship between the President and the bureaucracy are all very much the same.

We are going to have a good test of one of the propositions in the book which is that your position on an issue depends on where you are in the

bureaucracy with Mr. Gates who as you know was a career official of the CIA, then was the director of central intelligence -- and one of the perennial fights which we talk about in the book between the Defense Department and the CIA is the control of intelligence operations and the question of to what degree if at all the military should engage in covert operations and clandestine collection activities. Mr. Gates has spoken often on that subject not taking the position normally taken by the Secretary of Defense, and we will have to see whether or not his new role as Secretary of Defense changes on that subject.

We note in the book that no Secretary of the Air Force has ever been against a new manned bomber and I think we will have a test here or whether any Secretary of Defense thinks he really ought to control all the intelligence operations of the U.S. government.

I think the book helps us understand the current debate about Iran, and here again, Gates' testimony was very interesting on this subject because he clearly laid down a marker and one that is consistent with what we explain in the book to I think many people's surprise that is the standard view of the defense department about the use of military force, namely, the defense department is always against the use of military force and not for the use of military force for many reasons, among well which is they are well aware of the dangers and the shortcomings of the use of military force. And you saw in Gates' testimony when asked about whether we should go to war in Iran a classic statement of the defense department view that we should not do so.

I think the struggle will be between that view and two other positions that we talk about in the book. One is the struggle among the military services for roles and missions and for demonstration that the particular mission that they perform is the one that is the most effective. I think the Air Force is likely to be, and there is some leaking of information that it is, telling the President that they can win the war against Iran, that they do not need Army. Having lost their dominant role in the second Iraq war, and the Air Force played a very much more limited role in the second Iraq war than it did in the first, and of course is not playing much of a role at all now in dealing with the insurgency, therefore I think is likely to be wanting to make the case that they can in fact carry this out.

On the other side, you have the president. As we discuss in the book, presidents in their last 2 years in office worry about how they will look in the history books. Of course, that is really a form of self-prediction because what the history books will say nobody really knows, so what it means is that they start thinking about their own view of how they should look in the history books based on what they have done.

For some presidents, that leads them to want to become a man of peace. Lyndon Johnson, for example, spent a period of his last year in office looking for things to do that would lead him to be identified as somebody who worked for peace, and Eisenhower I think did similar things, and Reagan had similar impulses.

My own guess is that Bush may go in the other direction and think that what he wants to be remembered for in the history books is somebody who was willing to take on the Axis of Evil and not to leave behind a festering Iran tempting to get nuclear weapons in the way that he inherited the Saddam Hussein situation. So I think you are going to see an interesting interplay between those different elements in the evolution of Iran policy.

Let me just mention one other thing and then I will stop. There is one new chapter in the book, and that is on the role of Congress. We added a chapter on Congress because it plays a much more important role now than it did before. What we have tried to do is to apply the same analysis of who the players are, what their interests are in relation to their organizational structure and how the rules of the game work to describe how Congress functions and deals with national security matters. To just take one contemporary issue, I think nobody who has read that chapter would think there is the slightest chance that the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission on how Congress should reorganize itself had any chance of being adopted by the Congress. Those recommendations go to the heart of the struggle among congressional committees and I think we try to offer a way to understand how those struggle play out and why they play out the way they do.

MR. PASCUAL: Mort, thank you very much, and thank you for kicking off the discussion, Mike. Thank you for introducing it when I was running a few minutes late.

I am Carlos Pascual and I am the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Studies Program here, and I think this is a tremendous occasion actually to be able to kick off and have a discussion around two tremendous books that are extremely timely.

On the book "Bureaucratic Politics," we need a better way to understand how foreign policy decisions are taken and why they potentially go wrong, and I think that in this book one of the things from the outset that you have done has really very clearly laid out the importance of understanding motives, interests, sources of power, and how those combine with one another in order to actually produce results. It will be interesting as people will in fact I think take some of the frameworks that are developed in your book and apply them, you have not done directly so, but one of the sports of the day may be applying it to Iraq, and how is it that we ended up with policies that are indeed so disastrous.

I think one of the things that you have been very creative in laying out in the book is that you need to think about the motives of those who are influencing the United States, and we need to understand those who we are trying to influence, and in some cases if we are getting particular messages from certain groups, if we do not understand the factors that are influencing them and just take that message on the surface, re Mr. Chalabi, if we follow some of that advice too directly we can end up making decisions which we can in fact live to regret over time. So I hope that we as we continue with the discussion, one of the things that

we can continue to do as you have already started in your comments is to in fact apply some of that framework to some of the specific problems that we have today.

What we wanted to do in the discussion was go back and forth across some of the authors starting out with Mort, but then moving to Kurt Campbell and focusing if we might on hard power and the way that both Kurt Campbell and Mike O'Hanlon have used that book to underscore the importance of coming to terms with the design of hard power policies that are responsible and effective. I think one of the things that the two of them particularly underscore in their book is that the American public cares about how presidents exercise power, whether they are responsible in it and whether they are effective in it, and I think we are in fact seeing that come to fore today.

I am going to turn next to Kurt and ask him to elaborate on that this a little bit further. Kurt Campbell, I think as most of you know, is the Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies just down the road. He has been a great partner with us on a whole range of issues particularly related to Asia. He is somebody who has served in many senior positions in government, particularly in the Department of Defense in the Clinton Administration, and has also an academic background and so is able to bring to these issues the perspectives of a policy analyst, an academic, and a practitioner, and we are very appreciative of having him here today. Kurt?

MR. CAMPBELL: Thanks very much, Carlos, and thank you all

again for coming. It is really terrific to be here. Before I would just say a word about my own book, for those of you who are of a certain age who studied foreign policy and national security in the late-1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, "Bureaucratic Politics" is the most important book that you read as a graduate student as you think about how to understand the making of American foreign policy. I remember when I was a graduate student at Oxford and back in those days they had very few books, and so we had two copies of "Bureaucratic Politics" in the library and all the graduate students stole it every couple of months and kept it. I remember I had a copy of it that I had stashed carefully under my bed and never thought I would have the opportunity to work and become close with both Arnie and with Mort, so it is terrific to share a panel with them. And also I want to thank Brookings very quickly. It was wonderful writing a book with Mike O'Hanlon, and also it is the institution that employs my dear and wonderful wife who is here today, so I thank you all for coming.

Our book "Hard Power" really is not about the external manifestations of American foreign policy, it is about the domestic components, and it is about what has happened to foreign policy really essentially over the last 5 years, but then at a larger context, over the last generation. It proceeds from a proposition that was underscored most recently by a "Los Angeles Times" poll on who would you trust in terms of national security. This came out about a week and a half ago and it was thought to be enormously big news. Let me just give you context.

It for the first time found among a very broad swath of people in the United States, about 4,000 people were sampled, that Democrats and Republicans generically were at about the same level of who do you trust when it comes to implementing foreign policy and national security. In Democratic groups and among pollsters and strategists, that was viewed as big and pretty good news. But, frankly, our book proceeds from a different proposition, and that is that one of the things that the report today, the Baker-Hamilton Report reveals, is we are in the midst of probably one of the most enormous consequential strategic missteps in the history of the United States, enormous consequences likely to play out for generations. Hopefully we can recover and salvage something out of this, but we are in a desperate situation. And in the middle of this, you have roughly parity between how the American public views Democrats and Republicans.

