INTRODUCTION:

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MS. COHEN: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this Brookings Briefing on Next Steps for Darfur.

I am Roberta Cohen, a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution and a Senior Advisor to the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. The Project, which is co-sponsoring this event, works closely with the United Nations, in particular, the representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. The Project seeks to promote better solutions for people uprooted in their own countries by internal conflicts.

This is Brookings’ fourth briefing on Darfur over a three-year period. The purpose is to keep attention focused on one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world and also to stimulate solutions to the crisis. It has become commonplace to note but it is nonetheless horrifying that hundreds of thousands of people have died in Darfur, 2.5 million are uprooted from their homes, and 4 million people are totally dependent on the international community for survival. The conflict has also spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic bringing more displacement and death in its wake, and it threatens to upset implementation of the North-South Peace Agreement in Sudan and the integration of millions of displaced people in the South.

Allow me to recall that at our first briefing in 2004, we asked three questions of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Senator Jon Corzine, and Ambassador Francis Deng.
What should the United Nations and the United States do to effectively stop the killings and displacement?

Beyond diplomatic pressure, would sanctions and military actions be effective in this case?

How can the international community best engage the government of Sudan in a political process to resolve the conflict?

These questions still remain pertinent today.

Among the recommendations emanating from the 2004 briefing and from a subsequent one in 2006 with Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, were the need for political settlement, for a strengthened African Union force but also for its transition into a United Nations force, the need for increased U.S. financial and diplomatic support especially in engaging China and the Arab League, and for the appointment of a full-time U.S. envoy on Sudan and Darfur. There has been movement on some of these proposals, but the security and humanitarian situation which improved in early 2005 has worsened with military operations going on right now, with large areas inaccessible to the United Nations, and with relief workers under attack.

Today’s panel presents an opportunity to look at what steps the United Nations and the United States should be taking to fulfill the international responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. Carlos Pascual, Vice President of the Brookings Institution and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program will moderate the discussion.
On behalf of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, thank you so much for coming.

AMB. PASCUAL: Roberta, thank you and thank you for the leadership that you personally have shown and that the Internally Displaced Persons Project has shown in focusing attention on Darfur.

The two speakers that we have today are really in a unique position to help us address the issues of Sudan and Darfur and gain a better understanding of what the options and solutions might be.

One of the grand frustrations of Sudan and Darfur has been that there probably is no humanitarian crisis throughout the world that has been more roundly condemned by the international community and where it has been so difficult to achieve a meaningful peace and to address humanitarian concerns to stop the killing and to help people go back to some sort of normalcy in life and to have some sense of hope they can actually have a better life. In this issue, both the United States and the United Nations really do have a common cause and a common interest to see how we can cooperate with one another and the international community to help achieve meaningful change in the security situation and achieving a viable peace and to help begin to restore some sense of stabilization and reconstruction of people’s lives.

To begin our discussion, we are going to have U.N. Under Secretary-General for the Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Jean-Marie Guéhenno has been in that position since October of 2000. Currently, he is
managing at least 75,000 U.N. forces that are in the field, another 25,000 police and civilians, one of the largest U.N. deployments around the world that has ever been experienced, and managing the second largest international deployment of troops beyond that which is being managed by the United States. Prior to his time at the U.N., Jean-Marie held a number of senior positions in the French Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Service including being the head of their policy planning staff and Ambassador to the Western European Union.

Together with Jean-Marie Guéhenno will be Andrew Natsios. Andrew was appointed in September of 2006 as the U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan. Previous to that, many of you know Andrew as having been the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and in that capacity also playing a role as Special Humanitarian Coordinator and Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. Andrew was previously the Vice President of World Vision. He held senior positions in USAID. He is a politician from Massachusetts and brings with him knowledge of both local politics and international development, which is probably going to be critical in addressing these issues as well.

So, without further adieu, let me ask Jean-Marie to please begin and help us understand some of these issues from a U.N. perspective.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Thank you, Carlos, for those kind words. I am very happy to be at Brookings today because this institution certainly has I think played a critical role of putting the issue of Darfur and the plight of Darfur
on the map so that it would have the attention that it needs to have. And I am glad that I am on this panel with Andrew Natsios. We were together in Addis Ababa just a few days ago, last Thursday, and certainly a lot of what I am going to say will reflect the discussions we had in Addis, because certainly listening what you were saying on previous recommendations made here at Brookings, I think what happened in Addis last Thursday in a way is a follow-up to those recommendations and is very much in line with the kind of thinking that was developed here.

As we try to find the right answer to the immense challenge of Darfur, of course we are haunted by the memories of Rwanda, by the memories of Bosnia, by the memories of Somalia, too, and how do the right thing. As we discuss, as we negotiate, we see, as you were reminding us, that the situation on the ground has in recent weeks deteriorated rather than improved. Just on November 16th while we were meeting in Addis, there were military operations conducted in the area of Djebel Mara in North Darfur with military aircraft, with gunships carrying out bombing raids. There were also World Food Program convoys carrying lifesaving humanitarian supplies which were ambushed and looted by Arab militia in North and South Darfur. And we have seen the upsurge of violence in Chad and its possible spillover in the Central African Republic. So the situation on the ground is today unacceptable and it is clear I think to everybody who looks at the situation that it cannot be allowed to continue as it is and that it would be even worse when the military buildup that we are witnessing
with also additional mobilization of militias, if that were to continue while on the rebel side the NRF would also launch more military operations. That would just mean that we would go from very bad to even worse. And we know that the enormous relief operation that is being conducted in Darfur that has cost some $2-1/2 million already that involves close to 15,000 humanitarian workers, we know that that is not a sustainable answer.

So where are we today after Addis? And where were we just before Addis? I think we have to recognize that there are enormous mutual suspicions on both sides. There is obviously on the side of the government of Darfur worry about what is going to happen now with the South, whether unity will be made attractive, whether the spirit that inspired the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will endure and whether the possible decision of the South to move away from Darfur would just be a prelude then to Darfur and the integrity of Sudan being challenged in Darfur. So there is clearly I think on the Sudanese side a sense that the international community may have what they call a hidden agenda, that there is some kind of process that is threatening the foundations of the country.

And certainly on the side of the international community there is a deep suspicion of Sudanese authorities to allow for a U.N. force in Darfur reflects a political choice not to have a strong force, not to have a force that would make the difference that is needed today on the ground, even though the African Union has done everything it could, but that the refusal to have a force is not linked to
anything else but their desire to have the international community playing an active role in Darfur.

In the background of those mutual suspicions we have had many public statements which in a way have further entrenched the position which makes any solution more difficult because it becomes a zero-sum gain especially if you think in purely institutional terms, the U.N. versus A.U., or more U.N. means less A.U., and so any evolution on that now looks like someone losing face. And Resolution 1706, although it made clear that it invited the consent of the government of Sudan for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, and I am quoting from the resolution, Resolution 1706 has been presented as a sort of fait accompli that would make the point that decisions are made without the government of Sudan being part of them. So there is that background.

On top of that there has been the perception of a divided international community, divided in the Security Council, divided in Africa, divided between the League of Arab States and the African Union, so a sense that there was no unity of purpose and that the government of Sudan could listen to different voices in the international community.

I think in Addis Ababa that first day we began to address all those issues, and we began to address them probably because there was a clear sense of urgency. Everybody, as I say, knows what the situation is on the ground. Everybody also was aware that there is going to be a meeting of critical importance of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on November
24th at the end of this week. And we are just a few weeks away from the end of 2006, and that decisions have to be made on what happens on January 1, 2007, and making those decisions just a few weeks before that fateful date arrives, no time can be lost.

That sense of urgency I think helped us focus on the issues, to move away from the purely institutional debate and focus on the issues. The first is obviously the question of the ceasefire which I think was present in the minds of everybody because if you have an ongoing war developing on the ground, it is very difficult to talk of a political process, let alone of the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

The meeting in Addis came out with a strong call for a ceasefire, for a stop to the military operations which are ongoing, and for a ceasefire that would involve everybody. One of the big weaknesses of the post-Darfur peace agreement period has been that, as you know, the Ceasefire Commission has not played the role that it should play because some key actors on the ground were not part of the framework, and if you do not have in the structure that is supposed to implement the ceasefire a significant part of those who have begun, you are not going to make much progress. So you do need to have an inclusive ceasefire mission. It is an essential mechanism if you want to make any progress toward a ceasefire. What I would hope is that in the coming days, the government of Sudan which takes the position that its own military actions are reactions to the actions of the NRF, that the government of Sudan will take the initiative in
stopping military operations so that there the onus would be on those rebels who have not joined the ceasefire agreement. There are signals that can be sent there, and that would certainly help the Peace and Security Council at the end of the week.

But clearly a ceasefire is not going to last, is not going to be sustainable if there is no serious political process. I think there it was important in Addis, and it was significant, that the A.U., the U.N., the League of Arab States, the P-5, the government of Sudan, all agreed that if there is no solid political process in Darfur, just throwing a force at the problem will not stop the problem, that force is an important part, a credible, effective force and I am going to come to that, of the solution in Darfur, but it is only a part. If that force is deployed without a credible political process going on, it will not work. You can have an A.U. force, you can have a U.N. force, you can have a 10,000 force, a 20,000 force, or a 30,000 force, considering the size of Darfur and the fragmentation in Darfur, if you do not have a process that limits the influence of possible spoilers, then everybody is a spoiler and the force will not be in a position to really bring real progress.

