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THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR:

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PANELISTS:

KURT CAMPBELL

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JOHN HARRIS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

AMB. PASCUAL: [In Progress] — Considering the fact that there is sectarian violence that is rooted in historical differences — historical differences in discrimination and what might even be genocide within the country — in that kind of an environment, troops alone are unlikely to be a solution. There has to be a building of political confidence. But, in fact, has the situation so degenerated that it is impossible to create the political confidence again?

What could be the impact if there is further disintegration?

What impact on Iraq's neighbors?

What could be the impact on Iran and its role in the region?

Is this, in fact, strengthening Iran?

What could be the impact on nuclear proliferation if, in fact, Iran continues to develop its nuclear capability, and there is a further disintegration within Iraq?

These are the kinds of questions that, I think have to be answered and addressed. Most likely what we need to look at are options because it is going to be difficult to come up with any kind of solution that anybody can have 100 percent confidence in.

Another example might be Iran and North Korea, where too easily again it gets characterized as don't compromise with evil. Yet, at the same time, we need to think about some of the realities that the credibility of the U.S. military threat has been damaged as a result of our position in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there has been a

diminishing of U.S. credibility on the foreign policy front as well.

That said, everyday that North Korea and Iran go unchecked diplomatically, they advance their nuclear programs. Iran recently added a second cascade. North Korea has gone from having zero or potentially two nuclear weapons that were in a frozen state in 2000-2001 to now, by most accounts, probably having eight nuclear weapons. So how do you deal with that kind of an environment?

Similarly, there has been, I think, an oversimplification on the Global War on Terror where too often the line has become: We simply can't be soft on terrorism. But what does that mean? That debate was very much highlighted by the release or at least the release of portions of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq which indicated that perhaps indeed the way that the war is being fought in Iraq and the very war in Iraq is actually enhancing the ability of terrorist states or terrorist organizations to be able to add recruits to their cause.

These are the kinds of issues that we want to try to get at today — the real policy substance behind what has become in some ways seen as a political bumper sticker on foreign policy.

We have the benefit today of having three outstanding speakers. Kurt Campbell and Mike O'Hanlon, as all of you know, have just recently put out a book, *Hard Power: the New Politics of National Security*, and the other speaker, John Harris, recently published *The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008*.

Let me just say a word about our speakers. We are going to start today with Kurt. Kurt is at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the Senior Vice President and Director of their International Security Program. Kurt previously was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Pentagon. He was specifically responsible for policy on Asia and the Pacific. He has worked at the NSC and at the Treasury Department in Senior Positions. He has been a Naval Officer. He has been a Professor at the Kennedy School of Government.

Following Kurt will be John Harris. John, amusingly, in his own bio says that he showed up as an intern at *The Post* in 1985 and has hung around ever since. He has covered politics in Virginia and the U.S. Military. He has been a White House and politics reporter and is currently the National Politics Editor at *The Washington Post*.

Finally, we will have Mike O'Hanlon. Mike is a Senior Fellow here at The Brookings Institution with expertise on defense strategy, the use of military force, Homeland Security, and American foreign policy. I was counting out the number of books that Mike has authored and co-authored, and I counted at least 11. I am sure that I was actually short on that, but it gives you an indication of how prolific he is.

MR. O'HANLON: That is this month alone.

AMB. PASCUAL: That is this month.

So, three outstanding speakers, and we are going to begin the discussion, as I said, with Kurt Campbell, and Kurt is going to begin talking about the politics of national

security. I hope one of the things you address during the course of that is some of the questions that we really should be asking about Iraq.

MR. CAMPBELL: Thanks, Carlos, and thanks particularly to Brookings for setting up this wonderful event. It is great to be with my dear friend and co-author, Mike O'Hanlon. It is a wonderful opportunity to work with him, writing this book. It is a little bit like a marriage, and you work through things, and we are still together, I guess, on the stage. It has been terrific. Thank you all for coming.

As I was listening to Carlos describe this dichotomy which until four days ago when we were no longer allowed to use the term, cut and run, this idea of cut and run versus stay the course, I was thinking one of the great things about working at the Pentagon is you have the opportunity to work and get to know incredibly capable, patriotic folks who are ready to serve and put everything on hold and put everything at risk. One of the people I worked with closely at that time was a Marine Major who worked in my office and has since deployed a couple of times to Iraq. I saw him about two weeks, and we were joking around about this whole political debate in the United States. He said: Look, I will tell you how we think about it on the ground in Iraq. It is going to be neither. It is not going to be cut and run or stay the course. It is going to be stay and get cut.

That is how he and his troops perceive what their options are and what is going on inside the country. Incredibly fearful, difficult set of deployments but remarkably

morale is still quite high among most of the people that served inside the country.

What I am going to talk quickly about is not the actual specifics about recommendations that we put out in our book and a whole host of strategic issues facing the country. What I am going to talk about is the political context underneath the issues that Carlos alluded to.

I think at think tanks and among the strategically cognizant, there is this view that somehow it is possible even in the current debate to talk about national security options without the venom of politics, that somehow a priesthood can separate politics from national security choices. The essential point that we make in our book is that in contrast with at least parts of the Cold War in which there were elements of Republican and Democratic establishments that agreed that on the most critical issues, in the immortal words of Senator Vandenberg, the Senator from California in the 1940s, at the onset of the Cold War, politics needed to stop at the water's edge. There is no such consideration, both Mike and I argue, in current politics. Indeed, after a brief period of brotherly love after the 9/11 attacks, we have descended into an incredibly political environment in which national security issues are the key wedge issues that have been used to animate differences between the parties.

We argue that, in fact, it has been Republicans who have most effectively been able to use these issues against Democrats. Rather than simply being an environment where we say that is unfair or then attack against Republicans for some perceived

misdeed or follow-through issue, we try to look carefully at what Democrats also have to think about more seriously and have to do differently in order to gain the confidence of the American people on issues associated with national security. We believe that over the course of the last 15 or 20 years, a generation of American political pollsters and political pundits, particularly in the Democratic Party, has overlooked the importance of national security issues and decisions when making their choices about American political leaders. In fact, we quote one unnamed political consultant who said: Look, on national security in the 2000 and 2004 elections, all Democrats have got to do is “check the box” and then pivot and work on issues that are more conducive and more comfortable for Democrats, issues like healthcare, job creation, dealing with the impacts of globalizations, issues that polls reflect that Americans have a much greater degree of comfort with Democrats than with Republicans.

But we argue that it is like a ball in that at the very core of the ball is competence on national security. Unless Democrats — not just for Democrats’ sake but for the sake of a more healthy political discourse and a more effective checks and balances in our own system — unless Democrats can develop a much greater feel of the textures and tolerances of national security, then it is going to be harder for them to gain the opportunity to demonstrate their dexterity and flexibility on the rest of these issues.

So our book really lays out, I think, a historical set of challenges that the Democrats have faced basically since Vietnam. We try to suggest how these trends are

really here to stay and that despite what look to be significant changes in the course of the last couple of months in terms of trending more towards Democrats on key national security issues, we suggest that most of this is about deep unhappiness and concern about Republican implementation than attraction to Democratic ideas. Unless Democrats get much more serious, and this doesn't mean supporting every war or every military venture but get serious about the art of understanding military issues and hard power, that unless Democrats understand and appreciate these issues — not just Democrats, by the way, Independents and moderate Republicans who themselves have been challenged — if they cannot do that, then any gains that they have seen over the last couple of months and in the future are likely to be illusory.

Let me just conclude very quickly with what I hope will be interesting and set the stage for this book and give you a sense of what Mike and I have tried to accomplish. We bring this book with a quote, and I am going to read it to you and then give you the context of it. Then I will conclude and turn it over to John.

The quote begins like this: The vast majority of Democrats chose a middle ground. Supportive of a war, they voted for troops and money for the war effort, but they were increasingly critical of the evolving goals and tactics of the Republican Administration. For their criticism of the conduct of the war, they were accused treason. Defined as lacking national loyalty and identity by the Republicans, Democrats struggled to find a role for themselves as a loyal opposition party in a democracy at war.