What that suggests is not how badly damaged Republicans have been in terms of how the formulation and execution of American foreign policy in recent years has played out in American domestic policies, but more how far Democrats have to go, and others, independents and moderate Republicans, in convincing the American people that they are up to the challenge and the task of handling the hard questions of when the United States thinks and contemplates about going to war.

So this book really describes how national security has become the key wedge issue in American domestic politics and how, particularly the

Democrats but other as well, have really struggled since 9/11 to make the case that they are deserving of the trust and confidence of the American people when it comes time to lead the nation during difficult times. Our book basically begins from the proposition that rather than hurl insults across the aisle and point out what a horrible job folks have done in the implementation of this or that in Afghanistan and Iraq, to first begin to look inside our own institutions. Mike and I are both Democrats and we are not ashamed of that, and what we have tried to explore is what has happened inside the Democratic Party when it comes to national security since the Vietnam War.

Both of us go through in great detail, and Mike will talk about the context of the book and what the chapters are all about, but the basic going in position is this, that on almost every single issue when it comes to domestic politics, fiscal issues, management of health care, education, and on certain aspects of foreign policy, managing alliances, dealing with larger transnational questions like global climate change or HIV/AIDS, Democrats enjoy great confidence among the American people. It is only on this one issue, this one issue of whether the American people trust Democrats to take the country into war and whether we can handle it and have the nerves to manage complex problems associated with conflict. It is on this issue that you see gaps as late as 6 to 8 months ago between 20 to 30 percent, enormous gaps in confidence between Republicans and Democrats.

What we believe is that unless Democrats can get deadly serious,

excuse the pun, on these issues, and that does not mean, as Mort says, going and supporting every conflict that comes your way, but until Democrats are able to be confident about how they handle and how they think about national security issues and they do not try to always shift the subject back on the battlefields like domestic politics and the economy where they feel more comfortable, that unless Democrats are able to be clear about what they stand for on national security, then they will never get a chance at a systematic, long-term way, to demonstrate that they have smarter idea on economic policy and on other national security issues of the kind that I talked about earlier. And we also go on to say that this is really not just a problem of Democrats, it is a problem of independents, and increasingly it is a problem of moderate Republicans who find themselves shut out of the halls of power in the current government.

It is a book about politics, we hope that it is not polemical, and I am going to let Mike in a moment talk a little bit about what the specific components of the book are.

I will say just in closing that it is a book that suggests that many people think we will revert to a situation like in the 1990s where national security and foreign policy issues will be of less consequence or at the same level as economic and other domestic issues. We argue the converse, that for our lifetimes and probably our children's lifetimes the principal central issue when it comes to people making decisions about the highest level electoral office, that national security is going to be at the top of that list and you ignore that what we

believe central proposition at your electoral peril. Thank you, Carlos.

MR. PASCUAL: Thanks very much. I said that I would like to come back to you on what we have heard on one side are some of the bureaucratic issues, the motivators, the power issues internally within bureaucracies that can drive policy, and then some of the broader political constraints that can affect the capacity to wield effective power and to handle foreign policy issues effectively and wonder to what extent do you see these factors coming together? How do you see them as pieces that if in the end what we need to have is effective foreign policy and you have these bureaucratic constraints and we have political issues, in the end how do we bring that all back together to achieve and affect foreign policy. I do not know if that is something that you would feel comfortable at addressing as to how you thought about it in the book. I know Arnie can talk to these issues because he lived in that critical position of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and maybe between the two of you we might get some interesting insights on that combination of bureaucracy and politics coming together.

MS. CLAPP: I have indeed thought a lot about that because right after I did this book with Mort at Brookings and then did one on U.S.-Japanese relations using the bureaucratic politics model of analysis, I went into the government for 25 years and practiced what I had been studying, and it is very, very instructive to have had this kind of academic analytic background and then serve in the government, and I think Arnie probably had the same experience. So

in the course of all of that, you do begin to think about what constitutes effective management, if you will, of the bureaucracy. It is not always managed well, and if people do not understand the elements that go into bureaucratic politics, people inside the government often do not understand what is happening around them or how to move an issue effectively through the decision process.

I would say in my experience in the government, one of the most effective bureaucratic management systems was during the first Bush Administration. The NSC, the State Department, and the Defense Department worked very well together and there was good management from the level of the President and I think that had to do with the experience of the President himself, the prior experience that he had had. He had been in lots of different positions in the government, in the Congress, at the U.N.; he had even served as an effective ambassador in China when we opened relations with China. And he had looked at foreign policy making from very different perspectives in the government and understood a lot about how things interacted in the bureaucracy and what his role was as President to bring them together.

In the current Bush Administration, I would say that you have a President that does not have that kind of background. He came basically as a neophyte to Washington, but he is surrounded by people who have tremendous bureaucratic experience and they have wound up in many ways manipulating the bureaucracy quite effectively to gain the objectives that they were seeking with regard to Iraq and various other things. It is not that they do not know about the

bureaucracy, they probably knew too well how to manipulate it and how to narrow the voices that were coming forward on various issues, how to cut out certain departments. They did change the national security system quite a bit, and it will be interesting to see if that then reverts to its original patterns.

Also in this administration, another interesting development and significant development has been the rise of the power of the Vice President's Office. The Vice President's staff has grown a lot, but the staff was operating almost on a par with the national security staff itself. They were going to meetings with an equal voice to the national security staff and an awful lot of things were influenced and run out of the Vice President's Office, even more so than certainly during the Clinton Administration, and that is another factor that could revert later.

There are a few other major changes that have taken place; I would say historical changes, in the last 30 years that affect the way the bureaucracy operates. One is a shift in values. There is much more weight given now to democracy, human rights and various other values that were subsumed during the Cold War to national security interest, and I think that there is much more interplay now between national security and some of the other maybe you might call them softer values, and I am sure that will continue.

Secondly, there has been quite an expansion of the bureaucracy itself. There are new departments, and the Department of Homeland Security is one good example, and then the traditional departments such as Commerce,

Energy, and Agriculture that play a much stronger role in foreign policy now. They post people overseas, they are present in embassies, they have their own international affairs departments, and all of these interests now factor into foreign policy making in a much more direct way than they did during the Cold War. It makes the bureaucratic process considerably more complex and perhaps somewhat more unpredictable. In the State Department you have a whole new layer of under secretaries and more assistant secretaries and you have more bureaus and more battles that have to be fought out at higher levels.

And finally, technology has had a tremendous impact. Computerization and electronic communication has brought overseas posts much closer to the decision-making process in Washington and it has also facilitated to a large extent the communication among agencies and made it possible for many, many more players to get into the process. I think probably that is enough.