When you look at the political process, when you look at the reasons why the Darfur Peace Agreement is not today an agreement that has a wide following, you see that there are essentially three issues that stand out. There is the issue of compensation, how much money and how is that money provided to the victims. There is the issue of the region of Darfur versus the free
states of Darfur. And there is the issue of the presence of Darfurians in Sudanese state institutions.

When you look at those issues, then you see that there is space for diplomacy and the political process, and there again some positive signals can be sent, because clearly signals that the amount of compensation in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the government of Sudan committed for a first down payment so to speak of $30 million. That is a small amount of money. That needs to be complemented, that needs to be augmented, and it would be a signal that things can move on in a positive manner.

How do we get all the relevant people around the table? As I said, there is a Ceasefire Commission, but there has to be a political process. It was recognized in Addis that this process has to involve the key players, the United Nations and the African Union. At the moment there is an ongoing negotiation, actually it is supposed to restart I think today in Asmara between the Sudanese delegation and various rebel movements. One of the difficulties of negotiation in the past few months is there are several tracks, it is very compartmentalized, and different people say different things to different interpolators, so you do not have a sense that there is one unified vision. If you do not have that, then the negotiations go nowhere.

Obviously, for the negotiation on the political track to make progress, one will have to address the broader regional and international context. The regional context is the issue of relations between Sudan and Chad, the mutual
allegations that elements coming from Chad help the rebels, and particularly the JEM in Darfur, and of course from the Chad standpoint, the incursions of armed Arab militias in Chad and the threat that they can represent for the authorities in N'Djamena. So long as that is not addressed, the risk that the Darfur crisis and the Chad uncertainties feed into each other in a very dangerous is very high. So in such negotiations, it will be important that key regional stakeholders be part of them.

And it will be important that the international community stand together. I said at the beginning that before Addis Ababa there was a sense of a sometimes not so harmonious international community. It was striking to see in Addis actually how the international community came together, and probably one of the reasons why there seems to have been progress in Addis is the sense that we have reached the stage where there is a broadening understanding among all of the P-5, in the Arab League, in the African Union, that not making a strategic shift now in the way one addresses the crisis in Darfur can only lead to a complete breakdown and to tragedies where essentially events will be in control rather than rationality, and that is something that everybody wants and should want to avoid. It was interesting to see, for instance, in Addis how China was very helpful in steering the discussion in a way that will help create common ground between the various viewpoints and bring them closer together.

Having a solid political process that provides the foundation for the force, and having a ceasefire that allows for a political process is not enough.
There will be a need in Darfur for a credible force. There is an urgent need for such a force. What we focused in Addis was rather than the institutional envelope of that force, its capacities what is needed, there was agreement that initially what we call a light package of support to the African Union force would be put in place expeditiously, and we are doing that. We need some cooperation from member states for some aspects of the package, but we are doing that.

There was agreement that a heavier package including more police and civilian personnel, close to a thousand people, should also be put in place expeditiously. There the government of Sudan made the point that its implementation should be facilitated by the existing tripartite mechanism that has been agreed to, that is the mechanism between the United Nations, the African Union, and the government of Sudan. We have no objection to that because we want to be transparent, but it has to be clear that such a mechanism is a mechanism to implement. If we all agree that a political process is the answer to the situation in Darfur, a credible, inclusive political process is the answer, then we should all be agreed that a credible, effective force is part of that answer so that the government of Sudan and all the stakeholders in Darfur should accept that the force that is to be deployed has to be an effective force and has to be deployed in full transparency with the government of Sudan, but that transparency should not mean that its deployment is delayed by administrative actions, but that its deployment is made in full cooperation with the government of Sudan. That is
the third point that was discussed and agreed in principle in Addis Ababa, the deployment of an effective force in Darfur.

The Sudanese delegation made very clear that the size of the force, the exact command-and-control arrangements, would have to be checked with the authorities in Khartoum. Of course, these are important decisions that may need to be taken at the highest level. But our own position is very clear, for that force to be deployed, for that force to be financed by the United Nations — committed to make that recommendation, and it is not for him to make that decision, to make that recommendation to the organs of the United Nations, and that would be a momentous decision for the U.N. to fund the force that will not a fully U.N. force. For that recommendation to be sustained, the membership of the United Nations will want to have some guarantees. It will not be in a position to approve such a force if that force is not credible and if the membership of the Security Council is not convinced that that force is going make a real difference. So in terms of its size, it will have to be a force very much like the force that is described in the report of July 28 this summer made by the Secretary General, essentially the middle option in this report.

That force will have to have command-and-control structures that are effective, and there there is a structure that exists in the United Nations that is ready to support that force and to provide the kind of backstopping command-and-control support that is needed for that force to be effective. There the discussion is really not of a technical nature. The technicalities hide the
fundamental strategic choice that now has to be made, whether we now engage in a political process which is the fundamental interests of all those who want the suffering in Darfur to end and the government of Sudan has to be part of that. If that strategic choice is made, then a number of decisions flow from that, including having a significantly stronger force. We will in parity look at troops from the African Continent, but clearly already the African Continent is contributing to many peacekeeping operations, many under the U.N. flag, and we know that it may well be that beyond the African Continent there will be a need for non-African troops from traditional peacekeeping countries like the countries of South Asia which have always made a contribution to peacekeeping. We will need probably to add some non-African forces to the force and we will need to put into place robust command-and-control structures that will be in the best interests of the political process that we all agreed on. If we do that, I think that for the first time there is a real hope that we can begin to see the end of the immense suffering in Darfur.

For that to happen, a lot of concrete actions will need to be taken in the coming days and weeks. The Peace and Security Council on November 24th of course will have to take critical decisions on what is the mandate of that force because that force will need to clearly put the protection of civilians at the center of its mandate if it is to play a useful role. Intensive preparations and discussions will have to take place between the U.N., the African Union, and the government of Sudan so that we all clearly agreed on the timing and nature of the deployment
that we are going to have to make expeditiously. Last but not least, intensification of the political process needs to happen quickly. We committed to having a meeting in the next 2 weeks with the nonsignatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement. That is essential because if again we do not have that foundation, we will not succeed.

I will stop there by saying that there are three points that are really fundamental for us. The situation on the ground has to improve immediately. Hence the need for an effective ceasefire. The political process has to be reenergized, and the United Nations is ready to take its responsibility alongside the African Union to help that political process, and that was one of the key conclusions in Addis. And lastly, we are now I think closer to deploying an international force which would be a hybrid force. The detailed institutional packaging of that force is yet to be worked out, but I think what is not in doubt is the need if there is a credible political process to have a credible force to support it. Thank you.

AMB. PASCUAL: Jean-Marie, thank you. You have done an excellent job of laying out the stakes, the timeline, and in particular, the first step on November 24th with the A.U., some of the complexities that need to be worked out on the ceasefire, the political process, and the force structure. We look forward to coming back in the questions and answers and understanding aspects of it further.

Now, I am going to ask Andrew Natsios, the President’s Special Envoy on Sudan, to address us. Andrew, as I said, has been deeply involved in issues for
Sudan for a long, long time and will give us a perspective of what his mandate is and what the American strategy is to complement what the U.N. is doing.

Andrew, thanks.

MR. NATSIOS: Thank you very much, Carlos.

What I first want to say is that my mandate from the President and the Secretary of State is for all of Sudan, not just Darfur. It is for the East. There is unrest in the Nubian in the North over some water issues and certainly in the South where I have been involved for many years.

I do want to, though, just add a few comments about historical context. My first trip to Darfur was in 1991 during the first Darfur War, not the first in history but the first in the last 20-year cycle that we are going through. It started at the end of the Great Sahelian Drought of the mid-1980s. It was between the Fur and the Arabs and it started in 1985, 1986 and ended about 1991. I estimated then that about 20,000 people had died but mostly from hunger because there was a drought and a war at the same time, and in many developing countries, if you combine war and drought, it is usually a recipe for a lot of deaths.

Fortunately, one good thing this year -- about the only good thing in Darfur -- is that there was a good crop, good rains, good crop, which actually has been atypical in the last couple of decades.

The second war took place between the Massalit and the Arabs from 1996 to 1998. So that was the second war. I was in the NGO community at that time, and my NGO, World Vision, was not involved in the relief effort, at least I am not
aware of it. Maybe it was. I don’t think so. We were just in the South.

And the third war now is the one that began, depending on whether you follow Alex De Waal and Julie Flint’s arguments that in fact this did not start in 2003, but it started in 2002. Without going through a lot of debate about the beginning of the third war, this is clearly the most destructive of the three, in fact, clearly the most destructive in the history of Darfur, and that was because of the introduction of heavy weaponry and the arming of one particular set of Arab militias from the Rizeigat Abbala tribes, the camel-herding Rizeigat of the North of the Darfur. The Southern Rizeigat nazir refused to participate in this conflict. In fact, he has actually protected some of the African tribal leaders and chiefs in the South during this conflict and has refused to participate.