The tendency to conflict republicanism with loyalty and democracy with treason assumed various forms during these war years. For radical Republicans, the principles of the Republican Party had become the principles of the Nation. Republican victory was the fruition of years of labor for a cause many believe to be a religious as well as national imperative. Loyalty to the Nation could only be expressed through loyalty to the Republican Party.

Now, when I read these words — Mike and I have gone off on lots of opportunities to talk about the book — most of the audience, when you are out and talking to folks, most of the audience just assumed that this was written about the current civil disputes that rage between Republicans and Democrats. But, in fact, these words were written and they come from a book by a woman named Melinda Lawson who is an extraordinarily accomplished Civil War historian. They are, of course, about the strategy that President Lincoln so effectively, and his team of rivals that Goodman has written about, so effectively used against his Democratic counterparts who were critical, particularly in the early years of the Civil War.

Now, you are thinking to yourself: Well, that is interesting, but it doesn't have very much to do with the current context. Of course, there have always periods of this political fighting on national security issues.

What is interesting about the quote is that this book appeared in 2002 and had modest reviews and basically disappeared from view, something that Mike and I are

certainly beginning to experience. And so, the interesting thing was in addition to that, she received a five-page single-spaced letter that went into great detail about this strategy, commended her for her work, and also talked about the pivot points that Lincoln and his team used to more effectively put Democrats on the defensive. Of course, that letter came from the acknowledged master of modern political strategy, Karl Rove, a wonderful historian of the Civil War, but also in writing this letter which I have seen, he basically conveys an intense sense of pride that, in many respects, this very strategy was the strategy that he updated, revised, and used so effectively in political campaigns on behalf of George Bush.

This book is not a partisan book or it is not intended to be. It is a political book. It is a call for a more serious debate on national security issues which we think is absolutely essential as the country moves forward.

With that, thank you, Carlos.

AMB. PASCUAL: Thanks very much.

John, let me turn to you. In your comments, one thought I would ask you to give a little bit of attention to, possibly, is Kurt argues that competence on national security is critical for being elected today. As you watch the Congressional elections coming up, does competence in national security have anything to do with how the parties are using national security issues, and what are the implications for the way that the parties are addressing national security issues for the longer term substantive agenda?

MR. HARRIS: Sure, I would be happy to take a bite of that.

It is with pleasure that I come to Brookings where I was briefly housed when I was writing the Bill Clinton book that Carlos mentioned. So I feel like I am back among friends.

It is also with reluctance that I sit on a panel with my brother-in-law, Mike O'Hanlon. I know some of you have seen Bruce Reed's book that he wrote with Rham Emanuel. He divides the world of Washington people who are around politics either in it or covering it into two categories, wonks and hacks. Wonks are interested in ideas; hacks are interested in process. If you know Mike, you can probably guess at the Thanksgiving dinner table, which side he is on. If you know both me and Mike, as some people in this room do, you don't have to guess. You know I am here as the designated hack, as the political junkie.

I want to describe a little bit about this book that I wrote with my co-author, Mark Halperin of ABC News, *The Way to Win*. It does fit very much into Kurt's themes and the themes that Carlos has asked me to address. Even though it is fundamentally a process book, it is fundamentally a hack book; we are very much interested in ideas and more broadly, the climate in which modern politics, the climate that exists for the discussion of ideas. We are quite critical of that climate but also try to be quite realistic about the way it works and the implications of that for people that want to know the way to win.

The larger premise for the book was that if you look at the past generation, you have got something extraordinary in American history. Here we are as an egalitarian culture and yet our national politics has been dominated by these two political aristocracies. You have got Bush, eight years of Clinton, eight years of Bush, and we would argue another possibility for eight years of Clinton. No one is better positioned in our judgment on the Democratic side than Hillary Clinton. No one is better positioned in either party with the possible exception of John McCain to become the next President. We wanted to ponder this question: Why is that the case?

Our conclusion is that it is not an accident. It is not some historical fluke. These two families, we argue, have learned some tangible concrete things about navigating the environment of Presidential politics. Moreover, they are the primary innovators in politics of their age, and moreover what they have learned, they have learned by very methodically studying each other. Karl Rove was obsessed with Bill Clinton and his political operations during the 1990s. Since then, Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton have been obsessed with the Bush political operation and Karl Rove, its chief strategist. If Hillary Clinton runs for President, as I think we all expect she will, much of her strategy, we argue, is going to be based on studying tactics that Rove used. Obviously, she would deplore his ideas and his larger purposes for America, but she and Bill Clinton are quite admiring of some of the specific means that they used.

The book is based on interviews that we had, extensive interviews, with Karl Rove

and the White House — I was not surprised at all by Kurt’s revelation about that letter — and also based on the long conversation we had with Bill Clinton, who I have known well from covering him over the years, the long conversation with him up in his living room in Chappaqua about what he has learned over his lifetime in politics and how he sees this modern political environment and the possibilities that are there for Democrats in it.

Even more than Kurt, I should have to underscore that I am agnostic about who gets elected. These guys have a disclaimer that their book is all-purpose, but of course, we know their backgrounds. Quite rightfully, they are going to be rooting for Democrats in advance of their ideas in 2008. I am a professional journalist. I am not going to bring rooting for anybody and I can truly bring, hope, a clinician’s perspective to this.

Let me summarize a couple of the main points of *The Way to Win*, so you don’t have to buy it, although I am certainly in favor of your buying it in bulk, if possible.

Here is what winning politician’s do: They tell their life story and the values associated with that life story on their terms. Losing politicians allow the opposition to tell that life story and the values associated with that story on their terms. It sounds simple; it is complicated in the execution. That is one of the things that winning politicians do. That is the way to win.

The other thing is that even though we live in an age where much cynicism about the political process is amply justified, we come to an optimistic conclusion. The way to

win is to have something to say about what you will actually do if you are elected. That also sounds simple. You would be amazed if you were like me, covering politics — some of you don't have to be amazed because you advise candidates — at how rare that is and how frequent it is that you have candidates for the Presidency who are winging it with only the dimmest understanding of what they stand for or what they would want to do if, by chance, they would be elected. Fortunately, most of those people, at the end, aren't elected. There is a reason for that.

There are a lot of things that Bill Clinton and Karl Rove would have in common, and they are obsessed with each other. We describe this anecdote that both Clinton and Rove told us at the opening of Clinton's Presidential Library in November of 2004. John Kerry had just been beaten. Karl Rove, unlike now where he is really got his back to the wall, was the man of the moment, the so-called architect. Clinton spotted him in the crowd at Little Rock in the middle of a pouring rain — they were all huddled under the tent — and made a beeline over to Karl Rove. He said: What you did was fantastic. I want to talk politics with you. You have to come back to Little Rock, and we can sit down.

Obviously, he didn't think it was fantastic that he beat John Kerry, but he did have an appreciation for the techniques that Rove and Bush used to beat Kerry.

There are a lot of the similar things, but I don't think you can understand the two without focusing, as I would like to for a minute, on the fundamental differences. In the

book, Mark Halperin and I discuss this question of why American politics has become so polarized and so destructive. There are two fundamentally different answers to that if you ask the same question to Bill Clinton and to Karl Rove.

Let us start with Bill Clinton. He is the strategic author of what we call Clinton Politics. Bill Clinton would say: Look, American politics, just like American life, went through enormous upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s, huge debates about cultural values, about the role of race, about Vietnam. But in the generations since then, fundamentally, on most of the most important questions, Americans have reached a consensus and have reached a workable synthesis in their own mind about their values, and that it is possible and desirable to define a center that would include 60 to 70 percent of the people. What Americans want, fundamentally, is not to be divided. They want to be unified. What effective politicians do is they respond to that desire by transcending the so-called polarization of the debate, defining the middle. Occasionally, that means blurring ideological differences. By doing so, you can claim that 65 to 70 percent center that is real and does exist.