MR. PASCUAL: That is very helpful. Priscilla, I did not do justice to an introduction to you in part because of being late, and Mike may have already done this, but one of the things that is really striking about this team that put together the update on bureaucratic politics in foreign policy is their backgrounds as both practitioners and as academics. Priscilla has spent 33 years in the U.S. government including as U.S. Ambassador to Burma, and before that was in the academic world including a period of time at MIT, again bringing those different perspectives I think is extremely helpful.

One of the things that you highlighted, Priscilla, was the extension

of foreign policy in many ways to the security world to a whole range of new agencies and even within the State Department to a whole range of new different actors. One of the things that we increasingly hear from the military is the importance of the interplay between those who have the direct responsibility for traditional forms of the conduct of hard power and how that has become increasingly interrelated with those who can conduct soft power are able to conflict situations conduct stability operations, or in other cases are responsible for homeland security or energy security policies and how all of these interrelate.

Mike, let me turn back to you and use that as a transition point back to ask you to talk a little bit further about the agenda that you have outlined in "Hard Power." Mike O'Hanlon is a Senior Fellow here at the Bookings Institution and one of more renowned scholars. Indeed, while the title of the book is "Hard Power," one of the things you find consistently throughout it is that you and Kurt attempt to really underscore the interrelationship between the traditional forms of hard power and how they relate to other types of political and civilian capabilities that are absolutely crucial in order to make the conduct of hard power effective. Maybe if you can use that as a launching point for some of your comments.

MR. O'HANLON: Thanks, Carlos, and all of you for being here. And like Kurt, I am honored to be up here with the authors of this amazing book. It is a real privilege.

I wanted to talk for about 2 minutes per topic on the six major subjects Kurt and I have in our book in terms of the future agenda for the United States and national security, be you Democrat, Republican or independent, we like to hopefully bend your ear a little bit on that. But I want to put it in the context or through the framework through bureaucratic politics, because as Carlos was just saying, I think in every one of the six topics, even the first which is managing the military, there is a remarkably important role for collaboration across agencies and, therefore, for bureaucratic politics for better or for worse. So I just want to tick off these six and maybe with one or two observations on each about what the challenges are and look forward then to the discussion with Arnie and others hereafter.

On managing the military, you might think this is nothing but an internal DOD chapter, but one of the things we found in doing this work and in examining the Iraq experience and other experiences is the critical importance of having a strong capability within the State Department and the rest of the government to help DOD. And in this regard, I am also honored to be here with the founding director of the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction at the State Department, Carlos Pascual, because he was beginning the kind of thing that needs to be amplified at least ten times over. Kurt and I are not experts of the intricacies of this, but our basic message in this book was even when you think about DOD's role in going abroad, there is such an immediate transition from so-called Phase III combat operations to Phase IV reconstruction and stabilization,

and Phase IV, by the way, obviously includes a lot of war fighting as we are painfully aware these days, that you have to be viewing these capabilities as inherently one and the same, that they are all integrated, and they are not, you are in trouble, and we are in trouble, and that is part of the reason why. I do not claim that a better Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction would have solved all of our problems in Iraq, many of them were more traditionally military, not having proper rules of engagement to keep order after Saddam fell, so part of it was a classic military problem that we did not have a great military solution to, but a good part of it as well was the lack of proper interagency collaboration.

The second major substantive chapter is on homeland security, as Carlos just mentioned, and here you have in one sense one of the great failures over the last 2 years. Of course, we had bureaucratic cooperation or bureaucratic models that were working okay with FEMA and its relationship to other federal agencies, we had carved out a pretty good way for those bureaucracies to work well together, and then when we tried to simplify and meld everything together into one big Department of Homeland Security, lo and behold, FEMA performed probably the worst it has in its history with tragic results for the residents of the Gulf Coast. So I guess there is a lot to say on each one of these topics, and I am just touching on each one, but the message there is beware the simple solution that says more consolidation is easier and better and that bureaucratic politics always work more simply just because you unify people under one strong leader, that may or may not be the case, and Hurricane Katrina suggests otherwise.

I would say on the whole the DHS experience and more broadly homeland security is something here Kurt and I wind up with a mixed review for the Bush Administration. I think there have been some good efforts at improving our preventive efforts, to get better intelligence, do better surveillance, integrate the intelligence agencies, and here I think there was progress actually well before the 9/11 Commission Report, well before the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, the Patriot Act and the consolidation of various briefers in one meeting with the President each day and greater breaking down of stovepipes across FBI and CIA ground, a lot of this happened before the 9/11 Commission came out with its recommendations, and those were key bureaucratic initiatives that worked pretty well. So I would give in that regard the Bush Administration fairly high marks not so much for the part of its effort where it consolidated, because I think consolidation may have been counterproductive, but where it integrated and got people to work together better as a team especially with the intelligence agencies prior to the 9/11 Commission Report and the whole debate about creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I know I have a lot to do, so let me speed up a little.

The long-term war on terror. We do not have one. President Bush, I give him credit, his second inaugural I think was a great speech, unfortunately it has not had a very good 2 years, and the idea of democracy being our primary way of dealing with the long-term scourge of terrorism has not been very effective. It was always I think done in a somewhat oversimplified way by

the President, but at least he tried to have a strategy. But ironically, the only person in the U.S. government who diagnosed that we did not have such a strategy was the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, in his previous leaked memo, the one from October 2003, in which he said we did not have any such thing and we were perhaps losing the long-term war on terror. So why would you have to rely on a secretary of defense to come up with that kind of a diagnosis, and we still do not have a very good government-wide solution to this question of how do you help the Islamic world to essentially strengthen itself, strengthen reformers, strengthen moderates? Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton are weighing in on that today, I think they have some good ideas, but we have not really viewed this as a priority for the country as a whole with the exception of Mr. Bush's inaugural address which then, when it did not have a great next 18 to 24 months, left us again without much of a strategy, again reinforcing the importance of the topic today. I realize I am not having a consistent theme to my remarks, because in some cases you need to consolidate more, some you consolidate less, but the main point is you have to think of most problems as interagency problems, and deal with the realities of bureaucratic politics.

I have three more topics and you are probably already getting tired of my fire hose approach to this talk, so I am not going to go into each one in equal detail, but they involve the rise of China, a better energy policy, and a better nonproliferation policy. On each of these I think you would recognize immediately the importance of collaboration, whether it is with China and

everything from military deterrence on the one side to economic engagement on the other, but a kind of economic engagement that, as some of my economics colleagues here have argued, the kind of strategy that is tough and nuanced and not simply putting the whole economic relationship on autopilot. So we need a sophisticated integrated policy on China, and Arnie and others have worked on these in the past and implemented them in the past.

On the whole our government has done an okay job with China policy I think in the past, especially after the first or second year of any new administration, but it is an ongoing challenge and a whole new kind of challenge today than it ever has been before. So I will just volunteer that that is one more topic where interagency collaboration, interagency competition in some cases, will be very important in the future.

The last two I will simply mention, nonproliferation strategy and energy policy, trying to reduce our dependence on foreign oil which has a host of economic, scientific, and security implications. Again, it is an obvious candidate for the need for addressing the challenges in this great book that we are honored to share the stage with today. I think I will stop there.