So the perception that this is Arabs versus Africans is simply not accurate. This is some Arab tribes versus some African tribes. The reality is that in historical context, the tribes have intermarried. You will frequently find people in tribes that are half-Zaghawa and half-Arab. In fact, there is one tribe that has a new name that is half-Zaghawa and half-Fur and because of the combination of the bloodlines, it has a new name for the tribe.

This is very complicated. It is not simple. It goes back centuries. The Sultanate of the Fur goes back to the 1500s. Actually, there are some historical arguments that it goes back to the 15th Century, not just the 1500s.

I want to focus my attention, though, on what happened in Addis and complement a few of the comments that Jean-Marie has just made. I do want to
associate myself and the United States Government with the perspective and the analysis that Jean-Marie just made. It is not always the case that the United States agrees with U.N. leadership on every issue. I have to say — and everybody should know this — that with respect to Darfur, our perception of what is happening and our broader plan for what needs to happen is coincident with the leadership of the United Nations, with Kofi Annan, with Jean-Marie, and with the other leaders in the U.N.

That does not mean we agree on every single issue. There are issues where we are a little hardliner than perhaps they might be and issues that we put a little more focus on, but I do want to commend Kofi Annan. I have watched him over many years, and he was brilliant in Addis. I thought his leadership skills came out, and after many years of leadership in the U.N., he is showing those skills once again.

I also want to commend my friend, Chairman Konare, the Chairman of the African Union, for his leadership at that meeting, too.

Several things happened in Addis, the first of which is there was a general consensus-building effort. This was not just the United States versus Sudan or the West versus Sudan or the U.N. versus Sudan. It was, I think, a general effort among all of the participants, including the Sudanese, to come to some resolution of issues, many of which are dealt with in 1706.

Now, 1706 has become a very provocative term. My government stands behind that resolution; I want to repeat that. But it is interesting to me that if you
read the Darfur Peace Agreement, there are many things in the Darfur Peace Agreement that are in 1706. So when we have people condemn 1706 or criticize it, who also support the Peace Agreement on Darfur, there is an issue because there is a lot of overlap between the two. I presume there are just a couple of issues actually within 1706 which are the controversial ones which have led to this divisiveness over the resolution.

Now, I want to say that our job between now and the end of this calendar year is to coordinate every closely with the leadership of the United Nations on the diplomacy of the Addis Ababa framework that we agreed to in the last few days because I don’t want anyone to get the impression that we are conducting a separate negotiation of separate set of issues. We are not going to do that.

My government stands behind the Addis Ababa framework that was agreed to last week. We encourage the Sudanese Government to work through some of the remaining issues. When Lam Akol, the Foreign Minister, left, he said there were several issues I have to bring back to my government.

We look with great anticipation and interest on the reaction of the Sudanese Government on those issues, and I will be speaking with Mark Malloch Brown, the Secretary-General, and with Jean-Marie on a daily basis to ensure we are coordinated on these issues and that we don’t have two separate negotiating tracts because I think one of the reasons that the CPA negotiations were successful is we stopped having multiple negotiations going on at the same time with the Sudanese Government which confuses them and actually made the process last a lot longer.
I mean prior to the CPA negotiations starting. I think that is one of the reasons we didn’t have an agreement before is we had separate tracts going on at the same time.

It was very apparent to me in my trip to Khartoum five weeks ago that there were six negotiations going on simultaneously, and it was confusing everyone, including me, and not very helpful.

One of the first accomplishments of Addis Ababa is the agreement there is going to be now a U.N.-A.U. process and that our job in the African countries, the Arab League, the European Union, and the United States is to support that single tract.

The second point I want to make which is not an agreement that was made, but I think there was a consensus around the issue of timing. Amr Moussa from the Arab League said we are running out of time. I said we are running out of time. Kofi Annan knows we are running out of time because he is leaving office on January 1st.

There are three things happening on January 1st. One is there is a new Secretary-General, and it is not that the new Secretary-General is not able, but he is a different person than Kofi Annan. He is going to have different people in positions of authority. There is a transition that is going on in any institution when you change leaders, and we need to be aware of that.

We have a new Congress coming into power in my government, January 1st. So, from my perspective, I have to understand that we have basically six
weeks to get some agreements done before January 1st because I am clear now where we are. But on January 1st, there is a new Congress and they will be making policy decisions with us, and that may change. With respect to the political process here, we have six weeks.

We also have six weeks because the African Union has said that their mandate ends January 1st.

So for three different reasons, we are in a very tight timeline. Decisions have to be made. Agreements have to be reached. These are not artificial. They are based, because of the analysis I have just done, on a historical reality, not just one, not just Kofi Annan; it is in our government and it is also in the African Union in terms of their mandate.

Now, I want to say also when I was in the aid business and running humanitarian aid operations, the standards that I used to judge development programs and to develop action plans on crises from a purely humanitarian perspective, I had a different set of standards: Are we spending the money rapidly enough? Are people mobilized on the ground? Are we getting kids immunized? Is the food moving? Is the shelter moving? What is the security situation with respect to the people on the ground?

I must say I have to reorient my whole thinking about how to judge success from a purely diplomatic standpoint. I can’t get my development mind and my humanitarian mind completely out of my head. It is there to stay for the rest of my life. So, constantly in the background, I worry about what the conditions are
among the people in the villages and in the camps, both in Chad and in Darfur.

But essentially, we are not going to have one breakthrough moment when everything comes together on every single issue one day at one time. What we are having happen now is a series of steps are being taken where there is forward motion. As long as those steps are sufficient to reach a conclusion that is definitive by January 1st, I will be happy.

I think we began to do that in Addis. There was a series of things the Sudanese Government announced that they had not announced before. They essentially supported the package that we finished with. There were several issues that were remaining that they need to discuss in their government, but they did, for example, agree to the second package of assistance to upgrade the AMIS Force which is in Paragraphs 48 through 60 of Kofi Annan’s report of July 28th, 2006. So, if you see that, they had not agreed to that. In fact, actually, they had opposed it. They clearly definitively said so at that meeting. Lam Akol said: My government, in principle, has agreed to this. It is a matter of simply the operational details of getting this put in place. That, in my view, was a step forward. So, beyond the consensus-building, it was the second step.

The light package had been agreed to before, and Kofi Annan asked us not to debate something that had already been agreed to which I thought was a wise decision on his part.

I think it is very important we move along which is Jean-Marie’s obligation to do now or his duty to do, and he is in charge of that process.
I just want to say to you, if you need any help as you move along, please tell us.

I think there is a third thing that came out of this meeting. There is a lot of suspicion by the Sudanese Government that there are other agendas at work here, that this is not simply what it appears to be. I want to say this clearly, categorically from my government: The only agenda the United States has in Darfur is a human rights and humanitarian agenda. I hear so many bizarre rumors and stories circulating as to other agendas. It is nonsense.

I have been in every single meeting in the inter-agency process from May 1st when I took over as the AID Administrator because I was called into meetings that were purely diplomatic because of my expertise in Sudan. The only time I wasn’t in the meetings was the nine months from early this year until I took over this position in September when I was teaching at Georgetown. By the way, I am still teaching at Georgetown, and I want thank John DeGioia, the President of Georgetown for giving me a little bit more flexibility in my teaching schedule to do this. But during that nine-month period, there were no meetings held that dramatically changed policy.

There is no other agenda. There is no hidden agenda. There is nothing else at work in the U.S. Government over any other issues in Darfur. I need to say that because there is suspicion. There is distrust, and that distrust is, in my view, fueling the resistance of the Sudanese Government to a negotiation over the 1706. But now it is a little easier because I think all of these issues came out on the table
during Addis Ababa.

A proposal was put together to have a joint U.N.-A.U. appointment of the next senior political international official. We would typically call that an SRSG, Special Representative to the Secretary-General, which is sort of the Ambassador of the United Nations, but we are talking about a hybrid now and the hybrid would be an A.U. official and U.N. official simultaneously, jointly appointed who would likely be an African; and then a Force Commander who would also be an African, jointly appointed by the A.U. and the U.N. This was also a general concept that was presented, and I think there was consensus around it, though the Sudanese Government needs to still speak about that issue.

It is critically important, from the perspective of my government, for the United Nations regular funding system for peacekeeping operations be used. Now, it can’t be used in the traditional sense because this is a hybrid operation, but we cannot use the current system with which the Europeans and the United States have fully funded the AMIS Force. We have to keep going back for special appropriations to our Congress. The European budget for this is empty now to go back and assist AMIS. We are going to have to come up with some money between now and the end of the year to support AMIS during these critical months.

But the point is we need a regularized system for raising funds for this, so that we don’t have to do these supplemental appropriations. The reason I say that is there are always other issues in these supplemental appropriations in the United
States. It has nothing to do with either party or the ideology. The fact of the matter is people add other things in. There is a big dispute now over the supplemental about whether there should be any earmarks in it. When that is held up, it means the appropriations are held up to help the A.U. When the United Nations presents to us a bill for all their peacekeeping operations — I think is it 23 percent we pay now?

AMB. PASCUAL: Twenty-seven.