In Clinton's mind, the reason American politics is polarized is because even though most of the issues have been settled, very skilled operatives, he says, almost entirely on the conservative side, are expert at identifying those handful of areas where there isn't consensus — gay marriage being a classic example — exacerbating those, exploiting those, using those to advantage. So we are divided because, for cynical

reasons, politicians exploit differences for tactical advantage even though, fundamentally, the country wants to be unified. Effective and winning politicians claim that center.

If you ask Karl Rove the same question, he will say: No, that is all wrong. The reason American politics is angry and polarized and divided is that the people themselves are polarized and divided over really important questions. Much of the journalistic conversation has been on cultural values, but I would argue national security is fundamentally a values question, at least as it operates in a political context. Americans are sharply divided over the role that America should have in the world, post September 11th. They are fundamentally divided over the relative balance between force and persuasion in national security and as we approach the world.

In Rove's mind, these are not artificial. They are real, and from that flows a different brand of politics. The aim isn't to define a center by blurring the edges. It is to clarify the differences between the parties, gladly divide the electorate. The trick is to be on the winning side of that electorate. If you get 50.001 percent, that is all the power that you need under what we call Bush Politics, Karl Rove being the principle strategic author of that. That is all the power you need.

Two different answers about why American politics is polarized, two distinctly different political strategies that flow from that diagnosis.

National security is really right at the heart of the debate. Bill Clinton would say:

Look, we Democrats can define something that most Americans would agree with on pragmatic terms to how to approach the world. People aren't either-or. They don't want to be France or they don't want to retreat behind a Pax Americana.

Karl Rove would say: This is the heart of the most important values question facing voters. Let us drive it right down the middle and win that debate.

You saw him do that in 2004, and we are under more difficult circumstances in 2006.

The other concept — I think this goes in part to Carlos' question — that is fundamental to our book is what we call the Freakshow. The Freakshow is the environment in which politics plays out. Now, it was certainly the environment in which the 2000 and 2004 campaigns played out, and we feel certain will be the environment in which the 2008 campaign will play out. The Freakshow is our term for a system of incentives that exist in political culture and in media culture away from the center. They reward flamboyant rhetoric, extreme statements of position, give new currency to eccentric characters — people like Michael Moore on the left and Ann Coulter on the right — who, in an earlier generation would have been at the margins of the debate or cast outside of it, now to our regret have a new currency. You can't discuss national security except knowing it is in the context of the Freakshow because of the incentives in media, because of the incentives in politics. Extreme statements will predominate. The point is less to win an argument with your opponent than to brand your opponent

fundamentally morally unacceptable and unqualified by virtue of character for office.

A couple of quick implications of this Freakshow environment: It is dangerous — Exhibit A, John Kerry — in this environment to run simply on your biography. If you present yourself as running on your biography and your personal valor and heroism, the Freakshow, which specializes in destructiveness and specializes in hijacking the public images of politicians, you will become a particularly attractive target for the Freakshow.

The other implication of this is you need to go into a Presidential race, and this applies less, Carlos, at the Congressional level, I think, but it certainly applies to the Presidential level. You need to go into a campaign with a theory of the case. The old Nixon advice, you will remember, was: Run to the extremes during the primary, then tack to the center in the middle.

We argue — again, we aren't political experts, Halperin and I, because this is based on reporting and studying people who have won — that advice simply doesn't work in this modern environment. The scrutiny is too much. There are too many cameras for 24-hour cables. There are too many people with videos up on U-Tube. The worst thing you can be in an environment where national security matters is seen as weak and opportunistic. Somebody that pursued that old Nixon strategy would be exposed as weak and opportunistic. That is truly the way to lose.

You have to — it requires self-discipline — find a strategy that will merge your political objective and your policy objective in a consistent way that will carry through

the nominating season and the general election.

My final point: As I said, this is a cynical book, but the optimistic point is that ideas do matter. Ideas are the enemy of the Freakshow. Bill Clinton showed that. He had been studying the weaknesses of his party for a generation before he ran for President. This is hard for Democrats to swallow; Karl Rove also understands this, that ideas matter. He and Bush together studied very closely the weaknesses of their own party and had established a reputation among an elite circle of people who cared most about policy and ideas that he was the most persuasive person to implement those ideas.

So I would say the way to win is to have a strategy for dealing with the Freakshow and recognize that ideas matter. The implication of that is the Democrat who will win in 2008 is the Democrat who hires Mike O'Hanlon, my brother-in-law, to hook him up with some good ideas for him.

AMB. PASCUAL: John, thank you.

I am sure that Mike O'Hanlon will gladly put himself in the category of wonk.

One of the things that I was taken by in the book that Mike and Kurt did is that they consistently tried to focus this book on what is a good foreign policy, not a good foreign policy for Democrats, not a good foreign policy for Republicans, but what is a good foreign policy that a sensible politician would, in fact, actually bring to office. This question of who they believe might actually adopt such a foreign policy is a question of self-selection.

John puts a good perspective on the dynamics of trying to come up with good policy in the context of the Freakshow. Maybe, Mike, in John's appointed role that he has given you of wonk, you can bring us back to some of those core issues. Iraq which is, obviously, at the front of the agenda and where you have really set the defining baseline with the Iraq Index which you have been collecting information on for some period of time; Iran and North Korea, two issues that threaten to blow apart, if they have not already, the international non-proliferation regime; how should those be thought about?

The War on Terror; what does it mean? What does it mean in this context? Is that even the right term one should be applying to that?

Maybe you can give those issues a little bit of thought in your comments, and then we will come back to the audience for the questions and answers.

MR. O'HANLON: Thanks, Carlos, and thanks to all of you for being here. Thank you to my esteemed brother-in-law and my esteemed co-author and quasi-spouse, I guess, and also a great boss. It is a great privilege to be up here, sharing the podium with them.

Let me say John was very good in summarizing a lot of what we were trying to do with the book and how we were coming at it. I could imagine—and this is both to clarify a point about politics and to emphasize how much we try to focus on substance in the book—I could easily imagine voting for a Republican over a Democrat in 2008,

depending on who I agree with more in foreign policy. I think there have been enough mistakes on both sides that I hope much of the country will bring the same attitude to the election in 2008, that regardless of predilections, we have seen both parties flounder in the last few years in foreign policy, and that is a big part of our reason for writing this book. The country needs a vigorous two-party debate because it is not as if we are getting all the right answers from one side or the other, and we are in trouble. We are in trouble as a country. Our national security agenda is very difficult and problematic, and so we are going to need some very good ideas to improve our situation.

We have had a situation where one party has been executing foreign policy as badly as I have ever seen in my lifetime, especially on the key issue of the day, Iraq. The other party has mostly wanted either to bow out of the debate or just essentially belabor the obvious, that Iraq is not going well, and that has been the sum total of most of its thinking on the subject. Neither one of these is a very sufficient way to get beyond November 7th, 2006. That is, unfortunately, all we are likely to hear for the next eight days. But on November 8th, these strategies will become obsolete, and both parties are going to have to do better if our country is going to do better.

Let me also say a few more words about Iraq. I guess Carlos has asked me to talk about Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and the War on Terror. That is a good subset of the six or seven big issues we have in our book, and that is a good way for me to summarize some of our thinking.

On Iraq, let me clarify one thing; Kurt and I don't take a strong view on whether a hard power Democrat or Independent or moderate Republican should have been for or against this war. It is not really our purpose. This was tough call. Frankly, I think both of us maybe lean slightly hawkish on the Democratic spectrum, but bottom line, regardless of your ideology, regardless of your center of gravity on politics, the Iraq War was a tough call. There were a lot of Clinton Democrats who were very concerned about the way in which the sanctions policy was eroding in the late 1990s. People like Bill Perry and Bill Clinton were pretty vocal in saying that George Bush was right to confront Saddam. They tended to part company at some point with George W. on what he did about it and how and when, but there was a reasonable case, regardless of which side of the political aisle you are on for whether to go against this terrible tyrant or not.