MR. PASCUAL: Arnie, finally let me come back to you. I think as many of you know, Arnie Kanter was founder and principal of the Scowcroft Group and also was Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department and held many senior positions in the State Department and in the White House, but also had an academic career as well, again continuing this pattern of

individuals here who have been able to bridge between practice and academics and analysis.

We have laid out here a world of bureaucratic incentives coming from both the bottom-up and the top-down, avoiding bureaucracies in some cases or the way that bureaucracies may actually try to push specific policy issues, and the challenges of managing the politics. Mike has laid out in a couple of cases the complexity of now bringing that together in an effective policy on a few key issues, and I think that increasingly what we have come to find, in drawing an analogy with the military, when the military would seek to accomplish a mission they would say how do you bring all of the elements of power of the United States to bear on achieving a particular military victory, and now we have a situation where we are really asking almost a parallel question of how do we bring all of the elements of the U.S. government, and in fact in many cases the private sector, to bear to actually achieve an effective solution on many of the kinds of problems that we face today. We look forward to whatever insights you can give us on how to think about some of these questions, whether you want to do that in general or in specific contexts with you.

MR. KANTER: Carlos, thank you, and thanks to everyone up here for letting me join you. I appreciate that.

Rather than take on the question that Carlos has introduced by myself, let me make a couple of very brief introductory comments and then see whether everyone up here can take a shot at them and also make sure we have a

lot of time for questions.

In Bob Gates' hearing yesterday he allowed us how he was never allowed into political science courses when he was at Texas A&M because his belief is that you have to tear up the organization charts in order to understand the in which government works. He said that what really matters are the personalities and personal relations among officials. I believe that only in that respect he is about half right, because I think the real answer is it is both.

Priscilla said that after the first edition of the book she went into government and got to apply the analytical framework that the book has laid out. I bore the extra burden of having gone off to teach first for several years before I entered government, so I was burdened both by an analytical framework and scholarship, but after long years in government, I was able to overcome both handicaps and I now consider myself to be a recovering political scientist.

I think one question if I could add to your list, Carlos, that might be worth discussing is what has changed over the past, pick a number, 30 years, 20 years, 10 years? Let me throw out a couple of things that I think have changed that bear directly on the way in which governments make and implement policy and I think it will span the scope of both books.

The biggest change is a steady and by now dramatic decline in the insularity of the United States, and I do not mean this just psychologically, but the ability of the United States to either ignore others economically, or the ability of the United States to essentially dominate as leader of the free world during the

Cold War, are both obviously behind us. And for want of a better term, not only has globalization broadly defined become profound, but it has profound impacts on the United States, and it has profound impacts both with respect to our conduct in the world and with respect to our own domestic policy and politics. So I think that is one change, and we can talk about some of its implications.

A direct corollary of that is foreign policy itself has ceased to be insular, insulted from domestic politics and domestic policy, and increasingly foreign policy and domestic policy, and therefore domestic politics, have become intertwined. That means that as has already been alluded to by Priscilla, the agents of foreign policy in the United States are certainly not just the State Department and the Pentagon, in fact, I think a lot of our ambassadors overseas feel more like landlords than the President's personal representative. You have agriculture, you have justice, you have homeland security, you have everybody there, and the ambassador is in the position of presiding rather than running. But that is a reflection of the way in which foreign policy itself has become redefined.

At the same time as there has been this commingling of foreign and domestic policy and, therefore, politics, two other things have happened. One as Mort alluded to has been a change in the role of Congress, part cause, part result of this intermingling. At the same time, there has been in my view a secular and structural increase in partisanship. When you add all this together it means that the ability to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy, put aside the extent to which it is influenced by bureaucratic politics and so forth, but the notion that

politics stops at the water's edge and that while domestic policy is fair game for politics, foreign policy is not, those now look like quaint, historic, irrelevant concepts. So as we think about bureaucratic politics and foreign policy, as we think about the subjects covered by "Hard Power," I think we need to look at the structural changes that have occurred in the world, in the United States, and the way in which the United States interacts with the world because the ability to do foreign policy is affected by all of them. I will stop there.

MR. PASCUAL: There have been a tremendously powerful set of ideas put on the table. Before we turn to the audience for questions and answers, Mort, do you have any final thoughts?

MR. HALPERIN: No. I think it is time to go to the audience.

MR. PASCUAL: Let me turn to your questions.

QUESTION: I would like to begin with an observation based on "Bureaucratic Politics" analysis and then ask a question of Kurt Campbell and Mike O'Hanlon.

The observation actually goes back to the Rumsfeld memo of October 2003. The interesting and perhaps insightful comment in that memo was the point that the military is really not good at counterterrorism, but that is not really what the military is about, it does not specialize in that. There is a good reason for that, and this relates to I think the point that Mort Halperin was making about the self-interests of the military services. The military services deal in military operations against states, taking down regimes and other operations, they

do not deal with nonstate actors. That is not what they are good at, that is not what they get budgeted for, and that is not what they get weapons systems for. That is still the case today as it was when the Bush Administration came into power.

If this is the case, then we have here at least part of a major contradiction in the Bush Administration's national security strategy which is that it is indeed relying primarily on the military to carry out the global war on terror and with results which I think it is evident to most people, indeed two-thirds of the American people now believe that the war in Iraq makes the United States less secure, has made the United States less secure. That is my observation.

My question is to the two Democrats on the platform, are you prepared to take on this issue, the broader problem here, the broader contradiction here, between the obvious ineffectiveness of military power, at least the ineffectiveness of the way military services operate in relation to the problem of a very sophisticated problem that requires great sophistication and nuance if you will, and not something military services are good at, will the Democratic foreign policy specialists have the courage to take on this problem or are you going to look the other way and pretend that this is really not a problem and we can continue to carry on more or less in the same vein?

MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you for the question. I would say, roughly speaking in recent history, the military has been asked to do three different kinds of missions. One as you indicate, the more traditional kind of

mission about going after or preparing to go after states and countries in the international system, and I think you are correct when you suggest that these are more comfortable missions and ones that the modern military has spent more time thinking about until very recently. And then the other two kinds of missions are against nonstate actors, al Qaeda and the like, and for lack of a better word, stabilization efforts or post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the kind that we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq.

First of all, when you say that the military is not good at these latter two kinds of missions, there is ample evidence historically that the military has actually done remarkably effective jobs in certain circumstances in post-conflict stabilization efforts, and it is a relatively recent phenomena in which the military, and particularly the Army, has been uncomfortable in these situations. I think you had a confluence of issues that took place in the 1990s, and this is an uncomfortable statement, but I do think one of the most interesting parts of "Bureaucratic Politics" is the question of how one government succeeds another, and I think there is always a tendency with one regime comes into power to dismiss or discredit the actions of the previous government.

I would offer and, again, others might disagree, I do not think we have ever seen that experience played out to dramatically as to what we saw in 2000 in which there was the sense that everything that had gone on before was mistaken. In the 1990s there were some fledgling efforts at stabilization in the Balkans and Somalia, and this is all well known and understood, and I think the

administration when it came to power decided against doing anything of that sort. I think until relatively recently there has been a very strong ideological and almost a professional bond on these issues between the Republican Party and elements within the military, so I think with a deep reservation about taking on a mission like Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, if we would go back 5 or 6 years and would posit that we were going to be presiding over the largest reconstruction effort in our history, I think many people would not believe it.