MR. NATSIOS: 27 percent; I wasn’t trying to drop the figure, Jean-Marie, so don’t start rumors. It is just my memory at my advanced age is now slipping a bit.

So, 27 percent, we pay it. It is appropriated. We pay it through the regular budgeting process. That is what we need to go to. We cannot use the system we have used to support AMIS financially because it is not regularized.

And I might also add during Addis Ababa, there was also an educational process for all of the people there. It was not just for the Sudanese Government. It was for a lot of people who do not understand how complex these operations are. You must have systems for making checks out to the 7,000 soldiers who are on board. There is a regularized system for doing this.

I watched the U.N. military operations in the early nineties. I am not being mean here, but they were not up to par. Some of them were a disaster. Over 14 years, whatever it is from 1992 to now, there has been a gradual improvement in the systems, the mundane systems. You think they are not important? If you
don’t pay a soldier for six months and he is getting shot at on the field in any army, in any peacekeeping operation, you have a big problem with morale. Getting those checks from wherever the headquarters is in the middle of a war zone is not an easy thing to do. These are complex operations.

Do you have a memo of understanding between the African Union or the U.N. and the country in which the peacekeeping operation is going on because there are legal issues that come up? If someone gets hurt, what do you do? Do you pay taxes? Do you not pay taxes on these? There are all sorts of issues.

The U.N. has put in place a series of very complex arrangements that actually work very well. I compliment the United Nations — and I always do that — for the work that Kofi Annan has done, who used to have that job, Jean-Marie’s job, and Jean-Marie’s reforms over the last few years to put in place a set of what I would call critically important operational systems to make these operations work.

It is not a criticism of the A.U. to say that those systems are not in place in the A.U. Why aren’t they? Because it is their first operation. It is very difficult to do these. It was difficult for the U.N. to do them when they started. So this is not a criticism of the A.U. I think the A.U. has done a wonderful job under difficult circumstances in their first instance of these kinds of operations.

We need now going to 17,000 people from 7,000 which is what the proposal is at Addis, to established systems that has been tested over and over again that we know work. If we don’t have those systems, it weakens this all.
I want to say I am going to believe the Sudanese Government’s statements that they want an effective force, until they prove otherwise. They may prove otherwise, but I am going to wait for that to happen.

I believe the only way to make this work properly is to use U.N.-established backstopping systems and command and control systems because we know they work and we can see — I can see — the improvement in these operations over the last 14 years.

Jean-Marie mentioned the composition. There are issues about whether it will be only Africans or whether Africans will be encouraged from Arab countries and North Africa or outside of Africa in terms of South Asia and other countries with peacekeeping traditions. It is better to have countries that have done this before in other places around the world because it is more likely that they will be successful.

I want to just say something in conclusion. I have watched a lot of these operations. There are some things that are very dicey, very difficult to do, like disarming different groups, particularly from heavy weaponry. There is a lot of heavy weaponry sitting around Darfur right now on all sides. You can’t have a peace agreement implemented unless that stuff is collected. The U.N. did not do a good job 14 years ago. I watched them really mess up some things. They do an excellent job now in this. They have established procedures as to how to do it so it works. If we are going to have a peace agreement and Darfur is going to be stable again and development can take place, it is very important that we use
those established procedures.

I accepted this job because the President assured me and the Secretary assured me that we will have a robust American effort to fund an internationally-coordinated and run development program to reconstruct Darfur after this is all over. I think a lot of people in the camps, in all tribes, and this is going to be, by the way, for all tribes. It can’t be for one side and not the other. If it is for the Africans and not the Arabs, people are going to say in two more years, we are just going to have another war. Our objective here is to see to it that this is the last Darfur war, not the third of four or five or six wars.

People have suffered enough. The Sahara Desert is moving south. Destitution is terrible among all of the tribes because of the increase in population, the fragility of the environment, and the fact that there are an increasing number of droughts. There is a huge amount of water in Northern Darfur under the desert. It can be used, but we need a development program to do that.

I want to just say my government has agreed that they will play a role, a major role in that effort, but we must have a peace agreement and we must have the agreement include all of the tribes and all of the political interests and it has to be done in a collaborative way, not by force. We believe that the United Nations is the best way to accomplish that.

Thank you very much.
MR. PASCUAL: Andrew, thank you very much. One of the things that was particularly striking in your presentation was your emphasis on January 1st and the time between now and January 1st.

MR. NATSIOS: Yes.

MR. PASCUAL: What I am going to do is to turn to the audience and ask them to ask their questions. In the course of doing that, I am going to ask the two of you to comment as well on this January 1st issue and who the spoilers might be and what the prospects are in fact of actually being able to get the Justice and Equity Movement to buy on to a viable ceasefire, is it possible to restrain the Janjaweed. Have things deteriorated to such an extent where in some cases one can push certain actors to do negative things, but can you actually restrain them to do the positive thing, so let me ask you come back to that question.

I am going to turn to the audience. I will ask people to identify themselves. I will take three questions at a time, and then will ask the panelists to go forward.

QUESTION: (Off mike) from Sudan. My first question is to Mr. Jean-Marie. Listening to you, I get the sense that you are almost eulogizing the 1706 mandate, that is overtaken by the dynamics of the situation in Sudan, it is a very bad decision — did not mention it, there is no — package on it, there are no sanctions for the violators, there is no ultimatum for the nonsignatories, and the existence of the President of Sudan of not accepting it. So do we have to go back to the Security Council and modify this mandate? This number one.
My question is that I am happy that you said that the President is sending you for all Sudan. Do we know that we have never been a nation? We are in the process of developing a nation? That there is really a sincere will of keeping Sudan together rather than breaking it up? And do you have any intention of sitting with the other democratic parties who are in the position to bring them — because this government you know does not represent Sudan?

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you. Let me take one other question from this side over here.

MR. GOLDBERG: My name is Mark Goldberg with The American Prospect magazine. I have a question for both panelists. If seems that you have put a lot of faith that the government of Khartoum was negotiating in good faith in Addis, and I was wondering if you have thought through any punitive measures to take should in fact the government again put up roadblocks to the implementation of the hybrid force?

MR. PASCUAL: Since I asked a question to start with, let me turn it back to the two of you. Do you want to begin, Jean-Marie?

MR. GUÉHENNO: Your first question of what to do between now and January 1st so that the spoilers do not destroy the diplomatic effort, I think that is where there has to be a much more intense and much more focused diplomatic political process than what we have seen so far. The fragmentation of negotiation was something going on in Asmara and contacts here, that is not enough. What I would like to see happening is that these contacts become more
inclusive without becoming a big forum which becomes unmanageable, but where the key players like the U.N. and like the African Union are part of the discussion.

On your specific question on the JEM, I think it is very much linked to the Sudan-Chad issue which cannot be ignored. There were reciprocal visits, there were some kind of agreement, but it has never been really followed through. That needs to go much further if we want the situation to improve. I do not think you are going to resolve Darfur if the Sudan dimension is ignored.

On 1706, this has become some kind of a lightening rod or some kind of symbol. I think it will be for the Security Council to decide how it wants to deal with it, but the point which was made earlier, it remains that in 1706 there are lots of elements that are just implementation of the DPA. There are some elements that may need some clarification so that those issues that have been misunderstood in 1706 are clarified, but it is something that the Security Council is going to have to consider in the next few weeks.

On punitive measures, our role as peacekeepers is to look at developing a political space within which some kind of common ground can be found, and that is what I am doing. The Security Council looks at the broader context, and I think depending on how things develop, different courses of action may be taken.

MR. NATSIOS: In terms of whether or not I will be talking to other people than just the Sudanese government or the government of Southern Sudan, the answer is, yes, I will. It is going to take me a while because there are a
lot of different political parties and factions and leaders of different parts. When I started this last trip to Khartoum I had an evening meal at Imam al-Mahdi's house, I am sure you all know I was there, because virtually all of the older civil leadership of the Fur Tribe were at this dinner and we had a very interesting and useful conversation. I want to see Sadiq al-Mahdi on my next trip, and I am going to speak with him. I might even see Hassan Turabi at one point, I met him many years ago, to see where they are on these issues because I would like to hear from them directly rather than through the filter of the news media or other people quoting them.

From our perspective, it is my job and the job of the American Embassy there to continually keep up a conversation with these other groups because we need for them to understand that we want a constructive process for resolving these issues not through violence, but through an election process which has already been agreed to in the CPA. The CPA elections are not just in the South, they are for the whole country. One of the good things, and again there is lot of dark news from Sudan, but one of the good news things from Sudan is in virtually all of the conversations the AID mission, the embassy and I have had with Sudanese rulers in the ruling party, in the National Congress Party, is what effect will this have on our relative political position in the elections that are coming up.

The fact that they are asking that question means it is very healthy, because when politicians start thinking what effect it is going to have on the next
elections, one is it means that the elections are going to happen. But two, it means you are thinking in democratic terms. Am I going to lose the support of this group if I do this? Democracy complicates negotiation sometimes in that respect, but it is a healthy thing. This means that we are going to indeed have free and fair elections under the CPA. I actually think we are going to have them, and that would be very important.