In this sense, I don't know if John would agree, but let me put a hypothesis on the table. Iraq was a Rove issue in the sense that there are some issues where you can triangulate and find a reasonable center; there are some issues where you just got to make a tough call. Invading another country is the latter category.

So Bill Clinton did some very good things in defense. I see Bill Lin (phonetic) in the audience and other people here who were involved in, I think, the most successful downsizing of our Nation's military in our history under the Clinton Presidency. There are some very good things we talk about in the book that Clinton did and his Administration did much better than people often remember, matters such as deterring

China and North Korea in the mid-1990s. But the bottom line is that we are now at a point where, obviously, the whole set of issues is much different, and the Iraq issue required sort of a non-Clintonian view of the world. You had to actually make a tough call, yes or no. In that sense, it is a Rove issue.

In our book, we don't try to say you had to be on one side of this debate or the other, but we are where we are in 2006. I think that the first major issue we give recommendations on in this book is Iraq policy, and I think it is fair to say — Kurt will have an opportunity to give nuance later if he wishes — that we are uncomfortable with either party's basic stance on Iraq because to suggest that preserving the current position, as Mr. Bush does, as adequate, frankly, is ridiculous on its face.

The comment Mr. Bush made last Thursday, I find personally offensive, that obviously we are winning or yes, we are winning. This is, frankly, in the face of every fact that I can see on the table, and it is the way Vice President Cheney has sometimes sounded in the last two years. Mr. Bush has usually known better in the last year, but unfortunately, in the politicization of this issue leading up to the mid-term, he said something I think is virtually, demonstrably false, although I wish very much it were the case otherwise.

On the other hand — I don't want to give Mr. Bush the only criticism here — I think the Democratic Party has focused too much on the issue of troop withdrawal, not necessarily because everyone is in the Jack Murtha camp of getting out immediately but

because it is the only real issue Democrats have engaged on as a party. There have been some exceptions individually like Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton but as a party, the Democratic institutions have wanted to focus on this phased withdrawal concept. To say to the American people, one message, we are trying to get out faster than George Bush, and so you should know that about us as a Party; that is not a very good message. That is really now. We have to try very hard to win this thing. We are in it; we gotta win it.

Now, Kurt has been right to tell me in previous talks that I really shouldn't use that kind of soundbite because we are probably not going to win it. We are probably not going to come up with the kind of outcome we all aspired to at the beginning, but we are in it and we have got to salvage something if we can. The idea of seeing Iraq become another Rwanda but in a strategically significant part of the world where the implications would be huge for that country and the region are terrible to contemplate. As bad as things are, they can get 10 times worse.

To think that somehow we are going to withdraw quickly with impunity or at least with a limited amount of damage and George W. takes the primary hit and the country can recover quickly, that is almost the implication you sometimes hear from some of the Administration's critics; we have to do much better than that. In the book, we have a couple of specific ideas which I will just briefly mention and then get on to Iran, North Korea, and the War on Terror in all six minutes.

But on Iraq, one thing that Kurt and I advocate is the idea of a nationwide jobs

creation program. I certainly feel strongly about this, and I know Carlos has done some thinking about this too, the idea being that unemployment is far too high in Iraq and if we don't bring down that unemployment rate, the insurgency is going to continue to have a pool of two and a half million angry, young, bored, disenfranchised, Sunni Arab men. Iraq is now, unfortunately, much worse than just that problem because it is also a civil war between many of those same Sunni Arabs who have been against the idea of the new government since three and a half years ago and also now the Shiia death squads who perhaps want to have a civil war themselves because they think they can win it and wind up on better terms that if they to try to piece together this integrated multiethnic Iraq. So we have a dilemma on our hands, but I think a jobs program is the beginning of a way to reduce the pool of would-be recruits.

But, of course, that doesn't sound like a lot of hard power and by no means is the idea of economics alone going to be the basis for solving the problem in Iraq. So one more idea, and I won't blame Kurt totally for this because it is essentially a work in progress as the elections approach here in the United States.

If the Democrats win the House or even both chambers but certainly if they win the House, there are two ways to look at the way that Nancy Pelosi and George Bush could make Iraq policy. They can fight like mad over whether we stay committed or they can try to make a virtue out of necessity and present Prime Minister Al-Maliki in Iraq with an ultimatum, the kind of ultimatum *The New York Times* wrote about a week

ago — I think, with all due respect to my friends, they are somewhat misleading — but the kind of ultimatum that might actually be worth presenting to an Iraqi Prime Minister who, to be blunt, is not doing a good job right now and who is running the risk of civil war getting more likely. Well, there is a civil war in Iraq, but this would be even more serious dilemma, an accelerating civil war under the kind of policy guidance he is presently giving. We need to shake up the Iraqi political system. Americans should not keep dying in Iraq as they have been unless the Iraqis themselves start to make the kind of decisions that give their country a chance, and right now, they are not doing so.

I would propose, as a substantive matter, it would make sense for our presence in Iraq, pretty darn soon, to be conditional on major reforms by Al-Maliki and other Iraqi political leaders. This would require Bush and Pelosi to essentially each go halfway towards the other. President Bush would have to admit that if the Iraqis don't do the right thing, he is going to be prepared to reduce his commitment on the issue that has been the centerpiece of his Presidency. A pretty hard thing for him to come to on his own, but if he has a Democratic House to contend with that is responsible for passing the budgets to allow operations to continue in Iraq, he may not have much choice.

Speaker Pelosi or potential Speaker Pelosi; I have no idea how this is going to play out, but if the Democrats do win, Speaker Pelosi obviously is on record wanting to get out of Iraq. Well, I would submit that she should reconsider, and if the Iraqis are prepared to make the kinds of tough reforms that give the situation a chance, she should

make it clear that she is prepared to support George Bush on a large sustained American troop presence and the money for that jobs program and a few other things in the event the Iraqis come through.

So that is potentially making a virtue out of necessity out of the divided government we may see in eight days in this country.

Let me, obviously, very quickly go through; in fact, I am not going to do justice to all the other issues that Carlos put on the table.

AMB. PASCUAL: You can pick one or two of those. We will come back to them in the Q and A.

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, thank you.

I think I will speak a little bit about the North Korea policy. This is an issue where, again, we don't suggest in the book that if you are a hard power Democrat or moderate or progressive, whatever term you want to use, that you have to wind up in favor of a six-party process as opposed to a bilateral negotiation with North Korea or vice versa. In fact, I find myself quite fatigued by this conversation in Washington about what is the proper mechanism for negotiating with the North Koreans, as if getting the table size right with a Stalinist adversary would be the key to the solution. I think what we have to do is think more strategically. Here, I was very lucky to have a co-author who is an expert on politics in Asia, national security politics not only in this country but in Asia where he spent so much time working in the 1990s.

With North Korea, the Bush Administration has done, I think, so badly in a region where they have had some success otherwise. In fact, most places in the region, they have had pretty good success. The U.S.-Japan alliance is in pretty good shape. U.S.-China relations aren't bad. U.S.-India relations are quite promising; but on Korea policy, we have really had a huge breakdown. Here, you could say that they have favored hard power politics in one sense, but in a very unsophisticated way, it hasn't built coalitions and hasn't been realistic. So hard power politics, whether you are Republican or Democrat, doesn't mean pounding your chest and saying you don't like Kim Jong-Il and you are not going to deal with him unless he fundamentally changes which has essentially been Bush Administration policy. But by the same token, it doesn't mean overthrowing Kim Jong-Il militarily when that would probably lead to a million people dead on the Peninsula.

So the kind of logic that we tried to come up with in this book is to basically say: Think about the coalition and the end point. The coalition by itself is not enough. Multilateralism, for its own sake, is not enough. Democrats sometimes sound as if just building alliances will solve problems inherently. We say: Think about the way in which you can get China, South Korea, and Russia to join the U.S. and Japan in squeezing North Korea. You must have a hard power objective in mind, a coercive application of international power, probably not military power, and probably economic power. To get to that point, you have to understand China and South Korean and

Russian politics and make it clear to them that you have tried to figure out a solution to this North Korea problem. Try to offer North Korea a reasonable half-way meeting point, and if that doesn't work, hopefully you are then in position to say to Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow: Now is the time for pressure.