To answer your question directly, I do not think we have a choice here. I think the U.S. military is going to have to focus more on these latter two kinds of missions and I think that those are well underway now. And I think if you looked carefully at what Secretary-designate Gates said yesterday, he said as much, that the military has to train more effectively for these kinds of missions. So I think personally that there is going to be a broad bipartisan consensus that these are the directions and this is going to be an area where the United States is going to need to go.

By the by, I will turn it over to Mort here. I will say that that is the least of our problems. In fact, one of the things that is going to become clear over the course of the next year is that the military has been operating under a degree of psychological, mental, and operational stress that it is hard for us to understand and that the consequences in terms of equipment and retention, that that bill is going to come due. So the larger problem is not just shifting the mission from the traditional over-the-horizon and inflict damage to closer infighting of the kind

that you see in counterinsurgency and other operations, no, it is going to be much larger questions about major rehabilitation, equipment, the whole thing associated with rebuilding a military that has really suffered enormously over the course of the last couple of years.

MR. HALPERIN: I want to make one point. We talk in the book about organizational essence, that is, that each career organization has the particular task which the dominant group within the organization thinks they are good at and thinks the organization ought to do and that it is very difficult to get organizations to do things that are seen as contrary to their organizational interests. So I am actually dubious that we can get the military to take on in an effective way at least some of the tasks of post-construction, and I think we need an entity on the civilian side, although one that has a much more robust budget and manpower than the office that was started in the State Department.

There is a curious dichotomy between how we responded to the outbreak of the Cold War after World War II and how we have responded to the post-9/11 threat. After World War II, we created a whole set of new institutions, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, to deal with these new sets of threats. There has been a complete reluctance to establish new institutions. The Department of Homeland Security did not create a single new institution, it took boxes and moved them around and put them into a new department. I actually it was a good idea, but it did not create any new institutions. We have not created any new institutions to deal with this set of

threats.

We have in my view a Defense Department, a CIA, and an FBI designed to do other things, whose essence is utterly incompatible with an effective effort against counterterrorism, and I think we need to think about creating new institutions which are designed to deal with these problems.

MR. PASCUAL: Arnie?

MR. KANTER: Three quick points. No one in the United States government is any good at combating terrorism. We do not know how to do it very well so we are going to have to figure it out. The second point is at the risk of differing with Mort, organizations do change. Ask the horse cavalry, ask the battleship admirals and a few other folks and you can discern that organizations do evolve. It is real hard to do, but they do change. Frankly, I think the Army and the Marines are undergoing change, it is hard, it is grudging, the circumstances could not be worse, but I would not abandon hope of those organizations being directed to evolve and in fact evolving.

For better or worse, it is not quite true we have not stood up new organizations. I think about the National Economic Council and the Homeland Security Council, and standing up new organizations by themselves obviously does not solve the problem.

The third point is this is not a partisan issue. It is not like Republicans have been courageous and Democrats have not. It is not a matter of political courage. It is a matter of trying to figure out what the right thing is to do

and then do it, and I do not think there are partisan differences about the questions. Perhaps the answers, but not about the questions.

MR. PASCUAL: I think that is a very good point to build off of. In fact, I think when one deals with issues of terrorism you almost have to put it into the context of identifying three separate types of issues. One is Islam, the second is extremism, and the third is terrorism. To the extent to which a strategy around terrorism is focused only on the militaristic aspects of it, that that will potentially have an impact on that whole circle in a cascade which can actually fuel greater terrorism.

What it points back to I think is that if one strategy on counterterrorism is only a military one, that in fact you can end up making the problem worse in some circumstances and you would have to have a wider variety of tools and a balance among those tools. I think Arnie's point of understanding the problem that you are dealing with and its complexity when you are trying to define the solutions is absolutely critical, and this is one where we still have I think a long way to go.

MR. KANTER: And I would just say that combating terrorism and countering insurgencies are two related but different tasks and is the quintessentially interagency problem. It does not get more interagency than that.

MS. KRANTZ: My question is for Mike O'Hanlon.

MR. PASCUAL: If you could identify yourself, too, please.

MS. KRANTZ: I am Barrie Krantz with Itochu International.

Thank you to everybody for all your comments and insights today.

Mike, you mentioned briefly about today's Iraq Study Group Report and I am hoping you can add a few comments to the ones you made, and specifically which if any of the recommendations do you think the Bush Administration might take up and likely are they to succeed?

MR. O'HANLON: And find a way to do it in the context of today's topic. Thank you for the question. I am going to try to give one partial answer.

Let me come back to the war on terror question and the long-term counterterrorism question that Arnie has just mentioned again that we spent a chapter on in our book that Rumsfeld diagnosed as not going well. I do not know that reinvigorating the Arab-Israeli peace process is going to make much of a difference in Iraq, in fact I am dubious, but I think it is entirely the right thing to say. You could almost say that Secretary Baker found a hook, or he found a convenient vehicle to put forth that recommendation and I think his politics have been exemplary and in my judgment overall better than the last two administrations if you look at the experience of this Bush Administration and the 8 years of President Clinton. President Clinton did some good things with regard to Mid-East peace, but I think the first Bush Administration had the best balance, frankly, at being willing to put some pressure on our Israeli friends. I am delighted to see Secretary Baker get that piece in because whatever its impact may be on the Iraq war, I think it is critical for the long-term war on terror which

is one of the topics that we have been coming back to today, and so I have no shame in talking about it even though you tried to lead me off of the immediate subject of today's panel. But I appreciate the question and that is a piece of it that I think is quite relevant to today.

We need a long-term strategy to win the war on terror which I think is ultimately about helping moderate Islamic societies, governments, and reformers strengthen their own efforts within their countries. That is another way to say it. I think that requires a number of economic tools, it requires democracy promotion, it requires grassroots promotion of NGO activity, and it does have security elements as well. So far, frankly, while I do not think his implementation has been very good, I think that as critical as I of Bush Administration on this, President Bush is in a way the only major political figure who has tried to step up to the plate on this one. Most Democrats and most other Republicans have been shy about even trying to lay out what a strategy would be. So on this topic I think our book is totally nonpartisan, and we are asking both parties to get more serious than they have been.

MR. PASCUAL: Mort?

MR. HALPERIN: I think one way to think about Washington is that it is a city full of people with solutions looking for problems, and I think Mike has explained one version of that, whatever problem you present to Secretary Baker, part of his solution is seek an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. We talk in the book about two of the most consequential such decisions made by the

U.S. government. One was when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, President Truman convened a meeting of the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense came in and read a paper about the importance of defending Taiwan. Truman was quite confused and Achison explained to him afterwards that he was being offered a deal by the Joint Chiefs. They were eager to defend Taiwan and looking for a problem to which that was the solution, and the deal was that if Truman agreed to put the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Straits that they would support the decision to defend South Korea. We are still dealing with the consequences of that decision and it is not clear whether we are going to get past that without some kind of military conflict.