But we need as the government of the United States to send the message to all the factions that participating in the elections is critically important for the future of Sudan to hold the country together. It is the Sudanese people's decision to hold the country together, we cannot impose that from outside one way or the other, but our job is to support a process that is open, that includes everyone in which the public of Sudan, the people of Sudan, voters, will make their own decision as to what to do in the future.

Some of this will be determined by how the Sudanese government performs over the next few years. If we have peace in Darfur and people in the South see that things are really improving and that some of the reason for that is because of the Sudanese government's performance, then maybe they may be more likely to vote in favor of keeping the country together in 7 years.

The other question is the question of the spoilers. I have already met with one of the nonsignatory rebel leaders in Paris, I tried to see a second one and we could not arrange it, but we are going to make an effort to see all of the factions. It was a little easier to deal with this particular leader because they are
not engaged in combat in this operation. They are respecting the ceasefire even though they did not sign the CPA. I thought we had a very useful conversation, and I think they will play a constructive role in this process. I do want to see some of the other groups that actually may have other agendas which may not be helpful agendas in terms of concluding a peace agreement. I am going to send the same message to them that they need to use a political process to resolve their differences with the Sudanese government, not weapons.

But I say that also to the Sudanese government that a military solution will not work in Darfur. It is too vast an area, it is too complicated, and there are too many people. You cannot win militarily. The only way to resolve this for everyone is through political negotiations.

The last question was on punitive measures. I do not think at this point in terms of the negotiations on Darfur right now that we should talk about punitive measures. There are so many punitive measures on the law books of the United States and in our regulations right now, it is difficult to imagine what other things we would do anyway. I had a senior official who is President Bashir's staff quote a member of the Senate, a Republican who is quite militant on the issue of Darfur and Sudan generally, say, our carrots to your government are not using our sticks. It was sort of dark humor. They thought that it was rather humorous that that is how it was being defined. They did not like it very much, but I think we need to have this conversation with the Sudanese in terms of the Addis Ababa Framework, work through these issues, and if people work in good faith and
negotiate in good faith then we can get an agreement. If they do not, then that is a different matter and we will have to deal with that. But we have a time limit, January 1st.

MR. PASCUAL: Just to clarify one thing the two of you said.

MR. NATSIOS: We do not want to clarify too much, Carlos.

MR. PASCUAL: No, no.

MR. NATSIOS: I am finding out in diplomacy it is better not to have too much clarity sometimes.

MR. PASCUAL: Here on this point of diplomacy, you said earlier that there has to be one political process and Jean-Marie said the same thing, and in your meeting with all of these factions it does not mean that you are creating a separate political process, you are pushing people to participate in a single political process.

MR. NATSIOS: That is exactly correct.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Exactly.

MR. PASCUAL: I just want to make sure that there is no ambiguity, for obvious reasons, about that particular point.

MR. GUÉHENNO: It is very important that the U.S. be very engaged there because it is essential that different voices have the same message and that is what will make it effective.

MR. NATSIOS: Yes.
QUESTION: I just want to make a couple of quick points. One, I think to put things in perspective regarding the U.N., the current Secretary-General had your job during the Rwanda genocide, you did mention Rwanda, and he did not authorize his own commander to disrupt the planning of genocide. The U.N. currently has close to nine-thousand troops. Even though the date Dr. John Garang asked the Secretary-General to use that force to stop that genocide, the U.N. has done nothing in 3 years to protect civilians.

The point here is, here I think you are making the argument that this is an important stage, a strategic shift and so forth. I think we should be very blunt and direct and say this is the abandonment of 1706 and allowing a government that has been accused of genocide to dictate the terms to the international community.

And lastly about the third war, Andrew, the difference between the other two wars, this is a genocide. This is a deliberate systematic act by a sitting government.

MR. PASCUAL: Do you want to ask a question?

QUESTION: No.

MS. MEEHAN: Shannon Meehan of the International Rescue Committee. My question is you talk about a broad political process and reinforcing robust troops. My question is, does that also include Chad? Is there a discussion on the table to send in hopefully a hybrid force into Darfur and are we equalizing so that the spillover does not continue into Chad? And when you talk
of the political process, you had mentioned the need for Chad to have a political process. Is that a subset of the political process of Darfur or is that a separate process?

MR. MUSA: Khalid Musa (?) from the Embassy of Sudan. Using the political literature in Washington, I should first comment on the fresh perspective on the issue of Darfur, and I welcome this new language of cooperation, consultation and positive engagement with the government of Sudan. And I wonder why does it take a long time to have this positive reflection on the issue of Sudan, actually?

In order to have an effective negotiation, you have to have confidence building with the government of Sudan because as the two speakers pointed out, there is suspicion on both sides. I mean rather than the old formula of pressure — Sudan has every single right to be suspicious about the things because of broken promises of the U.S. government and the international community over there.

I think Sudan will continue to be suspicious if the international community or the U.S. administration would like to say aloud the old wine in a new glass, actually. I think any problem for a solution to the problem of Darfur should include this point, DPA should be the central point for any further political process of negotiation. The formula above all the others is lacking the development package, there is no mention for the development package at all. Tribal reconciliation. As pointed out by some presenters, there is no sanction and
ultimatum on regional settlement. And the African Union should take a leading role in the settlement and the peace process.

My last question is about whether you are going to have a unified one group negotiation as we had it in Abuja and DPA before, or are we going to negotiate with different factions at the same time? Are we going to unify all them together and presenting one group with the whole issue of Darfur? Thank you.

MR. PASCUAL: Andrew, do you want to stop this time?

MR. NATSIOS: Let me say I talked about the suspicions of the Sudanese government. We have suspicions, too. We suspect there are people in the regime who believe a military solution is necessary and because there have been three major defeats since August of the Sudanese military that they have now mobilized the Arab militias to attack soft targets, which is to say villages and the displaced camps. We have had three incidents in the last 3 weeks which are extremely disturbing to me. I have said this and I need to say it again over and over again, if a pattern develops, then a more confrontational approach will take place.

The United States will not accept any of this other process if it is simply a disguised attempt to avoid dealing with the reality of what is happening to people on the ground. Eighty-nine people were killed in the Jebel Moon area. Twenty-seven of them who were shot were children. Two-hundred people were killed in the Goz Beida area a week ago. They were mostly women and children. It was done by the militias, and I do not want to go into all the details of it
because it gets more and more provocative, but I want to say we have to improve each other's language and the way in which we talk to each other.

If this continues, then the attempt at a more conciliatory process is not going to work for my government in either party. So I just want to send that message to the Sudanese government very clearly, we are doing this process with the United Nations on the basis of certain limits. If someone is attacked, because we know the rebel groups attacked the Sudanese military, and the last two battles were started by the rebels. We know that. That does not give an excuse to attack noncombatants. It is not acceptable for us. You can make your own decisions, but I can tell you from the U.S. government it is not acceptable.

The other thing I want to comment on is Chad. We need to deal with the Chad issue. It is in the Addis agreement, only once sentence and it does not go into great detail, but it is clear that the Sudanese government is destabilizing Chad and the Chadian is destabilizing Darfur. The Chadians are supporting the rebels in Darfur, but it is also the opposite, and we have to have that stopped because that is simply making things worse than it already is. So there needs to be a process for stabilizing the border area and these incursions back and forth which are not helpful.

MR. GUÉHENNO: On Chad, actually, we just sent a mission to Chad and to the Central African Republic and has arrived I think today to look at all the practicalities of what a deployment would entail, from a very light one to a
bigger one. I think in Chad you need a combination probably of some military deployment, it may be light, if there is a solid political process combined with the political process that Andrew was referring to.

When you saying on the DPA and on the overall attitude of the international community, I will link what you were saying to what was said by the gentleman over there on the U.N. and what we have done and not done on Rwanda. We are very much aware that if we commit to a particular situation we need to have the resources to deliver and not to create false expectations to have troops that are configured and equipped to deal with the issue at hand and that will be in sufficient numbers, that is, not just the promise of security, but actual security that can be brought. That is a key lesson.

That is why I think for the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement which is a very complex agreement, that can be complemented, but that remains a solid basis. If one is serious about the implemented of the Darfur Peace Agreement one needs a very solid force considering the vast expanse of land that Darfur represents and the multitude of villages. You need a significant force and you need a very mobile force. Otherwise, you will not be able to really commit them and hold the promise that you have, and we will hear criticism like the one you just made.

MR. WEINTRAUB: I am Leon Weintraub, a former member of the Foreign Service and not an adjunct professor at George Washington University. While I am all in favor of a consensus kind of dialogue and the
political process, we have had some handouts here about the responsibility to protect. We have had this endorsed by the General Assembly and we have had it endorsed by the Security Council. Within the American system we have had the Gingrich-Mitchell Report of last year also endorsing it. Is there some way to make this meaningful or is it just words on paper that is not going to have any effect whatsoever?

MR. IVA: My name is Andrew Iva (?). I am a Sudan activist. My question is about the robust and credible force that we have been referring to. Considering on the U.N. Security Council we have China which receives 7 percent of its petroleum imports from Sudan and funds the genocide, and considering Russia also sits on the Security Council which provides the gunships and the bombers for the genocide, how likely is the U.N. Security Council approval for this robust force?