In other words — here, I will throw in a word on Iran — in a way, what we are saying is the Bush Administration should do on North Korea what it is beginning to do on Iran. Try the carrot but the right kind of carrot first, partly as a way to set up the application of the stick, not because you are a naïve Liberal or Libertarian or Conservative or anybody that just thinks that somehow brandishing carrots will automatically induce good behavior from Kim Jong-Il but because if you don't try to reach out halfway, China, South Korea, and Russia aren't going to go along with you in applying coercion. I think the Bush Administration has had a pretty good two or three weeks since the North Korean nuclear test on getting a good UN resolution, my compliments to them, but we can already see the limits on how far the enforcement of these sanctions is going to go, given the different world views about North Korea, that the different capitals have.

In a nutshell, I will finish on this point. We think that on North Korea policy, there does need to be a military option in the back of our minds if the North Koreans export nuclear weapons or nuclear technology or complete the construction of their two big reactors that Bill Perry threatened to attack in 1994 in a very effective previous

application of hard power by a Democratic Administration. If that happens again, we do need a military option, but for the most part, you want to set up the possibility for economic coercion of North Korea. The way you do that, ironically, is to offer to help the North Koreans reform, not just on nukes but on economics, even human rights. If the North Koreans are prepared to go down the Vietnam reform path, we can be helpful, economically and diplomatically and otherwise.

If not, then hopefully the world will stop blaming the United States for the impasse. It is remarkable in the region how much George Bush almost seems to share equal blame with Kim Jong-Il for the problem on that Peninsula. That is ridiculous, but is it also a travesty of American diplomacy that we have allowed that impression to emerge.

So these are just two very specific examples of what we address in our book. Also, Kurt has written a great chapter on the rise of China and its broader implications for the region.

We have a chapter on the long War on Terror which I won't mention now in any kind of detail, but we talk about how do we answer the very good Rumsfeld query: How do we make sure that the next generation of Al-Qaeda isn't going to be at least as numerous and powerful as the generation we are killing and arresting right now? We try to lay out some ideas on that.

We have some thinking on energy policy which relates to the Iran case because if

you can't threaten Iran with some energy brinkmanship, you are not going to be in very good shape, ultimately, to handle that nuclear crisis.

Then we also talk a bit about Homeland Security and how to manage the U.S. military and the U.S. defense budget. I won't go into more of that now and hopefully your questions will push us in that direction.

Thank you.

AMB. PASCUAL: Thanks very much. To all of you, thanks very much for your comments.

I think one of the things that really emerges from that final list of issues that Mike has put on the table is that we have such a complex web of foreign policy questions that, in fact, are confronting the nation and the international security system right now. One of those, the lead one has obviously been Iraq, but Iran is critical to that equation and increasingly a part of the Iraq debate, as well as the non-proliferation debate. It is inevitable that Iran and North Korea, those issues are influencing one another in the non-proliferation context. The Iran issues and the Iraq issues play into a much broader Middle East set of questions. We haven't even talked about the Middle East peace process, the war between Israel and Lebanon or Israel and Hezbollah and the implications for the region as a whole.

In a sense, there have arisen a whole series of questions that, depending on how they are answered, could truly begin to define the nature of the international security

system for the next 25 to 30 years because they really do cut at some of the core questions that we are facing today. Can there be, for example, a viable non-proliferation regime?

Can we deal with issues of conflict within other countries?

What are the inter-relationships between terror and indigenous insurgences or, in the case of Afghanistan, drug lords?

These are the realities of the questions that we are facing today, and I hope we can continue to get at them through your questions. So what I would ask you to do is to raise your hand and identify yourself. I will try to take three questions at a time and then come back to our panelists. Please, in the back?

QUESTIONER: My name Masahiro Matsumura. I am a Visiting Fellow from Japan at Brookings.

My question would primarily go to Mr. Harris, but I also welcome a response from the two presenters. In your discussion, I don't remember the exact phrase, but you said something like the question of national security is ultimately the question of values. Do you find a strong nexus between the political values and religious change going on in this country?

In the most recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Mr. Mead (phonetic) discussed the transformation or, more correctly, the transmutation of the American society dividing Protestantism into three segments of sectarians: Fundamentalists and Liberal Protestants

and Evangelicals. What happened over the last 30 years is the awakening of Liberal Protestantism and the rise Evangelicals. If you find a strong nexus between this religious trend and politics and then if you find religious groups as a prime driver of American politics, I don't think the future is very much optimistic in terms of reconciling the political division in this country. But nevertheless, I may misjudge your point, but you sound very much, not that much pessimistic, if not optimistic. So would you elaborate why you feel in that way?

AMB. PASCUAL: Let me take two other questions.

QUESTIONER: Scott Hill (phonetic), Brookings.

I just want to address the question, the hack question, if I can. The political process hasn't changed. We still have primaries. And so, the strategies of wanting to be sidelined to get the activists who are going to work hard on your behalf, particularly in the Presidential primary, are not going to change. I am just wondering how can we then appeal? How can a more moderate or hawkish Democrat win the hearts and minds of Iowa activists with an aggressive strategy that says we are going to stand up for moral values in foreign policy when that may not accord with the values of the people who they need to support them in the primary process?

AMB. PASCUAL: One more question; just in fairness, if Pietro Nivola after one or two more questions, I might put him on the spot and ask him to comment on one of these questions.

AMB. PASCUAL: Chris Robinson, the Navy Fellow here at Brookings this year.

Going back to your comment about Bush answering that question with regard to whether we are winning or not, it seems like that comes from the part of the Administration policy to express no doubt and that if they do express doubt, they answer that question either ambiguously or tentatively or say we don't know, and the next day there is a headline in *The New York Times*: Bush Shows Doubt on Iraq. That starts an unraveling that they can't control as far as probing further. What would be the strategy that you would recommend — any of you up there — the President or his inner circle to control that, to demonstrate they do have insight into the realities of what is going on without deviating from the resolve to win?

AMB. PASCUAL: Thanks.

John, let me start with you on the issues of the values, religion, and foreign policy.

MR. HARRIS: Sure, I do think, as I said, that in a political context, national security is not a tactical question but it is a values question. I don't have the data readily at hand, but I would guess that there probably is a high degree of overlap between people who be sympathetic to a Bush brand of foreign policy and where they would stand on some of these religious and cultural questions. I don't think that is the end of the conversation from the Democratic perspective.

The country has, for a generation, and maybe this is changing. A lot of things are very fluid in our politics right now, but the country has for a generation been rhetorically

conservative. Bill Clinton's genius was to recognize that and pay deference to that through his rhetoric and find ways to get the conversation out of the rhetorical realm, out of the abstract, and toward the concrete and the specific. He did that in a domestic context on the question of the size of government and his confrontation with Newt Gingrich about whether to dramatically scale back the Federal Government. I think he would have also tried to do that in a national security context. Get the conversation away from the realm of abstract values and very specifically what do you stand for.

I think it is even more important, in the current climate, for a Democrat to do that. National security, obviously, has a much higher prominence in the election coming up, both in 2000 and in 2008 than it did for most of the Clinton years. To move past an abstract discussion of values and to the harder question is where Democrats probably are going to be on more favorable ground.

AMB. PASCUAL: Thanks.

MR. CAMPBELL: Excellent questions; first, on the question of religion and politics, I think one of the interesting things about Americans is how uncomfortable on some level we are talking about the role of religion, even in other countries' political situations, and that is clearly the case in the United States. One of the things that is so astonishing for Americans that go abroad, particularly in Europe, is how much they ask you about the rise of religious players in politics. Sometimes for Americans, it can almost be confusing because it has such a different perspective in terms of how we

normally conceptualize issues on a day to day basis.