The other one that we have added to the book is the response of some people, including Paul Wolfowitz, to 9/11 which is let's invade Iraq. As Mr. Gates reminded us again in answer to a question yesterday, it was a different organization and a different person who was responsible for 9/11, nevertheless, a number of people who came into the Bush Administration, believing that we needed to go war with Iraq announced that that was the solution to the 9/11 problem and ultimately persuaded the President that they were right.

MR. KANTER: In the context of today's topic, I think what strikes me most about the Baker-Hamilton report is the premium it clearly has put on forging a bipartisan consensus. I think that in some respects the challenge was to find a set of recommendations on which a bipartisan consensus could be found rather than to examine all the options and to pick the best of the bunch. I think

this report is intended to serve an important political purpose, whether it will do so, and trying to take some of the politics out of Iraq remains to be seen, but I think that political purpose needs to be understood. I think as you look at the recommendations, the working of the recommendations almost shout the compromise language, there is something for everyone, the effort to bridge differences by finding words, the result is that the recommendations are inevitably and perhaps commendably not crisp and sharp. They are flexible, they are subject to interpretation, and that may have been a necessary requirement to achieve the objective of a consensus, I am not sure it is all bad going forward since it is easier to adopt things and then interpret them than to be confronted with black letter law that you have to reject.

One other comment a bit off the topic that we are discussing but directly on the report, what struck me in scanning the executive summary are two things. One is there is an unstated premise which is pretty important that is that the Iraqi government and political leadership is capable of imposing authority, reducing sectarian violence, essentially governing, and that the problem is an unwillingness to step up to do it. That may well be right, but be clear that that is a premise and not a demonstrated fact, and it turns out that the premise is mistaken, then it has rather profound implications for the recommendations because the recommendations in essence say we need to put pressure on the Iraqi government to get them to step up and if and as they step up we will be there with them, but if and as they fail to do so, we will be gone.

The report also notes, however, the chaos that is likely to ensure if and as Iraq gets even worse, and how profoundly U.S. national interests will be affected as a result. When you put these two things together, this unstated premise which may be right but may be wrong, and if it turns out that if it is wrong but we nevertheless pursue the policy of if they do not step up then we will be gone, then it seems to me that the analysis in the report, namely, the implications for U.S. interests of a collapse of Iraq are rather stark.

MR. PASCUAL: Let me actually stay with this topic a little bit. I know that there is going to be more than enough commentary in Washington and elsewhere about the Baker-Hamilton report and Iraq, but it is not often that we get the caliber of the five people who are up here to be able to engage on this topic, so I am going to exploit it for a little bit here.

I think you are absolutely right in highlighting that issue. In fact, two main critiques I would have of the recommendations or of the report is that it is not explicit about two key things, and I would take one point further, that Iraq is a failed state. How else do you define a failed state if you cannot protect your people, collect revenue, provide services, or administer the rule of law, and if your entire security environment is dominated by militias, and in fact some of the members of your government actually run some of the militias? How do you define failed state otherwise?

If that is the lever your are pushing against, what is it that you are going to get if you push on that lever, and what does it mean to surrender greater

authority to a lever of that nature? Let me put that to any of our panelists if you want to pick up on that.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that Arnie as usual has highlighted the dilemma. First of all, I think that it is very important that the Commission reached a bipartisan consensus, and to go back to where Kurt started, if the goal of Democrats is to demonstrate that they can be trusted with the national security issue, I think there is both an opportunity and a danger here. It is an opportunity to join in supporting this bipartisan consensus and in effect to isolate the President as not being willing to begin to move in this direction, or to force him to move in this direction so we get a bipartisan process which takes us out of Iraq.

If the Democrats go in the opposite direction in saying the report does not go far enough, that we really have to set a deadline to take out not only the combat troops but all of our military forces, then I think the Democrats will be doing exactly what the book is trying to warn against, undercutting the sense in the American people that they can be trusted with this issue.

I also think that the recommendations are right on the merits because I think that the dangers that they point out from a withdrawal while stated enormously starkly are in my view even understated, I think they would be worse than that, which leaves me the question as I suspect Arnie has been hinting at, can we really afford to leave even if the government of Iraq cannot step up and do the things, because I think the problem is not a lack of will, I think it is a lack of capability, and it is a lack of consensus within the society.

We have set loose forces there which I think will come to harm the Middle East and American policy unless we find a way to stay at least in some numbers and try to contain them. But I think the report provides the framework with the ambiguities in it to reestablish a consensus on this issue which gives us both in my view a chance to remain, which I think we need to do in some form, but also to take this off the plate as a domestic political issue which I think can only hurt the effort in the field and hurt our domestic politics.

MR. PASCUAL: Mike?

MR. O'HANLON: I agree, but I think you can only take it off the plate for 6 to 9 months. I think we can agree on trying to find some kind of a strategy to try and give it our last best shot in 2007, and this report did not really think about what a Plan B would be thereafter. I like Mort's point that a lot of us assume that Plan B is get the heck out, if it does not work, get out. I think that is the wrong way to think about Plan B. There have to be a number of other Plan B's, everything from figuring out the way to do soft partition right, to some kind of other negotiated framework in which we try to recognize there is a civil war but contain it and end it as soon as possible. That is the way in which Plan B's need to be conceptualized as opposed to complete departure.

This report did not try to get into that business, and it did not want to, for example, go down the Senator Biden road of thinking through how you would implement a soft partition plan for Iraq. But another task force might have to in 6 to 9 months, because I think there is no hope for consensus lasting longer

than that if Iraq continues to deteriorate. In that regard, I think Arnie Kanter has made a very good point about we do not really know whether it is capacity or will that is lacking, but in a sense, at one level I would argue it doesn't much matter. If it is capacity that is lacking, we really are in a fix because there is no hope, or at least there probably is not any hope. The strategy of trying to strengthen the government is not working. I still would support trying to do it a bit longer, do the Steve Hadley memo agenda, et cetera, go back to the $5 billion a year economic aid the Baker-Hamilton report recommends, all of that should be attempted, but it has not been working.

So what we had better hope that it is a lack of will and a lack of proper political consensus, and in that regard I am very happy to see the Baker-Hamilton's actual report which is different from the probably intentional leaks which said get out no matter what. That was the essence of last week's leaks. Thankfully those reports were wrong, they were flat-out wrong, because this is a conditional departure strategy which tries to use American leverage to say we will keep helping the Iraqis if they are willing to help themselves. And I take Arnie's point maybe they cannot help themselves even if they want to, but in that event we have probably already lost. So let's identify the main hope, let's work with that, and if it does not work, in 9 or 12 months we are going to need a new Plan B which I hope is not complete departure, but it is going to have to be something much different than even what is in this report.

MR. CAMPBELL: I had a chance to read most of this report this

morning and I agree with Mike completely that what is striking, I have rarely seen something that the leaks bear very little semblance to the reality. It is a very detailed, much more nuanced set of points that I had been led to believe.