MS. RICE: Susan Rice from Brookings. Andrew, a question for you. Some months ago the President said on the record that he envisioned that it would be necessary and indeed desirable for NATO to provide robust support to any international force that might deploy to Darfur. It would seem that if we are looking at a hybrid now of the U.N. and the African Union, that that sort of robust support from a capable entity like NATO would be even more necessary than at the time when he spoke. Is that option still on the table from the administration's point of view?
MR. PASCUAL: Jean-Marie, do you want to start on the responsibility to protect and the Security Council and China and Russia?

MR. GUÉHENNO: The notion of the responsibility to protect is the first legitimacy of a state in protecting its own citizens. If a state does not protect its own people, it is not fulfilling the basic common duty of the state, and then the international community has to come in first in support of that state, and if that state becomes the enemy of its people, then we are in a different world.

I think when I look at the situation not just in Sudan, but in many, many places, that the international community today is very stretched in terms of military resources. As the one who has the responsibility to raise the troops, I can tell you very candidly that there are not so many countries that are prepared to put the lives of their soldiers at risk just to support a principle that does not impact directly on their national interests. We have an emerging international community, but it is just emerging. There now, thank God, a greater sense of the common good worldwide, but that greater sense does not go so far as to make every country ready to immediately send troops when there is a need to provide a measure of order and security in one place around the world. Those troops are not available.

Second, I would say from experience that in most cases the insertion of a military force can make a very big difference, again, if there is a political process. If it is inserted in the midst of chaos and violence, that force unless it is overwhelming force, and then the issue of how many resources you
can master comes to the fore. Unless you have a political process, that force is overwhelmed and will not do what is expected of it. That is why I believe that to discharge our responsibility to protect, we have to work as much as possible on the basis of a national political process. If that national political process is nonexistent, it would be very hard to find the level of troops that would do the job.

On the second question, how could the Security Council provide for a robust and credible force when there are different views in the Council, I would go even further than you. The fundamental condition for success of such a force, and in a way it links this question to the previous question, the fundamental condition for success of a robust peacekeeping force in Darfur is that the government of Sudan is agreed that this international force is going to make a significant contribution to the stabilization of Darfur. Then everything becomes possible. If that force is going to work at fundamental strategic opposition with the government of Sudan, it is not a peacekeeping force and the risk of failure is quite high.

So if there is common recognition by all the members of the Council and by the government of Sudan that the insertion of the force is going to help solidify a credible political process, then there is a chance of success. If that force is seen as something that is working fundamentally against the political process that exists or does not exist in Darfur, then I do not have much hope.
So the question in a way is moot as soon as the government of Sudan makes the strategic decision that that force is not only welcome, but is necessary.

MR. PASCUAL: Jean-Marie, you spoke a little bit earlier about a more constructive tone that you felt was provided by the Chinese delegation at Addis Ababa. I don't know if you can say anything further on that.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Yes, I think China which wants a stable Africa and who has growing economic interests in Africa sees that an Africa that is destroyed by conflict, it will be bad for the Africans, it will be bad for the economic partners of Africa. So I think it was quite interesting to see in the meeting in Addis how China was focusing on the practicalities, on the point that we have been discussing this morning, that if you have a political process, then you need to have an effective force. So any discussion that would complicate the work of the force whether it be in command-and-control issues or size, that is a technicality. The political decision to be made is to have a force that is going to be effective, and then from that choice of effectiveness some conclusions flow. But if you are committed to a political process which does need to be underpinned by a credible force, then you have that force. That was the position of China, and I think it was extremely helpful.

So I do see the members of the Council and the members of the P-5 actually coming together on Darfur with the sense that the present stalemate
with the deterioration on the ground is something that is in the interests of nobody.

MR. PASCUAL: Andrew?

MR. NATSIOS: Let me just add a couple of comments. One is the Chinese government knows how important this is to our government because President Bush has spoken to President Hu, and this past weekend Dr. Rice spoke to the Chinese Foreign Minister. And the fact that the Chinese did not veto 1706, they abstained from voting, is an indication that they recognize how important this is not just to the United States, but to Britain, France and other Security Council members as well.

I might add that if you look carefully, and now I am as a diplomat looking at the nuance of language, little phrases change, little messages are sent. I was not a nuanced person in my previous career and I am learning, and it is difficult for me given my temperament to be nuanced, but if you look carefully at President Hu's statements when the African Conference was held in Beijing which was I think 2 or 3 weeks ago, he said some things he had not said before. He said we need to be concerned about their sovereignty and that the Sudanese government needs to approve whatever force is in there. However, they need to be cooperative with the international community and the United Nations and not be hostile to it, and he had not said that before.

Ambassador Wang's statements repeatedly at critical moments during the Addis negotiations indicated to me once again that the Chinese were
being very helpful, and I want to thank their government for doing that, and I want to thank Ambassador Wang. The Chinese are friendly with the Sudanese government. They have these commercial relationships and we understand that. To have them press on some of these points is particularly useful because I think they can be very influential in the process.

You asked about NATO. The discussion about NATO was earlier in the summer as I recall. I was a Georgetown so I was not watching as carefully as I am now every statement that is being made, and Tony Blair also made comments about that. That was before the substantial buildup of NATO troops in Afghanistan and before Lebanon. The European democracies have now stepped up. They are sending troops into Lebanon, many of them have troops now in Iraq, and they have far more troops than some of them had anticipated in Afghanistan, so they are in three other theaters. I think the comments earlier about NATO were before the deployment of all these additional troops, and in particular to Afghanistan and Lebanon. Lebanon had not taken place at that point.

I do know that two European democracies, Switzerland and Norway, have volunteered military engineering battalions. I have asked privately several senior members of the Sudanese government do you have a problem with an engineering battalion in uniform coming under U.N. auspices or A.U. auspices to support this, and their comment to me was, no, we do not. So I think they are being flexible in terms of support troops, not combat troops, of a technical nature who will build things. They build bridges and they pave roads and dig wells and
that sort of thing. That can be very useful to the building of these military installations for the additional force.

Can European troops be useful? I think yes in a supporting role. I think in terms of troops on the ground, because of the comments I just made about other theaters it will be difficult for them to do it and I think there is a sensitivity in Khartoum over that in any case.

MR. PASCUAL: One thing you will need for a credible force is going to be a force that can react quickly to the situation on the ground which presumably will mean commitment to their support and that will be a key item that you are going to have to look for, right?

MR. GUÉHENNO: Absolutely. We see tactical transport capabilities as a key element so that in each sector there is a quick-reaction force and the possibility to rapidly deploy troops in a hotspot, and for that you do need military transport because you cannot with commercial contracts fly troops in the midst of fighting, the commercial contracts do not work, so those capabilities will be a critical element for an effective force in Darfur.

We have to balance the need not to have a huge force which would be very difficult to sustain on the ground, with the fact that at the same time we need to cover a huge amount of land. So the only way to square that circle is to enhance the mobility component of the force.

MR. FEDYNSKY: Pete Fedynsky, Voice of America Television. Mr. Natsios, you mentioned that there are groundwater reserves under Darfur.
Could you elaborate and explain who are the haves and have-nots in terms of access to water today? And with the prospect of the Sahara moving South, can today's haves turn into have-nots? And can water be used as a bargaining chip to appeal to all sides?

QUESTION: My name is — and I am Darfur. My question goes to the Special Envoy Mr. Andrew Natsios. I think it was at the end of your presentation you mentioned something like there are lots and lots of heavy weapons in Darfur and for us to have a meaningful and sustainable, first the weapons need to be collected. As regards to the rebels and the government, maybe we will have a peace process whereby there will be a security arrangement and then the weapons will be given. But there are elements of the Janjaweed especially in Darfur, in the Central African Public, in Chad, and in Niger, and maybe the rest of the region, and there are lots and lots of heavy weapons with the Janjaweed. We know these weapons, they are not the invention of the Janjaweed or the importation of the Janjaweed. There is a mentality also in Khartoum and in Libya that has created this type of weaponry in the region.

What mechanisms are we going to use to collect these weapons from these people? And what are we doing to change this mentality that has created the idea of the Janjaweed in the region in the first place? There are lots of questions, but in the mean time I would just leave myself here.

MR. PERETSKY: Dawn Peretsky (?), Darfur Interfaith Network.

Can you give an estimate on the number of people who die on a daily or weekly
basis, and what are the acceptable numbers before Sudan's noncooperation will result in other action to protect noncombatants?

MR. NATSIOS: With respect to water, the largest underground aquifer is the Great Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. It is in Southern Libya, it is in Southern Egypt, it is in the northern province of Sudan and Northern Darfur and part of Northern Chad, and it is enormous. It is the size of Germany. The only people who have tried to access this water are the Libyans. They have spent $20 billion in building a huge underwater river to the coast, but no one in Sudan has used any of that water, I am unaware of it. Some of the oases in the north that the camel herders use, the Arizagat Bedala (?) use those oases. That water is from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. I think it is going to be expensive, and I am not suggesting we are going to spend $20 billion on water. I do not want anyone to think that that is what we are talking about here.