The one thing I would say is I think the great skill politically that has been accomplished over the last couple of years is indeed making foreign policy a values issue. Everyone who understands or has listened to Joe Biden knows that every foreign policy issue is complex, right, and that has been the great difficulty for Democrats because we are more likely to say that this is a complex, challenging issue in which you have immediately lost 50 percent of Americans, but the reality is that the challenge is to convey that, in fact, hard issues of national security cannot be simplified. The question would be whether this recent experience in Iraq plays into an appreciation that competence, experience, and training are essential prerequisites to handling foreign policy more generally.

I know Mike will have something to say about this, but just quickly, you often wonder how ideas from the outside penetrate politics. One of the most persuasive areas of research that has been adopted, basically as part of the governing philosophy of President Bush and his team, was done by a series of political scientists in the so-called Triangle Group down in North Carolina. Professor Peter Feaver, who is now Counsel at the National Security Council, during the 1990s and into 2000, did some very interesting work with polling and historical analogies and made the argument that the idea of casualty aversion is a misunderstanding of modern American political history and that when you start to see turns in American attitudes about specific conflicts, they have little

to do with the number of casualties that have actually been sacrificed in the field; they have much more to do in shows of signs of doubt at the strategic level, usually by the Commander in Chief.

I think President Bush has clung to that in all circumstances. I think the key conservative — small c — and Republican traditions about how you wage war are not inconsistent with certain aspects of that.

But I would say that there are three things that, in my view, the President and his team have overlooked. The first is when you go to war, you pay for it. If you ask most Americans, are we paying for this war, they would say yes, but in reality, we are putting it on the national credit card. Really, China and Singapore and South Korea, those countries that own debt are really paying for this war. The issue that I have, primarily, is a concern about if it is that important, then you have to pay for it. This same Major, who is now a Lieutenant Colonel, said: I hear even from my friends, hard-liners, that what really matters most is the war. I think what matters most is the tax cut. That is the number one thing that really matters. To the extent that the two are consistent, fine, but the tax cut comes first.

The second is that I think modern conservatism is empirically based. Evidence matters enormously. I think the attempt to twist and contort evidence to make facts or to make arguments is deeply antithetical. Basically, they are both political traditions of Democrats and Republicans, and it owes more, frankly, to traditions that you saw in

Russia at the turn of the last century among the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in which you take certain dynamics and you twist them to make your arguments.

Then the last issue is accountability. Remember, at the same time that Roosevelt, in 1942, was expressing tremendous determination to stay the course, Marshall was also firing huge numbers of generals and admirals that were not able to get it done. I think the biggest concern that I have among my friends, basically at the middle levels in the Pentagon in the Armed Forces, are issues associated with accountability and that when things have gone badly, both on the civilian and military sides, there has not been very much accountability, and so there have been lessons about what needs to be done right.

My fear is that this general argument about not showing doubt has been taken to such an extreme that it has distorted what I would consider to be the essential building blocks of constructing a good strategy towards winning a war.

AMB. PASCUAL: Peter Feaver probably never knew he had so much influence.

MR. HARRIS: He hoped he would, but he didn't think he would.

AMB. PASCUAL: He didn't think he would.

Mike, do you want to address this question?

There are another two years here while President Bush is still in the White House and if having a change or a more realistic strategy on Iraq has to wait another two years, that is a real problem. If you were to address this to President Bush, what are the things that you would say need to be put on the agenda?

MR. O'HANLON: First, let me say on the other two questions, Iowans have proven to me they are pretty darn smart. They did a good job in 2003 of figuring out that John Kerry was more electable, at least at that moment, than Howard Dean. I think they were right, although in the end, Kerry, I think, went more towards the Dean position in the party as the General unfolded. Maybe it is no longer true that you should tack left in the primary and then move toward the center, but you probably shouldn't start in the center and then tack to the left. So I think Iowans did a good job with what was known at the time and figuring out what was the right thing to do, and so I have a lot of confidence in Iowans. To your question, we will see what happens. I think they will respect a good debate, if nothing else. So let us give it to them.

On the issue of divisions across religions, let me just give a very brief personal note. One my most enjoyable experiences and satisfying experiences in this last year, apart from going to Thanksgiving dinner with John and writing with Kurt and working for Carlos was to work with a broad coalition, largely of Evangelicals and others on the religions right, on human rights policy towards North Korea. This is just one example of where a rich tradition of different kinds of thinking in our country can actually potentially help. In the Democratic Party, we have a strong tradition of putting emphasis on human rights. Jimmy Carter did it, partly from his own religious tradition but more from what would be called a moderate or mainstream Protestantism, maybe a mixture of that with Baptism. Carter is a little bit, well, he doesn't quite fit into one of those three

categories you mentioned. The main point simply is that we can use these different traditions in our thinking as an advantage on issues on North Korea, on issues like Sudan, on issues on how to construct the right policy towards China.

Again, I really hope, for those of you who are inclined to look at our book and only have time for one chapter, give some serious time and consideration to thinking about Kurt's chapter on China because we need a more sophisticated China policy. China is an important partner of the United States, but it is neither a strict strategic partner as Bill Clinton once hoped nor a strategic rival as George Bush had earlier explained. It is something in between. The role of thinking through human rights and religion in our dialogue with China, I think, is going to be very important. So there are some areas where I think our traditions can actually complement each other.

On the issue of Iraq, I am trying to bite my tongue, but please start, Mr. President, by not misleading me. I have never said that the weapons of mass destruction debate was one in which Mr. Bush lied. I don't think he lied if you define lie as a deliberate contortion of the truth. I think he was fooled to some extent, and I was too, by the available evidence, by a worst case analysis which was not totally unreasonable to apply to Saddam Hussein, given his historical record. So while I think they were misleading in some ways and I don't admire their use of the WMD or the Al-Qaeda issue in regard to the case for overthrowing Saddam, I don't go so far as to think that they lied.

I have a harder time, and I am not going to say that word, explicitly, but I have a

harder time being so charitable in regard to what Mr. Bush said last Thursday. So start by not misleading me, please.

Secondly, in terms of one concrete example, I already mentioned the jobs creation program. In terms of the ultimatum strategy towards Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the Iraqis need to do two or three things, and we have to turn the screws on them to make them do it. Yes, they are a democracy, but if they get certain issues wrong at this point in their democracy, they are headed for civil war, all-out civil democracy. So the idea of respecting their sovereignty and democracy does not apply to the idea of our being complicit in decisions that tear apart their country. Right now, Maliki is resisting resolution of the oil revenue allocation issue, and the Sunni Arabs feel that they are headed towards a place there they are going to live out in a ghetto in the western part of Iraq without any oil and without anything else. And you know what? I think they are right because I think the thrust of Shiia and Kurdish policy is increasingly to push them in that direction and I think the Shiias and Kurds are increasingly doing it as a matter of conscious policy. If we don't put leverage on the Shiias and Kurds to change that, then Iraq has no chance of holding together.

So I would submit that we have to apply American leverage on the issue of ensuring resolution of the constitutional ambiguity about how Iraq shares its oil.

There are a few other things I could go into as well, but I have gone on long enough.

AMB. PASCUAL: Mike, thanks.

Pietro, I am going to turn to you for one second, if I could, particularly on this issue of primaries versus the main election. Is there a danger of getting caught in a dilemma of playing to the extremes of the party in order to win the party base, and what are the implications for how that might position candidates in the actual elections?

MR. NIVOLA: Yes, I think Scott raised the right question earlier.

I think there is no question that a hawkish Democrat has a hard time of running the gauntlet of Democratic Party primaries where anti-war activists and so on are disproportionately represented. So the question, I guess, comes down to what could change that. I really don't see much prospect other than some basic institutional reforms in the states, for example, shifting increasingly to more an open type of primaries instead of the closed ones that are just registered party members because in the open variety, independents and even people on the other side of the aisle can participate and candidates are more likely to have to appeal to centrist and moderate voters.