However, that being said, it reminded me, and again as my last comment, I will end where I began, of an experience I had at Oxford. I am sorry, I will just make this quick, a little aside. I remember I rode with the Oxford boat and we were having problems rowing. So we brought in the greatest British rowing adviser who had advised the British Olympic team, and so he spent an afternoon with us riding his bike along the bank that I think many of you have seen. We sort of paddled along and we were rowing and it was raining and it was pretty miserable, and he did not say a word. At the very end, he had one of those little microphones, he said, "Gentlemen, try to row better."

(Laughter)

MR. CAMPBELL: I was the only American and all the British guys said, "Oh, of course. That's it. We are not rowing well enough." The report I must say has that quality to it.

I would say that are actually in reality two important things that come out of the report. One is that it has established for the first time in 5 to 7 years a benchmark for how Democrats and Republicans can work together even under enormous duress. So that quality, and I agree completely with Mort and Arnie and what Priscilla said about how difficult and how highly charged issues of bipartisan cooperation are, however, there are still essential given the stakes.

So I would say the first thing is that it at least sets a benchmark about what is possible in terms of working together and the quality of the cooperation. I was struck if you have seen the team as they appear together, it was much more collegial, they have worked together closely, and I think in the tradition in that sense of the 9/11 report.

The last thing I would say is I commend them, and my sense is that we are at the very, very early period of recognition of monstrous failure and that it is going to take time, and I agree with Mike, we will have to try all of these things. But I think the next phase is to start thinking really seriously about Plan B. The problem has been that we have set up the politics in the United States that if you start talking about Plan B, then you are a cut-and-runner or you never supported it in the first place, or you are not sufficiently tough. I appreciate and understand all that context, but it seems to me that quietly and effectively, groups of bipartisan smart Americans have to be thinking about Plan B much more seriously than we have done to this point.

MR. PASCUAL: Priscilla, would you like to add anything?

MS. CLAPP: I would like to add just one short point. It seems to me, and I am certainly not an expert on anything regarding Iraq, that over the past few days, perhaps the past week, there has been a very fundamental shift in the way people talk about Iraq. It seems to be acceptable now for people actually to be able to say that going in was a strategic mistake, and once you arrive at the position where it is acceptable for people to say that, and in fact Gates said as

much in some of his earlier remarks, that makes it possible to start taking bipartisan solutions because it kind of lances the boil. For a long time it simply was not acceptable for people to say that, people who were in the policy game, and I think that that is a major step forward.

MR. PASCUAL: I think for my two cents' worth, I think that there are I think two key issues that one has to come to terms with in thinking about a policy on Iraq and the Baker-Hamilton report. One is civil war, and I do not think it is just a rhetorical issue. If one looks at the history in recent decades of civil wars, whether that is the British experience in Northern Ireland and the conflict there, or Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia or a whole range of other conflicts, they have been settled through political solutions. As long as you have in some form of an insurgency a guerrilla army that is willing to disrupt, wreak havoc and mayhem and take lives and accept that as an interim outcome, then you will get a solution and you need some form of military settlement which I think underscores the importance of the recommendations of a diplomatic strategy and a political settlement. And I think that while it not surprising that former Secretary Baker is advocating attention on the Middle East, dealing with the Middle East issue is part of a broader political settlement and indeed actually marks sense, and I think that they deserve a lot of credit for that.

I am probably a little bit more pessimistic than Mike is on whether this question of capability versus will is not answered because I really do go back to the point that Iraq is a failed state. If you ask the question what is it that you

expect the state to do, and can Iraq do any of them, the answer is flatly, no, it cannot do any of them. If that is the case, and if one is counting on turning over greater responsibility to Iraqi forces while withdrawing American troops and embedding even more Americans within those Iraqi units, then this really be a recipe -- if that part of the recommendations, and this is a great danger I think and it is something that could come straight out an example of your book "Bureaucratic Politics" where you take one part of a recommendation as part of a bipartisan report and ignore the other part of the critical need for it to go forward with a political solution. If people hang onto the recommendation of withdrawing all combat troops by the first quarter of 2008 and embedding more Americans in those Iraqi units, it will I think lead to more conflict, more violence, and more American casualties particularly among those units who are going from the relative safety, and let's focus on the word relative, of being right now with full American units to being in Iraqi units that they cannot depend on, and if that occurs, then I think there is a much, much greater danger for Americans who are going to be put into those kinds of positions.

MR. HALE: Scott Hale (?) of Brookings. First for Priscilla, we are with the new Defense Secretary-nominee potentially going to be in a situation where we have if he is confirmed a CIA director in charge of the military and a military officer in charge of the CIA. I wonder if you think that will improve the coordination between the two agencies.

For Mike and Kurt, the things that we do do well on

counterterrorism, it seems that Democrats have traditionally emphasized that counterterrorism involves a lot of police work, a lot of intelligence cooperation with foreign countries, and a lot of emphasis on diplomacy and understanding the context in which terrorists may be operating abroad. Insofar as those elements go very far toward the success of any future military operation involving counterterrorism, would you not then say that Democrats are very well positioned to be more effective in exercising military power and using it to go after terrorists?

MS. CLAPP: I would say that having the military in charge of the CIA and the former CIA director in charge of the Pentagon probably should facilitate communication and understanding between the two, but as Arnie said, personality is often a major factor and I cannot predict how their personalities will interact. But I should think that Gates would not go into the Defense Department thinking that the Defense Department should control intelligence collection and analysis in this government, and that is probably a good thing.

MR. O'HANLON: Scott, on your question about Democrats' natural strengths in this area, or potential natural strengths, there is probably something to it, but I guess I would say a couple of things partly in rebuttal, too. One, I do not think this has been an area of huge breakdown in the Bush Administration's track record. In other words, the Bush Administration is not well liked in Europe and the Middle East to put it mildly, although it is not really disliked in Asia, and if you did a global popularity contest as we used to imagine

counting the straw polls around the world, it is not clear Bush would lose vis-à-vis many other American presidents because he is reasonably well liked, and Kurt may want to rebut me, but in parts of the world that have a lot of big populations. But anyway, in Europe and the Middle East he is not well liked.

But the level of intelligence, actually exchanging names and information on bad guys, has gone okay even with the French, even with many other countries, even with the Egyptians, countries who perceive common threats and problem. So I think rather than debate who is slightly better because you are probably right on balance, I would say overall the real point is none of it is enough. Relying on halfway decent multilateral views of the world and a better willingness to cooperate with allies which is often the way Democrats sound when they talk about counterterrorism strategy, is really not enough. You have to help Islamic countries that are teetering on the do better, strengthen themselves, strengthen their reformers. I am not saying that they have to become secular Western states, but they do have to become more like the Indias, Indonesias, and Thailands, and less like the Pakistans, Egypts, and Saudi Arabias to do it in very simplistic terms.

I think what that means is involving a full range of our tools that involve a lot of economic instruments. The Bush Administration has done a couple of small free-trade agreements with the Islamic world and some nations there, but not enough. President Bush missed a huge opportunity last year at the G-8 Summit in Scotland when Tony Blair wanted to have an antipoverty agenda,

Bush owed him a big favor, and Bush stiffed him. That would have been a great opportunity to say, yes, let's talk about this big new aid initiative in terms of global poverty amelioration, but we Americans deep down subliminally think of it in terms of counterterrorism strategy. It is the way you can help Pakistan strengthen its educational system without being so neocolonialist as to say that you are trying to reform their educational system for antiterror purposes. It was a great opportunity and we blew it.