AID already did some planning very quietly and talked to the Sudanese government, talked to the NGOs, and talked to some of the rebel groups, that one of the things we would like to do is to do water projects in the North because the water is there. It takes a particular kind of technology to access it, it has to be organized properly as a development project, but it is there, and some of the stress that the land is under is a function of the absence of water. If this were organized through development programs which we cannot do unless there is peace, unless there is peace and a peace agreement and the tribes have
agreed to stop fighting and these heavy weapons have been taken away, we cannot do this, so it is very important.

I do not like to call it a bargaining chip. I do not like to think of development as a bargaining chip. I think the people are poor enough as it is without using that language. However, I will use the incentive, an incentive for all of them to understand that if there is peace there can be developments. And I know my friends and other donor governments are willing to put money into Darfur to do this development if we have a peace agreement.

The second issue was the issue of disarmament of the heavy weapons. You are absolutely correct that the place is awash in heavy weapons, and it is not just in Darfur, it is in Chad, it is in Libya, and it is in Niger. One of the tribes was going to be expelled, I did not ask why, I will have to talk to the Nigerian ambassador, from Niger. Presumably they were causing trouble. They are the same tribe as Musa Hilal's tribe. Then they reversed the decision to expel them. We do not need more instability in North Africa right now. So there are all sorts of things going on in North Africa among the nomadic populations because of what is going on in terms of water resources and growing populations of animals and people. So I think we need to look at those broader issues, and being a development person I keep going back to these issues.

Finally, the mortality rates. We are not going to play a numbers game and say it is acceptable to kill 10 people, but not 20 people. We are not doing that. If there are attacks against noncombatants and it is clear that they are
organized at a higher level, then there is a problem with the United States
government. I want to say that clearly. We are not going to count them. We are
counting the incidents.

The mortality rates from nonviolence, from hunger and disease, are
actually lower in the camps than they are in the villages because we are providing
services in the camps because people are completely dependent on the
international community. The United States government has spent $1.6 billion. It
is a huge amount of money. I wish we had spent all that money in the
development program, we would have transformed Darfur. So rates have come
down, and they are well below what they traditionally are in Darfur. We are
tracking them very closely. I still look at all those rates, and it is because the kids
have all been immunized in the camps, there is regular food, although it has been
disrupted now, and conditions are not bad in the camps.

The problem is there are a lot of people in the villages who are not
in good shape. I might add in some of the northern Rezeigat tribes that are not
involved in any of the violence, their mortality rates are very high among the
nomads and I think we need a program to deal with the nomadic populations in
the North. I hope the politicization of this in the world does not prevent us from
doing that because I am going to argue we have to cover all of the tribes, not just
some of them, particularly the ones that are under the most distress, and it should
be based on need and not politics.
MR. PASCUAL: Andrew, let me pick up on one thing further with you. Water is clearly a development issue. The intersection of water and land is also an issue of conflict throughout and obviously it has been in Sudan. Is this an issue that has to be addressed as part of the peace negotiation? Do you put a process in place in parallel with that? What are your thoughts on how a question like this is addressed? When I think back on the time when I served in Sudan the big issues in — and Darfur were the sanctions between water and land.

MR. NATSIOS: There is an issue land, and it is a very serious issue. For 30 years, four governments of Sudan have promised land to the Rezeigat Abdala camel herders in the North. They are landless people. The subclans of that tribe that are landless are in fact principally the recruitment mechanism for the Janjaweed. That is one of the reasons they join because they think they are going to get land by using violence. That is not a good sign because there is no other available land that is usable.

If we deal with the water issue, land in the North that is now unusable even for camel herders may become usable. We need to think about that as an option, because if you look at the surveys on the Great Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, there is the possibility that some land that is useless now might become usable. We did some surveys, I had not read all of them in detail, but this is an issue and it was an issue many years ago, but it is getting worse because the population expanded and because of the justification issues, so we need to deal with it.
I do not want to have a detailed development plan in a political negotiation. We did put in the Addis protocols a plan for this, but as a general statement. The planning is going on now. The development agencies of the U.N. and bilateral agencies of the Europeans are already working quietly on this right now and we have talked with the Sudanese government and told them we have already begun planning hoping that there will be a political settlement.

MR. PASCUAL: Jean-Marie, do you want to add anything?

MR. GUÉHENNO: On this last point I think it is clear that for the population of Darfur today with the combination as Andrew said of the population growth and decertification, Darfur cannot sustain all the people in Darfur without a significant input in investment to mobilize water resources and other resources so that there are livelihoods for everybody in Darfur and that is one of the key elements of the crisis.

On the question of the statistics, there are horrific statistics of deaths. I think one fundamental point there is that today, as again was said by Andrew, in the camps themselves people survive thanks to enormous international efforts, but this is not something sustainable to create a long-term population of IDPs. It is not humanly sustainable, it is not politically sustainable. It is really laying the ground for future tragedies. So getting accustomed to the notion that hundreds of thousands of people can live a life in a camp is just wrong on all counts and that is why it is so urgent I think to really change the situation.
MR. NATSIOS: Carlos, let me add something because this is a sensitive issue in Darfur. Some people believe that because people in the camps are going to be in there forever, I have heard this comment made so let me assure everyone, we had the largest refugee population in the world for 20 years in Afghanistan, in Iran and in Pakistan right on the border areas. A lot of the people born in the camps had never lived in Afghanistan even though they were Afghans. As soon as there was relative security in Afghanistan within a year, there were massive population movements back to the villages. They all wanted to go back and see if their land was still there and they went back to the villages. The U.N. and the international community, the NGOs and the aid agencies, could not cope with the movement back. There was an effort to help them, but they moved back on their own.

So let me just say to people do not worry. If there is security and peace in Darfur, people will leave the camps. We cannot sustain $1.6 billion. We do not have that much money even in the U.S. government for one emergency in one country. So this is not sustainable and we will work for voluntary repatriation and resettlement when people think it is secure. We have done this all over the world. You take the tribal chiefs first, you bring them back to the village, you make them comfortable that the people can go back. Then they go back and say everybody can go back now, it is safe. That is how we do it.

We have done this very successfully. Fred Kuny (?), my old friend who is no longer with us unfortunately did this very successfully among Kurds in
Northern Iraq during that emergency where a million Kurds went up to the mountains. The first thing we did was the international community, the aid agencies, brought back the tribal chiefs to the cities to see that it was safe and secure and then they all came back, a million people came back within like 6 months. It will happen.

MR. PASCUAL: I am going to take one more round of questions, and then I am going to ask our speakers to both comment and add anything that they want to add in responding to those. One of the things that I will ask the two of you to think —

MR. NATSIOS: Haven't we said enough, Carlos?

MR. PASCUAL: No, you haven't said anything about the South, and I will leave this room until, Andrew, you comment for a minute on how this relates to the South as well.

MR. BACON: Ken Bacon, Refugees International. Thank you both for these presentations. I have a question for each. Jean-Marie, you have made it clear that the government of Sudan has some crucial decisions to make on mandate composition, command and control, about a hybrid force. What benchmarks will you apply to evaluate whether their decisions allow you have an effective force or not?

And Andrew, you mentioned the fighting that has been going on. Do you believe the government of Sudan thinks it is winning or losing this war right now? And how is that affecting its decision on the hybrid force?
MR. GEE: QUESTION: Thank you very much for this presentation. I am from Chad and my name is Rama Gee (?). I think as Andrew said, the U.S. is spending $1.6 billion in Darfur. That money is being wasted. The problem here, the mess in Darfur boils down to bad leadership and bad governance in Africa, and if the world wants to help us it will be better to have leaders who are different like Idriss Derby, al-Bashir, or Francois Bozize in the Central African Republic, because as long as you have leaders like this people, we will keep having other Darfurs.

It is clear that it is Derby's backing the Darfuran rebels. Why is it that the world has been closing its eyes on this factor, as Andrew said, for 3 years and we are just sitting back and counting all the dead, women being raped, kids being killed and nothing is being done? It is sad. I think it would be important for the world to take into consideration the Chadian factor in the conflict. It is not a small piece, and when Andrew said that in the Addis Ababa agreement there is only one line mentioning the political process in Chad, I am scared that we are heading to another fiasco. Thank you very much.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Good morning. My name is Schneider. I am from Brookings and American University, and I appreciate your comments on Fred Kuny, Mr. Natsios.

My question is you talked about new to the nuanced language of diplomacy and I know you have a humanitarian background. General Powell called this a genocide over 2 years ago and we are just now taking action. I am
wondering if you can comment on your statement that there is one singular agenda that the U.S. is pursuing via humanitarian assistance right now vis-à-vis John Pedergrass's column yesterday in The Post and the U.S.'s relationship to Sudanese intelligence with the war on terror.

MR. PASCUAL: Jean-Marie, do you want to begin? You are free to address any of those questions.

MR. NATSIOS: Even the issue of intelligence?

MR. GUÉHENNO: Let me say a word on the South, too, because of course the focus of the international community in the last 2 years or in the last 12 months has been on Darfur and rightly so, but the South should not be taken for granted. The institutions that were provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are only half working. There are a number of issues that are not resolved at this moment, like Abey (?), like the division of resources, of the oil revenues, all that is still very much to be completed. And of course, the death of John Garang was an immense tragedy because in a way it changed the dynamics of the relations between North and South.