I would like to, if I could, ask a question actually of either Kurt or Mike.

AMB. PASCUAL: Please go ahead.

MR. NIVOLA: Mike, you had talked about the use of carrots as well as sticks in confronting problems such as North Korea and Iran, but I guess I wonder what types of sticks are really available in situations like this. Forget about North Korea for now, but let us take Iran. *The Atlantic Monthly* had an article a few months ago about a war game

that was conducted on whether any kind of air strikes would be feasible or would be effective in dealing with the Iran nuclear program, and the unanimous conclusion of that war game seem to be that it was out of the question, that it would be folly. And so, I guess the question is: What kind of leverage does one use with Iran, especially in a military sense? Is there a military option?

MR. O'HANLON: Well, first of all, Pietro, thanks for the question and the comments.

Let me say I am sure it is not out of the question. I am sure there are people in Washington right now who are in positions of authority who don't consider an air strike against Iran to be out of the question. I am sure there are people inside the Administration still considering it as a very viable option for probably 2007 or early 2008. That would be a fascinating conversation. Whether or not George Bush wants to double the stakes on what his Presidency will be known for and go after the Iran problem even though it is perhaps going to reinforce his image as a trigger-happy Texan or does he want to then go with the Condi Rice kinder gentler more multilateral American foreign policy, it is going to be a big decision, and I would submit to you that it has probably not yet been made.

In terms of broader strategy beyond the military piece, this gets to a point Kurt and I make in our book about energy policy. I really think — Phil Gordon and Ivo Daalder have also argued this at Brookings — that we need to be in a position where we actually

have as much economic and energy leverage over Iran as they have over us. In fact, we should have more. Iran depends entirely on the global oil trade to make its foreign export earnings and also to get its gasoline which it has to import, at least half of it is imported, roughly speaking. The idea that somehow the global supply of four million barrels a day, which is about 5 percent of the world's total, and that we are hostage to Iran because it holds 5 percent of the world's total oil production — it is ludicrous that we have allowed ourselves to be in this position where Iran uses the energy issues against us instead of the other way around.

Now, in the political debate, what you heard in 2004 was people wanting to aspire to the extreme goal of energy independence, that we don't want to depend on any of these Middle Eastern characters for our oil and let us just get competently independent. That is a totally unrealistic goal in my judgment, but there is an in between where we would have enough cushion in global production, largely because we are adding ethanol as a major additional liquid energy source, that we then have the opportunity to play hardball with Iran and threaten to go after its oil trade. This is not something you can do in one or two years, but I would hope that the next American President, whether it is in regard to Iran specifically or more generally can aspire to a new kind of energy policy that would give us more leverage in these kinds of crises and also mitigate the global climate change problem and also give our farmers perhaps a new opportunity for markets and some promising technologies. This is an issue that could be very exciting,

and I hope the next campaign will bring energy to the forefront for a lot of overlapping reasons.

That is an indirect answer to your question about Iran because in the end, we may only have mediocre options for dealing with the short term crisis.

AMB. PASCUAL: I think one point that is important to add to this which just reinforces Pietro's point is that the international sanctions regime is broken and that actually adds to the difficulty in the conduct of foreign policy. Everybody wants to look at what the alternatives are to the use of force. Essentially, when you begin looking at the options of can you, in fact, bring together a coalition that will effectively turn the screws on a country that has undertaken reprehensible behavior, the reality is that it is extraordinarily difficult to get Russia and China to sign onto that coalition, especially when they have particular self-interest at stake. Iran and North Korea are good examples of that. I can go on a little bit further, but that is not my job here.

I think one thing it does do is it points out some of the weaknesses in the international security system which reinforces indirectly another point, that if you get certain policy decisions wrong at certain moments in time, it is a lot more difficult later to come back and try to fix them because the tools that we have are so imperfect in the international security system. So, if you make the wrong call on Iraq or if you make the wrong call on North Korea, for example, even in 2002, right now if we can get North Korea back to a situation in 2002 when we felt we had discovered evidence on HEU

enrichment program and be able to get them to allow the IAEA inspectors back in to monitor the plutonium that was under cold storage at the time, we would consider that a great victory. And so, right now, we have a difficult time even getting back to where we were previously in 2002 because of some of the wrong calls that might have been made at a different moment where we might have taken steps to actually preserve the inspection regime that was already in place, plus seek to see if there were other things that could have been done with the discovery of the HEU enrichment program.

Kurt, you have insight?

MR. CAMPBELL: Sorry; critics in the audience are thinking how can you trust this guy who can't even do fluid management. So I apologize.

I think that the complex issue of the tradeouts between military and diplomacy have been played out for us to see, and I will just give you a couple of general observations. I think Mike is right when we talk about an environment that shifts dramatically in the timeframe after the next election. I think that it will be slower to dawn on us, but there are going to be several factors over the course of the next six months to a year that are going to make it clear that we may not have as many military options in a variety of situations as we believe. There are several reasons behind that.

One is I think there is now much more consensus among Republicans and Democrats. Remember, we have talked about one friction that exists in politics between Democrats and Republicans. The one that has gone unsaid, which has in fact been much

more significant in our entire foreign policy parameter, has been the division between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch. The only group that is on par with the anger with Democrats on Capitol Hill towards the Republican White House is the Republican Congressional leadership who feel that they have been marginalized on many of these issues. I can assure that after this next election, they are going to be much more prominent and they are going to have many more concerns, and they are going to be much more involved in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

I believe among this group of people, there is going to be much more caution about another major use of military use of power, (a); and (b), I think that the military will be more open as General Schoomaker has been about how taxing this war has been and that, in fact, we don't have as many capabilities for imagining long open-ended conflicts, even if they involve more air power and naval power which have arguably not been as stretched as our ground forces have been in Iraq, and I think there will be a greater tendency among the American people to be more reluctant to consider military options subsequent. SO I think that is the larger political context that both Democrats and Republicans are going to have to work with and actually try to urge that we not return to a kind of isolationism or kind of anxiety about foreign policy that we saw in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam.

I would say, generally speaking, the general trajectory we have seen towards North Korea and Iran is the reverse of traditional diplomacy that particularly involves

allies, in which you begin with carrots, you try to bring people around, and then you end up with sticks. In that process, you try to do everything you can to convince your allies and even people around you that are reluctant that you are very serious about trying to get the best possible deal with the country that you are dealing with, in this case, North Korea or Iran. What we have done in both cases, I think, has been somewhat the reverse, start on an incredibly hard line and then over time, sort of ease that. The problem with that is it not only puts the country in question on guard, but it also, I think, signifies to the other countries that could be your allies in this process that you may not be really fundamentally serious about diplomacy and you have different goals and objectives in mind.

I think at the heart of this is something that we have not talked about, and that is in many respects, for the Administration, for reasons that I understand, it gets back to perhaps the earlier question about religion and the role of goodness and badness in the world. The idea is that if you sit down and negotiate with North Korea or Iran, somehow you are legitimizing that group of people in power and that you are strengthening them. I think initially the Administration, and even today with North Korea, is deeply reluctant to get involved in an engagement where it seems to be you are blessing a deeply reprehensible regime, clearly in North Korea, perhaps less so or debatable in Iran.

Even today, I think if the North Koreans said: We are going to come back. We are prepared to put everything on the table — I think there would be those in the White

House that would say: Look, North Korean is a brutal, horrible place. We can do nothing that is going to somehow send a message that you are an acceptable, viable member of the international regime.

Basically, getting over that and getting back to a more traditional Scowcroftian or Kissingerian view of diplomacy, which is you do diplomacy with countries who otherwise you have problems with, is a better approach to general problems of national security.

AMB. PASCUAL: Let me take two more questions.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, my name is Kay Roy-Ead (phonetic), from NHK, Japanese Public Television.

Should the Democrats take control of at least the House, to what extent do you think we will see a change in foreign policies here? Especially, Mr. O'Hanlon talked about Iraq but also about Iran and North Korea.