So on that sort of thing, unfortunately the Democrats did not do much better. If John Kerry had been there he probably would have given Tony Blair a billion bucks a year more than Bush did, but he did not want to campaign on this issue himself, he did not have that much of a strategy, and most Democratic politicians have not really done much with it because it is a dangerous issue. If you play it wrong or sound wrong it sounds soft, but you need to integrate all the different instruments, and that is your only hope.

MR. CAMPBELL: Let me just make one quick point. This is slightly different, but it is related to the question you asked Priscilla. First of all, the U.S. government as a whole is facing this huge trauma in Iraq in which the correlation of forces bureaucratically in Washington has changed fundamentally. You have a Congress with not only Democrats who have been critical and concerned who are now in a dominant position, but I would argue the only group that has been more angry and unhappy with the White House than congressional Democrats have been congressional Republicans, and we just have not seen that

yet, and we will see it in spades. I think the first group that is going to start saying we have to think seriously about getting out might well be Republicans because they do not want to have another election that is in many respects a referendum on Iraq policy in 2 years.

But I think the biggest challenge that the Bush Administration is going to face is that when the history is written about the Bush Administration, by an order of magnitude the most dominant figure in it is not the Vice President, it is not the President, it is Secretary Rumsfeld. And any of you who have spent time with him, it is a knee-buckling experience to be in the midst of his charisma and his ability to maneuver in small settings bureaucratically. It is quite something to experience. I would argue in his way he is even more dominant than Kissinger was because I think he had complete sway inside the U.S. government.

So the way the U.S. government functions today with the work-arounds and everything possible to deal with this incredibly dominant figure, he is gone now, and even though we have a new coming in who is going to learn about how the Department of Defense works, all of those ad hoc institutions that had to sprout up to deal with Rumsfeld, those are either all not necessary or you have to actually go back to the interagency process, something that Arnie knows very well. That process is going to be very hard to relearn government, the way government should actually work in the midst of a huge war with enormous international pressure and more pressure from Capitol Hill. That actually is going

to be the biggest challenge I think that the U.S. government is going to have to face, an immediate post-Rumsfeld world.

Some will say, great, easy, Gates is going to listen more to the military, it is much more than that, and I think it is going to take quite a while for the U.S. government to adapt to this new lack of this incredibly powerful bureaucratic and charismatic animal in Don Rumsfeld. I would love to hear what Arnie has to say about that.

MR. KANTER: I think there is no question but that Mr. Rumsfeld was a dominant and dominating figure, but I think that he has been less of a factor in the second term than in the first term. I think that, as Gates said in his testimony yesterday, he did not come to Washington to be a bump on the log, and having worked with him, I can assure you he will not be, and he will have a broad rather than a narrow definition of the scope of responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and he will be an active figure in his own right.

I do think the interagency dynamic will change importantly starting at the top, and I think, frankly, for the better. And if people are expecting Bob Gates to be a white knight, they will be deeply disappointed. I think he will make measurably impact I think sooner rather than later, and I think on the whole for the better.

MR. PASCUAL: Let me take one more question and then I will go back to the panelists and give you an opportunity to respond to that question, or if there are any other comments that you want to make in closing.

QUESTION: My name is Mary -- and I work with the Bosnia Support -- I just wanted to get back on our relationship and foreign policy with other countries and multilateralism and the U.N., and Mr. Bolton now not in the U.N. Do you have any idea of who would be better and what our policy should be especially since we want so many changes? I have listened to Europeans talk about what changes they wanted with the U.N., and then I listen to Americans and what changes they want, and they are not always the same. There are similarities, but they are not always the same and I was wondering if you could speak on that.

MR. PASCUAL: What I am going to do is come back this way across the panel, but I am going to give you, Mort, the last word, if that is okay. Mike, do you want to either respond to that question or any other wrap-up points you want to make other than buy the book?

MR. O'HANLON: I will say one very quick word, which is that we do not spend a lot of time on the U.N. in our book, but one thing we do talk about is how do you legitimate the use of force. Obviously it has been hugely controversial. Going to the U.N. is always the preference, but the Clinton Administration offered a great model of how you go to a body that legitimates an operation without the U.N., make no mistake about it, the Clinton Administration, obviously for somewhat lesser stakes, Kosovo versus Iraq, nonetheless was just as much denied permission to launch a war as was the Bush Administration, and it went to NATO. Kosovo is close to NATO's territory, it was within Europe, it was a little earlier call and it was a little less controversial mission given Milosovic's

track record and so forth, and it is something that others here at Brookings have been thinking about and writing about more than I have. But I think that in our book we want to encourage a shades-of-gray debate about how you legitimate the use of force. You cannot always rely on the U.N., but you always want to try.

It is a simple point, but I would simply finish with those two metaphors of Kosovo and Iraq. In Kosovo it was easier than it would have been in Iraq, admittedly, but we figured out a way to get legitimacy. In the first Gulf war in the first Bush Administration they figured out a way that obviously had maybe the best blessing of all, but you have to figure out some way to legitimate your action in wars of choice. I do not disagree with George Bush's desire to confront Saddam, but he did not have a good enough vehicle for maintaining legitimacy and that was obviously one of the things that haunts us today.

MR. CAMPBELL: Carlos, I will just say thank you.

MS. CLAPP: I will say thank you as well.

MR. KANTER: Before I say thank you, I just observe that the last 2 years of a two-term administration are usually a matter of just kind of hanging on while the presidential campaigns get underway. These next 2 years, however, may be a little different first because of the changes in personnel, we have mentioned Gates, we have mentioned Bolton, and I think those are consequential changes. Second, because the administration does not have the option of just hanging on. You cannot just hang on in Iraq, and what happens in Iraq and what you do differently in Iraq will ripple across our foreign policy. So I think the next

2 years will be kind of interesting. Stay tuned. And thank you.

MR. HALPERIN: I certainly agree with that. I think that the next 2 years will also be very consequential for the next President of the United States, and if you think there is going to be a Democratic president, you want Iraq to be clearly on the way toward settlement before that president comes in because the Democratic president has to confront the decisions and if we just coast for 2 more years the choices will be narrower and the consequences for the future of people's trust in a Democratic president will be much less, and I think that that is going to be a key issue that is played out here.

I want to take the opportunity to thank the Brookings Institution for its support a long time ago that made it possible for the three of us to write this book, for the support more recently that made it possible to bring out this new edition, and for giving us this opportunity to talk about it.

MR. PASCUAL: Thanks very much. My great thanks to the panelists, not just for their time and this conversation today, but the kind of scholarly, practical, analytic, and policy-oriented thought that went into these two books, because they really are outstanding example of scholarship and how to think about the world in practical solutions that we need to put in front of our policymakers to make it a better world. So thank you very much.

(Applause)

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