So I think that as we look at Darfur we must always think of the bigger picture also of the whole of Sudan and the commitment that was made at the time of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to make unity attractive. Are we today making enough efforts for unity to be made attractive? Is the international community in the South sufficiently coherent in its efforts to build up the government of South Sudan and to help create a solid interaction between the
government of South Sudan and the authorities in Khartoum? I think we could do more, and when I say we, I include we the United Nations. So I think this is not something that we can just forget about.

The second question was on the benchmark for an effective form to judge the response of the Sudanese authorities. It is very simple. I think we know what is needed in terms of an effective force. One can haggle whether one battalion here or one battalion there, but basically there are some basic criteria for effectiveness that reflects what was put forward in the report of the Secretary-General in July of this year. Either there will be a possibility to deploy such a credible force which will have the freedom of movement, which would have the support structures, the command-and-control arrangements, the mobility that make it an effective force, and then we are in good shape. And we are in good shape if in parallel with that there is a credible political process so that the force finds a situation on the ground that is can manage, and that political process itself can develop only if there is a space in which it can develop so that we see the military actions, the military tempo gradually coming to a stop, gradually or not gradually. It would be better if it came all at once. So there are a number of very concrete signs that we will see on the ground that will be indicators, and then the parameters which will allow us to recruit such a force, to develop it, or parameters that just make it impossible to recruit such a force, in which case we are in trouble.
One last comment that I would want to make that in a way reflects a bit on the question from our friend from Chad but goes beyond that. I think that when one discusses Darfur, really what is at stake is of course the plight of the people living in Darfur, but it goes way beyond that. It goes all the way from the Horn of Africa to this whole Sahara band East to West, and Niger was mentioned. There is really a lot at stake there, whether all these tensions that have a local-national dimension between the nomads and agriculturalists and the flight from scarce resources and all that, the Arab-African dimension and the manipulation of that dimension, whether all these tensions will become part of a narrative in a way that unifies them, in a way that will make them completely unmanageable and be extremely dangerous, or whether they will be addressed one at a time while recognizing the connections that exist between these various specific situations, because you have to start somewhere. So I think that what is today at stake in Darfur is, yes, to start with Darfur, recognize that it is connected, what is going to happen between Eritrea and Ethiopia, what happens in Somalia, what happens in Chad, what happens in Niger, recognizing that there are all these connections, but that if we do not address what is at the heart of the moment, the most violent conflict, what is happening in Darfur, then we are at risk that a whole band of Africa could become a space for war, more suffering, more displacements, and also possibly more terrorism and extreme violence.

MR. PASCUAL: Andrew?
MR. NATSIOS: Let me comment on the intelligence issue. This is part of the Washington Beltway conspiracy theory stuff. I have sat in virtually every Sudan meeting since May 1, 1991. Do you know how many times the intelligence issue has come up? Once in one sentence. You know, if you do this, it would disrupt this. The people in the room were ignored, the people who were upset about that. We ran over them and we did what we needed to do. I have known John Pendergrass for a very long time and the notion that it is driving U.S. policy is complete and utter rubbish. I have asked for a whole series of things in the past 3 months and I have received everything I asked for. If this were driving everything, this would have constantly come up saying you cannot do this, it is going to disrupt this relationship. It has not even come up, let alone me having to answer it.

It is very clear what the priorities that I was given, and by the way, I am in the meetings that the principals' level, that means the people at the senior levels of the U.S. government, the President of the United States, the Vice President and the secretaries and department heads. They are the principals, the Secretary of Defense, they are in the room. Then there is the deputies' level, and then there is the PCC level for those of you who do not know the interagency process. These issues are not coming up.

John is talking to some people who have their own agendas and they are simply creating conspiracy theories and rewriting American foreign
policy in the most ridiculous way. It is not helpful, it is not accurate, and I think he should stop writing those things.

I am in the meetings. I know what is going on. Did Salah Gosh visit the CIA last year? Yes, he did. But that does not mean that that is driving the policy formulation. The policy formulation is a reflection of America in both parties around human rights and humanitarian issues and development. That is what we care about. Do we have a relationship with them where we are exchanging information? Yes. But there are other things where we exchange information with governments that we do not necessarily get along with. That is not driving the agenda. If it were, I would have heard it, and I have not heard it.

QUESTION: Genocide is driving the agenda?

MR. NATSIOS: Human rights issues are driving the agenda of the United States government. You may agree or not agree with what we have or have not done. Some of the people, by the way, who are advocating all this stuff now, the most aggressive stuff, are telling us you need to put the African Union in. We put them in, 7,000 people, and we have paid $300 million for that with the Europeans. They put additional money in. We did what people asked because we thought it was actually a good suggestion and it made a lot of sense. It did not work as we wanted it to.

The instruments of power of the United States are more limited than anybody, including me, would like them to be. They have always been limited. Americans do not like to think of limitations. We need to use the
instruments of influence we have carefully and specifically to advance American
goals, and the American objective in Darfur right now is to protect human rights
and humanitarian agenda of the people of Darfur, all the people of Darfur, and we
are going to do that and we are doing it now. We do have a strategy we are
following and we are going to follow. The intelligence thing is way down on the
list and I have to tell you that.

Finally, the South. Some people say things are not working with
the CPA, and they are correct. There are provisions in the CPA and it is an
extremely complex document. Dr. John told me once we are going to fix
everything that failed in the Addis Ababa agreements under Nimeiry. I said Dr.
John, if you do that, this thing will be 125 pages long. It is 150 pages long, or
whatever it is. He fixed everything and now it is difficult to implements parts of
it because the Sudanese government does not want to implement, or the
Southerners do not want to focus on it, or because it is so complicated. Are there
militias? Yes, there are some. People are looking in the government and in the
South at the politics of implementing some of this stuff and it is going to be
divisive.

But let me just say something. The government of Sudan has
transferred a billion dollars in oil. Is it as much as the Southerners think they
deserve? No. But a billion dollars. Can you imagine 5 years ago the Sudanese
government having given a billion dollars in oil revenues to the Southerners?
Never. It has happened.
The roads are being rebuilt and we are building a lot of them from the U.S. government along with other donors, people are going back to their homes, and the economy is beginning to boom. Is everything perfect? Absolutely not. We have a problem with very weak institutions. For those of you who want everything done overnight, the development theory and the evidence is that it takes a long time to build sustainable institutions in any government in any country in the world. It is not going to happen in a year or two. We are working at it. I think we should accelerate it personally, I don't have the — to say this, I think we should be spending more money from the U.S. Treasury in Southern Sudan and I going to push for that. But the fact is, we are making some progress and we should not because all the provisions of the CPA are not implemented dismiss what has happened. There is a huge difference. There is no famine in the South. People are getting their land back. People are growing crops. They are not hungry anymore. There is no war. Is there some violence in some places? Yes. We have to deal with the LRA issue. But let's not diminish what we have already accomplished.

MR. PASCUAL: Andrew and Jean-Marie, both of you have made very compelling and powerful presentations. Just a couple of points I would take out of this.

One is that I think you have very much laid out how much is at stake from the humanitarian perspective, but for the entire region and how the
spillover effects can actually as you were saying at the end, Jean-Marie, extend themselves beyond Darfur and Sudan, and we need to address that very carefully.

You have both underscored the importance of the timeline, and you have given us two very important dates to look at. One is November 24th when the African Union meets and the mandate that needs to be extended and modified at that time. And the other is January 1st and the changes that will come both bureaucratically as well as in terms of the end of the current A.U. mandate and how critical it is to be able to get some understanding among the U.N., the A.U., and the government of Sudan on how this mission is going to be implemented by them.

You have both underscored that there really needs to be a single process and it has to happen around the Addis Ababa framework. I think it is extraordinarily important to hear that both from the United Nations and the United States. And Andrew's reinforcement that the United States is going to stay involved and engaged, but it is going to stay involved and engaged from the perspective of reinforcing that Addis Ababa process.

The issue of Chad has come up many, many times throughout the discussion and how Chad plays a very important role here both as a country which is affected by support by the government of Sudan for Chadian rebels, as well as Chadian government support for rebels in Sudan and that this is an issue that needs to be addressed in the context of the peace negotiations.
The importance of an effective force, and I just reinforce the word "effective" is obviously going to be critical. One of the great challenges for the U.N. and the African Union is going to be able to generate that force and particularly the kind of tactical air support that is going to be necessary to make rapid-response capability possible.

We have emphasized the importance again of thinking about what happens beyond this agreement. We have talked about development, water, land. Issues that have to be addressed right now have only been scratched as a marker in the Addis Ababa framework but in fact are going to have to be developed much more extensively in order for any kind of peace agreement to hold.

Finally, I think a question that we will continue to be coming back to over the years, unfortunately we are going to have to come back to it over the years, is a broader issue that was raised on the responsibility to protect, the critical recognition of the part of the international community of what happens in those cases where a government does not protect the human rights of its citizens and where are the capabilities in fact to respond in those kinds of circumstances.

We look forward to continuing this dialogue and debate. We look forward to seeing progress on the ground. We thank our speakers again for the excellent presentations that they made.

(Applause)

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(Applause)