Is there going to be any change at all, or as long as President Bush is in power, are we not going to see any change?

AMB. PASCUAL: One more.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, Dave Wood of the *Baltimore Sun*.

One of the things Peter Feaver talked about was that the American people would put up with significant casualties if they thought we were winning. Clearly, we are not winning; President Bush to the contrary, I guess. So my question is: How is that likely

to be played out if the Democrats take the House?

A withdrawal or some kind of extrication seems in the works from Iraq. How much difficulty could the Democrats cause in that process?

You talked about, I think, how bipartisanship should be great. What is the alternative?

AMB. PASCUAL: I am going to throw one other question in the mix as well, John, particularly to you. You had mentioned earlier that the Clintons and the Bushes have studied one another, Rove has studied the Clintons and the Clintons have studied Rove, and we should expect more. In the next Presidential campaign, we should expect the Democrats, especially if Hillary Clinton is the nominee, to utilize more of those Rovian tactics. Does that mean that we can expect a yet more polarizing debate from the Democratic side as well?

What I am going to do is ask each of the three panelists to reflect on the questions that have just been asked or any other issue that you want to comment on. John, let me begin with you.

MR. HARRIS: Sure, I think the two models I described of Clinton Politics and Bush Politics, one that aims to transcend the divisions and unify, even at the expense of blurring the important divisions, or the other that aims to clarify, you are going to see that model in both parties in 2008. The candidates in both parties will find, for different reasons, one model or the other attractive. It is not that strategy belongs to the

Republican Party and one belongs to the Democratic Party.

With respect to national security, where it has been a historical fact that Democrats are on the defensive, it is very difficult to practice Rove Politics. Rove Politics works when you leading with strength, not when you are leading with weakness. Bill Clinton's brand of politics is almost by definition, defensive in a lot of respects. What will be interesting to see is whether Iraq has so reshaped the national security debate that Democrats won't feel the need to be as defensive on it.

I do feel that starting on November 8th, almost irrespective of what happens, although it is almost certain that at least one house will change, that there will a major rethinking of Iraq policy. One sees it already in John Warner's comments and the pending Iraq Study Group. One gets the sense of a Republican establishment or former establishment saying: You know what; we are going to take the wheel for a while.

The reason for that is, ultimately, as Mike said, reality matters. We can talk about politics as a matter of positioning and manipulation of image, but at the end of the day, reality is the most dominant fact in politics and no brand of politics and no strategic model can sustain policy failure. It seems to me there is a hardening consensus in both parties that what we have right now is policy failure.

AMB. PASCUAL: Kurt?

MR. CAMPBELL: First of all, thank you, Carlos for a great job and thank all of you folks for coming. These are great questions.

I think the true answer for both President Bush and for the House and potentially senior leadership is neither side has any idea how they will act after the election. In fact, this idea that there are all these gameplans in motion, I would be very surprised if either side has fundamentally grasped how much the reality is going to change after this election, and I think it is most apparent in the White House. One of the hardest things is to go from a situation where you had an absolute monopoly on power for these nearly seven years and then suddenly to be in a situation where your powers are checked and questioned. Even though President Bush has a history which has often pointed to working extraordinarily well with Democrats in the Texas Legislature, I am not sure that a Schwarzenegger evolution or revolution for him personally is going to be possible. I think it will be difficult for him, personally. I also think that it will be very difficult for Democrats to sincerely want to work in a collegial manner. I think there will be areas of common ground, but I think it will be very difficult, given all that has transpired.

So I wouldn't be at all surprised that the President may be a little bit adrift after the election, at a little bit at a cognitive distance. I think as much as anything else, it is not just going to be just how the Democrats on the Hill treat him; much more important, how the Republicans treat him. Remember, this is the first Presidency since 1952 that at least up until now with the Vice President, there is nothing in the White House structure that instills and requires loyalty from Republicans on the Hill, particularly if this upcoming election goes poorly. You could easily imagine a period where it takes time

to find bearings and figure out.

I don't know if any of you ever meet guys who work in the White House. Mike and we spend time with these guys. It is a little like your own experience because you meet them, and it is like they are living in an aging chamber because the level of stress and pressure is just unimaginable. This is a team with remarkably few changes at the highest level. It is one thing to deal with this as President Clinton did after two years and then make adjustments and then get stronger, essentially, over time. It is quite another to have this come upon you really at the end of your Presidency or near the end, in which it is much more of a fundamental referendum on your accomplishments.

I think it is going to be very hard for the President to adjust. If he does adjust, it is possible that he can escape, as he always talks about, history's judgment. But if Iraq continues to go poorly, if there are tremendous divides between Republicans and Democrats, and Republicans themselves start to distance, I think basically you could find a situation that history and indeed modern politics regards the President and his team quite critically.

I think, unfortunately, because of Iraq, when the question comes up about how will our foreign policy change, I will tell you one way it will not change, and that is the scarcest resource in government and in Washington is not troops or money; it is really the high level attention span of senior officials. Iraq is going to take all the available bandwidth and oxygen out of the room, I would argue, for the next year. So other issues

will not get as much attention like North Korea, China, Middle East peace, global climate change, transatlantic partners, energy security, that they deserve.

AMB. PASCUAL: Thank you.

One of the points implicit in your comments as well is that since President Bush isn't running for re-election, there is a real danger that both Republicans and Democrats will run against the President, certainly on Iraq policy. Then the question becomes: Do politics dominate on both sides or does that create an environment where you can actually have some discussion about the reality because you don't have to pay deference to a President who is running for re-election?

That dynamic still hasn't played itself out.

Mike?

MR. O'HANLON: A lot has been very nicely summarized. I can be brief and hit on a couple of the same points but in a slightly different way.

On North Korea and Iran, I do not expect major changes in policy. I also do not expect major changes in policy on the defense budget debate. I think there may be a little more pressure to increase the size of the Army, but we are at a fairly late date to have that option exercised. I think it has been a mistake that we haven't done that sooner in this ongoing operation, but I don't think we will see a whole lot of change there.

On Iraq policy, I did give the optimistic interpretation which I will be trying to

share with others if this eventuality plays out. But I think a probably more likely scenario is where the Democrats will have to decide if they want to play the trump card or try to play the trump card, what you might call the nuclear option, which is refusing money for 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq with the alternative not being a zeroing out. You can't zero out troop spending in a time of war, but what you can try to do is to imagine a draw-down schedule and fund only enough money to allow that to occur. I think if the Democrats win the House, they are going to have to think hard about whether they want to exercise that option in a legislatively binding way and whether they even can because many Democrats — I will include myself in this option — would be uncomfortable with such an approach — not that I have a vote — especially if it happened before Democrats really tried to help improve the policy.

Now, when George Bush goes out and says Democrats are "defeatocrats" and obviously we are winning, this kind of ridiculous language, polarizing and almost scornful language, doesn't do much to create the possibility of bridges being formed, but I still hope that both sides can find a way to try to come up with a couple or three big ideas in Iraq policy — again, we have a couple in our book that I hope might be of some use — and give it one last push, including with this ultimatum to the Iraqis before we would start envisioning such a mandated draw-down of American forces. Whether Pelosi could even do this, again, within her own caucus and dealing with a possibly still Republican Senate and with Mr. Bush's veto almost all but certain, you are looking at a

likelihood of a confrontation like the shutdown of government confrontation in 1995. Which side will blink first? All sorts of scenarios that John is much more expert to think through than I am could play out here. I think that is going to be, for many people, the fundamental question they have to answer in the first few months of Democratic control of at least one chamber.

AMB. PASCUAL: Mike, Kurt, John, thank you very much. Thank you for your insights.

I think certainly one of the things that has come out of this is at a time like this, the politics, our national politics, are definitely going to make the management of an effective foreign policy even more complicated than it is. The issues are complicated enough, given the substance that we are trying to deal with, and thank you for the constructive thoughts you have all put on the table.

[Applause.]

(END OF RECORDED SEGMENT.)

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